Laurel vs GarciaGR 92013 July 25, 1990.Facts:Petitioners seek to stop the Philippine Government to sell the Roppongi Property, which is located in Japan. It is one of the properties given by the Japanese Government as reparations for damage done by the latter to the former during the war.Petitioner argues that under Philippine Law, the subject property is property of public dominion. As such, it is outside the commerce of men. Therefore, it cannot be alienated.Respondents aver that Japanese Law, and not Philippine Law, shall apply to the case because the property is located in Japan. They posit that the principle of lex situs applies.WON Philippine Law applies to the case at bar.The answer is in the affirmative.We see no reason why a conflict of law rule should apply when no conflict of law situation exists. A conflict of law situation arises only when: (1) There is a dispute over the title or ownership of an immovable, such that the capacity to take and transfer immovables, the formalities of conveyance, the essential validity and effect of the transfer, or the interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are to be determined; and (2) A foreign law on land ownership and its conveyance is asserted to conflict with a domestic law on the same matters. Hence, the need to determine which law should apply.In the instant case, none of the above elements exists.The issues are not concerned with validity of ownership or title. There is no question that the property belongs to the Philippines. The issue is the authority of the respondent officials to validly dispose of property belonging to the State. And the validity of the procedures adopted to effect its sale. This is governed by Philippine Law. The rule of lex situs does not apply.The assertion that the opinion of the Secretary of Justice sheds light on the relevance of the lex situs rule is misplaced. The opinion does not tackle the alienability of the real properties procured through reparations nor the existence in what body of the authority to sell them. In discussing who are capable of acquiring the lots, the Secretary merely explains that it is the foreign law which should determine who can acquire the properties so that the constitutional limitation on acquisition of lands of the public domain to Filipino citizens and entities wholly owned by Filipinos is inapplicable.

CHEESMAN V. IACShort summary: American married to a Filipina. Filipina wife sold land and house on it, initially w/o protest from American husband, but later contesting it, raising that the sale was made w/o his knowledge and consent. Court held that since he is an alien who is prohibitted from owning land in RP, he cannot claim that he has a share in the conjugal property and thus, has no legal standing to void the sale.Facts:-Thomas Cheesman (American) and Criselda (Filipino) were married in 1970, got separated in 1981-Before they got separated, Criselda was able to purchase a land. Although aware of the sale and the fact that the property was only in the name of his wife, Thomas never objected to the said transaction-tax declarations where issued in the name of Criselda-Criselda exercised exclusive management over the property-In 1981 (ooohkaya), Criselda sold the property. Thomas now complains-Thomas filed for ANNULMENT OF THE SALE: Sale executed w/o his knowledge and consentDefense:0. Thomas is American, disqualified to own or have any interest in real propertiesTC1: sale VOID (for Thomas)-the buyer filed PETITION FOR RELIEF: there was fraud, mistake or excusable negligence, seriously impairing her right to present her case adequately Granted by TC Summary judgment:2. Presumption that all properties acquired during the marriage belongs exclusively to the conjugal partnership DOES NOT APPLY because Thomas, an American Citizen, is disqualified under Consti to acquire and own real propertiesWON Thomas can contest the validity of the Contract? NO1. 3 factual matters affirmed by both TC and CA:(1) there was fraud, mistake or excusable negligence w/c seriously impaired the rights of the buyer(2) the property was bought by Criselda using the funds she had saved previous to the marriage(3) Criselda was the sole owner of the property1. Art XIV, Section 14, 1973 ConstitutionSave in cases of hereditary succession, no private land shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of public domain-Thomas had no capacity or personality to question the subsequent sale of the property by his wife on the theory that by doing so he is merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property1. Thomas and Criselda have no conjugal property-or else Consti violated: not only would he have interest over the land, he would have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition as well-SC didn't discuss WON Thomas could recover from his wife if ever the funds used in buying the land was not Criselda's but their shared money

RELLOSA VS. GAW CHEE HUNFACTS: On 1944, Dionisio Rellosa, a Filipino, sold to Gaw Chee Hun, aChinese, a parcel of land with ahouse erected on it, located inManila.Both parties entered into alease contract, whereby Rellosa, thevendor, occupied the land under thecondition that Gaw Chee obtainthe approval of the sale bythe Japanese Administration. Gaw Chee didnot obtain such approval. Rellosa now seeks toannul the sale andthelease. Gaw Chee, meanwhile, contends that suchsale was absoluteand conditional, the same not being contrary tolaw, morals and publicorder. He further states that Rellosa is estopped from asserting hisownership over the land, after having leased thesame from Gaw Chee,and thus, recognizing Gaw Chees title over the property.ISSUES: WON Rellosa can have the sale declared null and void andrecover the property considering the effectof the law governingrescission of contracts.HELD: The sale in question is null and void, but plaintiff is barred fromtaking the present action under the principle of paridelicto.RATIO: A party to an illegal contract cannot come into court to havehis illegal objects carried out. This is thedoctrine of In Pari Delicto.Rellosas sale of the land to Gaw Chee, analien is against theConstitution and is thus illegal. The Commonwealth Act provided thatsuch sale is not only unlawful but also null and void ab initio, that suchwill effect the annulling and cancelling ofthe title originally issued, andreverting the property and its improvements to theState.

EPIFANIA SARSOSA VDA. DE BARSOBIA and PACITA W. VALLARVs VICTORIANO T. CUENCO,G.R. No. L-33048. The lot in controversy is a one-half portion (onthe northern side) oftwo adjoiningparcels ofcoconutlandlocatedatBarrioMancapagao,Sagay,Camiguin,Misamisriental(nowCamiguin province)!Theentirelandwasownedpreviously"yacertain #eocadia Balisado, who had sold it to thespouses $atricio Barso"ia (now deceased) and%pifania Sarsosa, who were &ilipinociti'ens!%pifania who was then a widow, sold the land incontroversytoaChinese, nging$owholatertooactualpossessionandenjoyedthefruits of theproperty!nging$olaterlitigatedthepropertyto*ictorianoCuenco,anaturali'ed&ilipinowhoimmediately too possession ofthe property!%pifania later usurped the controverted propertywho later sold one-half of the property to $acita*allar!%pifania claimed that it was not her intention tosell the property as it was only to evidence herinde"tedness to ng ing $o!Cuencothenfiledacasefor&orci"le%ntryagainst %pifania "efore the MTC which was laterdismissedsincethe+uestionofpossessioncould not "e properly determined without firstsettling the issue on ownership!Cuenco later filed a case in the C& for recoveryof possession and ownership of the said land!The C& rendered a decision in favor of %pifaniaand *allar!The C later reversed the .ecision decreeinginsteadthatCuencowastheownerofthelitigated property!ISSUE: Whoistherightfulowneroftheproperty0CUENCO.There should "eno question that thesale of the landin questionin1234"y%pifaniatonging$owasine5istent and void from the "beginning, "because it was a contract executed against the mandatory provision of the1236Constitution,whichisane5pressionofpublic policy to conserve lands forthe &ilipinos!7ad this "been asuit "between %pifania and ng ing $o, she could have "been declared entitled to the litigatedland!Butthefactualset-uphaschanged!Thelitigatedproperty is now in the hands of a naturalized &Filipino! t is no longer owned "y a disqualified vendee! 8espondent,as a naturalized citizen, was constitutionally +qualified town the subject property! There would "e no more pu"licpolicyto"eservedinallowingpetitioner%pifaniatorecoverthelandasit isalready inthehands ofa qualifiedperson!/hile,strictlyspeaing,nging$o,privaterespondent9svendor,hadnorightsofownershiptotransmit,itisliewiseinescapa"lethatpetitioner%pifania had slept on her rights for :4 years from 1234to 124:! By her long inaction or ine5cusa"le neglect, she should "e held "erred from asserting her claim to the litigated property respondent,therefore,must"edeclaredto"ethe rightful owner of theproperty

SOCORRO VASQUEZ, plaintiff-appellant, vs. LI SENG GIAPand LI SENG GIAP & SONS, defendants-appellees.PADILLA, J.:That on January 22, 1940, plaintiff sold and transferred to defendant Li Seng Giap, then Chinesecitizen, for the sum of P14,500, a parcel of land together with a house of strong materials existingthereon. On August 21, 1940, defendant Li Seng Giap sold and transferred unto defendant LiSeng Giap & Sons, Inc., whose shareholdings then were owned by Chinese citizens, for the samesum of P14,500, the above-mentioned parcel of land, together with the improvements thereon,and duly registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 59684 of the Office of the Register ofDeeds for the city of Manila on August 23, 1940. Defendant Li Seng Giap was duly naturalizedas a Filipino citizen on May 10, 1941, under Certificate of Naturalization No. 515, the records ofwhich were duly reconstituted under an order of this Honorable Court in Case No. R-603 datedMay 24, 1946. Also defendant Li Seng Giap & Sons, Inc., is now a Filipino corporation, 96.67percent of its stock being owned by Filipinos, and duly authorized by its articles of incorporationto own, acquire or dispose of real properties.Issue:Whether or not naturalized Filipino citizens have a right to acquire and own land in thePhilippines.Held:Yes. The ban on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural but also urban lands, as construed bythis Court in the Krivenko case, is to preserve the nation's lands for future generations ofFilipinos, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but achieved by making lawful theacquisition of real estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by naturalization. The title to theparcel of land of the vendee, a naturalized Filipino citizen, being valid that of the domesticcorporation to which the parcel of land has been transferred, must also be valid, 96.67 per cent ofits capital stock being owned by Filipinos.

THE HOLY SEE vs. THE HON. ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, JR., as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 61 and STARBRIGHT SALES ENTERPRISES, INC.G.R. No. 101949 December 1, 1994FACTS:Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome, Italy, and is represented in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio; Private respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., is a domestic corporation engaged in the real estate business.This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square meters located in the Municipality of Paranaque registered in the name of petitioner. Said lot was contiguous with two other lots registered in the name of the Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC).The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent to the sellers. Later, Licup assigned his rights to the sale to private respondent.In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to private respondent, a dispute arose as to who of the parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters. Complicating the relations of the parties was the sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation (Tropicana).private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila for annulment of the sale of the three parcels of land, and specific performance and damages against petitioner, represented by the Papal Nuncio, and three other defendants: namely, Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., the PRC and Tropicanapetitioner and Msgr. Cirilos separately moved to dismiss the complaint petitioner for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit, and Msgr. Cirilos for being an improper party. An opposition to the motion was filed by private respondent.the trial court issued an order denying, among others, petitioners motion to dismiss after finding that petitioner shed off [its] sovereign immunity by entering into the business contract in question Petitioner forthwith elevated the matter to us. In its petition, petitioner invokes the privilege of sovereign immunity only on its own behalf and on behalf of its official representative, the Papal Nuncio.ISSUE:Whether the Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its business relations regarding selling a lot to a private entityRULING:The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of a foreign sovereign. The Holy See, through its Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has had diplomatic representations with the Philippine government since 1957 (Rollo, p. 87). This appears to be the universal practice in international relations.There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionisIf the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of a real estate business, surely the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of Lot 5-A were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. Private respondent failed to dispute said claim.Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The right of a foreign sovereign to acquire property, real or personal, in a receiving state, necessary for the creation and maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (Arts. 20-22). This treaty was concurred in by the Philippine Senate and entered into force in the Philippines on November 15, 1965.The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed with a governmental character. Petitioner did not sell Lot 5-A for profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose off the same because the squatters living thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation. The fact that squatters have occupied and are still occupying the lot, and that they stubbornly refuse to leave the premises, has been admitted by private respondent in its complaintPrivate respondent is not left without any legal remedy for the redress of its grievances. Under both Public International Law and Transnational Law, a person who feels aggrieved by the acts of a foreign sovereign can ask his own government to espouse his cause through diplomatic channels.Private respondent can ask the Philippine government, through the Foreign Office, to espouse its claims against the Holy See. Its first task is to persuade the Philippine government to take up with the Holy See the validity of its claims. Of course, the Foreign Office shall first make a determination of the impact of its espousal on the relations between the Philippine government and the Holy See (Young, Remedies of Private Claimants Against Foreign States, Selected Readings on Protection by Law of Private Foreign Investments 905, 919 [1964]). Once the Philippine government decides to espouse the claim, the latter ceases to be a private cause.WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the complaint in Civil Case No. 90-183 against petitioner is DISMISSED.

Wildvalley Shipping Co342 SCRA 213 Conflict of Laws Private International Law Proof of Foreign LawIn the Orinoco River in Venezuela, it is a rule that ships passing through it must be piloted by pilots familiar to the river. Hence, in 1988 Captain Nicandro Colon, master ofPhilippine Roxas, a ship owned by Philippine President Lines, Inc. (PPL), obtained the services of Ezzar Vasquez, a duly accredited pilot in Venezuela to pilot the ship in the Orinoco River. Unfortunately,Philippine Roxasran aground in the Orinoco River while being piloted by Vasquez. As a result, the stranded ship blocked other vessels. One such vessel was owned Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd. (WSC). The blockade caused $400k worth of losses to WSC as its ship was not able to make its delivery. Subsequently, WSC sued PPL in the RTC of Manila. It averred that PPL is liable for the losses it incurred under the laws of Venezuela, to wit:Reglamento General de la Ley de PilotajeandReglamento Para la Zona de Pilotaje No1 del Orinoco.These two laws provide that the master and owner of the ship is liable for the negligence of the pilot of the ship. Vasquez was proven to be negligent when he failed to check on certain vibrations that the ship was experiencing while traversing the river.ISSUE:Whether or not Philippine President Lines, Inc. is liable under the said Venezuelan laws.HELD:No. The two Venezuelan Laws were not duly proven as fact before the court. Only mere photocopies of the laws were presented as evidence. For a copy of a foreign publicdocumentto be admissible, the following requisites are mandatory:(1) It must be attested by the officer having legal custody of the records or by his deputy; and(2) It must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, viceconsularorconsularagent or foreign service officer, and with the seal of his office.And in case of unwritten foreign laws, the oral testimony of expert witnesses is admissible, as are printed and published books of reports of decisions of the courts of the country concerned if proved to be commonly admitted in such courts.Failure to prove the foreign laws gives rise to processual presumption where the foreign law is deemed to be the same as Philippine laws. Under Philippine laws, PPL nor Captain Colon cannot be held liable for the negligence of Vasquez. PPL and Colon had shown due diligence in selecting Vasquez to pilot the vessel. Vasquez is competent and was a duly accredited pilot in Venezuela in good standing when he was engaged.

Saudi Arabian Airlines v. CASummary:A Filipina stewardess was attempted to be raped by fellow male attendants who were Saudi nationals in Indonesia. The complaint for attempted rape was filed but when she got in Saudi Arabia, Saudi authorities questioned her and forced her to drop the charges against the two Saudi nationals. Before she left for Manila, she was brought by ER to courts and made to sign Arabic documents (all in the pretense that it was routine procedure in dropping case against Saudi nationals) but was instead sentenced for adultery and other violations of Islamic laws and sentenced to 5 months imprisonment and lashes. With assistance of RP embassy, Saudi officials (*I want to curse here but since this would be posted online, I better notWTF) admitted they wrongly accused Filipina. Still, Saudi Arabian Airlines terminated the contract. Filipina filed for damages against airline company in RP courts, which Saudi Arabian Airlines contested, saying that RP lacked substantial interest in the case. Court held that RP courts have jurisdiction since both the plaintiff and defendant claimed reliefs from RP courts, and that RP law is applicable since the injury is in RP and it is of no consequence that the other acts happened abroad (then goes the long long discussion on PRIL)Mini Digest from A2010 Torts Magic Notes for FinalsFACTS:Morada was employed by Saudi Arabian Airlines as a flight attendant. Her two co-workers tried to rape her. She filed a case against them. However, she was pressured to drop the case while her employers Chief Legal Officer stood by. She then attended a hearing, after being assured by her employer that it was routinary. She was shocked when she was sentenced to be imprisoned for adultery, going to disco, and socializing with male crew, in violation of Islamic laws, and was sentenced to be lashed. He employer refused to help her.ISSUE:Morada had cause of action. YESHELD:Article 19 merely declares a principle of law and Article 21 gives flesh to its provisions.Philippine Law applied because it is where Saudi Arabian deceived Morada. According to her, she honestly believed that her employer would act with justice and give her what is due. Instead, her employer failed to protect her.C L A S S N O T E S In the context of international law, this case is actually wrong: If the concept of Lex Loci delicti commisi would be followed, the place where most of the crimes was committed would determine what law should be applied. In this case, most of the violation of rights were committed in SAUDI! BUT COURT HELD THAT RP LAWS SHOULD BE APPLIED: no unnecessary difficulties and inconvenience shown by either parties if RP + Saudi already submitted to the jurisdiction of QC RTC This case demonstrates the broad application of A19 and A21. A 19, 20, 21 are not conflicts of law provisions but were applied in a conflicts of law case.Eto na formally...Facts:-Milagros Morada is a flight atttendant for Saudi Arabian Airlines (SAUDIA)-while in Jakarta, she Went to disco w/ fellow attendants Thamer and Allah (both Saudi nationals) Agreed to have breakfast at Thamer's room where Thamer attempted to rape her after Allah excused himself. Rape was not consumated when hotel staff heard Morada's cries. Thamer and Allah were both arrested Saudi government made the Indonesian authorities deport the 2 Saudi nationals only after 2 weeks of detention She was transferred to Manila (note: this until the next two paragraphs are important)-during one of her trips to Jeddah (1992), she was brought to the police who took her passport and questioned her about the Jakarta incident. Her passport was returned only after she agreed to drop the case against the 2 Saudi nationals-In 1993, before she was to return to Manila, a SAUDIAofficer brought her to Saudi Court to sign an Arabic document, then later interrogated through an interpreterall these with the assurance ofSAUDIAthat it was merely routine procedure necessary to drop the charges against 2 nationals. INSTEAD, SHE WAS SENTENCED TO 5 MONTHS IMPRISONMENT AND 286 LASHES FOR ADULTERY, GOING TO DISCO AND LISTENING TO MUSIC AND SOCIALIZING W/ MALE CREW, ALL IN VIOLAITONOF ISLAMIC LAW(wtf?)-RPembassy assisted Morada, eventually Saudi authorities admitted that she had been wrongly convicted-SAUDIA terminated her contract before she was allowed to return to Manila-Morada filed COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES vs. SAUDIACOA: Art 19 & 21, NCCMTD:1. RP lacked substantial interest in the case1. RP courts have no jurisdictionWON Morada has a COA?Yes.Though Art 19 merely declares a principle of law, Art 21 gives flesh to its provisionsWON RP Courts could exercise jurisdiction? YES0. Allowed under Section 1 of RA 7691 (expanded jurisdiction of MTC)0. Pragmatic considerations:Unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed-if dismiss, plaintiff would be compelled to bring her action in Saudi Arabia where she no longer have any substantial connections, thus causing her fundamental unfairness-no inconvenience and difficulty shown by SAUDIA-SAUDIA has filed several MTDs on other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction of the court, thus, asked affirmative relief from the courtWON RP Law is the choice of law applicable? YES0. 2 important questions sought to be answered by choice-of-law problems:3. What legal system should control a given situation where some of the significant facts occurred in two or more states3. To what extent should the chosen legal system regulate the situation0. Characterization/doctrine of qualification:processof deciding WON the facts relate to the kind question specified in a conflicts rule-purpose: enable the forum to select the proper lawHERE: CHARACTERIZED AS A TORT0. In tort, the "connecting factor" or "point of contact" could be the place or places where the tortiuos conduct or lex loci actus occurredHERE:RP is the place of tort-Morada was already working in Manila but SAUDIAbrought her to Jeddah on the pretense that she would merely testify in an investigation of the charges she made against the 2 SAUDIAcrew members for the attack on her person while they were in Jakarta BUT INSTEAD, she was the one made to face trial for very serious charges, including adultery and violation of Islamic laws and tradition-SO IT IS IN MANILA where SAUDIA deceived Morada-Morada honestly believed that petitioner would, in the exercise of its rights and in the performance of its duties, "act with justice, give her her due and obeserve honesty and good faith", but SAUDIA failed to protect her-That certain acts or parts of the injury allegedly occurred in another country is of no moment. For in our view, what is important here is the place where the over-all harm or the totality of the alleged injury to the person, reputation, social standing and human rights of complainant, had lodgedaccording to the private respondent. All told, it is not without basis to identify the Phil. as the situs of the alleged tort.0. applied MOST SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIP rule-what are the contacts to be taken into account and evaluated according to their relative importance w/ respect to the particular issue0. Place where the injury occurred0. Place where the conduct causing injury occurred0. The domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and place of business of parties0. Place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered-as applied in the case: Place of injury is RP Plaintiff is resident, national of RP Respondent is a resident foreign corporation engaged in the business of international air carriage engaged in RP Relationship between the parties were entered in RP1. RP TORTS LAW have paramount application-Plaintiff has no obligation to prove the applicable SAUDI ARABIAN LAW because her COA was Art 19 and 21 of NCC - it was SAUDIA who was invoking the applicability of Saudi Arabian law so it has the burden to plead and establish it

MITSUI VS. CA, 287 SCRA 366MENDOZA,J.:Facts:Petitioner Mitsui O.S.K. Lines Ltd. is a foreign corporation represented in thePhilippines by its agent, Magsaysay Agencies. Itentered into a contract of carriagethrough Meister ransport, Inc., an international freightfor!arder, !ith pri"aterespondent La"ine Lounge!ear Manufacturing #orporation to transport goods of thelatter fro$ Manila to Le %a"re, France. Petitioner undertoo& to deli"er the goods toFrance '( days fro$ initial loading. On)uly '*, ++, petitioner-s "essel loadedpri"ate respondent-s container "an for carriage atthe said port of origin.%o!e"er, in Kaoshiung, ai!an thegoods !ere not transshipped i$$ediately, !iththe result that the ship$ent arri"ed in Le %a"re only on o"e$ber +*, ++. heconsignee allegedly paid only half the "alue of the said goods on the ground thatthey did not arri"e in France until the /off season/ in that country. he re$aininghalf !as allegedly charged to the account of pri"ate respondent !hich in turnde$anded pay$ent fro$ petitioner through its agent.Issue:0hether or not pri"ate respondent-s action is for /loss or da$age/ to goodsshipped, !ithin the $eaning ofthe #arriage of 1oods by Sea Act2#O1SA3.4uling:o.he suit is not for /loss or da$age/ to goods conte$plated in 56273,the8uestion of prescription of action is go"erned not by the #O1SA but by Art. ++** ofthe #i"il #ode !hich pro"ides for a prescripti"e period of ten years. As defined inthe #i"il #ode and asapplied to Section 6273, paragraph * of the #arriage of 1oodsby Sea Act, /loss/ conte$plates $erely a situation !here no deli"ery at all !as$ade by the shipper of the goods because the sa$e had perished, gone out ofco$$erce, or disappeared in such a !ay that their e9istence is un&no!n or theycannot be reco"ered.here !ould be so$e $erit in appellant-s insistence that the da$ages suffered byhi$ as a result of the delay in the ship$ent of his cargo are not co"ered by theprescripti"e pro"ision of the #arriage of 1oods by Sea Act abo"e referred to, if suchda$ages !ere due, not to the deterioration and decay of the goods !hile in transit,but to other causes independent of the condition of the cargo upon arri"al, li&e adrop in their $ar&et "alue.