consti law i review notes (montejo()-4

8/21/2019 Consti Law i Review Notes (Montejo()-4

1/73

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IRIZADA, RESCI ANGELLI

JUDICIAL ELABORATION OF THE CONSTITUTION

A. CONSTRUCTION

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL V. GSIS- a consti provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability

imposed are fixed by the constitution itself.- A provision which lays down only general principles (article 2) are NOT self-executing.- Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a consti mandate, the

presumption is that all provisions of the consti are self-executing.- National economy and patrimony: QUALIFIED FILIPINOS ARE PREFERRED.- STATE ACTION—the acts of a person distinct from the government are considered STATE

ACTION covered by the constitution (1) when the activity it engages is in a ‘public function’; (2)when the government is so significantly involved with the private actor as to make thegovernment responsible for his action and (3) when the government has approved or authorizedthe action.

DOMINO V. COMELEC- The Constitution is not a document reserved only for scholarly disqualification by the most

eminent legal minds of the land—its contents and words should be interpreted in the senseunderstood by the ordinary men and women who place their lives on the line in its defense andwho pin their hopes for a better life on its fulfillment. [Domino vs. Commission on Elections, 310SCRA 546(1999)]

PAMATONG V. COMELEC- The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing, and there is no

plausible reason for according a different treatment to the “equal access” provision. Like the restof the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceableconstitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. Thedisregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts. [Pamatongvs. Commission on Elections, 427 SCRA 96(2004)]

TONDO MEDICAL V. CA- a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution are considered self-executing, and do not requirefuture legislation for their enforcement. For if they are not treated as self-executing, the mandateof the fundamental law can be easily nullified by the inaction of Congress. However, someprovisions have already been categorically declared by this Court as non self-executing.

- Examples of non-self-executing:1. sections found under Article II of the 1987 Constitution2. Sections 11, 12, and 13 of Article II;3. Section 13 of Article XIII; and4. Section 2 of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution are not self-executing provisions.5. Section 1 of Article XIII and6. Section 2 of Article XIV of the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially

enforceable rights.

These provisions, which merely lay down a general principle, are distinguished from otherconstitutional provisions as non selfexecuting and, therefore, cannot give rise to a cause ofaction in the courts; they do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights.

- constitutional provisions which are statements of principles and policies are mere directivesaddressed to the executive and the legislative departments—if unheeded, the remedy will not liewith the courts but rather, the electorate’s displeasure may be manifested in their votes.

SERRANO V. GALLANT MARITIME


2/73


- The non-impairment clause under Section 10, Article II of the Constitution is limited in applicationto laws about to be enacted that would in any way derogate from existing acts or contracts byenlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the intention of the parties thereto.—Theprohibition is aligned with the general principle that laws newly enacted have only a prospectiveoperation, and cannot affect acts or contracts already perfected; however, as to laws already inexistence, their provisions are read into contracts and deemed a part thereof. [Serrano vs.

Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., 582 SCRA 254(2009)]

MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS - RESIDUAL POWERS;- constitution is understood as providing for the LIMITATIONS OF state powers and NOT grant of

power.

KIDA V. SENATE - president can appoint OICs based on his RESIDUAL POWERS; executive power to implement

and execute the law- ra 10153 is NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL- synchronization is a recognized consti mandate. This can be gleaned from the transitory

provisions of the consti.

- B.Autonomy in the ARMMIt is further argued that while synchronization may be constitutionally mandated, it cannot be usedto defeat or to impede the autonomy that the Constitution granted to the ARMM. Phrased in thismanner, one would presume that there exists a conflict between two recognized Constitutionalmandates—synchronization and regional autonomy—such that it is necessary to choose oneover the other.We find this to be an erroneous approach that violates a basic principle in constitutionalconstruction—ut magis valeat quam pereat: that the Constitution is to be interpreted as awhole,81 and one mandate should not be given importance over the other except where theprimacy of one over the other is clear.8 [Kida vs. Senate of the Philippines, 659 SCRA 270(2011)]

- ARMM elections should be included among the term 'local election'. A basic rule in constitutional

construction is that the words used should be understood in the sense that they have in commonuse and given their ordinary meaning, except when technical terms are employed, in which casethe significance thus attached to them prevails. [Kida vs. Senate of the Philippines, 659 SCRA270(2011)]

- PRESIDENTS CERTIFICATION ON URGENCY OF RA 10153o Presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also of

reading the bill on separate days.o purpose of the rule dapat: (1) to inform legislators of matters they shall vote on and (2) to

give then notice that a measure is in progress through the enactment process

- RA9333 and RA 10153 DO NOT AMEND RA 9054 as they did not change or revise any provisionin the latter law; they merely filled the gap or supplemented the law by providing the date of thesubsequent regular elections.

- EVEN ASSUMING THEY AMENDED 9054, the supermajority voting required (2/3) has to bestruck down for giving 9054 the character of an irrepealable law by requiring more than what theconsti demands. (REMEMBER: under section 16 (2), article 6 of consti--'majority of each houseshall constitute a quorum to do business. as long as majority of the members of the house orsenate are present, these bodies have quorum needed to conduct business and hold session.)incontrast, the provision in 9054 requiring 2/3 vote is HIGHER than what consti provides forpassage of bills and thereby SERVES TO RESTRAIN PLEANARY POWER OF CONGRESS toamend/revise/repeal the laws passed.


3/73


- OPTIONS DAW TO SYNCHRONIZE ARMM ELECTIONS(1) hold over(2) call special elections and(3) authorize president to appoint OICs

- INTERIM MEASURES!i.e. those transitory measures involving transition from old constitution to

the new and for the introduction of new concepts; creation of LGUs

- HOLDOVER OPTION IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL: Section 8, article 10 provides that the term ofoffice of elective local officials shall be 3 years and no such official shall serve for more than 3consecutive terms. since elective arrm officials are local officials, they are covered and bound bythe 3 year limit prescribed by the constitution. they cannot extend their term thru holdover.

- principle: where the consti has itself made a determination or given its mandate--then such mattershould be respected. none of teh 3 branches can deviate from such only as teh consti itself mayallow.

- further, to claim that the holdover is effectively another term mandated by congress--constitutionally infirm because congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly. it cannot

act in way that would effectively extend the term of incumbents. congress CANNOT create a newterm and appoint the occupant. this is an act of appointment by congress and is thus anUNCONSTI INTRUSION into the consti appointment power of present.

- COMELEC HAS NO AUTHORITY TO ORDER SPECIAL ELECTIONSThe power to fix date of elections is essentially LEGISLATIVE in nature.when congress acted in postponing armm 2011 elections, it has made a POLICY DEICSION inthe exercise of its legislative wisdom that it shall not call special elections as an adjustmentmeasure in synchronizing armm elections. after it has so acted, neither executive nor judiciarycan act to the contrary by ordering special elections at the call of comelec. it cannot do sobecause court has no power to declare act of congress null and void and to supplant the decisionof congress to mandate what it should have done in the exercise of its legislative powers.further, comelec has NO POWER TO CALL FOR HOLDING of special elections unless pursuant

to a specific statutory grant.

- COURT HAS NO POWER TO SHORTEN TERM OF ELECTIVE OFFICIALSThe power to fix term of office of elective officials (exercised only in case of barangay officials) isgiven to congress as provided by the constitution. TERMS FIXED BY CONSTI cannot bechanged by mere statute. congress, court has NO AUTHORITY to fix terms of elective localofficials in the armm for less or more than the constitutionally mandated 3 years.

- PRESIDENTS POWER TO APPOINT OICS4 instances where president can appoint

o heads of exec departments, ambassadors, other public min and consuls, AFPofficers, other appointment are vested by consti

o all other officers whose apps not provided by lawo those whom PRESIDENT MAY BE AUTHORIZED BY LAW TO APPOINTo lower in rank officers whose app the congress may by law vest in president alone.

- pres authority to appoint OIC emanate from ra 101433 and so it falls on the 3rd group.

- RA 10153 only provides for synchronization of elections and for the interim measures that must inthe meanwhile PREVAIL. it is purely and simply an INTERIM MEASURE responding to theadjustments that synchronization requires. synchronization may temporarily disrupt the electionprocess as well as community's choice of leaders but this will take place under a situation ofNECESSITY and as an interim measure in the manner that interim measures have been adopted


4/73


and used in the creation of LGU and the adjustments of sub provinces to the status of provinces.besides, it is REASONABLE.

- CA 588 and RAC of 1987 PROVIDES THT president is empowered to make temp apps in casevacancy may occur. while this deal only with filling of vacancies in appointive positions, however,in the ABSENCE OF ANY CONTRARY PROVISION in the LGC and in the interest of public

service, we see no cogent reason why procedure thus outlined by 2 laws may not be similarlyapplied in the present case.

- a vacancy creates an anomalous situation. By leaving the positions vacant for 21 months wouldclearly cause DISRUPTIONS AND DELASY IN TEH DELIVERY OF BASIC SERVICES to thepeople, in the proper management of the affairs of the regional govt, and in responding to criticaldevelopments that may arise.

- allowing president in the exercise of his consti-recognized appointment power to appoint OICs isa REASONABLE measure to take.

- on construction of the law : provision must be construed not only to address problems of presentmust also to address the uncertainties or vagaries of the future

TANADA V. ANGARA- perfectionist provisions of the municipal statutes of all member states should give way to teh

globalization of trade. section 10 of art. 12 must be interpreted to mean not what is only requiredin 1987 when it was enacted but also, it must be able to address the uncertainties of the future(when it was raised in 2000)

JUDICIAL REVIEW

- Based on SEPARATION OF POWERS, system of checks and balances and Interdependenceamong government

ANGARA V. ELECTORAL COMMISSION

- Supremacy of the constitution or JUDICIAL SUPREMEACY- SC has the power or task to determine who between the EC or congress has power under theconstitution.

- when SC exercises judicial review, it is not acting supreme over the other branches but it isperforming a duty required of it under the constitution, it being the supreme authority in the land.

TAWANG MPC V. LA TRINIDAD- The Supreme Court’s power of review does not permit it to rewrite Presidential Decree (P.D.) 198

in a subsequent case and breathe life to its dead provisions—only Congress can.—Since theCourt, exercising itsConstitutional power of judicial review, has declared Section 47 of P.D. 198void and unconstitutional, such section ceased to become law from the beginning

METROBANK V. TOBIAS - under separation of powers, courts have no right to directly decide matters on which full

discretionary authority has been delegated to executive branch.- Finding of the existence of probable cause is an EXECUTIVE FUNCTION which discretion

cannot be substituted by the court.

RE: COA OPINION- By way of a long standing tradition, partly based on the intention to reward long and faithful

service, the sale to the retired Justices of specifically designated properties that they used duringtheir incumbency has been recognized both as a privilege and a benefit.— [Re: Coa Opinion on


5/73


the Computation of the Appraised Value of the Properties Purchased by the RetiredChief/Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, 678 SCRA 1(2012)]

2 concepts: PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY and CO-EQUALITY

PRESUMPTION--laws subjection of JR are presumed constitutional; double negative rule

COEQUALITY--Courts will initially refuse to exercise JR because it respects acts/exercise by co-equalbranches UNLESS 4 requisites are present

CONDITIONS FOR THE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

4 REQUISITES: AREL

NOTE: NEVER ATTEMPT TO ANSWER THE QUESTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A LAW IFTHERE IS NO DECIDED CASE YET. discuss requisites and then DISMISS petition.

APPROPRIATE CASE OR CONTROVERSY, RIPE FOR JUDICIAL DETERMINATION- if there has been damage, prejudice, threatened violation or damage on the rights of the party

against an act or law- SC no jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief (but you can raise it on lower courts)

EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY- -must not be raised too late as when issue already becomes moot or academic (court no need to

decide)

RAISED BY PROPER PART

1. CITIZEN SUIT--public right is violated or there is IMPENDING VIOLATION WHICH can beaddressed/assuaged by a favorable court decision or when court decides on the consti question;injury must be PERSONAL, MATERIAL damage or injury/threatened violation.

2. TAXPAYERS SUIT--issue on constitutionality involves spending of public money (i.e. creation ofpublic office)

3. VOTERS SUIT--consti question involves right to suffrage

4. LEGISLATORS SUIT--member of congress has legal standing over consti questions involving alaw (i.e. as when law violates the constitution

5. TRANSCENDENTAL IMPORTANCE--requisites: (1) clear consti violation; (2) case involvespublic expenditure and (3) there is NO OTHER PARTy to bring the consti question

6. INTERGENERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY--present gen can bring case on public right violationof the consti for benefit of future gen

RAISED AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY

HACIENDA LUISITA V. PARC- stock distribution was made instead of land distribution- supervisory group, ambala and their leaders are real parties in interest;- consti issue: not all the requirements are satisfied. while there is indeed an actual case, it was

only 14 years after approval of SDP that said plan and approving reso were sought revoked butnot by FARM or any of its members but by AMBALA. latter's petition did not question consti if ra6657 sec 31. FARM only questioned it with SC WHEN ITS QUITE TOO LATE IN THE DAY. they


6/73


SLEPT ON THEIR RIGHTS and even accepted benefits without any complaint on allegedunconstitutionality of section 31 upon which benefits were derived. the SC cannot now be goadedinto resolving a consti issue that FARM failed to assail after lapse of a long period of time.

- court will not pass upon a question of consti unless it be properly raised and presented in anappropriate case the 1st opportunity. FARM is remiss in belatedly questioning consti. the reqt thatconsti question should be raised at earliest possible opp is WANTING.

- further, the fact that it must be the VERY LIS MOTA--does NOT also obtain. the consti issuetendered is NOT CRITICAL to the resolution of the case. the rule has been to avoid an issueassailing consti of law. if some other grounds exist by which judgment can be made withouttouching consti of a law, such recourse is favored.

LIS MOTA--means that court will not pass upon question of unconsti if the case can be disposed of onsome other ground, such as application of the statute or the general law. petitioner must show that casecannot be legally resolved unless consti question raised is determined.

in this case, issues raised may be resolved without plunging into the constitutionality of ra 6657. the issueis not that said section is invalid but rather it is the ALLEGED APPLICATION of said provision in the SDPis FLAWED.

WHEN COURT RESOLVES CONSTI ISSUES OTHERWISE MOOT AND ACADEMIC1. grave violation of consti2. exceptional character of situation and paramount public interest is involved3. consti issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guid bench, bar and public4. case is capable of repetition yet evading review

CANDARI V. DONASCO - NO actual case or controversy; AC means there is a justiciable issue reqd to be resolved by court

or + necessity of court resolution to afford parties relief based on law upon the issues raised. inthis case, there was already election by general membership. so no more issue.

RIPENESS/LOCUS STANDI

LAMP V. SEC OF DBM –l- RIPENESS: The possibility of consti violations in implementation of PDAF involves interplay oflegal rights susceptible of jud resolution. LAMP--has the right to recover pub funds misapplied bymembers of congress. allegations of ILLEGAL EXPENDITURE OF PUB FUNDS reflect aCONCRETE INJURY. this petition complains of ILLEGAL DISBURSEMENT OF PF derived fromtaxation--definite, concrete , real or substantial controversy before the court

- LOCUS STANDI--rule: personal/substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained/willsustain direct injury as result of its enforcement. ; TAXPAYERS--allowed to sue where pub fundsare illegally disbursed or pub money deflected to improper purpose or PF wasted thruenforcement of an invalid/unconsti law. (i.e. PDAF SCAM)

- PARAMOUNT PUB INTEREST--ramification of issues re: unconsti spending of PDAF deservesconsideration of court

- ALLOWING DIRECT ALLOCATION AND RELEASE OF PDAF FUNDS TO CONGRESS basedon their own list of projects--NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTION

- basis: PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY ACCORDED TO STATUTORY ACTS OF CONGRESS.This rule can be overcome only by clearest showing of infraction of the constiution.

- in this case, there was no convincing proof that there were direct releases of funds to members ofcongress who actually spend them accdg to their sole discretion. court cannot declareunconstitutionality of the PDAF enforcement (at that time; with teh NAPOLES ISSUE now, i thinkthe legality of PDAF may be duly struck down!)

BUDGETING AND APPROPRIATION PROCESS


7/73


1. BUDGET PREPARATION--each agency submits agency budget estimates (consideration: generalceilings set by DBCC, available revenues, borrowing limits)2. LEGISLATIVE AUTHORIZATION--congress deliberates/acts on budget proposals of the president andcongress FORMULATES appropriation act3. BUDGET EXECUTION--executive; covers various OPERATIONAL ASPECTS of budgeting;establishment of obligation authority ceilings, evaluation of work/financial plans for indvl activities,

continuing review of govt fiscal position, regulation of funds releases, implementation of cash paymentskeds; ALLOCATION AND RELEASE OF FUNDS EARMARKED FOR VARIOUS PROJECTS

4. BUDGET ACCOUNTABILITY--evaluation of actual performance and initially approved work targets,obligations incurred, personnel hired and work accomplished are COMPARED with the targets set at thetime the agency budgets were approved.

POWER OF APPROPRIATION--vested in LEGISLATURE; appropriation bills originate EXCLUSIVE inthe HOUSE. senate to propose/concur with amendments

BUDGETARY PROCESS--commences from proposal submitted by PRESIDENT. CONGRESS--concludes the exercise by crafting and APPROPRIATION ACT based on its own judgment/wisdom/purposes.

APPROPRIATION ACT--may be objected to by way of PRESIDENTIAL VETO.

EXECUTIVE JOB--from regulation of fund releases--implementation of payment skeds and up to ACTUAL SPENDING OF FUNDS SPECIFIED IN THE LAW.

a. DBM--lays down guidelines for the disbursement of the fund.b. congress requested by president to recommend projects which may be funded from PDAFc. list submitted by congress is endorsed by Speaker to the DBM which reviews the same.

RULE: MEMBERS OF CONGRESS MAY PROPOSE AND SELECT PROJECTS TO BE FUNDED BYPDAF but there must be NO SHOWING OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION OF LEGISLATORS IN TEHACTUAL SPENDING OF BUDGET because to do otherwise will VIOLATE the constitutional

boundaries between the executive and legislative in the budgetary process.

the PROPOSALS/IDENTIFICATIONSmade by congress are MERELY RECOMMENDATORY and thatthe president, after due examination shall implement them.

direct particiaption of members of congress in PDAF implementation RUNS AFOUL against theprinciple fo SEPARATION OF POWERS because in receiving and thereafter, spending funds fortheir chosen projects, congress INTRUDES INTO AN EXECUTIVE FUNCTION. they cannot directlyspend the funds, the appropriation for which was made by them. congress cannot dictate uponexecutive how to spend taxpayers money. the authority to propose and select projects does notpertain to legislation.

THERE IS NO CLEAR PROOF in this case that there was direct releases of funds to congress whoactually spent them accdg to their discretion. there was (as yet no) ILLEGAL MISUSE of the PDAF in theform of kickbacks.

evidence: NAPOLES and the COA REPORT.source of PDAF: SPECIAL PURPOSE FUND (PDAF of 25.240M is only 8% of the total)

rule: PDAF ALLOCATIONS ARE NOT ACTUALLY RELEASED TO MEMBERS OF CONGRESS;rather, it is coursed via implementing agencies of the govt for 'soft' and hard projects

DELA LLANA V. CHAIRPERSON


8/73


- on lifting of pre-audit on govt transactions.- petitioner HAS LEGAL STANDING on a TAXPAYERS SUIT. discuss requisites.- issuance of COA CIRCULAR has led to dissipation of public funds through numerous

irregularities in govt financial transactions which has been LEFT UNCHECKED by the lifting ofthe COA pre-audit which is supposed to be coa's consti duty. petitioner then has legal standingsince as taxpayer, he would be adversely affected by the illegal use of public money.

CONDITIONS FOR PRE-AUDIT(1) proposed expenditure complies with an appropriation law(2) sufficient funds available for the purpose(3) prosed expenditure not unreasonable or extravagant; unexpended balance of appropriationsis sufficient to cover entire amount of expenditure(4) transaction approved by proper authority; claim supported by authentic underlying evidence

- HOWEVER, CONDUCT OF PRE-AUDIT IS NOT A MANDATORY DUTY OF COA. COA hasexclusive authority to define scope of its audit and examination. consti provides that post-audit ismandated for certain govt or private entities with state subsidy or equity and ONLY when theinternal control system of an audited entity is inadequate.

- in this case, COA MAY ADOPT MEASURES, including temporary or special pre-audit to correctdeficiencies. therefore, pre audit is only DISCRETIONARY. when language of law is clear andexplicit, there is NO ROOM FOR INTERPRETATION, only application. SCOPE OF PROVISIONCANNOT BE UNDLY ENLARGED.

GALICTO V. AQUINO - on the EO controlling grant of excessive salaries/allowances to GOCC and GFI employees and

effect of enactment of RA 10149 (GOCC Governance act of 2011; section 11 thereof authorizedpresident to fix compensation framework of GOCC and GFI's)

GALICTO HAS NO LOCUS STANDI. (actual threatened injury; traceable to challenged action;injury likely redressed by favorable action; 'real interest'--present substantial interest asdistinguished from mere expectancy)

in this case, he is NOT a real party in interest since future increases in salaries and other benefitsare merely contingent events or expectancies. he has NO VESTED RIGHTS to salary increases.

PETITION MOOTED BY SUPERVENING EVENTS. lapse of the suspension of allowances andbonuses; enactment of RA 10149 amending the provision in the charters of GOCCs empoweringtheir board of directors to determine their own compensation system, in favor of the grant ofauthority to the PRESIDENT to perform this act. with enactmetn of the new law, president is nowauthorized to fix teh compensation frameowrk of GOCCs aand GFIs. this means tat PRESIDENTCAN NOW REISSUE AN EO CONTAINING THESE SAME PROVISIONS without any legalconstraints. to still rule on the supposed constitutionality of EO 7 will merely be an academicexercise; issue is MOOT ON ITS FACE in light of enactment of RA 10149. there is no longerFLESH AND BLOOD case for court to resolve.

MOOT CASE--one that ceases to present justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening eventsthat a declaration thereon is of no practical use or value; dispute resolved

IDEALS VS. PSALM- iSSUE ON WATER RIGHTS VIOLATION has NOT BECOME MOOT. if impending sale violates

the constitution, it is duty of court to ANNUL THE CONTRACT AWARD as well as itsimplementation, supervening events cannot prevent the court from rendering a decision if there isa grave violation of the constitution.


9/73


+ LEGAL STANDING AS CITIZENS AND TAXPAYERS. continued availability of potable watermight be compromised if PSALM proceeds with privatization of the hydroelec power plant--substantial interest.

FUNA V. VILLAR - member of COA who was appointed as member then chairman during the 7 year term. when he

becomes chairman, is it Fresh 7 years or unexpired term? but during the transition, heRESIGNED when Aquino assumed presidency. CASE IS MOOT but SC DECIDED ON THECASE. Discuss exceptions. -This case calls for promulgation of principles that will GUID THEBENCH, BAR AND PUBLIC.

in this case, COA Chairman shall be appointed by president for term of 7 years and if + servedfull term--no reappointment. but this rule does not prohibit a PROMOTIONAL APPOINTMENTfrom commissioner to chairman as long as commissioner has not served the full term of 7 yearsso as not to disrupt the rotational system in the COA.

in no case can one be a COA member, either as chairman or commissioner or a mix of bothpositions, for aggregate term of more than 7 years. a contrary view would allow circumvention ofthe aggregate 7 year service limitation and would be constitutionally offensive as it would wreak

havoc to the spirit of the rotational system of succession.

in this case however, the PROMOTIONAL APPOINTMENT WAS NOT VALID. villar served 4 outof 7 years as commissioner. he cannot be appointed as chair when such position became vacantas a result of expiration of the 7 yr term of his predecessor. such appointment to a full term isNOT VALID as appointee will be allowed to serve MORE than 7 years under the consti ban. BUTif commissioner who resigned BEFORE his 7 year term can be extended an appointment to theposition of chairman for the unexpired period.

CAPALLA V. COMELEC--transcendental importance used.

CHAVEZ V. JBC--on JBC MEMBERS--1 member of HR and senate with 1 vote each or 1/2 vote?

CHAVEZ HAS LEGAL STANDING. the claim that composition of JBC is illegal is an object of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post but for all citizens who have the right to seek jud intervention forrectification of legal blunders.

HE SUES AS TAXPAYER. since JBC derives financial support for its operations from taxes paid, hepossesses as taxpayer both right and legal standing to demand that JDBC proceedings are not taintedwith illegality and its composition and actions do not violate the consti.

COMPOSTION OF JBCex officio members:

1. Chief Justice of SC2. Sec of justice3. A rep of congress

Regular members1. professor of law2. IBP rep3. private sector rep4. retired SC justice.

ONLY A SINGULAR REPRESENTATIVE MAY ABE ALLOWED TO SIT IN TEH JBC. Besides,JBC must be composed of 7 members only. to allow congress to have more quantitativeinfluence in the JBC would negate principle of equality among the 3 branches of govt.


10/73


OPERATIVE FACT doctrine applies. notwithstanding unconsti in the current JBC composition, allits prior official actions are nonetheless valid.

court cannot determine who should remain as sole representative of congress in the JBC. thisdetermination is best left to congress.

FUNCTIONS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

CHECKING/NEGATIVE-declaring law unconstiLEGITIMATING/POSITIVE--exercise of JR; not unconstiSYMBOLIC/TEACHING

ALL COURTS CAN EXERCISE JUDICIAL REVIEW.

but lower courts, must avoid ruling so if it can be avoided. remember tripartite govt. SC LANG DAPATULTIMATE MAG-RULE ON THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF A LAW.

BROKENSHIRE V. MINISTER OF LABOR--quasi-judicial agencies do not have the power to declarean act or law as unconstitutional. they do not have judicial power. DOLE or NLRC cannot declare

wage orders as unconstitutional.

EFFECTS OF DECLARATION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY

operative fact doctrine applies and traditional view:TRADITIONAL VIEW--when the law was effective and there was violation committed and that law wassubsequently annulled--damage or violation corrected as law was never considered effectiveOPERATIVE FACT--when law was effective and there was NO VIOLATION of rights--if law subsequentlyannulled, operative fact doctrine applies.

COCOFED V. REPUBLIC--Operative fact doctrine not only applies to laws or statutes but also inEXECUTIVE ORDERS. However, in this case, OPERATIVE FACT DOCTRINE DID NOT APPLY TO THEUCPB SHARES due to inequity. public funds which were supposed given utmost safeguard were

haphazardly distributed to private individuals based on EO that was found constitutionally infirm.recipients of UCPB shares may not actually be the intended beneficiaries of said benefit. to apply theOFD would be INIQUITOUS and serve INJUSTICE to govt.

also discussed 2 tests of delegation of legis power:COMPLETENESS TEST--when it sets forth the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented bydelegateSUFFICIENT STANDARD--provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out theboundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. to be sufficient--standard must specify the limits of delegates authority, announce legis policy and identify the conditionsunder which it is to be implemented.

HACIENDA LUISITA V. PARC- the operative fact doctrine does not only apply to laws subsequently declared unconstitutional or

unlawful, as it also applies to executive acts subsequently declared as invalid. As We havediscussed in Our July 5, 2011 Decision: That the operative fact doctrine squarely applies toexecutive acts––in this case, the approval by PARC of the HLI proposal for stock distribution––iswell-settled in our jurisprudence. Bearing in mind that PARC Resolution No. 89-12-210—anexecutive act—was declared invalid in the instant case, the operative fact doctrine is clearlyapplicable. [Hacienda Luisita, Incorporated vs. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, 660 SCRA525(2011)]

- Significantly, a decision made by the President or the administrative agencies has to be compliedwith because it has the force and effect of law, springing from the powers of the President under


11/73


the Constitution and existing laws. Prior to the nullification or recall of said decision, it may haveproduced acts and consequences in conformity to and in reliance of said decision, which must berespected. It is on this score that the operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts andconsequences that resulted from the implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the SDPof HLI. [Hacienda Luisita, Incorporated vs. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, 660 SCRA525(2011)]

POLITICAL vs. JUSTICEABLE QUESTION

POLITICAL--question by which people in their sovereign capacity will have to decide or in regard to whichfull discretionary authority has been delegated to legis/exec branch. it is concerned with issues onWISDOM of a particular measure (not its legality)

JUSTICEABLE—question rightful for court to decide on

VINUYA V. ROMULO--mandamus case compelling govt to file claim against japan in the ICJ re: comfortwomen case--> NOT COMPELLABLE BY MANDAMUS. The issue is POLITICAL in nature. the conductof foreign relations of our govt is committed to executive and legislative (politcal depts of govt) and thepropriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is NOT SUBJECT to judicial inquiry or

legislation. the issue is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed NOTTO COURTS but to the EXECUTIVE DEPT who has already decided to waive all claims of its nationalsfor reparations against japan in the treaty of peace in 1951. the wisdom of such decision is not for thecourts to question.

IDEALS VS. PSALM- the political question doctrine applies when the question calls for a ruling on the wisdom, and not

the legality, of a particular governmental act or issuance.- The political question doctrine has no application in the case here. In the privatization of AHEPP,

PSALM’s discretion is circumscribed not only by the provisions of EPIRA and its ImplementingRules and Regulations (IRR), but also by pertinent laws that are consequential and relevant to itsmandate of privatizing the power generation assets of NPC. Needless to stress, PSALM is dutybound to abide by the parameters set by the Constitution. In case it violates any existing law or

the Constitution, it cannot hide behind the mantle of the political question doctrine, because suchviolation inevitably calls for the exercise of judicial review by this Court. [Initiatives for Dialogueand Empowerment through Alternative Legal Services, Inc. (IDEALS, INC.) vs. Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM) , 682 SCRA 602(2012)]

COMELEC V. CRUZ- Congress has plenary authority under the Constitution to determine by legislation not only the

duration of the term of barangay officials but also the application to them of a consecutive termlimit. Whatever Congress in its wisdom decides on the term of office and term limitation arepolitical questions beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny.

THE PHILIPPINES AS A STATE

PHILIPPINE TERRITORY

Sabah claim falls within the phrase 'those territories which Philippines would exercise sovereignty and jurisdiciton'. claim is not largely based on historic/legal title.

EEZ--first 12 nautical miles is part of PHIL TERRITORY; outside of 12 NM up to 200 NM--part of EEZ andnot phil territory

violations within 12 NM--violation of philippine lawsviolation outside 12 NM and within 200--Violation fo UNCLOS


12/73


EEZ--reserved for EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC EXPLOITATION AND EXPLORATION.

PEOPLE AND CITIZENSHIP

-It was only during phil bill of 1902 (july 2, 1902) that the term 'citizens of phils' came about

-child born between April 11, 1899-july 1, 1902--citizens under principle of JUS SOLI--jones law--citizens ung inhabitants of phils as of april 11, 1899 and continues to reside therein includingchildren born subsequent thereto; includes Spaniards who remained there--1935 consti CITIZENS (fil citizens at time of adoption of PC, born of foreigner parents but who atadoption of 1935 consti was ELECTED TO PUB OFFICE; those father are citizens, mothers arecitizens/foreigner father but elected fil cit at majority; naturalized citizens)

--same citizens under 1987 and 1973 (just memorize those in 1935)

8 POSITIONS REQUIRING NAT BORN CITIZENS (pres, VP, members of congress, justices of SC andlowe courts; OMB and deputies; ConCom members; Monetary board; CHR)

--NATURAL BORN cits first defined in 1973 consti

--those children who had to elect fil cit under 1935 consti is NATURAL BORN (curative law appliedretroactively)--FERNANDO POE CASE--born of filipino mother and foreigner father. since he was illegitimate, hefollows cit of mother during his minority. once he reaches majority, he has to ELECT what citizenship.However, since in 1935, those born of Filipino fathers are considered natural born, that provision prevails.So he follows the citizenship of his FATHER. Therefore, he is natural born.

HOW TO ELECT PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP (formal mode on CA 625)1. execute SOWRN STATEMENT or affidavit of fact of election2. oath of allegiance3. registration of these documents with LCR

WHEN TO ELECT? upon REASONABLE time after attaining age of majority (i.e. 3 years)

IN RE: CHING - legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such

intention “in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officerauthorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said partyshall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and theGovernment of the Philippines.” [

- The 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which the electionof Philippine citi-zenship should be made; The phrase “reasonable time” has been interpreted tomean that the election should be made within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority; As held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice, the three (3) year period is not an inflexible rule.—

- based on the interpretation of the phrase “upon reaching the age of majority,” Ching’s electionwas clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the allowable period within which to exercisethe privilege.—In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already thirty-five (35) years old when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, orover fourteen (14) years after he had reached the age of majority.

REP V. LIM- no need to elect cit if he was born of filipino mother and he was illegitimate; child follows cit of

mother- he constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino citizenship apply only to legitimate

children.—Plainly, the above constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipinocitizenship apply only to legitimate children. These do not apply in the case of respondent who


13/73


was concededly an illegitimate child, considering that her Chinese father and Filipino mother werenever married. As such, she was not required to comply with said constitutional and statutoryrequirements to become a Filipino citizen. By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother,respondent automatically became a Filipino upon birth. Stated differently, she is a Filipino sincebirth without having to elect Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority. [Republicvs. Lim, 419 SCRA 123(2004)]

- The exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute apositive act of election of Philippine citizenship. [Republic vs. Lim, 419 SCRA 123(2004)]

-MA V. FERNANDEZ

- failure to register in LCR of documents in election of cit DOES NOT AFFECT a valid election.registration is not the fact of election.

-- The statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are: (1) a statement of election under

oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the Philippines; and (3)registration of the statement of election and of the oath with the nearest civil registry.

- Same; Same; Same; The phrase “reasonable time” has been interpreted to mean that theelections should be made within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority.

- The instant case presents a different factual setting. Petitioners complied with the first and

second requirements upon reaching the age of majority. It was only the registration of thedocuments of election with the civil registry that was belatedly done. We rule that under the factspeculiar to the petitioners, the right to elect Philippine citizenship has not been lost and theyshould be allowed to complete the statutory requirements for such election.

- Where as in petitioners’ case, the election of citizenship has in fact been done and documentedwithin the constitutional and statutory timeframe, the registration of the documents of electionbeyond the frame should be allowed if in the meanwhile positive acts of citizenship have publicly,consistently, and continuously been done

- It is not the registration of the act of election, although a valid requirement under Commonwealth Act No. 625, that will confer Philippine citizenship on the petitioners; Registration is only a meansof confirming the fact that citizenship has been claimed. [Ma vs. Fernandez, Jr., 625 SCRA566(2010)]

- The failure to register the election in the civil registry should not defeat the election and resultingly

negate the permanent fact that they have a Filipino mother.— [Ma vs. Fernandez, Jr., 625 SCRA566(2010)]

REP V. SAGUN - There is NO PROCEEDING established by law for the jud declaration of citizenship fo an

individual.- this Court has consistently ruled that there is no proceeding established by law, or the Rules for

the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. There is no specific legislationauthorizing the institution of a judicial proceeding to declare that a given person is part of ourcitizenry

- courts of justice exist for settlement of justiciable controversies, which imply a given right, legallydemandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of said right, and a remedy, granted orsanctioned by law, for said breach of right. As an incident only of the adjudication of the rights ofthe parties to a controversy, the court may pass upon, and make a pronouncement relative totheir status. Otherwise, such a pronouncement is beyond judicial power.

- t is a settled rule that only legitimate children follow the citizenship of the father and thatillegitimate children are under the parental authority of the mother and follow her nationality.—Being a legitimate child, respondent’s citizenship followed that of her father who is Chinese,unless upon reaching the age of majority, she elects Philippine citizenship.

- in making a valid election of Philippine citizenship, follow the 3 requirements + compliance with ALIEN REGISTRATION ACT. he must be required to register first as alien. file petition in bureauof immigration for cancellation fo ACR. then same is elevated to DOJ for final determination andreview. thus, no specific rule on going to courts in this matter.


14/73


- It should be stressed that there is no specific statutory or procedural rule which authorizes thedirect filing of a petition for declaration of election of Philippine citizenship before the courts. Thespecial proceeding provided under Section 2, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court on Cancellation orCorrection of Entries in the Civil Registry, merely allows any interested party to file an action forcancellation or correction of entry in the civil registry, i.e., election, loss and recovery ofcitizenship, which is not the relief prayed for by the respondent. Be that as it may, even if we set

aside this procedural infirmity, still the trial court’s conclusion that respondent duly electedPhilippine citizenship is erroneous since the records undisputably show that respondent failed tocomply with the legal requirements for a valid election. Specifically, respondent had not executeda sworn statement of her election of Philippine citizenship. The only documentary evidencesubmitted by respondent in support of her claim of alleged election was her oath of allegiance,executed 12 years after she reached the age of majority, which was unregistered. As aptlypointed out by the petitioner, even assuming arguendo that respondent’s oath of allegiancesuffices, its execution was not within a reasonable time after respondent attained the age ofmajority and was not registered with the nearest civil registry as required under Section 1 of C.A.No. 625. The phrase “reasonable time” has been interpreted to mean that the election should bemade generally within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority. Moreover, there was nosatisfactory explanation proffered by respondent for the delay and the failure to register with thenearest local civil registry. [Republic vs. Sagun, 666 SCRA 321(2012)]

VILANDO V. HRET - Limkaichong is QUALIFIED to sit as congressman. he is a NATURAL BORN CITIZEN. since his

father was conferred the status of naturalized Filipino, it follows that he was born a Filipino citizenborn to Filipino parents.

- An application for, and the holding of, an alien certificate of registration is not an act constitutingrenunciation of Philippine citizenship—for renunciation to effectively result in the loss ofcitizenship, the same must be express.—Obtaining an ACR by Limkaichong’s mother was nottantamount to a repudiation of her original citizenship. Neither did it result in an acquisition ofalien citizenship. In a string of decisions, this Court has consistently held that an application for,and the holding of, an alien certificate of registration is not an act constituting renunciation ofPhilippine citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the samemust be express. Such express renunciation is lacking in this case. Accordingly, Limkaichong’s

mother, being a Filipino citizen, can transmit her citizenship to her daughter. [Vilando vs. Houseof Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 656 SCRA 17(2011)]

INFORMAL MODE OF ELECTION

IN RE MALLARE and CO case--obiter dictum provided that even if no compliance with documentaryeivdinces, election can be had informally as shown in the CONDUCT of the person.

BUT ONLY FORMAL MODE IS ALLOWED TO ELECT FIL CIT.

NATURALIZATION AND DENATURALIZATION

NATURALIZATION PROCEDINGS--judicial (CA 473) and administrative (RA 9139)

Judicial naturalization (CA 473; June 17, 1939)--ARCPEN (substantive)procedural reqts:1. filing of declaration of intention at least 1 year before the filing of petition2. hearing3. decision (does not become effective until after 2 years waiting period)4. ACR cancellation5. issuance of cert of naturalization


15/73


DERIVATIVE CIT--wife and minor children will be fil cit too (must prove no disqualifications)

CHILDREN--if born and here during the grant (automatic); born here but outside during grant(mustexecute document electing FC); not born here and outside during grant (must file documents before gotoffice that they want to become FC) ; Born AFTER grant--citizens; born BEFORE grant--NOT naturalborn

ADMINISTRATIVE NAT (RA 9139 June 8, 2001)--covers those born in phils as foreignerssubstantive: AR-18-CPENProcedural:1. no declaration of intention needed2. file petition with the special commission on naturalization in ODJ3. payment of fees

IMPORTANT POINTS- Who are qualified to be naturalized- Declaration of intention- Procedure- When decision EXECUTORY:

- REPUBLIC ACT NO. 530 – AN ACT MAKING ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS FOR NATURALIZATION

Section 1. The provisions of existing laws notwithstanding, no petition for Philippine citizenship shall be heard by

the courts until after six months from the publication of the application required by law, nor shall any decision

granting the application become executory until after two years from its promulgation and after the court, on

proper hearing, with the attendance of the Solicitor General or his representative, is satisfied, and so finds, that

during the intervening time the applicant has (1) not left the Philippines, (2) has dedicated himself continuously to alawful calling or profession, (3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated

rules, (4) or committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government

announced policies.

Section 2. After the finding mentioned in section one, the order of the court granting citizenship shall be registered

and the oath provided by existing laws shall be taken by the applicant, whereupon, and not before, he will be entitled

to all the privileges of a Filipino citizen.-

DENATURALIZATION1. if person goes back to his country of origin and stays there for 1 year or 2 years if other country AND2. acts done WITHIN the 5r period from grant of naturalization status

CO V. CIVIL REGISTER- Section 15 of CA No. 473, which extends the grant of Philippine citizenship to the minor children

of thosenaturalized thereunder, should be similarly applied to the minor children of thosenaturalized under LOI No. 270, like the petitioners in this case. [

- Requisites.–It is not enough that the petitioners adduce in evidence the certificate ofnaturalization of their father, Co Boon Peng, and of his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the

Philippines, to entitle them to Philippine citizenship. They are likewise mandated to prove thefollowing material allegations in their petition:(a) that they are the legitimate children of Co Boon Peng;(b) that they were born in the Philippines; and,(c) that they were still minors when Co Boon Peng was naturalized as a Filipino citizen.

REPUBLIC V. ONG - Granting of petition for naturalization DOES NOT PRECLUDE reopening of that case and giving

govt another opportunity to present new evidence. nat proceeding is so infused with pub interestthat a GRANT of citizenship does NOT constitute res judicata to any matter supporting a


16/73


subsequent judgmetn canceling the same i.e. illegally or fraudulently procured. in this case, thereis proof that ong has not proven his possession of known lucrative trade, profession,etc. (even ifnot raised in the RTC, such questions may be entertained on appeal before SC)

FACT OF NAT BORN--refers to fact of citizenship and not to the fact of performing an act toperfect/acquire cit

BASTA if 1 parent is filipino--NATURAL BORN (even if later he needs to elect)if no Filipino parent--not natural born (even if subsequently, parents eventually became filipinos)

LOSS OF CITIZENSHIP

1. Naturalization in foreign countrya. REPUBLIC V. DELA ROSA

" Private respondent, having opted to reacquire Philippine citizenship thrunaturalization under the Revised Naturalization Law, is duty bound to follow theprocedure prescribed by the said law. It is not for an applicant to decide forhimself and to select the requirements which he believes, even sincerely, areapplicable to his case and discard those which he believes are inconvenient or

merely of nuisance value. The law does not distinguish between an applicantwho was formerly a Filipino citizen and one who was never such a citizen. It doesnot provide a special procedure for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship byformer Filipino citizens akin to the repatriation of a woman who had lost herPhilippine citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien. [

" Failure to comply with the publication and posting requirements under theRevised Naturalization Law rendered null and void the proceedings conducted,the decision rendered and oath of allegiance taken

" The petition for naturalization lacks several allegations required by Sections 2and 6 of the Revised Naturalization Law, particularly: (1) that the petitioner is ofgood moral character, (2) that he resided continuously in the Philippines for atleast ten years; (3) that he is able to speak and write English and any one of theprincipal dialects; (4) that he will reside continuously in the Philippines from the

date of the filing of the petition until his admission to Philippine citizenship; and(5) that he has filed a declaration of intention or if he is excused from said filing,the justification therefor. The absence of such allegations is fatal to the petition

" A decision in a petition for naturalization becomes final only after 30 days from itspromulgation, counted from the date of receipt by the Solicitor General of hiscopy of the decision.

" A decision granting citizenship in naturalization proceedings shall not beexecutory until after two years from its promulgation.— [Republic vs. De la Rosa,232 SCRA 785(1994)]

2. express renunciation or EXPATRIATIONa. YU V. DEFENSOR SANTIAGO

" Petitioner’s act of applying for a Portuguese passport despite his naturalizationas a Philippine citizen, and his act of declaring his nationality as Portuguese incommercial documents, constitute an express renunciation of his Philippinecitizenship acquired through naturalization. [Yu vs. Defensor-Santiago, 169SCRA 364(1989)]

" hilippine citizenship is not a commodity or ware to be displayed when requiredand suppressed when convenient. [Yu vs. Defensor-Santiago, 169 SCRA364(1989)]

b. AZNAR V. COMELEC" In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed to present direct

proof that private respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes


17/73


provided for under C.A. No. 63. Among others, these are: (1) by naturalization ina foreign country; (2) by express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) bysubscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of aforeign country. From the evidence, it is clear that private respondent Osmeñadid not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of the three mentioned hereinaboveor by any other mode of losing Philippine citizenship. [Aznar vs. Commission on

Elections, 185 SCRA 703(1990)]3. oath of allegiance to foreign country

REACQUISTION OF CITIZENSHIP

1. RA 8171)-nat born fil women who married foreigners-poltiical or economic necessity

2. RA 9225 (Dual citizenship)

AASJS V. DATUMANONG- What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who has

lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country; On its

face, it does not recognize dual allegiance; By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic,the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizen-ship

LOPEZ V. COMELEC- R.A. No. 9225 expressly provides for the conditions before those who re-acquired Filipino

citizenship may run for a public office in the Philippines, i.e., that they make a personal and swornrenunciation of any and all foreign citizenship.— [Lopez vs. Commission on Elections, 559 SCRA696(2008)]

JACOT V. DAL- Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized

as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship (1) totake the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 and (2) for those seeking

elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and swornrenunciation of any and all foreign citizenship.

DE GUZMAN V. COMELEC- Who may be allowed to re-acquire and retain Philippine Citizenship.—R.A. No. 9225 was enacted

to allow re-acquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship for: 1) natural-born citizens who havelost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country;and 2) natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of the law, become citizensof a foreign country. The law provides that they are deemed to have reacquired or retained theirPhilippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance.

- The filing of a certificate of candidacy does not ipso facto amount to a renunciation of his foreigncitizenship under Republic Act No. 9225

BENGZON V. HRET--when repatriation under 8171 is made, he acquires his former status as naturalborn.

CONDON V. COMELEC - RA 9225 allows retention and reacquisition of fil cit for nat born cits who have lost their phil cit by

taking an oath of allegiance to the republic.- in this case, when she took the oath, she reacquired her fil cit and became a DUAL CITIZEN.- ON RENUNCIATION OF FOREIGN CIT WHEN SEEKING PUBLIC OFFICE--but for renunciation

to be valid, it must be contained in an affidavit duly executed before officer of law authorized to


18/73


administer oath stating in clear unequivocal terms that affiant is renouncing all foreigncitizenship.

- In this case, the renunciation was NOT UNDER OATH. such defect was as if no personal andsworn renunciation of foreign cit was made. HENCE, CONDON CANNOT CURE THE DEFECTOF HER CANDIDACY AS SUCH additional qualification for elec office is the operative act whichwill restore her right to run for pub office.

ALTEREJOS V. COMELEC- In addition to taking the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the registration of

the Certificate of Repatriation in the proper civil registry and the Bureau of Immigration is aprerequisite in effecting the repatriation of a citizen

- hile Republic Act No. 8171 has impliedly repealed Presidential Decree No. 725, the Court’s rulingin Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, 257 SCRA 727 (1996), that repatriation retroacts to thedate of filing of one’s application for repatriation subsists and applies to repatriation under R.A.No. 8171. [

TABASA V. CA- Republic Act No. 8171; Persons Entitled to Repatriation Under Republic Act No. 8171.—The only

persons entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 are the following: a. Filipino women who lost their

Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; and b. Natural-born Filipinos including their minorchildren who lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity.

- Same; Same; Same; The privilege of repatriation under Republic Act No. 8171 is available only tonatural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or economic necessity, andto the minor children of said natural-born Filipinos—to claim the benefit of Republic Act No. 8171,the children must be of minor age at the time the petition for repatriation is filed by the parent.—Petitioner overlooks the fact that the privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is available only tonatural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or economic necessity, andto the minor children of said natural-born Filipinos. This means that if a parent who hadrenounced his Philippine citizenship due to political or economic reasons later decides torepatriate under RA 8171, his repatriation will also benefit his minor children according to the law.This includes a situation where a former Filipino subsequently had children while he was anaturalized citizen of a foreign country. The repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to

recover his natural-born citizenship and automatically vest Philippine citizenship on his children of jus sanguinis or blood relationship: the children acquire the citizenship of their parent(s) who arenatural-born Filipinos.

- To claim the benefit of RA 8171, however, the children must be of minor age at the time thepetition for repatriation is filed by the parent. This is so because a child does not have thelegal capacity for all acts of civil life much less the capacity to undertake a political act like theelection of citizenship. On their own, the minor children cannot apply for repatriation ornaturalization separately from their parents.

- In the case at bar, there is no dispute that petitioner was a Filipino at birth. In 1968, while he wasstill a minor, his father was naturalized as an American citizen; and by derivative naturalization,petitioner acquired U.S. citizenship. Petitioner now wants us to believe that he is entitled toautomatic repatriation as a child of natural-born Filipinos who left the country due to political oreconomic necessity. This is absurd. Petitioner was no longer a minor at the time of his“repatriation” on June 13, 1996. The privilege under RA 8171 belongs to children who are ofminor age at the time of the filing of the petition for repatriation. Neither can petitioner be anatural-born Filipino who left the country due to political or economic necessity. Clearly, he losthis Philippine citizenship by operation of law and not due to political or economic exigencies. Itwas his father who could have been motivated by economic or political reasons in deciding toapply for naturalization. The decision was his parent’s and not his. The privilege of repatriationunder RA 8171 is extended directly to the natural-born Filipinos who could prove that theyacquired citizenship of a foreign country due to political and economic reasons, and extendedindirectly to the minor children at the time of repatriation [Tabasa vs. Court of Appeals, 500 SCRA9(2006)]


19/73


DUAL ALLEGIANCE IS INIMICAL TO NATIONAL INTEREST and NOT dual citizenship.

when dual citizenship may arise:--application of laws of 2 states--marriage to foreigner

--children born of that marriage--child born of Filipino parents in country following jus soli

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

Instances WHEN SUIT IS AGAINST THE STATE:--republic sued by name--suit vs. unincorporated entity--pub off sued in official capacity

TEST: when case makes government APPROPRIATE FUNDS from the public treasury

PROFESSIONAL VIDEO V. TESDA

- An unincorporated instrumentality operating under a specific charter, it is equipped with bothexpress and implied powers.—Under these terms, both constitutional and statutory, we do notbelieve that the role and status of TESDA can seriously be contested: it is an unincorporatedinstrumentality of the government, directly attached to the DOLE through the participation of theSecretary of Labor as its Chairman, for the performance of governmental functions—i.e., thehandling of formal and non-formal education and training, and skills development. As anunincorporated instrumentality operating under a specific charter, it is equipped with both expressand implied powers, and all State immunities fully apply to it.

- The proscribed suit that the state immunity principle covers takes on various forms.—Theproscribed suit that the state immunity principle covers takes on various forms, namely: a suitagainst the Republic by name; a suit against an unincorporated government agency; a suitagainst a government agency covered by a charter with respect to the agency’s performance of

governmental functions; and a suit that on its face is against a government officer, but where theultimate liability will fall on the government. In the present case, the writ of attachment was issuedagainst a government agency covered by its own charter. As discussed above, TESDA performsgovernmental functions, and the issuance of certifications is a task within its function ofdeveloping and establishing a system of skills standardization, testing, and certification in thecountry. From the perspective of this function, the core reason for the existence of stateimmunity applies—i.e., the public policy reason that the performance of governmentalfunction cannot be hindered or delayed by suits , nor can these suits control the use anddisposition of the means for the performance of governmental functions.

- Even assuming that Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA) entered intoa proprietary contract with Professional Video, Inc. (PROVI) and thereby gave its implied consentto be sued, TESDA’s funds are still public in nature and, thus, cannot be the valid subjectof a writ of garnishment or attachment; Public funds cannot be the object of garnishmentproceedings even if the consent to be sued had been previously granted and the state liabilityadjudged

- Absent any actual disbursement, these funds form part of and Technical Education and SkillsDevelopment Authority’s (TESDA’s) public funds, and TESDA’s failure to pay ProfessionalVideo, Inc. (PROVI) the amount stated in the Certificate cannot be construed as an act offraudulent misapplication or embezzlement.

HEIRS OF MATEO PIDACAN V. ATO- State Immunity; Where the Director General of Air Transportation Office had informed the

landowners that the funding for the initial payment for the acquisition of their property was already


20/73


earmarked in the General Appropriations Act, such earmarking may be considered as theappropriation required by law in order that the landowners may be paid just compensation longdue them.

ATO V. RAMOS- The immunity from suit is based on the political truism that the State, as a sovereign, can do no

wrong. [Air Transportation Office vs. Ramos, 644 SCRA 36(2011)]- An unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of its

own enjoys immunity from suit because it is invested with an inherent power ofsovereignty.—. Accordingly, a claim for damages against the agency cannot prosper; otherwise,the doctrine of sovereign immunity is violated. However, the need to distinguish between anunincorporated government agency performing governmental function and one performingproprietary functions has arisen. The immunity has been upheld in favor of the former because itsfunction is governmental or incidental to such function; it has not been upheld in favor of the latterwhose function was not in pursuit of a necessary function of government but was essentially abusiness. [

- The Court of Appeals (CA) correctly appreciated the juridical character of the Air TransportationOffice (ATO) as an agency of the Government not performing a purely governmental orsovereign function.— but was instead involved in the management and maintenance of the

Loakan Airport, an activity that was not the exclusive prerogative of the State in its sovereigncapacity. Hence, the ATO had no claim to the State’s immunity from suit.

- The doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be successfully invoked to defeat a valid claim forcompensation arising from the taking without just compensation and without the properexpropriation proceedings being first resorted to of the plaintiffs’ property.

- The issue of whether or not the Air Transportation Office (ATO) could be sued without the State’sconsent has been rendered moot by the passage of Republic Act No. 9497, otherwise known asthe Civil Aviation Authority Act of 2008

CHINA NATIONAL V. SANTAMARIA--application of Doctrine of state immunity has been RESTRICTEDTO SOVEREIGN or govtl activities and cannot be extended to commercial/private and proprietary acts. inthis case, although CNMEG claims to be a GOCC, it failed to adduce evidence that it has not consentedto be sued under Chinese law. IT CANNOT CLAIM IMMUNITY FROM SUIT. in the absence of evidence

to the contrary, ti is presumed a GOCC WITHOUT an original charter. as a result, it has the capacity tosue and be sued under the corporation code.

HEIRS OF GAMBOA V. TEVES--view that govt, by concluding sale, has descended to the level of anoridnary citizen and stripped itself of the vestiges of immuity that is availbe in teh performance of govtlacts.the indirect sale of PLDT common shares to foreign investors partook of a PROPRIETARYBUSINESS TRANSACITON of the govt which was not undertaken as incident to a govtl function.accordingly, govt is vulnerable to estoppel . govt is PRECLUDED FFOM PENALIZEING these alieninvestors for an act performed upon its guarantee, through its facilities and with its imprimartur.

CONSENT TO BE SUED

How given: express or implied

EXPRES CONSENT:1. money claims arising from contract (CA 3039, 327 and PD 1415)

a. SAYSON V. SINGSON-- Action against the government auditors to approve payment topetitioner is a suit against the State and may not prosper without the latter’s consent.— Actually, the suit disguised as one for mandamus to compel the Auditors to approve thevouchers for payment, is a suit against the State, which cannot prosper or be entertainedby the Court except with the consent of the State * * *. In other words, the respondentshould have filed his claim with the General Auditing Office, under the provisions of Com.


21/73


Act 327 * * * which prescribe the conditions under which money claim against thegovernment may be filed * * * [Sayson vs. Singson, 54 SCRA 282(1973)]--claims must be submitted to COA first and if it does not have money to pay, file case incourt

2. Incorporation of GOCC (with original charter)

a. NHA V. GUIVELONDO--

Generally, funds and properties of the government cannot bethe object of garnishment proceedings even if the consent to be sued had beenpreviously granted and the state liability adjudged.The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private partieseither by general or special law, it may limit claimant’s action “only up to the completion ofproceedings anterior to the stage of execution” and that the power of the Courts endswhen the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not beseized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based onobvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be coveredby the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and public servicesrendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion ofpublic funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.38However, if the funds belong to a public corporation or a government-owned or controlled

corporation which is clothed with a personality of its own, separate and distinct from thatof the government, then its funds are not exempt from garnishment.39 This is so becausewhen the government enters into commercial business, it abandons its sovereigncapacity and is to be treated like any other corporation.40In the case of petitioner NHA, the matter of whether its funds and properties are exemptfrom garnishment has already been resolved. Having a juridical personality separate anddistinct from the government, the funds of such government-owned and controlledcorporations and non-corporate agency, although considered public in character, are notexempt from garnishment.the funds of petitioner NHA are not exempt from garnishment or execution.

IMPLIED CONSENT1. Govt enters into business contracts (proprietary acts i.e. public utilities; they are not necessary and

only for convenience)2. inequitable to claim immunity (i.e. non payment of just compensation in expropriation cases; propertyowner files INVERSE CONDEMNATION ACTION--DOES NOT PRESCRIBE)3. govt initiates a complaint and thereby opens itself to counterclaim

WHEN GOVT ENTER INTO BUSINESS CONTRACTS

PTA V. PGDEI--application of state immunity is proper only when proceedings arise out of sovereigntransactions cannot in cases of commercial activities or econ affairs. the state, in entering into a businesscontract, descends to the level of individual and is deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued.since the intramural golf course expansion projects partakes of PROPRIETARY CHARacter entered byPTA and philgolf, PTA CANNOT AVOID ITS FINANCIAL LIABILITY by merely invoking immunity fromsuit.

ROYAL PREROGATIVE OF DISHONESTY--used when state erroneously claims immunity because it isdishonest for it to claim the same. thus, when the court finds it inequitable, the court will rule that therehas been consent or waiver.

INEQUITABLE TO CLAIM IMMUNITY

EPG CONSTRUCTION V. VIGILAR- To our mind, it would be the apex of injustice and highly inequitable for us to defeat petitioners-

contractors’ right to be duly compensated for actual work performed and services rendered,


22/73


where both the government and the public have, for years, received and accepted benefits fromsaid housing project and reaped the fruits of petitioners-contractors’ honest toil and labor

- The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetratingan injustice on a citizen.—Under these circumstances, respondent may not validly invoke theRoyal Prerogative of Dishonesty and conveniently hide under the State’s cloak ofinvincibility against suit, considering that this principle yields to certain settled exceptions. True

enough, the rule, in any case, is not absolute for it does not say that the state may not be suedunder any circumstance. “the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as aninstrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen.”

- The Supreme Court—as the staunch guardian of the citizen’ rights and welfare-cannot sanctionan injustice so patent on its face, and allow itself to be an instrument in the perpetration thereof[EPG Construction Co. vs. Vigilar, 354 SCRA 566(2001)]

REPUBLIC V. UNIMEX- Although it may be gainsaid that the satisfaction of respondent’s demand will ultimately fall on the

government, and that, under the political doctrine of “state immunity,” it cannot be held liable forgovernmental acts (jus imperii), we still hold that petitioner cannot escape its liability. Thecircumstances of this case warrant its exclusion from the purview of the state immunity doctrine.

- Justice and equity now demand that the State’s cloak of invincibility against suit and liability be

shredded.— as the staunch guardian of the people’s rights and welfare, cannot sanction aninjustice so patent in its face, and allow itself to be an instrument in the perpetration thereof. Overtime, courts have recognized with almost pedantic adherence that what is inconvenient andcontrary to reason is not allowed in law. Justice and equity now demand that the State’s cloak ofinvincibility against suit and liability be shredded

GOVT INITIATES A COMPLAINT; OPEN TO COUTNERCLAIM

FROILAN V. PAN ORIENTAL- The filing by the Government of a complaint in intervention is in effect a waiver of its right of

nonsuability. [Froilan vs. Pan Oriental Shipping Co., 95 Phil. 905(1954)]

REPUBLIC V. SANDIGANBAYAN

- When the State, through its duly authorized officers, takes the initiative in a suit against a privateparty, it thereby descends to the level of a private individual and thus opens itself to whatevercounterclaims or defenses the latter may have against it.—In a last-ditch attempt to escapeliability, petitioner Republic, through the PCGG, invokes state immunity from suit. As argued, theorder for it to pay the value of the delinquent shares would fix monetary liability on a governmentagency, thus necessitating the appropriation of public funds to satisfy the judgment claim. But, asprivate respondent Benedicto correctly countered, the PCGG fails to take stock of one of theexceptions to the state immunity principle, i.e., when the government itself is the suitor, as in CivilCase No. 0034. Where, as here, the State itself is no less the plaintiff in the main case, immunityfrom suit cannot be effectively invoked. [Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Second Division), 484SCRA 119(2006)]

SCOPE OF CONSENT

UNDER ACT 3083

COMMISSIONER V. SAN DIEGO - Doctrine of immunity from suit does not apply to expropriation proceedings.—It is elementary that

in expropriation proceedings, the state precisely submits to the court’s jurisdiction and asks thecourt to affirm its lawful right to take the property sought to be expropriated for the public use orpurpose described in its complaint and to determine the amount of just compensation to be paidtherefore. The doctrine of immunity of the state from suit does not apply.


23/73


- While the State has given its consent to be sued in compensation cases, the pauper-claimanttherein must look specifically to the Compensation Guarantee Fund provided by the Workmen’sCompensation Act for the corresponding disbursement in satisfaction of his claim, since the Statein Act 3083, the general law waiving its immunity from suit “upon any money claim involvingliability arising from contract express or implied,” imposed the limitation in Sec. 7 thereof that “noexecution shall issue upon any judgment rendered by any Court against the Government of the

(Philippines) under the provisions of this Act;” and that otherwise, the claimant would have toprosecute his money claim against the State under Commonwealth Act 327. [Commissioner ofPublic Highways vs. San Diego, 31 SCRA 616(1970)]

UNDER A CHARTER- PNB V. CIR

EXECUTION

it is only valid if strictly a suit against the state. if there was valid consent, it will be valid from initiationonly up to rendition of judgment and DOES NOT EXTEND TO EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT. judgmentmust be presented to COA to determine if there is money. if none, the claim will be submitted to congressfor allocation in the appropriations bill. congress may fund or not fund it.

EXEUCTION MAY NOT ISSUE UPON SUCH JUDGMETN because statues waiving non-suability do notauthorize seizure of property so statisy jdugetns recored from such action. statutes only convey animplication that congress will recognize such judgmetn as final and make provisions for its fullsatisfaction.

DFA V. NLRC- Except in the specified cases of borrowing and guarantee operations, as well as the purchase,

sale and underwriting of securities, the ADB enjoys immunity from legal process of every form.The Bank’s officers, on their part, enjoy immunity in respect of all acts performed by them in theirofficial capacity. The Charter and the Headquarters Agreement granting these immunities andprivileges are treaty covenants and commitments voluntarily assumed by the Philippinegovernment which must be respected. [Department of Foreign Affairs vs. NLRC, 262 SCRA39(1996)]

REPUBLIC V. HIDALGO- No costs shall be allowed against the government of the Philippine Islands where the government

is the unsuccessful party [Republic vs. Hidalgo, 477 SCRA 32(2005)]- It is settled that when the State gives its consent to be sued, it does not thereby necessarily

consent to an unrestrained execution against it. Tersely put, when the State waives its immunity,all it does, in effect, is to give the other party an opportunity to prove, if it can, that the state has aliability. In Republic v. Villasor this Court, in nullifying the issuance of an alias writ of executiondirected against the funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to satisfy a final and executory judgment, has explained, thus—. . . The universal rule that where the State gives its consent tobe sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant’s action “only upto the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution” and that the power of theCourts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not beseized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obviousconsiderations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by thecorrespondent appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered bythe State cannot be allowed to paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from theirlegitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.

REPUBLIC V. NLRC- Proclamation No. 50’s provision that the APT, among other things, can “sue and be sued”

indubitably shows that APT can be haled to court


24/73


- When the State gives its consent to be sued, it does not thereby necessarily consent to anunrestrained execution against it

SUABILITY V. LIABILITY--If there was waiver of consent by the state--YOU CAN SUE. but it does not mean that state is liable.proof must be adduced still.

--SUABILITY--fact of having been opportunity to sue the state; dependent on presence of consent--LIABILITY--dependent on facts/evidence applicable to the laws of the case

QUASI DELICT COMMITTED BY SPECIAL AGENT

MERTITT V. GOVT--a special law may be passed to enable a person to sue the govt for an alleged quasidelictMUNICIPALITY V. JUDGE--municipality CANNOT be held liable for the torts committed by its regularemployee engaged in the discharge of GOVTL functions. the death of the passenger imposed NO duty topay monetary compensationMUN V. DUMDUM--Consent is IMPLIED when govt enters into business contracts or it may beEMBODIED IN GEN/SPECIAL LAW i.e LCG which vests LGUs with certain corporate powers--to sueand be sued. further, writ of attachment is useless since property of municipality MAY NOT BE

SUBJECTED TO WRITS OF EXECUTION AND GARNISHMENT UNLESS THERE HAS BEEN ACORRESPONDING APPROPRIATION PROVIDED BY LAW.

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY OF FOREIGN STATES--There has to be consent first.--officers--> personal capacity (allowed); official functions (consent required)

1963 VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC OFFICIALS--covers HEADS OF MISSION and ambassadors (ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY)--Consuls (relative immunity only; if not related sa official functions--they can b sued)

IMMUNITY BY REASON OF AGREEMENT/TREATIESUN (in re: WW II)--absolute immunity

NGO--relative ADB--immune except when it relates to banking functions

IMMUNITY OF CERTAIN GOVT OFFICERS

IMPEACHABLE OFFICERS--i.e. SC justice, president,THEY ARE IMMUNE ONLY DURING THEIR INCUMBENCY

LEGISLATIVE COMPOSITION/QUALIFICATIONS/TERM--Know the principles in domicileMITRA V. COMELEC--comelec determined fitness of a dwelling based on very personal/subjectvieassessment standards when teh law is replete with standards that can be used; when dwelling qulifies asresidence, his capacity to decorate the place or lack of it is IMMATERIAL.

ASSISTIO V. AGUIRRE--to effect a NEW domicile: animus manendi coupled with animus non reertendi.(3 requisites to effect a transfer)

TALAGA V. COMELEC--No local elec official shall serve for more than 3 consecutive terms in the sameposition. --to avoid the evil of a a single person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial juris as a result of a prolonged stay in the office.


25/73


SABILI V. COMELEC--To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must becoupled with conduct indicative of the intention to make it one's fixed and permanent place of abode. it isnot required that candidate should have his own house in order to establish his residence in a place. it isenough tht he should live in the locality, even in a rented house or that of a friend or relative.

APPORTIONMETN/DISTRICTS

SEMA V. COMELEC- The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative

districts out of existing ones. Congress exercises these powers through a law that Congress itselfenacts, and not through a law that regional or local legislative bodies enact. The allowablemembership of the House of Representatives can be increased, and new legislative districts ofCongress can be created, only through a national law passed by Congress.

- An inferior legislative body, created by a superior legislative body, cannot change themembership of the superior legislative body. [Sema vs. Commission on Elections, 558 SCRA700(2008)]

- Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous regions, expressly orimpliedly, to create or reapportion legislative districts for Congress. [Sema vs. Commission onElections, 558 SCRA 700(2008)]

ALDABA V. COMELEC- Under Executive Order (E.O.) No. 135, the population indicators Congress used to measure

Malolos City’s compliance with the constitutional limitation are unreliable and non-authoritative[Aldaba vs.Commission on Election, 615 SCRA 564(2010)]

- this fell short of EO 135’s requirements that (a) for intercensal years, the certification should bebased on a set of demographic projections and

- 566-- 566- SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED- Aldaba vs.Commission on Election- estimates declared official by the National Statistical and Coordination Board (NSCB); (b)

certifications on intercensal population estimates will be as of the middle of every year; and (c)certifications based on projections or estimates must be issued by the NSO Administrator or hisdesignated certifying officer. [Aldaba vs.Commission on Election, 615 SCRA 564(2010)]

- The Liga ng Barangay is not authorized to conduct population census much less during off-census years.— [Aldaba vs.Commission on Election, 615 SCRA 564(2010)]

NAVARRO V. ERMITA- The Constitution clearly mandates that the creation of local government units must follow the

criteria established in the Local Government Code. Any derogation of or deviation from thecriteria prescribed in the Local Government Code violates Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.[Navarro vs. Ermita, 612 SCRA 131(2010)]

- Gerrymandering is a term employed to describe an apportionment of representative districts socontrived

consti law i review notes (montejo()-4

Documents