People vs PerezFacts:1. Respondent (Isaac Perez), while holding a discussion with several persons on political matters in Pilar, Sorsogon, uttered the phrases: Asin an mangna Filipinos na caparejo co, maninigong gumamit nin sundang asinhaleon an payo no Wood huli can saiyang recomendacion sa pag raot can Filipinas (and theFilipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cuttingoff Woods head for having recommended a bad thing for the Philippines).2. Leonard Wood was the Governor-General during that time, April 1, 1922.For said phrases, Perez was accused for violating Article 256 of thePenal Code.Issue: WON the phrases uttered by Perez is within the prerogative of freedom of speechRuling: 1.It is our course fundamentally true thatthe provisions of Act No.292(Treason and Sedition Law) must not be interpreted so asto abridge the freedom of speech and the right of the people peaceably toassembly and petition the Government for redress of grievances. Criticism is permitted to penetrate even tothe foundations of Government.Criticism, no matter how severe, on the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary, is within the range ofliberty of speech, unless the intention and effect be seditious.But when the intention and effect of the act is seditious, the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and press and ofassembly and petition must yield to punitive measures designed tomaintain the prestige of constituted authority, the supremacy of the constitution andthe laws, and the existence of the State.2. In the case at bar, the personmaligned by the Accused is the ChiefExecutive of the Philippine Islands.His official position, like the presidency of the US and other high offices, under a democratic form of government instead of affording immunity from promiscuous comment, seems rather to invite abusive attacks.But in this instance, the attack on the Governor-General passes the furthestbounds of free speech and common decency.More than a figure of speech was intended.There is a seditious tendency of feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the Government and obedient to the laws.Being the representative of the executive civil authority in the Philippines and of thesovereign power, a seditious attack on the Governor-General is an attackon the rights of the Filipino people and on American sovereignty.3. As a matter of fact, Section 8 of the same act contemplates the said situation.Forsuch reasons, Perez has uttered seditious words.He has made a statement anddone an act which tended to instigate others to cabal or meet together forunlawful purposes.He has made a statement and one an act which suggested andincited rebellious conspiracies, which tended to stir up the people against thelawful authorities, which tended to disturb the peace of the communityand thesafety or order of the Government.Dennis v. United StatesBrief Fact Summary. The Petitioners, Dennis and others (Petitioners) were convicted for (1) willfully and knowingly conspiring to organize as the Communist Party of the United States, a group whose members advocated the overthrow of the United States government by force and (2) willfully and knowingly advocating and teaching the duty to do the same. The constitutionality of the statute under which the Petitioners were convicted was challenged.Synopsis of Rule of Law. For an impediment on free expression to be permissible, the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability of coming about, must sufficiently outweigh the invasion of free speech necessary to avoid the danger.Facts. The Smith Act (the Act) made it a criminal offense for a person to knowingly or willfully advocate the overthrowing of any government in the United States by force or to attempt to commit or conspire to commit the crime the same. The Petitioners were brought up on charges under the Act for allegedly (1) willfully and knowingly conspiring to organize as the Communist Party of the United States, a group whose members advocated the overthrow of the United States government by force and (2) willfully and knowingly advocating and teaching the duty to do the same. It was clear from the record that the leaders of the Communist Party intended to initiate a revolution when the opportunity came. The Trial Court found the Petitioners guilty. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The constitutionality of the statute under which the Petitioners were convicted was challenged.Issue. Was the statute invalid by its own terms because it prohibited academic discussions on topics such as that of the merits of Marxism-Leninism?Held. No. The Court of Appeals is affirmed.Chief Justice Fred Vinson (J. Vinson) We must apply the clear and present danger test. Accordingly, we note that the overthrow of the Government by force is certainly a substantial enough interest for the Government to limit speech. Obviously, clear and present danger does not mean the government may not act until the Putsch has been plotted and on is the verge of being executed.On the facts, the court was convinced that the requisite danger to act existed here: (1) the formation by the Petitioners of a highly organized conspiracy with rigidly disciplined members subject to call when the leaders (the Petitioners) felt it was time for action; (2) the inflammable nature of world conditions; (3) similar uprisings in other countries; and (4) the touch and go nature of our relations with other countries with whom the Petitioners were ideologically aligned. Thus, the convictions of the Petitioners were justified.Gonzales vs COMELECFacts: RA 4880 which took effect on June 17, 1967, prohibiting the too early nomination of candidates and limiting the period of election campaign or partisan political activity was challenged on constitutional grounds. More precisely, the basic liberties of free speech and free press, freedom of assembly and freedom of association are invoked to nullify the act. Petitioner Cabigao was, at the time of the filing the petition, an incumbent councilor in the 4th District of Manila and the Nacionalista Party official candidate for Vice-Mayor of Manila to which he was subsequently elected on November 11, 1967; petitioner Gonzales, on the other hand, is a private individual, a registered voter in the City of Manila and a political leader of his co-petitioner. There was the further allegation that the nomination of a candidate and the fixing of period of election campaign are matters of political expediency and convenience which only political parties can regulate or curtail by and among themselves through self-restraint or mutual understanding or agreement and that the regulation and limitation of these political matters invoking the police power, in the absence of clear and present danger to the state, would render the constitutional rights of petitioners meaningless and without effect. Senator Lorenzo M. Taada was asked to appear as amicus curiae, and elucidated that Act No. 4880 could indeed be looked upon as a limitation on the preferred rights of speech and press, of assembly and of association. He did justify its enactment however under the clear and present danger doctrine, there being the substantive evil of elections, whether for national or local officials, being debased and degraded by unrestricted campaigning, excess of partisanship and undue concentration in politics with the loss not only of efficiency in government but of lives as well. The Philippine Bar Association, the Civil Liberties Union, the U.P. Law Center and the U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle were requested to give their opinions. Respondents contend that the act was based on the police power of the state.Issue: Whether or Not RA 4880 unconstitutional.Held: Yes. As held in Cabansag v. Fernandez there are two tests that may supply an acceptable criterion for permissible restriction on freedom of speech. These are the clear and present danger rule and the 'dangerous tendency' rule. The first, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the 'substantive evil' sought to be prevented. It has the advantage of establishing according to the above decision a definite rule in constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words may be publicly established. The "dangerous tendency rule" is such that If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to prevent. The challenged statute could have been more narrowly drawn and the practices prohibited more precisely delineated to satisfy the constitutional requirements as to a valid limitation under the clear and present danger doctrine. As the author Taada clearly explained, such provisions were deemed by the legislative body to be part and parcel of the necessary and appropriate response not merely to a clear and present danger but to the actual existence of a grave and substantive evil of excessive partisanship, dishonesty and corruption as well as violence that of late has invariably marred election campaigns and partisan political activities in this country.The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for redress of grievances. As in the case of freedom of expression, this right is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent.The prohibition of any speeches, announcements or commentaries, or the holding of interviews for or against the election of any party or candidate for public office and the prohibition of the publication or distribution of campaign literature or materials, against the solicitation of votes whether directly or indirectly, or the undertaking of any campaign literature or propaganda for or against any candidate or party is repugnant to a constitutional command.Eastern Broadcasting vs Dans Jr.Facts: A petition was filed to reopen the Radio Station DYRE. DYRE was summarily closed on grounds of national security. The radio station was allegedly used to incite people to sedition. Petitioner, DYRE contends that they were denied due process. There was no hearing to establish factual evidence for the closure. Furthermore, the closure of the radio station violates freedom of expression. Before the court could even promulgate a decision upon the Issue raised, Petitioner, through its president Mr. Rene Espina, filed a motion to withdraw the petition. The rights of the station were sold to a new owner, Manuel Pastrana; who is no longer interested in pursuing the case. Despite the case becoming moot and academic, (because there are no longer interested parties, thus the dismissal of the case) the Supreme Court still finds that there is need to pass a RESOLUTION for the guidance of inferior courts and administrative tribunals in matters as this case.Issues: (1) Whether or not due process was exercised in the case of DYRE.(2) Whether or not the closure of DYRE is a violation of the Constitutional Right of Freedom of Expression.Held: The court finds that the closure of the Radio Station in 1980 as null and void. The absence of a hearing is a violation of Constitutional Rights. The primary requirements in administrative proceedings are laid down in the case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relation (69 Phil.635). The Ang Tibay Doctrine should be followed before any broadcast station may be closed. The Ang Tibay Doctrine provides the following requirements: (1) The right to hearing, includes the right to present ones case and submit evidence presented. (2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented(3) The decision must have something to support itself.(4) Evidence must be substantial (reasonable evidence that is adequate to support conclusion)(5) Decision must be based on the evidence presented at hearing(6) The tribunal body must act on its own independent consideration of law and facts and not simply accept subordinates views(7) Court must render decision in such a manner that the proceeding can know the various issued involved and reasons for decisions rendered.

The court stresses that while there is no controlling and precise definition of Due Process, it gives an unavoidable standard that government actions must conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty and property is valid. The closure of the radio station is like wise a violation of the constitutional right of freedom of speech and expression. The court stresses that all forms of media, whether print or broadcast are entitled to this constitutional right. Although the government still has the right to be protected against broadcasts which incite the listeners to violently overthrow it. The test for the limitation of freedom of expression is the clear and present danger rule. If in the circumstances that the media is used in such nature as to create this danger that will bring in such evils, then the law has the right to prevent it. However, Radio and television may not be used to organize a rebellion or signal a start of widespread uprising. The freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative democracy. The people continues to have the right to be informed on public affairs and broadcast media continues to have the pervasive influence to the people being the most accessible form of media. Therefore, broadcast stations deserve the the special protection given to all forms of media by the due process and freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution.Ayer Prod. PTY. LTD vs Judge CapulongFACTS: Hal McElroy owns the production company, Ayer Productions Pty Ltd. Through this movie production company, he intended to make a movie that would depict the historic peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA in a six hour mini-series. The proposed motion picture is entitled The Four Day Revolution, and was endorsed by the Movie Television Review and Classification Board as well as the other government agencies consulted. General Fidel Ramos also signified his approval of the intended film production. Petitioner McElroy had likewise informed Juan Ponce Enrile about the projected motion picture, enclosing a synopsis of it. Enrile replied that he would not and will not approve of the use, appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his name or picture or that of any member of his family in any cinema or television production. Because of this, petitioners deleted the name of Enrile in the movie script and proceeded to film the projected motion picture. Despite of the deletion, Respondent Sen. Enrile files a case against private petitioners for the production and filming of the projected motion picture The Four Day Revolution, which relates to the non-bloody change of government that took place at EDSA, for its unlawful intrusion upon the formers right to privacy.Petitioners contends that the freedom to produce and film includes in the freedom of speech and expression; and the subject matter of the motion picture is one of public interest and concern and not on the individual private life of respondent senator.ISSUE: WON the projected motion picture is guaranteed under the right to free speech.HELD: Yes. Freedom of speech and expression includes freedom to produce motion pictures and to exhibit them. What is involved is a prior restraint by the Judge upon the exercise of speech and of expression by petitioners. Because of the preferred character of speech and of expression, a weighty presumption of invalidity vitiates measures of prior restraint. The Judge should have stayed his hand considering that the movie was yet uncompleted and therefore there was no "clear and present danger." The subject matter of the movie does not relate to the private life of Ponce Enrile. The intrusion is no more than necessary to keep the film a truthful historical account. He is, after all, a public figure. The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case between freedom of speech and of expression and the right of privacy may be marked out in terms of a requirement that the proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful and historical in its presentation of facts. There must be no showing of a reckless disregard of truth. Notes: Ayer sought to produce a movie on the 4-day revolution. Enrile, who had previously been asked for the use of his character in the movie and had refused the offer, sued to enjoin the filming because he did not want any mention of his and his family's name. The SC lifted the injunction issued by the lower court on the ground that it amounted to prior restraint, which is no better if imposed by the courts than if imposed by administrative bodies or by ecclesiatical officials.In Ayer, the reference to Enrile is unavoidable because his name is part of history and this cannot be changed or altered; thus his name can be used so long as only his public life is dwelled only. But in Lagunzad, although Moises Padilla was also a public figure, the movie dealth with both the public and private lives of Moises Padilla.US vs OBrienBrief Fact Summary. The Defendant, OBrien (Defendant), burned his selective service registration certificate and was convicted of violating a federal statute making it a crime to mutilate the certificate. The Defendant appealed, noting that his act was symbolic speech and should fall under the protection of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution).Synopsis of Rule of Law. This case is the basis for the OBrien test: When speech and nonspeech elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify the limitations on First Amendment speech. A governmental regulation is sufficiently justified (1) if it is within the constitutional power of the government; (2) if it furthers governmental interest, which is (3) unrelated to the suppression of free expression and (4) if the governments interest outweighs the suppression of speech.Facts. The District Court convicted the Defendant for violating the statute, and the Court of Appeals Reversed. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) granted certiorari.Issue. This case considers whether symbolic speech may be suppressed when the actions done in furtherance of the speech are contrary to governmental interest.Held. Reversed.The Supreme Court found that the governmental interest in preserving selective service registration cards outweighed Defendants interest in making his symbolic speech and that Congress had a legitimate and substantial interest in preventing the destruction of these cards. Further the court notes that unrestrained destruction of the cards would disrupt the functioning of the selective service system, which was a greater problem than the abridgment of Defendants rights. When considering suppression of symbolic speech, the interest of the government may be taken into consideration, if it outweighs the protection afforded by the First Amendment of the Constitution.Sanidad vs COMELECFacts: On 23 October 1989, RA 6766 (Act providing for an organic act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region) was enacted into law. The plebiscite was scheduled 30 January 1990. The Comelec, by virtue of the power vested by the 1987 Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), RA 6766 and other pertinent election laws, promulgated Resolution 2167, to govern the conduct of the plebiscite on the said Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region. Pablito V. Sanidad, a newspaper columnist of Overview for the Baguio Midland Courier assailed the constitutionality of Section 19 (Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcers) of the said resolution, which provides During the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on plebiscite day, no mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues.

Issue: Whether columnists are prohibited from expressing their opinions, or should be under Comelec regulation, during plebiscite periods. Held: Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the Comelec was the power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants issued for the operation of transportation or other public utilities, media of communication or information to the end that equal opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates are ensured. Neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11-b, 2nd paragraph of RA 6646 (a columnist, commentator, announcer or personality, who is a candidate for any elective office is required to take a leave of absence from his work during the campaign period) can be construed to mean that the Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution 2167 has no statutory basis.National Press Club vs COMELECFacts: Petitioners in these cases consist of representatives of the mass media which are prevented from selling or donating space and time for political advertisements; two (2) individuals who are candidates for office (one for national and the other for provincial office) in the coming May 1992 elections; and taxpayers and voters who claim that their right to be informed of election Issue and of credentials of the candidates is being curtailed. It is principally argued by petitioners that Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 66461 invades and violates the constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression. Petitioners maintain that the prohibition imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to censorship, because it selects and singles out for suppression and repression with criminal sanctions, only publications of a particular content, namely, media-based election or political propaganda during the election period of 1992. It is asserted that the prohibition is in derogation of media's role, function and duty to provide adequate channels of public information and public opinion relevant to election Issue. Further, petitioners contend that Section 11 (b) abridges the freedom of speech of candidates, and that the suppression of media-based campaign or political propaganda except those appearing in the Comelec space of the newspapers and on Comelec time of radio and television broadcasts, would bring about a substantial reduction in the quantity or volume of information concerning candidates and Issue in the election thereby curtailing and limiting the right of voters to information and opinion. Issue: Whether or Not Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 constitutional.Held: Yes. It seems a modest proposition that the provision of the Bill of Rights which enshrines freedom of speech, freedom of expression and freedom of the press has to be taken in conjunction with Article IX (C) (4) which may be seen to be a special provision applicable during a specific limited period i.e., "during the election period." In our own society, equality of opportunity to proffer oneself for public office, without regard to the level of financial resources that one may have at one's disposal, is clearly an important value. One of the basic state policies given constitutional rank by Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution is the egalitarian demand that "the State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law." The essential question is whether or not the assailed legislative or administrative provisions constitute a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the operations of communication and information enterprises during an election period, or whether such act has gone beyond permissible supervision or regulation of media operations so as to constitute unconstitutional repression of freedom of speech and freedom of the press. The Court considers that Section 11 (b) has not gone outside the permissible bounds of supervision or regulation of media operations during election periods.Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and enforceability. By virtue of the operation of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution, Section 11 (b) is limited in its applicability in time to election periods. Section 11 (b) does not purport in any way to restrict the reporting by newspapers or radio or television stations of news or news-worthy events relating to candidates, their qualifications, political parties and programs of government. Moreover, Section 11 (b) does not reach commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by reporters or broadcasters or editors or commentators or columnists in respect of candidates, their qualifications, and programs and so forth, so long at least as such comments, opinions and beliefs are not in fact advertisements for particular candidates covertly paid for. In sum, Section 11 (b) is not to be read as reaching any report or commentary other coverage that, in responsible media, is not paid for by candidates for political office. Section 11 (b) as designed to cover only paid political advertisements of particular candidates.The limiting impact of Section 11 (b) upon the right to free speech of the candidates themselves is not unduly repressive or unreasonable.Adiong vs COMELECFACTS: Public respondent promulgated a resolution prohibiting the posting of decals and stickers on mobile places, public or private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized posting areas that COMELEC fixes. Petitioner senatorial candidate assails said resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles, wherein it is his last medium to inform the electorate that he is a senatorial candidate, due to the ban on radio, tv and print political advertisements.ISSUE: WON a resolution prohibiting posting of decals and stickers is constitutional.HELD: No. The COMELECs prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on mobile places whether public or private except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional grounds.-The COMELECs prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on mobile places whether public or private except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional grounds.2. Constitutional Law; Commission on Elections; Freedom of Speech; The qualitative significance of freedom of expression arises from the fact that it is the matrix, the indispensable condition of nearly every other freedom.-This qualitative significance of freedom of expression arises from the fact that it is the matrix, the indispensable condition of nearly every other freedom. (Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 [1937]; Salonga v. Pao, 134 SCRA 438 [1985]) It is difficult to imagine how the other provisions of the Bill of Rights and the right to free elections may be guaranteed if the freedom to speak and to convince or persuade is denied and taken away.3. Constitutional Law; Commission on Elections; Freedom of Speech; Verily, the restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizens private property which in this case is a privately-owned vehicle.-The resolution prohibits the posting of decals and stickers not more than eight and one-half (8-1/2) inches in width and fourteen (14) inches in length in any place, including mobile places whether public or private except in areas designated by the COMELEC. Verily, the restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizens private property, which in this case is a privately-owned vehicle. In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.4. Constitutional Law; Commission on Elections; Freedom of Speech; The prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on mobile places whether public or private except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be justified by the Constitution.-In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on mobile places whether public or private except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be justified by the Constitution.