consti law 1

7/28/2019 CONSTI LAW 1

1/20

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Political Law Ex Officio Officials EO 284

On 25 July 1987, Cory issued EO 284 which allows members of the Cabinet, their

undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions inaddition to their primary positions subject to limitations set therein. The CLU excepted this EO

averring that such law is unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is being challenged by

CLU on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13, Art 7 other than those

provided in the Constitution; CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase unless otherwise provided

in this Constitution, the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in

Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (i) The Vice-President may be

appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of

Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.

HELD: Sec 13, Art 7 provides:

Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or

assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or

employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly

practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any

contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any

subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled

corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of

their office.

It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President, members of

the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure multiple offices or

employment in the government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as

above clarified with respect to posts held without additional compensation in an ex-officio

capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of their office, the citation

of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as examples during the debate and deliberation on

the general rule laid down for all appointive officials should be considered as mere personal

opinions which cannot override the constitutions manifest intent and the peoples

understanding thereof. In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7,

par. (2), Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the

number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold

in addition to their primary position to not more than 2 positions in the government andgovernment corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment

in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution

prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.


2/20

GONZALES vs. COMELEC

Constitutional Law Political Question vs Justiciable Question

Facts: ?

One of the issues raised in this case was the validity of the submission of certain proposed

constitutional amendments at a plebiscite scheduled on the same day as the regular elections.

Petitioners argued that this was unlawful as there would be no proper submission of the

proposal to the people who would be more interested in the issues involved in the election. It

was contended that such issue cannot be properly raised before the courts because it is a

political one.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issue involves a political question.

HELD:Pursuant to Art 15 of the 35 Constitution, SC held that there is nothing in this provision

to indicate that the election therein referred to is a special, not a general election. The

circumstance that the previous amendment to the Constitution had been submitted to the

people for ratification in special elections merely shows that Congress deemed it best to do so

under the circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed

amendments for ratification in general elections. The SC also noted that if what is placed in

question or if the crux of the problem is the validity of an act then the same would be or the

issue would be considered as a justiciable question NOT a political one.
http://www.uberdigests.info/2011/09/political-question-vs-justiciable-question/http://www.uberdigests.info/2011/09/political-question-vs-justiciable-question/


3/20

IMBONG vs COMELEC

September 11, 1970

RA 6132: delegates in ConCon

(Contitutional Law 1)

Petitioner: Imbong

Respondents: Ferrer (Comelec Chair), Patajo, Miraflor (Comelec Members)

Petitioner: Gonzales

Respondent : Comelec

Ponente: Makasiar

RELATED LAWS:

Resolution No 2 (1967)

Calls for Constitutional Convention to be composed of 2

delegates from each representative district who shall be elected in November, 1970.

RA 4919 implementation of Resolution No 2

Resolution 4 (1969) amended Resolution 2: ConCon shall be composed of 320

delegates approportioned among existing representative districts according to the

population. Provided that each district shall be entitled to 2 deledates.RA 6132 Concon Act 1970, repealed RA 4919, implemented Res No. 2 & 4.

Sec 4: considers all public officers/employees as resigned when they file their

candicacy

Sec 2: apportionment of delegates

Sec 5: Disqualifies any elected delegate from running for any public office in the

election or from assuming any appointive office/position until the final adournment of the

ConCon. Par 1 Sec 8: ban against all political parties/organized groups from giving

support/representing a delegate to the convention.

FACTS:

This is a petition for declaratory judgment. These are 2 separate but relatedpetitions of running candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention

assailing the validity of RA 6132. Gonzales: Sec, 2, 4, 5 and Par 1 Sec 8, and validity of entire law

Imbong: Par 1 Sec 8

ISSUE: Whether the Congress has a right to call for ConCon and whether the

parameters set by such a call is constitutional.

HOLDING: The Congress has the authority to call for a Constitutional Convention as

a Constituent Assembly. Furthermore, specific provisions assailed by the petitioners

are deemed as constitutional.

y

Sec 4 RA 6132: it is simply an application of Sec 2 Art 12 of Constitution

y

Constitutionality of enactment of RA 6132: Congress acting as Constituent Assembly, has full

authority to propose amendments, or call for convention for the purpose by votes and these

votes were attained by Res 2 and 4

Y


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Sec 2 RA 6132: it is a mere implementation of Res 4 and is enough that the

basis employed for such apportions is reasonable. Macias case relied by

Gonsales is not reasonable for that case granted more representatives to

provinces with less population and vice versa. In this case, Batanes is equal

to the number of delegates I other provinces with more population.

y

Sec 5: State has right to create office and parameters to qualify/disqualify

members thereof. Furthermore, this disqualification is only temporary. This

is a safety mechanism to prevent political figures from controlling elections

and to allow them to devote more time to the Concon.

y

Par 1 Sec 8: this is to avoid debasement of electoral process and also to

assure candidates equal opportunity since candidates must now depend on

their individual merits, and not the support of political parties. This

provision does not create discrimination towards any particular

party/group, it applies to all organizations


5/20

BAUTISTA vs. SALONGA

Facts: ?

On 27 Aug 1987, Cory designated Bautista as the Acting Chairwoman of CHR. In December of the

same year, Cory made the designation of Bautista permanent. The CoA, ignoring the decision in

the Mison case, averred that Bautista cannot take her seat w/o their confirmation. Cory,

through the Exec Sec, filed with the CoA communications about Bautistas appointment on 14

Jan 1989. Bautista refused to be placed under the CoAs review hence she filed a petition before

the SC. On the other hand, Mallillin invoked EO 163-A stating that since CoA refused Bautistas

appointment, Bautista should be removed. EO 163-A provides that the tenure of the Chairman

and the Commissioners of the CHR should be at the pleasure of the President.

ISSUE: Whether or not Bautistas appointment is subject to CoAs confirmation.

HELD: Since the position of Chairman of the CHR is not among the positions mentioned in the

first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. 7 of the 1987 Constitution, appointments to which are to be made

with the confirmation of the CoA it follows that the appointment by the President of the

Chairman of the CHR is to be made without the review or participation of the CoA. To be more

precise, the appointment of the Chairman and Members of the CHR is not specifically provided

for in the Constitution itself, unlike the Chairmen and Members of the CSC, the CoE and the

COA, whose appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution in the President with the

consent of the CoA. The President appoints the Chairman and Members of the CHR pursuant to

the second sentence in Sec 16, Art. 7, that is, without the confirmation of the CoA because they

are among the officers of government whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to

appoint. And Sec 2(c), EO 163 authorizes the President to appoint the Chairman and Members

of the CHR.

Because of the fact that the president submitted to the CoA on 14 Jan 1989 the appointment ofBautista, the CoA argued that the president though she has the sole prerogative to make CHR

appointments may from time to time ask confirmation with the CoA. This is untenable according

to the SC. The Constitution has blocked off certain appointments for the President to make with

the participation of the Commission on Appointments, so also has the Constitution mandated

that the President can confer no power of participation in the Commission on Appointments

over other appointments exclusively reserved for her by the Constitution. The exercise of

political options that finds no support in the Constitution cannot be sustained. Further, EVEN IF

THE PRESIDENT MAY VOLUNTARILY SUBMIT TO THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS AN

APPOINTMENT THAT UNDER THE CONSTITUTION SOLELY BELONGS TO HER, STILL, THERE WAS

NO VACANCY TO WHICH AN APPOINTMENT COULD BE MADE ON 14 JANUARY 1989. There can

be no ad interim appointments in the CHR for the appointment thereto is not subject to CoAsconfirmation. Appointments to the CHr is always permanent in nature.

The provisions of EO 163-A is unconstitutional and cannot be invoked by Mallillin. The Chairman

and the Commissioners of the CHR cannot be removed at the pleasure of the president for it is

constitutionally guaranteed that they must have a term of office.


6/20


7/20

TOLENTINO vs. COMELEC

FACTS:

The case is a petition for prohibition to restrain respondent Commission on Elections "from

undertaking to hold a plebiscite on November 8, 1971," at which the proposed constitutional

amendment "reducing the voting age" in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution of the

Philippines to eighteen years "shall be, submitted" for ratification by the people pursuant to

Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971, and the subsequent

implementing resolutions, by declaring said resolutions to be without the force and effect of law

for being violative of the Constitution of the Philippines. The Constitutional Convention of 1971

came into being by virtue of two resolutions of the Congress of the Philippines approved in its

capacity as a constituent assembly convened for the purpose of calling a convention to propose

amendments to the Constitution namely, Resolutions 2 and 4 of the joint sessions of Congress

held on March 16, 1967 and June 17, 1969 respectively. The delegates to the said Convention

were all elected under and by virtue of said resolutions and the implementing legislation

thereof, Republic Act 6132.

ISSUE:

Is it within the powers of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 to order the holding of a

plebiscite for the ratification of the proposed amendment/s.

HELD: The Court holds that all amendments to be proposed must be submitted to the people in

a single "election" or plebiscite. We hold that the plebiscite being called for the purpose of

submitting the same for ratification of the people on November 8, 1971 is not authorized by

Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, hence all acts of the Convention and the respondentComelec in that direction are null and void. lt says distinctly that either Congress sitting as a

constituent assembly or a convention called for the purpose "may propose amendments to this

Constitution,". The same provision also as definitely provides that "such amendments shall be

valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at

which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification," thus leaving no room

for doubt as to how many "elections" or plebiscites may be held to ratify any amendment or

amendments proposed by the same constituent assembly of Congress or convention, and the

provision unequivocably says "an election" which means only one.

The petition herein is granted. Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of

1971 and the implementing acts and resolutions of the Convention, insofar as they provide for

the holding of a plebiscite on November 8, 1971, as well as the resolution of the respondent

Comelec complying therewith (RR Resolution No. 695) are hereby declared null and void. The

respondents Comelec, Disbursing Officer, Chief Accountant and Auditor of the Constitutional

Convention are hereby enjoined from taking any action in compliance with the said organic

resolution. In view of the peculiar circumstances of this case, the Court declares this decision

immediately executory. No costs

.


8/20

JAVELLANA vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Facts: ?

In 1973, Marcos ordered the immediate implementation of the new 1973 Constitution.

Javellana, a Filipino and a registered voter sought to enjoin the Exec Sec and other cabinet

secretaries from implementing the said constitution. Javellana averred that the said constitution

is void because the same was initiated by the president. He argued that the president is w/o

power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed constitution. Further,

the election held to ratify such constitution is not a free election there being intimidation and

fraud.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must give due course to the petition.

HELD: The SC ruled that they cannot rule upon the case at bar. Majority of the SC justices

expressed the view that they were concluded by the ascertainment made by the president of

the Philippines, in the exercise of his political prerogatives. Further, there being no competent

evidence to show such fraud and intimidation during the election, it is to be assumed that the

people had acquiesced in or accepted the 1973 Constitution. The question of the validity of the

1973 Constitution is a political question which was left to the people in their sovereign capacity

to answer. Their ratification of the same had shown such acquiescence.


9/20

DE LEON vs. ESGUERRA

Facts:

Alfredo de Leon won as barangay captain and other petitioners won as councilmen of barangay

dolores, taytay, rizal. On february 9, 1987, de leon received memo antedated december 1, 1986signed by OIC Gov. Benhamin Esguerra, february 8, 1987, designating Florentino Magno, as new

captain by authority of minister of local government and similar memo signed february 8, 1987,

designated new councilmen.

Issue:

Whether or not designation of successors is valid.

Held:

No, memoranda has no legal effect.

1. Effectivity of memoranda should be based on the date when it was signed. So, February 8,

1987 and not December 1, 1986.

2. February 8, 1987, is within the prescribed period. But provisional constitution was no longer

in efffect then because 1987 constitution has been ratified and its transitory provision, Article

XVIII, sec. 27 states that all previous constitution were suspended.

3. Constitution was ratified on February 2, 1987. Thus, it was the constitution in effect.

Petitioners now acquired security of tenure until fixed term of office for barangay officials has

been fixed. Barangay election act is not inconsistent with constitution.


10/20

SANIDAD vs. COMELEC

Facts:

O n 2 S e p t e m b e r 1 9 7 6 , P r e s i d e n t F e r d i n a n d E . M a r c o s i s s u e d

P D 9 9 1 c a l l i n g f o r a n a t i o n a l referendum on 16 October 1976 for the Citizens

Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its

replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the

period for the exercise by the President of his present powers. On 22 September 1976, the

President issued another PD 1031, amending the previous Presidential Decree 991, by declaring

the provisions of Presiden tial Decree 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of

votes in "barangays" (Citizens Assemblies) applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite

of 16 October 1976. The President also issued PD 1033, stating the questions to be submitted

to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on 16 October 1976. The Decree

recites in its "whereas" clauses that the people's continued opposition to the

convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire to have such

body abol ished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a

new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the

referendum-plebiscite of October 16. The Commission on Elections was vested with theexclusive supervision and control of the October 1976

National Referendum-Plebiscite.

P a b l o C . S a n i d a d a n d P a b l i t o V. S a n i d a d , f a t h e r a n d s o n ,

c o m m e n c e d f o r P r o h i b i t i o n w i t h P r e l i m i n a r y I n j u n c t i o n s e e k i n g t o e n j o i n

the COMELEC from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October

16; to declare without force and effect PD 991, 1033 and 1031. They contend that under the

1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to

exe rc is e the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution.

On 30 September 1976, another action for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction, wasinstituted by Vicente M. Guzman, a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional

Convention, asserting that the power to propose amendments to, or revision of the

Constitution during the transition period is expressly conferred o n t h e i n t e r i m

N a t i o n a l A s s e m b l y u n d e r a c t i o n 1 6 , A r t i c l e X V I I o f

t h e Constitution. Another petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction was filed by Raul

M. Gonzales, his son, and Alfredo Salapantan, to restrain the implementation of Presidential

Decrees.

Issue:

W/N the President may call upon a referendum for the amendment of the Constitution.

Held:

Section 1 of Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains that "(1) Any

amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by the National Assembly upon

a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or by a constitutional convention. (2)

The National Assembly may, by a vote of two -thirds of all its Members, call a

constitutional convention or, by a majority vote of all its Members, submit the question of calling

such a convention to the electorate in an election." Section 2 thereof provides that "Any

amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the


11/20

votes c a s t i n a p l e b i s c i t e w h i c h s h a l l b e h e l d n o t l a t e r t h a n

t h r e e m o n t h s a a f t e r t h e a p p r o v a l o f s u c h amendment or revision."

In the present period of transition, the interim National Assembly instituted in

the Transitory Provisions is conferred w ith that amending power.

Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions reads "The interim National Assembly,

upon special call by the interim Prime Minister, may, by a majority vote of all its Members,

propose amendments to this Constitution. Such amendments shall take effect when ratified in

accordance with Article 16 hereof." There are, therefore, two periods contemplated in the

constitutional l i fe of the nation: period ofnormalcy and period of transition.

In times of normalcy, the amending process may be initiated by the proposals of

the (1) regular National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or (2) by

aConstitutional Convention cal led by a vote of two -thirds of al l the Members of

the National Assembly. However the cal l ing of a Constitutional Convention may

b e s u b mi tte d to th e e l e ctorate i n an e l e ct i on v ote d u p on b y a major i ty

v o t e o f a l l t h e m e m b e r s o f t h e N a t i o n a l A s s e m b l y . I n t i m e s o f

trans i t ion amendments may be proposed by a majori ty vote of a l l the

Membe rs of the interim National Assembly upon special call by the interim Prime Minister.

The Court in Aquino v. COMELEC, had already settled that the incumbent President is

vested with that prerogative of discretion as to when he shall initially convene

the interim National Assembly. The Constitutional Convention intended to leave to the

President the determination of the time when he shall initially convene the interim

Nationa l Ass embly, co nsistent with the prevail i ng c onditi ons of pe ace and order in

the country.

When the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention voted on the Transitory Provisions,

they were aware of the fact that under the same, the incumbent President was given the

discretion as to when he could convene the interim National Assembly. ThePresident's decision to defer the convening of the interim National Assembly soon

found support from the people themselves. In th e pl eb is ci te of Ja nu ar y 10-15, 1973, at

which the ratification of the 1973 Constitution was submitted, the people voted

against the convening of the interim National Assembly. In the referendum of 2 4 J u l y

1 9 7 3 , t h e C i t i z e n s A s s e m b l i e s ( " b a g a n g a y s " ) r e i t e r a t e d t h e i r

s o v e r e i g n w i l l t o w i t h h o l d t h e convening of the interim National Assembly. Again,

in the referendum of 27 February 1975, the proposed question of whether the interim

National Assembly shal l be initial ly convened was el iminated, because some of

the members of Congress and delegates of the Constitutional Convention, who

we re de em ed a u t o m a t i c a l l y m e m b e r s o f t h e i n t e r i m N a t i o n a l

A s s e m b l y , w e r e a g a i n s t i t s i n c l u s i o n s i n c e i n t h a t referendum of January,

1973 the people had already resolved against it. In sensu striciore, when the legislative arm of

the state undertakes the proposals of amendment to a Constitution, that body is not in

the usual function of lawmaking. It is not legis lating when engaged in the

amending process. Rather, i t is exercis ing a pecul iar power bestowed upon it

by the fundame ntal charter itself .

In the Phi l ippines, that power is provided for in Article XVI of the1973

Constitution (for the regular National Assembly) or in Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions (for


12/20


13/20

DEFENSOR SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 127325 - March 19, 1997)

Facts:

P r i v a t e r e s p o n d e n t A t t y . J e s u s D e l f i n , p r e s i d e n t o f

P e o p l e s I n i t i a t i v e f o r R e f o r m s , Modernization and Action (PIRMA), filed

with COMELEC a petition to amend the constitution to lift the term limits of elective officials,

through Peoples Initiative. He based this petition on Article XVII, Sec. 2 of the 1987

Constitution, which provides for the right of the people to exercise the power

to directly propose amendments to the Constitution. Subsequently the

COMELEC issued an order directing the publ ication of the petit ion and of the

notice of hearing and thereafter set the case forhearing. At the hearing, Senator

Roco, the IBP, Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon, Public Interest Law Center, and

Laban ng Demokratikong Pi l ipino appeared as intervenors -oppositors. Senator

Roco filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition on the ground that one which is cognizable by

the COMELEC. The petitioners herein Senator Santiago, Alexander Padi l la, and

Isabel Ongpin f i led this civi l action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules

of Court against COMELEC and the Delfin petition rising the several arguments, such asthe following: (1) The constitutional provision on p e o p l e s i n i t i a t i v e t o a m e n d t h e

c o n s t i t u t i o n c a n o n l y b e i m p l e m e n t e d b y l a w t o be p a s s e d b y

Congress. No such law has been passed; (2) The peoples initiative is limited to amendments to

the Constitution, not to revision thereo f. Li ft ing of the term l imits constitutes a

revision, therefore it is outside the power of peoples initiative. The Supreme Court

granted the Motions for Intervention.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.

(2) Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the conduct of

initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law ofspecific provisions on the conduct of such initiative.

(3) Whether the l i ft ing of term l imits of elective off icials would constitute a

revision or an amendment of the Constitution.

Held: S e c . 2 , A r t X V I I o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n i s n o t s e l f e x e c u t o r y , t h u s ,

w i t h o u t i m p l e m e n t i n g legislation the same cannot operate. Although the Constitution

has recognized or granted the right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress does not provide

for its implementation. The portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 which prescribes rules and

regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void. It has been

an established rule that w h at h a s b e e n d e l e ga te d , ca n n o t b e d e l e ga te d

( p o t e s t a s d e l e g a t a n o n d e l e g a r i p o t e s t ) . T h e d ele gat io n o f t he po we r

to the COMELEC being inval id, the latter cannot val idly promulgate rules and

regulations to implement the exercise of the right to peoples initiative. T h e l i f t i n g o f t h e

t e r m l i m i t s w a s h e l d t o b e t h a t o f a r e v i s i o n , a s i t w o u l d a f f e c t

o t h e r provisions of the Constitution such as the synchronization of elections, the

constitutional guarantee of equal access to opportunities for public service, and

prohibiting political dynasties. A revision cannot be done by initiative. However,

considering the Courts decision in the above Issue, the issue of whether or not the petition is a

revision or amendment has become academic.


14/20

LAMBINO vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 174153, Oct. 25, 2006

(CARPIO, J.)

Requirements for Initiative Petition

Constitutional Amendment vs. Constitutional Revision

Tests to determine whether amendment or revision

FACTS:

The Lambino Group commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change

the 1987 Constitution and then filed a petition with COMELEC to hold a plebiscite for

ratification under Sec. 5(b) and (c) and Sec. 7 of RA 6735. The proposed changes under the

petition will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form

of government. COMELEC did not give it due course for lack of an enabling law governing

initiative petitions to amend the Constitution, pursuant to Santiago v. Comelec ruling

ISSUES:

Whether or not the proposed changes constitute an amendment or revision Whether or not the initiative petition is sufficient compliance with the constitutional

requirement on direct proposal by the people

RULING:

Initiative petition does not comply with Sec. 2, Art. XVII on direct proposal by people

Sec.2, Art. XVII...is the governing provision that allows a peoples initiative to propose

amendments to the Constitution. While this provision does not expressly state that the

petition must set forth the full text of the proposed amendments, the deliberations of the

framers of our Constitution clearly show that: (a) the framers intended to adopt relevant

American jurisprudence on peoples initiative; and (b) in particular, the people must first seethe

full text of the proposed amendments before they sign, and that the people must sign ona petition containing such full text.

The essence of amendments directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a

petition is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two

essential elements must be present.

2 elements of initiative

1. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or

representative can sign on their behalf.

2.Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.

These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is

first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a

petition. The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the

petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must stated the fact of such

attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the several millions of signatories to the

petition had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before not after signing.

Moreover, an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the nature and effect

of that which is proposed and failure to do so is deceptive and misleading which renders the

initiative void.


15/20

In the case of the Lambino Groups petition, theres not a single word, phrase, or sentence of

text of the proposed changes in the signature sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state that

the text of the proposed changes is attached to it. The signature sheet merely asks a question

whether the people approve a shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-

Parliamentary system of government. The signature sheet does not show to the people the draft

of the proposed changes before they are asked to sign the signature sheet. This omission is fatal.

An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the people

the full text of the proposed amendments is most likely a deception, and can operate as a

gigantic fraud on the people. Thats why the Constitution requires that an initiative must be

directly proposed by the people x x x in a petition - meaning that the people must sign on a

petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. On so vital an issue as

amending the nations fundamental law, the writing of the text of the proposed

amendments cannot be hidden from the people under a general or special power of

attorney to unnamed, faceless, and unelected individuals.

The initiative violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution disallowing revision through

initiatives article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the Constitution.

The first mode is through Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its Members. The second

mode is through a constitutional convention. The third mode is through a peoples initiative.

Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies to any amendment to,

or revision of, this Constitution. In contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII, referring to the third

mode, applies only to amendments to this Constitution. This distinction was intentional as

shown by the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. A peoples initiative to change the

Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and not to its revision. In

contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both amendments and revisions

to the Constitution.

Does the Lambino Groups initiative constitute a revision of the Constitution?Yes. By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a

Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of the Office of the President and the

abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere

amendment.

Amendment vs. Revision

Courts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment and a revision of a

constitution. Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the

constitution, like altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of checks-and-

balances. There is also revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the

constitution, as when the change affects substantial provisions of the constitution. On the

other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without

altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of the

constitution, while amendment generally affects only the specific provision being amended.

Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the Constitution without

affecting any other section or article, the change may generally be considered an amendment

and not a revision. For example, a change reducing the voting age from 18years to 15 years is an

amendment and not a revision.


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Similarly, a change reducing Filipino ownership of mass media companies from 100% to

60% is an amendment and not a

revision.

Also, a change requiring a college degree as an additional qualification for election

to the Presidency is an amendment and not a revision. The changes in these examples do not

entail any modification of sections or articles of the Constitution other than the specific

provision being amended. These changes do not also affect the structure of government or the

system of checks-and-balances among or within the three branches.

However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment or a

revision. A change in a single word of one sentence of the Constitution may be a revision and

not an amendment. For example, the substitution of the word republican with monarchic or

theocratic in Section 1, Article II of the Constitution radically overhauls the entire structure

of government and the fundamental ideological basis of the Constitution. Thus, each specific

change will have to be examined case-by-case, depending on how it affects other provisions,

as well as how it affects the structure of government, the carefully crafted system of checks-

and-balances, and the underlying ideological basis of the existing Constitution.

Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or several provisions of a

constitution, a deliberative body with recorded proceedings is best suited to undertake a

revision. A revision requires harmonizing not only several provisions, but also the altered

principles with those that remain unaltered. Thus, constitutions normally authorize

deliberative bodies like constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions to undertake

revisions. On the other hand, constitutions allow peoples initiatives, which do not have fixed

&identifiable deliberative bodies or recorded proceedings, to undertake only amendments &

not revisions.

Tests to determine whether amendment or revisionIn California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the

constitution just like in our Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test: the

quantitative test and the qualitative test. The quantitative test asks whether the proposed

change is so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the substantial entirety of the

constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions. The court

examines only the number of provisions affected and does not consider the degree of the

change.

The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the

constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will accomplish such far reaching

changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision. Whether

there is an alteration in the structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus, a

change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan includes change in its fundamental

framework or the fundamental powers of its Branches. A change in the nature of the basic

governmental plan also includes changes that jeopardize the traditional form of government &

the system of check and balances

Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Groups initiative is a

revision &Not merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Groups proposed changes

overhaul two articles - Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive -affecting a

total of 105 provisions in the entire Constitution. Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter


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substantially the basic plan of government, from presidential to

parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.

A change in the structure of government is a revision

A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the

three great co-equal branches of government in the present Constitution are reduced into two.

This alters the separation of powers in the Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-

Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution.

Merging the legislative and executive branches is a radical change in the structure of

government. The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of Executive

Power alters the separation of powers and thus constitutes a revision of the Constitution.

Likewise, the abolition alone of one chamber of Congress alters the system of checks-and-

balances within the legislature and constitutes a revision of the Constitution.

The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between amendment and revision is

only one of procedure, not of substance. The Lambino Group posits that when a deliberative

body drafts and proposes changes to the Constitution, substantive changes are called revisions

because members of the deliberative body work full-time on the changes. The same substantivechanges, when proposed through an initiative, are called amendments because the changes are

made by ordinary people who do not make an occupation, profession, or vocation out of such

endeavor. The SC, however, ruled that the express intent of the framers and the plain language

of the Constitution contradict the Lambino Groups theory. Where the intent of the framers and

the language of the Constitution are clear and plainly stated, courts do not deviate from such

categorical intent and language.


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PAMATONG vs. COMELEC

FACTS:

Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent

COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage a

nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a

registered political party with a national constituency.

Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the

COMELEC violated his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section

26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to

those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties.

The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the

presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the

office of the president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous

national organizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an internationalcampaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of government.

ISSUE:

Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office?

RULING:

No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege subject to

limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level

of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggestssuch a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort.

The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled

"Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally

considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different

treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II,

the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely

specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not

give rise to any cause of action before the courts.

Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that

would accommodate as many people as possible into public office. Moreover, the provision as

written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is

difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective

means and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be

subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended. Words and phrases such as

"equal access," "opportunities," and "public service" are susceptible to countless interpretations

owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to inflict

on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights


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may be sourced.

The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations.

Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the

provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates. As long as the limitations

apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not

violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are

meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar,

there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they

create.

The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of

candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The

State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and

orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical considerations in

conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the

opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and

resources in preparation for the election. The organization of an election with bona fidecandidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates with no serious

intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the electoral process.

This is not to mention the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-

note joke. The poll body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the

electoral process, most probably posed at the instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be

a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.

The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The

basis of the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the

reception of further evidence is in order. The SC remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of

further evidence, to determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is anuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Obiter Dictum: One of Pamatong's contentions was that he was an international lawyer and is

thus more qualified compared to the likes of Erap, who was only a high school dropout. Under

the Constitution (Article VII, Section 2), the only requirements are the following: (1) natural-born

citizen of the Philippines; (2) registered voter; (3) able to read and write; (4) at least forty years

of age on the day of the election; and (5) resident of the Philippines for at least ten years

immediately preceding such election.

consti law 1

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