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Report of the Committee on

Health Care Facilities

Technical Correlating Committee (HEA-AAC)

Douglas S. Erickson, ChairAmerican Society for Healthcare Engineering, VI [U]

Rep. American Society for Healthcare Engineering

Constance Bobik, B&E Fire Safety Equipment Inc., FL [IM]Wayne L. Brannan, Medical University of South Carolina, SC [U] Rep. American Society of Safety EngineersMichael A. Crowley, The RJA Group, Inc., TX [U]

Rep. NFPA Health Care SectionRichard E. Cutts, US Air Force, TX [E]Marvin J. Fischer, Monroe Township, NJ [SE]William E. Koffel, Koffel Associates, Inc., MD [SE]George F. Stevens, US Department of Health & Human Services, AZ [E] Mayer D. Zimmerman, US Department of Health & Human Services, MD [E]

Alternates

Sharon Stone Gilyeat, Koffel Associates, Inc., MD [SE] (Alt. to William E. Koffel)Eugene Phillips, Risk Management Resources, AR [U] (Alt. to Wayne L. Brannan)W. Thomas Schipper, Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, CA [U] (Alt. to Douglas S. Erickson)

Staff Liaison: Richard P. Bielen

Committee Scope: This Committee shall have primary responsibility for documents which contain criteria for safeguarding patients and health care personnel in the delivery of health care services within health care facilities: a) from fire, explosion, electrical and related hazards resulting either from the use of anesthetic agents, medical gas equipment, electrical apparatus and high frequency electricity, or from internal or external incidents that disrupt normal patient care; b) from fire and explosion hazards associated with laboratory practices; c) in connection with the use of hyperbaric and hypobaric facilities for medical purposes; d) through performance, maintenance and testing criteria for electrical systems, both normal and essential; and e) through performance, maintenance and testing and installation criteria: 1) for vacuum systems for medical or surgical purposes, and 2) for medical gas systems.


Administration (HEA-ADM)

Michael A. Crowley, ChairThe RJA Group, Inc., TX [SE]

August F. DiManno, Jr., Fireman s̓ Fund Insurance Company, NY [I]James S. Davidson, Jr., Davidson Associates, DE [SE]William C. McPeck, State of Maine Employee Health & Safety, ME [E]Mark A. Trudzinski, US Army Medical Command, TX [U]


Committee Scope: This Committee shall have primary responsibility for documents or portions of documents on the scope, application, and intended use of documents under the Health Care Facilities Project, as well as definitions not assigned to other committees in the Health Care Facilities Project.


Electrical Equipment (HEA-ELE) Saul Aronow, Waban, MA [SE]Yadin David, Texas Childrens Hospital, TX [U] Albert G. Garlatti, Intertek Testing Services NA, Inc., MN [RT]Alan Lipschultz, Christiana Care-Health Services, DE [SE] Rep. Association for the Advancement of Medical InstrumentationJames A. Meyer, Pettis Memorial VA Hospital, CA [C] Rep. American Society of AnesthesiologistsJoseph P. Murnane, Underwriters Laboratories Inc., NY [RT]Lawrence S. Sandler, US Department of Veterans Affairs, CA [U]George F. Stevens, US Department of Health & Human Services, AZ [E]Michael Velvikis, High Voltage Maintenance Corporation, WI [IM] Rep. InterNational Electrical Testing Association Inc. Robert F. Willey, III, Siemens Medical Systems, Inc., NJ [M] Rep. Health Industry Manufacturers Association

Alternates

Ralph E. Patterson, SETA-AC Testing, NC [IM] (Alt. to Michael Velvikis)

Dale Woodin, American Society for Healthcare Engineering, IL [U] (Voting Alt. to ASHE Rep.)


Committee Scope: This Committee shall have primary responsibility for documents or portions of documents covering the maintenance, performance and testing of equipment for the purpose of safeguarding patients and staff within patient care areas of health care facilities from the hazards of fire, explosion, electricity, nonionizing radiation, heat and electrical interference.


Electrical Systems (HEA-ELS)

Hugh O. Nash, Jr., ChairNash Lipsey Burch, LLC, TN [SE]

Dan Chisholm, Motor and Generator Institute, Inc, FL [IM]James H. Costley, Jr., Newcomb & Boyd Engineers, GA [SE] Rep. NFPA Health Care SectionRichard E. Cutts, US Air Force, TX [E]Herbert Daugherty, Middlesex County Utilities Authority, NJ [U] Rep. Electrical Generating Systems Association Albert G. Garlatti, Intertek Testing Services NA, Inc., MN [RT]James R. Iverson, Onan Corporation, MN [M]Edward A. Lobnitz, Tilden Lobnitz Cooper Inc., FL [SE]James E. Meade, US Army Corps of Engineers, MD [U]Joseph P. Murnane, Underwriters Laboratories Inc., NY [RT]Ronald M. Smidt, Carolinas HealthCare System, NC [U] Rep. American Society for Healthcare Engineering Michael Velvikis, High Voltage Maintenance Corporation, WI [IM] Rep. InterNational Electrical Testing Association Inc.Walter N. Vernon, IV, Mazzetti & Associates Inc., CA [SE]

Alternates

Lawrence A. Bey, Cummins West Hawaii Division, HI [M] (Alt. to James R. Iverson)Douglas S. Erickson, American Society for Healthcare Engineering, VI [U] (Alt. to Ronald M. Smidt)Ralph E. Patterson, SETA-AC Testing, NC [IM] (Alt. to Michael Velvikis )Jeffrey L. Steplowski, US Department of Veterans Affairs, DC [E] (Voting Alt. to VA Rep.)Howard Stickley, US Army Corps of Engineers, DC [U] (Alt. to James E. Meade)Herbert V. Whittall, Electrical Generating Systems Association, FL [U] (Alt. to Herbert Daugherty)


Committee Scope: This Committee shall have primary responsibility for documents or portions of documents covering performance, maintenance and testing of electrical systems for the purpose of safeguarding patients, staff and visitors within health care facilities.


Gas Delivery Equipment (HEA-GAS)

Yadin David, ChairTexas Childrens Hospital, TX [U]

Jay Crowley, US Department of Health & Human Services, MD [E]Alan Lipschultz, Christiana Care-Health Services, DE [SE] Rep. Association for the Advancement of Medical InstrumentationGeorge Mills, MM EC, Ltd., IL [U] Rep. American Society for Healthcare EngineeringDwight R. (DAK) Quarles, Institute of Exercise & Environmental Medicine, TX [U]Jay R. Sommers, Kimberly-Clark Corporation, GA [M]Robert M. Sutter, BOC Gases, NJ [M] Rep. Compressed Gas AssociationGerald L. Wolf, SUNY/HCSB, Brooklyn, NY [C] Rep. American Society of Anesthesiologists


Committee Scope This Committee shall have primary responsibility for documents or portions of documents on the performance, and maintenance criteria for safeguarding patients and health care personnel from fire, explosion, electrical, and related hazards in anesthetizing locations involving the administration of both flammable and nonflammable anesthetics, including equipment and facilities ancillary thereto; and the performance, maintenance and testing of patient-related gas equipment for the purpose of safeguarding patients and staff within health care facilities.

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Health Care Emergency Management (HEA-HCE)

Russell Phillips, ChairRussell Phillips & Associates, Inc., NY [SE]

Pete Brewster, US Department of Veterans Affairs, IN [U]Steve Ennis, The Reciprocal Group, VA [I] Curt Fogel, North Dakota Department of Health, ND [E]James C. Kendig, Jr., Health First, FL [U]William C. McPeck, State of Maine Employee Health & Safety, ME [E]W. Thomas Schipper, Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, CA [U] Rep. American Society for Healthcare EngineeringMichael L. Sinsigalli, Windsor Locks Fire Department, CT [E]Gregory E. Spahr, Loss Prevention Services, Inc., CA [SE]Steven Vargo, Raritan Bay Medical Center, NJ [U]Ronald W. Woodfin, TetraTek, Incorporated, TX [SE]

Alternates

Monte Engel, North Dakota Department of Health, ND [E] (Alt. to Curt Fogel) A. Richard Fasano, Russell Phillips & Associates Inc., CA [SE] (Alt. to Russell Phillips)Robert L. Hutchinson, Jr., US Department of Veterans Affairs, NY [U] (Alt. to Pete Brewster)Susan B. McLaughlin, SBM Consulting, Ltd., IL [U] (Alt. to W. Thomas Schipper)


Committee Scope: This Committee shall have primary responsibility for documents or portions of documents covering the performance of health care facilities under disaster conditions.


Hyperbaric and Hypobaric Facilities (HEA-HYP)

W.T. Workman, ChairWorkman Hyperbaric Services, Inc., TX [SE]

Peter Atkinson, Hyperbaric Technical & Nurses Association Inc., Australia [U]Harold D. Beeson, NASA Johnson Space Center, NM [RT]William H. L. Dornette, Kensington, MD [SE]Christy Foreman, US Department of Health & Human Services, MD [E]W. T. Gurnée, OxyHeal Health Group, CA [M]Robert W. Hamilton, Hamilton Research Ltd., NY [M]Eric P. Kindwall, Medical College of Wisconsin, WI [U]Michael D. Martin, Ford Motor Company, MI [U]Barry Newton, Wandell Hull & Associates, NM [SE]Russell E. Peterson, Environmental Tectonics Corporation, PA [M]Stephen D. Reimers, Reimers Systems, Inc., VA [M]Eric A. Schinazi, Duke University Medical Center, NC [U]Robert F. Schumacher, Nth Systems Incorporated, NC [M]J. Ronald Sechrist, Sechrist Industries, CA [M]Paul J. Sheffield, International ATMO, Inc., TX [U]Harry G. Vincent, Total Wound Treatment Center, TX [C] Rep. Baromedical Nurses Association

Alternates

Michael W. Allen, Environmental Tectonics Corporation, PA [M] (Alt. to Russell E. Peterson)Glenn J. Butler, Life Support Technologies, Inc., NY [M] (Alt. to Robert W. Hamilton)Ruben D. Campuzano, Undersea & Hyperbaric Medical Society, CA [U] (Voting Alt. to UHMS Rep.)Greg Godfrey, Sechrist Industries, Inc., CA [M] (Alt. to J. Ronald Sechrist)Robert B. Sheffield, International ATMO, Inc., TX [U] (Alt. to Paul J. Sheffield)Ellen C. Smithline, Baystate Medical Center, MA [C] (Alt. to Harry G. Vincent)Joanna H. Weitershausen, US Department of Health & Human Services, MD [E] (Alt. to Christy Foreman)Harry T. Whelan, Medical College of Wisconsin, WI [U] (Alt. to Eric P. Kindwall)Larry L. Wischhoefer, Reimers Systems Incorporated, WA [M] (Alt. to Stephen D. Reimers)


Committee Scope This Committee shall have primary responsibility for documents or portions of documents covering the construction, installation, testing, performance and maintenance of hyperbaric and hypobaric facilities for safeguarding staff and occupants of chambers.


Laboratories (HEA-LAB)

Susan B. McLaughlin, ChairSBM Consulting, Ltd., IL [U]

Rep. American Society for Healthcare Engineering

James F. Barth, FIREPRO Incorporated, MA [SE]John Francis Capron, III, The Cleveland Clinic Foundation, OH [U]Ulrich M. Lindner, Earl Walls Associates, CA [SE]John P. McCabe, National Institutes of Health, MD [E]Josephine Simmons, US Department of Health & Human Services, MD [E]James O. Wear, US Department of Veterans Affairs, AR [U] Rep. NFPA Health Care Section

Alternates

Carol Jacobson, Ohio State University Medical Center, OH [U] (Alt. to Susan B. McLaughlin)Judith A. Yost, US Department of Health & Human Services, MD [E] (Alt. to Josephine Simmons)


Committee Scope: This Committee shall have primary responsibility for documents or portions of documents covering the maintenance of equipment and environment for the purpose of safeguarding patients, visitors and staff within laboratories in health care facilities.


Piping Systems (HEA-PIP)

David B. Mohile, ChairMedical Engineering Services, Inc., VA [RT]

Mark W. Allen, Beacon Medical, NC [M] Rep. Medical Air Pumps, Inc.Christopher Bernecker, H. T. Lyons, Incorporated, PA [IM]David L. Brittain, PROVAC, OH [M]Sidney L. Cavanaugh, United Assn of Journeymen/Apprentices of Plumbing/Pipe Fitting (UA), CA [L ]Richard E. Cutts, US Air Force, TX [E]James S. Davidson, Jr., Davidson Associates, DE [SE]Douglas S. Erickson, American Society for Healthcare Engineering, VI [U] Rep. American Society for Healthcare Engineering Peter Esherick, Patient Instrumentation Corporation, PA [RT] P. L. Fan, American Dental Association, IL [U]Michael Frankel, Utility Systems Consultants, FL [SE] Rep. American Society of Plumbing EngineersEdward D. Golla, TRI/Environmental, Inc., TX [RT]David Eric Lees, Georgetown University Medical Center, DC [C] Rep. American Society of AnesthesiologistsMichael T. Massey, National ITC Corporation, CA [L]Richard L. Miller, Medical Gas Technology Inc., NC [RT] Thomas J. Mraulak, Metro Detroit Plumbing Industry Training Center, MI [L] Rep. American Society of Sanitary EngineeringFred C. Quarnstrom, Seattle, WA [U] Rep. American Dental AssociationE. Daniel Shoemaker, MDS Matrx, AZ [M]Ronald M. Smidt, Carolinas HealthCare System, NC [U] Rep. NFPA Health Care SectionEdward K. Stevenson, Liberty Mutual Property, MA [I] Rep. Alliance of American InsurersRobert M. Sutter, BOC Gases, NJ [M] Rep. Compressed Gas AssociationJ. Richard Wagner, Poole & Kent Company, MD [IM] Rep. Mechanical Contractors Association of America, Inc.Craig B. Williams, Hill-Rom, GA [M]

Alternates

David D. Eastman, Metro Detroit Plumbing Industry Training Center, MI [L] (Alt. to Thomas J. Mraulak)David Esherick, Patient Instrumentation Corporation, PA [RT] (Alt. to Peter Esherick)Keith Ferrari, Praxair, NC [M] (Alt. to Robert M. Sutter)James A. Meyer, Pettis Memorial VA Hospital, CA [C] (Alt. to David Eric Lees)Curtis L. Mezzic, National ITC Corporation, LA [L] (Alt. to Michael T. Massey)

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Daniel N. Miller, Medical Gas Technology Inc., NC [RT] (Alt. to Richard L. Miller)Sharon Stanford, American Dental Association, IL [U] (Alt. to P. L. Fan)Chris Swayze, The Sherman Engineering Company, PA [M] (Alt. to Mark W. Allen)Dale Woodin, American Society for Healthcare Engineering, IL [U] (Alt. to Douglas S. Erickson)


Committee Scope: This Committee shall have primary responsibility for documents or portions of documents covering the performance, maintenance, installation, and testing of medical and dental related gas piping systems and medical and dental related vacuum piping systems.

These lists represent the membership at the time the Committee was balloted on the text of this edition. Since that time, changes in the membership may have occurred. A key to classifications is found at the front of this book.

The Report of the Technical Committee on Health Care Facilities is presented for adoption.

The Reports were prepared by the:

• Technical Correlating Committee on Health Care Facilities(HEA-AAC) • Technical Committee on Administration(HEA-ADM) • Technical Committee on Electrical Equipment (HEA-ELE) • Technical Committee on Electrical Systems (HEA-ELS) • Technical Committee on Gas Delivery Equipment (HEA-GAS) • Technical Committee on Health Care Emergency Preparedness and Disaster Planning (HEA-HCE) • Technical Committee on Hyperbaric and Hypobaric Facilities (HEA-HYP) • Technical Committee on Laboratories (HEA-LAB) • Technical Committee on Piping Systems (HEA-PIP)

Report I: The Committee proposes for adoption, amendments to NFPA, Standard on Health Care Facilities, 2002 edition. NFPA 99-2002 is published in Volume 6 of the 2003 National Fire Codes and in separate pamphlet form.

NFPA 99 has been submitted to letter ballot of the individual Technical Committees. The results of the balloting, after circulation of any negative votes, can be found in the report.

NFPA 99 has also been submitted to letter ballot of the Technical Correlating Committee on Health Care Facilities, which consists of 9 voting members; of whom 8 voted affirmatively, 1 ballot was not returned (Zimmerman).

Report II: The Committee proposes for adoption, a complete revision to NFPA 99B, Standard on Hyperbaric and Hypobaric Facilities, 2002 edition. NFPA 99B-2002 is published in Volume 6 of the 2003 National Fire Codes and in separate pamphlet form.

NFPA 99B has been submitted to letter ballot of the Technical Committee on Hyperbaric and Hypobaric Facilities, which consists of 17 voting members. The results of the balloting, after circulation of any negative votes, can be found in the report.

NFPA 99B has also been submitted to letter ballot of the Technical Correlating Committee on Health Care Facilities, which consists of 9 vot-ing members; of whom 8 voted affirmatively, and 1 ballot was not returned (Zimmerman).

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99________________________________________________________________99-1 Log #47 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( Entire Document )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Mark Allen, Beacon Medical ProductsRecommendation: Correct wording across the document to agree with the definitions of Cylinder (applicable to high pressure gas cylinders) and Container (applicable to low pressure liquid containers). Where both are intended, use both terms.Substantiation: The terms are not clearly applied. As two examples, among many, in 5.1.3.3.1.7, the term “cylinder” is used, which could be construed to exempt containers from this requirement. In 5.1.3.4.10.4, the term “liquid cylinder” is used, which is not a defined term.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: I will not be able to give the necessary time to be fair and objective due to the extensive number of proposals and the short time frame for comment and review.

________________________________________________________________99-2 Log #CP302 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( Entire Document )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Piping SystemsRecommendation: In reference to vacuum systems, where the term “downstream” is used, insert the term “source side” after the word; and where the term “upstream” is used, insert the term “patient side” after the term.Substantiation: This clarifies what is upstream and downstream in a vacuum system.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-3 Log #CP316 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( Entire Document )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Piping SystemsRecommendation: Globally change ocurrances of the term “upstream” when referencing pressure gases with “upstream (source side)”. Globally change occurrances of the term “upstream” when referencing vacuum or WAGD with “downstream (source side)”. Globally change occurrances of the term “downstream” when referring to pressure gases with “downstream (patient or use side)”. Globally change occurrances of the term “downstream” when referencing vacuum or WAGD with “upstream (patient or use side)”.Substantiation: This should clarify the terminology of upstream and downstream.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-4 Log #73 HEA-ADM Final Action: Reject( 1.1.5.1(2) (New) )________________________________________________________________TCC Action: Reject The TCC rejects this proposal, as the CGA M-1 manual is not currently available. The submitter should submit a public comment to accept this proposal when the document becomes available.Submitter: Keith Ferrari, PraxairRecommendation: Add a new paragraph: “(2) This standard shall not apply to installers of bulk cryogenic liquid oxygen supply. Installers for bulk cryogenic liquid oxygen supplies shall be trained and qualified in accordance with the provisions in CGA M-1 Guideline for Medical Gas Supply Systems at Consumer Sites.”Substantiation: The Qualification of Installers under 5.1.10.6.11.2 refers to ANSI/ASSE Standard 6010 Professional Qualification Standard for Medical Gas and Vacuum System Installers. The content of the 6010 standard does not identify critical components of the training and education required by the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 21 part 211 and Current Good Manufacturing Practice (CGMP) for Installers of Bulk Medical Gas Supplies. The Position Statement from the Compressed Gas Association (CGA) covers the acceptable requirements for an Installer of Bulk Cryogenic Liquid Supply. 5.1.10.6.12 Qualification of Brazing Procedures and Brazing is included in the CGA M-1 document. A.5.1.3.3 second paragraph states that it is the responsibility of the owner of the equipment (Gas Supplier normally) to ensure that all components of the

bulk supply function properly before the system is put into service. 5.1.3.4.3(4) states that materials used in central supply systems, if intended for outdoor installation, materials shall be installed per the manufacturers requirements. These requirements are part f the training as outlines in the attachment. Note: Supporting material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptCommittee Statement: Note to the TCC. The HEA-PIP committee should review this proposal for technical review.Number Eligible to Vote: 5Ballot Results: Affirmative: 3 Vote Not Returned: 2 DIMANNO, TRUDZINSKI ________________________________________________________________99-5 Log #270 HEA-ADM Final Action: Accept( Chapter 2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: J. Richard Wagner, The Poole & Kent CorporationRecommendation: Add a section for ASSE XXX ASSE Publications. American Society of Sanitary Engineering, 28901 Clemens Road, Suite 100, Westlake, OH 44145 ASSE 6010, Porfessional Qualifications Standard for Medical Gas System Installers, 2001. ASSE 6030, Professional Qualifications Standard for Medical Gas System Verifiers, 2001.Substantiation: ASSE 6030 is maintained by ASSE. Only ASSE 6010 and 6030 in the 6000 series are within the scope of NFPA 99.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 5Ballot Results: Affirmative: 3 Vote Not Returned: 2 DIMANNO, TRUDZINSKI________________________________________________________________99-6 Log #7 HEA-ELS Final Action: Reject( 2.2 )________________________________________________________________TCC Action: The TCC would like the TC to review this proposal again and to either use a definition of switchgear that is compatible with manufacturers literature, use the definition from NFPA 70 or use and define the term “switch panel” in place of switchgear. Switchgear may not fit with the use of electrical panels used in the healthcare industry. The TCC feels the ELS committee is better suited to develop a definition than the ADM committee.Submitter: Keith Ferrari, PraxairRecommendation: Add the NFPA 70 or 70B definition of switchgear to the definitions section of NFPA 99 (2-2 Switchgear - refer to the definition below). Substantiation: Section 4-3.1.2.9(e) Piping Installation states: “Piping shall not be installed in kitchens or electrical switchgear rooms.” The word switchgear is a broad term used to identify a wide spectrum of electrical components. Currently, NFPA 99 does not define the word “switchgear”. NFPA 70 and 70B define the word switchgear as: A switchgear assembly is an assembled equipment (indoor or outdoor) including, but not limited to, one or more of the following: switching, interrupting, control, metering, protective, and regulating devices together with their supporting structure, enclosure, conductors, electric interconnections, and accessories. A switchgear assembly can be an open type, as part of a substation assembly, or an enclosed type. Metal-enclosed switchgear assemblies are enclosed on all sides and top with sheet metal. Access into the enclosure is provided by doors or a removable cover. The bus and bus connections are insulated in metal-clad switchgear assemblies, the insulation is not designed to protect against electrical shock. Contact with the bus or its connections should be avoided when the switchgear is energized. Low-voltage, metal-enclosed switchgear assemblies have a maximum nominal rating of 600 volts. Medium- and high- voltage metal-enclosed switchgear assemblies have a nominal voltage rating from 5,000 - 69,000 volts inclusive. These switchgear assemblies are normally constructed in modules or cubicles, each of which contains either one or more interrupting devices or auxiliary equipment, such as metering transformers, auxiliary power transformer, control relaying, and battery chargers. Power is fed throughout the assembly by the main power bus. This will clarify the definition of the word switchgear.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: The term “switchgear” is not used in Chapter 4 and the Proposal should be referred to the Technical Committee on Administration for definition clarification. In the opinion of the ELS Committee, the definition of switchgear found in NFPA 70 is too broad to be used in Chapter 5. Number Eligible to Vote: 14Ballot Results: Affirmative: 14 ________________________________________________________________99-7 Log #260 HEA-ADM Final Action: Accept( 2.3.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: J. Richard Wagner, The Poole & Kent CorporationRecommendation: Delete the following listed publications: ANSI/ASME B-40.1 Gauges, Pressure indicating Dial Type, Elastic Element, 1991. ANSI/ASSE Series 6000, Professional Qualifications Standard for Medical Gas Systems Installers, Inspectors, and Verifiers. ANSI B16.22, Wrought Copper and Copper Alloy Solder Joint Pressure Fittings, 1995.

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99

ANSI B57.1 (See CGA V-1) ANSI C-4 (See CGA C-4) ANSI G-7.1 (See CGA G-7.1)Substantiation: B-40.1 is an ASME standard with a revised title. Only ASSE 6010 and 6030 apply to NFPA 99. The CGA publications are listed in 2.3.6.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptCommittee Statement: Note to the TCC. The HEA-PIP committee should review this proposal for technical review.Number Eligible to Vote: 5Ballot Results: Affirmative: 3 Vote Not Returned: 2 DIMANNO, TRUDZINSKI

________________________________________________________________99-8 Log #261 HEA-ADM Final Action: Accept( 2.3.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: J. Richard Wagner, The Poole & Kent CorporationRecommendation: Delete the following: 2.3.2 ASHRAE Publications. American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air Conditioning Engineers, Inc. 1791 Tullie Circle, NE Atlanta, GA 300329-2305. ASHRAE, Handbook of Fundamentals - 1985, Chapter 24Substantiation: The publication is not referenced within NFPA 99. Chapter 24 in 1985 was Weather Data and Design Conditions.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 5Ballot Results: Affirmative: 3 Vote Not Returned: 2 DIMANNO, TRUDZINSKI

________________________________________________________________99-9 Log #262 HEA-ADM Final Action: Accept( 2.3.3 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: J. Richard Wagner, The Poole & Kent CorporationRecommendation: Add the following standards: ASME B40.100, Pressure Gauges and Gauge Attachments, 2000. ASME B16.22, Wrought Copper and Copper Alloy Solder-Joint Pressure Fittings 2001.Substantiation: The standards are ANSI accredited, but are maintained by ASME.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 5Ballot Results: Affirmative: 3 Vote Not Returned: 2 DIMANNO, TRUDZINSKI

________________________________________________________________99-10 Log #263 HEA-ADM Final Action: Accept( 2.3.3 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: J. Richard Wagner, The Poole & Kent CorporationRecommendation: Revise the following listings: ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, 1990 Section VIII, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, 2001 Section IX, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, 2001Substantiation: NFPA 99 references only Sections VIII and IX of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. The Code was last revised in 2001.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 5Ballot Results: Affirmative: 3 Vote Not Returned: 2 DIMANNO, TRUDZINSKI

________________________________________________________________99-11 Log #264 HEA-ADM Final Action: Accept( 2.3.4 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: J. Richard Wagner, The Poole & Kent CorporationRecommendation: Update the listings of the following standards in Chapter 5: ASTM B88 - 1996 02 ASTM B280 - 1997 02 ASTM B819 - 1995 00 ASTM B828 - 1998 02Substantiation: The listed standards do not indicate the most recent edition.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 5Ballot Results: Affirmative: 3 Vote Not Returned: 2 DIMANNO, TRUDZINSKI

________________________________________________________________99-12 Log #265 HEA-ADM Final Action: Accept( 2.3.4 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: J. Richard Wagner, The Poole & Kent CorporationRecommendation: Add the following publication: ASTM D2855, Standard Practice for Making Solvent-Cemented Joints in Poly(Vinyl Chloride) (PVC) Pipe and Fittings; 1996 (20020.Substantiation: The standard is referenced in 5.3.10.6.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 5Ballot Results: Affirmative: 3 Vote Not Returned: 2 DIMANNO, TRUDZINSKI

________________________________________________________________99-13 Log #266 HEA-ADM Final Action: Accept( 2.3.6 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: J. Richard Wagner, The Poole & Kent CorporationRecommendation: Update the listings of the following standards referenced in Chapter 5: Pamphlet C-7, 2000 Edition 7 Pamphlet G-4, 1996 Edition 9 Pamphlet G-4.1, 1996 Edition 4 Pamphlet G-8.1, 1990 Edition 3 Pamphlet V-1, 1994 Edition 10 Pamphlet V-5, 2000 Edition 4Substantiation: The listing does not necessarily indicate the most recent edition of the standard. CGA standards are now listed by the edition rather than date.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 5Ballot Results: Affirmative: 3 Vote Not Returned: 2 DIMANNO, TRUDZINSKI

________________________________________________________________99-14 Log #267 HEA-ADM Final Action: Accept( 2.3.6 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: J. Richard Wagner, The Poole & Kent CorporationRecommendation: Delete the following listings: Pamphlet C-9 Pamphlet G-7.1 Pamphlet G-10.1 Pamphlet P-2 Pamphlet P-9 Pamphlet E-10Substantiation: The listed publications are not referenced within NFPA 99.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 5Ballot Results: Affirmative: 3 Vote Not Returned: 2 DIMANNO, TRUDZINSKI_______________________________________________________________99-15 Log #268 HEA-ADM Final Action: Accept( 2.3.6 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: J. Richard Wagner, The Poole & Kent CorporationRecommendation: Add the following listing: Pamphlet O2-DIR, Directory of Cleaning Agents for Oxygen Service, Edition 4Substantiation: The listed standard is referenced in 5.1.10.5.3.11 and 5.3.10.7.3.10.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 5Ballot Results: Affirmative: 3 Vote Not Returned: 2 DIMANNO, TRUDZINSKI________________________________________________________________99-16 Log #269 HEA-ADM Final Action: Accept( 2.3.9 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: J. Richard Wagner, The Poole & Kent CorporationRecommendation: Update the listed publications: SP-58 - 1996 2002 SP-69 - 1996 2002 SP-73 - 1991Substantiation: Hangar publications SP-58 and SP-69 were updated in 2002. ANSI/ASME B16.50 now covers short-cup brazing fittings. Reference to SP73 is no longer necessary.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 5Ballot Results: Affirmative: 3 Vote Not Returned: 2 DIMANNO, TRUDZINSKI

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99________________________________________________________________99-17 Log #176 HEA-ADM Final Action: Accept( 2.3.11 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Bob Eugene, Underwriters Laboratories Inc.Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: UL Subject 94, Standard for Safety Test for Flammability of Plastic Materials for Parts in Devices and Appliances, 1996 2001.Substantiation: Revised date and title notes the most recently ANSI approved edition.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 5Ballot Results: Affirmative: 3 Vote Not Returned: 2 DIMANNO, TRUDZINSKI________________________________________________________________99-18 Log #10 HEA-ELS Final Action: Accept in Principle( Chapter 3 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Hugh O. Nash, Jr., Nash Lipsey BurchRecommendation: Add new text to read as follows: Invasive Procedure - Any procedure that penetrates the bodyʼs protective shield (i.e., skin, mucous membrane). Intravenous needles or catheters used to administer fluids and/or medications; endoscopes; colonoscopes; sigmoidoscopes; urinary catheters; and the like shall not be considered invasive.Substantiation: The definition of “critical care area” includes the words “areas in which patients are intended to be subjected to invasive procedures and connected to line-operated, patient-care-related electrical appliances.” Infusion pumps, which are electrically line-operated and “marginally invasive”, are routinely used in general care areas of hospitals/nursing homes and even at home. Unless the term “invasive procedure” is defined, AHJs can interpret NFPA 99 to require vast areas of the facility, traditionally regarded as general care areas, to be design as critical care areas.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise the current NFPA 99 text to read as follows: 3.3.135.2* Critical Care Areas. Those special care units, intensive care units, coronary care units, angiography laboratories, cardiac catheterization laboratories, delivery rooms, operating rooms, postanesthesia recovery rooms, emergency departments, and similar areas in which patients are intended to be subjected to invasive procedures, and connected to line-operated, patient-care-related electrical appliances, which could result in serious injury or if interrupted could result in a high risk of morbidity.Committee Statement: The term invasive procedure is not definable by the ELS TC. The addition to the definition of Critical Care Areas achieves the intent of the proposal. Number Eligible to Vote: 14Ballot Results: Affirmative: 14 _____________________________________________________________99-19 Log #12 HEA-ELS Final Action: Reject( Chapter 3 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Hugh O. Nash, Jr., Nash Lipsey BurchRecommendation: Add new text to read as follows: Optional loads: Contiguous or same-site facilities not covered in Chapters 12 through 20, and other loads not permitted by Chapter 4 to be connected to the hospital essential electrical system.Substantiation: A definition is needed for this new term, which is used in 4.4.1.1.8.3 and explained in great detail in the Annex.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: The definition of optional loads is adequately covered in the annex.Number Eligible to Vote: 14Ballot Results: Affirmative: 14 _______________________________________________________________99-20 Log #CP601 Final Action: Reject( 3 Ambulatory Health Care Facility )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on AdministrationRecommendation: Revise to read as follows: Ambulatory Health Care Facility. A building or part thereof used to provide services or treatment to four or more patients at the same time and meeting either (1) or (2). (1) Those facilities that provide, on an outpatient basis, treatment for patients that would render them incapable of taking action for self-preservation under emergency conditions without assistance from others, such as hemodialysis units or freestanding emergency medical units. (2) Those facilities that provide, on an outpatient basis, surgical treatment requiring general anesthesia.Substantiation: Glossary of terms requires correlation of definitions.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: The recommended definition (from NFPA 70) uses examples which is not allowed by the manual of style. In addition, the recommended definition limits the anesthesia practice to “general anesthesia” where the NFPA 99 definition uses the more generic term of “anesthesia”.Number Eligible to Vote: 5

Ballot Results: Affirmative: 3 Vote Not Returned: 2 DIMANNO, TRUDZINSKI ________________________________________________________________99-21 Log #CP600 Final Action: Reject( 3 Health Care Facilities )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on AdministrationRecommendation: Revise the definition as follows: Health Care Facilities. Buildings or portions of buildings in which medical, dental, psychiatric, nursing, obstetrical, or surgical care are provided. Health care facilities include, but are not limited to, hospitals, nursing homes, limited care facilities, clinics, medical and dental offices, and ambulatory care centers, whether permanent or movable.Substantiation: Glossary of terms requires correlation of definitions.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: NFPA 5000 used the definition from the 1999 edition of NFPA 99, Health Care Facilities. NFPA 99-2002 edition moved the examples to the annex per the Manual of Style. The NFPA 99 edition is correct as it meets the manual of style.Number Eligible to Vote: 5Ballot Results: Affirmative: 3 Vote Not Returned: 2 DIMANNO, TRUDZINSKI________________________________________________________________99-22 Log #CP100 HEA-HCE Final Action: Accept( Chapter 3 Definition )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Health Care Emergency ManagementRecommendation: Use the preferred definition of Incident Command System (ICS) as follows: “Incident Command System (ICS). The combination of facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and communications operating within a common organizational structure with responsibility for the management of assigned resources to effectively accomplish stated objectives pertaining to an incident (as described in the document Incident Command System) or training exercise.”Substantiation: This is the preferred definition and correlates with NFPA 1670.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 11Ballot Results: Affirmative: 6 Vote Not Returned: 5 BREWSTER, ENNIS, KENDIG, SINSIGALLI, VARGO________________________________________________________________99-23 Log #CP340 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( Chapter 3 Vacuum )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Piping SystemsRecommendation: Add definition to read as follows: Vaporizer. A heat exchange unit designed to convert cryogenic liquid into the gaseous state. (PIP)Substantiation: This term is used and should be defined.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-24 Log #366 HEA-ELS Final Action: Accept in Principle( 3.3 )________________________________________________________________TCC Action: Accept in Principle Change the action to Accept in Principle and revise as follows: “14.1 Applicability. This chapter applies to other health care facilities not covered in Chapters 13 and 15-21.” Other health care facilities are not defined and the TCC specified Chapter 14 covers the other occupancies that are not already covered in the standard.Submitter: Craig H. Kampmier Swansea, MARecommendation: Insert the following definition in Chapter 3: 3.x.x. “Other” Health Care Facilities. Buildings or portions thereof providing patient diagnostic and treatment services that are not defined as hospitals, nursing homes, limited care facilities, or freestanding birthing centers.Substantiation: Section 14.1 refers to the definition of other health care facilities in Chapter 3, and the definition is absent.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: This definition proposal does not come under the purview of the ELS Committee.Number Eligible to Vote: 14Ballot Results: Affirmative: 14 ________________________________________________________________99-25 Log #74 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 3.3.X Definitions (New) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Keith Ferrari, PraxairRecommendation: Add the following new definitions: Valves — Check Valve. A valve which permits flow in only one direction, automatically closing on flow in the opposite direction.

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99 Demand Valve. A valve, which permits flow only qwhen a mating part is engaged. Service (Lateral) Valve. A valve in the pipeline distribution system that is accessible only to authorized personnel and is used to isolate floors or wings within a health care facility in the event of maintenance and/or renovations. Main Valve. A valve located downstream (patient side) of the source valve and outside of hte source supply room, enclosure, or where the main line first enters the building. Maintenance Valve. An in-line valve intended for use to isolate existing systems for piping maintenance or to extend to new piping systems. Riser Valve. A in-line valve located adjacent to the riser line supplied from the main line. Source Valve. A valve located at the immediate outlet of hte source of supply, upstream (source supply side) of the main line shut0off valve, such that the entire source of supply, including all source supply accessory devices can be isolated from the pipeline system.Substantiation: The NFPA defines the other major pipeline components such as Alarms, outlets, manifolds,... The valves, although found throughout Chapter 5, are not found under the definitions section. For better understanding of the valves discussed in Chapter 5.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: The definitions are redundant from the information in the chapter.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47)._______________________________________________________________99-26 Log #75 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 3.3.X Medical/Surgical Vacuum (New) )________________________________________________________________TCC Action: Reject The TCC is rejecting this proposal and is asking the TC to reconsider this proposal as a committee comment. The term “Typically” should not be used in a definition.Submitter: Keith Ferrari, PraxairRecommendation: Add a new definition to read as follows: Medical/Surgical Vacuum. Typically used to provide a source of drainage, aspiration and suction in order to remove body fluids from patients. The pipeline is under sub atmospheric pressure. The usual operating range is 15–25 in. HgV.Substantiation: The NFPA defines the other medical gases associated with the Medical Gas System such as oxygen, nitrous oxide, nitrogen,... The medical/surgical vacuum, although found throughout Chapter 5, are not found under the definitions section. For better understanding of the vacuum discussed in Chapter 5.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Add a new definition to read as follows: Medical/Surgical Vacuum. Typically used to provide a source of drainage, aspiration and suction in order to remove body fluids from patients. The pipeline is under sub atmospheric pressure. Committee Statement: The operation range was deleted as it was only informational and not part of the definition.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-27 Log #CP324 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 3.3.xxx Medical Gas )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Piping SystemsRecommendation: Add definition to read as follows: 3.3.xxx Medical Gas. A patient medical gas or medical support gas. See definitions of patient medical gas and medical support gas.Substantiation: The definition of medical gas needed to differentiate medical gas from medical support gas.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-28 Log #CP326 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 3.3.x Medical Support Gas )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Piping SystemsRecommendation: Add definition to read as follows: 3.3.x Medical Support Gas. Piped gases such as nitrogen and instrument air that are used to support medical procedures by operating medical-surgical tools, equipment booms, pendants, and similar medical support applications.Substantiation: Instrument air and nitrogen are typically used to operate

equipment and needed to be differentiated from medical gas.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-29 Log #CP328 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 3.3.xxx Patient Medical Gas )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Piping SystemsRecommendation: Add definition to read as follows: 3.3.xxx Patient Medical Gas. Piped gases such as oxygen, nitrous oxide, [helium], [carbon dixide], and medical air that are used in the application of human respiration and the calibration of medical devices use for human respiration.Substantiation: The definition specifies which gases are used for patient care.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHComment on Affirmative: WAGNER: Delette the [ ] around helium and carbon dioxide.Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-30 Log #15 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 3.3.4.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: F. David Wyrick, Sr., Cambiare Ltd.Recommendation: Revise Section 3.3.4.2 as follows: A warning system within an area of use that provides continuous visible surveillance of high or low pressure problems and capable of canceling the audible surveillance of a Level 3 medical gas systems.Substantiation: A Level 3 Alarm systems have the Oxygen high/low/reserve features as Nitrous Oxide. All have a power on light and a buzz or bell ringing uncomfortable to the patient. Refer to 5.3.12.3.5.8 is the substantiation also.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: Appears to write specifications in the definition.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-31 Log #353 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 3.3.4.3 )________________________________________________________________TCC Action: Reject The TCC rejects this proposal, as instrument air is a medical gas, according to the proposed definition, therefore it is redundant.Submitter: Curtis Mezzie, National ITC CorporationRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: A warning system that provides continuous visible and audible surveillance of medical gas, and vacuum and instrument air (when installed) system source equipment at the equipment site.Substantiation: The instrument air system is not a medical gas or a vacuum system, yet it is alarmed at the Local Alarm when installed. The instrument air system is define thoroughly in Chapter 5 and should be included in this definition.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise to read as follows: A warning system that provides continuous visible and audible surveillance of medical gas, and vacuum and instrument air system source equipment at the equipment site.Committee Statement: See Action on 99-92 (Log #48).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: ERICKSON: This Technical committee is completely out of control and needs to have the brakes put on. As the readers of the ROP will notice the TC has now lumped instrument air into the same classification as any other medical gas and therefore will need to have all of the safeguards as an oxygen, medical air, nitrous oxide, and vacuum system. These safeguards include: a separate room for the instrument air compressor, piping (brazed) equivalent to oxygen, alarms - both area and master, verification, etc. The manufacturers on the TC freely admit that there is not an instrument air compressor available yet but it is coming and we need to make sure there are standards for it in 99. While I agree that some standards are necessary the industry cannot tolerate the increased level of installation, testing, and verification. There has to be some risk assumed by the installing organization and design professionals and we CAN”T REGULATE STUPIDITY although it certainly seems as if we are writing a standard to do exactly that. What is wrong with the use of a medical air system that can have regulators, and back flow preventers to drive

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99the medical equipment in the ORʼs and other locations in the hospitals? The use of medical air is becoming less and less in our hospitals and these systems should be available for use. think about the cost savings: another separate room eliminated, another compressor deleted from having to be maintained, piping eliminated from the source to the room where the equipment is being used, verification services cut, engineering design simplified and alarm systems reduced.Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-32 Log #354 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 3.3.4.4 )________________________________________________________________TCC Action: Change the reference in the committee statement and action to Log #329 as it is a direct reference as opposed to an indirect reference. Editorial.Submitter: Curtis Mezzie, National ITC CorporationRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: A warning system that monitors the operation and condition of the source of supply, the reserve source (if any) and the pressure in the main lines of each medical gas, and vaccuum and instrument air (when installed) piping system.Substantiation: The instrument air system is not a medical gas or a vacuum system, yet it is alarmed at the Master Alarm when installed. The instrument air system is defined thoroughly in Chapter 5 and should be included in this definition.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Action on 99-92 (Log #48).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: ERICKSON: See my Explanation of Negative on Proposal 99-31(Log #353).Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-33 Log #119 HEA-GAS Final Action: Reject( 3.3.8 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Peter Esherick, Patient Instrumentation Corp.Recommendation: Delete text as follows: Anesthetic: Remove “inhalation” limitation on anesthetics from text. As used in this standard, applies to any inhalation agent used to produce relative analgesia or general anesthesia.Substantiation: For too many years, all concerned with medical gas piping have only thought of operating rooms as anesthetizing locations. Other areas are: Endoscopy, Dental operatories, MRI, intervental radiology, CT scanner and Electro physiology lab. Some of these areas do not use inhalation anesthetics but use IV, rectal and topical anesthetics-many of which render the patient incapable of taking action for self-preservation under emergency conditions without the assistance of others.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: The issue is not that the patient is incapable of taking action as far as gas safety is concerned. The standard has adequate protection in those areas. There are no patient safety reason for expanding the definition. The submitter has not justified a rationale for expanding the definition to non inhalation agents .Number Eligible to Vote: 8Ballot Results: Affirmative: 5 Vote Not Returned: 3 CROWLEY, MILLS, SOMMERS________________________________________________________________99-34 Log #120 HEA-GAS Final Action: Reject( 3.3.9 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Peter Esherick, Patient Instrumentation Corp.Recommendation: Delete text as follows: Anesthetic Location: Any area of a facility that has been designated to be used for the administration of non flammable inhalation anesthetic agents in the course of examination or treatment, including the use of such agents for relative analgesia.Substantiation: For too many years, all concerned with medical gas piping have only thought of operating rooms as anesthetizing locations. Other areas are: Endoscopy, Dental operatories, MRI, intervental radiology, CT scanner and Electro physiology lab. Some of these areas do not use inhalation anesthetics but use IV, rectal and topical anesthetics-many of which render the patient incapable of taking action for self-preservation under emergency conditions without the assistance of others.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: The issue is not that the patient is incapable of taking action as far as gas safety is concerned. The standard has adequate protection in those areas. There are no patient safety reason for expanding the definition. The submitter has not justified a rationale for expanding the definition to non inhalation agents . This standard applies only to inhalation of gases used for anesthetizing. If inhalation was deleted it could cause requirements of this standard to apply to other anesthetizing locations that do not use gases.

Number Eligible to Vote: 8Ballot Results: Affirmative: 5 Vote Not Returned: 3 CROWLEY, MILLS, SOMMERS

________________________________________________________________99-35 Log #195 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 3.3.19 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Robert M. Sutter, BOC GasesRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Bulk System. An assembly of equipment such as storage containers, pressure regulators, pressure relief devices, vaporizers, manifolds, and interconnecting piping that terminates at the point where the system gas at service pressure first enters the facility supply line. Bulk Systems contain more than 566,335L (20,000ft3) of oxygen or 1452 kg (3200 lb) of nitrous oxide including unconnected reserves on the site.Substantiation: The deleted text is defined in 3.3.19.1 Bulk Nitrous Oxide System and 3.3.19.2 Bulk Oxygen System.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise text to read as follows: Bulk System. An assembly of equipment such as storage containers, pressure regulators, pressure relief devices, vaporizers, manifolds, and interconnecting piping that terminates at the source valve. Bulk Systems contain more than 566,335L (20,000ft3) of oxygen or 1452 kg (3200 lb) of nitrous oxide including unconnected reserves on the site.Committee Statement: Bulk systems end at the source valve.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-36 Log #196 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 3.3.19 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Robert M. Sutter, BOC GasesRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Bulk System. An assembly of equipment such as storage containers, pressure regulators, pressure relief devices, vaporizers, manifolds, and interconnecting piping that terminates at the point where the system gas at service pressure first enters the facility supply line (Piped Distribution System).Substantiation: “Facility Supply Line” is not included in the definitions. Using “Piped Distribution System” which is found in the current definitions helps to clarify where the Bulk System ends and the Piped Distribution System beginsCommittee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Action on 99-35 (Log #195).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-37 Log #CP310 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 3.3.25, 5.3.3.4 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Piping SystemsRecommendation: Delete 3.3.25 Delete the “*” from 5.3.3.4 Delete figure A.5.3.3.4 Delete A.5.3.3.4 Figure A.5.3.3.5 needs to make optional, either nitrogen or compressed air.Substantiation: Level 3 gas powered devices can be either from air compressor or nitrogen.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-38 Log #CP323 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 3.3.81 Instrument Air )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Piping SystemsRecommendation: Revise definition to read as follows: 3.3.81 Instrument Air. For the purposes of this standard, instrument air is air intended for the powering of medical devices unrelated to human respiration (e.g., surgical tools, ceiling arms). Medical air and instrument air are distinct systems for mutually exclusive applications. Instrument air is a medical support gas that falls under the general requirements for medical gases. (PIP)

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99Substantiation: Instrument Air is treated the same as medical gases.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: ERICKSON: See my Explanation of Negative on Proposal 99-31(Log #353).Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-39 Log #108 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 3.3.90 Level 1 Medical Piped Gas and Vacuum Systems )________________________________________________________________Submitter: David B. Mohile, Medical Engineering Services, Inc.Recommendation: Add wording as follows: Level 1 Medical Piped Gas and Vacuum Systems. Systems serving occupancies where interruption of the piped medical gas and vacuum system would place patients in imminent danger of morbidity or mortality. An example of a Level 1 system would be a hospital. (see 3.3.72).” (PIP)Substantiation: While the Committee added a technical definition for Level 1 for the 2002 edition, there is still a considerable amount of confusion amongst engineers and contractors. This would help remove the confusion.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: It is not appropriate to give examples as this could be interpreted to be all inclusive.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: WAGNER: Change the proposal as follows: “An One example of a Level 1 system would be in a hospital. (See 3.3.72). I feel that the example helps to define a Level 1 system. Refer to the acceptance of 99-264 (Log #349) on the use of examples.Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-40 Log #107 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 3.3.92 Level 2 Medical Piped Gas and Vacuum Systems )________________________________________________________________Submitter: David B. Mohile, Medical Engineering Services, Inc.Recommendation: Add wording as follows: “Systems serving occupancies where interruption of the piped medical gas and vacuum system would place patients at manageable risk of morbidity or mortality. Examples of Level 2 systems might include, but not be limited to, surgicenters, urgicenters, nursing homes and clinics, as well as orthopedic offices, plastic surgery offices and oral surgery offices where patients are placed under gaseous general anesthesia.” (PIP)Substantiation: While the Committee added a technical definition for Level 2 for the 2002 edition, there is still a considerable amount of confusion amongst engineers, contractors and end users as to what level a facility should be classified. This would help remove the confusion. It would also cut down on the excessive medical gas pipeline equipment (duplex compressors, vacuum pumps, etc.) often specified but not required by the document.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: It is not appropriate to give examples as this could be interpreted to be all inclusive. Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: WAGNER: The proposal says “might include, but not limited to”. How can it be interpreted to be all inclusive? The examples help to define Level 2 systems. Refer to the acceptance of 99-264 (Log #107).Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-41 Log #106 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 3.3.94 Level 3 Piped Gas Systems )________________________________________________________________Submitter: David B. Mohile, Medical Engineering Services, Inc.Recommendation: Add wording as follows: Level 3 Piped Gas Systems. Systems serving occupancies where interruption of the piped medical gas would terminate procedures but would not place patients at risk of morbidity or mortality. Examples of Level 3 systems might include, but not be limited, to medical-dental offices (see 3.3.108). (PIP)Substantiation: While the committee added a technical definition for Level 3 for the 2002 edition, there is still a considerable amount of confusion amongst engineers, contractors and end users as to what level a facility should be classified. This addition to the definition would help remove the confusion.Committee Meeting Action: Reject

Committee Statement: It is not appropriate to give examples as this could be interpreted to be all inclusive.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: WAGNER: The proposal says “might include, but not limited to”. How can it be interpreted to be all inclusive? The examples help to define Level 3 systems. Refer to the acceptance of 99-264 (Log #349) on the use of examples.Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-42 Log #16 HEA-ADM Final Action: Reject( 3.3.108.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: F. David Wyrick, Sr., Cambiare Ltd.Recommendation: Revise section as follows: (2) Only sedation, Relative Analgesia or local anesthesia is involved. Treatment or procedures do not render the patient with assistance incapable of self-preservation under emergency conditions.Substantiation: This definition has already created problems for Level 3 Facilities. More and more inspectors believe if Nitrous Oxide is used the patient is incapable of self-preservation. Also, there is little understanding of the Stages of Anesthesia and there is not a definition in Section 3. It is difficult to get beyond Relative Analgesia with 30 percent minimum Oxygen requirement for all analgesia units for Level 3. This is required by the FDA and for Dental by the ADA. As written in the 2002 Edition definition, blind, wheel chair or mentally retarded could not be treated in a Level 3 facility. I do not think that was the intent as in the past editions.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: The definition as written clearly defines the boundaries between medical/dental offices and ambulatory health care. Item (2) addresses the procedure that renders the patient incapable, not the fact that the patient comes into the facility incapable of self preservation.Number Eligible to Vote: 5Ballot Results: Affirmative: 3 Vote Not Returned: 2 DIMANNO, TRUDZINSKI

________________________________________________________________99-43 Log #320 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 3.3.109 Medical Gas System )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Thomas J. Mraulak, Metropolitan Detroit Plumbing Industry / Rep. American Society of Sanitary EngineeringRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: An assembly of equipment and piping for the distribution of nonflammable medical gases such as oxygen, nitrous oxide, instrument air, compressed air, medical air, carbon dioxide, and nitrogen.Substantiation: When the committee added instrument air it was not defined as a medical gas. There are no piping requirements for I.A. It should be a medical gas just like nitrogen. If I.A. is a medical gas it has to follow all the piping and installation requirements like any other med gas.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Action on 99-254 (Log #325).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: ERICKSON: See my Explanation of Negative on Proposal 99-31(Log #353).Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-44 Log #CP325 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 3.3.109 Medical Gas System )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Piping SystemsRecommendation: Revise definition to read as follows: 3.3.109 Medical Gas System. An assembly of equipment and piping for the distribution of nonflammable medical gases such as oxygen, nitrous oxide, compressed air, carbon dioxide, and helium, nitrogen, and instrument air. (PIP)Substantiation: Instrument air is treated the same as medical gases.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

99-10

Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99________________________________________________________________99-45 Log #CP327 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 3.3.117.1 Nitrogen, Oil Free, Dry (Nitrogen for Brazing and Testing) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Piping SystemsRecommendation: Revise defintion to read as follows: 3.3.117.1 Nitrogen, Oil Free, Dry (Nitrogen for Brazing and Testing). NF (Oil Free, Dry). Nitrogen complying as a minimum with oil-free, dry nitrogen NF. (PIP)Substantiation: This corrects the S.I. units.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHComment on Affirmative: WAGNER: The change is editorial and does not involve SI units.Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-46 Log #17 HEA-GAS Final Action: Accept in Principle( 3.3.119 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: F. David Wyrick, Sr., Cambiare Ltd.Recommendation: Revise section as follows: 3.3.119 Nitrous Oxide. An inorganic compound, one of the oxides of Nitrogen. It exists as a gas at atmospheric pressure and temperature, possesses a sweetish smell. and is capable of inducing the first and second stages of anesthesia when inhaled. The oxygen in the compound will be released under conditions of combustion, creating an oxygen-enriched atmosphere. (HYP)Substantiation: This definition will create problems for Level 3 facilities. There is not a definition of anesthesia to assist in understanding anesthesia or the use of Nitrous Oxide. It implies no use in Level 3. Stages are listed as “Stage I and Stage II”. One must understand the 3 planes of Stage I. Stage I - Analgesia: Plane 1 Pre Analgesia (aspirin as an example) Plane 2 Partial Analgesia Plane 3 Consciousness, Total Analgesia (Relative Analgesia per Dr. Harry Langaʼs book on the use of Nitrous Oxide) Stage II - Delirium Often called the Excitement or Exaggerated reflex by Dr. E. I. Mckesson in his book on Nitrous Oxide and other anesthesia books and writings. Most Medical/Dental providers would not be able to treat if the patient was in Stage II. It will be difficult to reach Stage II with 30 percent Oxygen, now required for all Analgesia dispensing devices by the FDA and the American Dental Assn.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise section as follows: 3.3.119 Nitrous Oxide. An inorganic compound, one of the oxides of Nitrogen. It exists as a gas at atmospheric pressure and temperature, possesses a sweetish smell and is used for inducing anesthesia when inhaled. The oxygen in the compound will be released under conditions of combustion, creating an oxygen-enriched atmosphere. (HYP)Committee Statement: First and second stages of anesthesia are confusing and this was deleted. It is useful to inform nonmedical personnel that nitrous oxide is used for inducing anesthesia when inhaled.Number Eligible to Vote: 8Ballot Results: Affirmative: 5 Vote Not Returned: 3 CROWLEY, MILLS, SOMMERS

________________________________________________________________99-47 Log #197 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 3.3.125 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Robert M. Sutter, BOC GasesRecommendation: Delete text as follows: Nonflammable Medical Gas System. A system of piped oxygen, nitrous oxide, compressed air, or other non-flammable medical gases.Substantiation: Definition is similar to section 3.3.109 Medical Gas System.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise to read: “Nonflammable Medical Gas System: See Medical Gas System.”Committee Statement: The term is used and should be defined.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-48 Log #198 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 3.3.140 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Robert M. Sutter, BOC GasesRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Piped Distribution System. A system that consists of a central supply system (manifold, bulk, or compressors) with control equipment (shutoff valves, signal switches, wiring) and piping extending to points in the facility where non-flammable medical gases are required, (the piped distribution system terminates at) with suitable (the) station outlet valves at each use point.Substantiation: The “Piped Distribution System” is a part of the general system description found in the broad definition of a “Medical Gas System”. Confusion is created when the limits of the piped distribution system are not clearly defined.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise to read as follows: Piped Distribution System: A pipeline network assembly of equipment which starts at and includes the source valve, warning systems (master, area, local alarms), bulk gas system signal actuating switch wiring, interconnecting piping and all other components up to and including the station outlets/inlets.Committee Statement: The revised wording clarifies the limitations and extent of the piped distribution system.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-49 Log #157 HEA-ADM Final Action: Accept( 3.3.179 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Burton R. Klein, Burton Klein AssociatesRecommendation: Revise definition to read: Wet locations. The area in a patient care area where a procedure is performed that is normally subjected to wet conditions while patients are present, including standing fluids on the floor or drenching of the work area, either of which condition is intimate to the patient or staff. (ADM)Substantiation: 1. (1st and 2nd changes) Some patient care areas have sinks in them for patients or staff to use. These are not considered ʻwet locations, ̓and thus should not be subject to the additional electrical safeguards (e.g., IPS) as required in Chapter 4 of NFPA 99. It is the type of procedure being done that can result in fluids in sufficient amounts to invoke ʻwet location ̓requirements. 2. (3rd change) Definitions should not include the term being defined within the definition. [NOTE: This proposal is the result of further discussions at workshops on the definition for ʻwet location. ̓A proposal was submitted previously on the subject.]Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 5Ballot Results: Affirmative: 3 Vote Not Returned: 2 DIMANNO, TRUDZINSKI

________________________________________________________________99-50 Log #96 HEA-ADM Final Action: Reject( 3.3.179 Wet Location )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Burton R. Klein, Burton Klein AssociatesRecommendation: 1. Revise 3.3.179 to read as follows: Wet Procedure Locations. A patient care area that is normally subject to standing fluids on the floor or to drenching of the work area (1) while patients are present, and (2) when either of which condition is intimate to the patient or staff. 2. Retain Annex A.3.3.179. 3. Change “wet location” to “wet procedure location” in Chapters 4 and 13.Substantiation: 1. Addition of the word “procedure” is for clarification in NFPA 99. It is the type of procedure being done that makes a patient care area “wet”. 2. It is a general rule that the definition of a term does not include the term itself. Current definition includes the term “wet location” within the definition of “wet location.”Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: The committee accepted the revised definition in 99-49 (Log #157).Number Eligible to Vote: 5Ballot Results: Affirmative: 3 Vote Not Returned: 2 DIMANNO, TRUDZINSKI

99-11

Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99________________________________________________________________99-51 Log #365 HEA-ELS Final Action: Accept in Principle( 4.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Craig H. Kampmier Swansea, MARecommendation: Revise to read as follows: 4.1* Applicability. This chapter is applicable to any health care facility as referenced in other chapters, and in consideration of the scope. 4.1.1. Wiring and installation requirements on equipment shall be in accordance with NFPA 70, National Electrical Code. 4.1.2 Requirements for illumination and identification of means of egress in health care shall be in accordance with NFPA 101, Life Safety Code. 4.1.3 The alternate source of emergency power for illumination and identification of means of egress shall be from the essential electrical system. 4.1.4 Requirements for the installation of stationary engines and gas turbines shall be in accordance with NFPA 37, Standard for the Installation and Use of Stationary Combustion Engines and Gas Turbines.Substantiation: The existing applicability does not describe the chapterʼs application consistent with paragraph 1.6.1.4 of the Manual of Style, January 2003 edition, or applicability sections of other chapters in NFPA 99. Subsection 4.1.1 is an electrical system requirement (Section 4.3). Subsections 4.1.2 and 4.1.4 are addressed by paragraph 1.1.4.1. Subsection 4.1.3 is addressed within subparagraph 4.4.1.1.8.1.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise the Proposal text to read as follows: 4.1* Applicability. This chapter is applicable applies to any health care facilitiesy as referenced in other chapters. and in consideration of the scope. The remaining portion is deleted as indicated by the submitter.Committee Statement: The panel agrees in principle with the editorial text change as indicated. Number Eligible to Vote: 14Ballot Results: Affirmative: 14

________________________________________________________________99-52 Log #362 HEA-ELS Final Action: Reject( 4.1 & 4.3 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Craig H. Kampmier Swansea, MARecommendation: Delete the requirements of Subsection 4.1.1 and relocate (insert) the requirements as a new paragraph within Section 4.3, Electrical System Requirements: 4.1.1. Wiring and installation requirements on equipment shall be in accordance with NFPA 70, National Electrical Code. 4.3.1.3. Wiring and installation requirements on equipment shall be in accordance with NFPA 70, National Electrical Code.Substantiation: The requirements are an electrical system requirement and do not direct the user on the application of the chapterʼs requirements.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: This is adequately addressed in Section 4.3.2.1.Number Eligible to Vote: 14Ballot Results: Affirmative: 14

________________________________________________________________99-53 Log #1 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 4.3.1.1.3 (New) )________________________________________________________________ This Proposal appears as Comment 99-50(Log # 117) which was held from the F2001 ROC on Propsoal 99-71Submitter: Robert M. Sutter, BOC GasesRecommendation: Add new text to read as follows: Vaporizers. Vaporizers which are provided to convert cryogenic liquid to the gaseous state shall be ambient heat transfer units so that the flow from the vaporizer is unaffected by the loss of power. Exception: use of powered vaporizers is permitted provided that: a. Reserve ambient vaporizers are provided are piped to the source of supply in such a manner as to be unaffected by a freeze up or flow stoppage from the powered vaporizer. The reserve vaporizer shall be capable of vaporizing at least one dayʼs average supply. b. Medical gas is available from a non-cryogenic source capable of providing at least one dayʼs average supply.Substantiation: At the present time there is no requirement for back up vaporization when powered vaporizers such as hot water, steam or electric is being used. A loss of the source heat, water, steam or electric would allow cryogenic fluids to enter medical piping system. This requirement would allow the use of powered vaporizer system while insuring a continuous supply of gaseous product to the medical facility.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Committee Statement: See Committee Proposal 99-179 (Log #CP313).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-54 Log #2 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 4.3.1.1.3 (New) )________________________________________________________________ This Proposal appears as Comment 99-51(Log # 118) which was held from the F2001 ROC on Propsoal 99-71Submitter: Robert M. Sutter, BOC GasesRecommendation: New text to read as follows: Vaporizers. Vaporizers shall be sized to provide adequate capacity under all conditions. Winter temperature extremes, structures that obstruct air circulation and sunlight shall be considered by the agency rating and selecting the vaporizers. Substantiation: At the present time there is no requirement for the proper sizing of vaporizers. An ambient air vaporizer has to be properly sized for the application and environment in which it is being used. Improperly sized vaporizers will accumulate large quantities of low temperature ice, which has lead to equipment damage and equipment failure. Improperly sized vaporizers will also allow low temperature gas to enter the medical gas piping. Vaporizers which have air circulation and sunlight restrictions will not perform as well as the same identical vaporizers that do not have these restrictions. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle See Committee Proposal 99-110 (Log #CP313).Committee Statement: See Committee Proposal 99-110 (Log #CP313).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-55 Log #3 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 4.3.1.1.3 (New) )________________________________________________________________ This Proposal appears as Comment 99-52(Log # 119) which was held from the F2001 ROC on Proposal 99-71Submitter: Robert M. Sutter, BOC GasesRecommendation: Add text to read as follows: Vaporizers. Vaporizers shall be installed in such a manner which permits the switching of units to allow deicing. Switching valves shall: a. Not be a solenoid if the valve is so located as to stop the flow of gas to the facility. b. If powered, have the ability to be manually operated. c. Not stop the flow of gas to the facility during switching.Substantiation: Vaporizers that convert cryogenic medical product into gaseous medical product operate in the -250 OF to -280 OF range. Under these conditions moisture in the air will condense and freeze on the piping. This ice will continue to grow until the outer layer of the ice reaches the dew point. This growth of ice has lead to equipment and pad failures. Due to the continuous use of medical gases at medical facilities a typical vaporizer will never be able to shed all of its ice. The installation of a switching system will allow a vaporizer to shed its ice load a. Solenoids should never be installed in a switching system if they can stop the flow of medical gas into the facility. Even fail open solenoids have failed in the closed position and these cannot be detected until the system switches and product fails to flow in to the medical facility. b. A switching system can be manual or automatic. An automatic system is better for larger medical facilities. When an automatic system is used the timing of the vaporizer system can be set to minimize the growth of mature or hard ice. The best valve for a switching system is a three-way divertor ball valve. These valves have actuators placed on the top which can easily be removed or made to operate in a manual mode. c. No switching system should be configured so that the flow of medical gas can be stopped. Some common installation designs place globe valves in front and back of vaporizers. In order to switch this type of system a valve must be opened and a valve must be closed. Doing this procedure improperly could lead to the system being shut down. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement:See Committee Proposal 99-110 (Log #CP313).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: ERICKSON: This proposal, which is not a part of CP313, appears to require two evaporators on the cryogenic bulk system. As a minimum standard the need for redundant evaporators and the necessary controls is overkill. there are plenty of locations in this country where icing of the fins is not a problem and if the system is sized properly icing should not occur.Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

99-12

Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99________________________________________________________________99-56 Log #4 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 4.3.1.1.3 (New) )________________________________________________________________ This Proposal appears as Comment 99-53 (Log # 120) which was held from the F2001 ROC on Propsoal 99-71Submitter: Robert M. Sutter, BOC GasesRecommendation: Add text to read as follows: Vaporizers. It shall be the responsibility of the facility to inform the owner or agency performing maintenance on the supply system of changes in the site or use pattern which would affect the performance of the vaporizers.Substantiation: Vaporizers that convert cryogenic medical product into gaseous medical product are sized to perform within set parameters. Changes in use patterns or loads can lead to an undersized vaporizer. It is not uncommon for a medical facility to continue to grow adding beds, operating suites and hyperbaric chambers without reviewing their vaporization system.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Proposal 99-110 (Log #CP313).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-57 Log #371 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 4.3.1.2.7 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Michael A. Gillespie, Viega NARecommendation: Add new (i) and renumber remainder of section (i) Couplings and fittings complying with ANSI/ASME B16.51 and rated by the coupling/fitting manufacturer for field-installed piping for the distribution of medical piped gases and having mechanically pressed joints that include a resilient O-ring seal that is rated for use with the medical gases shall be permitted to be used in lieu of a brazed joint. The press connection when made up shall be a permanent joint having the mechanical, thermal and sealing integrity of a brazed joint.Substantiation: The propose language will allow the use of mechanically pressed coupling and fitting technology. Mechanically pressed connections provide an alternative to brazing. Is a proven technology currently used for medical vacuum systems, domestic water, chilled water, hot water heating, low-pressure steam, industrial oxygen, nitrogen, argon, and NFPA rated fire protection systems. Will harmonize the piping material section with the vacuum section 5.1.10.5.8 Special Fittings (4).Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: There was not enough technical information to make an informed decision to accept the recommendation.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHComment on Affirmative: WAGNER: The O-ring in the joint does not provide the thermal integrity of a brazed joint.Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-58 Log #CP301 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 4.3.1.2.7 )________________________________________________________________TCC Action: The TCC is requesting the TC to provide a better statement as to why bending the tube is not an appropriate method to change direction.Submitter: Technical Committee on Piping SystemsRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Turns, offsets, and other changes in direction in piping shall be made with fittings complying with 4-3.1.2.7(E) exception:, turns, offsets & other changes in direction in outlet station pigtails shall be permitted to be made with tubing benders as stated in the copper tube handbook in Section IV. “Bending”.Substantiation: This was logged in as NFPA 99C, Ron Keller. We couldnʼt find it so we made a Committee Proposal. We would like to make this action on Ron Kellerʼs proposal.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: The committee feels that bending the tubing is not an appropriate method of changing direction.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: ERICKSON: The bending of pipe for pigtails for station outlets has been recommended as a justifiable method of installation and the TC gives as a justification that it feels that bending is not an appropriate method of changing direction. If this is not appropriate they need to tell us why.Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-59 Log #413 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 4.3.1.2.7(i) & 4.3.1.2.8 (6) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Ron R. Keller, J & S Mechanical Contractors, Inc.Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Have equal to or less than (1) 5 mg/m3 of permanent particulates sized 1 micron or larger in the air at normal atmospheric pressure.Substantiation: This is a substantial and unacceptable level of particulate matter. This change should be considered editorial in nature. the change from 5 mg/m3 to 1 mg/m3 was accepted by the committee during the previous session, and itʼs insertion was not included in the rewrite.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: The change made between the 1999 edition and the 2002 edition was not made in error and is correct.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-60 Log #6 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 4.3.1.2.8(b)10(D) )________________________________________________________________TCC Action: The TCC changes the committee statement to read: “The recommendation is not enforceable and the committee does not feel the internal evaluation of the pip is cost effective.. This change is editorial.Submitter: Richard A. Hoffmann, Hoffman & FeigeRecommendation: Add new text to read as follows: 4-3.1.2.8(b)(10). Each brazed joint shall be visually examined after cleaning of the outside of the joint. The following conditions shall be considered unacceptable: a. Flux or flux residue b. Excessive oxidation of the joint c. Presence of unmelted filler metal d. Failure of the filler metal to be clearly visible all the way around the joint at the interface between the socket and the tube e. Cracks in the tube or component f. Cracks in the braze filler metal g. Failure of the joint to hold the test pressure under 4-3.4.1.2(c) Add this text to the end of item 4-3.1.2.8(b)(10) Where possible, the inner surfaces (the sides opposite the side from which the braze alloy has been applied) of the brazed joint should be visually examined to establish if the braze alloy has traveled to the other side of the joint, demonstrating that the braze alloy has traveled the entire length of the braze joint. Note: Supporting material available for review upon your request at NFPA Headquarters. Substantiation: Justification - This change fulfills the requirements for visual examination presented in paragraph QB-141.6 of ASME IX, which states: Visual examination of brazed joints is used for estimating the soundness by external appearance, such as continuity of the brazing filler metal, size, contour, and wetting of fillet along the joint and, where appropriate, to determine if filler metal flowed through the joint from the side of application to the other side. Without the proposed changes which allow interior examination of the brazed joint and the resultant visual documentation of the penetration of the filler metal to the inside of the joint, the inspector has no quick, accurate and reliable method of determining if the braze alloy achieved its required percentage filling of the braze joint gap. The proposed revision would significantly increase the quality of the braze joints on piping and tubing systems, where it is possible through normal visual inspection tools, i.e., mirror and flashlight, to verify the inner quality of the joint in the areas that the inspector could examine. The present inspection requirements listed in 4-3.1.2.8(10) above are based solely on external inspection. My recommendation modifies this to allow examination of the interior of the braze joint in compliance with the requirements of ASME IX QB-141.6.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: The recommendation is not enforceable and the committee does not feel internal evaluation of the pipe is not cost effective.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHComment on Affirmative: WAGNER: The proposal is to examine both outside surfaces (near & far) of the brazed joint, not the inside. The standard already calls for “visual examination” which can only be accomplished if the entire brazed joint is examined.Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

99-13

Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99________________________________________________________________99-61 Log #8 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 4.3.1.2.9(e), Exceptions 1 & 2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Keith Ferrari, PraxairRecommendation: Revise text as follows: Exception 1: Room Locations Medical Air Compressor Supply Systems & Medical Surgical Vacuum Pump Supply Systems Exception 2: Room location for secondary distribution circuit panels and breakers having a maximum voltage rating of 600 volts.Substantiation: Section 4-3.1.2.9(e) Piping Installation states: “Piping shall not be installed in kitchens or electrical switchgear rooms.” The word switchgear is a broad term used to identify a wide spectrum of electrical components. Currently, NFPA 99 does not define the word “switchgear”. NFPA 70 and 70B define the word switchgear as: A switchgear assembly is an assembled equipment (indoor or outdoor) including, but not limited to, one or more of the following: switching, interrupting, control, metering, protective, and regulating devices together with their supporting structure, enclosure, conductors, electric interconnections, and accessories. A switchgear assembly can be an open type, as part of a substation assembly, or an enclosed type. Metal-enclosed switchgear assemblies are enclosed on all sides and top with sheet metal. Access into the enclosure is provided by doors or a removable cover. The bus and bus connections are insulated in metal-clad switchgear assemblies, the insulation is not designed to protect against electrical shock. Contact with the bus or its connections should be avoided when the switchgear is energized. Low-voltage, metal-enclosed switchgear assemblies have a maximum nominal rating of 600 volts. Medium- and high- voltage metal-enclosed switchgear assemblies have a nominal voltage rating from 5,000 - 69,000 volts inclusive. These switchgear assemblies are normally constructed in modules or cubicles, each of which contains either one or more interrupting devices or auxiliary equipment, such as metering transformers, auxiliary power transformer, control relaying, and battery chargers. Power is fed throughout the assembly by the main power bus. This will clarify the locations that medical gas piping can be installed. And although, low voltage assemblies are defined as switchgear assemblies, electrical light switches, Medical Air Compressors electrical controls, Medical/Surgical Vacuum Pump electrical controls, Medical Gas Manifold & Alarm transformers and electrical controls,...could fall under this definition. Secondary electrical distribution systems, such as floor lighting breaker or switch controls areas would be an exception.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptCommittee Statement: This will be in Section 5.1.10.6.3.2Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHComment on Affirmative: WAGNER: “Exception1: Room locations for medical air compressor supply systems and...”Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-62 Log #52 HEA-ELS Final Action: Accept( 4.3.2.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Burton R. Klein, Burton Klein AssociatesRecommendation: 1. Add an asterisk after paragraph number. 2. Add new Annex A.4.3.2.2 to read: “For additional wiring requirements for anesthetizing locations, see 13.4.1.”Substantiation: Technical Committee moved some requirements specific for anesthetizing locations to 13.4.1. This note calls readers attention to this situation.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 14Ballot Results: Affirmative: 14

________________________________________________________________99-63 Log #CP204 HEA-ELS Final Action: Accept( 4.3.2.2.1(C) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Electrical SystemsRecommendation: (C) Special Purpose Outlets. Branch circuits serving only special-purpose outlets or receptacles (e.g., portable X-ray receptacles) shall not be required rewired to conform to the requirements of 4.3.2.2.1(B).Substantiation: The correct wording should be required.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptCommittee Statement: The revision corrects the terminology Number Eligible to Vote: 14Ballot Results: Affirmative: 14

________________________________________________________________99-64 Log #64 HEA-ELS Final Action: Accept in Principle in Part( 4.3.2.2.4.2, 4.3.2.6.1.1, 4.4.2.1.3, 4.4.2.1.5 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Robert Bourke, Northeastern Regional Fire Code Dev.Recommendation: Revise to read: 4.3.2.2.4.2* If used, ground-fault circuit interrupters (GFCIs) shall be listed and approved for the purpose. 4.3.2.6.1.1 The isolation transformer shall be listed and approved for the purpose. 4.4.2.1.3 Automatic Transfer Switch Classification. Each automatic transfer switch shall be listed and approved for emergency electrical service (see NFPA 70, National Electrical Code, Section 700.3) as a complete assembly. 4.4.2.1.5 Nonautomatic Transfer Device Classification. Nonautomatic transfer devices shall be listed and approved for emergency electrical service (see NFPA 70, National Electrical Code, Section 700.3).Substantiation: Use of the word “approved” indicates that GFCIs can be used when arbitrarily acceptable to the authority having jurisdiction. By adding the words “listed and” in front of approved, it is clarified that the equipment shall meet identified standards or has been tested and found suitable for the specified purpose by independent testing. The isolation transformer shall be listed and approved for the purpose. Use of the word “approved” indicates that the transformer can be used when arbitrarily acceptable to the authority having jurisdiction. By adding the words “listed and” in front of approved, it is clarified that the equipment shall meet identified standards or has been tested and found suitable for the specified purpose by independent testing. Use of the word “approved” indicates that the automatic transfer switch can be used when arbitrarily acceptable to the authority having jurisdiction. By adding the words “listed and” in front of approved, it is clarified that the equipment shall meet identified standards or has been tested and found suitable for the specified purpose by independent testing. Use of the word “approved” indicates that the nonautomatic transfer switch can be used when arbitrarily acceptable to the authority having jurisdiction. By adding the words “listed and” in front of approved, it is clarified that the equipment shall meet identified standards or has been tested and found suitable for the specified purpose by independent testing.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle in Part Revise the Proposal to read as follows: 4.3.2.2.4.2* If used, ground-fault circuit interrupters (GFCIs) shall be listed or and approved for the purpose. 4.3.2.6.1.1 The isolation transformer shall be listed or and approved for the purpose. 4.4.2.1.3 Automatic Transfer Switch Classification. Each automatic transfer switch shall be listed or and approved for emergency electrical service (see NFPA 70, National Electrical Code, Section 700.3) as a complete assembly. 4.4.2.1.5 Nonautomatic Transfer Device Classification. Nonautomatic transfer devices shall be listed or and approved. for emergency electrical service (see NFPA 70, National Electrical Code, Section 700.3).Committee Statement: The changes in the submitterʼs Proposal permits the AHJ to accept non-listed devices. The Committee change in the submitterʼs language in 4.4.2.1.5 permits the installation of nonautomatic transfer switches. Section 700.3 of the NEC does not permit nonautomatic transfer switches. Number Eligible to Vote: 14Ballot Results: Affirmative: 13 Negative: 1 Explanation of Negative: MURNANE: It is unrealistic to expect the AHJʼs to render acceptance decisions on complex equipment such as transformers, circuit breakers and switchgear without some reasonable basis of acceptance. In addition to permitting inconsistencies in the application of the code requirements the panel decision may result in inherently unsafe and/or inadequate equipment being installed. Therefore the equipment shall be listed and approved for the application as the suggestion states.

________________________________________________________________99-65 Log #53 HEA-ELS Final Action: Accept( 4.3.2.2.6 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Burton R. Klein, Burton Klein AssociatesRecommendation: Move this section (Switches in Anesthetizing Locations), and make it new 13.4.1.2.6.7.Substantiation: Place additional switch requirements specifically for anesthetizing locations in one section.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 14Ballot Results: Affirmative: 14

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99________________________________________________________________99-66 Log #374 HEA-ELS Final Action: Accept( 4.3.2.2.7.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Dale Woodin, ASHE-American Society for Healthcare Engineering of the American Hospital Association (AHA)Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 4.3.2.2.7.2 Minimum Number of Receptacles. The number of receptacles shall be determined by the intended use of the patient care areas in accordance with 4.3.2.2.7.2(A) through (D). (A) Receptacles for Patient Bed Locations in General Care Areas. Each patient bed location shall be provided with a minimum of four receptacles (or two duplex receptacles). (B) Receptacle for Patient Bed Locations in Critical Care Areas. Each patient bed location shall be provided with a minimum of six receptacles (or three duplex receptacles). (C) Receptacles for Bathrooms or Toilets. Receptacles shall not be required in bathrooms or toilet rooms. (D) Receptacles for Special Areas. Receptacles shall not be required in areas where medical requirements mandate otherwise (e.g., certain psychiatric, pediatric, or hydrotherapy areas).Substantiation: Specifically identifying that duplex receptacles may be used will prevent misinterpretations that have required hospitals to install individual receptacles in patient care areas.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 14Ballot Results: Affirmative: 14

________________________________________________________________99-67 Log #54 HEA-ELS Final Action: Accept( 4.3.2.2.7.4 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Burton R. Klein, Burton Klein AssociatesRecommendation: 1. Move this section (Anesthetizing Location Receptacles), and make it new 13.4.1.2.6.3. 2. Renumber 13.4.1.2.6.3 through 13.4.1.2.6.6 to new 13.4.1.2.6.4 through 13.4.1.2.6.7. 3. Add asterisk after paragraph number 4.3.2.2.7. 4. Add new Annex A-4.3.2.2.7 to read: “For additional requirements for receptacles in anesthetizing locations see 13.4.1.2.6.”Substantiation: Place all additional requirements specifically for receptacles in anesthetizing locations in one section.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 14Ballot Results: Affirmative: 14

________________________________________________________________99-68 Log #121 HEA-ELS Final Action: Accept( 4.3.2.2.9.4 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Burton R. Klein, Burton Klein AssociatesRecommendation: Change reference from 4.3.2.2 to 4.3.2.6.Substantiation: Editorial. Section 4.3.2.6 is the correct reference.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 14Ballot Results: Affirmative: 14

________________________________________________________________99-69 Log #410 HEA-ELS Final Action: Reject( 4.3.2.2.10 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Judy Kathman, Post Glover LifelinkRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: An isolated power system shall not be required to be installed in any patient care area that is determined to be a wet location and where life support systems are in use or may be used. Except as specified in 4.3.2.2.9.Substantiation: Current language is unclear and the definition of wet location is not thoroughly defined. Many hospitals are now in violation of the standard and personnel, patients, and surgeons are placed at risk. Is Isolated Power Required? Many feel the only purpose for Isolated Power is for flammable inhalation anesthetizing locations. But that is not true! The NFPA 99, 2002 edition 4.3.2.2.9.1 states that if the area is a “Wet location the patient care area shall be provided with a special protection against electrical shock. This special protection shall be provided as follows: (1) A power distribution system that inherently limits the possible ground fault current due to a first fault to a low value, without interrupting the power supply.” In 4.3.2.2.9.4 it states that Isolated Power shall be permitted as the protective means capable of limiting the ground fault without power interruption. Some say all Operating Rooms are not Wet Locations and that is true maybe at the beginning of the operation but what happens when there is a spillage. NFPA 99 E.6.6.2 mentions that “Patients and personnel OFTEN are wet with prepping solutions, blood, urine, and other conductive fluids that greatly reduce resistance to the passage of unintended electrical current. More than ordinary

care is crucially necessary in the use and maintenance of all electrical systems and equipment.” Therefore we feel since accidents do happen the, “more than ordinary care”, would include Isolated Power, for the safety of the patient, doctors and nurses that may find themselves standing in fluids during an operation. We also feel that a patient who is under anesthetic can not tell you if they are receiving an electrical shock and should be protected by more than ordinary care of isolated power. NFPA 99 B.1.4.1 (General) says “Medical and nursing sciences are becoming progressively more dependent on electrical apparatus for the preservation of life of hospitalized patients. For example, year by year more cardiac operations are performed, in some of which the patientʼs life depends on artificial circulation of blood; in other operations, life is sustained by means of electrical impulses that stimulate and regulate hear action; in still others, suction developed by electrical means is routinely relied on to remove body fluids and mucus that might otherwise cause suffocation.” Interruption of power can cause a patient their life, thatʼs why the hospital has emergency back-up power. But what good would it be if due to a spillage of fluids on the floor during an operation the breaker trips, if it was on grounded power! On Isolated Power the equipment stays on and the hospital personnel gets an alarm to let them know there is a potential problem. The circuit breaker only trips when you have a line to line fault. Due to the extra protection Isolated Power provides the patient, all engineers should recommend it in all major operating rooms. If the hospital still recommends to remove it, the engineer should get that in writing from the hospital administration to protect themselves from a law suit later if an accident happens. North Carolina and Michigan have made it mandatory to have Isolated Power in all Operating Rooms. At one time NFPA was making an investigation about electrical shocks in operating rooms where they had taken Isolated Power out. To this date we have not heard the outcome of their findings. But where there is smoke you can bet someone got burned, whether or not they publish it or not! Please find the reasons to keep Isolated Power in all Operating Rooms: (1) Reduced Shock Hazard (2) Continuity of Power (3) Line Noise Reduction, the transformer acts as an electrical filter. (4) Advance warning system of what their equipment condition is. (5) Extra level of protection will keep down liability claims.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: The submitter has not provided adequate substantiation to justify the change in the current language. Section 4.3.2.2.9 currently addresses the submitters intent. Number Eligible to Vote: 14Ballot Results: Affirmative: 14

________________________________________________________________99-70 Log #122 HEA-ELS Final Action: Accept( 4.3.2.3 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Burton R. Klein, Burton Klein AssociatesRecommendation: Delete sentence 1 in 4.3.2.3 (“Power outlets shall be installed... and for Laboratory Power Sources.”)Substantiation: Reference document in sentence 1 (NCCLS Standard ASI-5) was withdrawn a number of years ago, and is no longer available.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 14Ballot Results: Affirmative: 14

________________________________________________________________99-71 Log #51 HEA-ELS Final Action: Accept( 4.3.2.5 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Hugh O. Nash, Jr., Nash Lipsey BurchRecommendation: Delete all text following 4.3.2.5 Ground-Fault Protection and create new 4.3.2.5.1 Applicability. The requirements of 4.3.2.5.2. shall apply to hospitals and other buildings housing critical care areas or utilizing life support equipment, and buildings which provide essential utilities or services for the operation of critical care areas or electrical life support equipment. Create new 4.3.2.5.2 followed by the text from 4.3.2.5. Delete the 3rd sentence (The ...pumps).Substantiation: The requirement for an additional level of ground-fault protection is intended to prevent nuisance tripping of the main breaker in a hospital due to a ground-fault on a feeder or branch circuit. The requirement is not appropriate for health care facilities that do not have critical care areas or electrical life support systems. The proposed change also recognizes that health care facilities with critical care and life support (i.e. outpatient surgery centers) can be located in commercial buildings, shopping centers, and other non-healthcare occupancies.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 14Ballot Results: Affirmative: 14

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99________________________________________________________________99-72 Log #55 HEA-ELS Final Action: Accept( 4.3.2.5 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Burton R. Klein, Burton Klein AssociatesRecommendation: Move last sentence in 4.3.2.5 (“When equipment ground-fault protection is first installed, each level shall be performance tested to ensure compliance with 4.3.2.5”) to new 4.3.3.4, adding a title “Ground-fault protection testing”.Substantiation: Text is performance criteria, and thus belongs in Section 4.3.3.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 14Ballot Results: Affirmative: 14

________________________________________________________________99-73 Log #391 HEA-ELS Final Action: Reject( 4.3.2.6.1.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Alfred Maske Jolier, ILRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: The isolation transformer shall be listed approved for medical power isolation the purpose. Substantiation: Corrects the style to match the NFPA style guide.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: The submitter has not provided sufficient substantiation for the change. This is not an NFPA Manual of Style issue. See the Committee Statement on Proposal 99-64 (Log # 64). Number Eligible to Vote: 14Ballot Results: Affirmative: 14

________________________________________________________________99-74 Log #56 HEA-ELS Final Action: Accept in Principle in Part( 4.3.2.6.3.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Burton R. Klein, Burton Klein AssociatesRecommendation: In sentence 1, change “in the anesthetizing location” to read “in the room where line isolation monitor is located” so that sentence reads: “The monitor shall be designed such that a green signal lamp, conspicuously visible in the room where the line isolation monitor is located remains lighted (rest the same).”Substantiation: Chapter 4 is facility independent and thus reference to a specific area is not necessary. Application of requirements is to be found in Chapters 13-18.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle in Part Revise the text to read: “The monitor shall be designed such that a green signal lamp, conspicuously visible in the area room where the line isolation monitor is utilized, located remains lighted (rest to the text remains).”Committee Statement: It is not necessarily intended that the line isolation monitor be located in the room being served by the line isolated power system. The term “conspicuously visible” is currently included in the text.Number Eligible to Vote: 14Ballot Results: Affirmative: 14

________________________________________________________________99-75 Log #57 HEA-ELS Final Action: Accept( 4.3.3.3.2 and 4.3.3.3.2.3 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Burton R. Klein, Burton Klein AssociatesRecommendation: Move 4.3.3.3.2.2 and 4.3.3.3.2.3 to new 4.3.4.1.4 and 4.3.4.1.5, respectively.Substantiation: Section 4.3.3 covers performance criteria and testing for new systems and equipment. These two paragraphs cover IPS systems after installation, and thus belong in Section 4.3.4 (Administration).Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 14Ballot Results: Affirmative: 14

________________________________________________________________99-76 Log #58 HEA-ELS Final Action: Accept in Principle( 4.3.3.3.2.3 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Burton R. Klein, Burton Klein AssociatesRecommendation: In 4.3.3.3.2.3, delete sentence 2 (“for a LIM circuit...not more than 12 months.”)Substantiation: This requirement is already covered in 4.3.3.3.2.2.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise section 4.3.3.3.2.3. to read as follows: 4.3.3.3.2.3 After any repair or renovation to an electrical distribution system and at intervals of not more than 6 months, the LIM circuit shall be tested in accordance with 4.3.3.3.2.1. and only when the circuit is not otherwise in use. For a LIM circuit with automated self-test and self-calibration capabilities, this test shall be performed at intervals of not more than 12 months.

Committee Statement: This change makes the language consistent with the previous section 4.3.3.3.2.2.Number Eligible to Vote: 14Ballot Results: Affirmative: 14

________________________________________________________________99-77 Log #330 HEA-ELS Final Action: Accept( 4.3.4.1.1& 4.3.4.1.3 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Hugh O. Nash, Jr., Nash Lipsey BurchRecommendation: Change 4.3.4.1.1 and 4.3.4.1.3 to read as shown below: 4.3.4.1.1 Testing intervals for hospital grade receptacles required at patient bed locations and in anesthetizing locations in patient care areas shall be performed after initial installation, replacement, or servicing of the device. 4.3.4.1.3 Receptacles at patient bed locations and in anesthetizing locations not listed as hospital grade shall be tested at intervals not exceeding 12 months.Substantiation: All receptacles in patient care areas are not required to be hospital grade. For example exam rooms, that are not bed locations and are not critical care areas, are not required to have hospital grade receptacles. In addition, the implication of 4.3.4.1.3 is that non-hospital grade receptacles in the business office and cafeteria must be tested annually.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 14Ballot Results: Affirmative: 14

________________________________________________________________99-78 Log #95 HEA-ELS Final Action: Accept( 4.3.4.1.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Burton R. Klein, Burton Klein AssociatesRecommendation: Revise text to read: 4.3.4.1.2 Additional testing of receptacles in patient care areas shall be performed at intervals defined by documented performance data. (changes underlined)Substantiation: Editorial. 3.3.4.2.3(a) in NFPA 99-1999 covered testing of receptacles in patient care areas. With new numbering in 2002 edition, wording could be misapplied. Addition of wording underlined will make it clear that paragraph applies only to hospital grade receptacles in patient care areas (as intended).Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 14Ballot Results: Affirmative: 14

________________________________________________________________99-79 Log #94 HEA-ELS Final Action: Accept in Principle( 4.3.4.1.3 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Burton R. Klein, Burton Klein AssociatesRecommendation: Revise text to read: “Receptacles in patient care areas not listed as hospital grade shall be tested at intervals not exceeding 12 months.” (change underlined)Substantiation: Editorial. Addition of wording underlined will make it clear that paragraph applies only to non-hospital grade receptacles in patient care areas (as intended).Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Action on 99-77 (Log #330).Number Eligible to Vote: 14Ballot Results: Affirmative: 14

________________________________________________________________99-80 Log #92 HEA-ELS Final Action: Accept in Principle( 4.4, 4.5 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Burton R. Klein, Burton Klein AssociatesRecommendation: Identify the following paragraphs as extracted text from NFPA 110, Standard for Emergency and Standby Power Systems: 4.4.1.1.9 Work space 4.4.1.1.11 Load pickup 4.4.1.1.12 Maintenance of temperature 4.4.1.1.13 Ventilating air 4.4.1.1.15 Compressed air starting devices 4.4.1.1.17 Requirements for safety devices 4.4.1.1.18 Alarm annunciators 4.4.2.1.4 Automatic transfer switch features 4.4.2.1.6 Non-automatic transfer switch features 4.4.2.1.7 Bypass-isolation switches 4.5.3.2.2.1.Substantiation: Conform to NFPA Extract policy. These paragraphs were identified in NFPA 99-1999 as extracted text from NFPA 110.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleRevise the NFPA 99 sections numbered below with extracted text from NFPA 110 as indicated and renumber as required. 4.4.1.1.9 Work Space or Room. (A) Energy converters shall be located in a separate service room dedicated to the generating equipment, separated from the remainder of the building by

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99fire separations having a minimum 2-hour fire rating, or located in an adequate enclosure outside the building capable of preventing the entrance of snow or rain and resisting maximum wind velocity required by the local building code. Rooms for such equipment shall not be shared with other equipment or electrical service equipment that is not a part of the essential electrical system. (B) The generating equipment shall be installed in a location that will permit ready accessibility and adequate [minimum of 30 in. (76 cm)] working space around the unit for inspection, repair, maintenance, cleaning, or replacement. 4.4.1.1.9 Work Space or Room. 7.2.1 The EPS shall be installed in a separate room for Level 1 installations. EPSS equipment shall be permitted to be installed in this room. 7.2.1.1 The room shall have a minimum 2-hour fire rating or be located in an adequate enclosure located outside the building capable of resisting the entrance of snow or rain at a maximum wind velocity required by local building codes. 7.2.3 The rooms, shelters, or separate buildings housing Level 1 or Level 2 EPSS equipment shall be designed and located to minimize the damage from flooding, including that caused by the following: (1) Flooding resulting from fire fighting (2) Sewer water backup (3) Similar disasters or occurrences 7.2.5 The EPS equipment shall be installed in a location that permits ready accessibility and a minimum of 76 cm (30 in.) from the skid rails ̓outermost point in the direction of access for inspection, repair, maintenance, cleaning, or replacement. This requirement shall not apply to units in outdoor housings. 4.4.1.1.11 Load Pickup. The generator set(s) shall have sufficient capacity to pick up the load and meet the minimum frequency and voltage stability requirements of the emergency system within 10 seconds after loss of normal power. 4.4.1.1.11 Load pickup The energy converters shall have the required capacity and response to pick up and carry the load within the time specified in Table 4.1(b) [NFPA 110] after loss of primary power. 4.4.1.1.12 Maintenance of Temperature. Provisions shall be made to maintain the generator room at not less than 10°C (50°F) or the engine water-jacket temperature at not less than 32°C (90°F). 4.4.1.1.12 Maintenance of temperature 5.3.1 The EPS shall be heated as necessary to maintain the water jacket temperature determined by the EPS manufacturer for cold start and load acceptance for the type of EPSS. 4.4.1.1.13 Ventilating Air. Provision shall be made to provide adequate air for cooling and to replenish engine combustion air. 7.7 Heating, Cooling, and Ventilating. 7.7.1* With the EPS running at rated load, ventilation air flow shall be provided to limit the maximum air temperature in the EPS room to the maximum ambient air temperature required by the EPS manufacturer. 7.7.1.1 Consideration shall be given to all the heat rejected to the EPS equipment room by the energy converter, uninsulated or insulated exhaust pipes, and other heat producing equipment. 7.7.2 Air shall be supplied to the EPS equipment for combustion. 7.7.2.1 For EPS supplying Level 1 EPSS, ventilation air shall be supplied directly from a source outside of the building by an exterior wall opening or from a source outside the building by a 2-hour fire rated air transfer system. 7.7.2.2 For EPS supplying Level 1 EPSS, discharge air shall be directed outside of the building by an exterior wall opening or to an exterior opening by a 2-hour fire rated air transfer system. 7.7.2.3 Fire dampers, shutters, or other self-closing devices shall not be permitted in ventilation openings or ductwork for supply or return/discharge air to EPS equipment for Level 1 EPSS. 7.7.3 Ventilation air supply shall be from outdoors or from a source outside of the building by an exterior wall opening or from a source outside the building by a 2-hour fire rated air transfer system. 7.7.4 Ventilation air shall be provided to supply and discharge cooling air for radiator cooling of the EPS when running at rated load. 7.7.4.1 Ventilation air supply and discharge for radiator cooled EPS shall have a maximum static restriction of 0.5 inches of water column (125 Pa) in the discharge duct at the radiator outlet. 7.7.4.2 Radiator air discharge shall be ducted outdoors or to an exterior opening by a 2-hour rated air transfer switch. 7.7.5 Motor operated dampers, when used, shall be spring operated to open and motor-closed. Fire dampers, shutters, or other self-closing devices shall not be permitted in ventilation openings or ductwork for supply or return/discharge air to EPS equipment for Level 1 EPSS. 7.7.6 The ambient air temperature in the EPS equipment room or outdoor housing containing Level 1 rotating equipment shall be not less than 4.5ºC (40ºF). 7.7.7 Units housed outdoors shall be heated as specified in 5.3.3. 7.7.8 Design of the heating, cooling, and ventilation system for the EPS equipment room shall include provision for factors including, but not limited to, the following: (1) Heat (2) Cold (3) Dust (4) Humidity (5) Snow and ice accumulations around housings

(6) Louvers (7) Remote radiator fans (8) Prevailing winds blowing against radiator fan discharge air 4.4.1.1.15 Compressed Air Starting Devices. Internal combustion engine air starting devices shall have sufficient capacity to supply five 10-second cranking attempts, with not more than a 10-second rest between attempts, with the compressor not operating. 4.4.1.1.15 Compressed air starting devices 5.6.4.1.2 Other types of stored energy starting systems (except pyrotechnic) shall be permitted to be used where recommended by the manufacturer of the prime mover and subject to approval of the authority having jurisdiction, under the following conditions: (1) Where two complete periods of cranking cycles are completed without replacement of the stored energy (2) Where a means for automatic restoration from the emergency source of the stored energy is be provided (3) Where the stored energy system has the cranking capacity specified in 5.6.4.2.1 (4) Where the stored energy system has a “black start” capability in addition to normal discharge capability 4.4.1.1.17 Requirements for Safety Devices. (A) Internal Combustion Engines. Internal combustion engines serving generator sets shall be equipped with the following: (1) A sensor device plus visual warning device to indicate a water-jacket temperature below those required in 4.4.1.1.12 (2) Sensor devices plus visual prealarm warning device to indicate the following: (a) High engine temperature (above manufacturerʼs recommended safe operating temperature range) (b) Low lubricating oil pressure (below manufacturerʼs recommended safe operating range) (c) Low water coolant level (3) An automatic engine shutdown device plus visual device to indicate that a shutdown took place due to the following: (a) Overcrank (failed to start) (b) Overspeed (c) Low lubricating oil pressure (d) Excessive engine temperature (4) A common audible alarm device to warn that any one or more of the prealarm or alarm conditions exist 4.4.1.1.17 Requirements for safety devices <insert and use the NFPA 110 Table 5.6.5.2> 4.4.1.1.18 Alarm Annunciator. A remote annunciator, storage battery–powered, shall be provided to operate outside of the generating room in a location readily observed by operating personnel at a regular work station (see NFPA 70, National Electrical Code, Section 700.12). The annunciator shall indicate alarm conditions of the emergency or auxiliary power source as follows: (1) Individual visual signals shall indicate the following: (a) When the emergency or auxiliary power source is operating to supply power to load (b) When the battery charger is malfunctioning (2) Individual visual signals plus a common audible signal to warn of an engine-generator alarm condition shall indicate the following: (a) Low lubricating oil pressure (b) Low water temperature (below those required in 4.4.1.1.12) (c) Excessive water temperature (d) Low fuel — when the main fuel storage tank contains less than a 4-hour operating supply (e) Overcrank (failed to start) (f) Overspeed 4.4.1.1.18 5.6.6 Remote Controls and Alarms. A remote, common audible alarm shall be provided as specified in 5.6.5.2(4) that is powered by the storage battery and located outside of the EPS service room at a work site observable by personnel. 5.6.6.1 An alarm-silencing means shall be provided, and the panel shall include repetitive alarm circuitry so that, after the audible alarm has been silenced, it reactivates after the fault condition has been cleared and has to be restored to its normal position to be silenced again. 5.6.6.2 In lieu of the requirement of 5.6.6.1, a manual alarm-silencing means shall be permitted that silences the audible alarm after the occurrence of the alarm condition, provided such means do not inhibit any subsequent alarms from sounding the audible alarm again without further manual action. 4.4.2.1.4 Automatic Transfer Switch Features. (A) General. Automatic transfer switches shall be electrically operated and mechanically held. The transfer switch shall transfer and retransfer the load automatically. Exception: It shall be permitted to program the transfer switch (1) for a manually initiated retransfer to the normal source, or (2) for an automatic intentional “off” delay, or (3) for an in-phase monitor relay or similar automatic delay method, so as to provide for a planned momentary interruption of the load. If used, this arrangement shall be provided with a bypass feature to permit automatic retransfer in the event that the alternate source fails and the normal source is available.

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99 (B) Interlocking. Reliable mechanical interlocking, or an approved alternate method, shall be inherent in the design of transfer switches to prevent the unintended interconnection of the normal and alternate sources of power, or any two separate sources of power. (C)* Voltage Sensing. Voltage sensing devices shall be provided to monitor all ungrounded lines of the normal source of power. (D) Time Delay on Starting of Alternate Power Source. A time delay device shall be provided to delay starting of the alternate source generator. The timer is intended to prevent nuisance starting of the alternate source generator with subsequent load transfer in the event of harmless momentary power dips and interruptions of the normal source. The time range shall be short enough so that the generator can start and be on the line within 10 seconds of the onset of failure. (E) Time Delay on Transfer to Alternate Power. An adjustable time delay device shall be provided for those transfer switches requiring “delayed-automatic” operation. The time delay shall commence when proper alternate source voltage and frequency are achieved. The delay device shall prevent transfer to the alternate power source until after expiration of the preset delay. (F)* Time Delay on Retransfer to Normal Power. An adjustable timer with a bypass shall be provided to delay retransfer from the alternate source of power to the normal. This timer will permit the normal source to stabilize before retransfer to the load and help to avoid unnecessary power interruptions. The bypass shall operate similarly to the bypass in 4.4.2.1.4(A). (G)* Test Switch. A test switch shall be provided on each automatic transfer switch that will simulate a normal power source failure to the switch. (H)* Indication of Switch Position. Two pilot lights, properly identified, shall be provided to indicate the transfer switch position. (I) Manual Control of Switch. A means for the safe manual operation of the automatic transfer switch shall be provided. (J) Time Delay on Engine Shutdown. A time delay of 5 minutes minimum to allow engine cooldown shall be provided for unloaded running of the alternate power source generator set prior to shutdown. Exception: Time delay need not be provided on small (15 kW or less) air-cooled prime movers or if included with the engine control panel. (K)* Motor Load Transfer. Provisions shall be included to reduce excessive currents resulting from motor load transfer if such currents can damage essential electrical system equipment or cause nuisance tripping of essential electrical system overcurrent protective devices. (L) Isolation of Neutral Conductors. Provisions shall be included for ensuring proper continuity, transfer, and isolation of the normal and the alternate power source neutral conductors whenever they are separately grounded, if needed, to achieve proper ground-fault sensing. [See NFPA 70, National Electrical Code, Section 230.95(b).] 4.4.2.1.4 X.XAutomatic Transfer Switch Features. <Renumber accordingly> 6.2.2 Source Monitoring. 6.2.2.1* Undervoltage-sensing devices shall be provided to monitor all ungrounded lines of the primary source of power as follows: (1) When the voltage on any phase falls below the minimum operating voltage of any load to be served, the transfer switch shall automatically initiate engine start and the process of transfer to the emergency power supply (EPS). (2)* When the voltage on all phases of the primary source returns to within specified limits for a designated period of time, the process of transfer back to primary power shall be initiated. 6.2.2.2 Both voltage-sensing and frequency-sensing equipment shall be provided to monitor one ungrounded line of the EPS power. 6.2.2.3 Transfer to the EPS shall be inhibited until the voltage and frequency are within a specified range to handle loads to be served. (A) Sensing equipment shall not be required in the transfer switch, provided it is included with the engine control panel. (B) Frequency-sensing equipment shall not be required for monitoring the public utility source where used as an EPS, as permitted by 5.1.4. 6.2.3 Interlocking. Mechanical interlocking or an approved alternate method shall prevent the inadvertent interconnection of the primary power supply and the EPS, or any two separate sources of power. 6.2.4* Manual Operation. 6.2.4.1 Instruction and equipment shall be provided for safe manual nonelectric transfer in the event the transfer switch malfunctions. 6.2.4.2 An automatic transfer switch shall visually annunciate when “not-in-automatic.” 6.2.5* Time Delay on Starting of EPS. A time-delay device shall be provided to delay starting of the EPS. The timer shall prevent nuisance starting of the EPS and possible subsequent load transfer in the event of harmless momentary power dips and interruptions of the primary source. 6.2.6 Time Delay at Engine Control Panel. Time delays shall be permitted to be located at the engine control panel in lieu of in the transfer switches. 6.2.7 Time Delay on Transfer to EPS. An adjustable time-delay device shall be provided to delay transfer and sequence load transfer to the EPS to avoid excessive voltage drop when the transfer switch is installed for Level 1 use. 6.2.7.1 Time Delay Commencement. The time delay shall commence when proper EPS voltage and frequency are achieved. 6.2.7.2 Time Delay at Engine Control Panel. Time delays shall be permitted to be located at the engine control panel in lieu of in the transfer switches. 6.2.8* Time Delay on Retransfer to Primary Source. An adjustable time-delay device with automatic bypass shall be provided to delay retransfer from the

EPS to the primary source of power, and allow the primary source to stabilize before retransfer of the load. 6.2.9 Time Delay Bypass If EPS Fails. The time delay shall be automatically bypassed if the EPS fails. 6.2.9.1 The transfer switch shall be permitted to be programmed for a manually initiated retransfer to the primary source to provide for a planned momentary interruption of the load. 6.2.9.2 If used, the arrangement in 6.2.9.1 shall be provided with a bypass feature to allow automatic retransfer in the event that the EPS fails and the primary source is available. 6.2.10 Time Delay on Engine Shutdown. A minimum time delay of 5 minutes shall be provided for unloaded running of the EPS prior to shutdown to allow for engine cooldown. 6.2.10.1 The minimum 5-minute delay shall not be required on small (15 kW or less) air-cooled prime movers. 6.2.10.2 A time-delay device shall not be required, provided it is included with the engine control panel, or if a utility feeder is used as an EPS. 6.2.11 Engine Generator Exercising Timer. A program timing device shall be provided to exercise the EPS as described in Chapter 8. 6.2.11.1 Transfer switches for Level 1 and Level 2 shall transfer the connected load to the EPS and immediately return to primary power automatically in case of the EPS failure. 6.2.11.2 Exercising timers shall be permitted to be located at the engine control panel in lieu of in the transfer switches. 6.2.11.3 A program timing device shall not be required in health care facilities that provide scheduled testing in accordance with NFPA 99, Standard for Health Care Facilities. 6.2.12 Test Switch. A test means shall be provided on each automatic transfer switch (ATS) that simulates failure of the primary power source and then transfers the load to the EPS. 6.2.13* Indication of Switch Position. Two pilot lights with identification nameplates or other approved position indicators shall be provided to indicate the transfer switch position. 6.2.14 Motor Load Transfer. Provisions shall be included to reduce currents resulting from motor load transfer if such currents could damage EPSS equipment or cause nuisance tripping of EPSS overcurrent protective devices. 6.2.15* Isolation of Neutral Conductors. Provisions shall be included for ensuring continuity, transfer, and isolation of the primary and the EPS neutral conductors wherever they are separately grounded to achieve ground-fault sensing. 6.2.16* Nonautomatic Transfer Switch Features. Switching devices shall be mechanically held and shall be operated by direct manual or electrical remote manual control. 6.2.16.1 Interlocking. Reliable mechanical interlocking, or an approved alternate method, shall prevent the inadvertent interconnection of the primary power source and the EPS. 6.2.16.2 Indication of Switch Position. Two pilot lights with identification nameplates, or other approved position indicators, shall be provided to indicate the switch position. 4.4.2.1.6 Nonautomatic Transfer Device Features. (A) General. Switching devices shall be mechanically held. Operation shall be by direct manual or electrical remote manual control. Electrically operated switches shall derive their control power from the source to which the load is being transferred. A means for safe manual operation shall be provided. (B) Interlocking. Reliable mechanical interlocking, or an approved alternate method, shall be inherent in the design in order to prevent the unintended interconnection of the normal and alternate sources of power, or of any two separate sources of power. (C) Indication of Switch Position. Pilot lights, properly identified, shall be provided to indicate the switch position. 4.4.2.1.6 Nonautomatic Transfer Switch Features. (A) General. Switching devices shall be mechanically held and shall be operated by direct manual or electrical remote manual control. (B) Interlocking. Reliable mechanical interlocking, or an approved alternate method, shall prevent the inadvertent interconnection of the primary power source and the EPS. (C) Indication of Switch Position. Two pilot lights with identification nameplates, or other approved position indicators, shall be provided to indicate the switch position. 4.4.2.1.7 Bypass-Isolation Switches. Bypass-isolation switches shall be permitted for bypassing and isolating the transfer switch. If installed, they shall be in accordance with 4.4.2.1.7(A) through (C). (A) Bypass-Isolation Switch Rating. The bypass-isolation switch shall have a continuous current rating and withstand current rating compatible with that of the associated transfer switch. (B) Bypass-Isolation Switch Classification. Each bypass-isolation switch shall be listed for emergency electrical service as a completely factory-assembled and tested apparatus. (See NFPA 70, National Electrical Code, Section 700.3.) (C)* Operation. With the transfer switch isolated or disconnected or both, means shall be provided so the bypass-isolation switch can function as an independent nonautomatic transfer switch and allow the load to be connected to either power source. Reconnection of the transfer switch shall be possible with a load interruption no greater than the maximum time, in seconds, by the type of essential electrical system.

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99 4.4.2.1.7 Bypass-Isolation Switches. Bypass-isolation switches shall be permitted for bypassing and isolating the transfer switch and installed in accordance with 4.4.2.1.7 (A) through (D) (A) Bypass-Isolation Switch Rating. The bypass-isolation switch shall have a continuous current rating and a current rating compatible with that of the associated transfer switch. (B) Bypass-Isolation Switch Classification. Each bypass-isolation switch shall be listed for emergency electrical service as a completely factory-assembled and factory-tested apparatus. (C) Operation. With the transfer switch isolated or disconnected, the bypass-isolation switch shall be designed so it can function as an independent nonautomatic transfer switch and allow the load to be connected to either power source. (D) Reconnection of Transfer Switch. Reconnection of the transfer switch shall be possible without a load interruption greater than the maximum time, in seconds, specified by the type of system. 4.5.3.2.2.1 All ac-powered support and accessory equipment necessary to the operation of the EPS shall be supplied from the load side of the automatic transfer switch(es), or the output terminals of the EPS, ahead of the main EPS overcurrent protection, as necessary, to ensure continuity of the EPSS operation and performance. 4.5.3.2.2.1. All ac-powered support and accessory equipment necessary to the operation of the EPS shall be supplied from the load side of the automatic transfer switch(es), or the output terminals of the EPS, ahead of the main EPS overcurrent protection to ensure continuity of the EPSS operation and performance.Committee Statement: The intent of the ELS Technical Committee is to extract the exact language from NFPA 110, 2002 and replace the existing NFPA 99 text with the current NFPA 110, 2002 text. Number Eligible to Vote: 14Ballot Results: Affirmative: 14

________________________________________________________________99-81 Log #123 HEA-ELS Final Action: Accept( 4.4.1.1.5 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Burton R. Klein, Burton Klein AssociatesRecommendation: Delete 4.4.1.1.5.Substantiation: This is maintenance material, and is covered in Section 4.4.4, Section 4.4.4.1.3.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 14Ballot Results: Affirmative: 14

________________________________________________________________99-82 Log #11 HEA-ELS Final Action: Accept( 4.4.1.1.8.4 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Hugh O. Nash, Jr., Nash Lipsey BurchRecommendation: Add new text to read as follows: 4.4.1.1.8.4 Where optional loads include contiguous or same-site facilities not covered in Chapters 12 through 20, provisions shall be made to meet the requirements of NFPA 101, NFPA 70 Article 700, and other applicable NFPA requirements for emergency egress under load-shed conditions.Substantiation: This new section insures that a building will be left in compliance with applicable codes regarding life safety and emergency egress, if and when it is disconnected (i.e., load-shed) from the hospital essential electrical system.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 14Ballot Results: Affirmative: 14

________________________________________________________________99-83 Log #59 HEA-ELS Final Action: Accept( 4.4.1.1.17(c) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Burton R. Klein, Burton Klein AssociatesRecommendation: Delete 4.4.1.17(C).Substantiation: Subject is covered in 4.4.1.118(2)(d).Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 14Ballot Results: Affirmative: 14

________________________________________________________________99-84 Log #CP200 HEA-ELS Final Action: Accept( 4.4.1.1.18 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Electrical SystemsRecommendation: Alarm Annunciator. A remote annunciator, storage battery powered, shall be provided to operate outside of the generating room in a location readily observed by operating personnel at a regular work station (see NFPA 70, National Electrical Code Section 700.12) the annunciator shall be hard-wired to indicate alarm conditions of the emergency or auxiliary power source as follows:

Substantiation: The evolution of technology requires this clarification to insure system reliability.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 14Ballot Results: Affirmative: 14

________________________________________________________________99-85 Log #279 HEA-ELS Final Action: Reject( 4.4.1.1.18.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Harold Jarrett, Omni Metrix LLCRecommendation: Add paragraph stating: A wireless transmitting device mounted on or close to the EPS can be used to transmit the data required by 4.4.1.1.18 and NPFA 110, table 5.6.5.2.Substantiation: In many cases it is more convenient and economically feasible to have data transmitted to a remote panel located at great distances from the EPS. A similar proposal is being made to NFPA 110, section 5.6.6.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: A wireless transmitting device is permitted as a supplement to the hard wired alarm annunciator.Number Eligible to Vote: 14Ballot Results: Affirmative: 14

________________________________________________________________99-86 Log #192 HEA-ELS Final Action: Accept in Principle( 4.4.2.1.3 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Hugh O. Nash, Jr., Nash Lipsey BurchRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 4.4.2.1.3 Automatic Transfer Switch Classification. Each automatic transfer switch Transfer of all loads shall be accomplished using automatic transfer switch(es), which shall be approved for emergency electrical service (see NFPA 70, National Electrical Code, Section 700.3) as a complete assembly.Substantiation: It has always been the intent of NFPA 99 that approved transfer switches be required. NFPA 99 implies that they are required, and the entire Chapter 4 is written to accommodate transfer/switch installation. This makes it clear that ATS are required.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise the submitters proposal to read as follows: 4.4.2.1.3 Automatic Transfer Switch Classification. Each automatic transfer switch Transfer of all loads shall be accomplished using automatic transfer switch(es), which shall be approved for emergency electrical service (see NFPA 70, National Electrical Code, Section 700.3) as a complete assembly.Committee Statement: The title “Automatic Transfer Switch“ classification is not appropriate. Number Eligible to Vote: 14Ballot Results: Affirmative: 14

________________________________________________________________99-87 Log #93 HEA-ELS Final Action: Accept( 4.4.2.2.4.2(A) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Burton R. Klein, Burton Klein AssociatesRecommendation: Revise “accessible to nursing and other authorized personnel” to read “accessible to authorized personnel” so that sentence two reads: “Branch circuit overcurrent devices shall be readily accessible to authorized personnel.”Substantiation: It is not necessary to list the various staff who should be given access to these overcurrent devices. This should be left to the administration of the facility to determine who should have access to overcurrent devices that are required to be located in a secure location per NFPA 70.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 14Ballot Results: Affirmative: 14

________________________________________________________________99-88 Log #158 HEA-ELS Final Action: Accept( 4.4.2.2.4.3 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Burton R. Klein, Burton Klein AssociatesRecommendation: Change “Article 700, Section E” to read “Article 700, Section V.”Substantiation: Editorial to reflect change in numbering scheme in NEC.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 14Ballot Results: Affirmative: 14

________________________________________________________________

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 9999-89 Log #159 HEA-ELS Final Action: Accept( 4.4.4.1.1.2(A) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Burton R. Klein, Burton Klein AssociatesRecommendation: In sentence 2, add “tested” after “shall be”, and change “Chapter 6” to “Chapter 8”, so sentence reads, “Generator sets serving emergency and equipment systems shall be tested in accordance with NFPA 110, Standard for Emergency & Standby Power Systems, Chapter 8.”Substantiation: Editorial. Subject of referenced chapter is ʻtesting. ̓Chapter 8 is now the correct number of chapter in NFPA 110.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 14Ballot Results: Affirmative: 14

________________________________________________________________99-90 Log #28 HEA-ELS Final Action: Accept( 4.5.2.2.3 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Burton R. Klein, Burton Klein AssociatesRecommendation: 1. Insert new 4.5.2.2.3.2 to read: AC Equipment for Nondelayed Automatic Connection. Generator accessories, including but not limited to, the transfer fuel pump, electrically operated louvers, and other generator accessories essential for generator operation, shall be arranged for automatic connection to the alternative power source. 2. Renumber existing 4.5.2.2.3.2 and 4.5.2.2.3.3 to new 4.5.2.2.3.3 and 4.5.2.2.3.4.Substantiation: For consistency with 4.4.2.2.3.3 under Type 1 essential electrical systems.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 14Ballot Results: Affirmative: 14

________________________________________________________________99-91 Log #91 HEA-ELS Final Action: Accept( 4.6.1.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Burton R. Klein, Burton Klein AssociatesRecommendation: Revise 4.6.1.1 to read: 4.6.1.1 Generators shall conform to 4.4.1.1 and 4.4.1.1.7.2.” (change underlined)Substantiation: To insure readers know the difference in requirements between generators for Type 3 systems and those for Type 1 and Type 2 systems.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 14Ballot Results: Affirmative: 14

________________________________________________________________99-92 Log #48 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.1.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Mark Allen, Beacon Medical ProductsRecommendation: Add “instrument air” after “...waste anesthetic gas disposal”.Substantiation: Instrument air is defined and used as a medical gas elsewhere in the document.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Proposal 99-399 (Log #CP329).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-93 Log #321 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.1.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Thomas J. Mraulak, Metropolitan Detroit Plumbing Industry / Rep. American Society of Sanitary EngineeringRecommendation: Wherever the terms medical gas or vacuum occur, ... oxygen, nitrous oxide, instrument air, medical air, carbon dioxide,..Substantiation: As it stands now instrument air is not a medical gas and there are no piping or installation requirements. Could it be installed in black screwed pipe or soldered copper, ASTM B280, type “m”? By making I.A. a medical gas it would have to follow all the requirements of a med gas. If itʼs not going to be a med gas the committee has to write a set of requirements for it.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Action on Proposal 99-399 (Log #329).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGH

Explanation of Negative: ERICKSON: See my Explanation of Negative on Proposal 99-31(Log #353).Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-94 Log #CP329 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.1.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Piping SystemsRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.1.2* Wherever the terms term medical gas or vacuum occur occurs the provisions shall apply to all piped systems for oxygen, nitrous oxide, medical air, carbon dioxide, helium, nitrogen, instrument air, medical surgical vacuum, waste anesthetic gas disposal, and mixtures thereof. Wherever the name of a specific gas or vacuum service occurs, the provision shall apply only to that gas.Substantiation: Instrument air is treated the same as medical gas.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: ERICKSON: See my Explanation of Negative on Proposal 99-31(Log #353).Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-95 Log #249 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.3 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Eldon P. Rosentrater, Allied Healthcare Products Inc.Recommendation: Add text to read as follows: 5.1.3.1.7 Cylinders shall be fitted with valves that include a means to slow the initial, opening pressurization time to allow the heat of compression to safely dissipate.Substantiation: There have been reported incidents of oxygen fires involving Central Supply System pigtails, manifolds and directly connected pressure regulators. These oxygen fires caused property damage and could result in serious injury. FDA, Industry and several expert organizations have investigated the possible causes of these oxygen fires. Two basis conditions are necessary to produce an oxygen fire: (1) Fuel source such as flammable contamination and (2) Ignition source such as a spark, flame or heat. Fuel sources are always present and requiring special care in the handling and connection of high-pressure oxygen cylinders to manifolds and regulators. Heat is always produced when pressure in a contained volume is rapidly increased as occurs when a cylinder valves is opened. It is almost impossible for a user to open a high-pressure valve slowly enough to prevent the rapid pressurization causing heat of compression in oxygen connections. This proposal recommends that all cylinders used in medical gas systems have cylinder valves designed to reduce the heat of compression so any fuel accidentally present will not ignite. Adding this proposal requirement to paragraph 5.1.3 in NFPA 99 will make high-pressure cylinder supply(s) safer for piped medical gas systems. Note: Supporting material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Add a new 5.1.13.1.1 (4) as follows: Cylinder shall be permitted to be fitted with valves that include a means to slow the initial opening pressurization.Committee Statement: The material was moved to the appropriate section and editorially modified to allow the use of this device.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHComment on Affirmative: WAGNER: “Cylinder Cylinders shall be...”Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-96 Log #347 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.3 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Curtis Mezzie, National ITC CorporationRecommendation: Add text to read as follows: 5.1.3.4.9.8 Manifolds for Gas Cylinders with Reserve Supply.Substantiation: Manifolds for gas cylinders with reserve supply is mentioned in various sections of 5.1.3 Level 1 Sources. But there is no descriptions or specifications on what a reserve supply shall be. So if a facility wants a manifold gas cylinder system with reserve, where do you find the requirements?Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Add new text as follows: 5.1.3.4.10 Manifolds for Gas Cylinders with Reserve Supply (see Figure A-5.1.3.1.10).

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99 5.1.3.4.10.1 The manifolds in this category shall be located in accordance with 5.1.3.3.1 and the following: (1) If located outdoors, be installed in an enclosure used only for this purpose and sited to comply with minimum distance requirements in Table A-2.2 in NFPA 50, Standard for Bulk Oxygen Systems at Consumer Sites. (2) If located indoors, be installed within a room used only for this purpose. 5.1.3.4.10.2 The manifolds in this category shall have their primary and secondary headers located in the same enclosure. 5.1.3.4.10.3 The reserve header shall be permitted to be located in the same enclosure as the primary and secondary headers or in another enclosure compliant with 5.1.3.4.10.1. 5.1.3.4.10.4 The manifold locations in this category shall be constructed in accordance with 5.1.3.3.2. 5.1.3.4.10.5 The manifolds locations in this category shall be ventilated in accordance with 5.1.3.3.3. 5.1.3.4.10.6 The manifolds in this category shall consist of the following: (1) Two equal headers per 5.1.3.4.8 each having sufficient number of gas cylinder connections for an average day[ʻs supply but not fewer than two connections, and with the headers connected to the final line pressure regulator assembly in such a manner that either header may supply the system. (2)* A reserve header per 5.1.3.4.8 having sufficient number of gas cylinder connections for an average dayʼs supply but not fewer than three connections, and connected downstream of the primary/secondary headers and upstream of the final line pressure regulators. (3) An intermediate relief valve(s), piped to the outside in accordance with 5.1.3.4.5.1(5-9), that protects the line pressure regulators from over pressure in the event of a header regulator failure. 5.1.3.4.10.7 The manifolds in this category shall include an automatic means of controlling the three headers to accomplish the following during normal operation: (1) One gas cylinder header is the primary and the other is the secondary, with either capable of either role. (2) When the primary header is supplying the system, the secondary header is prevented from supplying the system. (3) When the primary header is depleted, the secondary header shall automatically begin to serve the system. 5.1.3.4.10.8 The manifolds in this category shall include a manual or automatic means to place either header into the role as primary header and the other in the role of secondary header. 5.1.3.4.10.9 The manifolds in this category shall include a means to automatically activate the Reserve Header if for any reason the primary and secondary headers cannot supply the system. 5.1.3.4.10.10 The manifolds in this category shall actuate a local signal and shall activate an indicator at all master alarms under the following conditions: (1) When or at a predetermined set point before, the secondary header begins to supply the system, indicating changeover. (2) When or at a predetermined set point before the reserve header begins to supply the system, indicating reserve is in use. (3) When or at a predetermined set point before the reserve header contents fall to one dayʼs supply, indicating reserve low. 5.1.3.4.10.11 If manifolds in this category are located outdoors, they shall be installed per manufacturerʼs requirements.Committee Statement: Chapter 5 addresses manifolds for gas cylinders without reserve supply and it addresses manifolds for cryogenic liquid cylinders but it does not address manifolds for gas cylinders with reserve supply. This new section was added to address this common configuration.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-97 Log #199 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.3.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Robert M. Sutter, BOC GasesRecommendation: Add text to read as follows: Permanently installed pressure vessels used central supply systems shall comply with Section VIII, Unfired Pressure Vessels, of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.Substantiation: Current section does not include the use of ASME pressure vessels. DOT vessels are not permitted to be permanently installed.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Proposal 99-110 (Log #CP313).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-98 Log #9 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.3.1.3 through 5.1.3.1.6 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: David B. Mohile, Medical Engineering Services, Inc.Recommendation: 1. Add new sections to read as follows: 5.1.3.1.3 Cryogenic liquid cylinders shall be marked by continuous tape, stencil, or other means extending completely around the circumference of the vessel, with the name of the contents repeated at least four times so as to be visible on all sides, in letters not less than 15 mm (6 in.) high and using the colors as specified in Table 5.1.11. 5.1.3.1.4 Cryogenic liquid cylinders shall be provided with gas specific outlet connections in accordance with CGA V-5, Diameter-Index Safety System Non-Interchangeable Low Pressure Connections for Medical Gas Applications or V-1, Compressed Gas Cylinder Valve inlet and Outlet Connections. 5.1.3.1.5 Cylinder and cryogenic liquid cylinder outlet connections shall be affixed in such a manner as to be integral to the valve(s), unremovable with ordinary tools or so designed as to render the attachment point unusable when removed. 2. Renumber existing 5.1.3.1.3 through 5.1.3.1.6 3. Revise existing 5.1.3.1.3 to read as follows: 5.1.3.1.6 Contents of cylinders, cryogenic liquid cylinders, and containers shall be verified prior to use. 4. Add a new section 5.1.13.1.2(4) (4) Methods for verifying the contents of any gas or cryogenic liquid cylinder prior to placing them into service.Substantiation: Submitterʼs Reason: A problem has existed for some time now that needs to be addressed by a formal T.I.A. to the 2002 edition of NFPA 99. In November of 2000, four patients in a nursing care facility in Ohio were killed by the introduction on nitrogen into the piped oxygen system. The problem happened as follow as was reported by the media and investigations. The nursing facility used cryogenic liquid cylinders, also knows as dewars, to provide oxygen to their patients. These were connected to an alternating manifold as described by paragraph 4-3.1.1.6, 1999 edition of NFPA 99. These large (approximately 60” tall by 22” wide) stainless steel vessels weigh about 500 pounds full. Their use appeals to nursing homes since each vessel contains liquid oxygen with the equivalent of approximately 16 regular high-pressure cylinders of gaseous oxygen. Since the vessel is usually delivered and put into place by the vendor (gas delivery company) due to the size, the nursing home has minimal labor involved, which cuts down on their operating costs. The problem with these vessels is that they are very expensive to purchase. And when a small vendor has a major investment in these vessels (around $5,000 each) they like to see that they are used to the maximum. This may mean that a vessel used for liquid oxygen one day may be returned to the vendor who has a call for a vessel of liquid nitrogen from another customer the next day. The vendor changes the inlet and outlet fittings, flushes out the old product (oxygen, nitrous oxide, nitrogen, argon, etc.) fills with the requested liquid, changes the label, and delivers it the next day to a new customer. What apparently happened was that when one of these vessels was called for from the nursing home, the driver erroneously put a vessel filled with liquid nitrogen on the truck and delivered it to the nursing home. The nitrogen label that was stuck over the oxygen label was smaller than the oxygen label and the driver apparently did not see the smaller label. When it became time to connect up the new vessel, an employee of the nursing home attempted to change the pigtail from the empty oxygen vessel to the full vessel. When it would not connect up, he noticed that the outlet fitting of the full vessel was on with TeflonÓ tape. He went and got a wrench and switched the fitting from the empty vessel to the full vessel and was then able to connect up the full vessel to the pipeline. Unfortunately the full vessel was filled with nitrogen, which went into the pipeline and caused injury to seven patients and ultimately the death by asphyxiation of a total of four patients. This situation was reported to the FDA who subsequently published on their website that similar situations have happened over the last few years including but not limited to: · A 1998 incident in Idaho that caused two deaths from nitrogen being used instead of oxygen. · A 1997 incident in Nebraska in which argon was used instead of oxygen and a patient died. · A 1996 incident in New York, which involved carbon dioxide instead of oxygen. This caused critical injuries to two children We are also aware of an incident in 1982 at an Army hospital in Alabama, which caused the death of several patients by argon being piped into the oxygen system. In Response to these incidents the Compressed Gas Association, which represents the compressed gas providers and manufacturers, formulated rules, which would require that the inlet and outlet fittings on these vessels shall be permanently attached. These rules were to be phased in over the next several years due to the cost of retrofitting. We have also heard that these rules may be suspended for a variety of reasons. These are entirely to many deaths over a situation, which can be remedied by a relatively simple change in our standard. With that in mind, we submit the following T.IA, which states:

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99 1. The cryogenic liquid cylinders shall be marked by continuous marking around the entire circumference of the vessel. 2. That the marking be at least 6 inches high and in the colors mandated by our Standard. This does not mean that the vessel is to be painted, but that the labeling follows the requirements for medical gas cylinders. 3. That the inlet and outlet connections shall be permanently connected to the vessel in such a manner that it is not removable with ordinary tools. 4. That the connections are either CGA V-5 or V-1 types. 5. That the contents of the vessels shall be verified prior to usage. The costs associated with this T.I.A. will impact as follows: ·The vendors will have to have dedicated vessels for each gas (oxygen, nitrogen, carbon dioxide, argon, etc.). Since these vessels cost around $5,000 each some vendors may have to limit the number of vessels they own or can provide. · The manufacturers of the vessels (of which there are only two or so) will have to install permanent inlet and outlet fittings. This is a relatively simple operation and would consist of not having common thread fittings to which adapters can be attached. · That the end user health care facility (nursing home, surgicenter, etc.) either receive a written document indicating concentration analysis from the vendorfor each vessel for each delivery, or an employee of the health care user can check the contents with a simple oxygen analyzer (approximate cost one time $200 for a analyzer). Please note that most large vendors already provide a written analysis for each delivery of medical oxygen to health care facilities.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise 5.1.3.1.3 as follows: Liquid containers shall have additional product identification visible from all directions with a minimum of 51 mm (2 in.) high letters such as a 360 degree wrap around tape for medical liquid containers. Revise 5.1.3.1.2(4) as follows: Verify gas content and mechanical connection specificity of each cylinder or container prior to placing them into service. The remainder of the proposal will stand as submitted.Committee Statement: Two inch letters is what the CGA recommends.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-99 Log #CP331 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.3.1.5 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Piping SystemsRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.3.1.5 Locations containing medical gases other than oxygen, and medical air, and instrument air shall have their door(s) labeled substantially as follows:

CAUTION Medical Gases NO Smoking or Open Flame Room May Have Insufficient OxygenOpen Door and Allow Room to Ventilate before Entering

Substantiation: Instrument air is being treated the same as medical air and requires the same signage.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: ERICKSON: See my Explanation of Negative on Proposal 99-31(Log #353).Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-100 Log #CP332 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.3.1.6 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Piping SystemsRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.3.1.6 Locations containing central supply systems or cylinders containing only oxygen, or medical air, or instrument air shall have their doors(s) labeled as follows:

CAUTION Medical GasesNO Smoking or Open Flame

Substantiation: Instrument air is being treated the same as medical air.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGH

Explanation of Negative: ERICKSON: See my Explanation of Negative on Proposal 99-31(Log #353).Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-101 Log #271 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.3.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: J. Richard Wagner, The Poole & Kent CorporationRecommendation: Add the following: 5.1.3.2.10 Care shall be exercised when handling cylinders that have been exposed to freezing temperatures or containers that contain cryogenic liquids to prevent injury to the skin. 5.1.3.2.11 Cylinders containing compressed gases and containers for volatile liquids shall be kept away from radiators, steam piping, and like sources of heat. 5.1.3.2.12 When cylinder valve protection caps are supplied, they shall be secured tightly in place unless the cylinder is connected for use. 5.1.3.2.13 Containers shall not be stored in a tightly closed space such as a closet.Substantiation: The language proposed to be added to 5.1.3.2 appears in Level 3 under 5.3.3.2 but not in Level 1.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: ERICKSON: New section 5.1.3.2.13 makes the statement that containers shall not be stored in tightly closed spaces which I agree with, however, the reference to closets is inappropriate as a closet can be a large enough area to have containers stored. Letʼs not fall in a trap of classifying an area based on a name versus whether it is appropriate or not. The last thing we need are the verifiers and enforcers writing us up because of the what we call a space versus whether it is or is not appropriate.Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-102 Log #154 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.3.2.9 )________________________________________________________________TCC Action: The TCC is requesting the TC to provide a better statement as to why the committee feels this is not a safe practice.Submitter: John Neal, GMK AssociatesRecommendation: Revise 5.1.3.2.9 by deleting the sentence about not transfilling containers from the bulk supply and add text to read “Personnel transfilling liquid oxygen from bulk supply shall be certified to do so.”Substantiation: Requiring a separate system to transfill dewars costs the hospitals anywhere from 30,000 to 50,000 dollars in additional expense. Medical costs are extremely high and 5.1.3.2.9 is driving costs still higher. Somewhere we have to reconcile safety and common sense.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: The committee does not feel this is a safe practice.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: ERICKSON: The TC did not spend time to discuss this but as evidenced by the committee statement dismissed it because of feelings and not empirical data, common practice or historical data. This TC is known for its feelings and not for researching new methodologies and common practice in health care facilities.Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-103 Log #334 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.3.3.1.3 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: David B. Mohile, Medical Engineering Services, Inc.Recommendation: Add new wording as follows: (5) any other compressor, vacuum pump, or electrically powered machinery. Substantiation: If the purpose of the following paragraph (5.1.3.3.1.4) is to prevent medical air compressors and medical vacuum pumps from being in the same room as manifolds and tanks of gas in storage is to limit the compromising of the manifolds in the event of fire, would not the same problem be present with any air compressor or vacuum pump being in the same room? by adding the new wording, we are saying that we do not want any electrically operated machinery from being in the same room as source gas equipment.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGH

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99Explanation of Negative: ERICKSON: The separation of medical air compressors, vacuum pumps, and all other electrically powered machinery is ridiculous. The submitter makes the statement that we need to protect this equipment in the event of a fire so we donʼt compromise systems. Hospitals for decades have been putting this equipment in mechanical spaces with a host of other equipment. I have seen vacuum pumps and medical gas compressors side by side in the majority of our hospitals and this has not been a problem. It is easier for the maintenance and engineering staff to see problems with these units if out in the open in these mechanical spaces. We see no advantage in hiding each individual pump or compressor in a separate room. Where is the justification and cost benefit analysis on this proposed change?Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-104 Log #77 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.3.3.1.3(4) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Keith Ferrari, PraxairRecommendation: Add text to (4) as follows: “Instrument air compressor sources (See 5.1.3.8).”Substantiation: The instrument air source can be supplied from high pressure cylinders (although not economical, but still would meet the criteria of the application for instrument air).Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: ERICKSON: See my Explanation of Negative on Proposal 99-31(Log #353).Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-105 Log #78 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.3.3.1.4 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Keith Ferrari, PraxairRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: “..., except medical air or instrument air reserve headers complying with 5.1.3.4.13 and 5.1.3.3.1.7.”Substantiation: The medical air and instrument air reserve cylinders, as all cylinders are required, shall be prevented from reaching temperatures in excess of 130 degrees Fahrenheit.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Action on 99-107 (Log# 322).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-106 Log #310 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.3.3.1.4 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: David D. Eastman, Metro Detroit Plumbing Industry Training Center / Rep. American Society of Sanitary EngineeringRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.3.3.1.4 Any system listed under 5.1.3.3.1.3 shall not be located in the same room with any system listed under 5.1.3.3.1.1. or 5.1.3.3.1.2, except medical air or instrument air reserve headers complying with 5.1.3.4.13 shall be allowed in rooms or enclosures for systems listed under 5.1.3.3.1.1 or 5.1.3.3.1.2.Substantiation: This change eliminates the only textual reference to medical air reserve header, and clearly maintains the policy of separating mechanical sources from containerized sources.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: This will pose a conflict with 99-107 (Log #322).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-107 Log #322 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.3.3.1.4 )________________________________________________________________TCC Action: The TCC is requesting the TC to revise its committee statement, as it does not support the changes the committee made in the committee action.Submitter: Thomas J. Mraulak, Metropolitan Detroit Plumbing Industry / Rep. American Society of Sanitary EngineeringRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Any system listed under 5.1.3.3.1.3 shall not be located in the same room with any system listed under 5.1.3.3.1.1 or 5.1.3.3.1.2, except medical air or

instrument air reserve headers complying with 5.1.3.4.13 shall be allowed to be in the same room as the simplexed instrument air compressor.Substantiation: Clarification. I believe this was the committeeʼs intent.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise text to read as follows: Any system listed under 5.1.3.3.1.3 shall not be located in the same room with any system listed under 5.1.3.3.1.1 or 5.1.3.3.1.2, except medical air or instrument air reserve headers complying with 5.1.3.8.5 and 5.1.3.3.1.7 shall be allowed to be in the same room as an instrument air compressor.Committee Statement: The reference to limit the temperature was added.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-108 Log #323 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.3.3.1.4 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Thomas J. Mraulak, Metropolitan Detroit Plumbing Industry / Rep. American Society of Sanitary EngineeringRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Any system listed under 5.1.3.3.1.3 shall not be located in the same room with any system listed under 5.1.3.3.1.1 or 5.1.3.3.1.2, except medical air or instrument air reserve headers complying with 5.1.3.4.13.Substantiation: To my knowledge there are no medical air reserve headers.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Action on 99-107 (Log #322).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-109 Log #200 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.3.3.1.8 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Robert M. Sutter, BOC GasesRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Central supply systems for nitrous oxide and carbon dioxide using cylinders or portable containers shall be prevented from reaching temperatures lower than the recommendations of the central supply systems manufacture, but shall never be lower than - 7°C(20°F) or greater than 54°C(130°F).Substantiation: The current wording includes permanently installed bulk systems which are installed outside of the facility where winter conditions can get lower than -7°C(20°F).Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-110 Log #CP313 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.3.3.1.11,5.1.3.3.1.11, 5.1.3.3.1.12, 5.1.3.3.1.13, 5.1.3.4.11 Add new 5.1.3.4.4.2, 5.1.10.5.1.6, 5.1.13.1.2(4), 5.1.13.1.3(6), 5.1.13.8.2 and 5.1.13.8.3 (New) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Piping SystemsRecommendation: Modify sections 5.1.3.3.1.11, 5.1.3.3.1.12, 5.1.3.3.1.13, 5.1.3.4.11 as follows and add new 5.1.3.4.4.2, 5.1.10.5.1.6, 5.1.13.1.2(4), 5.1.13.1.3(6), 5.1.13.8.2 and 5.1.13.8.3 5.1.3.3.1.11 Central Supply systems for carbon dioxide using permanently installed containers with product capacities greater than 1000 pounds shall comply with CGA G-6.1, Standard for Insulated Carbon Dioxide Systems at Consumer Sites. 5.1.3.3.1.12 Central Supply systems for carbon dioxide using permanently installed containers with product capacities of 1000 pounds or less shall comply with CGA G-6.5, Standard for Insulated Carbon Dioxide Systems at Consumer Sites. 5.1.3.3.1.13 Central Supply systems for nitrogen with a total capacity connected and in storage of 566,335 L (20,000) or more at standard temperature and pressure (STP) shall comply with CGA P-18, Standard for Bulk Inert Gas Systems at Consumer Sites. 5.1.3.4.11* Bulk Cryogenic Liquid Systems. 5.1.3.4.11.1 Bulk Cryogenic Liquid systems shall be: (1) Oxygen systems shall be compliant with NFPA 50 Standard for Bulk Oxygen Systems at Consumer Sites.Or Oxygen Systems shall be compliant with NFPA 55 Standard for the Storage, Use and Handling of Compressed Gases and Cryogenic Fluids in Portable and Stationary Containers, Cylinders and Tanks, chapter 9 Bulk Oxygen Systems (old NFPA 50 Standard for Bulk Oxygen at Consumer Sites.)

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99 (2) In an enclosure constructed per 5.1.3.3.2(1) through (3) and (5), (8), and (9). (3) In an enclosure ventilated per 5.1.3.3.3.3. (4) In compliance with CGA M-1, Guidelines for Medical Gas Supply Systems at Consumer Sites. (5) Designed in such a manner that the items noted in 5.1.3.4.11.2 and trailer unloading area are readily visible to delivery personal during filling operations. (6) Protected against over pressurization of the pressure vessel during filling operations. (7) Installed per 5.1.10.1 through 5.1.10.5.7. (8) Installed by personnel qualified to CGA M-1 Guideline for Medical Gas Supply Systems at Consumer Sites. (9) Installed in compliance with the Federal FDA̓ s Current Good Manufacturing Practices as found in CFR 21 Parts 210 and 211. 5.1.3.4.11.2 The following components of the bulk system shall be readily accessible to delivery personnel; (1) Fill connection (2) Top and bottom fill valves (3) Hose purge valve (4) Vent valve (5) Full try/cock (6) Liquid level gauge (7) Tank pressure gauge 5.1.3.4.11.3 Bulk cryogenic liquid system sites shall include: (1) a poured concrete pad, designed for the weight, dynamic loads, wind loads, surface loading and complying with local seismic requirements. (2) permanent anchors holding the components to the pad in accordance with the design requirements. (3) a complete enclosure as per 5.1.3.3.2(3) (4) concrete or crushed stone completely filling the enclosed space. (3)* a vehicle pad for the delivery vehicle compliant with NFPA 50 and readily accessible for refilling supply as stated in CGA M-1. (4) allowance for at least three (3) feet of clearance around storage container, vaporizer(s) and pressure regulating manifold for system maintenance and operation. 5.1.3.4.11.4 The equipment pad and vehicle pad shall: (1) be sloped to provide that all drainage run away from any building, parked vehicles, or combustible materials. (2) have no drain located within the pad or closer than 2450 mm (8 feet) from the edge of the pad. 5.1.3.4.11.5 Bulk cryogenic liquid sources shall consist of the following: (1) One or more main supply vessel(s), whose capacity shall be determined after consideration of the customer usage requirements, delivery schedules, proximity of the facility to alternate supplies, and the emergency plan. (2) A contents gage on each of the main vessel(s). (3) A reserve supply sized for greater than an average dayʼs supply, with the appropriate size of vessel or number of cylinders being determined after consideration of delivery schedules, proximity of the facility to alternate supplies, and the facilityʼs emergency plan. (4) At least two main vessel relief valves and rupture discs installed downstream of a three-way (three –port) valve. (5) A check valve located in the primary supply piping upstream of the intersection with a secondary supply or reserve supply. 5.1.3.4.11.6 Bulk cryogenic liquid sources shall include a reserve supply including either or both of the following: (1) A second cryogenic liquid vessel or a cylinder header per 5.1.3.4.8 having sufficient gas cylinder connections for an average dayʼs supply but not fewer than three. (2) An actuating switch/sensor monitoring internal pressure of the reserve cryogenic liquid vessel (if provided). (3) a contents gage monitoring liquid level in the reserve cryogenic liquid vessel (if provided). (4) a check valve to prevent backflow into the reserve system. (5) a pressure switch monitoring the pressure in the cylinder header (if provided). 5.1.3.4.11.7 Bulk cryogenic liquid sources shall include a fill circuit consisting of the following components: (1) A non-removable product specific fill connection in compliance with CGA V-6 Standard Cryogenic Transfer Connection. (2) A means to seal and secure the fill connection inlet. (3) A minimum 100 mesh strainer of monel or brass construction. (4) A Check valve to prevent product backflow from the fill inlet. (5) A fill hose purge valve. (6) Supports which hold the fill piping off the ground. (7) A secure connection between the bulk tank and the fill piping. (8) Supports as necessary to hold the fill line in position during all operations associated with the filling procedure. 5.1.3.4.11.8 Bulk cryogenic liquid sources shall include automatic means to provide the following functions: (1) When the main supply is supplying the system, the reserve supply shall be prevented from supplying the system until the main supply is reduced to a level at or below the reserve activation pressure. (2) When the main supply cannot supply the system, the reserve supply shall automatically begin to supply the system.

(3) Where there is more than one main supply vessel, the system shall operate as described in 5.1.3.4.10 for primary, secondary, and reserve operation. (4) Where there are two or more cryogenic vessels, they shall be permitted to alternate (e.g., on a timed basis) in the roles of primary, secondary, and reserve, providing an operating cascade (primary–secondary–reserve) as required in 5.1.3.4.10.4 is maintained at all times. (5) Where a cryogenic vessel is used as the reserve, the reserve vessel shall include a means to conserve the gas produced by evaporation of the cryogenic liquid in the reserve vessel and to discharge the gas into the line upstream of the final line regulator assembly as required in 5.1.3.4.10.6. 5.1.3.4.11.9 The bulk systems shall actuate a local signal and an indicator at all master alarms under the following conditions: (1) When or at a predetermined set point before the main supply reaches an average dayʼs supply, indicating low contents. (2) When or at a predetermined set point before the reserve supply begins to supply the system, indicating reserve is in use. (3) When or at a predetermined set point before the reserve supply contents fall to one dayʼs average supply, indicating reserve low. (4) If the reserve is a cryogenic vessel, when or at a predetermined set point before the reserve internal pressure falls too low for the reserve to operate properly, indicating reserve failure. (5) Where there is more than one main supply vessel, when or at a predetermined set point before the secondary vessel begins to supply the system, indicating changeover. 5.1.3.4.11.10 Where vaporizers are required to convert cryogenic liquid to the gaseous state, the vaporizer units shall: (1) Be permitted to operate by either ambient heat transfer or external thermal source (e.g. electric heater, hot water, steam). (2) Be designed to provide adequate capacity for the customerʼs peak and average flowrates under local conditions, seasonal conditions for weather and humidity, and structures that obstruct air circulation flow and sunlight. (3) Have piping and manual/automatic valving configured in such a manner that operating vaporizer(s) can be switched to non-operating vaporizer to deice thought a valving configuration that assures continuous flow to the facility through either/and/or both vaporizers if valving switchover partially hangs up or fails. 5.1.3.4.11.11 Where a vaporizer requires an external thermal source the flow from the source of supply shall be unaffected by the loss of the external thermal source through provision of: (1) Reserve ambient heat transfer vaporizers of sufficient capacity for at least one dayʼs average supply and piped so as to be unaffected by flow stoppage through the main vaporizer. (2) A reserve non-cryogenic source capable of providing at least one dayʼs average supply. Add new 5.1.3.4.4.2 to read: The line pressure regulators required under 5.1.3.4.4.1 when used for bulk cryogenic liquid systems shall be of a balanced design. Renumber 5.1.3.4.4.2 to 5.1.3.4.4.3 Add new 5.1.10.5.1.6 to read: Brazing performed between bulk cryogenic liquid vessels and their vaporizers (i.e. subject to cryogenic exposure) shall be permitted to be brazed using Bag brazing alloy with flux by a brazer qualified to CGA M-1 “Guidelines for Medical Gas Supply Systems at Consumer Sites” Renumber 5.1.10.5.1.6 to 5.1.10.5.1.7 Add new 5.1.13.1.2 (4) to read:Annual training on the operation of the bulk cryogenic liquid system. Add new 5.1.13.1.3 (6) to read: Locations intended for the delivery vehicle delivering cryogenic liquid to bulk cryogenic liquid systems shall remain open and shall not be used for any other purpose (e.g. vehicle parking, storage of trash containers, etc.) Add new 5.1.13.8.2, 3 to read: 5.1.13.8.2 The supplier of the bulk cryogenic liquid system shall provide documentation of vaporizer(s) sizing criteria to the facility. 5.1.13.8.3 An annual review of bulk system capacity shall be conducted to ensure the source system has sufficient capacity. 5.1.13.8.4 Central supply systems for nonflammable medical gases shall: 5.1.13.8.4.1 Be inspected annually 5.1.13.8.4.2 Be maintained by a qualified representative of the equipment owner. 5.1.13.8.4.3 Have a record of the annual inspection available for review by the Authority Having Jurisdiction. Renumber existing.Substantiation: The committee revised the section on bulk cyrogenic liquid systems to incorporate many of the public proposals.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: ERICKSON: See my Explanation of Negative on Proposal 99-55(Log #3).Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99________________________________________________________________99-111 Log #201 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.3.3.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Robert M. Sutter, BOC GasesRecommendation: Add text to read as follows: Cylinders that are in storage, are full or empty and not connected to a manifold shall have their cylinder valve protection devices in place and be secured by nesting with a chain around the nest.Substantiation: Securing individual cylinders that are connected to a manifold is an important safety practice and should be continued. Individually securing all unconnected cylinders can be a greater safety hazard in the amount of cylinder movement that would be needed to secure the cylinders. Cylinders that have their protective caps in place, are nested in accordance with the CGA document P-1 Safe Handling of Compressed Gasses in Containers, and have a chain around the nest are extremely stable and allow of ease of cylinder movement.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: The issue of nesting is not a design and construction issue. This is not the appropriate section to address this issue. See Action on 99- (Log #113).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-112 Log #380 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.3.3.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Dale Woodin, ASHE-American Society for Healthcare Engineering of the American Hospital Association (AHA)Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.3.3.2* Design and Construction. (7) Be provided with racks, chains, or other fastenings to individually secure all cylinders, whether connected, unconnected, full, or empty, from falling.Substantiation: The phrase “secure all cylinders” is adequate, there is no reason to specify the method “individually”. This term has been cited as the reason that the state of Illinois has not adopted 2002 edition.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-113 Log #427 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.3.3.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Tom Spremo, Medical Gas SolutionsRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Be provided with racks, chains, or other fastenings to individually secure all cylinders, whether connected, unconnected, full, or empty, form falling. that have the safety cap removed. Cylinders with properly installed safety caps may be secured as a group.Substantiation: It has been found in many hospital manifold rooms that the space required for single cylinder support systems is not available. This is especially the case when multiple gases are located in the same room. Adding the option for group securing as noted above, would help the facility with their space constraint while maintaining a safe condition.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: See Action on 99-114 (Log #113). Not all cylinders need to be secured individually.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-114 Log #113 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.3.3.2(7) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: David B. Mohile, Medical Engineering Services, Inc.Recommendation: Change the wording as follows: “Be provided with racks, chains, or other fastenings to individually secure all cylinders, whether connected, unconnected, full, or empty, from falling.”Substantiation: 4.3.1.1.2(a) 3. of the 1999 edition of the document mandated that, “Provisions shall be made for racks or fastenings to protect cylinders from accidental damage or dislocation.” This applied to level 1 and level 2 facilities, However, 4.5.1.1.1 of the level 3 requirements stated, “Cylinders in service and in storage shall be individually secured and located to prevent falling or being knocked over.” Somehow the requirement for level 3 was imposed upon level 1

for the 2002 edition of the code. While it is generally a good idea in an office-based occupancy to individually restrain cylinders of gas since they usually are working with three or four cylinders of gas total and may change only one cylinder at a time, a larger hospital manifold room may contain two or more manifolds, each with five to ten cylinders attached, and back up full, as well as empty cylinders, may amount to thirty or more cylinders of gas in a room. Individual restraints are impractical.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-115 Log #202 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.3.3.2(1) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Robert M. Sutter, BOC GasesRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Be constructed with (safe and reasonable) access to move cylinders, equipment and so forth, in and out of the location (on suitability designed hand trucks).Substantiation: The movement of cylinders is a hazardous job and needs to be done as safely as possible. In the industrial and medical gas industry the greatest cause of injuries to workers involves the movement of cylinders. Therefore it is important that any cylinder storage or use area be designed and maintained so that safe and reasonable access can be maintained.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Proposal 99-110 (Log #CP313). Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHComment on Affirmative: WAGNER: Does Log 99-110 (Log #CP313) address this issue?Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-116 Log #203 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.3.3.2(7) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Robert M. Sutter, BOC GasesRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Be provided with racks, chains or other fastenings to individually secure all cylinders whether (that are) connected (to a manifold to keep them) , unconnected, full, or empty, from falling.Substantiation: Securing individual cylinders that are connected to a manifold is an important safety practice and should be continued. Individually securing all unconnected cylinders can be a greater safety hazard in the amount of cylinder movement that would be needed to secure the cylinders. Cylinders that have their protective caps in place, are nested in accordance with the CGA document P-1 Safe Handling of Compressed Gasses in Containers, and have a chain around the nest are extremely stable and allow for ease of cylinder movement.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Statement on Proposal 99-114 (Log #113).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-117 Log #341 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.3.3.3 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Frank Rudilosso, Medigas Life SafetyRecommendation: Add text to read as follows: Louvered natural ventilation openings and mechanical ventilation shall consist of an appropriate fire damper.Substantiation: Although required by NFPA 101 in rated fire walls, dampers are often omitted. If stated as a requirement, just as in fittings (1990), installers should not forget them.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: The heat will be concentrated at the ceiling and the fire dampers at the floor level will be ineffective.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHComment on Affirmative: WAGNER: Fire dampers are governed by the building codes. They would not be required in openings in an exterior wall.

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-118 Log #126 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.3.3.3.1(b) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Craig B. Williams, Hill-Rom Inc.Recommendation: Change to read: Where the total of medical gases connected and in storage is greater than 84,950 (3000 ft3) at STP indoor supply locations shall be provided with dedicated mechanical ventilation systems that draw air from within 300 mm (1 ft) of the floor and operate continuously. A means to provide makeup air from an outside source or other sources other than from any fire exit corridor must be placed within 300 mm (1 ft) of the ceiling.Substantiation: Although the 2002 edition of NFPA 99 provided requirements for dedicated mechanical ventilation for indoor locations for medical gas manifolds located inside a health care facility, the current requirement does not allow for the mechanical ventilation to work effectively since there is no requirement for makeup air to be drawn into the room.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: The Life Safety Code would not allow a louver to be installed at the top of the wall for make up air.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: WAGNER: Mechanical ventilation systems require a source of makeup air. The Life Safety Code does not necessarily prohibit openings at the top of walls. The opening does not have to be at the top of the wall. Change proposal to: A means of makeup air shall be provided.Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-119 Log #49 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.3.3.3.3 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Mark Allen, Beacon Medical ProductsRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Outdoors locations surrounded by impermeable walls shall have protected ventilation openings located at the base of each wall to allow free circulation of air within the enclosure. Walls which are shared with other enclosures or with buildings shall be permitted to not have openings.Substantiation: The present wording does not make a necessary exception for enclosures with shared walls.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-120 Log #29 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.3.3.4.2 )________________________________________________________________TCC Action: The TCC is requesting the TC to revise its committee statement as it is confusing and does not specify what changes were reconciled.Submitter: Mark Allen, Beacon Medical ProductsRecommendation: Add new 5.1.3.3.4.2 as follows: 5.1.3.3.4.2 Cylinders, whether full or empty shall not be stored in enclosures containing medical air compressor sources, medical vacuum supply systems, or WAGD supply systems. Only cylinders containing medical air and intended for use on cylinder reserves complying with 5.1.3.8.5 shall be permitted to be stored in enclosures containing instrument air compressors.Substantiation: It is not presently prohibited to store cylinders of medical gas with compressors or pumps. This may create a hazard by creating an oxidizing atmosphere near electrical motors.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Add new 5.1.3.3.4.2 as follows: 5.1.3.3.4.2 Cylinders, whether full or empty shall not be stored in enclosures containing medical air compressor sources, medical vacuum supply systems, or WAGD supply systems. Only cylinders intended for instrument air reserve headers complying with 5.1.3.8.5 shall be permitted to be stored in enclosures containing instrument air compressors.Committee Statement: The changes reconciled the changes between several changes.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention:

CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-121 Log #129 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.3.4 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Craig B. Williams, Hill-Rom Inc.Recommendation: Add section after section (5.1.3.4.10) to address the possibility of Cryogenic Liquid Cylinders & Gas Cylinder Combinations to read as follows: 5.1.3.4.11 Manifolds for Cryogenic and Gas Cylinders 5.1.3.4.11.1 The manifolds in this category shall be located in accordance with 5.1.3.3.1 and the following: (1) If located outdoors, be installed in an enclosure used only for this purpose and sited to comply with minimum distance requirements in Table A-2.2 in NFPA 50 Standard for Bulk Oxygen Systems at Consumer Sites. (2) If located indoors, be installed within a room used only for this purpose. 5.1.3.4.11.2 The manifolds in this category shall have their primary and secondary headers located in the same enclosure. 5.1.3.4.11.3 The manifolds in this category shall consist of the following: (1) Two headers, per 5.1.3.4.8, each having sufficient number of cylinder connections for an average dayʼs supply but no less than one connection for the liquid cylinder header and three connections for the gas cylinders header, and with the headers connected to the final line pressure regulator assembly in such as manner that either header may supply the system. (2) A pressure relief installed downstream of the connection of the reserve header and upstream of the final line pressure regulating assembly and set at 50 percent above the maximum expected inlet pressure. 5.1.3.4.11.4 The manifolds in this category shall include an automatic means of controlling the two headers to accomplish the following during normal operation: (1) The cryogenic liquid header is primary and the gas header is the reserve. (2) When the primary header is supplying the system, the reserve header is prevented from supplying the system. (3) When primary header is depleted, the reserve header shall automatically begin to supply the system. 5.1.3.4.11.5 The manifolds in this category shall actuate a local signal and shall activate an indicator at all master alarms under the following conditions: (1) When or at a predetermined set point before the reserve header begins to supply the system, indicating primary supply empty. (2) When or at a predetermined set point before the reserve header contents fall to one dayʼs average supply, indicating reserve supply low.Substantiation: The requirements written in the 2002 edition of NFPA 99 for Manifolds for Gas Cylinders without Reserve Supply and for Manifolds for Cryogenic Liquid Cylinders provide clear guidelines for both of these types of Central Supply Systems. However, this edition of NFPA 99 does not provide adequate provisions for possible combinations of these two systems.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Statement on Proposal 99-153 (Log #243).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-122 Log #305 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.3.4.1 )________________________________________________________________TCC Action: The TCC is requesting the TC to revise its committee statement and explain why the requirement is too restrictive.Submitter: David D. Eastman, Metro Detroit Plumbing Industry Training Center / Rep. American Society of Sanitary EngineeringRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.3.4.1 Central supply systems shall be obtained from and installed in accordance with the instructions of a supplier manufacturer familiar with their proper construction and use.Substantiation: A piping-materials wholesaler dealing in pipe, regulators, etc. is a supplier. Changing “supplier” to “manufacturer” emphasizes that central supply systems are manufactured items and are not to be constructed on-site from generic components.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: The requirement would be too restrictive.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99________________________________________________________________99-123 Log #46 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.3.4.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Mark Allen, Beacon Medical ProductsRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.3.4.2* Central supply systems for medical gases shall be used only for medical purposes.

The following limitations shall be observed: (1) Sources supplying Oxygen USP, Nitrous Oxide USP, Medical Air USP, Carbon Dioxide USP, Helium USP and mixtures of these gases shall be reserved for used in direct patient treatment which involves respiration or topical application of the gases. (2) Instrument air, Medical-Surgical Vacuum, Nitrogen, and WAGD shall be permitted to be used in any medical support role, including laboratories, but shall not be used for nonmedical purposes. (3) Other applications using similar gases (e.g. HVAC control air, welding, tire inflation, etc.) shall be supplied from separate systems not connected with the medical systems.Substantiation: The revised wording will permit tighter control of the pharmaceutical gases while freeing up the use of the less critical systems for more varied, but none the less medical, uses.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Proposal 99-250 (Log #CP333).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-124 Log #142 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.3.4.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: David B. Mohile, Medical Engineering Services, Inc.Recommendation: Delete existing language and rewrite this section as follows: 5.1.3.4.2 Central supply systems for oxygen, medical air, nitrous oxide, carbon dioxide and all other medical gases shall not be piped to, or used for, any other purpose except patient care applications. 5.1.3.4.2.1 Central supply systems for nitrogen and instrument air shall be permitted to be used for equipment operation such as booms, drying applications such as endoscopy blow down, or other uses where inert gases are required.Substantiation: During the MOS rewrite, the Committee neglected to mention the acceptance of the usage of nitrogen, as well as the new instrument air section, to operate equipment. Since both gases are piped at a minimum of 160 psig they are not designed for patient application. The use of nitrogen to operate booms and other similar machinery in the hospital is now standard.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Delete existing language and rewrite this section as follows: 5.1.3.4.2 Central supply systems for oxygen, medical air, nitrous oxide, carbon dioxide and all other medical gases shall not be piped to, or used for, any other purpose except patient care applications. 5.1.3.4.2.1 Central supply systems for nitrogen and instrument air shall be permitted to be used for medical patient support roles such as operation of ceiling pendants and columns, drying applications for instrument and equipment used during patient procedures.Committee Statement: The revised wording gives specific examples of uses of instrument air.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: ERICKSON: See my Explanation of Negative on Proposal 99-31(Log #353).Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-125 Log #174 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.3.4.2 )________________________________________________________________TCC Action: The TCC changes the reference in the committee action and statement to Log #CP33 as it is a direct reference as opposed to an indirect reference.Submitter: Richard L. Miller, Medical Gas Technology Inc.Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Central supply systems for oxygen, medical air, nitrous oxide, carbon dioxide, and all other respirable medical gases shall not be piped to, or used for, any purpose except patient respiratory applications.Substantiation: I have omitted nitrogen because it is not respired, and is often the gas of choice for other applications. I have also modified patient care applications to patient respiratory applications. Patient care is too broad or a category.

Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See the Committee Statement on Proposal 99-124 (Log #142).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-126 Log #379 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.3.4.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Dale Woodin, ASHE-American Society for Healthcare Engineering of the American Hospital Association (AHA)Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.3.4.2* Central supply systems for oxygen, medical air, nitrous oxide, carbon dioxide, nitrogen and all other medical gases shall not be piped to, or used for, any purpose except patient care applications. Medical air shall be used only in the application of human respiration, and calibration of medical devices for respiratory application.Substantiation: The addition is directly from 5.1.3.5.2*. Often hospitals attempt to use medical air for clinically related task such as scope drying. By moving the wording 5.1.3.5.2 to a more prominent section, this would avoid confusion and mistakes as hospitals would not have to search deeper the standard for guidance on this issue.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-127 Log #CP333 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.3.4.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Piping SystemsRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Central supply systems for oxygen, medical air, nitrous oxide, carbon dioxide, nitrogen, instrument air, and all other medical gases shall not be piped to, or used for, any purpose except patient care and medical support applications.Substantiation: Instrument air is being treated the same as medical air. Medical and Industment air can also be used for related uses such as medical support activities.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-128 Log #258 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.3.4.3(1) )________________________________________________________________TCC Action: The TCC is requesting the TC to revise its committee statement, as it is very confusing.Submitter: Dennis Huffman, Western EnterprisesRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.3.4.3(1) In those portions of systems intended to handle oxygen at gage pressure greater than 2070 kPa (300 psi), interconnecting hose shall contain no polymeric materials. Cylinder leads, containing polymeric materials, used for oxygen service at gage pressures than 2070 kPa (300 psi), shall to include an end piece having a minimum volume of .0667 square in./linear ft of (.250 ID) flexible hose.Substantiation: Likely any other product, if it is properly designed and manufactured, it should be safe to use. If a product is not properly designed or manufactured, there may be problems when using the product. The Compressed Gas Association (CGA) has a pamphlet (CGA E-9 Standard for PTFE Lined pigtails for compressed gas service) for the design of Teflon lined pigtails. This document has specific requirements for pigtails used in oxygen service. The issue with using Teflon lined pigtails for oxygen service has to do with the heat of recompression. When the gas expands (when the cylinder valve is opened), and then recompresses (at the check valve located at the header) back up to cylinder pressure, heat is generated. This heat can be as high as 2000°F for a fraction of a second. In order to properly use Teflon lined pigtails the heat needs to be contained in the brass end of the pigtail. If the heat occurs in the Teflon area, it is possible that the hose can burst. The CGA document has specific volume requirements (.02 sq. in. for a 36 in. long pigtail) for oxygen pigtails to ensure that the heat is contained in the brass portion of the pigtail, rendering the pigtails safe for use. While the current requirement (all metal) insures that the heat is properly contained, they do have other characteristics that affect their safety. Copper pigtails are subject to work hardening and kinking, which can shorten their useable life. Western currently recommends that flexible (Teflon lined) pigtails be replaced after 4 years, and copper pigtails be replaced after 2 years. I would also like to note that Teflon-lined pigtails continue to be used in oxygen service in the industrial market, without incident. Other than a few

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99redundancies, industrial manifolds and are essentially the same as Medical manifolds. When the NFPA specification was changed, the proposal mentioned that there have been instances where PTFE-lined pigtails have burst in oxygen service. The proposal, however, did not provide any information on the number of occurrences or whether the pigtail design met CGA E-9 guidelines. I think that the evidence in the industry shows that PTFE-lined pigtails can be used in oxygen service safely, if the design meets the requirements of the CGA specification.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: The orifice described may be too flow restrictive and no data was given. The proposal was too vague as to where it should be placed and how one makes sure it is placed at the correct end. There may be other eligible methods.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-129 Log #204 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.3.4.4.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Robert M. Sutter, BOC GasesRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: All positive pressure central supply systems shall be provided with (a balanced design) duplex final line pressure regulators, installed in parallel with isolation valves before each regulator, and an isolation or check valve after each regulator permitting service to either regulator without interruption of the supplySubstantiation: The outlet pressure from a balanced design regulator has less fluctuation then an unbalanced design regulator as the inlet pressure to the regulator increases or decreases.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Proposal 99-179 (Log #CP313).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-130 Log #205 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.3.4.5 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Robert M. Sutter, BOC GasesRecommendation: Add text to read as follows: “...is maintained in accordance with applicale codes or manufactures recommendation.”Substantiation: This is no current requirement for maintaining the relief valves.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Rewrite this recommendation and move as a new item under 5.1.13.8.4(1) and renumber the existing. Add text to read as follows: “Relief valves shall be maintained in accordance with applicable codes or manufacturers recommendation.”Committee Statement: This requirement fits better in the maintenance section.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-131 Log #CP312 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.3.4.5, 5.1.3.4.5.1, 5.1.3.4.5.2, 5.1.3.4.5.3 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Piping SystemsRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.3.4.5 Relief Valves 5.1.3.4.5.1 All pressure relief valves shall meet the following requirements: (1) Be of brass, bronze, or stainless steel construction (2) Be designed for the specific gas service (3) Have a relief pressure setting not higher than the maximum allowable working pressure (MAWP) of the component with lowest working pressure rating in the portion of the system being protected (4) Be vented to the outside of the building, except that relief valves for compressed air systems having less than 84,950 L (3,000 ft3) at STP shall be permitted to be diffused locally by means that will not restrict the flow (5) Have a vent discharge line that is not smaller than the size of the relief valve outlet (6) Where two or more relief valves discharge into a common vent line, itʼs internal cross-sectional area shall be not less than the aggregate cross-sectional area of all relief valve vent discharge lines served

(7) Shall not discharge into locations creating potential hazards (8) Have the discharge terminal turned down and screened to prevent the entry of rain, snow, or vermin. 5.1.3.4.5.2 When vented to outdoors, materials and construction for relief valve discharge lines shall be the same as required for positive pressure gas distribution [5.1.10.1.1]. 5.1.3.4.5.3 Central supply systems for positive pressure gases shall include one or more relief valves, all meeting the following requirements: (1) Be located between each final line regulator and the source valve (2) Have a relief setting that is 50 percent above the normal system operating pressure, as indicated in Table 5.1.11.Substantiation: This proposal incorporates the recommendations from Poposals 99-140 (Log #127), 99-139 (Log #287), 99-141 (Log #302), 99-136 (Log #303) and 99-137 (Log #304).Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-132 Log #45 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.3.4.5.X )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Mark Allen, Beacon Medical ProductsRecommendation: Add new 5.1.3.4.5.3 “When vented outside, relief valve vent lines shall be labeled in accordance with 5.1.11.1.4, in any manner which will distinguish them from the medical gas pipeline.”Substantiation: When attached from many manifolds, it is difficult to distinguish the vent line form the medical gas piping itself. This requirement would discourage inadvertent misconnection.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-133 Log #206 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.3.4.5.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Robert M. Sutter, BOC GasesRecommendation: Add text to read as follows: “...installed so that it can be maintained.”Substantiation: The current system design requirements allow a relief valve to be installed in a method that discourage removal for maintenance due to the need for shutting the pipeline down.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: The standard already requires maintenance on the systems. Section 5.1.13.8 contains these requirements.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-134 Log #207 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.3.4.5.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Robert M. Sutter, BOC GasesRecommendation: New text to read as follows: “...shall be certified to a recognized standard.”Substantiation: There are currently no requirements for the pipeline relief valve to be approved by a recognized authority.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: There was no specific reference cited.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-135 Log #208 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.3.4.5.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Robert M. Sutter, BOC GasesRecommendation: Add text to read as follows: The pipeline pressure relief valve must be designed in accordance with a recognized standard.Substantiation: The current standard does not have a requirements for the sizing of the central supply system relief valve.

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Add text to read as follows: (10) Shall be designed in accordance with ASME B31.3, Pressure Process Piping.Committee Statement: The specific reference was given.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHComment on Affirmative: WAGNER: The title of ASME B31.3 is “Process Piping”.Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-136 Log #303 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.3.4.5.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: David D. Eastman, Metro Detroit Plumbing Industry Training Center / Rep. American Society of Sanitary EngineeringRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.3.4.5.1 All positive pressure central supply systems shall be provided with at least one relief valve that meets relief valves shall meet the following requirements; 3. is located between the final line regulator outlet valve and the source valve. 4. Is set at 50 percent above the normal expected system operating pressure (See tables 5.1.11.)Substantiation: Current wording only establishes criteria for final line relief valve. Revised wording extends these requirements to all relief valves. See new proposed 5.1.3.4.5.3.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Action on Proposal 99-131 (Log #CP312).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-137 Log #304 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.3.4.5.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: David D. Eastman, Metro Detroit Plumbing Industry Training Center / Rep. American Society of Sanitary EngineeringRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.3.4.5.1 All positive pressure central supply systems shall be provided with at least one relief valve that meets the following requirements: 5. Is vented to the outside of the building, except that relief valves for air systems having less than 3000 cubic feet at STP shall be permitted to be diffused locally.Substantiation: In the event of a fire even small amounts of air will help spread a fire if diffused locally.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Action on Proposal 99-131 (Log #CP312).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-138 Log #209 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.3.4.5.1(2) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Robert M. Sutter, BOC GasesRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: “...is designed for the intended gas service.Substantiation: By requiring the relief valve to be specifically designed for its intended service it prevents material compatibility and improper sizing problems.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise text to read as follows: “(2) Is designed for the required gas service.Committee Statement: Clarification.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-139 Log #287 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.3.4.5.1(5) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: David D. Eastman, Metro Detroit Plumbing Industry Training Center / Rep. American Society of Sanitary EngineeringRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.3.4.5.1(5) is vented to the outside of the building, except that relief valves for air systems having less than 3000 cubic feet at STP shall be permitted to be diffused locally by means that will not restrict flow.Substantiation: Some commercially available diffusers baffle or restrict the flow of air.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Action on Proposal 99-131 (Log #CP312).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-140 Log #127 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.3.4.5.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Craig B. Williams, Hill-Rom Inc.Recommendation: Change to read: When vented outside, materials for relief valve vent lines shall comply with 5.1.10.2.Substantiation: There is no reason to have relief valve vent lines comply with the same standard as for medical gas distribution as stated in 5.1.10.1. This section requires installation of ASTM B 819 tubing. Having the vent lines comply with the same standard as for medical vacuum lines, as stated under 5.1.10.2, will ensure these vent lines are adequate for the purpose they are intended and will not create possible confusion for an individual who tries to keep these lines clean for oxygen use once they are installed by possibly placing a plug at discharge end of the vent line.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Action on Proposal 99-131 (Log #CP312).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: WAGNER: This proposal should have been rejected, based on 99-131 (Log #CP312). It proposed to permit relief valves discharge lines to be run in tubing approved for medical vacuum. Log 99-131 (Log #CP312) requires that the lines be run the same as positive pressure gas.Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-141 Log #302 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.3.4.5.3 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: David D. Eastman, Metro Detroit Plumbing Industry Training Center / Rep. American Society of Sanitary EngineeringRecommendation: Add text to read as follows: 5.1.3.4.5.3 All positive pressure central supply systems shall be provided with at least one relief valve that meets the following requirements: 1. Is located between the final line regulator outlet valve and the source valve. 2. Is set at 50 percent above the normal system operating pressure (See Tables 5.1.11.)Substantiation: Establishes criteria for final line pressure relief valve.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Action on Proposal 99-131 (Log #CP312).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-142 Log #44 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.3.4.6 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Mark Allen, Beacon Medical ProductsRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.3.4.6 Multiple Pressures. Where a single central supply system supplies two piped distribution networks operating at different pressures, each piped distribution network shall be separately provided with all elements in 5.1.3.4.4 (pressure regulators), 5.1.3.4.5 (relief valves), 5.1.4.4 (source valve), 5.1.3.5.9 (pressure regulators) only if medical air, 5.1.8.2.2(1) and 5.1.9.2.4(6) (master alarm).

99-29

Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99Substantiation: The present wording is too vague and encompasses many items not required simply because two pressures are derived from a single source. This rewording will permit less unnecessary duplication.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.3.4.6 Multiple Pressures. Where a single central supply system supplies separate piped distribution networks operating at different pressures, each piped distribution network shall comply with the following: (a) Medical Air Compressor Systems, 5.1.3.5.9 (pressure regulators) and 5.1.9.2.4(6) (master alarm) (b) All Central Supply Systems, 5.1.3.4.4 (pressure regulators), 5.1.3.4.5 (relief valves), 5.1.4.4 (source valve), 5.1.9.2.4(6) (master alarm).Committee Statement: Reorganized for clarity.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-143 Log #97 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.3.4.6 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Corky Bishop, Medical Gas Management, Inc.Recommendation: Add after 5.1.3.4.6: “A manually operated shutoff valve shall be installed upstream of each pressure regulator, and a shutoff valve or check valve shall be installed downstream to allow for maintenance of any one regulator without shutting down the system.”Substantiation: These valves are needed to perform maintenance to the system without shutting down. This requirement was dropped from the 1999 edition, 4-3.1.1.8(d).Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: This is covered in 5.1.3.4.4.1.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-144 Log #98 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.3.4.6 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Corky Bishop, Medical Gas Management, Inc.Recommendation: Add after 5.1.3.4.6: “A check valve shall be located in the primary supply main, upstream of the point of intersection with the secondary or reserve supply main for cryogenic manifolds and bulk systems.”Substantiation: This check valve allows the reserve supply to feed the distribution system rather than trying to refill the primary tank. This requirement was dropped from the 1999 edition, 4-3.1.1.8(f).Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Proposal 99-110 (Log #CP313).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-145 Log #306 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.3.4.8 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: David D. Eastman, Metro Detroit Plumbing Industry Training Center / Rep. American Society of Sanitary EngineeringRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.3.4.8 Headers. In central supply systems using cylinders containing either gas or liquid, each header shall include the following: 5. A pressure indicator indicating the pressure of header contentsSubstantiation: A pressure indicator cannot indicate the contents of a header; i.e., cannot tell what gas is in the header. It can only indicate the pressure of the gas.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________

99-146 Log #257 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.3.4.8(4) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Dennis Huffman, Western EnterprisesRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: (4) If intended for gas cylinder service, a A header shutoff valve downstream of the nearest cylinder connection, but upstream of the point at which the header connects to the central supply system.Substantiation: The requirement for a master shut off valve was an inadvertent change that occurred during the “Manual of Style” rewrite process. When a master valve is placed on the header, upstream of where the header attaches to the manifold, it requires an additional relief valve to be added to the system. Since master valves rated for cryogenic service are typically rated to 600 psig, the headers need to incorporate relief devices in case they are inadvertently connected to a high pressure cylinder. The manifold cabinet will also need to contain a relief valve since it may be possible that a high pressure source (high pressure cylinder header) may be connected to the manifold inlet. If the text is reverted back to the old requirement (no master valve) then only one set of relief valves will be required. The current requirement is adding cost (master valves, relief valves, and associated piping) but really isnʼt providing any additional safety. Since there were no requests to add master valves, it should revert back to the old requirement.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: A header shutoff valve is required for both cylinder gas and for liquid.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-147 Log #128 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.3.4.8(8) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Craig B. Williams, Hill-Rom Inc.Recommendation: Delete last part of statement so the statement reads: If intended for gas cylinder service, a pressure regulator to reduce the cylinder pressure to an intermediate pressure to permit the proper operation of the primary and secondary headers.Substantiation: The requirement imposed by the 2002 edition of NFPA 99 of limiting the intermediate pressure to less than 2070 kPa (300 psi) also limits the possibility for other technology, which might provide greater flow rates for medical gases, particularly nitrogen on this type of central supply system.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-148 Log #76 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.3.4.8(8) and Figure A.5.1.2.4.8(a) )________________________________________________________________TCC Action: The TCC is requesting the TC to revise its committee statement and explain why the proposed requirement would create a greater hazard than it would fix.Submitter: Keith Ferrari, PraxairRecommendation: Add text to (8) as follows: “If intended for gas cylinder service, pressure relief valves installed upstream of hte header valve, upstream of the header regulator (between the header valve and heard regulator) and upstream of the header check valve (between the header regulator and header check valve).” Figure A.5.1.2.4.8(a) would need to be updated also.Substantiation: In a high-pressure header application (using oxygen as an example), the 2800 psig of pressure that comes from the cylinders charges the header bar piping. With check valves installed on the pigtails for each cylinder and a header valve turned to the off position, it is possible to take off all the attached cylinders and still have 2800 psig in the header bar. If any repair/maintenance/modifications to the header bar occur with this gas pressure in the system, a potential explosion hazard may occur. This same concern arises throughout the header bar design. Any area of the header bar that can isolate elevated pressures, such as the piping between the header valve and regulator, and the regulator and check valve should have a relief valve.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: This would create a greater hazard than it would fix.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

99-30

Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99________________________________________________________________99-149 Log #79 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.3.4.9.4(1) and Figure A.5.1.3.4.9 )________________________________________________________________TCC Action: The TCC is requesting the TC to revise its committee statement and explain why the proposed requirement would create a greater hazard than it would fix.Submitter: Keith Ferrari, PraxairRecommendation: Add text to (1) to read as follows: “The manifold shall consist of pressure relief valves installed upstream of the header valve, upstream of the header regulator (between the header valve and heard regulator) and upstream of the header check valve (between the header regulator and header check valve).” Figure A.5.1.3.4.9 would need to be updated also.Substantiation: In a high-pressure header application (using oxygen as an example), the 2800 psig of pressure that comes from the cylinders charges the header bar piping. With check valves installed on the pigtails for each cylinder and a header valve turned to the off position, it is possible to take off all the attached cylinders and still have 2800 psig in the header bar. If any repair/maintenance/modifications to the header bar occur with this gas pressure in the system, a potential explosion hazard may occur. This same concern arises throughout the header bar design. Any area of the header bar that can isolate elevated pressures, such as the piping between the header valve and regulator, and the regulator and check valve should have a relief valve.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: This would create a greater hazard than it would fix.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-150 Log #327 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.3.4.10 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Thomas J. Mraulak, Metropolitan Detroit Plumbing Industry / Rep. American Society of Sanitary EngineeringRecommendation: Add text to read as follows: 5.1.3.4.10 Manifolds for Gas Cylinders with Reserve. 5.1.3.4.10.1 The manifolds in this category shall comply with 5.1.3.4.9. 5.1.3.4.10.2(1) The manifolds in this category shall have a reserve header, per 5.1.3.4.8 having sufficient number of gas cylinder connections for an average dayʼs supply but not fewer than three connections and connected downstream of the primary/secondary headers and upstream of the final line pressure regulators. (2) A pressure relief valve installed downstream of the connection of the reserve header and upstream of the final line pressure regulating assembly and set at 50 percent above the maximum expected inlet pressure. (Note: Renumber the rest of 5.1.3.4)Substantiation: This section has been in previous standards and I believe it was inadvertently left out of the 2002 standard.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Action on 99-96 (Log #347).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-151 Log #131 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.3.4.10(1) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Craig B. Williams, Hill-Rom Inc.Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Two equal headers, per 5.1.3.4.8, each having sufficient number of liquid cylinder connections for an average dayʼs supply but not fewer than one connection, and with the headers connected to the final line pressure regulator assembly in such a manner that either header may supply the system.Substantiation: The requirement for having no less than two connections should be required only for manifolds using gas cylinder headers. The same requirement can cause large volumes of waste contents if the manifold is for cryogenic liquid cylinders and if the facility total demand allows the secondary liquid header to empty itself due to evaporation before it can be used. Many facilities require only one liquid cylinder connection to meet their demand and they should not be penalized by added expense of wasted gas contents because of their size or medical gas operating requirements.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Action on 99-152 (Log #43).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-152 Log #43 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.3.4.10.4 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Mark Allen, Beacon Medical ProductsRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.3.4.10.4 The manifolds in this category shall consist of the following: (1) Two equal headers, per 5.1.3.4.8, each having sufficient number of liquid cylinder container connections for an average dayʼs supply but not fewer than two connections, and with the headers connected to the final line pressure regulator assembly in such a manner that either header may supply the system.Substantiation: There is no particular value in requiring two liquid containers. A 1 x 1 liquid manifold is a valid arrangement.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-153 Log #243 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.3.4.10.4 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Mark Allen, Beacon Medical ProductsRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.3.4.10.4 The manifolds in this category shall consist of the following: (1) Two equal headers per 5.1.3.4.8 each having sufficient number of liquid container or gas cylinder connections for an average dayʼs supply but not fewer than two connections, and with the headers connected to the final line pressure regulator assembly in such a manner that either header may supply the system. (2)* A reserve header per 5.1.3.4.8 having sufficient number of gas cylinder connections for an average dayʼs supply but not fewer than three connections, and connected downstream of the primary/secondary headers and upstream of the final line pressure regulators. (3) A pressure relief installed downstream of the connection of the reserve header and upstream of the final line pressure regulating assembly and set at 50 percent above the nominal inlet pressure. 5.1.3.4.10.5 The manifolds in this category shall include an automatic means of controlling the three headers to accomplish the following during normal operation: (1) If provided with two liquid container headers, one cryogenic liquid header is the primary and the other is the secondary, with either being capable of either role. (2) If provided with one liquid container header and one gas cylinder header (a hybrid arrangement), the liquid header is the primary and the gas cylinder header is the secondary. (3) When the primary header is supplying the system, the secondary header is prevented from supplying the system. (4) When the primary header is depleted, the secondary header shall automatically begin to supply the system. 5.1.3.4.10.6 The manifolds in this category shall be equipped with a means to conserve the gas produced by evaporation of the cryogenic liquid in the secondary header (when so provided). This mechanism shall discharge the conserved gas into the system upstream of the final line regulator assembly. 5.1.3.4.10.7 The manifolds in this category shall include a manual or automatic means to place either header into the role as primary header and the other in the role of secondary header, except where a liquid/gas hybrid manifold is employed. 5.1.3.4.10.8 The manifolds in this category shall include a means to automatically activate the Reserve Header if for any reason the primary and secondary headers cannot supply the system. 5.1.3.4.10.9 The manifolds in this category shall actuate a local signal and shall activate an indicator at all master alarms under the following conditions: (1) When or at a predetermined set point before, the secondary header begins to supply the system, indicating changeover. (2) Where a hybrid arrangement is employed, when or at a predetermined set point before the secondary (cylinder) header contents fall to one dayʼs average supply, indicating Secondary Low. (3) When or at a predetermined set point before the reserve header begins to supply the system, indicating reserve is in use. (4) When or at a predetermined set point before the reserve header contents fall to one dayʼs average supply, indicating reserve low.Substantiation: Hybrid manifolds are presently in successful service and represent a useful variant on the traditional manifold. These changes explicitly permit such a design and place it in the context of the other permitted designs.See Figure A.5.1.3.4.10.5(2) on the following page.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.3.4.10.4 The manifolds in this category shall consist of the following: (1) Two headers, per 5.1.3.4.8, each having sufficient number of cylinder connections for an average dayʼs supply but at least one connection for the liquid container header and three connections for the gas cylinders header, and with the headers connected to the final line pressure regulator assembly in such as manner that either header can supply the system.

99-31


(2)* A reserve header per 5.1.3.4.8 having sufficient number of gas cylinder connections for an average dayʼs supply but not fewer than three connections, and connected downstream of the primary/secondary headers and upstream of the final line pressure regulators. (3) A pressure relief installed downstream of the connection of the reserve header and upstream of the final line pressure regulating assembly and set at 50 percent above the nominal inlet pressure. 5.1.3.4.10.5 The manifolds in this category shall include an automatic means of controlling the three headers to accomplish the following during normal operation: (1) If provided with two liquid container headers, one cryogenic liquid header is the primary and the other is the secondary, with either being capable of either role. (2) If provided with one liquid container header and one gas cylinder header (a hybrid arrangement), the liquid header is the primary and the gas cylinder header is the secondary. (3) When the primary header is supplying the system, the secondary header is prevented from supplying the system. (4) When the primary header is depleted, the secondary header shall automatically begin to supply the system.

5.1.3.4.10.6 The manifolds in this category shall be equipped with a means to conserve the gas produced by evaporation of the cryogenic liquid in the secondary header (when so provided). This mechanism shall discharge the conserved gas into the system upstream of the final line regulator assembly. 5.1.3.4.10.7 The manifolds in this category shall include a manual or automatic means to place either header into the role as primary header and the other in the role of secondary header, except where a liquid/gas hybrid manifold is employed. 5.1.3.4.10.8 The manifolds in this category shall include a means to automatically activate the Reserve Header if for any reason the primary and secondary headers cannot supply the system. 5.1.3.4.10.9 The manifolds in this category shall actuate a local signal and shall activate an indicator at all master alarms under the following conditions: (1) When or at a predetermined set point before, the secondary header begins to supply the system, indicating changeover. (2) Where a hybrid arrangement is employed, when or at a predetermined set point before the secondary (cylinder) header contents fall to one dayʼs average supply, indicating Secondary Low. (3) When or at a predetermined set point before the reserve header begins to supply the system, indicating reserve is in use. (4) When or at a predetermined set point before the reserve header contents fall to one dayʼs average supply, indicating reserve low.

99-32

Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99Committee Statement: A change was made to include a 3 connection gas cylinder, which is more specific than what was recommended.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-154 Log #42 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.3.4.10.10 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Mark Allen, Beacon Medical ProductsRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.3.4.10.10 A variant on the Cryogenic Liquid Container Manifold shall be permitted having three headers of cylinders. Such a variant shall comply with all requirements of 5.1.3.4.10, except: (1) The minimum number of cylinder connections required for each header under 5.1.3.4.10.4(1) shall be two. (2) 5.1.3.4.10.6 shall not apply.Substantiation: The revisions in the 2002 version eliminated a rarely used but technically possible variant on a three header manifold. This proposal would restore that possible variant.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-155 Log #130 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.3.4.11 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Craig B. Williams, Hill-Rom Inc.Recommendation: Change this section and all subsections listed under it to begin with 5.1.3.4.12.Substantiation: This section numbered sequence would change if the proposal to add Liquid and Gas Cylinder Manifolds is accepted.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Action on Proposal 99-154 (Log #42).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-156 Log #210 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.3.4.11.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Robert M. Sutter, BOC GasesRecommendation: Add text to read as follows: “...installed using installers that meet the requirements of 5.1.10.6.11.1 and 5.1.10.6.12.Substantiation: Making this change along with one other proposed revision allows sections of the requirements for “Qualifications of Installers” to apply to a “Bulk Cryogenic System”. The other change that is offered in another proposal is the removal of the words “...located outdoor as follows” in Section 5.1.3.11.1.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Proposal 99-110 (Log #CP313).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-157 Log #211 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.3.4.11.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Robert M. Sutter, BOC GasesRecommendation: Add text to read as follows: Fill lines for Bulk Cryogenic Liquid systems shall not exceed 20 ft in length from the filling valves for the health care facilities supply vessel to the point where the hose from the delivery vehicle is connected unless a risk analysis with personnel from the health care facility and product supplier is completed.Substantiation: The use of an extended cryogenic fill line involves several risks, therefore a risk analysis should be completed. Some of the hazards associated with an extended fill line are; 1. Loss of pressure in the receiving tank. 2. An increase of pressure in the receiving tank. 3. Overfilling of the receiving tank. 4. Excessive venting resulting in fog creation.

Typical cryogenic tankers will off-load product at 100 gal per minute or more. The tank is be filled using indication of full from a “Full Trycock” valve (HCV-4). The “Full Trycock” valve is attached to a line (G) that extends down through the vapor/head space of the tank. When the liquid level in the tank reaches the inlet of this line the valve will spit liquid and the delivery personnel will know that the tank is full. Cryogenic tanks have a vapor space, which is based on the tank volume. This vaporizer space varies, from 10 percent or 49 gal. for smaller tanks to 3 percent or 452 gal. on larger tanks (Gross gallons - nominal gallons = vapor space). The vapor space allows for expansion of the liquid as it warms up. When a fill line is extended the time to stop the filling process is increased and it is easy for a delivery person to overfill a tank. When a tank is overfilled the condition is not readily evident. Problems with an overfilled tank do not usually appear until a period of time after the fill. The product already in the tank will warm the colder dense product, which was delivered. As the product warms it will expand raising the liquid level and the pressure in the tank. This increase in pressure could cause the relief valve (PSV-1A or B) to lift or the rupture disc (PSE-1A or B) to fail and vent the expanding liquid. The extended fill line also causes problems with the tank pressure during filling. When a cryogenic tank is being filled the pressure in the receiving vessel is being controlled by the delivery personnel. When product is being placed in to the top of the tank (Top Filling valve HCV-2, line A) the cold incoming liquid will recondense the gas in the vapor space of the tank causing the pressure to drop. When product is being placed in to the bottom of the vessel (Bottom Filling valve HCV-1, line B) the liquid level in the tank is rising which compresses the gas in the vapor space of the tank. this will cause the tank pressure to rise. A delivery person will balance the flow of product through these valves and maintain the desired tank pressure during the delivery. When a fill line is extended beyond a reasonable limit it becomes difficult for the delivery person to control the tank pressure and stop the filling process without affecting the operation of the receiving tank. Note: Supporting material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Proposal 99-110 (Log #CP313).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHComment on Affirmative: WAGNER: 99-110 (Log #CP313) does not appear to include this proposed change.Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-158 Log #212 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.3.4.11.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Robert M. Sutter, BOC GasesRecommendation: Add text to read as follows: A common fill line for two or more Bulk Cryogenic Liquid systems shall not exceed 30 ft in length from the filling valves for the farthest supply vessel to the point where the hose from the delivery vehicle is connected unless a risk analysis is completed. The risk analysis shall involve personnel from the health care facility and product supplier.Substantiation: This proposal is in addition to the proposal to limit extended fill lines for single tanks to 20 ft.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Proposal 99-110 (Log #CP313).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHComment on Affirmative: WAGNER: 99-110 (Log #CP313) does not appear to include this proposed change.Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-159 Log #213 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.3.4.11.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Robert M. Sutter, BOC GasesRecommendation: Add text to read as follows: Installed per 5.1.10.1 through 5.1.10.5.7.Substantiation: Making this change along with two other proposed revisions allows sections of the requirements for “Piping Materials for Field Installed Positive Pressure Medical Gas Systems” to apply to a “Bulk Cryogenic System”. The two other changes that are offered in other proposals are the removal of the words “...located outdoors as follows” in section 5.1.3.11.1, and the addition of using a BAg series filler metal on cryogenic piping. In section 5.1.10.5.1.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Proposal 99-110 (Log #CP313).Number Eligible to Vote: 23

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-160 Log #214 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.3.4.11.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Robert M. Sutter, BOC GasesRecommendation: Add text to read as follows: “...shall be suitably protected against over pressurization during operation attended refill.Substantiation: There have been several incidents where tanks have been over pressurized during filling that has led to catastrophic tank failures. The CGA issued a Position Statement PS-8-2003 “Protection of Cryogenic Storage Tanks From Overpressure During Operator Attended Refill” to address methods of evaluating the relief systems of cryogenic storage tanks.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Proposal 99-110 (Log #CP313).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-161 Log #215 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.3.4.11.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Robert M. Sutter, BOC GasesRecommendation: Add text to read as follows: “...located so that they are readily accessible to delivery personnel during off loading”.Substantiation: During off loading delivery personnel need to have unobstructed access between the delivery trailer and the storage vessel in order to safely deliver product.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Proposal 99-110 (Log #CP313).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-162 Log #216 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.3.4.11.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Robert M. Sutter, BOC GasesRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: “Bulk crogenic liquid systems shall be located outdoors as follows...”Substantiation: Current wording restricts the requirements to the outdoor location of a bulk cryogenic system. Removing these words allow all of the requirements in NFPA 50 and CGA-MI to apply. Other proposals are also based on this proposed change.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Proposal 99-110 (Log #CP313).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-163 Log #217 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.3.4.11.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Robert M. Sutter, BOC GasesRecommendation: Add text to read as follows: “...installed in compliance with the federal FDA̓ s current good manufacturing practice as found in CFR 21 parts 210 and 211.Substantiation: In recently published draft guidance to the medical gas industry the FDA declared it authority over storage tank installations at health care facilities by providing guidance on how to comply with the CGMPʼs.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Proposal 99-110 (Log #CP313).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-164 Log #218 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.3.4.11.1(1) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Robert M. Sutter, BOC GasesRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: (For oxygen systems) in an enclosure sited to comply with minimum distance requirements in Table A-2.2 in NFPA 50, Standard for Bulk Oxygen Systems at Consumer Sites.Substantiation: The current wording place the requirement of NFPA 50 on nitrogen systems.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Proposal 99-110 (Log #CP313).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-165 Log #219 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.3.4.11.1(1) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Robert M. Sutter, BOC GasesRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: In an enclosure sited to comply with minimum distance requirements in Table A-2.2 in Installed in compliance with NFPA 50, Standard for Bulk Oxygen Systems at Consumer Sites.Substantiation: The current wording makes the appendix in NFPA 50 a part of this standard. appendixes are not considered a part of the requirement for NFPA documents. They are included for information purposes only. The current statement also restricts the requirements to the minimum distance requirements of NFPA 50 and not the complete standard. Location requirements of NFPA 50 are already covered in Section 5.1.3.3.1.9.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Proposal 99-110 (Log #CP313).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-166 Log #99 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.3.4.11.1(4) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Corky Bishop, Medical Gas Management, Inc.Recommendation: Delete entire paragraph: “In compliance with CGA, Guidelines for Medical Gas Installations at Consumer Sites.”Substantiation: CGA does not appear to offer such a guideline.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: The guidelines do exist. See 99-167 (Log #220).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-167 Log #220 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.3.4.11.1(4) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Robert M. Sutter, BOC GasesRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: In compliance with CGA M-1, Guideline For Medical Gas Installations Supply Systems at Consumer Sites.Substantiation: Revise to reflect the actual CGA document title.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: The committee has not seen this document and can not accept it until it becomes available.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: WAGNER: This proposal should have been approved. CGA M-1 has been included in 99-110 (Log #CP313).Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99________________________________________________________________99-168 Log #275 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.3.4.11.1(4) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: J. Richard Wagner, The Poole & Kent CorporationRecommendation: Delete this section. (4) In compliance with CGA, Guidelines for Medical Gas Installations at Consumer Sites.Substantiation: Do these Guidelines exist?Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: The guidelines do exist. See 99-167 (Log #220).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-169 Log #221 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.3.4.11.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Robert M. Sutter, BOC GasesRecommendation: Add text to read as follows: Shall allow at least 3 ft of clearance around the storage container vaporizer(s) and pressure regulating manifold for system maintenance and operation.Substantiation: Adequate clearance around the storage container, vaporizer and other associated equipment is critical for the safe operation and maintenance of bulk cryogenic liquid systems. Ambient air vaporizers need air circulation and sunlight to efficiently operate. Maintenance technicians need adequate room to be able to safely maintain the system and Health Care facility personnel will also need room to safely perform their daily inspection of the system.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Proposal 99-110 (Log #CP313).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-170 Log #222 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.3.4.11.2(a) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Robert M. Sutter, BOC GasesRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: The supply system shall be anchored firmly to a poured concrete pad, appropriate for the weight, surface loading, (wind loading) and complying with local seismic requirements.Substantiation: The Gulf Coast and Florida are located in seismic zone . However they are located in areas of 90 to 150 mph winds. In calculating foundation designs the overturn moment due to wind loading forces need to be considered.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Proposal 99-110 (Log #CP313).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-171 Log #223 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.3.4.11.2(c) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Robert M. Sutter, BOC GasesRecommendation: The location intended for the delivery vehicle (the vehicle pad) shall comply with NFPA 50 not be used for any other purpose.Substantiation: The requirements to comply with NFPA 50 are already covered in other sections of NFPA 99. The vehicle pads have been used for other purposes such as parking and storage of trash containers.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Proposal 99-110 (Log #CP313).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-172 Log #247 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.3.4.11.2(f) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Michael Frankel, Utility Systems Consultants / Rep. American Society of Plumbing EngineersRecommendation: Delete this paragraph in its entirety.Substantiation: No consideration was given for installation of a vaporizer which is part of almost every liquid oxygen supply. This device is always coated with ice that melts. A drain must be provided directly under the vaporizer to have a means to keep any water from accumulating and keep slab as dry as possible. It is good engineering practice to install a drain in the slab.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: Deletion of this requirement will cause a dangerous condition if a drain were present. Liquid oxygen could flow down the drain.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-173 Log #224 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.3.4.11.3 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Robert M. Sutter, BOC GasesRecommendation: Add text to read as follows: Dual main vessel relief valves and rupture discs installed down stream of a three-way valve.Substantiation: When a bulk cryogenic liquid source has a single main relief valve and rupture disc the tank must be removed from service when the relief valve or rupture disc needs servicing. When a three-way valve with dual safeties and rupture discs are installed on the tank the component needing service can be isolated while the cryogenic liquid source remains in service and protected.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Proposal 99-110 (Log #CP313).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-174 Log #225 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.3.4.11.3 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Robert M. Sutter, BOC GasesRecommendation: Add text to read as follows: • At a minimum the fill circuit shall consist of the following connection in compliance with CGA V-6 Standard Cryogenic Transfer Connections. • A means to seal and secure the fill connection inlet. • A minimum 100 mesh strainer of monel or brass construction. • Check valve • Hose purge valve • A method to properly support the fill connection.Substantiation: • A non-removable product specific fill connection prevents the connection from being removed and having the wrong product placed into the tank. • All fill connections should have a cap installed on them when they are not in use to prevent foreign objects from getting the fill connection. Securing the fill connection with a lock will help prevent tampering with the fill connection. • A strainer in the fill line will stop material that could damage the seats in the fill valves from entering the system. • A check valve installed in the fill circuit will prevent the unintentional or intentional removal of product in the storage vessel when the fill valves are opened. • A hose purge valve should be installed in the fill circuit to allow the delivery personnel to purge the fill hose of any moisture that accumulated in the line as the result of condensation from a previous fill. • Overtime an improperly supported fill connection will begin to leak and may fail during product deliveries.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Proposal 99-110 (Log #CP313).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99________________________________________________________________99-175 Log #80 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.3.4.11.5 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Keith Ferrari, PraxairRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: “...until the main supply is reduced to a level below the reserve activation pressure, at which point...”.Substantiation: The current wording “main supply fails or is depleted” seems to indicate that there will be a disruption in supply to the patients prior to the reserve supplying the system.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Proposal 99-110 (Log #CP313).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-176 Log #226 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.3.4.11.7 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Robert M. Sutter, BOC GasesRecommendation: Add text to read as follows: Vaporizers used to convert cryogenic medical product to gaseous medical product shall: • Be heated using ambient air • If heated by other means are provided with backup ambient air units capable of vaporizing two days average usage. • Be sized to provide adequate capacity under all local conditions. • Allow for seasonal conditions for weather and humidity, structures that obstruct air circulation or sunlight when sizing is determined. • Have documentation of sizing provided to the facility. • Be capable of being switched to allow deicing when ambient air vaporizers are used. • Be switched using a method other than solenoid valves. • Not stop the flow of gas to the facility during switching. • Be reviewed on an annual basis to insure that they are being operated within their design parameters.Substantiation: At the present time there is no requirement for the sizing or operation of vaporizers. This proposal is intended to place some guidelines around the vaporizers. The majority of vaporizers used at health care facilities use the heat in ambient air to convert the medical gas from a cryogenic state to a gaseous state. Some of the larger health care facilities located in cities will use a steam or hot water vaporizer due to reduced space needs. However when powered vaporizers are used a loss of the heating medium would cause the system to shut down. Having ambient air vaporizers as a backup to the powered vaporizer would provide an uninterrupted flow of medical gas to the facility while repairs are made. The sizing of vaporizers is critical to their proper operation. An ambient air vaporizer has to be properly sized for the application and location in which it is used. Improperly sized vaporizers will accumulate large quantities of low temperature ice, which can lead to equipment damage and equipment failure. Improperly sized vaporizers can also allow low temperature gas to enter the piped distribution system. Vaporizers which have air circulation and sunlight restrictions will not perform as well as the identical vaporizes that do not have these restrictions. Sizing documentation should be used as proof of proper sizing. Vaporizers that convert cryogenic medical product into gaseous medical product operate in the -250°F to -320°F range. Under these conditions moisture in the air will condense and freeze on the piping. This ice will continue to grow until the outer layer of ice rises above the dew point. This growth of ice has lead to equipment and pad failures. Due to the continuous use of medical gas systems at health care facilities a typical vaporizer is never capable of shedding the accumulating ice. The installation of a switching system allows the unused vaporizer to shed its ice. Solenoid valves either normally open or closed should never be installed in a switching system if their failure can stop flow through the system. Vaporizers are sized to perform within set parameters. Changes in use patterns or loads can lead to over drawn vaporizers. When a medical facility grows or changes their medical gas use pattern a review of the bulk supply system should be completed.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Proposal 99-110 (Log #CP313).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-177 Log #132 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.3.4.12 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Craig B. Williams, Hill-Rom Inc.Recommendation: Change this section and all subsections listed under it to begin with 5.1.3.4.13.Substantiation: This section numbered sequence would change if the proposal to add Liquid and Gas Cylinder Manifolds is accepted.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: Changes are not needed now. See Action on 99-153 (Log #243).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-178 Log #312 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.3.4.12 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: David D. Eastman, Metro Detroit Plumbing Industry Training Center / Rep. American Society of Sanitary EngineeringRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.3.4.12* Emergency Oxygen Supply Connection (EOSC) EOSCs shall be installed... 3. Where multiple freestanding buildings are served from a single oxygen source such that damage to the interconnecting oxygen line could result in one or more buildings losing oxygen supply. In this situation, each building shall be provided with a separate emergency connection. 5.1.3.4.12.1 Where multiple freestanding buildings are served from a single oxygen source such that damage to the interconnecting oxygen line could result in one or more building losing oxygen supply. In this situation, each building shall be provided with a separate emergency connection.Substantiation: Current wording doesnʼt specify the exact circumstances that would require an EOSC installation. If all three circumstances must be present, then an EOSC is not required on any system that doesnʼt supply multiple free-standing buildings. If only one of the circumstances must be present, then a cylinder system without reserve would require either an in-building oxygen reserve or an EOSC connection. Revised wording clarifies that any installation of a bulk oxygen system not connected to an in-building emergency reserve header will require an EOSC. Moving the current third requirement to a separate section clearly addresses a situation not related to either a bulk installation or an in-building emergency reserve and separates it from the other two requirements.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: The proposed change will mandate the EOSC for all buildings.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-179 Log #313 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.3.4.12.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: David D. Eastman, Metro Detroit Plumbing Industry Training Center / Rep. American Society of Sanitary EngineeringRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.3.4.12.1 EOSCs shall be located as follows: 1. On the exterior of the building being served in a location accessible by emergency supply vehicles at all times in all weather conditions. 2. Connected to the main supply line immediately downstream of the main shutoff valve and upstream of any alarm sensors and mainline pressure indicators.Substantiation: It is not obvious to everyone that “immediately downstream” means “the next thing downstream.” The additional wording would make it less likely that anyone would inadvertently isolate the alarm signals with the check valves required in 5.1.3.4.12.2.4.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: The existing language already covers this requirement adequately.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99________________________________________________________________99-180 Log #189 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.3.4.12.1(2) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Don Holden, Holden Hospital SupplyRecommendation: Section should read as follows: “...connected to the main supply line down stream of the main shutoff valve.Substantiation: It should not read “...immediately down stream...”Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: This would allow the connection to be made anyplace downstream of the main shut off valve. Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-181 Log #133 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.3.4.13 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Craig B. Williams, Hill-Rom Inc.Recommendation: Change this section and all subsections listed under it to begin with 5.1.3.4.14.Substantiation: This section numbered sequence would change if the proposal to add Liquid and Gas Cylinder Manifolds is accepted.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: Action no longer needed. See Action on 99-153 (Log #243).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-182 Log #286 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.3.4.13.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: David D. Eastman, Metro Detroit Plumbing Industry Training Center / Rep. American Society of Sanitary EngineeringRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.3.4.13.2 If a reserve is provided inside a building as a substitute for the EOSC, it shall be located in accordance with 5.1.3.3 as follows:Substantiation: Nothing restricts the use of the in-building emergency reserve to oxygen. Current text defines the appropriate location for oxygen reserves, but would allow an in-building emergency reserve for, say, nitrous oxide to be located in the menʼs room.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-183 Log #281 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.3.4.13.4 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: David D. Eastman, Metro Detroit Plumbing Industry Training Center / Rep. American Society of Sanitary EngineeringRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.3.4.13.4 In-building emergency reserves shall include a check valve in the main line placed on the distribution system side of the ordinary sourceʼs main line valve to prevent flow of gas from the emergency reserve to the ordinary source, and a check valve in the line from the in-building emergency reserve to the main line to prevent the flow of gas from the ordinary source to the emergency reserve.Substantiation: The in-building emergency reserve can either be a header per 5.1.3.4.8 or a cylinder system without reserve. If a header is used, this check valve is required by 5.1.3.4.8; if a cylinder system without reserve is used, there is no current provision for this check valve.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: This issue is addressed in section 5.1.3.4.8Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: WAGNER: The check valve for the cylinder system without reserve does not appear to be addressed in 5.1.3.4.8.Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-184 Log #285 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.3.4.13.5 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: David D. Eastman, Metro Detroit Plumbing Industry Training Center / Rep. American Society of Sanitary EngineeringRecommendation: Delete the following text: 5.1.3.4.13.5 in building emergency reserves shall actuate a local signal and an alarm at all master alarms when or just before it begins to serve the system.Substantiation: The in-building emergency reserve doesnʼt automatically activate. Therefore, a signal at the master panel stating that it is about to begin to serve the system is unnecessary.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: The required alarm is a valuable signal.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHComment on Affirmative: WAGNER: Are in-building emergency reserves activated manually or automatically? If manual, change 5.1.3.4.13.5 as follows: “In-building emergency reserves shall activate a local alarm and an alarm at all master alarm panels when or jest before it begins they begin to serve the system,”Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-185 Log #317 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.3.5 )________________________________________________________________TCC Action: The TCC is requesting the TC to review the action on this proposal again as a committee comment as the reference to Log #307 does not address after-coolers..Submitter: David D. Eastman, Metro Detroit Plumbing Industry Training Center / Rep. American Society of Sanitary EngineeringRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.3.5 After-coolers shall be permitted to be constructed of ferrous and/or non-ferrous materials deemed suitable by the manufacturer.Substantiation: Current wording is places no limitations on the material that can be used, but also assigns no responsibility for choice of material. Revising the wording places the responsibility for material selection solely on the manufacturer.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Action on 99-216 (Log #307).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: WAGNER: The proposal should have been accepted as submitted. 99-216 (Log #307) applies to vacuum pumps.Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-186 Log #134 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.3.5.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Craig B. Williams, Hill-Rom Inc.Recommendation: Delete: (4) Have less than 25 ppm gaseous hydrocarbonsSubstantiation: This requirement is redundant to the requirement mentioned in 5.1.3.5.2(2). The requirement for medical air to be less than 25 ppm is required under USP making this statement redundant.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: Hydrocarbons are not addressed in USP.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-187 Log #67 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.3.5.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Mark Allen, Beacon Medical ProductsRecommendation: Add new (7) to read as follows: “Except as defined in (1) through (6), materials and devices used between the medical air intake and the medical air source valve shall be permitted to be of any design or construction appropriate for the service as determined by the manufacturer.”Substantiation: In extending requirements from other sections of the standard into the air system, persons have attempted to impose inappropriate components within air compressor packages. In doing so they force substitution of components selected by the original designer and create a potential hazard through the installation of inappropriate components.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle The correct reference should be 5.1.3.5.3.2

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99 Add new (7) to read as follows: “Except as defined in (1) through (6), materials and devices used between the medical air intake and the medical air source valve shall be permitted to be of a design or construction appropriate for the service as determined by the manufacturer.”Committee Statement: The correct reference should be 5.1.3.5.3.2 Editorially changed “any” to “a”.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-188 Log #135 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.3.5.3.2(6) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Craig B. Williams, Hill-Rom Inc.Recommendation: Revise text to read: Piping and components between the compresssor and the source shutoff valve that do not contribute to contaminant levels.Substantiation: The main concern for medical air systems is to ensure the system produces USP medical air continuously. Requiring piping between the compressor and the source valve to be oxygen compatible or cleaned for oxygen use will not always answer this requirement. Components such as receivers, after-coolers, solenoids, valves, regulators are not required to meet this requirement. Liquid-ring compressors will off gas contaminates such as chlorine, fluoride and other water additives the local water supplier adds to the domestic water supply. The NFPA 99 requirement for medical air systems should be that it provides a minimum quality of air based on USP continuous.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-189 Log #170 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.3.5.4 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Craig B. Williams, Hill-Rom Inc.Recommendation: Add new text to read as follows: 5.1.3.5.4.6 An intake filter shall be installed between the compressorʼs isolation valve and the compressor.Substantiation: Compressor intake filters are needed to prevent the entry of small particulate matter that might cause failure of on of the components of the medical air system.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: Section 5.1.3.5.3.2 (4) already requires a filter. Anyone can provide more than the minimum requirements.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-190 Log #13 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.3.5.4.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Lyle Wells, LW ConsultingRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.3.5.4 Compressors for Medical Air. 5.1.3.5.4.1* Compressors for medical air shall be designed to prevent the introduction of contaminants or liquid into the pipeline by either one of the following methods: (1) Elimination of oil anywhere in the compressor (e.g., liquid ring and permanently sealed bearing compressors) (2) Separation of the oil-containing section from the compression chamber by at least two seals creating an area open to atmosphere that allows the following: (a) Direct and unobstructed visual inspection of the interconnecting shaft through vent and inspection openings no smaller than 1.5 shaft diameters in size (b) The facility operators to confirm proper seal operation by direct visual inspection through the above-shaft opening, without disassembly of the compressor (e.g., extended head compressors with an atmospheric vent between the compression chamber and the crankcase) (3) Separation of the oil-containing section from the compression chamber of rotary type compressors by at least two seals separated by a barrier ring having an atmospheric vent on each side. The vent for the lubricant seal shall provide gravity drain and visual indication of oil migration without disassembly of

the compressor. Centrifugal force shall provide additional protection of oil migration with a minimum of 550 meters per minute (1805 ft per minute) shaft surface speed. 5.1.3.5.8.1 Compressors complying with 5.1.3.5.4.1(2) and 5.1.3.5.4.1(3) shall be provided with the following: (1) Coalescing filters with element change indicators (2) Charcoal absorbers with colorimetric hydrocarbon indicators 5.1.3.5.14.4. Where compressors compliant with 5.1.3.5.4.1(2) and 5.1.3.5.4.1(3) are used, the following requirements shall apply: (1) The air temperature at the immediate outlet of each compressor cylinder compression chamber shall be monitored by a high temperature sensor that shuts down that compressor and activates a local alarm indicator. [See 5.1.9.4.4(9).] The temperature setting shall be as recommended by the compressor manufacturer. (2) Coalescing filters with element change indicator shall be provided. (3) Charcoal filters with colorimetric hydrocarbon indicator shall be provided. (4) Liquid hydrocarbons shall be monitored on a continuous basis by pigment indicator or other type of instrument permanently installed downstream of each compressor and shall be inspected and documented daily. (5) Gaseous hydrocarbons shall be monitored on a quarterly basis. A.5.1.3.5.4.1 Examples of 5.1.3.5.4.1(1) are liquid ring and permanently sealed bearing compressors. An example of 5.1.3.5.4.1(2) is an extended head compressor with an atmospheric vent between the compression chamber and the crankcase. An example of 5.1.3.5.4.1(3) is a rotary compressor having two shaft seals and two atmospheric vents separated by a barrier ring and shaft surface speeds exceeding 550 meters per minute (1805 ft per minute).Substantiation: The definition of Medical Air Compressor in NFPA 99-2002, 3.3.107 allows the use of at least eight different types of compressors that have adequate seal design. However the description of compressors for medical air 5.1.3.5.4 limits the field to four, liquid ring, single acting reciprocating, double acting reciprocating and scroll. The best suited compressor for this service, however, is the oil free rotary screw compressor with adequate seal design. This has been proven in many medical air compressor applications over more than 15 years, having been applied through the Equivalency process 1.4.2. Moreover, it is the compressor of choice for use in the electronics industry in clean rooms and chip making facilities where the specification for compressed air cleanliness is more stringent than for medical air and even the slightest contamination of particulate or hydrocarbon can ruin millions of dollars worth of product. It would be to the Health Care Facilities advantage to modify 5.1.3.5.4.1 by adding the proposed paragraph (3). This will allow the use of oil free rotary screw, rotary lobe and centrifugal compressors that have sealing arrangements suitable for excluding oil in the compression chamber and air stream, even during a double fault (bearing and seal). This will also require changes to related 5.1.3.5.8.1, 5.1.3.5.14.4 and A.5.1.3.5.4.1. An added benefit to all of the above mentioned compressors (except liquid ring and water injected screw) is the partial sterilization of the medical air provided by Adiabatic Heating (3.3.2). This process occurs twice on two stage compressors with temperatures exceeding 177°C (350°F), although he dwell time at this temperature is probably less than three seconds per stage. The liquid ring compressor does not benefit from this process and indeed can promote growth of algae and other undesirables depending on seal water source (open type cooling tower, etc.), not to mention that it requires about twice the horsepower of the screw compressor.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: Insufficient technical data to prove the piping system could not be contaminated by oil.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-191 Log #163 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.3.5.4.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Craig B. Williams, Hill-Rom Inc.Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: For Liquid-ring compressors, scal water of a quality recommended by the compressor manufacturer and is free of any possible added contaminates (e.g., Chorine, Fluoride).Substantiation: Many local water supplies place additional chemicals into their water supply in order to kill living microorganisms or prevent tooth decay. These additives can evaporate into a gas, which is then added to the medical air produced by the medical compressed air system.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: The recommendation would prohibit a technology that is currently used throughout the United States.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99________________________________________________________________99-192 Log #316 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.3.5.4.3 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: David D. Eastman, Metro Detroit Plumbing Industry Training Center / Rep. American Society of Sanitary EngineeringRecommendation: 5.1.3.5.4.3 Compressors shall be permitted to be constructed of ferrous and/or non-ferrous materials deemed suitable by the manufacturer.Substantiation: Current wording is places no limitations on the material that can be used, but also assigns no responsibility for choice of material. Revising the wording places the responsibility for material selection solely on the manufacturer.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-193 Log #164 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.3.5.4.5 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Craig B. Williams, Hill-Rom Inc.Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Flexible connectors, when required by the manufacturer, shall connect the air compressors with their intake and outlet piping in accordance with the manufacturerʼs recommendations.Substantiation: Not all compressors vibrate to the degree that they need flexible connectors. This requirement should be up to the manufacturer to decide if flexible connectors are needed at the compressorʼs intake and outlet.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: The compressor could vibrate and could cause pipe failure if it does not have a flexible connector.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-194 Log #311 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.3.5.7 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: David D. Eastman, Metro Detroit Plumbing Industry Training Center / Rep. American Society of Sanitary EngineeringRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.3.5.7 Medical Air Dryers. Medical air dryers shall meet the following requirements: 3. Be permitted to be constructed of ferrous and/or non-ferrous materials deemed suitable by the manufacturer.Substantiation: The manufacter is best suited to specify the materials for their equipment.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-195 Log #165 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.3.5.7(1) )________________________________________________________________TCC Action: The TCC is requesting the TC to revise its committee statement and explain why the proposed requirement didnʼt add any apparent value.Submitter: Craig B. Williams, Hill-Rom Inc.Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Be designed or configured within the medical air system to provide air at a maximum dew point that is below the frost point [0°C (32°F)] when expanded to the systemʼs final delivery pressure at any level of demand.Substantiation: The current 2002 requirement for maximum dew point of medical air dryers is worded such that refrigerant dryers would be required to dry air below the frost point at the systemʼs operating pressure, which is typically at approximately 100 psi. The dew point of compressed air will decrease as the systemʼs operating pressure expands when decreased to the systemʼs delivery pressure. Refrigerant dryers are capable of allowing the medical air system to produce dew point levels below the frost point at the systemʼs final delivery pressure when the dryer is positioned within the system correctly. The location for monitoring dew point for medical air is at the systemʼs delivery pressure and not at the systemʼs operating pressure. The revised text clarifies the intent of this requirement.Committee Meeting Action: Reject

Committee Statement: The proposed change didnʼt add any apparent value.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: WAGNER: The proposal clarifies the pressure at which the dew point is to be maintained.Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-196 Log #191 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.3.5.7(1) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Don Holden, Holden Hospital SupplyRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Each dryer system shall be designed to provide air at a maximum dew point of 35°F (1.7°C) at the peak calculated demand of the system.Substantiation: The 2002 standards were written to prevent refrigerant air dryers from being used yet there are parts of the world where they work great. The principle is to prevent the air line from raining out and there are parts of the world that will never reach temperatures that would cause rain out. It is ideal to have a choice of products for each specific application rather than exclude options that work. Note: Supporting material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: The committee did not exclude refrigerated dryers.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-197 Log #315 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.3.5.8 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: David D. Eastman, Metro Detroit Plumbing Industry Training Center / Rep. American Society of Sanitary EngineeringRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.3.5.8 Medical Air Filters. Medical air filters shall meet the following requirements: 5. Be permitted to be constructed of ferrous and/or non-ferrous materials deemed suitable by the manufacturer.Substantiation: Current wording is places no limitations on the material that can be used, but also assigns no responsibility for choice of material. Revising the wording places the responsibility for material selection solely on the manufacturer.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-198 Log #166 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.3.5.8(3) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Craig B. Williams, Hill-Rom Inc.Recommendation: Add new text to read as follows: (3) Be located upstream of any desiccant dryer.Substantiation: Desiccant dryers will fail in the event that water or particulate matter should contaminate the desiccant bed, leading to desiccant dust spreading into all parts of the medical air system. A properly maintained coalescing and particulate filter will help to prevent the possibility of this situation.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: The location of the proposal is incorrect. It deals with the specification of the filters and not the placement.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHComment on Affirmative: WAGNER: 5.1.3.5.8(2) requires filters upstream from the final line regulators, which would prevent desiccant dust from spreading to all arts of the medical air system.Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-199 Log #314 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.3.5.9 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: David D. Eastman, Metro Detroit Plumbing Industry Training Center / Rep. American Society of Sanitary EngineeringRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.3.5.9 Medical Air Regulators. Medical air Regulators shall meet the following requirements:

99-39

Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99 1. Be sized for 100 percent of the peak calculated demand at design condition. 2. Be permitted to be constructed of ferrous and/or nonferrous materials deemed suitable by the manufacturer.Substantiation: Current wording is places no limitations on the material that can be used, but also assigns no responsibility for choice of material. Revising the wording places the responsibility for material selection on the manufacturer.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-200 Log #41 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.3.5.11.3 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Mark Allen, Beacon Medical ProductsRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.3.5.11.3 When aftercoolers are provided, they shall be either be: (1) Arranged as a duplex or multiplex set, sized to serve the peak calculated demand with the largest single aftercooler out of service and provided with valves adequate to isolate any single aftercooler from the system without shutting down supply of medical air. (2) Arranged one per compressor, sized to handle the output of that compressor, and valved as appropriate to permit repair or replacement with that compressor out of service but without shutting down supply of medical air.Substantiation: The association of a compressor with an aftercooler designed for that single compressor is a common and in some ways superior design. The wording did not permit this variation.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-201 Log #167 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.3.5.11.4 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Craig B. Williams, Hill-Rom Inc.Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Medical air receiver(s) shall be provided with proper valves to allow the flow of compressed air to enter and exit out of separate receiver ports during normal operation and allow the receiver to be bypassed during service without shutting down the supply of medical air.Substantiation: The wording in the 2002 edition of NFPA 99 stating requirements for three-valve bypass on receivers, limits other possibilities, which will provide the same results.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-202 Log #367 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.3.5.11.4 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Craig B. Williams, Hill-Rom Inc.Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Medical air receiver(s) shall be provided with proper valves to allow the flow of compressed air to enter and exit out of separate receiver ports during normal operation and allow the receiver to be bypassed during service without shutting down the supply of medial air.Substantiation: The wording in the 2002 edition of NFPA 99 stating requirements for three-valve bypass on receivers, limits other possibilities, which will provide the same results. See the following drawing of a receiver with one two-port valve and one three-port valve).Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle See action on 99-201 (Log #167). Add the figures to A.5.1.3.5.11.4Committee Statement: See Committee Action on 99-201 (Log #167).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-203 Log #168 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.3.5.11.7 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Craig B. Williams, Hill-Rom Inc.Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Three-port indexed to flow, full port valves shall be permitted to be used to isolate one branch or component for the purposes of 5.1.3.5.11.3, 5.1.3.5.11.4, 5.1.3.5.11.5, 5.1.3.5.11.6.Substantiation: The name Three-way valve is not a proper name for this type of valve. It will only allow flow through two of its three ports with one port being common to the other two. It really is a valve with three ports and should be called by a more descriptive name of three-port valve. Since the three-port valves are allowed, in the 2002 edition of NFPA 99, to isolate banks of filters and regulators, it should also be allowed to isolate after-coolers, receivers, dryers, filters and regulators.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise text to read as follows: A three way valve (three-port) indexed to flow, full port valves shall be permitted to be used to isolate one branch or component for the purposes of 5.1.3.5.11.3, 5.1.3.5.11.4, 5.1.3.5.11.5, 5.1.3.5.11.6.Committee Statement: Revised wording explains the flow.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-204 Log #296 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.3.5.11.10 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: David D. Eastman, Metro Detroit Plumbing Industry Training Center / Rep. American Society of Sanitary EngineeringRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.3.5.11.10 If the relief valve required in 5.1.3.5.3.2(5) and 5.1.3.5.6(3) can be isolated from the system by the valve arrangement used to comply with 5.1.3.5.11.6, then redundant relief valves shall be installed in the parallel sequence.Substantiation: Section 5.1.3.5.6(3) refers to the relief valve on the medical air receiver. In order to isolate that relief valve, one would have to isolate the receiver. If the receiver is isolated from the source, then a) it doesnʼt need a relief valve, and b) the receiver doesnʼt have a parallel sequence.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: Relief valves should not be cut-off for safety reasons.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: WAGNER: 5.1.3.5.11.10 deals with the parallel arrangement of dryers, filter, and regulators. If the isolating valves for these devices will isolate the relief valve required by 5.1.3.5.3.2(5), then a relief valve must be provided in each parallel arrangement. 5.1.3.5.6(3) deals with the relief valves on the air receiver, which are not part of the dryer-filter-regulator arrangement.

99-40

Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-205 Log #416 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.3.5.12.3 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Fritz Koppenberger, Environmental Testing Services Inc.Recommendation: Add text to read as follows: (6) Automatic restart function after power interruptionSubstantiation: A medical air compressor system should not have to be manually restarted when there is a temporary power loss. There are many areas of concern when a hospital loses power, and medical gas systems should not be one of them. There are compressor systems available that will not restart themselves when power loss occurs. These systems are advertised as economical for facilities where the air usage is high. A facility that needs large volumes of air is exactly the type that should not have to be manually restart the air compressor after a disaster. There is no other medical gas/vacuum source I am aware of that will not start back up after power loss except for these particular types of air compressors. These units should not be available to healthcare facilities without an automatic restart feature. Designers of new compressor systems should have clearly defined parameters within this document to follow regarding minimum safety features.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-206 Log #169 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.3.5.13.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Craig B. Williams, Hill-Rom Inc.Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: The compressor air intake shall be located outdoors above the roof level, at a minimum distance of 3050 mm (10 ft) from any door, window, exhaust, other intake or opening in the building, a minimum distance of 6000 mm (20 ft) above the ground, turn down and screened.Substantiation: The requirements stated in the pre-2002 editions of NFPA 99, requiring the intake piping to be turned down and screen provided an easy unmistakable statement for installers to use when placing the intake for medical compressed air systems. Reinstating this statement will prevent installers from incorrectly installing the medical air intake piping.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Action on 99-210 (Log #324).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-207 Log #340 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.3.5.13.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Frank Rudilosso, Medigas Life SafetyRecommendation: Add text to read as follows: Compressor intake shall take air a minimum of 36 in. above the roof.Substantiation: Many intakes have been installed with the piping turned down and screening in close proximity to the roof. Heavy rain and snow accumulations may affect compressor function.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: Putting in an arbitrary number can not cover all circumstances. Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-208 Log #40 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.3.5.13.4 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Mark Allen, Beacon Medical ProductsRecommendation: Change reference to 5.1.10.2.Substantiation: Entire section applies, not just the materials specification.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGH

Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-209 Log #429 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.3.5.13.4 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Tom Evans, Medical Gas Management, Inc.Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: “Compressor intake piping shall be hard-drawn seamless copper, either ASTM B-819 Medical gas tube, ASTM B-88 Water tube (Type K, L, or M), or ASTM B-280 ACR tube that will not add contaminates in the form of particulate matter, odor or other gases.”Substantiation: The reference to vacuum piping under 5.1.10.2.1 is misleading and confusing allowing misinterpretation of the standard. Installers may confuse the reference to vacuum materials as allowing the installation procedures for compressor intake piping to be the same as those of vacuum systems. Please note the following field inspection report which includes documented procedures inappropriate to Medical Air intake installation. A. Use of a sawzall to cut existing piping (commonly found to be used to sever vacuum piping). B. Lack of Nitrogen purge. The installer indicated that the NFPA book says he can install the intake piping just like vacuum, referring to 5.1.3.5.13.4. A grave misinterpretation. MEDICAL GAS SYSTEM INSPECTION SUBJECT: Medical Air Intake Piping Inspection Following Piping Relocation. LOCATION: 1. Medical Air Compressor/Boiler Room, Gnd Level 2. Level 3 Roof Top Intake Location On Monday, Nov. 18, 02 a site inspection was conducted on the temporary medical air intake piping and the permanent reconnected medical air 3 in. piping serving Bldg. F. The following was noted 1. The temporary intake piping was connect via masking tape at each pipe joint including the P.O.C. 2. The temporary intake piping was installed in a vertical position without being turned down, screened and without filters. 3. The existing intake piping was cut by the installer using a “sawzall” allowing cuttings inside. 4. The existing intake piping was brazed in place without the use of nitrogen as purge gas allowing internal oxidation within the assembly. 5. The installer indicated that the NFPA book (99C) allowed him to “do the medical air intake just like vacuum.” Referring to NFPA 99C 5.1.3.5.13.4, the difference between materials and procedures was explained to him. 6. Testing of the relocated existing medical air intake revealed quantities of particulate.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: Type M tubing cannot be properly brazed.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-210 Log #324 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.3.5.13.6 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Thomas J. Mraulak, Metropolitan Detroit Plumbing Industry / Rep. American Society of Sanitary EngineeringRecommendation: Add text to read as follows: The end of the intake shall be turned down and screened or otherwise be protected against the entry of vermin, debris, or precipitation by screening, fabricated or composed of a non-corroding material.Substantiation: This statement has been in previous standards. I believe it was inadvertently left out of the 2002 standard and should be put back in the 2005 standard.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-211 Log #81 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.3.5.14.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Keith Ferrari, PraxairRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: “..., air receivers shall be equipped with a water alert indicator that activates a local alarm to warn of a water level buildup in the receiver and a high water level sensor that shuts down the compressor system...”.Substantiation: Under the current standard, if water builds up in the receiver an alarm sounds and the Medical Air Compressor System will completely

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99shutdown. This is a patient safety issue. By incorporating a water alert indicator, the health care facility will have time to inspect and hopefully correct the water problem prior to the system shutting down. At least this will allow the health care facility some time to react to any patients on the Medical Air System and place them on a backup system.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: A preliminary signal would not be effective.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-212 Log #300 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.3.5.14.5 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: David D. Eastman, Metro Detroit Plumbing Industry Training Center / Rep. American Society of Sanitary EngineeringRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.3.5.14.5 When the backup or lag compressor is running, a local alarm shall activate. (see 5.1.9.4.4(1)). This signal shall be manually reset.Substantiation: Addresses possible lack of awareness problem in 5.1.9.1(2).Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-213 Log #254 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.3.5.15 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Daniel N. Miller, Medical Gas Technology Inc.Recommendation: Add text to read as follows: Dew point and carbon monoxide monitors shall activate the individual monitorʼs signal at all master alarm panels if the monitor loses power.Substantiation: Several dewpoint and carbon monoxide monitorʼs dry contacts do not open when power is lost. This can lead to the loss of these monitors for an extended period of time, without notice at the master alarms, and results in a compromise of medical air quality.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-214 Log #68 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.3.6.1.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Mark Allen, Beacon Medical ProductsRecommendation: Add new (6) to read as follows: “Except as defined in (1) through (5), materials and devices used between the medical vacuum exhaust and the medical vacuum source shall be permitted to be of any design or construction appropriate for the service as determined by the manufacturer.”Substantiation: In extending requirements from other sections of the standard into the vacuum system, persons have attempted to impose inappropriate components within pump packages. In doing so they force substitution of components selected by the original designer and create a potential hazard through the installation of inappropriate components.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHComment on Affirmative: WAGNER: “...and the medical vacuum source shutoff valve shall be...”Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-215 Log #331 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.3.6.1.2(5) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Craig B. Williams, Hill-Rom Inc.Recommendation: Revise to read: Piping between the vacuum pump and the source shutoff shall be of materials capable of providing flows and pressures specified by the manufacturer of the vacuum source.Substantiation: The requirements of piping to be the same within the vacuum source equipment as it is in the medical vacuum distribution system limits the technology that could be used by manufacturers to improve the source

equipment performance, size, weight and design. This proposal will allow the manufacturer to use other types of piping other than copper K, L, or M or stainless.Committee Meeting Action: Reject This is covered in an errata issued in April 2003 which states: The Committee on Health Care Facilities notes the following errors in the 2002 edition of NFPA 99, Standard for Health Care Facilities. 1) Revise 5.1.3.6.1.2(5) to read: “Piping between the vacuum pump(s), discharge(s), receiver(s), and the vacuum source shutoff valve shall be in accordance with 5.1.10.2 except that stainless, galvanized or black steel pipe shall be permitted to be used.” 2) Revise 5.1.12.3.8(e) to read: “...dew point shall not exceed 500 ppm (-12°C (10°F)) at 50 psig.” 3) Revise 5.1.12.1.12.2(2) to read: “(2) Medical Air and instrument air sources shall be tested to 5.1.12.3.14.3.” 4) Add a new 5.1.5.16 to read: “WAGD networks shall provide a WAGD inlet at each anesthetizing location.” 5) Revise references in the following paragraphs as follows: 13.3.5.1.(2)(1) should read “13.3.5.1(1) a and b apply.” (3) (a) should read “13.3.5.1(1) a and b and 13.3.5.1(2) b apply.” 14.3.5.1(2) (1) should read “14.3.5.1(1) a and b and 14.3.5.1(2) (b) apply.” (3) (a) should read “14.3.5.1(1) a and b and 14.3.5.1(2) apply.” 17.3.5.1(2) (a) should read “17.3.5.1(1) a and b apply.” (3) (a) should read “17.3.5.1(1) a and b and 17.3.5.1(2) (b) apply.” 18.3.5.1 (2) (a) should read “18.3.5.1(1) a and b apply.” (3) (a) should read “18.3.1.1(1) a and b and 18.3.5.1 (2)(b) apply.” 6) In 17.3.4.1.3 change the reference from “17.3.4.1.3” to “17.3.4.12” 7) In 4.4.3.2.1 change the reference of extracted material from “110: 5.12.5” to “110: 7.12.5” 8) In 4.4.4.1.1.1 and 4.4.4.1.1.2(A) change the reference from “Chapter 6” to “Chapter 8” 9) In 10.2.13.3.2.1 change “10 µA” to “10 ma”Committee Statement: The committee incorporated errata 99-02-01.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-216 Log #307 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.3.6.2.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: David D. Eastman, Metro Detroit Plumbing Industry Training Center / Rep. American Society of Sanitary EngineeringRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.3.6.2.1 Vacuum pumps shall be permitted to be constructed of ferrous and/or non-ferrous materials deemed suitable by the manufacturer.Substantiation: Current wording is places no limitations on the material that can be used, but also assigns no responsibility for choice of material. Revising the wording places the responsibility for material selection solely on the manufacturer.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.3.6.2.1 Vacuum pumps shall be permitted to be constructed of ferrous and/or non-ferrous materials materials deemed suitable by the manufacturer.Committee Statement: Editorial.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-217 Log #309 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.3.6.2.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: David D. Eastman, Metro Detroit Plumbing Industry Training Center / Rep. American Society of Sanitary EngineeringRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.3.6.2.1 Vacuum pumps shall be permitted to be made constructed of ferrous and/or nonferrous materials deemed suitable by the manufacturer.Substantiation: Current wording is places no limitations on the material that can be used, but also assigns no responsibility for choice of material. Revising the wording places the responsibility for material selection solely on the manufacturer.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99________________________________________________________________99-218 Log #114 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.3.6.5.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: David B. Mohile, Medical Engineering Services, Inc.Recommendation: Change wording as follows: “The medical-surgical vacuum receiver(s) shall be serviceable without shutting down the medical-surgical vacuum system by either any of the following methods: (1) By providing an isolation valve where the receiver is teeʼd into the main line (2) By piping the receiver at the end of a valved isolation line (3) By providing a three valve bypass”Substantiation: The previous wording precluded the use of a three valve bypass as one method of isolation. This is an attempt to provide another method of isolation which is used by many facilities and manufacturers.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-219 Log #308 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle in Part( 5.1.3.6.5.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: David D. Eastman, Metro Detroit Plumbing Industry Training Center / Rep. American Society of Sanitary EngineeringRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.3.6.5.2 The medical surgical vacuum receiver(s) shall be serviceable without shutting down the medical surgical vacuum system by either of the following methods. 1. By provided an isolation valve where the receiver is teeʼd into the main line. 2. By piping the receiver at the end of a valved isolation line. by installing a three-valve bypass around the receiver.Substantiation: As currently written, options (1) and (2) are different descriptions of the same piping configuration. A three-valve bypass option is not mentioned in the text, although it would serve the same purpose, and a three-valve bypass option is illustrated in the annex.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle in Part Do not accept the deletion. See Committee Action on 99-218 (Log #114).Committee Statement: See Committee Action on 99-218 (Log #114).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-220 Log #348 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.3.6.5.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Curtis Mezzie, National ITC CorporationRecommendation: Add text to read as follows: (3) By piping the receiver with a three-valve bypass arrangement.Substantiation: The three-valve bypass piping arrangement is used at the medical air receiver and this arrangement is also shown on page 75 of the 99C as an option for isolating the vacuum receiver. This arrangement meets the requirement of isolating the receiver without interrupting the supply system.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Action on 99-113 (Log #114).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-221 Log #CP317 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.3.6.6.3(6), 5.1.3.5.12.3.(6), 5.1.3.7.4.3(6) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Piping SystemsRecommendation: Vacuum Add to 5.1.3.6.6.3(6): “Automatic restart function such that pump(s) will restart after power interruption without manual intervention.” Medical Air Add to 5.1.3.5.12.3(6): “Automatic restart function such that compressor(s) will restart after power interruption without manual intervention.” WAGD Add to 5.1.3.7.4.3(6): “Automatic restart function such that produces(s) will restart after power interruption without manual intervention.”

Substantiation: Automatic restart of the compressor and vacuum pumps are necessary to maintain the continuity of operations.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-222 Log #335 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.3.6.7.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Frank Rudilosso, Medigas Life SafetyRecommendation: Add text in (3) and renumber 4 and 5. End of exhaust shall be a minimum of 36 in. above the roof.Substantiation: Some exhausts have been installed with the piping turned down and screening in close proximity to the roof. Snow accumulations may affect pump function as well as heavy rains.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: Putting in an arbitrary number can not cover all circumstances. Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-223 Log #82 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.3.6.7.2(5) (New) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Keith Ferrari, PraxairRecommendation: Add new text to read as follows: (5) At least 25 ft from a place of public assembly.Substantiation: Vacuum discharge exhaust is considered to be contaminated and thus is a patient safety risk. The location of the exhaust 25 ft away and included items 5.1.3.6.7.2(1) through (4) will allow the exhaust fumes to dissipate in the air before coming into contact with people.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: Public assembly is not well defined as there are multiple definitions.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-224 Log #290 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.3.6.8 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: David D. Eastman, Metro Detroit Plumbing Industry Training Center / Rep. American Society of Sanitary EngineeringRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.3.6.8 Operating Alarms. Medical surgical vacuum systems shall activated a local alarm when the backup or lag pump is running per 5.1.9.4. This signal shall be manually reset.Substantiation: Addresses possible lack of awareness problem in 5.1.9.1(2).Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-225 Log #70 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.3.7 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Mark Allen, Beacon Medical ProductsRecommendation: Add text to read as follows: 5.1.3..7.1.2 If WAGD is produced by the medical/surgical vacuum source, the following shall apply: (1) The medical/surgical vacuum source shall comply with 5.1.3.6. (2) Flammable anesthetics or other flammable vapors shall be diluted below the lower flammable limit prior to disposal into the Medical/Surgical Vacuum system or the vacuum pumps shall comply with 5.1.3.7.2.1(2). (3) The medical/surgical vacuum source shall be sized to accommodate the additional volume. 5.1.3.7.1.3 If WAGD is produced by a dedicated WAGD producer, the following shall apply: (1) The WAGD source shall be located in accordance with 5.1.3.3. (2) The WAGD source shall be indoors in a dedicated mechanical equipment are with any required utilities.

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99 (3) The WAGD source shall be in a room constructed per 5.1.3.3.2. (4) The WAGD source shall be ventilated per 5.1.3.3.3.2. (5) For air-cooled equipment, the WAGD source shall be located to maintain the ambient temperature range as recommended by the manufacturer. (6) The WAGD producers shall comply with 5.1.3.7.2. 5.1.3.7.2 WAGD Producers 5.1.3.7.2.1 Vacuum pumps used for WAGD service shall be as follows: (1) Compliant with 5.1.3.6.2. (2) Designed of materials and using lubricants and sealants (where) that are inert in the presence of oxygen, nitrous oxide and halogenated anesthetics. 5.1.3.7.2.2 Vacuum producers (e.g. fans or blowers) designed for operation at vacuums below 130 mm (5 in.) HgV shall be as follows: (1) Permitted to be made of any materials determined by the manufacturer as suitable for the service. (2) Provided with anti-vibration mountings as required by equipment dynamics or location and in accordance with the manufacturerʼs recommendation. (3) Connected with their intake and outlet piping through flexible connections. (4) Used only for WAGD service and not employed for other services. (5) Interconnected via piping, ductwork, etc. made of materials determined by the manufacturer as suitable to the service.Substantiation: 1. Organization is improved. 2. The evidence is connecting vacuum pumps in WAGD service with fires in these pumps remains sketchy, but the attached photograph is of a pump which was engaged in WAGD/Medical vacuum service and clearly has suffered a fire out of proportion to what might be expected in the absence of elevated oxygen. Fire in WAGD applications is clearly an obvious risk which can be entirely eliminated by a designer who takes appropriate care in producer selection and design. This rewriting increases the emphasis on this concern. 3. There is occasional interest in mixing WAGD and laser plume evacuation into the same system. Multiple uses of this type are potentially hazardous, particularly as the two applications have very different technical requirements, limitations on use and occupational risks to the maintenance workers.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-226 Log #146 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.3.7 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Rickey Rutherford, Carolina Healthcare SystemsRecommendation: Add new text to read as follows: If WAGD is joined to vacuum piping, it shall be connected a minimum distance of 5 ft from vacuum outlet.Substantiation: At times the vacuum canister is bypassed in ORʼs preventing suction not only from vacuum outlet but WAGD outlet as well. The fluid hardens in hose, outlet, and into piping system past the tee where WAGD is connected. I have not observed over a distance of 1 ft past outlet plugged.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptCommittee Statement: Add this as new section 5.1.5.14 and renumber existing sections.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHComment on Affirmative: WAGNER: “...from a vacuum outlet inlet.”Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-227 Log #147 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.3.7 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Rickey Rutherford, Carolina Healthcare SystemsRecommendation: List mandatory areas where WAGD outlets must be installed. (CT scans, Cath Lab, Angio...etc.)Substantiation: This would have engineers and architects include on prints (maybe).Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle This is covered in an errata issued in April 2003 which states: The Committee on Health Care Facilities notes the following errors in the 2002 edition of NFPA 99, Standard for Health Care Facilities. 1) Revise 5.1.3.6.1.2(5) to read: “Piping between the vacuum pump(s), discharge(s), receiver(s), and the vacuum source shutoff valve shall be in accordance with 5.1.10.2 except that stainless, galvanized or black steel pipe shall be permitted to be used.” 2) Revise 5.1.12.3.8(e) to read: “...dew point shall not exceed 500 ppm (-12°C (10°F)) at 50 psig.”

3) Revise 5.1.12.1.12.2(2) to read: “(2) Medical Air and instrument air sources shall be tested to 5.1.12.3.14.3.” 4) Add a new 5.1.5.16 to read: “WAGD networks shall provide a WAGD inlet at each anesthetizing location.” 5) Revise references in the following paragraphs as follows: 13.3.5.1.(2)(1) should read “13.3.5.1(1) a and b apply.” (3) (a) should read “13.3.5.1(1) a and b and 13.3.5.1(2) b apply.” 14.3.5.1(2) (1) should read “14.3.5.1(1) a and b and 14.3.5.1(2) (b) apply.” (3) (a) should read “14.3.5.1(1) a and b and 14.3.5.1(2) apply.” 17.3.5.1(2) (a) should read “17.3.5.1(1) a and b apply.” (3) (a) should read “17.3.5.1(1) a and b and 17.3.5.1(2) (b) apply.” 18.3.5.1 (2) (a) should read “18.3.5.1(1) a and b apply.” (3) (a) should read “18.3.1.1(1) a and b and 18.3.5.1 (2)(b) apply.” 6) In 17.3.4.1.3 change the reference from “17.3.4.1.3” to “17.3.4.12” 7) In 4.4.3.2.1 change the reference of extracted material from “110: 5.12.5” to “110: 7.12.5” 8) In 4.4.4.1.1.1 and 4.4.4.1.1.2(A) change the reference from “Chapter 6” to “Chapter 8” 9) In 10.2.13.3.2.1 change “10 µA” to “10 ma”Committee Statement: The committee incorporated errata 99-02-01.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-228 Log #242 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.3.7 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Mark Allen, Beacon Medical ProductsRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.3.7.1.3 If WAGD is produced by a dedicated WAGD producer with a total power greater than 1 horsepower in total (both producers), the following shall apply: (1) The WAGD source shall be located in accordance with 5.1.3.3. (2) The WAGD source shall be indoors in a dedicated mechanical equipment area with any required utilities. (3) The WAGD source shall be in a room constructed per 5.1.3.3.2. (4) The WAGD source shall be ventilated per 5.1.3.3.3.2. (5) For air-cooled equipment, the WAGD source shall be located to maintain the ambient temperature range as recommended by the manufacturer. 5.1.3.7.1.4 If WAGD is produced by a dedicated WAGD producer with a total power less than 1 horsepower in total (both producers), the following shall be permitted to apply: (1) The WAGD source shall be permitted to be located near the inlet(s) served. (2) For air-cooled equipment, the WAGD source shall be located to maintain the ambient temperature range as recommended by the manufacturer.Substantiation: New WAGD interfaces now being installed on anesthesia machines are requiring higher flows and lower pressures, which are most effectively produced by smaller machines (primarily blowers). These blowers are most effective when located near the inlets where the length of piping can be minimized. It is undesirable to locate large machines in spaces not adequately prepared for them (i.e., dedicated mechanical spaces) but smaller machines can be located without any more hazard than is present in a typical O.R. The 1 Hp. limit is chosen to minimize any hazard from one of these machines located in a ceiling space or closet while allowing a large enough machine to be effective.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-229 Log #188 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.3.7.1.6(2) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Don Holden, Holden Hospital SupplyRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: The venturi shall be driven using water, inert gas instrument air or other dedicated air source.Substantiation: Water can also be used to drive a venturi.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99________________________________________________________________99-230 Log #332 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.3.8 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Craig B. Williams, Hill-Rom Inc.Recommendation: Delete entire section 5.1.3.8 Instrument air Supply Systems.Substantiation: This type of Central supply system does not have enough peripheral components to support it in its entirety. There are no suitable gas specific outlets, which can be used for this type of system and using outlets for medical air or nitrogen is not acceptable.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: Instrument air is needed and should not be deleted.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-231 Log #338 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.3.8.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Frank Rudilosso, Medigas Life SafetyRecommendation: Add text to read as follows: Instrument air (not designated for use as a replacement for nitrogen) shall be permitted to be minimum 100 psi.Substantiation: Many facilities do not use nitrogen but would like to use an instrument air system to operate booms or pendants or blow out endoscopy equipment. A 100 psi minimum will allow smaller and more cost effective equipment to be able to be used.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: The committee feels that 160 psig is a more appropriate pressure to operate at.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-232 Log #298 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.3.8.3.3 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: David D. Eastman, Metro Detroit Plumbing Industry Training Center / Rep. American Society of Sanitary EngineeringRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.3.8.3.3 Instrument air sources shall be permitted to include at least two compressors or one compressor and a standby header complying with 5.1.3.8.4 5.1.3.4.8.Substantiation: Section 5.1.3.8.4 refers to the rules for Instrument Air compressors; 5.1.3.4.8 refers to the requirements for headers. Apparently the numbers were transposed.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: ERICKSON: See my Explanation of Negative on Proposal 99-31(Log #353).Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-233 Log #295 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.3.8.5.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: David D. Eastman, Metro Detroit Plumbing Industry Training Center / Rep. American Society of Sanitary EngineeringRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.3.8.5.1 Where instrument air systems are provided with a standby header, the header shall meet the following requirements: 3) enter the system upstream of the final line regulators filters.Substantiation: The cylinders in the instrument air standby header are required to have medical air connections; connecting the header upstream of the filters would at least assure that the standby air is filtered to instrument air standards.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-234 Log #318 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.3.8.7.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: David D. Eastman, Metro Detroit Plumbing Industry Training Center / Rep. American Society of Sanitary EngineeringRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.3.8.7.1 Instrument air sources shall be filtered with activated carbon filters that meet the following requirements. 2) Be sized for 100 percent of the system peak calculated demand at design conditions. 3) Be permitted to be constructed of ferrous and/or non-ferrous materials deemed suitable by the manufacturer.Substantiation: Current wording is places no limitations on the material that can be used, but also assigns no responsibility for choice of material. Revising the wording places the responsibility for material selection solely on the manufacturer.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-235 Log #319 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.3.8.7.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: David D. Eastman, Metro Detroit Plumbing Industry Training Center / Rep. American Society of Sanitary EngineeringRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.3.8.7.2 Final line filters shall meet the following requirements: 4) Be equipped with a continuous visual indicator showing the status of the filter element life. 5) Be permitted to be constructed of ferrous and/or non-ferrous materials deemed suitable by the manufacturer.Substantiation: Current wording is places no limitations on the material that can be used, but also assigns no responsibility for choice of material. Revising the wording places the responsibility for material selection solely on the manufacturer.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-236 Log #288 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.3.8.10.1(1) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: David D. Eastman, Metro Detroit Plumbing Industry Training Center / Rep. American Society of Sanitary EngineeringRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.3.8.10.1(1) A local alarm that activates when or just before the backup compressor if provided activates, indicating that the lag compressor is in operation. This signal shall be manually reset.Substantiation: Addresses possible lack of awareness problem in 5.1.9.1(2).Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-237 Log #39 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.3.8.11 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Mark Allen, Beacon Medical ProductsRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.3.8.11 Electrical Power and Control 5.1.3.8.11.1 When multiple compressors are used, additional compressor(s) shall automatically activate when the compressor(s) in operation is incapable of maintaining the required pressure. 5.1.3.8.11.2 When multiple compressors are used, automatic or manual alternation of compressors shall allow division of operating time. If automatic alternation of compressors is not provided the facility staff shall arrange a schedule for manual alternation. 5.1.3.8.11.3 Each compressor motor shall be provided with electrical components including, but not limited to, the following: (1) A dedicated disconnect switch installed in the electrical circuit ahead of each motor starter. (2) Motor starting device. (3) Overload protection.

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99 (4) Where compressor systems having two or more compressors employ a control transformer or other voltage control power device, at least two such devices shall be installed. (5) Control circuits arranged in such a manner that the shutdown of one compressor does not interrupt the operation of another compressor. (6) Automatic restart function such that compresssor(s) will restart after power interruption without manual intervention. 5.1.3.8.11.4 Electrical installation and wiring shall conform to the requirements of NFPA 70, National Electrical Code. 5.1.3.8.11.5 Emergency electrical service for the compressors shall conform to the requirements of the essential electrical system as described in Chapter 4 of this document.Substantiation: This section for electrical requirements is missing from the Instrument Air section.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-238 Log #227 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.4.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Robert M. Sutter, BOC GasesRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: shutoff valves shall be provided to isolate sections or portions of the piping piped distribution-system for maintenance, repair, or planned future expansion need, and to facilitate periodic testing.Substantiation: Changing the wording from piping system to piped distribution system uses phrasing that is already shown in the definition section of the document.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-239 Log #228 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.4.4 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Robert M. Sutter, BOC GasesRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: A shutoff valve shall be placed at the immediate connection of each source system to the distribution piping piped distribution system to permit the entire source including all accessory devices (such as air dryers, final line regulators, etc.), to be isolated from the facility.Substantiation: Changing the wording from distribution piping to piped distribution system uses phrasing that is already shown in the definition section of the document.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-240 Log #83 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.4.5 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Keith Ferrari, PraxairRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: “...inside the building being served when the source shutoff valve is not accessible from within the building being served.”Substantiation: Freestanding multi-building complexes require a main valve for each building being served. The modification for clarification of valve placement.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: This could cause a loss of oxygen if the buildings are connected in series and one valve is closed.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-241 Log #38 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.4.5.4 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Mark Allen, Beacon Medical ProductsRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.4.5 Main Line Valve. A shutoff valve shall be provided in the main supply line inside of the building except where one or more of the following conditions exist: when the source shutoff valve is not accessible from within the building. (1) The source and source valve are located inside the building served. (2) the source system is physically mounted to the wall of the building served and the pipeline enters the building in the immediate vicinity of the source valve. 5.1.4.5.1 The main line valve shall be located to permit access by authorized personnel only (i.e., by locating above a ceiling or behind a locked access door). 5.1.4.5.2 The main line valve shall be located on the facility side of the source valve and outside of the source room, enclosure, or where the main line first enters the building. 5.1.4.5.3 The main line valve shall be labeled in accordance with 5.1.11.2. 5.1.4.5.4 A main line valve shall not be required where the source shutoff valve is accessible from within the building. Annex 5.1.4.5 The presence of a main line shutoff valve is optional where the source valve can equally or more effectively perform the same function. An example is a case where the source is within the building or just on the outside of the building and therefore there would be no great distance separating the two valves. A source which was physically separate from the building would require both valves to assure the intervening piping could be controlled.Substantiation: The present language is unnecessarily restrictive and precludes an outdoor situation common to manifold installations.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-242 Log #178 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.5 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Tommy Miller, Medical Gas Technology, Inc.Recommendation: Add new text to read as follows: WAGD inlets shall be provided in all locations where nitrous oxide or halogenated anesthetic agents are likely to be administered.Substantiation: This reference was left out of the 2002 Chapter 5 and is shown under Chapter 13.3.5.2. This reference was previously listed in the 1999 Chapter 4 under Section 4.3.3.2.3(a). I believe this was inadvertently left out in the layout of NFPA 99 2002.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Add new text to read as follows: WAGD inlets shall be provided in all locations where nitrous oxide or halogenated anesthetic agents are intended to be administered.Committee Statement: “Likely” was changed to “intended” because “likely” is too broad and includes every possibility. Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-243 Log #253 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.5 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Daniel N. Miller, Medical Gas Technology Inc.Recommendation: Add text to read as follows: Quick-coupler style outlet/inlets shall be strong enough to support gas specific adapters and any accessories connected to adapter without compromising full connection.Substantiation: Quick-coupler outlet/inlets often are not strong enough to support vacuum regulators, flow meters and other accessories without stripping keyed front connections. This incident leads to leaks, low flow and complete loss of connection ability.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: This requirement is not enforceable. The requirement needs to be quantified.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99________________________________________________________________99-244 Log #173 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.5.3 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Richard L. Miller, Medical Gas Technology Inc.Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Each station inlet shall consist of a primary valve (assembly). Manufacturers shall be permitted to exclude the secondary valve.Substantiation: We currently require no secondary valve, some manufacturers still use them. We should not mandate their manufacturing technique.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Action on 99-245 (Log #244).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-245 Log #244 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.5.3 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Mark Allen, Beacon Medical ProductsRecommendation: Change “shall” to “shall be permitted”.Substantiation: 1. This wording is design restrictive. A manufacturer should be permitted to assemble the vacuum terminal in any way desired so long as that terminal can meet the flow requirements of the standard (see 5.1.12.3.10.4). 2. This wording is obsolescent. It has been in the standard since at least 1983, and was originally placed there because when there was no flow requirement stipulated. Now that there is a flow requirement, it serves no further purpose in the present form 3. As worded, this paragraph contradicts 5.1.5.4. 4. The provision of a second check is a feature many facilities would prefer to retain. Without it the inlet makes an appalling noise when the primary valve is removed for cleaning, etc.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Change to read as follows: “Each station inlet shall consist of a primary valve (or assembly).”Committee Statement: Editorial.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-246 Log #140 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.5.4 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Corky Bishop, Medical Gas Management, Inc.Recommendation: Delete the word “or vacuum” in reference to the secondary valve for medical vacuum inlets.Substantiation: 5.1.5.3 states that “Each station inlet shall consist of a primary valve (or assembly) only” Secondary valves tend to reduce the flow at the inlet.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Action on 99-247 (Log #291).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-247 Log #291 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.5.4 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: David D. Eastman, Metro Detroit Plumbing Industry Training Center / Rep. American Society of Sanitary EngineeringRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.5.4 The secondary valve or unit shall close automatically to stop the flow of medical gas or vacuum when the primary valve or unit is removed.Substantiation: There is no secondary check valve on vacuum according to 5.1.5.3.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Change to read as follows: “The secondary valve (or unit) shall close automatically to stop the flow of medical gas (or vacuum, if provided) when the primary valve (or unit) is removed.” Also see Action on 99-245 (Log #244).Committee Statement: The proposed amendment clarifies the requirement which is the same as the submitters recommendation.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1

Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-248 Log #422 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.5.4 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Fritz Koppenberger, Environmental Testing Services Inc.Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.5.4 The secondary valve (or unit) shall close automatically to stop the flow of medical gas or vacuum when the primary valve (or unit) is removed.Substantiation: Editorial. The secondary valve for a vacuum inlet is not required per 5.1.5.3.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Action on 99-247 (Log #291).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-249 Log #246 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.5.11.12 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Mark Allen, Beacon Medical ProductsRecommendation: Insert the words “Factory installed copper inlet tubes on station...”Substantiation: The intended application of this paragraph is the copper inlet tubes brazed to outlet bodies, and it has been incorrectly applied to outlets employing hoses, which cannot be made in this larger size.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptCommittee Statement: This is for sections 5.1.5.11 and 5.1.5.12Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-250 Log #333 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.6.4 )________________________________________________________________TCC Action: The TCC is requesting the TC to revise itʼs committee statement and explain why and how the proposed requirement will reduce the safeguards. The TC should quantify their statement as much as possible.Submitter: Craig B. Williams, Hill-Rom Inc.Recommendation: Revise text to read: Manufactured assemblies employing flexible hoses for gases operating at 50 - 149 psi or for vacuum shall use hose and flexible connectors with a minimum burst gage pressure of 1380 kPa (200 psi). Flexible hoses for gases operating at greater than 149 shall use hose and flexible connectors with a minimum burst gage pressure of 6895 kPa (1000 psi).Substantiation: There is no reason to require hoses with burst gage pressure of 6895 kPa (1000 psi) when other components within the same pipeline, such as outlets, are rated with much less pressure limitations.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: The recommendation will reduce the safeguards of the hose burst pressure.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-251 Log #245 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.6.7 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Mark Allen, Beacon Medical ProductsRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.6.7 Manufactured assemblies employing hoses or flexible connectors, where the station outlet (inlet) attached to the piping is not fully and immediately accessible (i.e., cannot be manipulated without the removal of panels, doors, etc.), shall have station outlets (inlets) with the following additional characteristics: (1) Be DISS connectors. (2) In pressure gases, be permitted to omit the secondary check required in 5.1.5.2. (3) In vacuum and WAGD, be permitted to have no check for minimal restriction to flow. (4) Be provided with a second terminal at which the user connects and disconnects complying with 5.1.5 except 5.1.5.2.Substantiation: The requirement in this paragraph for a check in the vacuum inlets has proven very difficult for manufacturers to meet while maintaining the flows required in 5.1.12.3.10.4. In the case of vacuum removal of the check is far less important than meeting the flow requirement.Committee Meeting Action: Accept

99-47

Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-252 Log #430 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.6.75.1.6.8, and 5.1.5.12 )________________________________________________________________TCC Action: The TCC is requesting the TC to revise its committee statement and explain why the proposed requirement does not offer patient safety.Submitter: Jim Lucas, Tri-Tech Medical CenterRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: “3/8 in. OD nominal tube should be allowed for all gas services, including vacuum and evac for manufactured assemblies.”Substantiation: Manufactured assemblies for vacuum and Evac/WAGD services are required to be made with 1/2 in. OD nominal tubing. The intent being to allow more flow than making the assembly with 3/8 in. OD nominal tubing. Per CGA standards, the maximum thru hole for a vacuum DISS nipple is 0.245 in. As the nipple thru hole is clearly the restriction, requiring 1/2 tube instead of 3/8 tube (0.305 in. ID) makes no sense.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: The proposed change does not offer patient safety.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Abstain: 2 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47). ERICKSON: The TC failed to convince me that the 3/8 in. OD nominal tube could not be used on these systems. If this is not a safe practice then the TC needs to explain why it is not permissible.

________________________________________________________________99-253 Log #37 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.8.2.3 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Mark Allen, Beacon Medical ProductsRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.8.2.3 All pressure-sensing devices and mainline pressure gages downstream of the source valves shall be provided with a gas-specific demand check fitting to facilitate service testing or replacement. Pressure indicators as required under 5.1.4.8.3 do not require demand checks.Substantiation: To clarify that the gauges in zone valves are not subject to this requirement.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Action on 99-254 (Log#325).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-254 Log #325 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.8.2.5 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Thomas J. Mraulak, Metropolitan Detroit Plumbing Industry / Rep. American Society of Sanitary EngineeringRecommendation: Add text to read as follows: Gas-specific demand check fittings shall not be required on zone valve pressure indicators.Substantiation: If demand checks are installed on zone valve gauges, the gauge would be sticking out of the cabinet and into the hallway, and the cover will not go on the cabinet. If the gauge needs to be changed (this could be done in a relatively short time) only a few outlets/inlets would be affected by shutting off the zone valve.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise 5.1.8.2.3 as follows: All pressure sensing devices and main line pressure gauges downstream of the source valve: 1) Shall be provided with a gas specific demand check fitting to facilitate service, testing or replacement 2) Gas-specific demand check fittings shall not be required on zone valve pressure indicatorsCommittee Statement: The section was reworded to meet the Manual of Style. Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-255 Log #71 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.9.1(9) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Mark Allen, Beacon Medical ProductsRecommendation: Change wording to read: (9) Power for Master and Area alarms from the life safety branch of the emergency electrical system as described in Chapter 4, Electrical Systems. (10) Power for local alarms, Dew point and Carbon monoxide sensors shall be permitted to be from the same essential electrical branch as is used to power the air compressor system. (renumber)Substantiation: 1. Powering the system and itʼs alarm from separate branches results in the absurdity of alarms operating when there is no air being supplied, or air being supplied but no monitors. The proposal corrects this.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-256 Log #36 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.9.2.1(1) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Mark Allen, Beacon Medical ProductsRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: (1) One master alarm panel shall be located in the office or work space of the on site individual responsible for the maintenance of the medical gas and vacuum piping systems.Substantiation: To recognize that third parties may actually perform the maintenance. Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-257 Log #CP315 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.9.2.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Piping SystemsRecommendation: Modify 5.1.9.2.2 as follows: 5.1.9.2.2 A centralized computer shall not be allowed to be substituted for any of of the panels required in 5.1.9.2.1(1). but shall be permitted to be used to supplement the medical gas and vacuum alarm system.Substantiation: Centralized computer systems are used effectively for many functions such as fire, security, building management. This should also apply to monitoring medical gas and vacuum systems.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-258 Log #35 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.9.2.3 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Mark Allen, Beacon Medical ProductsRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.9.2.3 The master alarm panels required in 5.1.9.2.1 shall connect directly to the alarm initiating devices that they monitor. (A) Master alarm signals shall not be relayed from one master alarm panel to another. (B) Where multi-pole alarm relays are used to isolate the alarm initiating signals to master alarm panels, the control power source for the relays shall be independent of any of the master alarm panels. (C) Multiple master alarms shall be permitted to monitor a single initiating device.Substantiation: To explicitly recognize that two master alarms are permitted to be activated by a single initiating switch or relay as is the typical practice today.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99________________________________________________________________99-259 Log #100 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.9.2.4(4) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Corky Bishop, Medical Gas Management, Inc.Recommendation: Insert before subparagraph (4) about reserve liquid level low: “An alarm indication for cylinder reserve pressure low when the content of a cylinder reserve header is reduced below one average dayʼs supply.”Substantiation: See the requirement for manifolds for cryogenic liquid cylinders in 5.1.3.4.10.9(3) and for bulk cryogenic liquid systems in 5.1.3.4.11.4(2).Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHComment on Affirmative: WAGNER: 99-260 (Log #250) also revised the same section as 99-259 (Log #100). Which version applies?Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-260 Log #250 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.9.2.4(4) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Tommy Miller, Medical Gas Technology, Inc.Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: For bulk cryogenic liquid systems, an alarm when or at a predetermined set point before the resrve supply contents fall to one dayʼs average supply, indicating reserve low.Substantiation: In Section 5.1.3.4.11.6(3) it is stipulated that both a local and master alarm signal should be in place when the reserve supply contents fall to one dayʼs average supply, indicating reserve low. This section does not state that this is applicable only when the reserve is cryogenic; however, under Section 5.1.9.2.4 the only requirement for a reserve low signal on a cryogenic system is when the reserve is liquid.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHComment on Affirmative: WAGNER: 99-259 (Log #100) also revised the same section as 99-260 (Log #250). Which version apples?Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-261 Log #256 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.9.2.4(4) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Richard L. Miller, Medical Gas Technology Inc.Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: For bulk cryogenic liquid systems, an alarm when or at a predetermined set point before the reserve supply contents fall to one dayʼs average supply, indicating reserve low.Substantiation: In Section 5.1.3.4.11.6(3) it is stipulated that both a local and master alarm signal should be in place when the reserve supply contents fall to one dayʼs average supply, indicating reserve low. This section does not state that this is applicable only when the reserve is cryogenic; however, under section 5.1.9.2.4 the only requirement for a reserve low signal on a cryogenic system is when the reserve is liquid.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Action on Proposal 99-260 (Log #250).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-262 Log #110 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.9.2.4(9) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: David B. Mohile, Medical Engineering Services, Inc.Recommendation: Change the dewpoint alarm from the current +4°C (+39°F) PDP down to +3°C (+35°F) PDP.Substantiation: When the Committee changed the operating dewpoint from +35°F PDP to +32°F PDP for the 2002 edition it did not change the alarm set point down.Committee Meeting Action: Accept 35° F is 2° C. Change to correct error.Committee Statement: Editorial correction.Number Eligible to Vote: 23

Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-263 Log #34 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.9.2.5 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Mark Allen, Beacon Medical ProductsRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.9.2.5 The alarm indications required in 5.1.9.2.4(6) and (7) shall originate from sensors installed in the main lines immediately downstream (on the facility side) of the source valves. Where it is necessary to install a main line valve in addition to a source valve (see 5.1.4.5 and 5.1.4.5.4), the sensors shall be located downstream (on the facility side) of the main valve.Substantiation: The use of the term downstream is potentially confusing in light of the applicability of this paragraph to vacuum.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.9.2.5 The alarm indications required in 5.1.9.2.4(6) and (7) shall originate from sensors installed in the main lines immediately downstream (on the patient or use side) of the source valves. Where it is necessary to install a main line valve in addition to a source valve (see 5.1.4.5 and 5.1.4.5.4), the sensors shall be located downstream (on the patient or use side) of the main valve.Committee Statement: Downstream is used by the industry and it should be kept.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-264 Log #349 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.9.3 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Curtis Mezzie, National ITC CorporationRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Area alarm panels shall be provided to monitor all medical gas, medical/surgical vacuum, an piped WAGD systems supplying anesthetizing locations, and other vital life support and critical areas such as (i.e., post anesthesia recovery, intensive care units, emergency departments etc.) and so forthSubstantiation: The wording “and so forth” is vague and does not give the reader any direction and can be misleading and is open ended.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleChange “i.e.” to “e.g”.Committee Statement:Editorial.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-265 Log #175 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.9.3.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Richard L. Miller, Medical Gas Technology Inc.Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Area alarms shall be located at a nurseʼs station or other location that will provide for responsible surveillance.Substantiation: I dropped the word continuous because it negated responsible, and often made it impossible to locate area alarms.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise text to read as follows: Area alarms shall be located at a nurseʼs station or other similar location that will provide for surveillance.Committee Statement:”Responsible” is not defined and was deleted.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-266 Log #33 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.9.3.4 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Mark Allen, Beacon Medical ProductsRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.9.3.4 Sensors for area alarms shall be located as follows: (1)* Vital life support and critical areas shall have the alarm sensors installed on the inlet/outlet side of any of the individual zone valve box assemblies.

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99Substantiation: Recognize that this paragraph applies to vacuum.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.9.3.4 Sensors for area alarms shall be located as follows: (1)* Vital life support and critical areas shall have the alarm sensors installed on the patient or use side of any of the individual zone valve box assemblies.Committee Statement:This makes it clear as to what is the outlet/inlet side.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-267 Log #177 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.9.3.4(2) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Tommy Miller, Medical Gas Technology, Inc.Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Areas for anesthetizing gas delivery shall have the sensors installed on the source side of any of the individual room zone valve box assemblies or on the outlet side of each of the individual zone valve assemblies.Substantiation: Some state inspectors will not allow hospitals to install an area alarm sensor downstream of the zone valve for an anesthetizing location due to the existing wording (source side). The “or” should be used to allow hospitals to monitor each zone separately if they choose to purchase an alarm for each area.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise text to read as follows: Areas for anesthetizing gas delivery shall have the sensors installed either on the source side of any of the individual room zone valve box assemblies or on the patient or use side of each of the individual zone valve assemblies.Committee Statement:This clarifies that the sensors can be installed on either side of the zone valve assembly.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHComment on Affirmative: WAGNER: The text should indicate that whether the pressure sensors for zone valves are located before or after the zone valves should be as dictated by the health care facility. The location is not an option for the installer.Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-268 Log #32 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.9.4.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Mark Allen, Beacon Medical ProductsRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.9.4.2 The master alarm shall include at least one signal from the source equipment. At least one signal from each local alarm system shall be connected to the master alarm panels to indicate a problem with the source equipment at this location. This master alarm signal shall activate when any of the required local alarm signals for this source equipment activates.Substantiation: The present wording appears to require a master-slave arrangement which has been prohibited elsewhere. This revised wording allows signaling directly from the equipment to the master.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-269 Log #337 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.9.4.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Frank Rudilosso, Medigas Life SafetyRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: At least one signal from each local alarm source system shall be connected to the master alarm panels to indicate that a problem is present with the source equipment at this location.Substantiation: Knowing which system is having a problem upon an alarm will save time and allow for better response to a situation. This is especially true for remote system locations as well as understaffed facilities or off hours alarms. A “medical vacuum system fault” is better than a “source equipment fault”.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle See Committee Action on Proposal 99-268(Log #32).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGH


________________________________________________________________99-270 Log #297 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.9.4.3 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: David D. Eastman, Metro Detroit Plumbing Industry Training Center / Rep. American Society of Sanitary EngineeringRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.9.4.3 If there is more than one medical air compressor system, instrument air compressor system, WAGD system and/or more than one medical surgical vacuum pump system at different locations in the facility, or if the medical air compressors and/or medical surgical vacuum pumps sources are in different locations in the facility, then it shall be necessary for each location to have separate alarms at the master panels.Substantiation: This change would more closely align the master alarm requirements for WAGD and Instrument Air systems with those for medical-surgical vacuum and medical air.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-271 Log #289 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.9.4.4(5) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: David D. Eastman, Metro Detroit Plumbing Industry Training Center / Rep. American Society of Sanitary EngineeringRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.9.4.4(5) When a central dedicated WAGD producer is provided as per 5.1.3.7.1.3, WAGD lag in use. This signal shall be manually reset.Substantiation: Addresses possible lack of awareness problem in 5.1.9.1(2).Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-272 Log #233 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.10 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Michael T. Massey, National ITC CorporationRecommendation: Add new text to read as follows: 5.1.10.5.10 Joints for medical gas and medical surgical vacuum systems shall be permitted to be made using an autogenes auto orbital procedure. The automatic orbital gas tungsten arc fusion welding procedures and the welder performance shall be qualified in accordance with Section IX, Welding and Brazing Qualifications of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.Substantiation: The limited procedures for joining copper piping, especially on major installations. We believe having options in the joining process, for distribution piping in positive pressure medical gas and medical-surgical vacuum systems, that is equal to or surpasses the integrity and cleanliness of the current standards will have a positive effect on the industry. Orbital welding has become the standard method of joining process piping in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries in the United States, primarily because of the consistently smooth inner weld surface produced by this technology. A smooth inner weld surface is an essential requirement for a high-purity piping system in order to prevent the establishment of viable organisms in the system, which would contaminate the product making it unsuitable for use. Another recognized benefit of orbital welding are the increase in productivity during construction, the time it takes to make a joint is significantly less using orbital welding than the current Brazing procedures. Orbital weld heads for fusion tube welding are available for 1/8 in. OD up to 7 in. OD with each head capable of welding a range of tube sizes. The microprocessor-based welding power supply has a very high degree of accuracy so that the weld parameters such as welding currents, travel speed, level times, pulsation rates, etc., can be precisely controlled and repeated from weld-to weld. This accuracy makes it possible to produce a large number of identical welds of excellent quality. It is this repeatability and consistency of the weld results, which has made orbital welding an integral part of high-purity piping system fabrication. Finally, the overall integrity of the joints within the system is far superior to the brazing techniques employed today. Lab tests associated with the qualification of this procedure on a 1 in. Type L sample gave results exceeding 31,000 psi in the Ultimate Stress Test. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Action on Proposal 99-295 (Log #355).

99-50

Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-273 Log #357 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.10 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Michael T. Massey, National ITC CorporationRecommendation: Add text to read as follows: 5.1.10.5.10 Joints for medical gas and medical surgical vacuum systems shall be permitted to be made using an autogenes auto orbital procedure. The automatic orbital gas tungsten arc fusion welding procedures and the welder performance shall be qualified in accordance with Section 1X, Welding and Brazing Qualifications of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.Substantiation: The limited procedures for joining copper piping, especially on major installations. Note: Supporting material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Action on Proposal 99-295(Log #355).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-274 Log #415 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.10.1.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Fritz Koppenberger, Environmental Testing Services Inc.Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.10.1.2 Each length of tube shall be delivered plugged or capped by the manufacturer and kept sealed until prepared for installation. Plugs shall not be used to seal piping.Substantiation: One of the most common problems in medical gas installation is failure of the installer to remove the plug from the piping, and melting it inside the pipe while brazing. This problem creates a strong odor within the piping and usually requires demolition and replacement. If medical gas piping was required to have only a cap, the installer would not be able to make up the piping without removing the cap. Currently, it is quite easy to slide a coupling over a plugged length of medical gas piping.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement:This would change the requirements of an ASTM standards.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-275 Log #101 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.10.1.4 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Corky Bishop, Medical Gas Management, Inc.Recommendation: Revise text as follows: “Tubes shall be hard-drawn seamless copper ASTM B 819 medical gas tube, Type L, except where operating pressures are above a gauge pressure of 1275 kPa (185 psi), Type K shall be used for sizes larger than DN80 (NPS3) (3 1/8 in. O.D.).Substantiation: The current wording would allow for a 220 psi Nitrogen system in 1 in. Type L piping with Dynacon outlets. It has been prohibited to allow Type L piping at this pressure in past editions. Few high-pressure medical gas systems will require piping of 3 in. diameter or larger.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: Type L tubing has adequate safety ratings up to 3 inches.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-276 Log #143 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.10.2.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: David B. Mohile, Medical Engineering Services, Inc.Recommendation: Add new Sections 5.1.10.2 to read as follows: 5.1.10.2.2 Vacuum Tubing Marking

5.1.10.2.2.1 If copper vacuum tubing is installed along with any medical gas tubing, either the vacuum tubing or the medical gas tubing shall, prior to installation, be prominently labeled or otherwise identified to preclude using materials or installation procedures in the medical gas system that are not suitable for oxygen service. 5.1.10.2.2.2 If medical gas tube (ASTM B819) is used for vacuum piping, such special marking shall not be required, provided that the vacuum piping installation meets all other requirements for medical gas piping, including the prohibition of flux on copper-to-copper joints and the use of a nitrogen purge while brazing.Substantiation: In the 1999 edition of the Standard we mandated that the tubing used for vacuum systems (ASTM B88, ASTM B280) be labeled prior to installation if it was not precleaned for medical gas service (ASTM B819). When we combined the vacuum and medical gas systems into one section for the 2002 edition of the Standard this requirement was left out. This will preclude any chance that tubing not cleaned for oxygen service such as ASTM B88 or ASTM B280, which are allowed for vacuum systems, will be accidentally installed in any system other than vacuum or WAGD systems.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Add new Sections 5.1.10.2 to read as follows: 5.1.10.2.2 Vacuum Tubing Marking 5.1.10.2.2.1 If copper vacuum tubing is installed along with any medical gas tubing, the vacuum tubing shall, prior to installation, be prominently labeled or otherwise identified to preclude using materials or installation procedures in the medical gas system that are not suitable for oxygen service. 5.1.10.2.2.2 If medical gas tube (ASTM B819) is used for vacuum piping, such special marking shall not be required, provided that the vacuum piping installation meets all other requirements for medical gas piping, including the prohibition of flux on copper-to-copper joints and the use of a nitrogen purge while brazing.Committee Statement: The concept was left out of the 2002 edition. Deletion of the option to mark the medical gas tubing was felt to clarify the intent.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-277 Log #336 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.10.2.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Frank Rudilosso, Medigas Life SafetyRecommendation: Delete the following text: Vacuum tubes shall be hard-drawn seamless copper, either ASTM B 819 medical gas tube, ASTM B 88 wter tube (Type K, L, or M) or ASTM B 280 ACR tube.Substantiation: Since medical vacuum piping is brazed (no more soldering) piping should be a minimum wall thickness of “L”.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHComment on Affirmative: WAGNER: If Type M copper tube canʼt be braxed, it should be deleted in 5.1.10.2.1. The CDA Copper Tube Handbook does not prohibit brazing Type M copper tube.Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-278 Log #152 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.10.3.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: J. Richard Wagner, The Poole & Kent CorporationRecommendation: Replace MSS SP-73 with ANSI/ASME B16.50 for short-cup copper brazing fittings as follows: 1. Add the following to 2.3.3 ASME Publications: ANSI/ASME B16.50 Wrought Copper and Copper Alloy Braze-Joint Pressure Fittings, 2001. 2. Revise 5.1.10.3.1 as follows: 5.1.10.3.1 Turns, offsets, and other changes in direction in medical gas and vacuum piping shall be made with brazed wrought copper capillary fittings complying with ANSI ASME B16.22, Wrought Copper and Copper Alloy Solder-Joint Pressure Fittings, or brazed fittings complying with MSS SP 73 Brazed Joints for Wrought and Cast Copper Alloy Solder Joint Pressure Fittings ASME B16.50 Wrought Copper and Copper Alloy Braze-Joint Pressure Fittings, or for vacuum only, fittings as permitted in 5.1.10.5.8(4) through 5.1.10.5.8(7). 3. Revise 5.3.10.3.1 as follows: 5.3.10.3.1 Turns, offsets, and other changes in direction in medical gas piping, copper Level 3 vacuum piping, and piping for gas-powered devices shall be made with brazed wrought copper capillary fittings complying with ANSI ASME B16.22, Wrought Copper and Copper Alloy Solder-Joint Pressure

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99Fittings, or brazing fittings complying with MSS SP 73, Brazed Joints for Wrought and Cast Copper Alloy Solder Joint Pressure Fittings ASME B16.50 Wrought Copper and Copper Alloy Braze-Joint Pressure Fittings. 4. Revise A.5.1.10.3.1 as follows: A.5.1.10.3.1. A distinction is made between deep-socket solder-joint fittings (ANSI ASME B16.22) and those having shallow sockets for brazing (MSS SP 73) (ASME B16.50). The use of shallow-socket brazing fittings improves the quality of the brazement without decreasing its strength, particularly larger sizes, which are difficult to heat. See Table A.5.1.10.3.1 for socket depths conforming to MSS SP 73 ASME B16.50. The installer can use MSS SP 73 ASME B16.50 fittings (if available) or have the sockets on ANSI ASME B16.22 fittings cut down to MSS ASME B16.50 depths. Where shallow-socket fittings are used for the medical gas piping, care should be taken to avoid their use in other piping systems where joints could be soldered instead of brazed. 5. Revise the title of Table A.5.1.10.3.1 as follows: Table A.5.1.10.3.1 Socket dDepths for MSS SP 73 ASME B16.50 Brazing Fittings. Substantiation: ANSI/ASME B16.50 is an ANSI accredited standard. MSS SP-73 is not. Note: Supporting material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-279 Log #CP300 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.10.3.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Piping SystemsRecommendation: In Section 5.1.10.3.1, revise to read as follows: “Turns, offsets, and other changes in direction in welded or brazed medical gas and vacuum piping shall be made with wrought copper capillary fittings...”Substantiation: Welded fittings need to be addressed as this technology was added to the standard.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-280 Log #272 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.10.3.1 and 5.3.10.3.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: J. Richard Wagner, The Poole & Kent CorporationRecommendation: Change ANSI B16.22 to ASME B16.22.Substantiation: B16.22 is maintained by ASME, not ANSI.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-281 Log #368 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.10.4(1) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Craig B. Williams, Hill-Rom Inc.Recommendation: Revise to read: Be limited to connections to pressure/vacuum indicators, alarm devices, check-valves, and source equipment.Substantiation: Many large size pipeline check-valves come only with threaded connections. It is easy to screw on copper pipes with extensions to these check-valves and thus eliminate damage that occurs when installer try to braze pipes onto the check-valvesʼs threaded connection.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-282 Log #273 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.10.4(2) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: J. Richard Wagner, The Poole & Kent CorporationRecommendation: Revise 5.1.10.4(2) as follows: (2) Be tapered pipe threads complying with ANSI B1.20.1 ASME B1.20.1 Pipe Threads, General Purpose.

Substantiation: B1.20.1 is managed by ASME, not ANSI.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-283 Log #274 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.10.5 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: J. Richard Wagner, The Poole & Kent CorporationRecommendation: Change 5.1.10.5.8 to 5.1.10.6. Change 5.1.10.5.9 to 5.1.10.7. Change 5.1.10.6 to 5.1.10.8. Change 5.1.10.7 to 5.1.10.9.Substantiation: Section 5.1.10.5 covers brazed joints. 5.1.10.5.8 and 5.1.10.5.9 are not brazed joints.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-284 Log #350 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.10.5 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Curtis Mezzie, National ITC CorporationRecommendation: Add text to read as follows: 5.1.10.5.1.7 Braze joints shall be continuously purged with Nitrogen NF.Substantiation: This will clear up the question of “Do you have to purge a Level 1 medical/surgical vacuum pipeline? When you braze, you purge. The Nitrogen NF is defined in the Section 5.1.10.5.5 Nitrogen Purge.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-285 Log #229 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.10.5.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Robert M. Sutter, BOC GasesRecommendation: Add text to read as follows: Copper to copper joints that can be exposed to cryogenic temperatures shall be brazed using a silver (BAg series) brazing filler metal.Substantiation: Making this addition to this section will allow sections 5.1.10.5.1.1 through 5.1.10.5.7.6 to apply to bulk cryogenic liquid systems.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Proposal 99-110(Log #CP313).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-286 Log #155 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.10.5.2.3 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: David B. Mohile, Medical Engineering Services, Inc.Recommendation: Delete entire paragraph.Substantiation: The purpose of deburring the end of a piece of tubing is to increase the internal diameter back to its original size after cutting. The proposal for adding deburring to the Standard for the 1999 edition was based upon the fact that it was standard practice in many building codes. In point of fact, deburring of tubing has fallen into disfavor and is being removed from many local codes. One of the very real problems that develop from deburring is that very fine copper shavings are created which often go into the tubing. These are then blown around the system and can lodge in the check assemblies of medical gas outlets. These shavings can cause leaks when they get stuck part way through a primary or secondary check. Worse still is when they do not get blown out of the pipeline during purging and wind up lodged in patient care equipment. When you consider that except for nitrogen and instrument air, all medical gas tubing is low pressure (50 psig) there is no need to increase the internal diameter of the tubing. This was not a reported problem prior to the change being made in the Standard for 1999.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: MASSEY: 1. I am not aware of a single “local” building code that addresses reaming or deburring, or any local building code that has removed this section.2. Reaming or deburring is an accepted industry practice in all piping systems. I think it denigrates the installers ̓ability to propoerly install piping systems of all types, not just medical gas pipelines. To allege that installers are so incompetent as to be unable to deburr properly is wrong.Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-287 Log #84 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.10.5.3.5 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Keith Ferrari, PraxairRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: “Abrasive pads shall be...”.Substantiation: The pads that are used in most applications on Medical Gas Systems for the cleaning joints for brazing are clean, non-shedding, souring pads, which are by definition abrasive pads.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Change the text to read: “Clean, non-shedding, abrasive pads shall be used to cleean the exterior surface of the tube ends.”Committee Statement: There is a problem with shedding of the abrasive material and this is to eliminate this problem.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-288 Log #141 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.10.5.3.5 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Corky Bishop, Medical Gas Management, Inc.Recommendation: Delete the prefix “non” concerning the abrasive pads used to clean the exterior surfaces of tube ends.Substantiation: The pads obviously have to be abrasive in order to scratch off the oxidation from the copper. This wording will then match ASSE 6010 10-4.2.1e; Abrasive Pads: Clean, non-shedding scouring pads, sand cloth, emery cloth, and steel wool shall not be used.”Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Change the text to read: “Clean, non-shedding, abrasive pads shall be used to clean the exterior surface of the tube ends.”Committee Statement: There is a problem with shedding of the abrasive material and this is to eliminate this problem.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-289 Log #118 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.10.5.3.13 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Scott Jussel, Medical Air Systems, Inc.Recommendation: Revise text as follows: “Joints shall be brazed within one hour eight hours after the surfaces are cleaned for brazing.”Substantiation: Industry standard is to fit piping for 1/2 day, and then to braze all work by end of work day.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Action on 99-291 (Log #339).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-290 Log #190 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.10.5.3.13 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Don Holden, Holden Hospital SupplyRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Joints shall be brazed the same day the surfaces are cleaned for brazing.Substantiation: One hour before brazing is just not enough time to be reasonable.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle

Committee Statement: See Committee Action on 99-291 (Log #339).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-291 Log #339 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.10.5.3.13 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Frank Rudilosso, Medigas Life SafetyRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Joints shall be brazed within one eight hours after the surfaces are cleaned for brazing.Substantiation: Most medical gas installations are performed by teams of an installer and a helper. Piping is installed and brazed by the end of the shift. The installer brazes and the helper stands fire watch. The one hour equipment is not practical.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-292 Log #116 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.10.5.5 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: David B. Mohile, Medical Engineering Services, Inc.Recommendation: Add new wording as follows: “In order to assure that all ambient air has been removed from the pipeline prior to brazing, an oxygen analyzer shall be used to verify the effectiveness of the purge. The oxygen analyzer shall read below 1 percent oxygen concentration before brazing is to begin.”Substantiation: The use of an oxygen analyzer is accepted practice in several documents including the ANSI/ASSE 6010 [10.4.2(g)], and will assist the installing contractor in assuring that the formation of copper oxide is kept to a minimum. Battery-operated oxygen analyzers with acceptable accuracy can be obtained for less than $150 and would be a one-time purchase similar to a purge regulator with an audible alarm (5.1.10.5.5.2). In order to put the use of this device in the proper order, the above wording should be made 5.1.10..5.5.6, the existing wording in 5.1.10.5.5.6 should be made 5.1.10.5.5.7, and all following numbers changed accordingly. None of the existing wording should be deleted.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-293 Log #234 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.10.5.5 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Michael T. Massey, National ITC CorporationRecommendation: Add new text to read as follows: 5.1.10.5.5.12 When using the autogenes orbital welding process, joints shall be continuously purged, inside and outside, with a mixture of 75 percent Helium and 25 percent Argon. This is to assure a quality joint and to prevent the formation of copper oxide on the inside and outside surfaces of the joint.Substantiation: The autogenes welding process requires a Helium/Argon gas mixture to properly join copper to copper. This proposal is necessary to backup the proposal to add orbital welding as a joining process.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Action on Proposal 99-295 (Log #355).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-294 Log #351 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.10.5.5 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Curtis Mezzie, National ITC CorporationRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.10.5.5.1 When brazing, While being brazed, joints shall be continuously purged with oil-free, dry Nitrogen NF to prevent the formation of copper oxide on the inside surfaces of the joint.

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99Substantiation: This puts an end to the discussion on when do you purge. This revision along with the revision in Section 5.1.10.5 Brazed Joints should make it clear that when you braze, you purge.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-295 Log #355 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.10.5.5 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Michael T. Massey, National ITC CorporationRecommendation: Add text to read as follows: 5.1.10.5.5.12 When using the autogenes orbital welding process, joints shall be continuously purged, inside and outside, with a mixture of 75 percent Helium and 25 percent Argon. This is to assure a quality joint and to prevent the formation of copper oxide on the inside and outside surfaces of the joint.Substantiation: The autogenes welding process requires a Helium/Argon gas mixture to properly join copper to copper. This proposal is necessary to backup the proposal to add orbital welding as a joining process.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Insert new 5.1.10.6 after existing 5.1.10.5.7.6 and renumber the remainder of the section. 5.1.10.6 Welded Joints 5.1.10.6.1 Welded joints for medical gas and medical surgical vacuum systems shall be permitted to be made using a gas tungsten arc welding (GTAW) autogenous orbital procedure. 5.1.10.6.2 The GTAW autogenous orbital procedure and the welder qualification procedure shall be qualified in accordance with ASME Section IX, Welding and Brazing Qualifications of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. 5.1.10.6.3 Welder qualification procedures shall include a “bend test” and a “tensile test” per ASME Section IX on each tube size diameter. 5.1.10.6.4 Each welder shall qualify to a welding procedure specification (WPS) for each tube diameter. 5.1.10.6.5* GTAW autogenous orbial welded joints shall be purged during welding with a commercially available mixture (+- 5%) of 75% Helium and 25% Argon. 5.1.10.6.6 The shield gas shall be as required in section 5.1.10.6.5 5.1.10.6.7 Test coupons shall be welded and inspected, as a minimum at start of work and every 4 hours thereafter, or when the machine is idle for more than 30 minutes, and at the end of the work period. 5.1.10.6.8 Test coupons shall be inspected on the I.D. and O.D. by a qualified quality control inspector. 5.1.10.6.9 Test coupons shall also be welded at change of operator, weld head, welding power supply or gas source. 5.1.10.6.10 All production welds shall be visually inspected on the O.D. by the operator and any obvious weld failures shall be cut out and re-welded. A.5.1.10.6.5 Gas mixtures are commonly used in GTAW autogenous fusion welding. The identification of a gas mixture as “75He 25Ar” is a common industry term to define a commercially available grade from gas suppliers. Should test welding results lead to questions about the mixture percentage or gas quality, another bottle should be substituted and test welds performed.Committee Statement: The new sections addressed test coupons and details regarding the purge gas.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-296 Log #179 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.10.5.5.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Don Holden, Holden Hospital SupplyRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: While being brazed, joints shall be continuously purged with oil-free, dry nitrogen NF, or nitrogen equal to or better than to prevent the formation of copper oxide on the surfaces of the joint.Substantiation: Medical grade nitrogen is the same as dry nitrogen, used for welding. Both have their cylinders pumped with a vacuum before they are filled from the same spicket. The industrial nitrogen costs less than medical. All nitrogen regulators used for purging should have filters to stop flow of particulates. This would be more economical.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: Equal to or better than is not a recognizable standard. Nitrogen NF is different than other grades of nitrogen. Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGH


________________________________________________________________99-297 Log #172 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.10.5.5.3 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Richard L. Miller, Medical Gas Technology Inc.Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: The purge gas flow rate shall not produce undesirable pressure in the piping system.Substantiation: I dropped the word positive pressure because we must develop a positive pressure to establish a purge.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Delete section 5.1.10.5.5.3 and renumber as appropriate.Committee Statement: The requirement is unenforceable.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-298 Log #72 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.10.5.5.10 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Keith Ferrari, PraxairRecommendation: Add a new paragraph: “Prior to the tie-in of new piping to an existing, in-use pipeline, the affected portion of the existing, in-use pipeline that will be tied into the new piping shall be shutdown and the source gas purged out. The tie-in will occur under ambient air conditions inside the pipelines without the use of a nitrogen purge.”Substantiation: One of the main concerns of the NFPA is patient safety. Any interruption or actual loss of gas in an active system that is supplying gas/vacuum to patients would jeopardize patient safety. This new paragraph will allow for a better understanding of 5.1.10.5.5.10 intent. Although common sense would tell you not to cut into an active (live) system, some installers and heath care employees have interpreted incorrectly that the final tie standard allows a tie into an existing (ʻliveʼ) system.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: Adding a contaminant gas to a pipeline is inappropriate.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-299 Log #342 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.10.5.5.10 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Fred Evans, Medical Gas Management, Inc.Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.10.5.5.10 The final connection of new piping to an existing, in use pipeline shall be permitted to be made without the use of a nitrogen purge. 5.1.10.5.5.11 After a final connection in a positive pressure medical gas pipeline is made without a nitrogen purge, an outlet in the immediate downstream zone...Substantiation: We go to great effort to provide clean piping systems throughout the entire installation process. It is not difficult to braze with a nitrogen urge during a tie-in. This would provide for a consistent process from start to finish. Proper testing will remove any nitrogen from the piping system before putting it back into service. Some installers believe that each outlet is the last joint on the system and can be brazed without nitrogen urge. This produces many dirty joints in the collective system.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: See Committee Action on Proposal 99-298 (Log #72).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-300 Log #193 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.10.5.8 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Albert McKay, A, Lokring Technology CorporationRecommendation: Add new text to read as follows: 5.1.10.5.8 (8) Axially swaged, elastic strain preload fittings providing metal to metal seal having pressure and temperature ratings not less than that of a brazed joint.

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99Substantiation: Technology exists that will allow for the installation of permanent joints that are superior to a brazed joint without the need for hot work and attendant safety and cleanliness concerns. Refer to the attached information for further explanation. Note: Supporting material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Add new text to read as follows: 5.1.10.5.8 (4) Axially swaged, elastic strain preload fittings providing metal to metal seal having pressure and temperature ratings not less than that of a brazed joint and when complete are permanent and non-separable. In 5.1.10.3.1 change “5.1.10.5.8(4) through 5.1.10.5.8(7)” to “5.1.10.5.8(5) through 5.1.10.5.8(8)”.Committee Statement: It is important that the connections be permanent and can not be separated. Needed to change the references as a new section was added.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-301 Log #235 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.10.5.8 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Michael T. Massey, National ITC CorporationRecommendation: Add new text to read as follows: (8) Pre manufactured bends, prefabricated bends or on-site bending of ASTM B819 seamless copper tube shall be permitted only when using the autogenes orbital welding procedure.Substantiation: This autogenes welding process is for butt weld joints only. This proposal is necessary to backup the proposal to add orbital welding as a joining process.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: Fittings are available and in compliance with section 5.1.10.3.1. Therefore bending is not allowed.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: ERICKSON: The use of prefabricated bends appears to be an acceptable practice in many applications and should be permitted for medical gas systems with operating psi pressures of 55 or less. The TCʼs rationale for rejecting this is because fittings are available but no justification is given for prohibiting a prefabricated bends. The deletion of an acceptable practice out-of-hand just because another method is available is not a justifiable reason for rejection.Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-302 Log #259 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.10.5.8 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: J. Richard Wagner, The Poole & Kent CorporationRecommendation: Delete the following: 5.1.10.5.8(4) Couplings and fittings rated by the coupling/fitting manufacturer for full vacuum service having mechanically pressed joints that include a O ring seal that is rated for use with anesthetizing agents. 5.1.10.5.8(5) Grooved joints rated by the coupling/fitting manufacturer for full vacuum service consisting of roll grooved tube ends and mechanical joint couplings that include resilient gaskets rated for use with anesthetizing agents. 5.1.10.5.8.(6) Copper tube shall not be joined by roll grooving if less than DN50 (NPS 2 in.) pipe size. 5.1.10.5.8(7) Mechanically pressed joints and grooved joints shall be made using the coupling/fitting manufacturerʼs recommended procedure. Also, 5.1.10.3.1 Turns, offsets and other changes in direction...or for vacuum only, fittings as permitted in 5.1.10.5.8(4) through 5.1.10.5.8(7) Special Fittings.Substantiation: The fittings have O-rings and the couplings have resilient gaskets that do not provide the thermal integrity of a brazed joint, as required by 5.1.10.5.8(2). Victaulic pressfit fittings are not rated for steam and are only rated up to 180°F. Grade “E” EPDM gaskets, which Victaulic recommended for roll-grooved couplings on medical vacuum service, are only rated for 230°F. The seals will be damaged by exposure to fire or other elevated temperatures, such as brazing joints in adjacent medical gas piping.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-303 Log #301 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject

( 5.1.10.5.8 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: David D. Eastman, Metro Detroit Plumbing Industry Training Center / Rep. American Society of Sanitary EngineeringRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.10.5.8 Special Fittings 4. “Copper, copper alloy, or copper clad couplings and fittings rated by the coupling and fitting...” 5. “Copper, copper alloy, or copper clad grooved joints rated by the coupling/fitting manufacturer...”Substantiation: Addresses the same concerns for corrosion as are addressed in 5.1.10.6.4.3.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: See Committee Action on Proposal 99-302 (Log #259).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-304 Log #356 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.10.5.8 )________________________________________________________________TCC Action: The TCC is requesting the TC to revise itʼs committee statement and explain why bending is not allowed. What are the hazards or problems associated with bending?Submitter: Michael T. Massey, National ITC CorporationRecommendation: Add text to read as follows: (8) Pre-manufactured bends, pre-fabricated bends or on-site bending of ASTM B819 seamless copper tube shall be permitted only when using the autogenes orbital welding procedure.Substantiation: This autogenes welding process is for butt weld joints only. This proposal is necessary to backup the proposal to add orbital welding as a joining process. We believe having options in the joining process, for distribution piping in positive pressure medical gas and medical-surgical vacuum systems, that is equal to or surpasses the integrity and cleanliness of the current standards will have a positive effect on the industry. Orbital welding has become the standard method of joining process piping in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries in the United States, primarily because of the consistently smooth inner weld surface produced by this technology. A smooth inner weld surface is an essential requirement for a high-purity piping system in order to prevent the establishment of viable organisms in the system, which would contaminate the product making it unsuitable for use. Another recognized benefit of orbital welding are the increase in productivity during construction, the time it takes to make a joint is significantly less using orbital welding than the current Brazing procedures. Orbital weld heads for fusion tube welding are available for 1/8 in. OD up to 7 in. OD with each head capable of welding a range of tube sizes. The microprocessor-based welding power supply has a very high degree of accuracy so that the weld parameters such as welding currents, travel speed, level times, pulsation rates, etc., can be precisely controlled and repeated from weld-to-weld. This accuracy makes it possible to produce a larger number of identical welds of excellent quality. It is the repeatability and consistency of the weld results, which has made orbital welding an integral part of high-purity piping system fabrication. Finally, the overall integrity of the joints within the system is far superior to the brazing techniques employed today. Lab tests associated with the qualification of this procedure on a 1 in. Type L sample gave results exceeding 31,000 psi in the Ultimate Stress Test. Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: Fittings are available and in compliance with section 5.1.10.3.1 therefore bending is not allowed.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: ERICKSON: See my Explanation of Negative on Proposal 99-301 (Log #301).Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-305 Log #117 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.10.5.8(1) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: David B. Mohile, Medical Engineering Services, Inc.Recommendation: Delete entire (1).Substantiation: The memory-metal system consists of a titanium-nickel coupling which is machined, stored and shipped in a bath of liquid nitrogen. When removed from the ultra cold nitrogen, the cut ends of copper tubing are stuck in each end of the coupling. As the coupling comes to ambient

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99temperature it shrinks slightly, forming a joint that meets the parameters of a brazed joint. This was initially developed for use in computer chip rooms and other special applications where brazing was not practical. While memory-metal fittings have been in the document for many years, the problem is that it is now being used improperly in the medical field. People are making live taps into oxygen, nitrous oxide and other medical gas lines and claiming that these do not add any contaminants to the pipelines. Additionally, neoprene tubing, drive valves, etc., are being used. Problems have been reported using this system, and this would be an attempt to remove another potential source of problem with the installation of medical gas pipelines.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Proposal 99-194 (Log #CP311).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-306 Log #406 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.10.5.8(1) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Peter Esherick, Patient Instrumentation Corp.Recommendation: Delete the following text: Memory metal couplings having temperature and pressure ratings joints not les than that of a brazed joint.Substantiation: The manufactures advises in their literature that maximum temperature is 600°F. 5.1.10.5.11 says that the brazing alloy exhibit a melting temperature in excess of 538°C.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle See Committee Proposal 99-194 (Log CP#311).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-307 Log #CP311 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.10.5.8(1) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Piping SystemsRecommendation: Add/change wording as follows: (1) Memory-metal couplings having minimum manufacturer temperature ratings of 538°C (1,000°F) and complying with other applicable requirements in 5.1.10.1. If used for positive pressure gas systems these fittings shall also be cleaned by the manufacturer for oxygen service. Add wording with new numbering as follows: 5.1.10.5.8.1 Live or hot taps into existing, active, medical gas and vacuum pipelines shall not be permitted.Substantiation: Various vendors have been working in the health care setting using memory-metal couplings which the manufacturer has rated for only 600°F. In addition, they refer to a ʻprocess ̓in the NFPA. The NFPA only lists fittings and not a process. Additionally these vendors are performing this work on live medical gas and vacuum systems. This means that while the system is still active and flowing to patients these vendors are cutting into the pipelines and adding these fittings, all the while claiming the NFPA approves this process. This is potentially very dangerous and not compliant with the mandates of the Standard. The above proposal attempts to resolve this matter while not limiting the technology of memory-metal, as long as proper fittings meeting the Standard requirements are used. The Technical Committee recently approved another method of joining tubing, and assuming this clears the ROC and final Standards approval process, facilities will have this as an alternative method of tieing into lines without brazing.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-308 Log #421 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.10.5.9 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Fritz Koppenberger, Environmental Testing Services Inc.Recommendation: Add text to read as follows: 5.1.10.5.9(3) The use of pipe crimping tools to temporarily or permanently stop the flow of medical gas and vacuum piping shall be prohibited.Substantiation: Tools that crimp and flatten piping are being used to temporarily or permanently shut off the flow of medical gas systems. This process destroys the integrity of any ASTM rating required under 5.1.10, and

creates a distinct fire hazard. There is no valid test data available that shows that this process produces an acceptable pressure rating, and consistency of use of these tools is left to the ability of the user. Bending of tubing is already prohibited. If tubing can not be bent, it should not be flattened and than opened back up. Flared and compression type fittings are also prohibited because integrity of the fitting is based on the ability of the installer. These devices should be prohibited for use on medical gas piping. If an emergency situation requires the use of such a device, the facility may invoke the AHJ clause of this document and use the device. The routine use of these devices for construction and permanent modification should be eliminated.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleAdd text to read as follows: 5.1.10.5.9(3) The use of pipe crimping tools to permanently stop the flow of medical gas and vacuum piping shall be prohibited.Committee Statement: The use of a temporay crimp should be allowed as it is a viable method to stop flows.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-309 Log #412 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.10.5.12.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Todd Hedgepeth, Praxair HealthcareRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Brazing procedures and brazer performance..., both as modified by 5.1.10.6.12.2 through 5.1.10.6.12.6. Add 5.1.10.6.12.6 new text. (1) brazing procedure is only required for copper to copper brazes provided that the procedure includes both vertical up and horizontal flows and the procedure is qualified using a minimum of 2 in. ID piping.Substantiation: Currently, NFPA has referenced ASME and AWS. Those standards require a new procedure based on pipe size, with the new requirement for brazing vacuum lines (larger pipe sizes) it may require as many as four to five procedures to complete one project. This results in much added cost and time for installers and it is very difficult to manage and enforce on the job site. By setting a minimum size of qualification at 2 in. we would have a larger range established which would require more skill and better results on larger diameter piping. All in an effort to eliminate multiple procedures for medical gas brazing. NFPA currently takes exceptions to ASME and AWS through 5.1.10.6.12.2 through 5.1.10.6.12.5. Why not take one more modification (exception)?Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: This requirement conflicts with ASME and AWS requirements.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-310 Log #150 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.10.6.5 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: J. Richard Wagner, The Poole & Kent CorporationRecommendation: Delete the mandatory requirement for continuous enclosures around underground piping outside of buildings as follows: 5.1.10.6.5 Underground Piping Outside of Buildings. 5.1.10.6.5.1 Buried piping outside of buildings shall be installed below the local level of frost penetration. 5.1.10.6.5.2 Underground piping shall be installed in a continuous enclosure to protect the pipe during backfilling. The installation procedure for underground piping shall protect the piping from physical damage while being backfilled. 5.1.10.6.5.3 The continuous enclosure shall be split or otherwise provide access at the joints during visual inspection and leak testing. If underground piping is protected by a conduit, cover, or other enclosure, the following requirements shall be met: (1) Access shall be provided at the joints for visual inspection and leak testing. (2) The conduit, cover, or enclosure shall be self-draining and not retain ground water in prolonged contact with the pipe. 5.1.10.6.5.4 Buried piping that will be subject to surface loads shall be buried at a depth that will protect the piping and or its enclosure from excessive stresses. 5.1.10.6.5.5 The minimum backfilled cover above the top of the pipe or its enclosure for buried piping outside of buildings shall be 900 mm (36 in.), except that the minimum cover shall be permitted to be reduced to 450 mm (18 in.) where physical damage is otherwise prevented. 5.1.10.6.5.6 Trenches shall be excavated so that the pipe or its enclosure has firm, substantially continuous bearing on the bottom of the trench.

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99 5.1.10.6.5.7 Backfill shall be clean and compacted so as to protect and uniformly support the pipe or its enclosure. 5.1.10.6.5.8 A continuous tape or marker placed immediately above the pipe or its enclosure shall clearly identify the pipeline by specific name. 5.1.10.6.5.9 A continuous warning means shall also be provided above the pipeline at approximately one-half the depth of bury. 5.1.10.6.5.10 Where underground piping is installed through a wall sleeve, the ends of the sleeve shall be sealed to prevent the entrance of ground water into the building.Substantiation: The purpose of the continuous enclosure was to protect the tubing from physical damage while being backfilled. The enclosure is not necessarily watertight. It can become flooded with ground water and retain the ground water after the surrounding soil dries. Ground water can contain road salt, fertilizers, and other chemicals that will corrode copper if allowed to contact the tubing over extended periods of time. The Copper Development Association does not recommend continuous enclosures for underground copper tubing.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: ERICKSON: Section 5.1.0.6.5.3(1) is very poorly written as it appears as if the protecting conduit or other enclosure is going to have to have an access panel or other method of providing access at each and every joint. While I agree that this is necessary when installing buried piping it does not state that in the new language which means a series of permanent inspection points at each joint for this buried pipe.Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-311 Log #171 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.10.6.6 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Richard L. Miller, Medical Gas Technology Inc.Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Runouts from horizontal piping shall be taken off above the centerline of the main or branch piping.Substantiation: Additional language was wrong and confusing.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Action on Proposal 99-312 (Log #276).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-312 Log #276 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.10.6.6 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: J. Richard Wagner, The Poole & Kent CorporationRecommendation: Revise as follows: 5.1.10.6.6: “...not less more than 45 degrees from vertical.”Substantiation: In most plumbing codes, vertical pipes are 45 degrees or less from vertical.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-313 Log #326 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.10.6.6 )________________________________________________________________TCC Action: Reject The TCC is rejecting this proposal and is asking the TC to reconsider this proposal as a committee comment. Because the proposal uses the term “such as” it is unclear if only nitrogen and instrument air are the only gases that can be used as medical support gas or if other gases are also allowed.Submitter: Thomas J. Mraulak, Metropolitan Detroit Plumbing Industry / Rep. American Society of Sanitary EngineeringRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Runouts from horizontal piping shall be taken off above the centerline of the main or branch pipe and rise vertically at an angle of not less more than 45 degrees from verticalSubstantiation: See drawing.

Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Action on Proposal 99-312 (Log #276).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-314 Log #352 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.10.6.6 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Curtis Mezzie, National ITC CorporationRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Runouts from horizontal piping shall be taken off above the centerline of the main or branch pipe and rise vertically or at an angle of not less more than 45° from vertical.Substantiation: The wording of not less than 45° from vertical is wrong. The way it is now would put the branch at more than 45° to horizontal.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Action on Proposal 99-312 (Log #276).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-315 Log #292 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.10.6.12.4 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: David D. Eastman, Metro Detroit Plumbing Industry Training Center / Rep. American Society of Sanitary EngineeringRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.10.6.12.4 The brazing procedure specification qualification record and the record of brazer performance qualification shall document filler metal used, cleaning, joint clearance, overlap, internal purge gas and flow rate during brazing of the coupon, and the absence of internal oxidation in the completed coupon.Substantiation: Misprint from wording in 1999 standard. Editorial.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-316 Log #236 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.10.6.13.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Michael T. Massey, National ITC CorporationRecommendation: Add new text to read as follows: 5.1.10.6.13.1 Orbital welding procedures and welder performance for the installation of medical gas and vacuum piping shall be qualified in accordance with ASME Section IX, Welding and Brazing Qualification of the Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code as modified by 5.1.10.6.13.2 and shall comply with 5.1.10.6.12.5 through 5.1.10.6.12.7.Substantiation: This proposal is necessary to backup the proposal to add orbital welding as a joining process.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Action on Proposal 99-295 (Log #355).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-317 Log #358 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.10.6.13.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Michael T. Massey, National ITC CorporationRecommendation: Add text to read as follows: 5.1.10.6.13.1 Orbital welding procedures and welder performance for the installation of medical gas and vacuum piping shall be qualified in accordance with ASME Section IX, Welding and Brazing Qualification of the Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code as modified by 5.1.10.6.13.2 and shall comply with 5.1.10.6.12.5 through 5.1.10.6.12.7.Substantiation: This proposal is necessary to backup the proposal to add orbital welding as a joining process.

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Action on Proposal 99-295 (Log #355).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-318 Log #239 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.10.6.13.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Michael T. Massey, National ITC CorporationRecommendation: Add new text to read as follows: 5.1.10.6.13.2 Orbital welders shall be qualified by visual examination of the test coupon followed by radiographic examination as per (QW-191) of ASME Section IX.Substantiation: This proposal is necessary to backup the proposal to add orbital welding as a joining process.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Action on Proposal 99-295 (Log #355).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-319 Log #359 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.10.6.13.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Michael T. Massey, National ITC CorporationRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.10.6.13.2 Orbital welders shall be qualified by visual examination of the test coupon followed by radiographic examination as per (OW-191) of ASME Section IX.Substantiation: This proposal is necessary to backup the proposal to add orbital welding as a joining process.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: See Committee Action on Proposal 99-295 (Log #355).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-320 Log #69 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.10.7 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Mark Allen, Beacon Medical ProductsRecommendation: Add text to read as follows: 5.1.10.2 Piping Material for Field Installed Medical/Surgical Vacuum and WAGD Systems. 5.1.10.2.1 Vacuum tubes shall be hard drawn seamless copper, either ASTM B19 medical gas tube, ASTM B 819 medical gas tube ASTM B 88 water tube (Type K, L, or M), or ASTM B 280 ACR tube. 5.1.10.2.2 Vacuum piping shall be permitted to be constructed of alternate materials when joined using methods as required in 5.1.10.6. 5.1.10.2.3 WAGD systems shall be piped as follows: (1) Using materials compliant with 5.1.10.2.1 or 5.1.10.2.2. (2) In systems operated under 130 mm (5 in.) HgV maximum vacuum only, using any non-corroding tube or ductwork. 5.1.10.7.4 Joints in WAGD networks 5.1.10.7.4.1 WAGD networks designed for operation at vacuum in excess of 130 mm ( 5 in.) HgV may be joined by any method usable for medical vacuum under 5.1.10.7.5 or 5.1.10.7.6. 5.1.10.7.4.2 WAGD networks designed for operation at vacuum below 130 mm (5 in.) HgV may be joined by any method usable for medical vacuum under 5.1.10.7.5 or 5.1.10.7.6 or by any method which will result in a leak free network when tested per 5.1.12.3.2.Substantiation: 1. Organization is improved and WAGD requirements are addressed. 2. Allowance is made for low-vacuum WAGD designs which are can be implemented using less expensive materials and methods due to their near - atmosphere maximum vacuum. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Add text to read as follows: 5.1.10.2 Piping Material for Field Installed Medical/Surgical Vacuum and WAGD Systems.

5.1.10.2.1 Vacuum tubes shall be hard drawn seamless copper, ASTM B 819 medical gas tube ASTM B 88 water tube (Type K or L), or ASTM B 280 ACR tube. 5.1.10.2.2 WAGD systems shall be piped as follows: (1) Using materials compliant with 5.1.10.2.1 or 5.1.10.2.2. (2) In systems operated under 130 mm (5 in.) HgV maximum vacuum only, using any non-corroding tube or ductwork. 5.1.10.5.10 Joints in WAGD networks 5.1.10.5.10.1 WAGD networks designed for operation at vacuum in excess of 130 mm ( 5 in.) HgV shall be permitted to be joined by any method usable for medical vacuum under 5.1.10.5. 5.1.10.5.10.2 WAGD networks designed for operation at vacuum below 130 mm (5 in.) HgV shall be joined by any method usable for medical vacuum under 5.1.10.5 or by any method which will result in a leak free network when tested per 5.1.12.3.2.Committee Statement: The committee corrected references.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: ERICKSON: The TC is now going to require WAGD systems to be piped in the same material that is required for vacuum system piping. Where is the justification for this increase in installation techniques for a system that is going to operate at just above 5 in. of HgV? This committee is slowly increasing the installation of all piping systems to brazed type K or L copper.Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-321 Log #31 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.11.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Mark Allen, Beacon Medical ProductsRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.11.1 Pipe Labeling. 5.1.11.1.1 Piping shall be labeled by stenciling or adhesive markers that identify the medical gas or vacuum system and include: (1) The name of the gas/vacuum system or the chemical symbol per Table 5.1.11. (2) The gas or vacuum system color code per Table 5.1.11. (3) Where positive pressure gas piping systems operate at pressures other than the standard gage pressure in Table 5.1.11 of 345 to 380 kPa (50 to 55 psi) or a gage pressure of 1100 to 1275 kPa (160 to 185 psi) for nitrogen the pipe labeling shall include the nonstandard operating pressure in addition to the name of the gas. 5.1.11.1.2 Pipe labels shall be located as follows: (1) At intervals of not more than 6100 mm (20 ft) (2) At least once in or above every room (3) On both sides of walls or partitions penetrated by the piping (4) At least once in every story height traversed by risersSubstantiation: The rewrite is an attempt to make the wording more clear and to reference the information in the Table more accurately.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleIn addition to the proposal, also delete sections 5.1.11.1.3 and 5.1.11.1.4.Committee Statement: Sections 5.1.11.1.3 and 5.1.11.1.4 were incorporated into the proposal.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-322 Log #145 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.11.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Rickey Rutherford, Carolina Healthcare SystemsRecommendation: Add new text to read as follows: Vacuum exhaust shall be labeled, “Danger vacuum exhaust and waste anesthetic gas (should it apply) proper PPE to be worn.” Substantiation: As a precaution of roof workers. If replacing screen or cleaning, proper PPE is to be worn.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: The facility should comply with OSHA requirements for this situation.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99________________________________________________________________99-323 Log #251 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Part( 5.1.11.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Richard L. Miller, Medical Gas Technology Inc.Recommendation: Add two new sections to the pipe labeling section. 5.1.11.1.5 Medicao gas pipeline shall not be painted. 5.1.11.1.6 Permanent label on tubing shall be visible from a standing position.Substantiation: When existing painted pipe is cut for the purpose of branching to new lines or any other type of breach that requires preparation of the pipe for brazing, it is extremely difficult to remove the paint in order to braze the pipe.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Part Accept the first recommendation only.Committee Statement: The second requirement is not easily enforced. Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-324 Log #255 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.11.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Richard L. Miller, Medical Gas Technology Inc.Recommendation: Add two sections to the pipe labeling section. 5.1.11.1.5 Medical gas pipeline shall not be painted. 5.1.11.16 Permanent label on tubing shall be visible from a standing position.Substantiation: When existing painted pipe is cut for the purpose of branching to new lines or any other type of breach that requires preparation of the pipe for brazing, it is extremely difficult to remove the paint in order to braze the pipe.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Action on Proposal 99-323 (Log #251).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-325 Log #299 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.11.1.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: David D. Eastman, Metro Detroit Plumbing Industry Training Center / Rep. American Society of Sanitary EngineeringRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.11.1.1 Piping shall be labeled by stenciling or adhesive markers that identify the medical gas, instrument air, WAGD, or vacuum systemSubstantiation: Since instrument air isnʼt specifically included as a medical gas, current text doesnʼt require that it be labeled. This change would require labeling of instrument Air and clarify the requirement for labeling WAGD.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Action on Proposal 99-92 (Log #48).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-326 Log #14 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.12 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Stewart Caladie, MedGas, Inc.Recommendation: Add new text to read as follows: All station outlets/inlets which are subjected to the 24 hour standing pressure test per 5.1.12.2.6/5.1.12.2.7 shall require caps and labeled “Outlet/Inlet locked out” - DO NOT USE. The label and cap shall remain until all system verification test per Section 5.1.12.3 have been completed.Substantiation: This will eliminate the possibility of a patient accidentally getting exposed to the Dry Nitrogen (N.F.) gas.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: This will add an expense to the cost of the system, but it may not add any additional safety.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-327 Log #185 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.12.2.1.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Don Holden, Holden Hospital SupplyRecommendation: Same as 5.1.10.5.5.1.Substantiation: Same as 5.1.10.5.5.1.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: Equal to or better than is not a recognizable standard. Nitrogen NF is different than other grades of nitrogen. Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-328 Log #180 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.12.2.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Don Holden, Holden Hospital SupplyRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Piping in medical gas and vacuum distribution systems shall be blown clean by means of oil-free, dry nitrogen NF or nitrogen equal to or better than as follows:Substantiation: Same as in 5.1.10.5.5.1.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: Equal to or better than is not a recognizable standard. Nitrogen NF is different than other grades of nitrogen. Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-329 Log #187 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.12.2.4.3 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Don Holden, Holden Hospital SupplyRecommendation: Same as 5.1.10.5.5.1.Substantiation: Same as 5.1.10.5.5.1.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: Equal to or better than is not a recognizable standard. Nitrogen NF is different than other grades of nitrogen. Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-330 Log #420 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.12.2.5 )________________________________________________________________TCC Action: The TCC is requesting the TC to revise its committee statement and explain what is meant by “too subjective”.Submitter: Fritz Koppenberger, Environmental Testing Services Inc.Recommendation: Add text to read as follows: 5.1.1.2.5.3 During the purging process, the installer shall assure that no odor is present within the piping system.Substantiation: One of the most common problems in new installations is caused when the installer leaves a pipe plug in the piping and it is melted during the brazing process, causing a strong odor. The verifier is usually well into his test procedure before he reaches a point where the smell from a burned plug is discovered. Usually, the piping where the plug was melted must be removed to stop the odor. This causes undue delays in the project, and requires the verifier to start his test procedure from the beginning. Odor within the system should be discovered and remedied by the installer before the verifier is requests at the job site.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: Odors are too subjective and is not enforceable.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-331 Log #86 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.12.2.5.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Keith Ferrari, PraxairRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: “This purging shall be started at the closest point to the zone valve and continue to the furthest point from the zone valve.”

99-59

Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99Substantiation: Standard industry practice for purging pipelines, starts at a point closest to the source of supply and moves with the direction of airflow to the end of the pipeline. This allows particulate matter to move downstream with the flow of the gas and reduces the possibilities of particulate matter blow by.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise text to read as follows: “This purging shall be started at the closest outlet/inlet to the zone valve and continue to the furthest outlet/inlet within the zone.”Committee Statement: The change was editorial and for clarification.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: WAGNER: It is still not clear where to start the purge - before the zone valve? after the zone valve? at the source equipment?Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-332 Log #181 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.12.2.6.3 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Don Holden, Holden Hospital SupplyRecommendation: Same as 5.1.10.5.5.1.Substantiation: Same as 5.1.10.5.5.1.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: Equal to or better than is not a recognizable standard. Nitrogen NF is different than other grades of nitrogen. Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-333 Log #294 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.12.2.7 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: David D. Eastman, Metro Detroit Plumbing Industry Training Center / Rep. American Society of Sanitary EngineeringRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.12.2.7 Standing Pressure Vacuum Test for Vacuum System.Substantiation: This change would bring the section title into agreement with the text of the section and more accurately describe the test.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-334 Log #293 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.12.2.7.3 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: David D. Eastman, Metro Detroit Plumbing Industry Training Center / Rep. American Society of Sanitary EngineeringRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.12.2.7.3 Test pressure shall be not less than between 12 in. HgV and full vacuum.Substantiation: Technically speaking, a test pressure of not less than 12 in. of mercury is any pressure greater than 12 in. of mercury (e.g., 1 00 psi). This revision clarifies that the test level for vacuum be in the systems operating range.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-335 Log #407 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.12.3 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Peter Esherick, Patient Instrumentation Corp.Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: The gas of system designation shall be allowed for all tests, regardless of the size of the system. This includes: 1) Standing pressure (5.1.12.3.2) 2) Cross Connection (5.1.12.3.3) 3) Alarms (5.1.12.3.5) 4) Piping Purge (5.1.12.3.6)

5) Piping Particulates (5.1.12.3.7)Substantiation: This is now allowed for all tests in small systems (5.1.12.3.1.8) and specifically allowed in Piping Purity Test (5.1.12.3.8).Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHComment on Affirmative: WAGNER: Where does the revised text go? Is it a replacement for 5.1.12.3.1.8?Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-336 Log #183 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.12.3.1.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Don Holden, Holden Hospital SupplyRecommendation: Same as 5.1.10.5.5.1.Substantiation: Same as 5.1.10.5.5.1.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: Equal to or better than is not a recognizable standard. Nitrogen NF is different than other grades of nitrogen. Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-337 Log #411 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.12.3.1.4 )________________________________________________________________TCC Action: The TCC is requesting the TC to revise its committee statement and explain specifically why the existing text is adequate.Submitter: Michael Palmer, Hebsco Inc.Recommendation: Proposed new text is an addition to test found in: 5.1.12.3.1.4. Original Text: Testing shall be performed by a party other than the installing contractor. Proposed New Text: Testing shall be performed by a third party other than the installing contractor and/or equipment provider.Substantiation:Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: The committee feels that adequate protection is provided by the existing text.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-338 Log #184 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.12.3.5.1(E) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Don Holden, Holden Hospital SupplyRecommendation: Same as 5.1.10.5.5.1.Substantiation: Same as 5.1.10.5.5.1.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: Equal to or better than is not a recognizable standard. Nitrogen NF is different than other grades of nitrogen. Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-339 Log #369 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.12.3.7 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Kenneth J. Muzal, Liberty Mutual Industrial Hygiene LabRecommendation: Add text to read as follows: Before testing a new installation perform the following test: 1) Pass a minimum of 1000L gas through a 0.45u PTFE filter. 2) Rapidly interrupt the flow several times during the test. The filter shall accrue no more than 0.1 mg/cu m of matter and no substance greater than 1/2 the current AcGIH TLV for the tie in tester IQ. The analysis should include: ed <0.001 mg/m3 Cu <0.005 mg/m3, Pb <0.025mg.m3, A0 <0.005 mg/m3 and Cu <0.1 mg/m3.

Substantiation: Evidence by our laboratory shows that dust on the filters can have cadmium, lead copper, chromium and arsenic in detectable concentrations. To eliminate contamination of new pipelines, test the old ones before tie in. Some of the levels detected were at TLV levels.Committee Meeting Action: Reject

99-60

Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99Committee Statement: The committee does not wish to make the purity tests retroactive.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-340 Log #115 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.12.3.7(C) )________________________________________________________________TCC Action: The TCC is requesting the TC to revise its committee statement and specifically explain why the existing safeguards are adequate.Submitter: David B. Mohile, Medical Engineering Services, Inc.Recommendation: Change this sentence to read as follows: “The filter shall accrue no more than 0.001 g (1 mg) 0.01 g (10 mg) of matter from any outlet tested.”Substantiation: For the last edition we changed slightly the particulate limit for contamination in medical gas pipelines. This would again slightly change the amount of particulate acceptable from construction. Filters on medical air compressors are only required to have a capability of 98 percent efficiency at 1 micron or greater. This means that up to 2 percent of the particulate matter greater than 1 micron is still getting through the filter out to the patient with no apparent effect on either the patient or the equipment. And this is a measurement of the size of particulate; not the weight. This means that 1/2 pound of particulate matter could pass through the filter and to the patient as long as the matter was smaller than 1 micron. The U.S. Navy has set 5 mg per cubic meter as an acceptable limit for divers who are totally dependent upon the air in their SCUBA tanks. The same with U.S. fire departments who also permit 5 mg per cubic meter as the limit in their tanks of air. We now clearly mandate a blow down by the installing contractor and also a detailed blow down procedure by the verifier. The proposed amount of 0.01 grams of material is an extremely small amount of matter per 35 cubic feet (1,000 liters) of gas. This would equate to less than .000001 grams of matter per liter. This is an almost unmeasurable amount.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: The existing safeguards are adequate.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-341 Log #182 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.12.3.7(E) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Don Holden, Holden Hospital SupplyRecommendation: Same as 5.1.10.5.5.1.Substantiation: Same as 5.1.10.5.5.1.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: Equal to or better than is not a recognizable standard. Nitrogen NF is different than other grades of nitrogen. Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-342 Log #109 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.12.3.8 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: David B. Mohile, Medical Engineering Services, Inc.Recommendation: Delete all reference to Hydrocarbons as methane and halogenated hydrocarbons in 5.1.12.3.8 Piping Purity Test, paragraph (B) and (D); also, 5.1.12.3.1.2, Table, 5.1.12.3.1.3 Contaminant Parameters for Medical Air (Compressor System).Substantiation: The levels of hydrocarbons were first introduced into the standard back in 1993 as a method of determining the level of cleanliness of tubing. The halogenated hydrocarbon testing was to assure that the tubing installed was cleaned for oxygen service and that cleaning solvents were not left in the tubing. The hydrocarbon as methane testing was an attempt to verify that compressor oils were not migrating into the tubing from new compressors. Since the introduction and almost universal acceptance of ASTM B819 tubing the problem of solvents in the tubing has become almost nonexistent. Tubing manufacturers are particularly aware of the problems that solvents caused in the past and are not using processes that can leave solvents in the tubing any longer. In addition, the hydrocarbon testing has become very expensive and is very difficult to perform on the jobsite. This cost is passed onto the contractor or the facility. Also, the amount of new air compressors that use oil in the crankcase is rapidly decreasing with the advent of newer technology, and the ones that do have are monitored by hospital-mandated checks for oil vapors in

the standard on a daily and quarterly basis [see 5.1.3.5.14.4(4)(5)]. The three methods of doing this test are (1) to zero a portable analyzer to a source of nitrogen and then move the analyzer to the far end of the piping system. The source of nitrogen is then monitored at the far end of the system by the analyzer to determine the presence, if any, of hydrocarbon contamination; (2) run a measured amount of gas through a sample cylinder and send it to an off-site laboratory for analysis; (3) use a test bag to grab a sample of the gas and send it off to a laboratory. The problem with all of these methods is that you are not sure that the gas is going throughout the pipeline. There have been statistically insignificant amount of reported problems with hydrocarbons. Just about the only people that want to keep this test in the document are those laboratories that make money doing the testing. The proposal to delete references from the table below would follow. Proposal 2: If the deletion of hydrocarbons as recommended above is adopted by the Committee, then item (E) will need to be redone. We recommend that this paragraph be relabeled Piping Dewpoint Test. New wording for this paragraph would be as follows: “A test for dewpoint shall be conducted at the outlet most remote from the source and the dewpoint shall not exceed 0°C (+32°F) PDP.”Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Proposal 99-199 (Log #CP314) on 5.1.12.3.8.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-343 Log #424 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.12.3.8 )________________________________________________________________TCC Action: The TCC is requesting the TC to revise its committee statement and explain what is meant by subjective and cannot be enforced.Submitter: Fritz Koppenberger, Environmental Testing Services Inc.Recommendation: Add text to read as follows: 5.1.12.3.8(F) There shall be no odor present within the piping system.Substantiation: The verifier should check for, and certify, that there is no odor present within the system. Odor within a new system is typically a melted pipe plug, however, there are other unusual reasons for odor to be present within the system. USP does not allow odor in medical oxygen, and the piping system itself must not add odor to medical gas. This statement should be present in the code to clarify to all users of this document that the presence of odor is not acceptable in a medical gas system.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: Odors are subjective and can not be enforced.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-344 Log #CP314 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.12.3.8 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Piping SystemsRecommendation: For each positive-pressure system, the purity of the piping system shall be verified. A. These tests shall be performed with oil-free, dry Nitrogen NF or the gas of system designation. B. The test shall be for total non-methane hydrocarbons (as methane) and halogenated hydrocarbons, and compared with the source gas. C. This test shall be performed at the outlet most remote from the source. D. The difference between the two tests shall in no case exceed the following: (1) Total Hydrocarbons (excluding methane) 5 ppm (2) Halogenated Hydrocarbons 5 ppm E. A test for dew point shall be conducted at the outlet most remote from the source and dew point shall not exceed 500 ppm or -12°C (10° F) @ 50 psig.Substantiation: The revised text incorporated an erratta to correct the dewpoint requirement.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-345 Log #CP335 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.12.3.8 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Piping SystemsRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.12.3.8 Piping Purity Test. For each positive-pressure medical gas system, the purity of the piping system shall be verified.

99-61

Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99Substantiation: this clarifies the pipe purity test is for medical gas.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHComment on Affirmative: WAGNER: “Medical gases” include nitrogen and instrument air. Is it the intent to verify the purity in these medical support gas systems?Committee Proposals on Instrument AirThe following two items were in the committee proposal that was the basis of Committee Proposals CP324, CP326, CP328, CP329, CP331, CP332, CP333, and CP335. They appear to have been missed.5.1.1.x Wherever the term medical vacuum occurs, the provisions shall apply to systems for piped medical-surgical vacuum and piped waste anesthetic gas disposal (WAGD). Wherever the name of a specific vacuum sedrvice occurs, the provisions shall apply only to that vacuum service.Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-346 Log #186 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.12.3.8(A) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Don Holden, Holden Hospital SupplyRecommendation: Same as 5.1.10.5.5.1.Substantiation: Same as 5.1.10.5.5.1.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: Equal to or better than is not a recognizable standard. Nitrogen NF is different than other grades of nitrogen. Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-347 Log #370 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.12.3.8(A) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Kenneth J. Muzal, Liberty Mutual Industrial Hygiene LabRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: (A) These test shall be performed with oil free, dry nitrogen NF or the gas of system designation or oil free medical air.Substantiation: Oxygen and nitrous oxide are oxidizing gases. If there is solvents in these lines a potential hazardous situation could occur.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: There is no sufficient advantage to using medical air as opposed to gas of system designation.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-348 Log #87 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.12.3.8(E) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Keith Ferrari, PraxairRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: “...shall not exceed 500 ppm or –12 degrees Celsius (10 degrees Fahrenheit) @ 50 psig.”Substantiation: The original submittal 99-164 that was accepted in principle by the committee revised the 99-164 to include the values I stated above.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-349 Log #403 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.12.3.8(E) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Peter Esherick, Patient Instrumentation Corp.Recommendation: Delete the following text: A test for dewpoint shall be conducted at the outlet most remote from the source and the dewpoint shall not exceed 500 ppm at 12°C (53.6°F). Add to 5.1.12.3.8(D): (3) Dewpoint 5°C @ 50 psigSubstantiation: None given.

Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: See Committee Action on Proposal 99-348 (Log #87).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-350 Log #111 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.12.3.9.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: David B. Mohile, Medical Engineering Services, Inc.Recommendation: Add wording as follows: “Each joint in the final connection between the new work and the existing system shall be leak-tested with the gas of system designation at the normal operating pressure by means of soapy water or other means safe for use with oxygen. Vacuum joints shall be tested using an ultrasonic leak detector or other means that will permit detection of leaks in an active vacuum system.”Substantiation: With the cost of ultrasonic leak detectors dropping to $200 or so, there is no reason for not testing for leaks in vacuum joints. Since vacuum lines are frequently large, undiscovered vacuum joints can cause source machinery to run excessively and may cause premature failure.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-351 Log #88 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.12.3.10.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Keith Ferrari, PraxairRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: “Test shall be performed with oil firee, dry Nitrogen NF, the gas of system designation, or the operating vacuum.”Substantiation: The Operational Pressure Test is conducted after the final line tie-in. This test is normally conducted with source gas.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-352 Log #CP336 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.12.3.10.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Piping SystemsRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: All gas outlets with a gage pressure of 345 kPa (50 psi), including but not limited to oxygen, nitrous oxide, medical air, and carbon dioxide, shall deliver 100 Nl/min SLPM (3.5 SCFM) with a pressure drop of not more than 35 kPa (5 psi) and static pressure of 345-380 kPa (50-55 psi).Substantiation: This correct the S.I. units.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-353 Log #CP337 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.12.3.10.3 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Piping SystemsRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.12.3.10.3 Nitrogen and instrument air outlets shall deliver 140 Nl/min SLPM (5.0 SCFM) with a pressure drop of no more than 35 kPa (5 psi) gage and static pressure of 1100 to 1275 kPa (160 to 185 psi) gage.Substantiation: This corrects the S.I. units.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: ERICKSON: See my Explanation of Negative on Proposal 99-31(Log #353).Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99________________________________________________________________99-354 Log #419 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.12.3.10.4 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Fritz Koppenberger, Environmental Testing Services Inc.Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Medical-surgical vacuum inlets shall draw 85 Nl/min (3 SCFM) without reducing the vacuum pressure below 300 mm (12 in.) gage HgV at any adjacent station inlet .Substantiation: Checking an adjacent outlet assumes that the adjacent outlet is correctly functioning, or assumes that the outlet is close enough to affect the test result. Vacuum outlets should be tested at the outlet for flow and pressure, the same way positive pressure outlets are tested. Testing the vacuum line pressure drop at the inlet is a very valid and repeatable test, and is much more reliable and consistent than attempting to check the next closest inlet, which might be in the next room or down the hall. The description of the vacuum test in 5.1.12.3.10.4 is contradictory to 5.1.12.3.10, which state that “...tests (plural) shall be performed at each station outlet inlet”. There are only two tests covered in this section, flow rate and pressure drop. They can and should be performed at the outlet.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: This requirement will make the test much more restrictive.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-355 Log #CP338 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.12.3.10.5 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Piping SystemsRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Oxygen and medical air outlets serving critical care areas shall permit a transient flow rate of 170 Nl/min SLPM (6 SCFM) for 3 seconds.Substantiation: This corrects the S.I. units.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-356 Log #112 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.12.3.11 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: David B. Mohile, Medical Engineering Services, Inc.Recommendation: Change the accuracy for the oxygen analyzer from > (greather than) 99 percent to >97 percent.Substantiation: An oxygen analyzer that can consistently be accurate to 99 percent or greater is called a paramagnetic analyzer and costs more than $2,500. Since current clinical practice in almost every healthcare institution is to use galvanic cell technology with an accuracy of 2 percent to 3 percent, I do not believe it is necessary to enforce a much higher level of accuracy and cost on the verifier. In summation, when the respiratory therapist and doctor are comfortable with 2 percent to 3 percent, we should accept this as a standard.Committee Meeting Action: Accept99% oxygen should be changed in other areas if applicable.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-357 Log #425 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( Table 5.1.12.3.11 )________________________________________________________________TCC Action: The TCC is requesting the TC to revise its committee statement and explain specifically what existing requirements cover the proposed change.Submitter: Fritz Koppenberger, Environmental Testing Services Inc.Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Medical Air (compressed) 20.9 percent oxygen Medical Air (synthetic) 19.5 percent - 23.5 percentSubstantiation: Atmospheric air is 20.946 percent oxygen, +/- 0.02 percent (reference CRC Manual of Chemistry and Physics). This percentage has not changed in recorded history. The designation 19.5 percent to 23.5 percent refers to blended or synthetic air only. CGA G-7.1, Commodity Specification for Air, is almost universally misinterpreted because no one reads the fine print which states that medical air shall be “atm/19.5-23.5”, and there is a footnote, (#5) in the CGA G-7.1 specification, which states: “#5 - The term ʻatm ̓

(atmospheric) denotes the oxygen content normally present in atmospheric air: The numerical values denote the oxygen limits of synthesized air.” If compressed medical air is below 20.9 percent oxygen, there is a contamination problem with it, or there is still nitrogen in the system that needs to be purged. If the line percentage is above 20.9 percent oxygen, there is also a problem that must be addressed, because there is cross contamination from an oxygen source. Only synthetic air from a cylinder can be in the 19.5 percent to 23.5 percent oxygen range. This is a necessary technical change that will correctly synchronize NFPA with one of itʼs reference documents, and provide the verifier with knowledge that will aid in diagnosing problems within the medical air system.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: The existing requirements covers the requirements. See Committee Action on Proposal 99-356 (Log #112).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHComment on Affirmative: WAGNER: Can a centralized computer be substituted for all of the master alarm panels required in 5.1.9.2.1(1)? What prevents a single point of failure?Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-358 Log #CP339 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( Table 5.1.12.3.11 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Piping SystemsRecommendation: Revise Table 5.1.12.3.11 as follows:

Table 5.1.12.3.11 Gas ConcentrationsMedical Gas Concentration

Oxygen >99% OxygenNitrous oxide >99% Nitrous oxideNitrogen <1% Oxygen or 99% NitrogenMedical air and Instrument air 19.5-21.5% Oxygen

Substantiation: Instrument air was added to the table as it is treated the same as medical gases.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: ERICKSON: See my Explanation of Negative on Proposal 99-31(Log #353).Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-359 Log #417 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( Table 5.1.12.3.12.3 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Fritz Koppenberger, Environmental Testing Services Inc.Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Pressure dew point.Substantiation: This is a technical clarification. There is a significant difference between atmospheric and pressure dew point, and there should be no misunderstanding or misinterpretation of the fact that the dew point must be established at line pressure.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-360 Log #144 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.13 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: David B. Mohile, Medical Engineering Services, Inc.Recommendation: Move the following sections of Chapter 5 to Chapter 9 Gas Equipment. Move all of 5.1.13.1 through 5.1.13.5.4 to Chapter 9. Keep current 5.1.13.5.5 and renumber it. Keep current 5.1.13.7 and renumber it. Move all of 5.1.13.8 to Chapter 9. Move all of 5.3.13.1 to Chapter 9. (Chapter 9 Committee might wish to combine the requirements for Level 1, Level 2, and Level 3; their call)Substantiation: Chapter 5 is primarily a construction document. Administration and maintenance of the systems once they are turned over to the facility is not what Chapter 5 is all about. All of the above information has to do with the administration and handling of cylinders of gases in an occupied facility. Items such as purchasing specifications, training procedures, policies for enforcement, maintenance programs, etc., as well as special handling of cylinders with regard to respiratory therapy equipment, are covered. This would better be put in the

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99chapter on Gas Equipment where it will be read by the facilities. None of this really has anything to do with the construction of a portion of healthcare facility. The only sections that we are recommending retaining in Chapter 5 are a statement on cylinders of nitrous oxide and oxygen being stored in anesthetizing areas and the section on special precautions of piped patient gas and vacuum systems.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-361 Log #231 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.1.13.1.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Robert M. Sutter, BOC GasesRecommendation: Add text to read as follows: Annual review of the normal operation of the bulk cryogenic liquid system.Substantiation: Personnel that are responsible for the daily inspection of bulk cryogenic liquid systems need to be aware of the normal function of the system.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle See Committee Action on Proposal 99-110 (Log #CP313).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-362 Log #418 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.13.1.3(5) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Fritz Koppenberger, Environmental Testing Services Inc.Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: All tests required in 5.1.12.3 shall be successfully conducted prior to the use of any medical gas or vacuum piping system for patient care.Substantiation: Editorial.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-363 Log #404 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.1.13.2.2(2) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Peter Esherick, Patient Instrumentation Corp.Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: The high-pressure valve on the oxygen cylinder shall be opened slowly before bringing the apparatus to the patient or the patient to the apparatus.Substantiation: It is believed that the word slowly was inadvertently left out. One should always open a cylinder valve slowly.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-364 Log #408 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.13.8.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Peter Esherick, Patient Instrumentation Corp.Recommendation: Add: (The period shall be once every 2 years)Substantiation: Merely telling the hospital, etc. Periodic testing is required is not enough. Periodic could be once every 50 years!Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: The period for testing should be determined by the hospital.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-365 Log #405 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.13.8.5(1) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Peter Esherick, Patient Instrumentation Corp.Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: (1) Be periodically tested once every 12 months to determine that they are functioning correctly.Substantiation: Periodically could be once every 50 years. There must be some time specified if it is required to be done. Shall is used in 5.1.13.8.5.(1).Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: NFPA 101 requires a monthly test.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-366 Log #409 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.1.13.8.5(1) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Peter Esherick, Patient Instrumentation Corp.Recommendation: Add: The period shall be once every six (6) monthsSubstantiation: Merely telling the hospital, etc. Periodic testing of alarms is required is insufficient. Periodic could be once every 50 years!Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: See the Committee Action on 99-122 (Log #305).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-367 Log #153 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.3 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: J. Richard Wagner, The Poole & Kent CorporationRecommendation: Where the Level 3 requirements are the same as Level 1, refer to Level 1. This proposal is not intended to make any technical changes. 5.3 Level 3 Piped Gas and Vacuum Systems

5.3.1 Applicability

5.3.1.1 These requirements shall apply to health care facilities that qualify to install Level 3 systems as referenced in Chapters 13 through 21.

5.3.1.2 Wherever the term medical gas occurs for Level 3, the provisions shall apply to piped systems for oxygen and nitrous oxide.

5.3.1.3 Wherever the term gas-powered device occurs for Level 3, the provisions shall apply to piped systems for compressed air and nitrogen.

5.3.1.3 5.3.1.4 Where the term vacuum occurs for Level 3, the provisions shall apply to all piped systems for vacuum.

5.1.3.4 5.3.1.5 An existing Level 3 system that is not in strict accordance with the provisions of this standard shall be permitted to be in continued use as long as the authority having jurisdiction has determined that such use does not constitute a distinct hazard to life.

5.3.2 Nature of Hazards of Gas and Vacuum Systems. Potential fire and explosion hazards associated with medical gas systems and vacuum systems shall be considered in the design, installation, testing, operation, and maintenance of these systems. (See Annex B.2.)

5.3.3 Level 3 Sources

5.3.3.1 Medical Gas Supply System Identification and Labeling.

5.3.3.1.1 Only cylinders and containers constructed, tested, and maintained in accordance with U.S. Department of Transportation specifications and regulations shall be permitted to be used.

5.3.3.1.2 Cylinder contents shall be identified by attached labels or stencils naming the contents in accordance with CGA Pamphlet C-7, Guide to the Preparation of Precautionary Labeling and Marking of Compressed Gas Containers.

5.3.3.1.3 Contents of cylinders and containers shall be verified prior to use.

5.3.3.1.4 Labels shall not be defaced, altered, or removed, and connecting fittings shall not be modified.

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 995.3.3.1.5 Locations containing medical gases other than oxygen shall have their door(s) labeled substantially as follows:

CAUTIONMedical Gases

NO Smoking or Open FlameRoom May Have Insufficient Oxygen

Open Door and Allow Room to Ventilate before Entering

5.3.3.1.6 Locations containing only oxygen shall have their door(s) labeled as follows:

CAUTIONMedical Gases

NO Smoking or Open Flame

5.3.3.1 Medical Gas Supply System Identification and Labeling. Level 3 systems shall comply with 5.1.3.1 (Level 1).

5.3.3.2 Supply System Operations.

5.3.3.2.1 The use of adapters or conversion fittings to adapt one gas specific fitting to another shall be prohibited.

5.3.3.2.2 Only medical gas cylinders, reusable shipping containers, and their accessories shall be permitted to be stored in rooms containing medical gas supply systems or medical gas cylinders.

5.3.3.2.3 No flammable materials, cylinders containing flammable gases, or containers containing flammable liquids shall be stored in rooms with medical gas cylinders.

5.3.3.2.4 Wooden racks for cylinder storage shall be permitted.

5.3.3.2.5 If cylinders are wrapped when received, the wrappers shall be removed prior to storage.

5.3.3.2.6 Cylinders not in use shall have their valve protection caps secured tightly in place.

5.3.3.2.7 Cylinders without correct markings or whose markings and gas specific fittings do not match shall not be used.

5.3.3.2.8 Cryogenic liquid storage units intended to supply gas to the facility shall not be used to transfill other liquid storage vessels.

5.3.3.2.9 Care shall be exercised when handling cylinders that have been exposed to freezing temperatures or containers that contain cryogenic liquids to prevent injury to the skin.

5.3.3.2.10 Cylinders containing compressed gases and containers for volatile liquids shall be kept away from radiators, steam piping, and like sources of heat.

5.3.3.2.11 When cylinder valve protection caps are supplied, they shall be secured tightly in place unless the cylinder is connected for use.

5.3.3.2.12 Containers shall not be stored in a tightly closed space such as a closet.

5.3.3.2 Supply System Operations. Level 3 systems shall comply with 5.1.3.2 (Level 1).

5.3.3.3 Source Systems — Level 3.

5.3.3.3.1 Cylinders in service and in storage shall be individually secured and located to prevent falling or being knocked over.

5.3.3.3.2 Locations for Medical Gas Supply Systems.

5.3.3.3.2.1 Medical gas supply systems shall be permitted to be located indoors or outdoors.

5.3.3.3.2.2 Air compressors and vacuum pumps shall be located separately from other medical gas systems or cylinder storage enclosures.

5.3.3.3.2.3 Locations for supply systems shall not be used for storage purposes other than for containers of nonflammable gases except that storage of full or empty containers shall be permitted.

5.3.3.3.2.4 Other nonflammable medical gas supply systems or storage locations shall be permitted to be in the same location with oxygen or nitrous oxide, or both, provided adequate ventilation to prevent the development of oxygen deficient atmospheres in the event of functioning of cylinder or manifold pressure relief devices is provided.

5.3.3.3.2.5 Enclosures shall not be located in close proximity to open electrical conductors and transformers.

5.3.3.3.2.6 Enclosures shall not be located adjacent to storage tanks for flammable or combustible liquids.

5.3.3.3.3 Indoor Locations.

5.3.3.3.3.1 Enclosures for medical gases shall serve no other purpose.

5.3.3.3.3.2 Enclosures shall be constructed of an assembly of building materials with a fire resistance rating of at least 1 hour.

5.3.3.3.3.3 Enclosures shall not communicate directly with anesthetizing or storage locations for flammable anesthetizing agents.

5.3.3.3.3.4 Other nonflammable (inert) medical gases shall be permitted to be stored in the enclosure.

5.3.3.3.3.5 Flammable gases shall not be stored with oxidizing agents.

5.3.3.3.3.6 Storage of full and/or empty cylinders is permitted in the same enclosure.

5.3.3.3.4 Outdoor Locations.

5.3.3.3.4.1 Storage facilities that are adjacent to a building wall shall be located such that the distance to any window of the adjacent building is greater than 7620 mm (25 ft).

5.3.3.3.5 Doors and Gates. Enclosures for medical gas supply systems shall be provided with doors or gates.

5.3.3.3.5.1 If the enclosure is outside and/or remote from the single treatment facility, it shall be kept locked.

5.3.3.3.5.2 If the storage area is within the single treatment facility (i.e., is not remote), it shall be permitted to be locked.

5.3.3.3.6 Ventilation. Enclosures for medical gas systems (e.g., oxygen and nitrous oxide) shall be ventilated.

5.3.3.3.6.1 Where the total volume of Level 3 medical gases (e.g., oxygen and nitrous oxide) connected and in storage is greater than 84,950 L (3000 ft3) at STP, indoor supply locations shall be provided with dedicated mechanical ventilation systems that draw air from within 300 mm (1 ft) of the floor and operate continuously.

5.3.3.3.6.2 The power supply for mechanical ventilation fans shall conform to the requirements of an essential electrical system as described in Chapter 4 of this document.

5.3.3.3.6.3 Where the total volume of Level 3 medical gases (e.g., oxygen and nitrous oxide) connected and in storage is less than 84,950 L (3000 ft3) at STP, natural ventilation shall be permitted to be employed.

5.3.3.3.6.4 Where natural ventilation is permitted, it shall consist of two louvered openings, each having a minimum free area of 46,500 mm2 (72 in.2), with one located within 300 mm (1 ft) of the floor and one located within 300 mm (1 ft) of the ceiling.

5.3.3.3.6.5 Louvered natural ventilation openings shall not be located in an exit access corridor.

5.3.3.3.6.6 Mechanical ventilation shall be provided if the requirements of 5.3.3.3.6.5 cannot be met.

5.3.3.3.6.7 Heating (where required) shall be by steam, hot water, or other indirect means.

5.3.3.3.6.8 Where enclosures (interior or exterior) for medical gas supply systems are located near sources of heat, such as furnaces, incinerators, or boiler rooms, they shall be of construction that protects cylinders from reaching temperatures 54°C (130°F).

5.3.3.3.7 Locations for Air Compressors and Vacuum Pumps.

5.3.3.3.7.1 Air compressors and vacuum pumps shall be installed in a designated mechanical equipment area, ventilated and with required utilities (e.g., electricity, drains, lighting, etc.).

5.3.3.4 Medical Gas Supply Systems — Level 3.

5.3.3.4.1 Mechanical means shall be provided to ensure the connection of cylinders containing the correct gas to the piping system.

5.3.3.4.1.1 Cylinder valve outlets for nonflammable gases and gas mixtures for medical purposes shall comply with CGA Pamphlet V-1, Standard for Compressed Gas Cylinder Valve Outlet and Inlet Connections (ANSI B57.1; CSA B96).

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 995.3.3.4.1.2 Threaded connections between the regulators and the piping system shall comply with CGA Pamphlet V-5, Diameter-Index Safety System.

5.3.3.4.2 Level 3 medical gas supply systems shall include the components designated in 5.3.3.4.2(A) through (C).

(A) A shutoff valve or check valve shall be installed downstream of each pressure regulator.

(B) A pressure relief valve set at 50 percent above normal line pressure shall be installed downstream of the shutoff valve or check valve required in 5.3.3.4.2(A).

(C) Pressure relief valves shall be of brass, bronze, or stainless steel and designed for oxygen service.

5.3.3.4.3 Flexible connectors of other than all-metal construction used to connect outlets of pressure regulators to fixed piping shall not exceed 1520 mm (5 ft) in length and shall not penetrate walls, floors, ceilings, or partitions.

5.3.3.4.3.1 Flexible connectors shall comply with the provisions of 5.3.3.4.1.2.

5.3.3.4.3.2 Flexible connectors shall have a pressure rating of at least a gage pressure of 6895 kPa (1000 psi).

5.3.3.4.4 Supply systems supplying only a single treatment facility shall contain the following: Two banks of cylinders each containing the greater of either at least an average dayʼs supply or one of the following:

(1) When storage is not remote, two cylinders of oxygen and one cylinder of nitrous oxide (if used)

(2) When storage is remote, two cylinders of oxygen and two cylinders of nitrous oxide (if used)

(A) The cylinders for each gas service shall be manifolded so that the cylinders can alternately supply the piping system.

(B) When the primary bank is unable to supply the system, the secondary bank shall be capable of being switched to supply the system.

(C) When storage is not remote, either manual or automatic switchover shall be permitted to be used.

(D) When the supply system is remote, automatic switchover shall be provided.

5.3.3.4.5 Supply systems supplying multiple treatment facilities shall contain the following: Two banks of cylinders each containing at least the greater of an average dayʼs supply or two cylinders of oxygen and two cylinders of nitrous oxide (if used).

(A) The cylinders for each gas service shall be manifolded so that the cylinders can alternately supply the piping system.

(B) When the primary bank is unable to supply the system, the secondary bank shall automatically operate to supply the piping system.

5.3.3.5 Level 3 Gas-Powered Devices Supply Systems.

5.3.3.5.1 Level 3 gas-powered devices supply systems shall be used where compressed air is required to drive dynamic devices used for patient treatment.

5.3.3.5.1.1 A gas-powered devices supply system shall be permitted to be used to supply power to gas-driven devices for scavenging but only where the exhaust of the scavenging device is a closed vent to the outside of the building.

5.3.3.5.2 Level 3 gas-powered devices supply systems shall be obtained from and be installed under the supervision of a manufacturer(s) or supplier(s) familiar with proper practices for its construction and use.

5.3.3.5.3 Level 3 gas-powered devices supply systems shall include the following:

(1) Disconnect switch(es)

(2) Motor-starting device(s)

(3) Motor overload protection device(s)

(4) One or more compressors

(5) For single, duplex, or multi- compressor systems, a means for activation/deactivation of each individual compressor

(6) When multiple compressors are used, manual or automatic means to alternate individual compressors

(7) When multiple compressors are used, manual or automatic means to activate the additional unit(s) should the in-service unit(s) be incapable of maintaining adequate pressure

(8) Intake filter–muffler(s) of the dry type

(9) Receiver(s) with drain plug or a manual drain or an automatic drain

(10) Shutoff valves

(11) Air dryer(s) that maintain 40 percent relative humidity at operating pressure and temperature

(12) In-line final particulate filters rated at 5 microns, 98 percent efficiency, with filter status indicator to ensure the delivery of compressed air with a maximum allowable 0.05 ppm liquid oil

(13) Pressure regulator(s)

(14) Pressure relief valve

(15) Pressure indicator

(16) Moisture indicator

(17) Oil indicator

5.3.3.5.3.1 A reserve for cylinders shall be permitted to be used to supplement or act as a reserve for the compressor source.

5.3.3.5.4 Receiver.

5.3.3.5.4.1 Receiver(s) shall have the capacity to prevent short cycling of the compressor(s).

5.3.3.5.4.2 Receiver(s) shall comply with Section VIII, Unfired Pressure Vessels, of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.

5.3.3.5.5 Moisture Indicator.

5.3.3.5.5.1 The moisture indicator shall be located in the active air stream prior to or after the receiver and upstream of any system pressure regulators.

5.3.3.5.5.2 The moisture indicator shall indicate (i.e., by color change, digital readout, or other method understood by the user) when the relative humidity of the compressed air exceeds 40 percent at line pressure and temperature.

5.3.3.5.6 Oil Indicator.

5.3.3.5.6.1 The oil indicator shall be located downstream of the receiver.

5.3.3.5.6.2 The oil indicator shall measure (i.e., by color change, digital readout, or other method understood by the user) an oil concentration of 0.05 ppm ± 0.03 ppm in air at a gage pressure of 550 to 690 kPa (80 to 100 psi).

5.3.3.5.7 Source of Intake Air.

5.3.3.5.7.1 Air sources for a compressor(s) located inside the building shall meet the following requirements:

(1) Be located within a room where no chemical-based material is stored or used and that is not an operatory

(2) Not be taken from a room or space in which there is an open or semi-open discharge from a Level 3 vacuum or scavenging system

5.3.3.5.7.2 Air sources for a compressor(s) located outside the building shall be drawn from locations where no contamination from vacuum or scavenging system discharges or particulate matter is anticipated.

5.3.3.5.8 Cylinder Gas Reserves/Supplements to Compressor Sources.

5.3.3.5.8.1 When used, cylinder reserves/supplements for compressor sources shall be a system of cylinders and necessary supply equipment that will permit supplying the required supply gas as an alternative to the compressor supplied air.

5.3.3.5.8.2 When the content of one primary cylinder is unable to supply the normal operating pressures, the secondary cylinder(s) shall be activated manually or automatically.

5.3.3.5.8.3 When used, cylinder gas reserves/supplements to compressor sources shall be piped into the system through a check valve and shutoff valve located in each supply line prior to the tee connection to the main line.

5.3.3.5.8.4 The designed operating pressure shall be below a gage pressure of 1100 kPa (160 psi).

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 995.3.3.5.8.5 Reserves/supplements to compressor source systems shall either have regulator(s) mounted on the individual cylinder(s) or the cylinder(s) may be connected to a manifold via pigtail with pressure regulated at the manifold.

5.3.3.5.8.6 When nitrogen is used as the gas in a reserves/supplement to a compressor source, the following shall be permitted to apply:

(1) The volume of nitrogen connected and in storage shall not be considered in the limit of 84,950 L (3000 ft3) of medical gases (e.g., oxygen and nitrous oxide) for classification as Level 3 and the ventilation of enclosures.

(2) Nitrogen gas cylinders shall be permitted to be stored in compressor rooms.

(3) The gas used shall be oil-free, dry Nitrogen NF.

5.3.3.6 Level 3 Vacuum Systems.

5.3.3.6.1 Level 3 vacuum sources shall be obtained from and be installed under the supervision of a manufacturer(s) or supplier(s) familiar with its installation and use.

5.3.3.6.2 Level 3 vacuum sources shall include the following:

(1) Pump or pumps suited for wet or dry service as intended in the design

(2) If intended for wet service, a liquid/air separator

5.3.3.6.3 Drains.

5.3.3.6.3.1 Liquids drained from a Level 3 vacuum source shall be directly connected to a sanitary drainage system through a trapped and vented drain.

5.3.3.6.3.2 Where the drainage is from a waste holding tank on the suction side of the vacuum source the following requirements shall be met:

(1) A check valve shall be installed in the drain line from the holding tank.

(2) The trap in the building drainage system shall be the deep-seal type that is conventionally vented within the plumbing system.

(3) An additional vent shall be installed between the holding tank drain check valve and the drain trap, on the inlet side of the trap, to close and seal the check valve while the holding tank is operating under vacuum and collecting waste.

(4) The additional vent described in (3) shall be permitted to be connected to the plumbing system vents.

(5) Both of the vents in (3) and (4) shall extend vertically to not less than 152 mm (6 in.) above the top of the holding tank before turning horizontal.

(6) The trap and drain branch shall be not less than two pipe sizes larger than the waste pipe from the separator, but not less than DN50 (NPS 2).

(7) The trap seal shall be not less than 100 mm (4 in.) deep.

(8) The vent for the vacuum check valve shall be not less than the size of the check valve.

(9) The vent for the trap shall be not less than one-half the size of the trap and drain branch.

5.3.3.6.3.3 Where the drainage is at a positive pressure from an air/waste separator on the discharge side of the vacuum source the following requirements shall be met:

(1) The trap in the building drainage system shall be the deep-seal type that is conventionally vented within the plumbing system.

(2) The trap vent shall extend vertically to not less than 152 mm (6 in.) above the top of the separator before turning horizontal.

(3) The trap and drain branch shall be not less than two pipe sizes larger than the waste pipe from the separator, but not less than DN40 (NPS 11⁄2).

(4) The vent shall be the full size of the trap and drain.

(5) The trap seal shall be at least two times the exhaust back pressure in the separator, but not less than 100 mm (4 in.) deep.

5.3.3.6.4 Exhausts.

5.3.3.6.4.1 The gas discharge from a Level 3 vacuum source shall be piped to the outside.

5.3.3.6.4.2 The discharge point shall be chosen to minimize the hazards of noise.

5.3.3.6.4.3 The discharge point shall be located remote from any door, window, or other opening in the building.

5.3.3.6.4.4 The discharge point shall be located at a different level than air intakes.

5.3.3.6.4.5 The discharge point shall not be located where affected by prevailing winds, adjacent buildings, topography, or other obstacles to the rapid dispersion of the exhaust gases.

5.3.3.6.4.6 The discharge point shall be protected against the entry of insects, vermin, debris, and precipitation.

5.3.3.6.4.7 The discharge piping shall be sized to prevent back pressure greater than the pump manufacturerʼs recommendations.

5.3.3.6.4.8 Where multiple pumps discharge through a common pipe, each pump shall be fitted with a check valve, a manual isolation valve, or shall be arranged to permit capping the individual pump exhausts when a pump is removed for service.

5.3.3.6.4.9 Where multiple pumps discharge through a common pipe, piping shall be arranged following the pump manufacturerʼs recommendations.

5.3.4 Level 3 Valves.

5.3.4.1 Emergency Shutoff Valves.

(A) Where the central supply is remote from the medical gas system use points, the main supply line shall be provided with a shutoff valve so located in the single treatment facility as to be accessible from use-point locations in an emergency.

(B) Where the supply is remote from a single treatment facility, the main supply line shall be provided with a shutoff valve so located in the single treatment facility as to be accessible from use-point locations in an emergency. Such valves shall be labeled to indicate the gas controlled and shall shut off only the gas to that single treatment facility. A remotely activated shutoff at the supply cylinder shall not be used for emergency shutoff. For clinical purposes, such a remote actuator shall not fail-closed in the event of a loss of electric power. If remote actuators are the type that fail-open, it shall be mandatory that cylinder shutoff valves be closed whenever the system is not in use.

(C) Where the central supply system supplies two single treatment facilities, each facility shall be provided with a shutoff valve so located in each treatment facility as to be accessible from the use-point locations in an emergency. Such valves shall be labeled to indicate the gas controlled and shall shut off only the gas to that single treatment facility. A remotely activated shutoff at the supply manifold shall not be used for emergency shutoff valves for dual treatment facility installations. For clinical purposes, such a remote actuator shall not fail-closed in the event of a loss of electric power. If remote actuators are the type that fail-open, it shall be mandatory that cylinder shutoff valves be closed whenever the system is not in use.

(D) Each riser supplied from the main line shall be provided with a shutoff valve adjacent to the riser connection. Riser valves shall remain accessible and shall not be obstructed.

5.3.5 Station and Service Inlets and Outlets.

5.3.5.1 Factory installed tubes on station outlets used for medical gases (e.g., oxygen and nitrous oxide) extending no more than 205 mm (8 in.) from the body of the terminal shall be not less than DN8 (NPS 1⁄4) (3/8 in. O.D.) size with 8 mm (0.3 in.) minimum inside diameter.

5.3.5.2 The service outlet for Level 3 gas-powered devices shall not be interchangeable with a medical air station outlet.

5.3.5.3 The service inlet for Level 3 vacuum shall be permitted to be either a shutoff valve with a threaded female pipe connector or a quick connect fitting with a single check valve.

5.3.6 Level 3 Manufactured Assemblies. (Reserved)

5.3.7 Level 3 Surface Mounted Medical Gas Rails. (Reserved)

5.3.8 Level 3 Pressure and Vacuum Indicators. (Reserved)

5.3.9 Level 3 Warning Systems.

5.3.9.1 Warning systems for medical gases (e.g., oxygen and nitrous oxide) in Level 3 facilities shall provide the alarm functions of a Level 1 facility as required in 5.1.9, except as follows:

(1) Area and local alarms shall not be required.

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99(2) Warning systems shall be permitted to have a single alarm panel.

(3) The alarm panel shall be located in an area of continuous surveillance while the facility is in operation.

(4) Pressure switches/sensors that monitor main line pressure shall be mounted at the source equipment with a pressure indicator at the alarm panel.

(5) Changeover alarms to suit the arrangement of the source equipment shall be provided.

5.3.9.2 Systems for gases such as compressed air or nitrogen used to power devices, as well as Level 3 vacuum systems, shall not be required to have warning systems.

5.3.10 Level 3 Distribution.

5.3.10.1 Piping Materials for Field-Installed Level 3 Positive-Pressure Gas Systems.

5.3.10.1.1 Piping for Medical Gases. Piping for Level 3 positive-pressure nonflammable medical gases (e.g., oxygen and nitrous oxide) shall meet the requirements in 5.3.10.1.1(A) through (B).

(A) Tubes, valves, fittings, station outlets, and other piping components in medical gas systems shall have been cleaned for oxygen service by the manufacturer prior to installation in accordance with CGA 4.1 Cleaning Equipment for Oxygen Service.

(B) Each length of tube shall be delivered plugged or capped by the manufacturer and kept sealed until prepared for installation.

(C) Fittings, valves, and other components shall be delivered sealed and labeled by the manufacturer and kept sealed until prepared for installation.

(D) Tubes shall be hard-drawn seamless copper ASTM B 819 medical gas tube, Type L or K.

(E) ASTM B 819 medical gas tube shall be identified by the manufacturerʼs markings “OXY,” “MED,” “OXY/MED,” “OXY/ACR,” or “ACR/MED” in blue (Type L) or green (Type K).

5.3.10.1.1 Piping for Medical Gases. Piping for Level 3 medical gases (e.g., oxygen and nitrous oxide) shall meet the requirements in 5.1.10.1 (Level 1).

5.3.10.1.2 Piping for Level 3 Gas-Powered Devices. Tubes shall be hard-drawn seamless copper; either ASTM B 819 medical gas tube (Type K or L), ASTM B 88 water tube (Type K or L), or ASTM B 280 ACR tube (O.D. size), except that tube installed underground or within floor slabs shall be permitted to be soft annealed temper.

5.3.10.2 Piping Materials for Field-Installed Level 3 Vacuum Systems.

5.3.10.2.1 In copper piping systems, the tubes shall be hard-drawn seamless copper, either ASTM B 819 medical gas tube (Type K or L), ASTM B 88 water tube (Type K, L, or M), or ASTM B 280 ACR tube (O.D. size).

5.3.10.2.2 Copper tube installed underground or within floor slabs shall be permitted to be soft annealed temper.

5.3.10.2.3 In plastic piping systems, the pipe shall be polyvinylchoride (PVC) plastic, Schedule 40 minimum.

5.3.10.3 Fittings.

5.3.10.3.1 Turns, offsets, and other changes in direction in medical gas piping, copper Level 3 vacuum piping, and piping for gas-powered devices shall be made with brazed wrought copper capillary fittings complying with ANSI B16.22, Wrought Copper and Copper Alloy Solder-Joint Fittings, or brazing fittings complying with MSS SP-73, Brazed Joints for Wrought and Cast Copper Alloy Solder Joint Pressure Fittings.

5.3.10.3.2 Cast copper alloy fittings shall not be used where joints are brazed.

5.3.10.3.3 Branch connections in copper vacuum piping systems shall be permitted to be made using mechanically formed, drilled, and extruded tee-branch connections that are formed in accordance with the tool manufacturerʼs instructions, and brazed.

5.3.10.3.4 Turns, offsets, and other changes in direction in plastic Level 3 vacuum piping shall be made with solvent-cemented PVC plastic pressure fittings, Schedule 40 minimum.

5.3.10.4 Threaded Joints. Threaded joints in Level 3 gas-powered systems and vacuum distribution piping shall meet the following requirements:

(1) Be limited to connections to pressure/vacuum indicators, alarm devices, and source equipment

(2) Have tapered pipe threads complying with ANSI B1.20.1, Pipe Threads, General Purpose

(3) Be made up with polytetrafluoroethylene (such as Teflon™) tape or other thread sealant recommended for oxygen service, with the sealant applied to the male threads only

5.3.10.4 Threaded Joints. Threaded joints shall comply with 5.1.10.4 (Level 1).

5.3.10.5 Soldered Joints. Soldered joints in copper Level 3 vacuum and Level 3 gas-powered systems piping shall be made in accordance with ASTM B 828, Making Capillary Joints by Soldering of Copper and Copper Alloy Tube and Fittings, using a “lead-free” solder filler metal containing not more than 0.2 percent lead by volume.

5.3.10.6 Solvent-Cemented Joints. Solvent-cemented joints in plastic Level 3 vacuum piping shall be in accordance with ASTM D 2855, Practice for Making Solvent-Cemented Joints in PolyVinyl Chloride (PVC) Pipe and Fittings.

5.3.10.7 Brazed Joints.

5.3.10.7.1 General Requirements.

5.3.10.7.1.1 Brazed joints shall be made using a brazing alloy that exhibits a melting temperature in excess of 538°C (1000°F) to retain the integrity of the piping system in the event of fire exposure.

5.3.10.7.1.2 Brazed tube joints shall be the socket type.

5.3.10.7.1.3 Filler metals shall bond with and be metallurgically compatible with the base metals being joined.

5.3.10.7.1.4 Filler metals shall comply with ANSI/AWS A.5.8, Specification for Brazing Filler Metal.

5.3.10.7.1.5 Copper-to-copper joints shall be brazed using a copper–phosphorus or copper–phosphorus–silver brazing filler metal (BCuP series) without flux.

5.3.10.7.1.6 Joints to be brazed in place shall be accessible for necessary preparation, assembly, heating, filler application, cooling, cleaning, and inspection.

5.3.10.7.2 Cutting Tube Ends.

5.3.10.7.2.1 Tube ends shall be cut square using a sharp tubing cutter to avoid deforming the tube.

5.3.10.7.2.2 The cutting wheels on tubing cutters shall be free from grease, oil, or other lubricant not recommended for oxygen service.

5.3.10.7.2.3 The cut ends of the tube shall be deburred with a sharp, clean deburring tool, taking care to prevent chips from entering the tube.

5.3.10.7.3 Cleaning Joints for Brazing.

5.3.10.7.3.1 The interior surfaces of tubes, fittings, and other components that are cleaned for oxygen service shall be stored and handled to avoid contamination prior to assembly and brazing.

5.3.10.7.3.2 The exterior surfaces of tube ends shall be cleaned prior to brazing to remove any oxides and surface dirt and to roughen the surfaces to prepare them for brazing.

5.3.10.7.3.3 If the interior surfaces of fitting sockets that were cleaned for oxygen become contaminated prior to brazing, they shall be re-cleaned for oxygen in accordance with 5.3.10.7.3.9 and be cleaned for brazing with a clean, oil-free wire brush.

5.3.10.7.3.4 Non-abrasive pads shall be used to clean the exterior surfaces of tube ends.

5.3.10.7.3.5 The use of steel wool or sand cloth shall be prohibited.

5.3.10.7.3.6 The cleaning process shall not result in grooving of the surfaces to be joined.

5.3.10.7.3.7 After being abraded, the surfaces shall be wiped using a clean, lint-free white cloth.

5.3.10.7.3.8 Tubes, fittings, valves, and other components shall be visually examined internally before being joined to verify that they have not become contaminated for oxygen service (if so required) and that they are free of obstructions or debris.

5.3.10.7.3.9 The interior surfaces of tube ends, fittings, and other components that were cleaned for oxygen service by the manufacturer, but become contaminated prior to being installed, shall be permitted to be re-cleaned on-site

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99by the installer by thoroughly scrubbing the interior surfaces with a clean, hot water/alkaline solution, such as sodium carbonate or trisodium phosphate, mixed 450 g to 11 L (1 lb to 3 gal) of potable water and thoroughly rinsing them with clean, hot potable water.

5.3.10.7.3.10 Other aqueous cleaning solutions shall be permitted to be used for the on-site re-cleaning permitted in 5.3.10.7.3.9, provided that they are as recommended in CGA Pamphlet G-4.1, Cleaning Equipment for Oxygen Service, and are listed in CGA Pamphlet O2-DIR, Directory of Cleaning Agents for Oxygen Service.

5.3.10.7.3.11 Material that has become contaminated internally and is not clean for oxygen service (if so required) shall not be installed.

5.3.10.7.3.12 Joints shall be brazed within one hour after the surfaces are cleaned for brazing.

5.3.10.7.4 Brazing Dissimilar Metals.

5.3.10.7.4.1 Flux shall only be used when brazing dissimilar metals, such as copper and bronze or brass, using a silver (BAg series) brazing filler metal.

5.3.10.7.4.2 Surfaces shall be cleaned for brazing in accordance with 5.3.10.7.3.

5.3.10.7.4.3 Flux shall be applied sparingly to minimize contamination of the inside of the tube with flux.

5.3.10.7.4.4 The flux shall be applied and worked over the cleaned surfaces to be brazed using a stiff, stainless steel bristle brush to ensure complete coverage and wetting of the surfaces with flux.

5.3.10.7.4.5 Where possible, short sections of copper tube shall be brazed onto the non-copper component and the interior of the subassembly shall be cleaned of flux prior to installation in the piping system.

5.3.10.7.4.6 On joints DN20 (NPS 3⁄4) (7/8 in. O.D.) size and smaller, flux-coated brazing rods shall be permitted to be used in lieu of applying flux to the surfaces being joined.

5.3.10.7.5 Nitrogen Purge.

5.3.10.7.5.1 While being brazed, joints shall be continuously purged with oil-free, dry Nitrogen NF to prevent the formation of copper oxide on the inside surfaces of the joint.

5.3.10.7.5.2 The source of the purge gas shall be monitored and the installer shall be audibly alerted when the content is low.

5.3.10.7.5.3 The purge gas flow rate shall not produce a positive pressure in the piping system.

5.3.10.7.5.4 The purge gas flow rate shall be controlled by the use of a pressure regulator and flow meter, or combination thereof.

5.3.10.7.5.5 Pressure regulators alone shall not be used to control purge gas flow rates.

5.3.10.7.5.6 During and after installation, openings in the piping system shall be kept capped or plugged to maintain a nitrogen atmosphere within the piping and to prevent debris or other contaminants from entering the system.

5.3.10.7.5.7 While a joint is being brazed, a discharge opening shall be provided on the opposite side of the joint from where the purge gas is being introduced.

5.3.10.7.5.8 The flow of purge gas shall be maintained until the joint is cool to the touch.

5.3.10.7.5.9 After the joint has cooled, the purge discharge opening shall be plugged or capped to prevent contamination of the inside of the tube and maintain the nitrogen atmosphere within the piping system.

5.3.10.7.5.10 The final connection of new piping to an existing in-use pipeline shall be permitted to be made without the use of a nitrogen purge.

5.3.10.7.5.11 After a final connection in a Level 3 positive-pressure gas pipeline is made without a nitrogen purge, an outlet in the immediate downstream zone of the affected portion(s) of both the new and existing in-use piping shall be tested in accordance with 5.3.12.3.9, Final Tie-In Test.

5.3.10.7.6 Assembling and Heating Joints.

5.3.10.7.6.1 Tube ends shall be inserted fully into the socket of the fitting.

5.3.10.7.6.2 Where flux is permitted, the joint shall be heated slowly until the flux has liquefied.

5.3.10.7.6.3 After flux is liquefied, or where flux is not permitted to be used, the joint shall be heated quickly to the brazing temperature, taking care not to overheat the joint.

5.3.10.7.6.4 Techniques for heating the joint, applying the brazing filler metal, and making horizontal, vertical, and large-diameter joints shall be as stated in sections on Applying Heat and Brazing and Horizontal and Vertical Joints in Chapter VII, Brazed Joints in the CDA Copper Tube Handbook.

5.3.10.7.7 Inspection of Brazed or Soldered Joints.

5.3.10.7.7.1 After brazing or soldering, the outside of all joints shall be cleaned by washing with water and a wire brush to remove any residue and permit clear visual inspection of the joint.

5.3.10.7.7.2 Where flux has been used, the wash water shall be hot.

5.3.10.7.7.3 Each joint shall be visually inspected after cleaning the outside surfaces.

5.3.10.7.7.4 Joints exhibiting the following conditions shall not be permitted:

(1) Flux or flux residue (when flux or flux-coated BAg rods are used with dissimilar metals)

(2) Base metal melting or erosion

(3) Unmelted filler metal

(4) Failure of the filler metal to be clearly visible all the way around the joint at the interface between the socket and the tube

(5) Cracks in the tube or component

(6) Cracks in the braze or solder filler metal

(7) Failure of the joint to hold the test pressure or vacuum under the installer-performed initial pressure or vacuum test (5.3.12.2.3 or 5.3.12.2.4) and standing pressure or vacuum test (5.3.12.2.7 or 5.3.12.2.8).

5.3.10.7.7.5 Joints that are identified as defective under conditions 5.3.10.7.7.4(2) or (5) shall be replaced.

5.3.10.7.7.6 Joints that are found to be defective under conditions 5.3.10.7.7.4(1), (3), (4), (6), or (7) shall be permitted to be repaired, except that no joint shall be reheated more than once before being replaced.

5.3.10.7 Brazed Joints. Brazed joints shall comply with 5.1.10.5.1 through 5.1.10.5.8 (Level 1).

5.3.10.8 Special Joints.

5.3.10.8.1 The following joints shall be prohibited throughout Level 3 medical gas (e.g., oxygen and nitrous oxide) pipeline systems:

(1) Flared and compression connections, including connections to station outlets and inlets, alarm devices, and other components

(2) Other straight-threaded connections, including unions

5.3.10.8.2 Flared and compression connections shall be permitted in piping for Level 3 gas-powered devices and Level 3 vacuum in junction boxes, and where exposed at station outlets/inlets and source equipment.

5.3.10.9 Special Fittings. The following special fittings shall be permitted to be used in lieu of brazed joints:

(1) Memory-metal couplings having temperature and pressure ratings joints not less than that of a brazed joint

(2) Listed or approved metallic gas tube fittings that, when made up, provide a permanent joint having the mechanical, thermal, and sealing integrity of a brazed joint

5.3.10.10 Installation of Level 3 Piping and Equipment.

5.3.10.10.1 Qualification of Installers.

5.3.10.10.1.1 The installation of Level 3 gas and vacuum systems shall be made by qualified, competent technicians who are experienced in making such installations.

5.3.10.10.1.2 The installers of Level 3 medical gas systems (e.g., oxygen and nitrous oxide) shall be qualified under the requirements of ASSE 6010, Medical Gas Systems Installers Professional Qualifications Standard.

5.3.10.10.1.3 Brazing on medical gas system pipelines shall be performed by individuals who are qualified under the provisions of 5.3.10.10.15.

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 995.3.10.10.1.4 Prior to any installation work involving brazing, the installer of Level 3 medical gas piping shall provide documentation for the qualification of brazing procedures and individual brazers that is required under 5.3.10.10.15.

5.3.10.10.2 Pipe Sizing. Piping systems shall be designed and sized to deliver the required flow rates at the utilization pressures.

5.3.10.10.3 Minimum Pipe Sizes.

5.3.10.10.3.1 Mains, branches, and drops to individual service outlets in Level 3 oxygen piping systems shall be not less than DN10 (NPS 3/8) (1⁄2 in. O.D.) size.

5.3.10.10.3.2 Mains, branches, and drops to individual service outlets and inlets in the following piping systems shall be not less than DN8 (NPS 1⁄4) (3/8 in. O.D.) size:

(1) Level 3 medical gases other than oxygen (e.g., nitrous oxide)

(2) Gas-powered devices

(3) Level 3 vacuum

5.3.10.10.3.3 Runouts to alarm panels and connecting tubing for pressure/vacuum indicators and alarm devices shall be permitted to be DN8 (NPS 1⁄4) (3/8 in. O.D.)

5.3.10.10.4 Protection of Piping. Piping shall be protected against freezing, corrosion, and physical damage.

5.3.10.10.4.1 Piping exposed in corridors and other areas where subject to physical damage from the movement of carts, stretchers, portable equipment, or vehicles shall be protected.

5.3.10.10.4.2 Piping underground within buildings or embedded in concrete floors or walls shall be installed in a continuous conduit.

5.3.10.10.4 Protection of Piping. Piping shall be protected in accordance with 5.1.10.6.2 (Level 1).

5.3.10.10.5 Location of Piping. Piping for Level 3 medical gases, Level 3 gas-powered devices, and Level 3 vacuum systems shall be located in accordance with 5.3.10.10.5(A) through (C):

(A) Piping shall be installed overhead wherever possible.

(B) Piping shall not be installed in electrical switchgear rooms, elevator shafts, and areas having open flames.

(C) Medical gas piping (e.g., oxygen and nitrous oxide) shall not be located where subject to contact with oil.

5.3.10.10.6 Pipe Support

5.3.10.10.6.1 Piping shall be supported from the building structure in accordance with MSS Standard Practice SP-69, Piping Hangers and Supports — Selection and Application.

5.3.10.10.6.2 Hangers and supports shall comply with MSS Standard Practice SP-58,Pipe Hangers and Supports — Materials, Design, and Manufacture.

5.3.10.10.6.3 Hangers for copper tube shall be sized for copper tube and have a copper finish.

5.3.10.10.6.4 In potentially damp locations, copper tube hangers and supports that are in contact with the tube shall be plastic-coated or otherwise be electrically insulated from the tube.

5.3.10.10.6.5 Maximum support spacing for copper tubing shall be in accordance with Table 5.3.10.10.6.5.

Table 5.3.10.10.6.5 Maximum Pipe Support SpacingHanger Spacing

Pipe Size mm ftDN8 (NPS 1⁄4) (3/8 in. O.D.) 1520 5DN10 (NPS 3/8) (1⁄2 in. O.D.) 1830 6DN15 (NPS 1⁄2) (5/8 in. O.D.) 1830 6DN20 (NPS 3⁄4) (7/8 in. O.D.) 2130 7DN25 (NPS 1) (11/8 in. O.D.) 2440 8DN 32 (NPS 11⁄4) (13/8 in. O.D.) 2740 9DN40 (NPS 11⁄2) (1 5/8 in. O.D.) and larger 3050 10Vertical risers, all sizes Every floor, but not to exceed: 4570 15

5.3.10.10.6.1 Copper tubing shall be supported in accordance with 5.1.10.6.4 (Level 1).

5.3.10.10.6.6 5.3.10.10.6.2 PVC plastic piping for Level 3 vacuum systems shall be supported at a maximum spacing of 1220 mm (4 ft), except that vertical piping shall be supported at every floor and with mid-story guides.

5.3.10.10.6.7 5.3.10.10.6.3 Where required, Level 3 gas and vacuum piping shall be seismically restrained against earthquakes in accordance with the applicable building code.

5.3.10.10.7 Piping Within Floor Slabs and Underground Within Buildings. The following conditions shall be permitted only when piping must be installed within a floor slab or underground within a building in order to reach the service outlets or inlets served.

5.3.10.10.7.1 Tubes shall be permitted to be annealed, soft-temper, seamless copper tube up to DN10 (NPS 3/8) (1⁄2 in. O.D.) maximum size.

5.3.10.10.7.2 Tubes shall have been cleaned for oxygen service in accordance with CGA Pamphlet G-4.1, Cleaning Equipment for Oxygen Service.

5.3.10.10.7.3 The tube(s) shall be installed in one (or more) continuous conduits that are of sufficient size to permit subsequent installation, removal, and replacement of the gas and/or vacuum lines.

5.3.10.10.7.4 Each tube pulled into the conduit shall be a continuous length having no joints within the conduit.

5.3.10.10.8 Underground Piping Outside of Buildings.

5.3.10.10.8.1 Underground piping outside of buildings shall be installed below the local level of frost penetration.

5.3.10.10.8.2 Underground piping shall be installed in a continuous enclosure to protect the pipe during backfilling.

5.3.10.10.8.3 The continuous enclosure shall be split or otherwise provide access at the joints during visual inspection and leak testing.

5.3.10.10.8.4 Underground piping that will be subject to surface loads shall be buried at a depth that will protect the piping and its enclosure from excessive stresses.

5.3.10.10.8.5 The minimum backfilled cover above the top of the enclosure for underground piping outside of buildings shall be 920 mm (36 in.), except that the minimum cover shall be permitted to be reduced to 460 mm (18 in.) where the pipeline is not subject to physical damage.

5.3.10.10.8.6 Trenches shall be excavated so that the pipe enclosure has firm, substantially continuous bearing on the bottom of the trench.

5.3.10.10.8.7 Backfill shall be clean and compacted so as to protect and uniformly support the pipe enclosure.

5.3.10.10.8.8 A continuous tape or marker placed immediately above the enclosure shall clearly identify the pipeline by specific name.

5.3.10.10.8.9 A continuous warning means shall also be provided above the pipeline enclosure at approximately one-half the depth of bury.

5.3.10.10.8.10 Where underground piping is installed through a wall sleeve, the ends of the sleeve shall be sealed to prevent the entrance of ground water into the building.

5.3.10.10.8 Underground Piping Outside of Buildings. Underground piping outside of buildings shall comply with 5.1.10.6.5 (Level 1).

5.3.10.10.9 Branch Takeoffs. Runouts from horizontal piping shall be taken off above the centerline of the main or branch pipe and rise vertically or at an angle of not less than 45 degrees from vertical.

5.3.10.10.9 Branch Takeoffs. Branch takeoffs from horizontal piping shall comply with 5.1.10.6.6 (Level 1).

5.3.10.10.10 Special Requirements for Level 3 Vacuum Piping.

5.3.10.10.10.1 Horizontal piping in Level 3 vacuum systems shall be sloped a minimum of 7 mm per 3050 mm (1/4 in. per 10 ft) toward the vacuum source equipment.

5.3.10.10.10.2 Horizontal piping shall include no sags or low points that will permit fluids or debris to accumulate.

5.3.10.10.10.3 Accessible cleanouts shall be provided where necessary to clear the piping of obstructions.

5.3.10.10.11 Hose and Flexible Connectors.

5.3.10.10.11.1 Hose and flexible connectors, both metallic and non-metallic, shall be no longer than necessary and shall not penetrate or be concealed in walls, floors, ceilings, or partitions.

5.3.10.10.11.2 Flexible connectors, metallic or non-metallic, shall have a minimum burst pressure, with a gage pressure of 6895 kPa (1000 psi).

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 995.3.10.10.11 Hose and Flexible Connectors. Hose and flexible connectors shall comply with 5.1.10.6.7 (Level 1).

5.3.10.10.12 Prohibited System Interconnections.

5.3.10.10.12.1 Two or more piping systems for medical gases, gas-powered devices, and Level 3 vacuum shall not be interconnected for testing or any other reason.

5.3.10.10.12.2 Leak testing shall be accomplished by separately charging and testing each individual piping system.

5.3.10.10.12 Prohibited System Interconnections. Prohibited system interconnections shall be as indicated in 5.1.10.6.8 (Level 1).

5.3.10.10.13 System Manufacturerʼs Instructions.

5.3.10.10.13.1 The installation of individual components shall be made in accordance with the instructions of the system manufacturer.

5.3.10.10.13.2 Such instructions shall include directions and information deemed by the system manufacturer to be necessary for attaining proper operation, testing, and maintenance of the system.

5.3.10.10.13.3 Copies of system manufacturerʼs instructions shall be left with the system owner.

5.3.10.10.13 System Manufacturerʼs Instructions. The requirements for system manufacturerʼs instructions shall be in accordance with 5.1.10.6.9 (Level 1).

5.3.10.10.14 Changes in System Use.

5.3.10.10.14.1 Where a Level 3 positive-pressure gas piping distribution system originally used or constructed for use at one pressure or for one gas is converted for operation at another pressure or for another gas, all provisions of 5.3.10 shall apply as if the system were new.

5.3.10.10.14.2 Piping for Level 3 gas-powered devices or Level 3 vacuum shall not be permitted to be converted for use as a medical gas piping system (e.g., oxygen or nitrous oxide).

5.3.10.10.15 Qualification of Brazing Procedures and Brazing.

5.3.10.10.15.1 Brazing procedures and brazer performance for the installation of Level 3 brazed piping shall be qualified the same as for Level 1 piping, in accordance with either Section IX, Welding and Brazing Qualifications, of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, or AWS B2.2, Standard for Brazing Procedure and Performance Qualifications, both as modified by 5.3.10.10.15.2 through 5.3.10.10.15.5.

5.3.10.10.15.2 Brazers shall be qualified by visual examination of the test coupon followed by sectioning.

5.3.10.10.15.3 The brazing procedure specification shall address cleaning, joint clearance, overlap, internal purge gas, purge gas flow rate, and filler metal.

5.3.10.10.15.4 The brazing procedure specification and the record of brazer performance qualification shall document filler metal used, cleaning, joint clearance, overlap, internal purge gas and flow rate during brazing of coupon, and the absence of internal oxidation in the completed coupon.

5.3.10.10.15.5 Brazing procedures qualified by a technically competent group or agency shall be permitted under the following conditions:

(1) The brazing procedure specification and the procedure qualification record meet the requirements of this standard.

(2) The employer obtains a copy of both the brazing procedure specification and the supporting qualification records from the group or agency and signs and dates these records, thereby accepting responsibility for the qualifications that were performed by the group or agency.

(3) The employer qualifies at least one brazer following each brazing procedure specification used.

5.3.10.10.15.6 An employer shall be permitted to accept brazer qualification records of a previous employer under the following conditions:

(1) The brazer has been qualified following the same or an equivalent procedure that the new employer uses.

(2) The new employer obtains a copy of the record of brazer performance qualification tests from the previous employer and signs and dates these records, thereby accepting responsibility for the qualifications performed by the previous employer.

5.3.10.10.15.7 Performance qualifications of brazers shall remain in effect indefinitely unless the brazer does not braze with the qualified procedure for a

period exceeding 6 months, or there is a specific reason to question the ability of the brazer.

5.3.10.10.15 Qualification of Brazing Procedures and Brazers Brazing procedures and brazers shall be qualified in accordance with 5.1.10.6.12 (Level 1).

5.3.11 Labeling and Identification.

5.3.11.1 Pipe Labeling.

5.3.11.1.1 Piping shall be labeled by stenciling or adhesive markers that identify the system.

5.3.11.1.2 Pipe labels shall show the name of the gas/vacuum system or the chemical symbol.

5.3.11.1.3 Where positive-pressure gas piping systems operate at pressures other than the standard gage pressure of 345 to 380 kPa (50 to 55 psi) or gage pressure of 1100 to 1275 kPa (160 to 185 psi) for nitrogen, the pipe labels shall include the nonstandard operating pressure in addition to the name or symbol of the gas.

5.3.11.1.4 Pipe labels shall be located as follows:

(1) At intervals of not more than 6100 mm (20 ft)

(2) At least once in or above every room

(3) On both sides of walls or partitions penetrated by the piping

(4) At least once in every story height traversed by risers

5.3.11.2 Shutoff Valves.

5.3.11.2.1 Shutoff valves shall be identified as to the following:

(1) The name or chemical symbol for the specific system

(2) The name of the room(s) or area(s) served

(3) A caution to not close (or open) the valve except in an emergency

5.3.11.2.2 Where positive-pressure gas systems operate at pressures other than the standard gage pressure of 345 to 380 kPA (50 to 55 psi) or gage pressure of 1100 to 1275 kPa (160 to 185 psi) for nitrogen, the valve identification shall also include the nonstandard operating pressure.

5.3.11.3 Service Outlets and Inlets.

5.3.11.3.1 Service outlets and inlets shall be identified as to the name or chemical symbol for the specific gas or vacuum provided.

5.3.11.3.2 Where positive-pressure gas systems operate at pressures other than the standard gage pressure of 345 to 380 kPa (50 to 55 psi) or gage pressure of 1100 to 1275 kPa (160 to 185 psi) for nitrogen, the station outlet identification shall include the nonstandard operating pressure.

5.3.11 Labeling and Identification. Labeling and identification for Level 3 piping shall be in accordance with 5.1.11 (Level 1).

5.3.12 Performance Criteria and Testing - Level 3 (Medical Gas, Gas-Powered Devices, Vacuum)

5.3.12.1 General.

5.3.12.1.1 Inspection and testing shall be performed on all new piped gas systems, additions, renovations, temporary installations, or repaired systems, to assure the facility, by a documented procedure, that all applicable provisions of this document have been adhered to and system integrity has been achieved or maintained.

5.3.12.1.2 Inspection and testing shall include all components of the system or portions thereof including, but not limited to, medical gas source(s), compressed air source systems (e.g., compressors, dryers, filters, regulators), alarms and monitoring safeguards, pipelines, isolation valves, and service outlets and inlets.

5.3.12.1.3 All systems that are breached and components that are subjected to additions, renovations, or replacement (e.g., new medical gas sources, compressors, dryers, alarms) shall be inspected and tested.

5.3.12.1.4 Systems shall be deemed breached at the point of pipeline intrusion by physical separation or by system component removal, replacement, or addition.

5.3.12.1.5 Breached portions of the systems subject to inspection and testing shall be confined to only the specific altered zone and components in the immediate zone or area that is located upstream for vacuum systems and downstream for pressure gases at the point or area of intrusion.

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 995.3.12.1.6 The inspection and testing reports shall be submitted directly to the party that contracted for the testing, who shall submit the report through channels to the responsible authority and any others that are required.

5.3.12.1.7 Reports shall contain detailed listings of all findings and results.

5.3.12.1.8 The responsible facility authority shall review these inspection and testing records prior to the use of any systems to assure that all findings and results of the inspection and testing have been successfully completed.

5.3.12.1.9 All documentation pertaining to inspections and testing shall be maintained on-site within the facility.

5.3.12.1.10 Before piping systems are initially put into use, the Level 3 health care facility authority shall be responsible for ascertaining that the gas/vacuum delivered at each outlet/inlet is that shown on the outlet/inlet label and that the proper connecting fittings are installed for the specific gas/vacuum. (See 5.3.12.1.11.)

5.3.12.1.11 Acceptance of the verifierʼs reports required under 5.3.12.3, System Verification, shall be permitted to satisfy the requirements of 5.3.12.1.10.

5.3.12.2 Initial Tests.

5.3.12.2.1 General.

5.3.12.2.1.1 The tests required by 5.3.12.3.1 through 5.3.12.3.13 shall be performed prior to the tests listed in 5.3.12.3, System Verification, by one or more of the following:

(1) The installer

(2) A representative of the system supplier

(3) A representative of the system manufacturer

5.3.12.2.1.2 The test gas for positive-pressure gas systems shall be oil-free, dry Nitrogen NF.

5.3.12.2.1.3 Where manufactured assemblies are to be installed, the tests required under 5.3.12.2 shall be performed as follows:

(1) After completion of the distribution piping

(2) Prior to installation or connection of manufactured assemblies supplied through flexible hoses or flexible tubing

(3) At all station outlets/inlets on manufactured assemblies supplied through copper tubing

5.3.12.2.2 Initial Blow Down. Piping in Level 3 positive-pressure gas distribution systems shall be blown clear by means of oil-free, dry Nitrogen NF as follows:

(1) After installation of the distribution piping

(2) Before installation of station outlets and other system components (e.g., pressure alarm devices, pressure indicators, pressure relief valves, manifolds, source equipment)

5.3.12.2.3 Initial Pressure Test for Positive-Pressure Gas Systems and Copper Level 3 Vacuum Piping.

5.3.12.2.3.1 Each section of the piping in Level 3 positive-pressure gas piping systems and copper Level 3 vacuum systems shall be pressure tested using oil-free, dry Nitrogen NF.

5.3.12.2.3.2 Initial pressure tests shall be conducted as follows:

(1) After installation of station outlets/inlets rough-in assemblies. Test caps shall be permitted to be used.

(2) Prior to the installation of components of the distribution piping system that would be damaged by the test pressure (e.g., pressure/vacuum alarm devices, pressure/vacuum indicators, line pressure relief valves).

5.3.12.2.3.3 Where Level 3 vacuum piping systems include plastic piping, they shall be inspected to assure that there are no visible cross-connections to positive-pressure gas piping systems prior to applying test pressures to the positive-pressure systems.

5.3.12.2.3.4 The source shutoff valves for all piping systems shall remain closed during these tests.

5.3.12.2.3.5 The test pressure for positive-pressure gas piping shall be 1.5 times the system working pressure but not less than a gage pressure of 1035 kPa (150 psi).

5.3.12.2.3.6 The test pressure for copper Level 3 vacuum piping shall be a gage pressure of 105 kPa (15 psi).

5.3.12.2.3.7 The test pressure shall be maintained until each joint has been examined for leakage by means of soapy water or other equally effective means of leak detection.

5.3.12.2.3.8 Leaks, if any, shall be located, replaced (if permitted) or repaired (if required) and retested.

5.3.12.2.4 Initial Leak Tests — PVC Level 3 Vacuum Piping. Plastic Level 3 vacuum piping shall be leak-tested under vacuum conditions.

5.3.12.2.4.1 Plastic Level 3 vacuum piping shall not be tested with compressed gas.

5.3.12.2.4.2 Leak tests shall be conducted after installation of station inlets.

5.3.12.2.4.3 The piping being tested shall be subjected to a vacuum of not less than 485 mm (19 in.) gage HgV, using either the vacuum source equipment or a vacuum test pump.

5.3.12.2.4.4 The test vacuum shall be maintained until each joint has been examined for leakage.

5.3.12.2.5 Initial Cross-Connection Test. The installer shall determine that no cross-connections exist between the various Level 3 gas and vacuum piping systems.

5.3.12.2.5.1 All Level 3 gas and vacuum piping systems shall be at atmospheric pressure.

5.3.12.2.5.2 Face plates for outlets/inlets shall be installed.

5.3.12.2.5.3 Level 3 vacuum piping systems shall be subjected to a vacuum of not less than 485 mm (19 in.) gage HgV, using either the vacuum source equipment or a test pump.

5.3.12.2.5.4 Each individual system gas outlet and vacuum inlet in each piping system shall be checked to determine that the vacuum is present only at the inlets for the vacuum system being tested.

5.3.12.2.5.5 The vacuum piping system shall be relieved to atmospheric pressure.

5.3.12.2.5.6 The test gas for all positive-pressure gas piping systems shall be oil-free, dry Nitrogen NF.

5.3.12.2.5.7 Sources of test gas and vacuum shall be disconnected from all piping systems except for the one system being tested.

5.3.12.2.5.8 The positive-pressure gas system being tested shall be pressurized to a gage pressure of 345 kPa (50 psi) with oil-free, dry Nitrogen NF.

5.3.12.2.5.9 Each individual system gas outlet and vacuum inlet in each installed piping system shall be checked to determine that the test gas is being dispensed only from the outlets in the piping system being tested.

5.3.12.2.5.10 The cross-connection test shall be repeated for each installed positive-pressure gas piping system.

5.3.12.2.5.11 The proper labeling and identification of system outlets/inlets shall be confirmed during these tests.

5.3.12.2.6 Initial Piping Purge Test. The outlets in each Level 3 positive-pressure gas piping system shall be purged to remove any particulate matter from the distribution piping.

5.3.12.2.6.1 The test gas shall be oil-free, dry Nitrogen NF.

5.3.12.2.6.2 Using appropriate adapters, each outlet shall be purged with an intermittent high-volume flow of test gas until the purge produces no discoloration in a clean white cloth.

5.3.12.2.6.3 The purging shall be started at the furthest outlet in the system and proceed towards the source equipment.

5.3.12.2.7 Initial Standing Pressure Test for Positive-Pressure Gas Piping. After successful completion of the initial pressure tests under 5.3.12.2.3, Level 3 positive-pressure gas distribution piping shall be subjected to a standing pressure test.

5.3.12.2.7.1 Tests shall be conducted after the installation of station outlet valve bodies and face plates, and other distribution system components (e.g., pressure alarm devices, pressure indicators, and line pressure relief valves).

5.3.12.2.7.2 The source valve shall be closed during this test.

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 995.3.12.2.7.3 The piping systems shall be subjected to a 24-hour standing pressure test using oil-free, dry Nitrogen NF.

5.3.12.2.7.4 Test pressures shall be 20 percent above the normal system operating line pressure.

5.3.12.2.7.5 At the conclusion of the tests, there shall be no change in the test pressure greater than a gage pressure of 35 kPa (5 psi).

5.3.12.2.7.6 Leaks, if any, shall be located, repaired (if permitted), replaced (if required), and retested.

5.3.12.2.8 Initial Standing Vacuum Test for Vacuum Systems. Level 3 vacuum systems, with either plastic or copper piping, shall be subjected to a standing vacuum test.

5.3.12.2.8.1 The piping system shall be subjected to a vacuum of not less than 485 mm (19 in.) gage HgV for 24 hours, using either the vacuum source equipment or a test source.

5.3.12.2.8.2 During the test, the source of test vacuum shall be disconnected from the piping system.

5.3.12.2.8.3 At the conclusion of the test, the vacuum shall not have reduced to less the 300 mm (12 in.) HgV.


5.3.12.3 System Verification.

5.3.12.3.1 General.

5.3.12.3.1.1 Verification tests shall be performed only after all tests required in 5.3.12.2 Initial Tests, have been completed.

5.3.12.3.1.2 The test gas shall be oil-free, dry Nitrogen NF or the system gas where permitted.

5.3.12.3.1.3 Testing shall be conducted by a party technically competent and experienced in the field of Level 3 gas and vacuum system verification and meeting the requirements of ANSI/ASSE Standard 6030, Medical Gas Verifiers Professional Qualifications Standard.

5.3.12.3.1.4 Testing shall be performed by a party other than the installing contractor.

5.3.12.3.1.5 All tests required under 5.3.12.3 shall be performed after installation of any manufactured assemblies supplied through flexible hose or tubing.

5.3.12.3.1.6 Where manufactured assemblies include multiple possible connection points for terminals, each possible position shall be tested independently.

5.3.12.3.1.7 For small projects affecting a limited number of areas where the use of nitrogen is impractical, the system gas shall be permitted to be used for the following tests:

(1) Standing pressure (5.3.12.3.2)

(2) Cross-connection (5.3.12.3.4)

(3) Warning system (5.3.12.3.5)

(4) Piping purge (5.3.12.3.6)

(5) Piping particulate (5.3.12.3.7)

(6) Piping purity (5.3.12.3.8)

(7) Operational pressure (5.3.12.3.10)

5.3.12.3.1.8 All verification test results shall be reported as required in 5.3.12.1.

5.3.12.3.2 Verifier Standing Pressure Test. Each positive-pressure gas piping system shall be subjected to a ten-minute standing pressure test at operating line pressure using the following procedures:

(1) After the system is filled with oil-free, dry Nitrogen NF or the system gas, the source valve and any zone valves shall be closed.

(2) The piping system downstream of the valves shall show no decrease in pressure after ten minutes.

(3) Any leaks found shall be located, repaired (if permitted), replaced (if required), and retested.

5.3.12.3.3 Verifier Standing Vacuum Test. Each Level 3 vacuum piping system shall be subjected to a ten-minute standing vacuum test at operating line vacuum using the following procedures:

(1) After the system has stabilized at the operating line vacuum, the source valve and any zone valves shall be closed.

(2) The piping system upstream of the valves shall show no decrease in vacuum after ten minutes.

(3) Leaks, if any, shall be located, repaired (if permitted), replaced (if required), and retested.

5.3.12.3.4 Verifier Cross-Connection Test. After closing of walls and completion of the requirements of 5.3.12.2, Initial Tests, it shall be determined that no cross-connections of the piping systems exist by use of the following method:

(1) Shutoff the source of test gas for all positive-pressure gas piping systems and reduce them to atmospheric pressure.

(2) Operate Level 3 vacuum systems at the normal system vacuum, using the source equipment.

(3) Each positive-pressure gas outlet and Level 3 vacuum inlet shall be tested with appropriate adapters to verify that vacuum is present only at the vacuum inlets in the system being tested and not at any positive-pressure gas outlets.

(4) Shutdown the vacuum source equipment and slowly break the vacuum in the Level 3 vacuum piping system, increasing its pressure to atmospheric.

(5) Using oil-free, dry Nitrogen NF or the system gas, pressurize one of the positive-pressure gas piping systems to a gage pressure of 345 kPa (50 psi).

(6) Test each positive-pressure gas outlet and Level 3 vacuum inlet using appropriate adapters to verify that the test gas pressure is present only at the outlets in the piping system being tested.

(7) After it has been verified that a piping system is free of cross-connections, disconnect the source of test gas and reduce the piping to atmospheric pressure.

(8) Proceed to test each positive-pressure gas piping system until all gas and vacuum systems are verified to be free of cross-connections.

5.3.12.3.5 Verifier Level 3 Warning System Tests.

5.3.12.3.5.1 All warning systems required by 5.3.9 shall be tested to ensure that all components function correctly prior to placing the system into service.

5.3.12.3.5.2 Permanent records of these tests shall be maintained.

5.3.12.3.5.3 Warning systems that are part of an addition to an existing piping system shall be tested prior to connection of the new piping to the existing system.

5.3.12.3.5.4 Tests of warning systems for new installations (initial tests) shall be performed after the verifierʼs cross-connection testing (5.3.12.3.4), but before purging the piping (5.3.12.3.6) and performing the remaining verification tests (5.3.12.3.7 through 5.3.12.3.13).

5.3.12.3.5.5 Test gases for the initial tests shall be either oil-free, dry Nitrogen NF, the gas of system designation, or the operating vacuum source.

5.3.12.3.5.6 The audible and non-cancelable alarm signals in each single treatment facility shall be checked to verify that they are in a location that will be continuously attended while the facility is in operation.

5.3.12.3.5.7 The operation of the Level 3 line pressure alarms required by 5.3.9.1(4) shall be verified.

5.3.12.3.5.8 Audible and non-cancelable visual signals in each single treatment facility shall indicate if the pressure in the main line being monitored increases or decreases 20 percent from the normal operating pressure.

5.3.12.3.5.9 The operation of the Level 3 changeover alarms required by 5.3.9.1(5) shall be verified.

5.3.12.3.5.10 Audible and non-cancelable visual signals shall indicate whenever automatic changeover occurs or is about to occur.

5.3.12.3.5.11 Where Level 3 gas and vacuum systems include other alarm features that are not mandatory under 5.3.9, they shall be functionally tested in accordance with their intended purpose and the equipment manufacturerʼs recommendations.

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 995.3.12.3.6 Verifier Piping Purge Test. In order to remove any traces of particulate matter deposited in the pipelines as a result of construction, a heavy, intermittent purging of each medical gas (e.g., oxygen and nitrous oxide) pipeline shall be done.

5.3.12.3.6.1 The appropriate adapter shall be obtained from the facility or manufacturer, and high purge rates of at least 230 Nl/min (8 SCFM) shall be put on each outlet.

5.3.12.3.6.2 After the purge is started, it shall be rapidly interrupted several times until the purge produces no discoloration in a white cloth loosely held over the adapter during the purge.

5.3.12.3.6.3 In order to avoid possible damage to the outlet and its components, this test shall not be conducted using any implement other than the correct adapter.

5.3.12.3.7 Verifier Piping Particulate Test. The cleanliness of the piping in each medical gas (e.g., oxygen and nitrous oxide) system shall be verified as follows:

(1) The test shall be performed using oil-free, dry Nitrogen NF or the system gas.

(2) A minimum of 1000 L (35 ft3) of gas shall be filtered through a clean, white 0.45-micron filter at a minimum flow rate of 100 Nl/min (3.5 SCFM).

(3) Each zone shall be tested at the outlet most remote from the source.

(4) The filter shall accrue no more than 0.001 g (1 mg) of matter from any outlet tested.

5.3.12.3.8 Verifier Piping Purity Test. For each medical gas (e.g., oxygen and nitrous oxide) system, the purity of the piping system shall be verified as follows:

(1) These tests shall be performed with oil-free, dry Nitrogen NF or the system gas.

(2) The tests shall be for total hydrocarbons (as methane) and halogenated hydrocarbons, and compared with the source gas.

(3) This test shall be performed at the outlet most remote from the source.

(4) The difference between the two tests shall in no case exceed the following:

(a) Total hydrocarbons, 1 ppm

(b) Halogenated hydrocarbons, 2 ppm

(5) A test for dew point shall be conducted at the outlet most remote from the source and the dew point shall not exceed 500 ppm at 12°C.

5.3.12.3.9 Verifier Final Tie-In Test.

5.3.12.3.9.1 Prior to the connection of any new piping to its source of supply, including extensions or additions to an existing piping system, the verification tests in 5.3.12.3.1 through 5.3.12.3.8 shall be successfully performed on the new work.

5.3.12.3.9.2 Each joint in the final connection between the new work and the existing system shall be leak-tested with the gas of system designation or vacuum at the normal operating pressure by means of soapy water or other means effective for use with oxygen.

5.3.12.3.9.3 For positive-pressure gases, immediately after the final connection is made and leak-tested, the specific altered zone and components in the immediate zone or area that is downstream from the point or area of intrusion shall be purged per 5.3.12.3.6.

5.3.12.3.9.4 Before the new work is used for patient care, the following tests shall be performed for all medical gas (e.g., oxygen and nitrous oxide) systems:

(1) Operational pressure (5.3.12.3.10)

(2) Gas concentration (5.3.12.3.11)

5.3.12.3.9.5 Permanent records of these tests shall be maintained in accordance with 5.3.13.8.1.

5.3.12.3.10 Verifier Operational Pressure Test. Operational pressure tests shall be performed at each station outlet in Level 3 medical gas piping systems (e.g., oxygen and nitrous oxide) where the user makes connections and disconnections.

5.3.12.3.10.1 Tests shall be performed using either oil-free, dry Nitrogen NF or the gas of system designation.

5.3.12.3.10.2 Medical gas outlets (e.g., oxygen and nitrous oxide) shall deliver 100 Nl/min (3.5 SCFM) with a pressure drop of no more than 35 kPa (5 psi) and static pressure of 345–380 kPa (50–55 psi).

5.3.12.3.11 Verifier Gas Concentration Test. After purging each piping system with the gas of system designation, the following shall be performed:

(1) Each medical gas outlet (e.g., oxygen and nitrous oxide) shall be analyzed for concentration of gas, by volume.

(2) Analysis shall be conducted with instruments designed to measure the specific gas dispensed.

(3) Allowable concentrations shall be as follows:

(a) Oxygen > 99 percent oxygen

(b) Nitrous oxide > 99 percent nitrous oxide

5.3.12.3.12 Labeling. The presence and correctness of labeling required by this standard for all components (e.g., station outlets/inlets, shutoff valves, and alarm panels) shall be verified.

5.3.12.3.13 Source Equipment Verification.

5.3.12.3.13.1 General. Source equipment verification shall be performed following the installation of the interconnecting pipelines, accessories, and source equipment.

5.3.12.3.13.2 Use of Source Equipment for Pipeline Verification Tests. Where the source equipment and system gas or vacuum is used for verification testing of the distribution piping, the source equipment shall be verified prior to verification of the distribution piping.

5.3.12.3.13.3 Level 3 Source Equipment for Positive-Pressure Gases.

5.3.12.3.13.4 Level 3 Vacuum Source Equipment. The functioning of the Level 3 vacuum source system(s) shall be tested and verified before it is put into service.

5.3.13 Level 3 Operation and Management.

5.3.13.1 Administration. Administrative authorities of health care organizations shall provide policies and procedures for safe practices.

5.3.13.1.1 Purchase specifications shall include the following:

(1) Specifications for cylinders

(2) Marking of cylinders, regulators, and valves

(3) Proper connection of cylinders supplied to the facility

5.3.13.1.2 Training procedures shall include the following:

(1) Maintenance programs in accordance with the manufacturerʼs recommendations for the piped gas system

(2) Use and transport of equipment and the proper handling of cylinders, containers, hand trucks, supports, and valve protection caps

(3) Proper uses of the medical–surgical vacuum system in order to eliminate practices that reduce the systemʼs effectiveness, such as leaving suction tips and catheters open when not actually aspirating, and using equipment arrangements that are improperly trapped or are untrapped.

5.3.13.1.3 Policies for enforcement shall include the following:

(1) Regulations for the storage and handling of cylinders and containers of oxygen and nitrous oxide

(2) Regulations for the safe handling of oxygen and nitrous oxide in anesthetizing locations

(3) Prompt evaluation of all signal warnings and the performance of all necessary measures to reestablish the proper functions of the medical gas system

(4) The capability and resources of the organization to cope with a complete loss of any medical gas system

(5) All tests required in 5.3.12 successfully conducted prior to the use of any medical gas piping system for patient care.

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 995.3.13.2 Special Precautions for Handling Oxygen Cylinders and Manifolds. Handling of oxygen cylinders and manifolds shall be based on CGA Pamphlet G-4, Oxygen.

5.3.13.2.1 Oxygen cylinders, containers, and associated equipment shall be protected from contact with oil or grease. Specific precautions shall include the following:

(1) Oil, grease, or readily flammable materials shall never be permitted to come in contact with oxygen cylinders, valves, regulators, gages, or fittings.

(2) Regulators, fittings, or gages shall never be lubricated with oil or any other flammable substance.

(3) Oxygen cylinders or apparatus shall never be handled with oily or greasy hands, gloves, or rags.

5.3.13.2.2 Equipment associated with oxygen shall be protected from contamination. Specific precautions shall include the following:

(1) Particles of dust and dirt shall be cleared from cylinder valve openings by slightly opening and closing the valve before applying any fitting to the cylinder.

(2) The high-pressure valve on the oxygen cylinder shall be opened before bringing the apparatus to the patient or the patient to the apparatus.

(3) An oxygen cylinder shall never be draped with any materials such as hospital gowns, masks, or caps.

(4) Cylinder-valve protection caps, where provided, shall be kept in place and be hand tightened, except when cylinders are in use or connected for use.

(5) Valves shall be closed on all empty cylinders in storage.

5.3.13.2.3 Cylinders shall be protected from damage. Specific procedures shall include the following:

(1) Oxygen cylinders shall be protected from abnormal mechanical shock, which is liable to damage the cylinder, valve, or safety device.

(2) Oxygen cylinders shall not be stored near elevators, gangways, or in locations where heavy moving objects will strike them or fall on them.

(3) Cylinders shall be protected from the tampering of unauthorized individuals.

(4) Cylinders or cylinder valves shall not be repaired, painted, or altered.

(5) Safety relief devices in valves or cylinders shall never be tampered with.

(6) Valve outlets clogged with ice shall be thawed with warm — not boiling — water.

(7) A torch flame shall never be permitted under any circumstances to come in contact with cylinder valves or safety devices.

(8) Sparks and flame shall be kept away from cylinders.

(9) Even if they are considered to be empty, cylinders shall never be used as rollers, supports, or for any purpose other than that for which the supplier intended them.

(10) Large cylinders (exceeding size E) and containers larger than 45 kg (100 lb) weight shall be transported on a proper hand truck or cart complying with Chapter 9.

(11) Freestanding cylinders shall be properly chained or supported in a proper cylinder stand or cart.

(12) Cylinders shall not be supported by radiators, steam pipes, or heat ducts.

5.3.13.2.4 Cylinders and their contents shall be handled with care. Specific procedures shall include the following:

(1) Oxygen fittings, valves, regulators, or gages shall never be used for any service other than that of oxygen.

(2) Gases of any type shall never be mixed in an oxygen cylinder or any other cylinder.

(3) Oxygen shall always be dispensed from a cylinder through a pressure regulator.

(4) The cylinder valve shall be opened slowly, with the face of the gage on the regulator pointed away from all persons.

(5) Oxygen shall be referred to by its proper name, oxygen, not air, and liquid oxygen referred to by its proper name, not liquid air.

(6) Oxygen shall never be used as a substitute for compressed air.

(7) The markings stamped on cylinders shall not be tampered with because it is against federal statutes to change these markings without written authority from the Bureau of Explosives.

(8) Markings used for the identification of contents of cylinders shall not be defaced or removed, including decals, tags, stenciled marks, and the upper half of shipping tag.

(9) The owner of the cylinder shall be notified if any condition has occurred that might permit any foreign substance to enter a cylinder or valve, giving details and cylinder number.

(10) Neither cylinders nor containers shall be placed in proximity to radiators, steam pipes, heat ducts, or other sources of heat.

(11) Very cold cylinders or containers shall be handled with care to avoid injury.

5.3.13.2.5 Oxygen equipment that is defective shall not be used until one of the following has been performed:

(1) It has been repaired by competent in-house personnel.

(2) It has repaired by the manufacturer or his or her authorized agent.

(3) It has been replaced.

5.3.13.2.6 Regulators that are in need of repair or cylinders having valves that do not operate properly shall never be used.

5.3.13.3 Special Precautions for Making Cylinder and Container Connections.

5.3.13.3.1 Wrenches and tools used to connect equipment shall be manufactured of material of adequate strength.

5.3.13.3.2 Cylinder valves shall be opened and connected in accordance with the following procedure:

(1) Make certain that apparatus and cylinder valve connections and cylinder wrenches are free of foreign materials.

(2) Turn the cylinder valve outlet away from personnel. Stand to the side — not in front and not in back. Before connecting the apparatus to cylinder valve, momentarily open cylinder valve to eliminate dust.

(3) Make connection of apparatus to cylinder valve. Tighten connection nut securely with a wrench.

(4) Release the low-pressure adjustment screw of the regulator completely.

(5) Slowly open cylinder valve to full open position.

(6) Slowly turn in the low-pressure adjustment screw on the regulator until the proper working pressure is obtained.

(7) Open the valve to the utilization apparatus.

5.3.13.3.3 Connections for containers shall be made in accordance with the container manufacturerʼs operating instructions.

5.3.13.4 Special Precautions for the Care of Safety Mechanisms.

5.3.13.4.1 Personnel using cylinders and containers and other equipment covered in this chapter shall be familiar with the Pin-Index Safety System (see Chapter 9) and the Diameter-Index Safety System (see Chapter 9); both are designed to prevent utilization of the wrong gas.

5.3.13.4.2 Safety relief mechanisms, non-interchangeable connectors, and other safety features shall not be removed or altered.

5.3.13.5 Special Precautions — Storage of Cylinders and Containers.

5.3.13.5.1 Storage shall be planned so that cylinders can be used in the order in which they are received from the supplier.

5.3.13.5.2 If stored within the same enclosure, empty cylinders shall be segregated from full cylinders.

5.3.13.5.3 Empty cylinders shall be marked to avoid confusion and delay if a full cylinder is needed in a rapid manner.

5.3.13.5.4 Cylinders stored in the open shall be protected against the following conditions:

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99(1) Extremes of weather and from the ground beneath to prevent rusting

(2) Accumulations of ice or snow during winter

(3) Continuous exposure to direct rays of the sun in those localities where extreme temperatures prevail in summer

5.3.13.6 Special Precautions — Piped Patient Gas/Vacuum Systems.

5.3.13.6.1 Piping systems shall not be used for the distribution of flammable anesthetic gases.

5.3.13.6.2 Piping systems for gases shall not be used as a grounding electrode.

5.3.13.6.3 The vacuum system shall not be used for vacuum steam condensate return or other non-medical applications.

5.3.13.6.4 Special Precautions.

5.3.13.6.4.1 Every facility shall establish a procedure for manually turning off the gas supply at the cylinder valves at the end of the work day, or when the facility is not in use.

5.3.13.6.4.2 No other method such as emergency shutoff valves or remote actuators (see 5.3.4.1) shall be used to turn off the gas supply.

5.3.13.7 Gas/Vacuum Systems Information and Warning Signs.

5.3.13.7.1 The gas content of medical gas piping systems shall be labeled according to 5.3.11.1.

5.3.13.8 Gas/Vacuum Systems Maintenance and Record Keeping.

5.3.13.8.1 Permanent records of all tests required by Section 5.3 shall be maintained in the organizationʼs files.

5.3.13.8.2 A periodic testing procedure for nonflammable medical gas/vacuum and related alarm systems shall be implemented.

5.3.13.8.3 Whenever modifications are made or maintenance is performed that breaches the system, the tests specified in 5.3.12 shall be conducted on the downstream portions of the medical gas piping system.

5.3.13.8.4 A maintenance program shall be established for the following:

(1) The medical air compressor supply system in accordance with the manufacturerʼs recommendations

(2) The vacuum source and accessories in accordance with the manufacturerʼs recommendations

(3) Both the vacuum piping system and the secondary equipment attached to vacuum station inlets to ensure the continued good performance of the entire vacuum system

(4) The scavenger system to assure performance

5.3.13.8.5 Audible and visual alarm indicator(s) shall meet the following requirements:

(1) Be periodically tested to determine that they are functioning properly

(2) Have the records of the test maintained until the next test is performed

5.3.13 Level 3 Operation and Management. The operation and management of Level 3 piping systems shall be in accordance with 5.1.13 (Level 1).Substantiation: Level 3 repeats many Level 1 requirements. This adds to the bulk of Level 3. The reader gets lost in Level 3 and canʼt tell if heʼs in Level 3 or Level 1.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: It has taken three cycles to create a document less dependent on referencing back to previous levels. With the focus on Level 1 in the minds of inspectors, referencing ack to Level 1 causes the inspectors to stay in that level, making it very, very difficult to get them back into the intentions of Level 3 or 2. Since the majority of usage of this document is for Level 3, there are compelling, functional reasons to kep it as self contained as possible.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: ALLEN: See my Explanation of Negative on 99-374(Log #18).Comment on Affirmative: WAGNER: Keeping Level 3 requirements up-to-date with Level 1 requirements will be an administrative nightmare. There are already numerous changes proposed to Level 1 which are not being incorporated into Level 3.


________________________________________________________________99-368 Log #277 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.3 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: J. Richard Wagner, The Poole & Kent CorporationRecommendation: Editorially insert the phrase “Level 3” at least several times on each page in Section 5.3 (Level 3) to help orient the readers that they are in the Level 3 portion of the Standard.Substantiation: The reader can easily become disoriented as to where they are when moving through the Level 1, Level 2, and Level 3 sections of the standard.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: Level 3 is mentioned throughout the level 3 document.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: ALLEN: See my Explanation of Negative on 99-374(Log #18).Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-369 Log #283 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.3 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: David D. Eastman, Metro Detroit Plumbing Industry Training Center / Rep. American Society of Sanitary EngineeringRecommendation: Globally change “e.g.”, to “i.e,” except where it appears in 5.3.3.3.7.1.Substantiation: All the other uses of “e.g.” are in reference to medical gas (e.g., oxygen and nitrous oxide). “E.g.” means “for example,” implying that other medical gases to be considered as well. According to 5.3.1.2, the term “medical gas” applies to piped systems for nitrous oxide and oxygen. Using the abbreviation “i.e.” which means “that is,” or “in other words,” would clarify that only oxygen and nitrous oxide are considered under the requirements of Level 3.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: ALLEN: See my Explanation of Negative on 99-374(Log #18).Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-370 Log #284 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.3.1.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: David D. Eastman, Metro Detroit Plumbing Industry Training Center / Rep. American Society of Sanitary EngineeringRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.3.1.2 Wherever the term medical gas occurs in Level 3, the term shall apply to all piped systems of nitrous oxide and oxygen only.Substantiation: No other gases are mentioned as medical gases in Level 3; nitrogen is specifically exempted from consideration as a medical gas. Throughout the text of Level 3, only oxygen or nitrous oxide are mentioned specifically, and usually in conjunction with the term “medical gas”. No provisions are made for piping other specific gases, even though such provisions would be necessary (such as minimum temperatures for carbon dioxide). This wording would clearly restrict the piping of Level 3 medical gases to oxygen and nitrous oxide.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: ALLEN: See my Explanation of Negative on 99-374(Log #18).Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-371 Log #18 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.3.3.1.5 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: F. David Wyrick, Sr., Cambiare Ltd.Recommendation: Delete 5.3.3.1.5 in total.Substantiation: What gases are going to be used in Level 3 other than Oxygen, Nitrous Oxide and in fewer facilities Nitrogen. In Level 3, 5.3.3.3.6.3. Suggest 5.3.3.1.6 be used.

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Retain the existing text. Delete section 5.3.3.1.6Committee Statement: Readers of the signage may not know what a medical gas is. The existing label should stay as it helps define a potential hazard.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 19 Negative: 2 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: ALLEN: All level 3 materials was revisited in our second meeting in error. The actions from the first meeting should be restored and the ballot reissued. WAGNER: Both of the signs in 5.3.3.1.5 and 5.3.3.1.6 mention “medical gases”. If 5.3.3.1.6 is deleted, how is a room containing only oxygen cylinders labeled? The existing test does not support this change.Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-372 Log #CP303 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.3.3.3.2.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Piping SystemsRecommendation: Rewrite section 5.3.3.3.2.2 as follows: Air compressors and vacuum pumps shall be located separately from medical gas (i.e. oxygen and nitrous oxide) cylinder storage enclosures.Substantiation: This will allow nitrogen cylinders to be stored in the same room as the compressors and vacuum.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: ALLEN: See my Explanation of Negative on 99-374(Log #18).Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-373 Log #CP318 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.3.3.3.2.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Piping SystemsRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.3.3.3.2.2 Air compressors and vacuum pumps shall be located separately from other medical gas systems or (i.e. Oxygen and Nitrous Oxide) cylinder storage enclosures.Substantiation: This change delineates medical gas as oxygen and nitrous oxide onbly and hot medical air.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 19 Negative: 2 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: ALLEN: See my Explanation of Negative on 99-374(Log #18). SHOEMAKER: See my Explanation of Negative on Proposal 99-402(Log #20).Comment on Affirmative: WAGNER: This change is the same as 99-372 (Log #CP303).Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-374 Log #19 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.3.3.3.6.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: F. David Wyrick, Sr., Cambiare Ltd.Recommendation: Delete Section 5.3.3.3.6.1.Substantiation: From the beginning in 56F, 1974 Edition, the Committee decided the control of Small Systems in non hospital-based facilities was cylinder volume. This volume control was one of the ways to keep a system small. If a greater volume was required, the system would meet Chapter 2. By 1983 Edition, there was a Subcommittee to include more info for Small Systems in Chapter 5. The 1987 Edition adopted the use of Type I and Type II. 4-3.1.2.3 continued to control the volume of 2000 cu ft or less to meet Type II requirements. The 1993 Editions, 4-3.1.2.3 increased the volume to 3000 cu ft. This allows for 2 Oxygen and 2 Nitrous Oxide cylinders and an additional storage of full cylinder and stay below the 3000 cu ft will surely create problems. To my knowledge there has not been a use of the additional 3000 cu ft as non use storage only allow in the 1999 Edition is not required.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: Some conditions from Level 1 requiring mechanical ventilation.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 19 Negative: 1 Abstain: 2 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGH

Explanation of Negative: ALLEN: See my Explanation of Negative on 99-374(Log #18).Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47). WAGNER: I donʼt understand the proposal and the committee statement.

________________________________________________________________99-375 Log #343 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.3.3.4.4 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Corky Bishop, Medical Gas Management, Inc.Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Supply systems supplying only a single treatment facility shall contain the following: Two banks of cylinders each containing the greater of either at least an average dayʼs supply or one of the following:... Delete paragraph (B): When the primary bank is unable to supply the system, the secondary bank shall be capable of being switched to supply the system.Substantiation: Requiring two banks of cylinders elevated the equipment to a level 1 style manifold. This is not needed in a level 3 facility. The long standing dental manufacturers do not make a manifold like this. This would return to the requirement of the 1999 edition with the addition of a 1 day supply minimum.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle 5.3.3.4.4* Supply systems supplying only a single treatment facility shall contain the following: at minimum of Two banks of cylinders of oxygen and a minimum of two cylinders of nitrous oxide (if used). each containing the greater of either at least an average dayʼs supply. or one of the following: (1) When storage is not remote, two cylinders of oxygen and one cylinder of nitrous oxide (if used) (2) When storage is remote, two cylinders of oxygen, minimum, and two cylinders of nitrous oxide. minimum. (if used) In addition, change “bank” to “cylinder” in 5.3.3.4.4 (B)Committee Statement: Since nitrous oxide is stored in a liquid state, the gauge will not correctly indicate the volume in the cylinder (e.g. oxygen). During use, there is no indication of depletion of volume, potentially resulting in sudden loss of nitrous oxide flow. While not “dangerous” it does change the prescription of medication to the patient outside the control of the doctor or staff.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHComment on Affirmative: WAGNER: At the end of the Committee Meeting Action - “containing the greater of either at least an average dayʼs supply” - should be deleted.Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-376 Log #344 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.3.3.4.5 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Corky Bishop, Medical Gas Management, Inc.Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Supply systems supplying multiple treatment facilities shall contain the following: Two banks of cylinders each containing at least the greater of an average dayʼs supply or at least two cylinders of oxygen and two cylinders of nitrous oxide (if used).Substantiation: Requiring two banks of cylinders elevated the equipment to a level 1 style manifold. This is not needed in a level 3 facility. The long standing dental manufacturers such as Porter and Matrix do have automatic switching manifolds. They are typically not 2 X 2 manifolds requiring 4 cylinders of oxygen. This would return to the requirement of the 1999 edition.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHComment on Affirmative: WAGNER: The phrase “at least” is not necessary. The requirement is for the greater of either an average dayʼs supply or two cylinders of oxygen and two cylinders of nitrous oxide (if used). If the average dayʼs supply exceeds two cylinders of either gas, then more than two cylinders of that particular gas needs to be provided.Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-377 Log #89 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.3.3.5.8.6(2) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Keith Ferrari, PraxairRecommendation: Delete the following text: “(2) Nitrogen gas cylinders shall be permitted to be stored in compressor rooms.”Substantiation: This sentence conflicts with 5.3.3.3.2.2 which does not allow cylinders in the same room as compressors and pumps. And this also

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99may conflict with 5.1.3.3.1.7 cylinders shall be prevented from reaching temperatures in excess of 130 degrees Fahrenheit.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: We should revise 5.3.3.2.2 to designate the difference between the storage of Medical Gases (Oxygen & Nitrous Oxide) and dynamic drive gases (Air or Nitrogen). As for the temperature, 130° is higher than any manufacturers specs for the mechanical equipment in the mechanical roomNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: ALLEN: See my Explanation of Negative on 99-374(Log #18).Comment on Affirmative: WAGNER: 99-136 (Log #CP303) revises 5.3.3.3.2.2 as suggested in the Committee Statement.Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-378 Log #282 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.3.3.6.3 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: David D. Eastman, Metro Detroit Plumbing Industry Training Center / Rep. American Society of Sanitary EngineeringRecommendation: Add text to read as follows: 5.3.3.6.3 Drains None of the following provisions are intended to supersede provisions of local plumbing codes.Substantiation: This section addresses issues that are frequently in direct conflict with local plumbing codes.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 18 Negative: 3 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: ALLEN: See my Explanation of Negative on 99-374(Log #18). FAN: The committee at its August meeting voted to accept in principle and deleted the word “plumbing” from the recommendation to ad text. Local codes could include local plumbing codes. There is no need to be this specific. SHOEMAKER: See my Explanation of Negative on Proposal 99-402(Log #20).Comment on Affirmative: WAGNER: Except for the National Standard Plumbing code (PHCC), plumbing codes do not address the special requirements for draining waste from Level 3 vacuum waste holding tanks or Level 3 vacuum air/waste separators. See Figures A.5.3.3.6.3(a) and (b). The indirect connections called for by the plumbing codes are intended to protect the potable water supply from contamination by backflow or back-siphonage of sewage from the drainage system. Level 3 vacuum waste can be just as infectious as sewage. Level 3 vacuum piping is contaminated before it reaches the sanitary drainage system. Connecting the vacuum waste line downstream from a floor drain or other floor level receptor would allow a sewage backup to spill over on the floor before it backed-up into the Level 3 vacuum piping system.Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-379 Log #102 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.3.3.6.3.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Corky Bishop, Medical Gas Management, Inc.Recommendation: Replace with: “Liquids drained from a Level 3 vacuum source shall be directly connected to a sanitary drainage system through a trapped and vented drain. (1) The system must be protected from sewage backup by air gap or check valve in accordance with the applicable plumbing code.”Substantiation: Some plumbing codes do not allow for direct connection of equipment to the sanitary sewer.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 17 Negative: 4 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: ALLEN: See my Explanation of Negative on 99-374(Log #18). FAN: The committee at its August meeting voted to reject 99-379(Log #102) as it is already addressed in 99-378(Log #282). It is not clear why the committee reversed its recommendation. This issue is already addressed in 99-378(Log #282). SHOEMAKER: See my Explanation of Negative on Proposal 99-402(Log #20). WAGNER: The two piping arrangements for Level 3 vacuum waste holding tanks and Level 3 air-waste separators include check valves to prevent backflow. If an air gap is provided, the connection to the drainage system would not be direct, as called for by the proposal.Except for the National Standard Plumbing Code (PHCC), plumbing codes do not address the special requirements for draining waster from Level 3 vacuum

waste holding tanks or Level 3 vacuum air/waste separators. See Figures A.5.3.3.6.3(a) and (b). The indirect connections called for by the plumbing codes are intended to protect the portable water supply from contamination by backflow or back-siphonage of sewage from the drainage system. Level 3 vacuum waste can be just as infectious as sewage. Level 3 vacuum piping is contaminated before it reaches the sanitary drainage system. Connecting the vacuum waste line downstream from a floor drain or other floor level receptor would allow a sewage backup to spill over on the floor before it backed-up into the Level 3 vacuum piping system.Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-380 Log #431 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.3.3.6.3.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Richard Milstead, Arrow PlumbingRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: “Liquids drained from a Level 3 vacuum source shall be directly connected to connected to a sanitary drainage system through a trapped and vented drain in accordance with the local plumbing code.”Substantiation: Direct connection without air gap is in violation of plumbing Code when the possibility of contamination of potable water exists. In this case, there is possible contamination of a system that places a device directly in the human mouth.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 17 Negative: 4 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: ALLEN: See my Explanation of Negative on 99-374(Log #18). FAN: The committee at its August meeting voted to reject -99380(Log #431) as it is already addressed in 99-378(Log #282). It is not clear why the committee reversed its recommendation. This issue is already addressed in 99-378(Log #282). In addition, the committee discussed and agreed that vacuum lines are not connected to potable water lines and therefore the substantiation provided by the submitter that there is a possibility of contamination of potable water is not accurate. SHOEMAKER: See my Explanation of Negative on Proposal 99-402(Log #20). WAGNER: Except for the National Standard Plumbing Code (PHCC), plumbing codes do not address the special requirements for draining waste from Level 3 vacuum air/waste separators. See Figures A.5.3.3.6.3(a) and (b). The indirect connections called for by the plumbing codes are intended to protect the potable water supply from contamination by backflow or back-siphonage of sewage from the drainage system. Level 3 vacuum waste can be just as infectious as sewage. Level 3 vacuum piping is contaminated before it reaches the sanitary drainage system. connecting the vacuum waste line downstream from a floor drain or other floor level receptor would allow a sewage backup to spill over on the floor before it backed-up into the Level 3 vacuum piping system.Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-381 Log #CP304 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.3.5.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Piping SystemsRecommendation: Add text to read as follows: 5.3.5.2 The service outlet / inlet for Level 3 Medical Gas (i.e. Oxygen and Nitrous Oxide), shall not be interchangeable with other service outlets / inlets (e.g. Source for gas powered devices (i.e. Air or Nitrogen), vacuum, or water).Substantiation: Present requirements do not prevent connecting resuscitation equipment to sources other than oxygen. Resuscitation equipment can potentially be connected to dynamic drive gas or water outlets. In addition, other devices contaminated with oil or water can be connected to an oxygen outlet on the wall or other connection points.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: ALLEN: See my Explanation of Negative on 99-374(Log #18).Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-382 Log #21 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.3.9.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: F. David Wyrick, Sr., Cambiare Ltd.Recommendation: Revise Section 5.3.9.1 as follows: Warning systems for medical gases (e.g., oxygen and nitrous oxide) in Level 3 shall provide the following alarm functions: of a Level 1 facility as required in 5.1.9, except as follows:

99-78

Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99 (1), (2), (3) remain the same as written. (4) Pressure switches/sensors that monitor main line pressure shall be mounted at the source equipment with pressure indicators (lamp or LED) at the alarm panel. The audible and noncancelable alarm visual signals shall indicate if the pressure in the main line increases or decreases 20 percent from the normal operating pressure. Visual indicators shall remain until the situation that caused the alarm is resolved. (5) When automatic changeover of source gases is required, changeover the alarm shall have a reserve feature to suit the arrangement of the source equipment. shall be provided. Refer A.5.3.3.2 (6) A cancelable audible indication of each alarm condition that produces a sound at the alarm panel and shall re-initiation of the audible signal if another alarm condition occurs while the audible is silenced. (7) Pressure switches/sensors shall be installed downstream from any Emergency Shutoff Valves required by 5.3.4.1 and 5.3.9(4) & (5).Substantiation: All the information has not been explained on the requirements of the Level 3 Alarm or Warning system. Refer to Edition 1999, Sections 4-1.2.8 and 4-5.1.2.11. To refer back to Section 5.1.9 has caused some confusion already. Many locals have not adopted 2002 Edition, but have called on these sections. Section 5.1.9 has some requirements that do not effect Level 3 and the use or not use is not clear. The fewer refers back to Level 1 will prove more efficient. That was the goal for the 1999 Edition.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise text as follows: 5.3.9.1 Warning systems for medical gases (e.g., oxygen and nitrous oxide) in Level 3 facilities shall provide conform to the following: alarm functions of a Level 1 facility as required in 5.1.9, except as follows: (1) Area and local alarms shall not be required. (2) Warning systems shall be permitted to have a single alarm panel. (3) The alarm panel shall be located in an area of continuous surveillance while the facility is in operation. (4) Pressure switches/sensors that monitor main line pressure shall be mounted at the source equipment with a pressure indicator(s) (lamp or LED) at the alarm panel. The audible and noncancelable alarm visual signals shall indicate if the pressure in the main line increases or decreases 20 percent from the normal operating pressure. Visual indicators shall remain until the situation that caused the alarm is resolved. (5) When automatic changeover of source gases is required, changeover the alarm shall have a reserve indicator. Changeover alarms to suit the arrangement of the source equipment. shall be provided. Refer to A.5.3.3.2 (6) A cancelable audible indication of each alarm condition that produces a sound at the alarm panel and shall re-initiate the audible signal if another alarm condition occurs while the audible is silenced. (7) Pressure switches/senses shall be installed downstream from any emergency shutoff valves required by 5.3.4.1 and shall comply with 5.3.9.1 (4) and (5) 5.3.9.2 Systems for gases such as compressed air or nitrogen used to power devices, as well as Level 3 vacuum systems, shall not be required to have warning systems. Committee Statement: Editorially corrected.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: ALLEN: See my Explanation of Negative on 99-374(Log #18).Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-383 Log #148 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.3.10 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: J. Richard Wagner, The Poole & Kent CorporationRecommendation: Delete the use of soft temper copper tubing for Level 3 piping for gas-powered devices and copper vacuum piping within floor slabs and underground within buildings as follows: 5.3.10.1.2 Piping for Level 3 Gas-Powered Devices. Tubes shall be hard-drawn seamless copper; either ASTM B 819 medical gas tube (Type K or L), ASTM B 88 water tube (Type K or L), or ASTM B 280 ACR tube (O.D. size), except that tube installed underground or within floor slabs shall be permitted to be soft annealed temper. 5.3.10.2 Piping Materials for Field-Installed Level 3 Vacuum Systems. 5.3.10.2.1 In copper piping systems, the tubes shall be hard-drawn seamless copper, either ASTM B 819 medical gas tube (Type K or L), ASTM B 88 water tube (Type K, L, or M), or ASTM B 280 ACR tube (O.D. size). 5.3.10.2.2 Copper tube installed underground or within floor slabs shall be permitted to be soft annealed temper. 5.3.10.2.3 5.3.10.2.2 In plastic piping systems, the pipe shall be polyvinylchoride (PVC) plastic, Schedule 40 minimum. 5.3.10.10.7 Piping Within Floor Slabs and Underground Within Buildings. The following conditions shall be permitted only when piping must be installed within a floor slab or underground within a building in order to reach the service outlets or inlets served. Piping shall be permitted to be installed within floor slabs or underground within buildings only when necessary to reach the service outlets or inlets served.

5.3.10.10.7.1 Tubes shall be permitted to be annealed, soft temper, seamless copper tube up to DN10 (NPS 3/8) (1/2 in. O.D.) maximum size. 5.3.10.10.7.2 Tubes shall have been cleaned for oxygen service in accordance with CGA Pamphlet G-4.1, Cleaning Equipment for Oxygen Service. 5.3.10.10.7.3 The tube(s) shall be installed in one (or more) continuous conduits that are of sufficient size to permit subsequent installation, removal, and replacement of the gas and/or vacuum lines. 5.3.10.10.7.4 Each tube pulled into the conduit shall be a continuous length having no joints within the conduit. 5.3.10.10.7.1 Piping materials for the various systems shall comply with 5.3.10.1 and 5.3.10.2. 5.3.10.10.7.2 Tubing installed within floor slabs shall not cross expansion joints. 5.3.10.10.7.3 The individual tubing runs shall be pressure tested (5.3.12.2.3) or leak tested (5.3.12.2.4) prior to back filling or the placement of concrete. 5.3.10.10.7.4 Tubing shall be protected from physical damage while being backfilled or during the placement of concrete. 5.3.10.10.7.5 The individual tubing runs shall be pressure tested (5.3.12.2.3) or leak tested (5.3.12.2.4) after back filling or the placement of concrete and prior to connection to branch piping or equipment.Substantiation: To provide more consistent installation procedures. Level 3 medical gases must use hard temper tubing. Piping for gas-powered devices and copper vacuum can be installed using the same procedures as medical gases.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: There is no reason that NON MEDICAL gas for gas powered devices or vacuum should not be allowed to be installed with soft copper tubing or be required to comply with MED GAS standards. There is no Life Support here.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: ALLEN: See my Explanation of Negative on 99-374(Log #18).Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-384 Log #30 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.3.10.1.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Mark Allen, Beacon Medical ProductsRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.3.10.1.1 Piping for Medical Gases, Piping for Level 3 positive-pressure nonflammable medical gases (e.g., oxygen and nitrous oxide) shall meet the requirements in 5.3.10.1.1(A) through (BE).Substantiation: Present reference is incomplete.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: ALLEN: See my Explanation of Negative on 99-374(Log #18).Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-385 Log #278 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.3.10.4 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: J. Richard Wagner, The Poole & Kent CorporationRecommendation: Revise 5.3.10.4(2) as follows: (2) Have tapered threads complying with ANSI ASME B1.10.1, Pipe Threads, General Purpose.Substantiation: B1.20.1 is managed by ASME, not ANSI.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: ALLEN: See my Explanation of Negative on 99-374(Log #18).Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-386 Log #22 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.3.10.8.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: F. David Wyrick, Sr., Cambiare Ltd.Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Flared and compression connections shall be permitted in piping for Level 3 gas-powered devices and Level 3 vacuum in junction boxes, and were exposed at station outlets/inlets and source equipment. Standard pipe threads 1/8 and 1/4 FPT and MPT are allowed for exposed connections for source equipment. Refer to Section 5.3.10.4.

99-79

Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99Substantiation: From the beginning, compression fittings have not been allowed for the possibility of ID reduction.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: Compression fittings on gas powered devices supply systems is the industry standard. Though not “standard” in level 3 vacuum there is no reason to prevent the use there either.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: ALLEN: See my Explanation of Negative on 99-374(Log #18).Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-387 Log #194 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.3.10.9 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Albert McKay, A, Lokring Technology CorporationRecommendation: Add new text to read as follows: 5.3.10.9 (3) Axially swaged, elastic strain preload fittings providing metal to metal seal having pressure and temperature ratings not less than that of a brazed joint.Substantiation: Technology exists that will allow for the installation of permanent joints that are superior to a brazed joint without the need for hot work and attendant safety and cleanliness concerns. Refer to the attached information for further explanation. Note: Supporting material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Add new text to read as follows: 5.3.10.9 (3) Axially swaged, elastic strain preloaded fittings providing metal to metal seal having pressure and temperature ratings not less than that of a brazed joint and when complete are permanent and non-separable.Committee Statement: The connections should be permanent and should not able to separate.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: ALLEN: See my Explanation of Negative on 99-374(Log #18).Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-388 Log #CP319 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.3.10.10.3, A.5.3.10.10.3 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Piping SystemsRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.3.10.10.3* Minimum Pipe Sizes. A.5.3.10.10.3 One of the major concerns is the cross-connection of piping systems of different gases. The reason for different sizes is to prevent cross-connections, not for capacity concerns. The problem of cross connection of oxygen and other gases such as air, and nitrogen can readily be recognized/prevented by the use of different sizes of tubing. It is recommended that piping and manifolds for oxygen service to be a different size from the piping intended for other gas services. The piping for other than oxygen can be of a smaller size. Generally, oxygen is installed in 1/2 in. O.D. tube size and other gases with 3/8 in. O.D. tube size.Substantiation: The new annex material clarifies that the pipe sizes are relatd to cross-connection safety.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: ALLEN: See my Explanation of Negative on 99-374(Log #18).Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-389 Log #CP305 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.3.10.10.3.1, 5.3.10.10.3.2, 5.3.10.10.3.3, 5.3.10.10.3.4 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Piping SystemsRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.3.10.10.3.1 Mains, branches, and drops to individual service outlets in Level 3 oxygen piping systems shall be not less than DN10 (NPS 3/8”) (1/2 in. O.D.) size., but at least one size larger than the piping for Nitrous Oxide. 5.3.10.10.3.2 Mains, branches, and drops to individual service outlets in Level 3 Nitrous Oxide and inlets in the following piping systems shall be not less than DN8 (NPS 1/4 in) (3/8 in. O.D.) size. (1) Level 3 medical gases other than oxygen (e.g., nitrous oxide) (2) Gas-powered devices (3) Level 3 vacuum

5.3.10.10.3.3 Mains, branches, and drops to individual service outlets/inlets in Level 3 piping systems for gas powered devices and vacuum shall not be the same as the sizes used for Oxygen and Nitrous Oxide. 5.3.10.10.3.3 5.3.10.10.3.4 Runouts to alarm panels and connecting tubing for pressure/vacuum indicators and alarm devices shall be permitted to be DN8 (NPS 1/4”) (3/8 in. O.D.) (NPS 1/8 in.) (1/4 in. O.D.) size.Substantiation: This clarifies the sizing requirements for Level 3 piped oxygen, nitrous oxide and vacuum.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: ALLEN: See my Explanation of Negative on 99-374(Log #18).Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-390 Log #CP321 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.3.10.10.4.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Piping SystemsRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.3.10.10.4.2 Piping for Level 3, Medical Gas (i.e. Oxygen and Nitrous Oxide) Piping that is underground within buildings or embedded in concrete floors or walls shall be installed in a continuous conduit.Substantiation: This clarifies that Level 3 Medical Gas is allowed to be piped underground.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 19 Negative: 2 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: ALLEN: See my Explanation of Negative on 99-374(Log #18). WAGNER: Any Level 3 piping can be installed underground within buildings or embedded in concrete walls or floors, not just medical gases. A continuous conduit is not necessarily required. Some of the pressure/leak testing called for in 99-383 (Log #148) during backfill and placing concrete should be retained.Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-391 Log #138 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.3.10.10.5 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Corky Bishop, Medical Gas Management, Inc.Recommendation: Delete “Level 3 vacuum systems”.Substantiation: Level 3 vacuum piping is not to be installed overhead. It is a sloped gravity drain system with no low points for fluid to accumulate per 5.3.10.10.10.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise text to read as follows: 5.3.10.10.5.1 Piping for Level 3 medical gases (i.e. Oxygen and Nitrous Oxide), and Level 3 gas-powered devices, and Level 3 vacuum systems shall be located in accordance with 5.3.10.10.5.1 (A) through (C): (A) Piping shall be permitted to be installed overhead wherever possible. (B) Piping shall not be installed in electrical switchgear rooms, elevator shafts, and areas having open flames. (C) Medical gas piping (i.e., oxygen and nitrous oxide) shall not be located where subject to contact with oil.Committee Statement: The committee deleted Level 3 vacuum systems as recommended by the submitter.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 17 Negative: 4 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: ALLEN: See my Explanation of Negative on 99-374(Log #18). FAN: The committee at its August meeting voted to accept it in principle so as to be able to modify it to align with CP 322 which addresses both level 3 gas-power systems and Level 3 vacuum systems. SHOEMAKER: See my Explanation of Negative on Proposal 99-402(Log #20). WAGNER: Canʼt vacuum inlets lift waste to above the ceiling? Is the action on this proposal coordinated with the action on 99-219 (Log #138)?Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-392 Log #CP308 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.3.10.10.5.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Piping SystemsRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.3.10.10.5.2 Piping for Level 3 gas-powered devices, and Level 3 vacuum systems shall be located in accordance with 5.3.10.10.5.2 (A) and (B):

99-80

Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99 (A) Piping shall be permitted to be installed: 1) under floor or under ground 2) underground within buildings 3) above the ground (B) Piping shall not be installed in electrical switchgear rooms, elevator shafts, and areas having open flames. Exception 1: Room Locations for level 3 gas powered devices and level 3 vacuum systems. Exception 2: Room location for secondary distribution circuit panels and breakers having a maximum voltage rating of 600 volts.Substantiation: The committee clarified the locations of where it is permissible to install Level 3 gas powered devices and vacuum piping.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: ALLEN: See my Explanation of Negative on 99-374(Log #18).Comment on Affirmative: WAGNER: This proposal conflicts with 99-393 (Log #322).Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-393 Log #CP322 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.3.10.10.5.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Piping SystemsRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.3.10.10.5.2 Piping for Level 3 gas-powered devices, and Level 3 vacuum systems shall be located in accordance with 5.3.10.10.5.2(A) and (B): (A) Piping shall be permitted to be installed under floor or under ground within buildings. (B) Piping shall not be installed in electrical switchgear rooms, elevator shafts, and areas having open flames.Substantiation: This change specifies where Level 3 gas-powered devices and vacuum systems can be installed. See Proposal 99- (Log #CP321 fro specifics on medical gas.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: ALLEN: See my Explanation of Negative on 99-374(Log #18).Comment on Affirmative: WAGNER: This proposal conflicts with 99-392 (Log #CP308).Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-394 Log #139 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.3.10.10.7 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Corky Bishop, Medical Gas Management, Inc.Recommendation: Change title to “Level 3 Gas-powered Device and Vacuum Piping Within Floor Slabs and Underground Within Buildings.”Substantiation: The medical gas piping is required to be hard-drawn ASTM B 819 medical gas tube. Only gas-powered devices and vacuum have the exception for soft annealed temper in Section 5.3.10.1.2 and 5.3.10.2.2. There is no logical reason to limit the size of dental air and vacuum piping to a maximum of 3/8 in. nominal pipe size. Dental air and vacuum piping re not required to be cleaned for oxygen service.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: Leave text unchanged current text accurately reflects committeeʼs intent.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 18 Negative: 3 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: ALLEN: See my Explanation of Negative on 99-374(Log #18). FAN: The committee at its August meeting voted to accept in principle. this is to clarify that 5.3.10.10.7 for Level 3 gas-powered systems and Level 3 vacuum systems. The committee action to reject is an inaccurate reflection of the committee discussions at this time. SHOEMAKER: See my Explanation of Negative on Proposal 99-402(Log #20).Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-395 Log #149 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.3.10.10.7 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: J. Richard Wagner, The Poole & Kent CorporationRecommendation: Require that soft-temper copper tubing within floor slabs and underground within buildings be ASTM B280 ACR as follows: 5.3.10.10.7 Piping Within Floor Slabs and Underground Within Buildings. The following conditions shall be permitted only when piping must be installed within a floor slab or underground within a building in order to reach the service outlets or inlets served. 5.3.10.10.7.1 Tubes shall be permitted to be annealed, soft-temper, seamless ASTM B280 ACR copper tube up to DN10 (NPS 3/8) (1/2 in. O.D.) maximum size. 5.3.10.10.7.2 Tubes shall have been cleaned for oxygen service in accordance with CGA Pamphlet G-4.1, Cleaning Equipment for Oxygen Service. 5.3.10.10.7.3 5.3.10.10.7.2 The tube(s) shall be installed in one (or more) continuous conduits that are of sufficient size to permit subsequent installation, removal, and replacement of the gas and/or vacuum lines. 5.3.10.10.7.4 5.3.10.10.7.3 Each tube pulled into the conduit shall be a continuous length having no joints within the conduit.Substantiation: Annealed, soft temper coper tubing is not available cleaned for oxygen. The Copper Development Association has had ASTM B280 ACR soft temper tubing from three different manufacturers tested and determined that the samples passed the piping particulate test (5.3.12.3.7) and the piping purity test (5.3.12.3.8).Committee Meeting Action: Reject Leave text unchanged current text accurately reflects committeeʼs intent.Committee Statement: This clarifies that only gas powered devices and vacuum piping could be soft temper cooper run within floor slabs and underground.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 18 Negative: 3 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: ALLEN: See my Explanation of Negative on 99-374(Log #18). FAN: The committee at its August meeting voted to accept in principle. Piping for Level 3 gas-powered devices and Level 3 vacuum systems do no need to be cleaned for oxygen. SHOEMAKER: See my Explanation of Negative on Proposal 99-402(Log #20).Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-396 Log #151 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.3.10.10.8 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: J. Richard Wagner, The Poole & Kent CorporationRecommendation: Delete the mandatory requirement for continuous enclosures around underground piping outside of buildings as follows: 5.3.10.10.8 Underground Piping Outside of Buildings. 5.3.10.10.8.1 Buried piping outside of buildings shall be installed below the local level of frost penetration. 5.3.10.10.8.2 Underground piping shall be installed in a continuous enclosure to protect the pipe during backfilling. The installation procedure for underground piping shall protect the piping from physical damage while being backfilled. 5.3.10.10.8.3 The continuous enclosure shall be split or otherwise provide access at the joints during visual inspection and leak testing. If underground piping is protected by a conduit, cover, or other enclosure, the following requirements shall be met: (1) Access shall be provided at the joints for visual inspection and leak testing. (2) The conduit, cover, or enclosure shall be self-draining and not retain ground water in prolonged contact with the pipe. 5.3.10.10.8.4 Buried piping that will be subject to surface loads shall be buried at a depth that will protect the piping and or its enclosure from excessive stresses. 5.3.10.10.8.5 The minimum backfilled cover above the top of the pipe or its enclosure for buried piping outside of buildings shall be 900 mm (36 in.), except that the minimum cover shall be permitted to be reduced to 450 mm (18 in.) where physical damage is otherwise prevented. 5.3.10.10.8.6 Trenches shall be excavated so that the pipe or its enclosure has firm, substantially continuous bearing on the bottom of the trench. 5.3.10.10.8.7 Backfill shall be clean and compacted so as to protect and uniformly support the pipe or its enclosure. 5.3.10.10.8.8 A continuous tape or marker placed immediately above the pipe or its enclosure shall clearly identify the pipeline by specific name. 5.3.10.10.8.9 A continuous warning means shall also be provided above the pipeline at approximately one-half the depth of bury. 5.3.10.10.8.10 Where underground piping is installed through a wall sleeve, the ends of the sleeve shall be sealed to prevent the entrance of ground water into the building.

99-81

Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99Substantiation: The purpose of the continuous enclosure was to protect the tubing from physical damage while being backfilled. The enclosure is not necessarily watertight. It can become flooded with ground water and retain the ground water after the surrounding soil dries. Ground water can contain road salt, fertilizers, and other chemicals that will corrode copper if allowed to contact the tubing over extended periods of time. The Copper Development Association does not recommend continuous enclosures for underground copper tubing.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: ALLEN: See my Explanation of Negative on 99-374(Log #18).Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-397 Log #328 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.3.10.10.9 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Thomas J. Mraulak, Metropolitan Detroit Plumbing Industry / Rep. American Society of Sanitary EngineeringRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Runouts from horizontal piping shall be taken off above the centerline of the main or branch pipe and rise vertically at an angle of not less more than 45 degrees from verticalSubstantiation: See drawing.

Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Action on 99-312 (Log #276).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: SHOEMAKER: See my Explanation of Negative on Proposal 99-402(Log #20).Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-398 Log #CP309 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.3.10.10.10.3 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Piping SystemsRecommendation: Revise to read as follows: 5.3.10.10.10.3 Accessible cleanouts shall be limited to vertical downflow shall be provided where necessary to clear the piping of obstructions.Substantiation: Cleanouts should never be installed in a horizontal pipe in a Level 3 vacuum. Cleanouts in vertical pipes is permitted. Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 19 Negative: 2 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: ALLEN: See my Explanation of Negative on 99-374(Log #18). WAGNER: Why are cleanouts prohibited on horizontal Level 3 vacuum piping?Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-399 Log #329 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.3.10.10.15.4 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Thomas J. Mraulak, Metropolitan Detroit Plumbing Industry / Rep. American Society of Sanitary EngineeringRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: The brazing procedure specification qualification record and the record of brazer performance qualification shall document filler metal used, cleaning, joint clearance, overlap, internal purge gas and flow rate during brazing of the coupon, and the absence of internal oxidation in the completed coupon.Substantiation: Misprint from wording in 1999 standard. Editorial.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1

Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-400 Log #162 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.3.12 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: J. Richard Wagner, The Poole & Kent CorporationRecommendation:5.3.12 Performance Criteria and Testing - Level 3 (Medical Gas, Gas-Powered Devices, Vacuum)5.3.12.1 General.

5.3.12.1.1 Inspection and testing shall be performed on all new piped gas systems, additions, renovations, temporary installations, or repaired systems, to assure the facility, by a documented procedure, that all applicable provisions of this document have been adhered to and system integrity has been achieved or maintained.

5.3.12.1.2 Inspection and testing shall include all components of the system or portions thereof including, but not limited to, medical gas source(s), compressed air source systems (e.g., compressors, dryers, filters, regulators), alarms and monitoring safeguards, pipelines, isolation valves, and service outlets and inlets.

5.3.12.1.3 All systems that are breached and components that are subjected to additions, renovations, or replacement (e.g., new medical gas sources, compressors, dryers, alarms) shall be inspected and tested.

5.3.12.1.4 Systems shall be deemed breached at the point of pipeline intrusion by physical separation or by system component removal, replacement, or addition.

5.3.12.1.5 Breached portions of the systems subject to inspection and testing shall be confined to only the specific altered zone and components in the immediate zone or area that is located upstream for vacuum systems and downstream for pressure gases at the point or area of intrusion.

5.3.12.1.6 The inspection and testing reports shall be submitted directly to the party that contracted for the testing, who shall submit the report through channels to the responsible authority and any others that are required.

5.3.12.1.7 Reports shall contain detailed listings of all findings and results.

5.3.12.1.8 The responsible facility authority shall review these inspection and testing records prior to the use of any systems to assure that all findings and results of the inspection and testing have been successfully completed.

5.3.12.1.9 All documentation pertaining to inspections and testing shall be maintained on-site within the facility.

5.3.12.1.10 Before piping systems are initially put into use, the Level 3 health care facility authority shall be responsible for ascertaining that the gas/vacuum delivered at each outlet/inlet is that shown on the outlet/inlet label and that the proper connecting fittings are installed for the specific gas/vacuum. (See 5.3.12.1.11.)

5.3.12.1.11 Acceptance of the verifierʼs reports required under 5.3.12.3, System Verification, shall be permitted to satisfy the requirements of 5.3.12.1.10.

5.3.12.2 Initial Tests.

5.3.12.2.1 General.

5.3.12.2.1.1 The tests required by 5.3.12.3.1 through 5.3.12.3.13 shall be performed prior to the tests listed in 5.3.12.3, System Verification, by one or more of the following: (1) The installer(2) A representative of the system supplier(3) A representative of the system manufacturer5.3.12.2.1.2 The test gas for positive-pressure gas systems shall be oil-free, dry Nitrogen NF.

5.3.12.2.1.3 Where manufactured assemblies are to be installed, the tests required under 5.3.12.2 shall be performed as follows: (1) After completion of the distribution piping(2) Prior to installation or connection of manufactured assemblies supplied through flexible hoses or flexible tubing(3) At all station outlets/inlets on manufactured assemblies supplied through copper tubing5.3.12.2.2 Initial Blow Down. Piping in Level 3 positive-pressure gas distribution systems shall be blown clear by means of oil-free, dry Nitrogen NF as follows: (1) After installation of the distribution piping

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99(2) Before installation of station outlets and other system components

(e.g., pressure alarm devices, pressure indicators, pressure relief valves, manifolds, source equipment)

5.3.12.2.3 Initial Pressure Test for Positive-Pressure Gas Systems and Copper Level 3 Vacuum Piping.

5.3.12.2.3.1 Each section of the piping in Level 3 positive-pressure gas piping systems and copper Level 3 vacuum systems shall be pressure tested using oil-free, dry Nitrogen NF.

5.3.12.2.3.2 Initial pressure tests shall be conducted as follows: (1) After installation of station outlets/inlets rough-in assemblies. Test caps

shall be permitted to be used.(2) Prior to the installation of components of the distribution piping system

that would be damaged by the test pressure (e.g., pressure/vacuum alarm devices, pressure/vacuum indicators, line pressure relief valves).

5.3.12.2.3.3 Where Level 3 vacuum piping systems include plastic piping, they shall be inspected to assure that there are no visible cross-connections to positive-pressure gas piping systems prior to applying test pressures to the positive-pressure systems.

5.3.12.2.3.4 The source shutoff valves for all piping systems shall remain closed during these tests.

5.3.12.2.3.5 The test pressure for positive-pressure gas piping shall be 1.5 times the system working pressure but not less than a gage pressure of 1035 kPa (150 psi).

5.3.12.2.3.6 The test pressure for copper Level 3 vacuum piping shall be a gage pressure of 105 kPa (15 psi).

5.3.12.2.3.7 The test pressure shall be maintained until each joint has been examined for leakage by means of soapy water or other equally effective means of leak detection.

5.3.12.2.3.8 Leaks, if any, shall be located, replaced (if permitted) or repaired (if required) and retested.

5.3.12.2.4 Initial Leak Tests — PVC Level 3 Vacuum Piping. Plastic Level 3 vacuum piping shall be leak-tested under vacuum conditions.

5.3.12.2.4.1 Plastic Level 3 vacuum piping shall not be tested with compressed gas.

5.3.12.2.4.2 Leak tests shall be conducted after installation of station inlets.

5.3.12.2.4.3 The piping being tested shall be subjected to a vacuum of not less than 485 mm (19 in.) gage HgV, using either the vacuum source equipment or a vacuum test pump.

5.3.12.2.4.4 The test vacuum shall be maintained until each joint has been examined for leakage.

5.3.12.2.5 Initial Cross-Connection Test. The installer shall determine that no cross-connections exist between the various Level 3 gas and vacuum piping systems.

5.3.12.2.5.1 All Level 3 gas and vacuum piping systems shall be at atmospheric pressure.

5.3.12.2.5.2 Face plates for outlets/inlets shall be installed.

5.3.12.2.5.3 Level 3 vacuum piping systems shall be subjected to a vacuum of not less than 485 mm (19 in.) gage HgV, using either the vacuum source equipment or a test pump.

5.3.12.2.5.4 Each individual system gas outlet and vacuum inlet in each piping system shall be checked to determine that the vacuum is present only at the inlets for the vacuum system being tested.

5.3.12.2.5.5 The vacuum piping system shall be relieved to atmospheric pressure.

5.3.12.2.5.6 The test gas for all positive-pressure gas piping systems shall be oil-free, dry Nitrogen NF.

5.3.12.2.5.7 Sources of test gas and vacuum shall be disconnected from all piping systems except for the one system being tested.

5.3.12.2.5.8 The positive-pressure gas system being tested shall be pressurized to a gage pressure of 345 kPa (50 psi) with oil-free, dry Nitrogen NF.

5.3.12.2.5.9 Each individual system gas outlet and vacuum inlet in each installed piping system shall be checked to determine that the test gas is being dispensed only from the outlets in the piping system being tested.

5.3.12.2.5.10 The cross-connection test shall be repeated for each installed positive-pressure gas piping system.

5.3.12.2.5.11 The proper labeling and identification of system outlets/inlets shall be confirmed during these tests.

5.3.12.2.6 Initial Piping Purge Test. The outlets in each Level 3 positive-pressure gas piping system shall be purged to remove any particulate matter from the distribution piping.

5.3.12.2.6.1 The test gas shall be oil-free, dry Nitrogen NF.

5.3.12.2.6.2 Using appropriate adapters, each outlet shall be purged with an intermittent high-volume flow of test gas until the purge produces no discoloration in a clean white cloth.

5.3.12.2.6.3 The purging shall be started at the furthest outlet in the system and proceed towards the source equipment.

5.3.12.2.7 Initial Standing Pressure Test for Positive-Pressure Gas Piping. After successful completion of the initial pressure tests under 5.3.12.2.3, Level 3 positive-pressure gas distribution piping shall be subjected to a standing pressure test.

5.3.12.2.7.1 Tests shall be conducted after the installation of station outlet valve bodies and face plates, and other distribution system components (e.g., pressure alarm devices, pressure indicators, and line pressure relief valves).

5.3.12.2.7.2 The source valve shall be closed during this test.

5.3.12.2.7.3 The piping systems shall be subjected to a 24-hour standing pressure test using oil-free, dry Nitrogen NF.

5.3.12.2.7.4 Test pressures shall be 20 percent above the normal system operating line pressure.

5.3.12.2.7.5 At the conclusion of the tests, there shall be no change in the test pressure greater than a gage pressure of 35 kPa (5 psi).


5.3.12.2.8 Initial Standing Vacuum Test for Vacuum Systems. Level 3 vacuum systems, with either plastic or copper piping, shall be subjected to a standing vacuum test.

5.3.12.2.8.1 The piping system shall be subjected to a vacuum of not less than 485 mm (19 in.) gage HgV for 24 hours, using either the vacuum source equipment or a test source.

5.3.12.2.8.2 During the test, the source of test vacuum shall be disconnected from the piping system.

5.3.12.2.8.3 At the conclusion of the test, the vacuum shall not have reduced to less the 300 mm (12 in.) HgV.


5.3.12.3 System Verification.

5.3.12.3.1 General.

5.3.12.3.1.1 Verification tests shall be conducted on Level 3 medical gases (e.g., oxygen and nitrous oxide).

5.3.12.3.1.1 5.3.12.3.1.2 Verification tests shall be performed only after all tests required in 5.3.12.2 Initial Tests Initial Tests, have been completed on all positive-pressure and vacuum piping systems.

5.3.12.3.1.2 5.3.12.3.1.3 The test gas shall be oil-free, dry Nitrogen NF or the system gas where permitted.

5.3.12.3.1.3 5.3.12.3.1.4 Testing Verification testing shall be conducted by a party technically competent and experienced in the field of Level 3 medical gas and vacuum system verification and meeting the requirements of ANSI/ASSE Standard 6030, Medical Gas Verifiers Professional Qualifications Standard.

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 995.3.12.3.1.4 5.3.12.3.1.5 Testing Verification testing shall be performed by a party other than the installing contractor.

5.3.12.3.1.5 5.3.12.3.1.6 All verification tests required under 5.3.12.3 shall be performed after installation of any manufactured assemblies supplied through flexible hose or tubing.

5.3.12.3.1.6 5.3.12.3.1.7 Where manufactured assemblies include multiple possible connection points for terminals, each possible position shall be tested independently.

5.3.12.3.1.7 5.3.12.3.1.8 For small projects affecting a limited number of areas where the use of nitrogen is impractical, the system gas shall be permitted to be used for the following tests: (1) Standing pressure (5.3.12.3.2)(2) Cross-connection (5.3.12.3.4 5.3.12.3.3)(3) Warning system (5.3.12.3.5 5.3.12.3.4)(4) Piping purge (5.3.12.3.6 5.3.12.3.5)(5) Piping particulate (5.3.12.3.7 5.3.12.3.6)(6) Piping purity (5.3.12.3.8 5.3.12.3.7)(7) Operational pressure (5.3.12.3.10 5.3.12.3.9)5.3.12.3.1.8 5.3.12.3.1.9 All verification test results shall be reported as required in 5.3.12.1.

5.3.12.3.2 Verifier Standing Pressure Test. Each positive-pressure gas piping system Level 3 medical gas piping systems (e.g., oxygen and nitrous oxide) shall be subjected to a ten-minute standing pressure test at operating line pressure using the following procedures: (1) After the system is filled with oil-free, dry Nitrogen NF or the system

gas, the source valve and any zone valves shall be closed.(2) The piping system downstream of the valves shall show no decrease in

pressure after ten minutes.(3) Any leaks found shall be located, repaired (if permitted), replaced (if

required), and retested.5.3.12.3.3 Verifier Standing Vacuum Test. Each Level 3 vacuum piping system shall be subjected to a ten-minute standing vacuum test at operating line vacuum using the following procedures: (1) After the system has stabilized at the operating line vacuum, the source

valve and any zone valves shall be closed.(2) The piping system upstream of the valves shall show no decrease in

vacuum after ten minutes.(3) Leaks, if any, shall be located, repaired (if permitted), replaced (if

required), and retested.5.3.12.3.4 5.3.12.3.3 Verifier Cross-Connection Test. After closing of walls and completion of the requirements of 5.3.12.2, Initial Tests Initial Tests, it shall be determined that no cross-connections of the piping systems exist between the Level 3 medical gas systems and any of the other positive-pressure and vacuum piping systems by use of the following method: (1) Shutoff the source of test gas for all positive-pressure gas piping systems

and reduce them to atmospheric pressure.(2) Operate Level 3 vacuum systems at the normal system vacuum, using

the source equipment.(3) Each positive-pressure gas outlet and Level 3 vacuum inlet shall be

tested with appropriate adapters to verify that vacuum is present only at the vacuum inlets in the system being tested and not at any positive-pressure gas outlets.

(4) Shutdown the vacuum source equipment and slowly break the vacuum in the Level 3 vacuum piping system, increasing its pressure to atmospheric.

(5) (2) Using oil-free, dry Nitrogen NF or the system gas, pressurize one of the positive-pressure Level 3 medical gas piping systems to a gage pressure of 345 kPa (50 psi).

(6) (3) Test each positive-pressure gas outlet and Level 3 vacuum inlet using appropriate adapters to verify that the test gas pressure is present only at the outlets in the Level 3 medical gas piping system being tested.

(7) (4) After it has been verified that a Level 3 medical gas piping system is free of cross-connections, disconnect the source of test gas and reduce the piping to atmospheric pressure.

(8) (5) Proceed to test each positive-pressure gas piping system until all gas and vacuum systems each Level 3 medical gas piping system until they are verified to be free of cross-connections.

5.3.12.3.5 5.3.12.3.4 Verifier Level 3 Warning System Tests.

5.3.12.3.5.1 5.3.12.3.4.1 All warning systems required by 5.3.9 that are installed for Level 3 medical gases shall be tested verified to ensure that all components function correctly prior to placing the system into service.

5.3.12.3.5.2 5.3.12.3.4.2 Permanent records of these tests shall be maintained.

5.3.12.3.5.3 5.3.12.3.4.3 Warning systems that are part of an addition to an existing piping system shall be tested prior to connection of the new piping to the existing system.

5.3.12.3.5.4 5.3.12.3.4.4 Tests of warning systems for new installations (initial tests) shall be performed after the verifierʼs cross-connection testing (5.3.12.3.4) (5.3.12.3.3), but before purging the piping (5.3.12.3.6) and performing the remaining verification tests (5.3.12.3.7 through 5.3.12.3.13).

5.3.12.3.5.5 5.3.12.3.4.5 Test gases for the initial tests shall be either oil-free, dry Nitrogen NF, or the gas of system designation, or the operating vacuum source.

5.3.12.3.5.6 5.3.12.3.4.6 The audible and non-cancelable alarm signals in each single treatment facility shall be checked to verify that they are in a location that will be continuously attended while the facility is in operation.

5.3.12.3.5.7 5.3.12.3.4.7 The operation of the Level 3 line pressure alarms required by 5.3.9.1(4) shall be verified.

5.3.12.3.5.8 5.3.12.3.4.8 Audible and non-cancelable visual signals in each single treatment facility shall indicate if the pressure in the Level 3 medical gas main line being monitored increases or decreases 20 percent from the normal operating pressure.

5.3.12.3.5.9 5.3.12.3.4.9 The operation of the Level 3 changeover alarms required by 5.3.9.1(5) shall be verified.

5.3.12.3.5.10 5.3.12.3.4.10 Audible and non-cancelable visual signals shall indicate whenever automatic changeover occurs or is about to occur.

5.3.12.3.5.11 5.3.12.3.4.11 Where Level 3 medical gas and vacuum systems include other alarm features that are not mandatory under 5.3.9, they shall be functionally tested in accordance with their intended purpose and the equipment manufacturerʼs recommendations.

5.3.12.3.6 5.3.12.3.5 Verifier Piping Purge Test. In order to remove any traces of particulate matter deposited in the pipelines as a result of construction, a heavy, intermittent purging of each Level 3 medical gas (e.g., oxygen and nitrous oxide) pipeline shall be done.

5.3.12.3.6.1 5.3.12.3.5.1 The appropriate adapter shall be obtained from the facility or manufacturer, and high purge rates of at least 230 Nl/min LPM (8 SCFM) shall be put on each outlet.

5.3.12.3.6.2 5.3.12.3.5.2 After the purge is started, it shall be rapidly interrupted several times until the purge produces no discoloration in a white cloth loosely held over the adapter during the purge.

5.3.12.3.6.3 5.3.12.3.5.3 In order to avoid possible damage to the outlet and its components, this test shall not be conducted using any implement other than the correct adapter.

5.3.12.3.7 5.3.12.3.6 Verifier Piping Particulate Test. The cleanliness of the piping in each Level 3 medical gas (e.g., oxygen and nitrous oxide) system shall be verified as follows: (1) The test shall be performed using oil-free, dry Nitrogen NF or the system

gas.(2) A minimum of 1000 L (35 ft3) of gas shall be filtered through a

clean, white 0.45-micron filter at a minimum flow rate of 100 Nl/min LPM (3.5 SCFM).

(3) Each zone shall be tested at the outlet most remote from the source.

(4) The filter shall accrue no more than 0.001 g (1 mg) of matter from any outlet tested.

5.3.12.3.8 5.3.12.3.7 Verifier Piping Purity Test. For each Level 3 medical gas (e.g., oxygen and nitrous oxide) system, the purity of the piping system shall be verified as follows: (1) These tests shall be performed with oil-free, dry Nitrogen NF or the

system gas.

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99(2) The tests shall be for total hydrocarbons (as methane) and halogenated

hydrocarbons, and compared with the source gas.(3) This test shall be performed at the outlet most remote from the source.(4) The difference between the two tests shall in no case exceed the

following: (a) Total hydrocarbons, 1 ppm(b) Halogenated hydrocarbons, 2 ppm

(5) A test for dew point shall be conducted at the outlet most remote from the source and the dew point shall not exceed 500 ppm at 12°C.

5.3.12.3.9 5.3.12.3.8 Verifier Final Tie-In Test.

5.3.12.3.9.1 5.3.12.3.8.1 Prior to the connection of any new Level 3 medical gas piping to its source of supply, including extensions or additions to an existing piping system, the verification tests in 5.3.12.3.1 through 5.3.12.3.8 5.3.12.3.7 shall be successfully performed on the new work.

5.3.12.3.9.2 5.3.12.3.8.2 Each joint in the final connection between the new work and the existing system shall be leak-tested with the gas of system designation or vacuum at the normal operating pressure by means of soapy water or other means effective for use with oxygen.

5.3.12.3.9.3 5.3.12.3.8.3 For positive-pressure gases Level 3 medical gases, immediately after the final connection is made and leak-tested, the specific altered zone and components in the immediate zone or area that is downstream from the point or area of intrusion shall be purged per 5.3.12.3.6.

5.3.12.3.9.4 5.3.12.3.8.4 Before the new work is used for patient care, the following tests shall be performed for all Level 3 medical gas (e.g., oxygen and nitrous oxide) systems: (1) Operational pressure (5.3.12.3.10 5.3.12.3.9)(2) Gas concentration (5.3.12.3.11 5.3.12.3.10)5.3.12.3.9.5 5.3.12.3.8.5 Permanent records of these tests shall be maintained in accordance with 5.3.13.8.1.

5.3.12.3.10 5.3.12.3.9 Verifier Operational Pressure Test. Operational pressure tests shall be performed at each station outlet in Level 3 medical gas piping systems (e.g., oxygen and nitrous oxide) where the user makes connections and disconnections.

5.3.12.3.10.1 5.3.12.3.9.1 Tests shall be performed using either oil-free, dry Nitrogen NF or the gas of system designation.

5.3.12.3.10.2 5.3.12.3.9.2 Medical gas outlets (e.g., oxygen and nitrous oxide) shall deliver 100 Nl/min LPM (3.5 SCFM) with a pressure drop of no more than 35 kPa (5 psi) and static pressure of 345–380 kPa (50–55 psi).

5.3.12.3.11 5.3.12.3.10 Verifier Gas Concentration Test. After purging each Level 3 medical gas piping system with the gas of system designation, the following shall be performed: (1) Each medical gas outlet (e.g., oxygen and nitrous oxide) shall be

analyzed for concentration of gas, by volume.(2) Analysis shall be conducted with instruments designed to measure the

specific gas dispensed.(3) Allowable concentrations shall be as follows: (a) Oxygen > 99 percent oxygen (b) Nitrous oxide > 99 percent nitrous oxide5.3.12.3.12 5.3.12.3.11 Labeling. The presence and correctness of labeling required by this standard for all Level 3 medical gas components (e.g., station outlets/inlets, shutoff valves, and alarm panels) shall be verified.

5.3.12.3.13 5.3.12.3.12 Source Equipment Verification.

5.3.12.3.13.1 5.3.12.3.12.1 General. Source equipment verification for Level 3 medical gases shall be performed following the installation of the interconnecting pipelines, accessories, and source equipment.

5.3.12.3.13.2 5.3.12.3.12.2 Use of Source Equipment for Pipeline Verification Tests. Where the source equipment and system gas or vacuum is used for verification testing of the distribution piping, the source equipment shall be verified prior to verification of the distribution piping.

5.3.12.3.13.3 5.3.12.3.12.3 Level 3 Source Equipment for Positive-Pressure Gases Level 3 Medical Gases (Oxygen and Nitrous Oxide).

The system apparatus shall be tested for proper function, including the changeover from primary to secondary supply (with its changeover signal), before the system is put into service.

5.3.12.3.13.4 Level 3 Vacuum Source Equipment. The functioning of the Level 3 vacuum source system(s) shall be tested and verified before it is put into service.

5.3.12.4 Final Testing of Level 3 Systems for Gas Powered Devices and Vacuum

5.3.12.4.1 General

5.3.12.4.1.1 Final testing of gas powered device systems and vacuum systems shall be performed only after all tests required by 5.3.12.2 Initial Tests, have been performed.

5.3.12.4.1.2 The tests required by 5.3.12.4.2 through 5.3.12.4.8 shall be performed by one or more of the following(1) The installer(2) A representative of the system supplier(3) A representative of the system manufacturer(4) A system verifier per 5.3.12.3.1.45.3.12.4.1.3 The test gas shall be oil-free, dry Nitrogen NF or the system gas where permitted.

5.3.12.4.2 Final Standing Pressure Test (Level 3 Gas Powered Devices) Each gas powered device piping system shall be subjected to a ten-minute standing pressure test at operating line pressure using the following procedures: (1) After the system is filled with oil-free, dry Nitrogen NF or the system

gas, the source valve and any zone valves shall be closed.(2) The piping system downstream of the valves shall show no decrease in

pressure after ten minutes.(3) Any leaks found shall be located, repaired (if permitted), replaced (if

required), and retested.5.3.12.4.3 Final Standing Vacuum Test (Level 3 Vacuum). Each Level 3 vacuum piping system shall be subjected to a ten-minute standing vacuum test at operating line vacuum using the following procedures: (1) After the system has stabilized at the operating line vacuum, the source

valve and any zone valves shall be closed.(2) The piping system upstream of the valves shall show no decrease in

vacuum after ten minutes.(3) Leaks, if any, shall be located, repaired (if permitted), replaced (if

required), and retested.5.3.12.4.4 Final Cross-Connection Test (Level 3 Gas Powered Devices and Vacuum) After closing of walls and completion of the requirements of 5.3.12.2, Initial Tests, it shall be determined that no cross-connections exist between the piping systems for gas powered devices and Level 3 vacuum using the following method:(1) Where facilities have more than one gas or vacuum system, test each

system separately.(2) Shutoff the source of test gas for all gas powered device piping systems

and reduce them to atmospheric pressure.(3) Operate each Level 3 vacuum system at the normal system vacuum,

using the source equipment.(4) Each gas powered device gas outlet and Level 3 vacuum inlet shall be

tested with appropriate adapters to verify that vacuum is present only at the vacuum inlets in the system being tested and not at any gas powered device gas outlets or inlets of other vacuum systems.

(5) Shutdown the vacuum source equipment and slowly break the vacuum in the vacuum piping system, increasing its pressure to atmospheric.

(6) Test each Level 3 vacuum system until all are determined to be free of cross-connections.

(7) Using oil-free, dry Nitrogen NF or the system gas, pressurize the gas powered device piping system to a gage pressure of 345 kPa (50 psi).

(8) Test each gas powered device gas outlet using appropriate adapters to verify that the test gas pressure is present only at the outlets in the gas powered device system being tested.

(9) After it has been determined that a gas powered device piping system is free of cross-connections, disconnect the source of test gas and reduce the piping to atmospheric pressure.

(10) Proceed to test each gas powered device piping system until all are determined to be free of cross-connections.

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 995.3.12.4.5 Final Piping Purge Test (for Level 3 Gas Powered Devices) In order to remove any traces of particulate matter deposited in the pipelines as a result of construction, a heavy, intermittent purging of each gas powered device pipeline shall be done.

5.3.12.4.5.1 The appropriate adapter shall be obtained from the facility or manufacturer, and high purge rates shall be put on each outlet.

5.3.12.4.5.2 After the purge is started, it shall be rapidly interrupted several times until the purge produces no discoloration in a white cloth loosely held over the adapter during the purge.

5.3.12.4.5.3 In order to avoid possible damage to the outlet and its components, this test shall not be conducted using any implement other than the correct adapter.

5.3.12.4.6 Final Tie-In Test (Piping for Gas Powered Devices and Level 3 Vacuum)

5.3.12.4.6.1 Prior to the connection of any new piping to its source of supply, including extensions or additions to an existing piping system, the final tests in 5.3.12.4.1 through 5.3.12.4.5 shall be successfully performed on the new work.

5.3.12.4.6.2 Each joint in the final connection between new work and an existing system shall be leak-tested with the gas of system designation or vacuum at the normal operating pressure by means of soapy water or other means effective for use with oxygen.

5.3.12.4.6.3 For gas powered device piping, immediately after the final connection is made and leak-tested, the specific altered zone and components in the immediate zone or area that is downstream from the point or area of intrusion shall be purged per 5.3.12.4.5.

5.3.12.4.7 Labeling. The presence and correctness of labeling required by this standard for all Level 3 gas powered device and vacuum system components (e.g., station outlets/inlets and shutoff valves) shall be checked.

5.3.12.4.8 Source Equipment Testing

5.3.12.4.8.1 General. Source equipment checks for Level 3 gas powered devices and Level 3 vacuum shall be performed following the installation of the interconnecting pipelines, accessories, and source equipment.

5.3.12.4.8.2 Use of Source Equipment for Pipeline Verification Tests. Where the source equipment and system gas or vacuum is used for final testing of the distribution piping, the source equipment shall be checked-out and placed in operation prior to testing the distribution piping.

5.3.12.4.8.3 Level 3 Gas Powered Devices Source Equipment. The source equipment for Level 3 gas powered device system(s) shall be checked-out and placed in operation according to the manufacturerʼs instructions.

5.3.12.4.8.4 Level 3 Vacuum Source Equipment. The source equipment for Level 3 vacuum systems shall be checked-out and placed in operation according to the manufacturerʼs instructions.Substantiation: This proposal requires that only Level 3 medical gases (e.g., oxygen and nitrous oxide) be verified. Piping systems for Level 3 gas powered devices and vacuum do not warrant the cost of testing by a verifier. They can be tested by the installer or supplier.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: ALLEN: See my Explanation of Negative on 99-374(Log #18).Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-401 Log #137 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.3.12.2.7 & 5.3.12.2.8 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Corky Bishop, Medical Gas Management, Inc.Recommendation: Delete the word “Initial” from the title.Substantiation: These sections refer to the Standing Pressure Test for Positive-Pressure Gas Piping and the Standing Vacuum Test for Vacuum Systems. They should not be confused with the Initial Pressure Test and Initial Leak Test referred to in 5.3.12.2.3 and 5.3.12.2.4.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise text to read as follows: 5.3.12.2.7 Initial Standing Pressure Test for Postive-Pressure Gas Piping. After successful completion of the initial pressure tests under 5.3.12.2.3, Level

3 positive-pressure gas distribution piping shall be subjected to a standing pressure. 5.3.12.2.8 Initial Standing Vacuum Test for Vacuum Systems. Level 3 vacuum systems, with either plastic or copper piping, shall be subjected to a standing vacuum test.Committee Statement: See Committee Action on 99-400 (Log #162), Section 5.3.12.3.5.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 19 Negative: 2 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: ALLEN: See my Explanation of Negative on 99-374(Log #18). WAGNER: The tests called for by 5.3.12.2.3 and 5.3.12 2.4 Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-402 Log #20 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.3.12.3 & 5.3.12.3.8 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: F. David Wyrick, Sr., Cambiare Ltd.Recommendation: Delete whole Section of 5.3.12.3.7 and 5.3.12.3.8.Substantiation: This will not prove effective and there has not been a problem in over 30 years. If nitrogen is used in the brazing process and the lines purged (average in Level 3 includes 4 to 6 Station outlets). This will be cost prohibited in many rural areas across the USA. This will in many cases eliminate using a piped system as in a few states now. Many Medical or Dental Doctors will wave this as the RAF.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: Though correct information it does not allow for cutting corners or out right deception by installers who fail to use Nitrogen correctly if at all. Verification assures correctness.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 19 Negative: 2 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: ALLEN: See my Explanation of Negative on 99-374(Log #18). SHOEMAKER: The reason is the same for each. there were two meetings of this committee. In the first meeting we discussed and voted on each of the Level 3 items. These specific items were changed without the presence of the Level 3 experts in attendance. This was known by the committee at the time the second meeting was called. I support the original committee actions not the conclusions reached in the second meeting.Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-403 Log #402 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.3.12.3.8(5) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Peter Esherick, Patient Instrumentation Corp.Recommendation: Delete the following text: A test for dewpoint shall be conducted at the outlet most remote from the source and the dewpoint shall not exceed 500 ppm at 12°C Add to 5.3.12.3.8(4): (c) Dewpoint 5°C @ 50 psigSubstantiation: This change differentiates medical-surgical vacuum and WAGD systems as they have different functions.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Change 5.3.12.3.8(5) to read: “A test shall be conducted at the outlet most remote from the source and the moisture concentration shall not exceed 500 ppm or an equivalent pressure dew point of -12°C (10°F) at 50 psig (345 kPa).”Committee Statement: This correlates with Level 1.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: ALLEN: See my Explanation of Negative on 99-374(Log #18).Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-404 Log #CP330 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 5.5.1.x )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Piping SystemsRecommendation: Add text to read as follows: 5.1.1.x Wherever the term medical-surgical vacuum occurs, the provisions shall apply to systems for piped medical-surgical vacuum and piped waste anesthetic gas disposal (WAGD). Wherever the name of a specific vacuum service occurs, the provision shall apply only to that vacuum service.Substantiation: This requirement differentiates medical-surgical vacuum from WAGD systems.

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-405 Log #230 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 5.10.5.4.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Robert M. Sutter, BOC GasesRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Flux shall only be used when brazing joints that can be exposed to cryogenic temperatures or dissimilar metals such as copper and bronze or brass using a silver (BAg series) brazing filter metal.Substantiation: At the present time the brazing practices of bulk system installers is to use a BAg series filler metal along with flux when installing cryogenic piping. Should other proposals be accepted that would place the brazing practices and procedures for bulk supply systems within the scope of the 99 standard some confusion could exist without changing the statement “Flux shall only be used when brazing dissimilar metals”.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Action on Proposal 99-110 (Log #CP313).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-406 Log #423 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 5.12.11.1.4 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Fritz Koppenberger, Environmental Testing Services Inc.Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: (1) At intervals of not more than 6100 mm (20 ft) 3050 mm (10 ft)Substantiation: The increase in the use of ceiling space to house new equipment significantly decreases the ability of anyone to read the medical gas labels on the piping. Ducting has increased in size due to regulatory agency changes. Multiple direction changes in the piping are now common over short runs, and identifying and tracing piping is becoming more difficult than in the past. A decrease in the distance between labels is needed to allow construction workers and hospital maintenance personnel to adequately identify medical gas piping.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: The current spacing is adequate for the identification of the pipelines.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: WAGNER: Labeling at 20 foot intervals is adequate for straight runs that are fully visible, but piping should be labeled on both sides of obstructions, such s ducts, that prevent an individual from visually tracing the line. Pipelines should be labeled wherever exposed between obstructions.Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-407 Log #62 HEA-ADM Final Action: Accept in Principle( 7.2.2.2 (New) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Eddie Phillips, Southern Fire Code Development CommitteeRecommendation: Add a new 7.2.2.2 to read: 7.2.2.2 Flammable Materials. 7.2.2.2.1* Flammable liquids, gels or other similar materials shall be limited to patient care rooms and other approved locations. 7.2.2.2.2 The storage and handling of flammable liquids shall be in accordance with NFPA 30. A.7.2.2.2.1 The placement of hand cleaning dispensers or other flammable liquids should not be placed in corridors, means of egress or other areas not located within the patient room. The life safety code 18 & 19.7.5 prohibits combustible decorations and similar items from being in heath care occupancies.Substantiation: There is an increased use of hand cleaning materials that are classified as flammable liquids. These cleaners are being placed in corridors and other means of egress and should be prohibited in these areas. The proper location is in the patient rooms. The storage of the spare product should meet NFPA 30. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Add a new 7.2.2.2.1 to read: 7.2.2.2.1 Flammable Hand Cleaning Materials.

7.2.2.2.1.1* Flammable liquids, gels or other similar materials shall be limited to patient care rooms and other approved locations. 7.2.2.2.1.2 The storage and handling of flammable liquids shall be in accordance with NFPA 30. A.7.2.2.2.1.1 The placement of hand cleaning dispensers or other flammable liquids should not be placed in corridors, means of egress or other areas not located within the patient room. The life safety code 18 & 19.7.5 prohibits combustible decorations and similar items from being in heath care occupancies.Committee Statement: The recommendation was added in a different subsection to allow for additional flammable materials to be addressed in this section.Number Eligible to Vote: 5Ballot Results: Affirmative: 3 Vote Not Returned: 2 DIMANNO, TRUDZINSKI

________________________________________________________________99-408 Log #363 HEA-ELE Final Action: Accept( 8.1.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Craig H. Kampmier Swansea, MARecommendation: Delete the following text: 8.1.2 this chapter does not require formal approval or listing of any applianceSubstantiation: The section conflicts with other requirements, i.e. 8.5.2.4.4, 8.5.2.4.5.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 11Ballot Results: Affirmative: 8 Vote Not Returned: 3 GARLATTI, WILLEY, WOODIN

________________________________________________________________99-409 Log #390 HEA-ELE Final Action: Reject( 8.1.2 and 8.1.3 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Alfred Maske Jolier, ILRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 8.1.2 Patient-Care-Related Electrical Appliance shall be either: (a) Equipment listed for use in the patient care vicinity, or (b) Equipment fully evaluated to all relevant requirements from IEC 60601-1, Medical Electrical Equipment - General Requirements for Safety, and all collateral (IEC 60601-1-xx) and particular (IEC 60601-2-xx) standards which apply, or (c) Experimental or research equipment built to order or under development which shall be used under qualified supervision and shall have a degree of safety that has been deemed acceptable by the facility. This chapter does not require formal approval or listing of any appliance. 8.1.3 Experimental or research apparatus built to order or under development shall be used under qualified supervision and shall have a degree of safety equivalent to that described herein or have a degree of safety that has been deemed acceptable by the facility.Substantiation: This clause as presently written is confusing because an NFPA Standard by its very nature looks for “approval” as an outcome of applying the standard. When an AHJ or Health Care Facility uses NFPA 99 and signs off on the installation they are in effect “approving” the health care appliances covered by the standard. In addition, Chapter 8 references Chapter 10 many times, and Chapter 10 requires listing for some equipment. for example see 10.2.2.1. However, the overall intent of this change is more broad than just correcting the confused wording of the original. NFPA 99 will be dramatically improved if it is revised to take advantage of medical appliance listing programs that already exist, rather than trying unsuccessfully to serve as a complete stand-alone medical appliance standard. This proposal seeks to align NFPA 99 with harmonizd international medical equipment standards, as industry has requested many times. Having another set of equipment requirements in NFPA 99 cause equipment manufacturers extra time, effort, and cost. This effort is wasted since these products are highly regulated already and most have already been proven to meet safety standards by virtue of UL Listing, FDA acceptance, CE Marking, or other certification. It is acknowledged that some specialized, one-of-a-kind equipment may need more flexibility and this is permitted in item (c).Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: The action on Proposal 99-408 (Log #363) addressed the issue of listed equipment. Section 8.1.3 is needed to address the safety in research equipment. There is no record to show that the additional listing requirements are necessary.Number Eligible to Vote: 11Ballot Results: Affirmative: 8 Vote Not Returned: 3 GARLATTI, WILLEY, WOODIN

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99________________________________________________________________99-410 Log #392 HEA-ELE Final Action: Reject( 8.4.1.2 through 8.4.1.2.4.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Alfred Maske Jolier, ILRecommendation: Delete text as follows: 8.4.1.2 Cord and Plug Connected Portable Equipment. All patient care related electrical equipment supplied by a flexible cord and plug, carrying 20 V or more, shall meet the requirements of 8.4.1.2. 8.4.1.2.1 Grounding of Appliances. 84.1.2.1.1 All cord connected electrically powered appliances that are not double insulated and are used in the patient care vicinity shall be provided with a three wire power cord and a three pin grounding type plug. 8.4.1.2.1.2 Double insulated appliances shall be permitted to have two conductor cords. 8.4.1.2.2 Attachment Plugs. Attachment plugs installed by the facility shall meet the requirements of 10.2.2.1. 8.4.1.2.3 Power Cords. Power cords installed by the facility shall meet the requirements of 10.2.2.2. 8.4.1.2.4 Line Voltage Equipment. Anesthetizing Locations. Flexible cord for portable lamps or portable electric appliances operating at more than 12 V between conductors, intended for use in anesthetizing locations, shall meet all of the following requirements: (1) Cords shall be continuous. (2) Cords shall be without switches from the appliance to the attachment plug. (3) Cords shall be of a type designated for extra hard usage in accordance with NFPA 70, National Electrical Code. (4) Cords shall be protected at the entrance to equipment by an insulating grommet. (5) Cords shall be of sufficient length to reach any position in which the portable device is to be used. (6) The attachment plug shall be inserted only in a fixed approved receptacle. (7) Adapters shall be used and maintained in accordance with 8.5.2.5. 8.4.1.2.4.1 Foot treadle operated controllers shall be permitted in any anesthetizing location if appended to portable electric appliances in an approved manner. Foot treadle operated controllers and their connector shall be splashproof.Substantiation: NFPA 99 tries to provide product requirements which will result in safe medical equipment, without requiring listing of the medical equipment or compliance with recognized consensus standards. This effort, though well-meaning, is incomplete and unsuccessful. Excellent product standards already exist for medical equipment, and a review of those standards shows that NFPA 99 is woefully inadequate by comparison. Simply put, medical devices which comply only with NFPA 99 cannot be presumed to be safe, because they have not been evaluated for many of the hazards which need to be considered. Omissions in NFPA 99 include such basic safety principles as dielectric strength between mains parts and patient circuits, mechanical hazards (loading, pinch points, stability), evaluation of single-fault conditions, fire-hazards of transformers, and many others. This proposal coordinated with my proposal to require listing or compliance with equipment standards in Clause 8.1.2.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: This chapter is appropriate for users and this chapter is meant to assist users and not be a product standardNumber Eligible to Vote: 11Ballot Results: Affirmative: 8 Vote Not Returned: 3 GARLATTI, WILLEY, WOODIN________________________________________________________________99-411 Log #60 HEA-ELE Final Action: Accept( 8.4.1.2.4.2(5) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Burton R. Klein, Burton Klein Associates

Recommendation: Renumber this paragraph as new 8.4.1.2.4.3.Substantiation: In previous editions of NFPA 99, this was a separate Exception. It does not belong in paragraph 8.4.1.2.4.2 which covers receptacles to a movable equipment assembly.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 11Ballot Results: Affirmative: 8 Vote Not Returned: 3 GARLATTI, WILLEY, WOODIN________________________________________________________________99-412 Log #389 HEA-ELE Final Action: Reject( 8.4.1.2.5 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Alfred Maske Jolier, ILRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 8.4.1.2.5 Adapters and Extension Cords. Adapters and extension cords shall be listed for use in medical facilities meet the following requirements; (1) Attachment plugs shall meet the requirements of 10.2.2.1. (2)* Power cords shall meet the requirements of 10.2.2.2.Substantiation: NFPA 99 should be rewritten to delete the product-specific requirements. The standard should take advantage of existing Listing programs for medical equipment and accessory equipment.

Requiring the adapters and extension cords to be listed for use in health care facilities will cause these devices to be constructed with robust grounding as is presently required by NFPA 99. In addition, the listing program for this type of equipment is more complete than the NFPA requirements, resulting in an improvement in safety. This proposal coordinates with my proposal to require listing or compliance with equipment standards in Clause 8.1.2.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: This is a user chapter and users will construct adapter cords, therefore the material is needed.Number Eligible to Vote: 11Ballot Results: Affirmative: 8 Vote Not Returned: 3 GARLATTI, WILLEY, WOODIN________________________________________________________________99-413 Log #393 HEA-ELE Final Action: Reject( 8.4.1.3.3 through 8.4.1.3.6 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Alfred Maske Jolier, ILRecommendation: Delete clauses 8.4.1.3.3 through 8.4.1.3.6.Substantiation: NFPA 99 should be rewritten to delete the detailed leakage current testing in these paragraphs. This information is presently a rough equivalent to the leakage current requirements in ANSI/AAMI standards, IEC 60601-1, and UL2601-1. However, the NFPA version has omitted some very important material. Rather than try to keep NFPA 99 aligned with the other product standards it would be much easier and accurate to refer to those other requirements. Product manufacturers are already complying with IEC 60601-1 and to add the unharmonized requirements of NFPA 99 only confuses the issue. The standard should take advantage of existing listing programs for medical equipment and accessory equipment, or at least should simply reference IEC 60601-1 or UL 2601-1. This proposal coordinates with my proposal to require listing or compliance with equipment standards in Clause 8.1.2.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: This chapter is meant to be used by users and the requirements are needed by the users.Number Eligible to Vote: 11Ballot Results: Affirmative: 8 Vote Not Returned: 3 GARLATTI, WILLEY, WOODIN

________________________________________________________________99-414 Log #160 HEA-ELE Final Action: Accept in Principle( 8.4.1.3.3(B) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Burton R. Klein, Burton Klein AssociatesRecommendation: Add the following sentence: Test shall not be made on the load side of any isolation power system.Substantiation: There is no explicit text in Chapter 8 with respect to performing leakage current and the use of isolated power systems (portable or permanent). Incorrect readings result if measurement is made with ʻisolated ̓power. Subparagraph (B) mentions only ʻproperly grounded. ̓Subparagraph (D)(1) mentions only ʻpolarity of the power line normal. ̓New sentence is to ensure that the two phase wires are not ʻisolated.ʼCommittee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Change to read as follows: “Test shall not be made on the load side of an Isolated Power System or Isolation Transformer.” Annex A.8.4.1.3.3(B) to read as follows: “This test is not valid when performed on the load side of an isolation transformer or an isolated power system because the values obtained will be falsely low.” Committee Statement: This should not apply to any isolation power system. The annex material was added to clarify the measurement will not read correctly when measured on the load side.Number Eligible to Vote: 11Ballot Results: Affirmative: 8 Vote Not Returned: 3 GARLATTI, WILLEY, WOODINComment on Affirmative: LIPSCHULTZ: Change. This should not apply to any isolation power system. The word ʻany ̓is inappropriate.________________________________________________________________99-415 Log #381 HEA-ELE Final Action: Accept in Principle( 8.4.1.3.5.2 )________________________________________________________________TCC Action: In the proposed 8.4.1.3.5.2(2) add the word “the” before “health care facility”. Editorial.Submitter: Dale Woodin, ASHE-American Society for Healthcare Engineering of the American Hospital Association (AHA)Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 8.4.1.3.5.2 Chassis leakage current between 300 and 500µA shall be permitted on existing or special equipment (such as mobile X-ray machines) under the following conditions: (1) The grounding conductor is intact. (2) A documented maintenance schedule, such as three months, is established to ensure the integrity of the grounding connection. The health care facility shall be permitted to establish a protocol with shortened or

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99lengthened time intervals, depending on the intensity of the use of the appliance and prior test data.Substantiation: Evidence based research has not shown chassis leakage current to be a safety issue. Suggesting a frequency of three months for verifying the integrity of the ground is a waster of staff resources. The hospital should have the latitude to determine frequencies of routine inspection and verification.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise text to read as follows: 8.4.1.3.5.2 Chassis leakage current between 300 and 500 A shall be permitted on existing or special equipment (such as mobile X-ray machines) under the following conditions: (1) The grounding conductor is intact. (2) A documented maintenance schedule such as three months, is established to ensure the integrity of the grounding connection. The health care facility shall be permitted to establish a protocol with shortened or lengthened time intervals, depending on the intensity of the use of the appliance and prior test data.Committee Statement: The committee feels that chassis leakage current is a safety concern. There is a difference between leakage current and frequency of testing. This proposal addresses the frequency and not the leakage current. The second sentence was not deleted as it sets the responsibility of who determines the protocol.Number Eligible to Vote: 11Ballot Results: Affirmative: 7 Negative: 1 Vote Not Returned: 3 GARLATTI, WILLEY, WOODINExplanation of Negative: STEVENS: The recommended language is missing the following text. “...is established to ensure the integrity of the ground connection. The...”Comment on Affirmative: LIPSCHULTZ: My notes donʼt agree with ballot. Voting positive, since I regard this as an editorial error on your part. Ballot says “(2) A documented maintenance schedule, health care facility shall be permitted to establish a protocol with shortened or lengthened time intervals, depending on the intensity of the use of the appliance and prior test data. My notes say it should be “(2) A documented maintenance schedule is established to ensure the integrity of the grounding connection. the health care facility shall be permitted to establish a protocol with shortened or lengthened time intervals, depending on the intensity of the use of the appliance and prior test data. SANDLER: Note: Editorial correction. Chassis leakage current reads 300 and 500A, should be 300 and 500MA.

________________________________________________________________99-416 Log #CP700 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( Figures 8.4.1.3.5.5, 8.4.1.3.6.1, 8.4.1.3.6.2, 8.4.1.3.6.3, 8.4.1.3.6.4 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Electrical EquipmentRecommendation: In Figures 8.4.1.3.5.5, 8.4.1.3.6.1, 8.4.1.3.6.2, 8.4.1.3.6.3 and 8.4.1.3.6.4 change the “120V” to “Input Line Voltage”.Substantiation: This is to clarify that the input line voltage applies to more than just 120 Volts.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-417 Log #124 HEA-ELE Final Action: Accept( 8.4.1.3.6.3(b)2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Burton R. Klein, Burton Klein AssociatesRecommendation: Change reference from 10.2.1.3.4.2 to 10.2.13.4.2.Substantiation: Editorial. Correct reference paragraph number.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 11Ballot Results: Affirmative: 8 Vote Not Returned: 3 GARLATTI, WILLEY, WOODIN

________________________________________________________________99-418 Log #125 HEA-ELE Final Action: Accept( 8.4.1.3.6.3(b)2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Burton R. Klein, Burton Klein AssociatesRecommendation: Renumber this paragraph to 8.4.1.3.5.6.Substantiation: Reference to test in Chapter 10 is for a chassis leakage current test. Thus test belongs under 8.4.1.3.5.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 11Ballot Results: Affirmative: 8 Vote Not Returned: 3 GARLATTI, WILLEY, WOODIN

________________________________________________________________99-419 Log #394 HEA-ELE Final Action: Reject( 8.4.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Alfred Maske Jolier, ILRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 8.4.2 Nonpatient Electrical Appliances and Equipment. 8.4.2.1 Permanently Connected -Fixed. (Reserved) 8.4.2.2 Cord- and Plug-connected - Portable Equipment. 8.4.2.2.1 Patient Care Area. 8.4.2.2.1.1 The leakage current for facility-owned appliances (e.g., housekeeping or maintenance appliances) shall not exceed 500 uA in the following situations: (1) Wwhen they are used for any duration in a patient care vicinity (2) When they will, in normal use, contact patients Tests shall be made with Switch A in Figure 8.4.1.3.5.5 in the open position for two-wire equipment that is not double-insulated.Substantiation: Considering clause 8.4.2.2.1.1(2), equipment which in normal use contacts patients is a Patient-Care-Related Electrical Appliance and thus should not be included in 8.4.2. In addition, I recommend the addition of “for any duration” to 8.4.2.2.1.1(1) in order to make it very clear that any use of equipment in the patient care area requires equipment with a low leakage current. The use of equipment (vacuum cleaners etc.) with dangerous leakage currents in the patient vicinity is unsafe. Heart fibrillation can begin with only a momentary contact with elevated leakage currents.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: The submitter has not provided any substantiation such as case reports or hazardous situations that have been avoided to show how this will improve safety. Number Eligible to Vote: 11Ballot Results: Affirmative: 7 Negative: 1 Vote Not Returned: 3 GARLATTI, WILLEY, WOODINExplanation of Negative: ARONOW: The submitter has raised a valid problem. Clause 8.4.1 refers to Patient-Care-Related appliances, which is a defined term. 8.4.2 refers to Nonpatient Electrical Appliances, which is not defined and is confusing. Does it really mean Non-Patient Care-Related Appliances? But in normal use it contacts the patient? His recommendations may need revision, but it is correct in principle.

________________________________________________________________99-420 Log #376 HEA-ELE Final Action: Accept in Principle( 8.4.2.2.1.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Dale Woodin, ASHE-American Society for Healthcare Engineering of the American Hospital Association (AHA)Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Household or office appliances not commonly equipped with grounding conductors in their power cords shall be permitted provided they are not located within the patient care vicinity. shall be permitted if they are double insulated or equipped with grounding conductors in their power cords.Substantiation: Household or office appliances are often double insulated rather then being equipped with a ground. These devices are common in patient care environments and do not pose a danger to the patient.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Add a new second sentence to section 8.4.2.2.1.2 to read as follows: “Double Insulated appliances shall be permitted in the patient care vicinity.”Committee Statement: This makes it clear that double insulated appliances are allowed in the patient care vacinity. Number Eligible to Vote: 11Ballot Results: Affirmative: 8 Vote Not Returned: 3 GARLATTI, WILLEY, WOODIN

________________________________________________________________99-421 Log #395 HEA-ELE Final Action: Reject( 8.4.2.2.2 thorugh 8.4.2.2.2.4 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Alfred Maske Jolier, ILRecommendation: Delete 8.4.2.2.2 through 8.4.2.2.2.4.Substantiation: NFPA 99 should be rewritten to delete the detailed product-specific requirements in these paragraphs. This information is presently a rough equivalent to the requirements in the IEC standard for laboratory equipment (IEC 61010). However, the NFPA 99 version has omitted some very important material. Rather than try to keep NFPA 99 aligned with the other product standard it would be much easier and accurate to refer to those other requirements. Product manufacturers are already complying with IEC 61010 and to add the unharmonized requirements of NFPA 99 only confuses the issue. The standard should take advantage of existing listing programs for laboratory equipment and accessory equipment, or at least should simply reference IEC 61010.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: This chapter is for users and the requirements are needed to assist the user.Number Eligible to Vote: 11

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99Ballot Results: Affirmative: 8 Vote Not Returned: 3 GARLATTI, WILLEY, WOODIN________________________________________________________________99-422 Log #387 HEA-ELE Final Action: Reject( 8.5.2.1.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Alfred Maske Jolier, ILRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 8.5.2.1.1 Medical and surgical electrical instrumentation and monitoring devices, as well as all electric appliances used for the care and entertainment of the patient, acquired for use by the facility (e.g., purchased, leased, donated, constructed on-site, loaned, etc.), shall be listed as medical equipment or listed for the specific use for which the device is being placed in service. meet the safety performance criteria of Chapter 10.Substantiation: NFPA 99 should be rewritten to delete product-specific requirements and use presently existing product listing programs. It would be much easier and accurate to require listing or refer to other product standards rather than trying to repeat all the product requirements in NFPA 99.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: The submitter has not provided substantiation to show this will add another level of safety.Number Eligible to Vote: 11Ballot Results: Affirmative: 8 Vote Not Returned: 3 GARLATTI, WILLEY, WOODIN________________________________________________________________99-423 Log #373 HEA-ELE Final Action: Reject( 8.5.2.1.2.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Dale Woodin, ASHE-American Society for Healthcare Engineering of the American Hospital Association (AHA)Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 8.5.2.1.2.2 All appliances used in patient care areas shall be tested in accordance with 8.4.1.3 or 8.4.2.2.1.1 before being put into service for the first time and after repair or modification. Patient care related electrical appliances shall be retested at intervals determined by their normal location or area of normal use, but not exceeding the intervals listed before: (1) General care areas - 12 months (2) Critical care areas - 6 months (3) Wet locations - 6 months Exception No.1: The testing intervals listed are intended to be nominal values, and facilities shall be permitted to adopt a protocol using either longer or shorter intervals provided that there is a documented justification based on previous safety testing records for the equipment in question, unusually light or heavy utilization, or similar considerations. Exception No. 2: Facility owned household or other appliances that are used in the patient care vicinity, but that are not intended to contact the patient, shall be tested at intervals deemed appropriate by the facility. The facility shall be permitted to structure a testing protocol and frequency for some equipment that might be more limited than that prescribed in 8.4.1.3.Substantiation: Normal practice in Clinical Engineering since 1989 has been to do electrical safety testing only as described in the first sentence of 8.5.2.1.2.2. The exception was a requirement from the College of American Pathologists (CAP) for safety testing every six months. About 4 years ago, they too dropped their electric safety testing requirement to conform with the present common practice.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: The submitter has not submitted any substantiation to show this is a safe practice. This could lead to appliances that have not been tested for extended periods of times and the appliance could have a malfunction without anyone being aware of it. Exception number 1 provides adequate guidance for the user.Number Eligible to Vote: 11Ballot Results: Affirmative: 8 Vote Not Returned: 3 GARLATTI, WILLEY, WOODIN________________________________________________________________99-424 Log #388 HEA-ELE Final Action: Reject( 8.5.2.1.5 and 8.5.2.1.5.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Alfred Maske Jolier, ILRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 8.5.2.1.5 Protection of Patients with Direct Electrical Pathways to the Heart. 8.5.2.1.5.1 Only equipment that is marked with the CF symbol specifically desinged for the purpose, that is, provided with suitable isolaed patient leads or connections, shall be connected directly to electrically conductive pathways to a patientʼs heart.

Substantiation: The CF Symbol is recognized around the world as meaning “Suitable for connection directly to the heart”. NFPA 99 should be harmonized with worldwide accepted symbology.Committee Meeting Action: Reject

Committee Statement: There are many older devices that are suitable for the use and do not have the CF symbol. The CF symbol does not guarantee that the equipment will be intended to be used for direct electrically conductive pathways to the heart.Number Eligible to Vote: 11Ballot Results: Affirmative: 8 Vote Not Returned: 3 GARLATTI, WILLEY, WOODIN________________________________________________________________99-425 Log #382 HEA-ELE Final Action: Reject( 8.5.2.1.9 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Dale Woodin, ASHE-American Society for Healthcare Engineering of the American Hospital Association (AHA)Recommendation: Delete 8.5.21.9.Substantiation:Eliminate this section. This is addressed through various regulatory agencies.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: This requirement is valid and the procurement authority needs this information. This is valid information to the users.Number Eligible to Vote: 11Ballot Results: Affirmative: 8 Vote Not Returned: 3 GARLATTI, WILLEY, WOODIN_________________________________________________99-426 Log #396 HEA-ELE Final Action: Reject( 8.5.2.3 through 8.5.2.3.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Alfred Maske Jolier, ILRecommendation: Delete 8.5.2.3 or 8.5.2.3.2.Substantiation: These requirements are attempting to dictate the action of the clinicians and nursing staff during surgery. This is way outside the scope of NFPA 99 and should be left to the health care facility to put procedures in place (if needed) for these issues.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: The text addresses safe interfacing with the equipment and does not address the safe clinical applications or procedures.Number Eligible to Vote: 11Ballot Results: Affirmative: 8 Vote Not Returned: 3 GARLATTI, WILLEY, WOODIN________________________________________________________________99-427 Log #397 HEA-ELE Final Action: Reject( 8.5.2.4.4 and 8.5.2.4.5 )________________________________________________________________TCC Action: The TCC changes the committee meeting action to delete 8.5.2.4.5 of the existing text, as it is redundant with 8.5.2.4.4.Submitter: Alfred Maske Jolier, ILRecommendation: Delete either 8.5.2.4.4 or 8.5.2.4.5.Substantiation: These two clauses are duplicating each other.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Reverse the order of the existing 8.5.2.4.4 and 8.5.2.4.5 Add new A.5.2.4.5 to read: “This section is more stringent because the equipment will actually be used in an oxygen enriched atmosphere.Committee Statement: The two sections address different areas. One section addresses equipment intending to be used in an oxygen enriched atmosphere and the other section is where equipment that is actually used in an enclosed oxygen enriched atmosphere.Number Eligible to Vote: 11Ballot Results: Affirmative: 6 Negative: 2 Vote Not Returned: 3 GARLATTI, WILLEY, WOODINExplanation of Negative: LIPSCHULTZ: George Stevens is right. Section 8.5.2.4.5 should be deleted. When I first read the submitterʼs proposal, I was thinking of Section 8.5.2.4.1 in my mind. As George points out, or the two sections listed in the proposal, neither is more severe. STEVENS: I do not see any difference; they both say “must be listed for use in oxygen-enriched atmospheres.” Neither is more severe than the other. If there is no difference, why have two sections. If they are different, the difference should be more profound.

________________________________________________________________99-428 Log #65 HEA-ELE Final Action: Accept in Principle( 8.5.5.1 )________________________________________________________________TCC Action: Revise the proposed 8.5.5.1 to read as follows: “Personnel concerned for the application or maintenance of electric appliances shall be trained on the risks associated with their use.” Add new annex material as follows: “A.8.5.5.1 Personnel includes physicians, nurses, nursing assistants, engineers and technicians.” This complies with the Manual of Style and coordinates with GAS Log #CP500.Submitter: Robert Bourke, Northeastern Regional Fire Code Dev.Recommendation: Revise to read: 8.5.5.1 Personnel responsible for the application or maintenance of electric appliances, including physicians, nurses, nursing assistants, engineers, and technicians, shall receive training as to the risks associated with their use.Substantiation: The word concerned appears to be too broad a term and could include many more individuals than those listed in the requirement. The word

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99responsible gives more clarity. Adding “or” to make the requirement read “the application or maintenance” clarifies that some personnel, such as a nurse, may be responsible for the application of the appliances and some routine maintenance, but an engineer may only maintain the appliances and never actually use them. By changing the words “be cognizant of” to “receive training as to” clarifies there is a procedure to make sure that the responsible personnel are aware of the risks associated with the use of the appliances.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise to read: 8.5.5.1 Personnel concerned for the application or maintenance of electric appliances, including physicians, nurses, nursing assistants, engineers, and technicians, shall receive training as to the risks associated with their use.Committee Statement: The word “responsible” is too restrictive and could exclude those with necessary indirect responsibility. Number Eligible to Vote: 11Ballot Results: Affirmative: 7 Negative: 1 Vote Not Returned: 3 GARLATTI, WILLEY, WOODINExplanation of Negative: STEVENS: 1. “Concerned with the application” or “responsible for the application” is a complex way of stating “Personnel who operate or maintain electrical appliances... 2. “Or” is an improvement over “and” for the reason given. 3. “Cognizant of the risks”, as is, is a measurable outcome of training. The following sections 8.5.5.1.1, .2, and .3 inform the reader how the knowledge (or cognizance) is imparted. A change to “receive training” would be redundant to those sections. Receiving training also does not equate to cognition. As written, a two-step process of providing training is augmented by assessment of cognition. Personnel who operate or maintain electronic appliances, including physicians, nurses, nurses assistants, engineers, and technicians, shall be cognizant of the risks associated with their use.________________________________________________________________99-429 Log #248 HEA-GAS Final Action: Accept in Principle( 9.3 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Eldon P. Rosentrater, Allied Healthcare Products Inc.Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 9.3 Cylinder and Container Source 9.3.7 Cylinder valves shall include a means to slow the initial, opening pressurization time to allow the heat of compression of safely dissipate. [Renumber remaining paragraphs.]Substantiation: As explained in the supporting materials, there have been recent oxygen fires resulting in serious injury and property damage. FDA, Industry and several expert organizations have investigated the possible causes of these oxygen fires. Two basic conditions are necessary to produce an oxygen fire: (1) Fuel source and (2) a Source of Ignition. Fuel sources are always present and consist of various contaminants that will ignite and burn in an oxygen environment at lower temperatures and pressures than ambient, atmospheric conditions. Ignition sources are open flames, sparks and heat generated when high pressure flows rapidly into a lower pressure chamber. This is called the heat of compression and is what happens when a high-pressure cylinder valve is opened rapidly. Oxygen systems using small cylinders are more at risk because their conductive thermal mass is less than large cylinder systems. Eliminating heat of compression as a source of ignition takes away the likely cause of oxygen fires, even when a fuel contaminant may be accidentally present. NFPA should join in the effort to make small cylinder, medical oxygen systems safer by encouraging the use of heat of compression limiting cylinder valves in the Gas Equipment requirements of Chapter 9 as stated in the requirements for proposed wording in new paragraph 9.3.7. Note: Supporting material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise 9.3 to read as follows: Cylinders shall be permitted to be fitted with valves that include a means to slow the initial opening pressurization.Committee Statement: The revised wording makes the requirement more generic. Number Eligible to Vote: 8Ballot Results: Affirmative: 5 Vote Not Returned: 3 CROWLEY, MILLS, SOMMERS________________________________________________________________99-430 Log #136 HEA-GAS Final Action: Reject( 9.3.2.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Wayne C. Karcher, Allied Healthcare Products, Inc.Recommendation: Add text to read as follows: A surge suppressing device shaall be placed between the cylinder and the regulator on aluminum oxygen cylinders, to prevent the heat of re-compression from reaching the auto ignition temperature of some regulator materials.Substantiation: A number of fires have been reported in oxygen regulators due to the heat generated when the cylinder valve was first opened. Note: Supporting material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: The proposal was not specific as to what size cylinder this device can be used on. This may be one way to reduce the risk but not the only way, therefore it is too restrictive and could be exclusionary.

Number Eligible to Vote: 8Ballot Results: Affirmative: 5 Vote Not Returned: 3 CROWLEY, MILLS, SOMMERS

________________________________________________________________99-431 Log #375 HEA-ELE Final Action: Reject( 9.4.1.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Dale Woodin, ASHE-American Society for Healthcare Engineering of the American Hospital Association (AHA)Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 8.4.1.2 Cord- and Plug-Connected—Portable Equipment. All patient-care-related electrical equipment supplied by a flexible cord and plug, carrying 20 28 V or more, shall meet the requirements of 8.4.1.2.Substantiation: Low voltage equipment commonly operates at 24 volts.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: The submitter needs to provide more substantiation to retain the level of safety with the proposed new voltage requirement.Number Eligible to Vote: 11Ballot Results: Affirmative: 8 Vote Not Returned: 3 GARLATTI, WILLEY, WOODIN

________________________________________________________________99-432 Log #372 HEA-GAS Final Action: Reject( 9.4.3, 9.4.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: George L Scott, Scott Associates LLCRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 9.4.3 Storage for nonflammable gases with a total volume compressed equal to or less than 8.5 m3 (300 ft3) or equal to or less than 17 m3 (600 ft3), for emergency preparedness supply. For medical systems ̓planned and uplanned shutdowns shall comply... 9.4.2 Except as allowed in 9.4.3 storage for nonflammable gases...Substantiation: It is becoming common emergency preparedness practice particularly in patient care units with multiple ventilator patients LICU, NICD to “backfeed” zones within these units during unforeseen O2 and air system shutdowns. Please reference ASSE 6000-2001 edition Appendix F. The present standard allows only one large cylinder which is not an adequate supply for units with multiple ventilator patients.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: There is an increased risk because of the increased number of smaller cylinders and the extra handling of those cylinders. In addition the proposed recommendation does not clearly define how or when these cylinders will be used for emergency preparedness. Some may use the veil of emergency preparedness to justify the storage of these cylinders.Number Eligible to Vote: 8Ballot Results: Affirmative: 5 Vote Not Returned: 3 CROWLEY, MILLS, SOMMERS

________________________________________________________________99-433 Log #401 HEA-GAS Final Action: Accept in Principle( 9.4.3(a) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Peter Esherick, Patient Instrumentation Corp.Recommendation: “...2100m2 (22,500 ft2), ...replace with: ...8.5m3 (300 ft3)...Substantiation: Numbers are obviously inccorrect and should be the same as in 9.4.3.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise 9.4.3 (A) to read as follows: “...not to exceed 2100 sq. m. (22,500 sq. ft) of floor area, shall not be...”Committee Statement: There is confusion between the volume of the gas and the floor area of a patient care area. The change clarified that the 22,500 sq. ft. is a floor area, not a volume of the gas.Number Eligible to Vote: 8Ballot Results: Affirmative: 5 Vote Not Returned: 3 CROWLEY, MILLS, SOMMERS

________________________________________________________________99-434 Log #CP500 HEA-GAS Final Action: Accept( 9.6.2.1, 9.6.2.1.1, 9.6.2.1.2, 9.6.2.1.3, 8.5.5.3 )________________________________________________________________TCC Action: The TCC modifies the proposed 9.6.2.1.1 as follows: “Personnel concerned with the application and maintenance of medical gases and others who handle medical gases and the cylinders that contain the medical gases shall be trained on the risks associated with their handling and use.” Add annex material as follows: “A.9.6.2.1.1 Personnel typically include physicians, nurses, nursing assistants, respitory therapists, engineers, techniciansand others.” The TCC modified these section to conform to the Manual of Style. The TCC would also like the TC to define what is “Qualified”.Submitter: Technical Committee on Gas Delivery EquipmentRecommendation: Add new 9.6.2.1 to read as follows: 9.6.2.1 Qualification and Training of Personnel. 9.6.2.1.1 Personnel concerned with the application and maintenance of medical gases including physicians, nurses, nursing assistants, respitory therapists, engineers, technicians, and others who handle medical gases and

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99the cylinders that contain the medical gases shall be cognizant of the risks associated with their handling and use. 9.6.2.1.2 The health care facilities shall provide programs of continuing education for its personnel. 9.6.2.1.3 Continuing education programs shall include periodic review of safety guidelines and usage requirements for medical gases and the cylinders. (See annex B.2 and B.6) 8.5.5.3 Equipment shall be serviced by qualified personnel only. Renumber existing section.Substantiation: The committee feels some level of training should be required for personnel handling cylinders.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 8Ballot Results: Affirmative: 5 Vote Not Returned: 3 CROWLEY, MILLS, SOMMERS________________________________________________________________99-435 Log #364 HEA-GAS Final Action: Reject( 9.6.2.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Craig H. Kampmier Swansea, MARecommendation: Add text to read as follows: (4) The area ventilation and luminaire shall be explosion proof, and connected to a common switch located outside of the room.Substantiation: Dust, dirt and oil accumulations can occur. Explosion proof fixtures minimize any risk of such accumulations and ignition sources contributing to an incident with a leak or release of LOX within the room. Simultaneously turning on the ventilation and room luminaire prior to entry will ensure an immediate reduction of OEA should one have occurred.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: The submitter did not provide any history of problems or fires to warrant an increase of protection.Number Eligible to Vote: 8Ballot Results: Affirmative: 5 Vote Not Returned: 3 CROWLEY, MILLS, SOMMERS

________________________________________________________________99-436 Log #398 HEA-ELE Final Action: Reject( Chapter 10 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Alfred Maske Jolier, ILRecommendation: Delete Chapter 10.Substantiation: NFPA 99 tries in Chapter 10 to provide product requirements which will result in safe medical equipment, without requiring listing of the medical equipment or compliance with recognized consensus standards. This effort, though well-meaning, is incomplete and unsuccessful. Excellent product standards already exist for medical equipment, and a review of those standards shows that NFPA 99 is woefully inadequate by comparison. Simply put,medical devices which comply only with NFPA 99 cannot be presumed to be safe, because they have not been evaluated for many of the hazards which need to be considered. Omissions in NFPA 99 include such basic safety principles as dielectric strength between mains parts and patient circuits, mechanical hazards (loading, pinch points, stability), evaluation of single-fault conditions, fire-hazards of transformers, and many others. Deletion of this chapter will coordinate with the requirement to require listing or compliance with equipment standards proposed for Clause 8.1.2.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: This standard is not to be used as a product evaluation standard to the exclusion of any other standard. NFPA 99 pulls together many different types of requirements. Number Eligible to Vote: 11Ballot Results: Affirmative: 8 Vote Not Returned: 3 GARLATTI, WILLEY, WOODIN

________________________________________________________________99-437 Log #361 HEA-LAB Final Action: Reject( Chapter 11 )________________________________________________________________TCC Action: The TCC needs more information from the TC as to why Chapter 11 is still needed. The TCC would like to see what areas of Chapter 11 are unique to hospital laboratories and which areas are covered by other standards.Submitter: Richard E. Cutts, USAFRecommendation: Chapter 11 should be deleted from NFPA 99.Substantiation: Chapter 11 should be deleted from NFPA 99, the information contained is redundant and is very vague. It resembles policies and procedures rather than codes and standards. All labs must be certified, within the laboratory certification process guidance and inspections of all policy and procedures are covered in depth. Only one agency should provide guidance.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: The committee feels that fire protection is important in hospitals and the hazards found in healthcare laboratories pose unique hazards. In addition the requirements of Chapter 11 are more stringent than other related standards and the requirements need to stay in one location, which is more user friendly.

Number Eligible to Vote: 7Ballot Results: Affirmative: 4 Vote Not Returned: 3 LINDNER, SIMMONS, WEAR________________________________________________________________99-438 Log #CP402 HEA-LAB Final Action: Reject( 11.3.1.1 )________________________________________________________________TCC Action: Reject The TCC rejects this proposal because NFPA 5000 is not currently coordinated with other referenced standards such as NFPA 30 or NFPA 45 and therefore is not in favor of referencing the 2002 edition of NFPA 5000 at this time.Submitter: Technical Committee on LaboratoriesRecommendation: Revise section 11.3.1.1 to read as follows: 11.3.1.1* Construction of laboratories shall comply with the requirements of NFPA 45, Standard on Fire Protection for Laboratories Using Chemicals, NFPA 101, Life Safety Code, and NFPA 5000, Building Construction and Safety Code and with the following additional requirements.Substantiation: A reference was needed to NFPA 5000 for the construction requirements for laboratories.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 7Ballot Results: Affirmative: 4 Vote Not Returned: 3 LINDNER, SIMMONS, WEAR

________________________________________________________________99-439 Log #CP403 HEA-LAB Final Action: Accept( 11.3.1.1.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on LaboratoriesRecommendation: Revise section 11.3.1.1.1 to read as follows: 11.3.1.1.1 Health care laboratories that are not protected by an automatic extinguishing system and that are not classified by the authority having jurisdiction as a severe hazard shall be separated from surrounding health care areas and from exit access corridors by a fire barrier wall with a minimum 1-hour fire resistant rating, and all openings protected by ı hour-rated assemblies.Substantiation: This new terminology correlates with NFPA 5000.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 7Ballot Results: Affirmative: 4 Vote Not Returned: 3 LINDNER, SIMMONS, WEAR

________________________________________________________________99-440 Log #CP401 HEA-LAB Final Action: Reject( 11.7.2.1 )________________________________________________________________Note: Since the ballot on this Proposal did not confirm the Committee Action, the Committee is soliciting public comment for review when the proposal is reconsidered by the Committee as a Public Comment.TCC Action: Reject The TCC rejects this proposal because the NFPA 5000 is for new construction. The quantities of flammable or combustible liquids listed in Table 34.1.3.1 does not have any bearing on the requirements of NFPA 99, Chapter 11 as this section addresses the handling and use requirements.Submitter: Technical Committee on LaboratoriesRecommendation: Revise section 11.7.2.1 as follows: 11.7.2.1* Flammable and combustible liquids shall be used from and stored in approved containers in accordance with NFPA 30, Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code, NFPA 45, Standard on Fire Protection for Laboratories Using Chemicals and NFPA 5000, Building Construction and Safety Code, Table 34.1.3.1 except as modified herein.Substantiation: A reference to NFPA 5000 was needed for coordination. In addition, the requirements in NFPA 99, Chapter 11 are more stringent than other codes and standards and these requirements need to stay.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 7Ballot Results: Affirmative: 3 Negative: 1 Vote Not Returned: 3 LINDNER, SIMMONS, WEARExplanation of Negative: MCCABE: Based on this brief analysis NFPA 5000 Table 34.2.4.2 are more restrictive concerning the requirements for storage and use of flammable and combustible liquids (as well as other materials considered as “high hazard contents”) based on the control area concept for the upper floors of a multi-story building. It should be noted that if the Chapter 34 requirements for use and storage of flammable and combustible liquids are exceeded for a control area per Table 34.2.4.2 then the use is considered as Protection Level 2 or 3 per NFPA 5000 Section 34.3. Per NFPA 5000 Table 7.4.1 the differences in height and area limitations between Protection Level 2 or 3 and Health Care appear to be significant. The following is substantiation for my concern: NFPA 5000 -Chapter 34 Section 34.2 - Requirements for All Occupancies Containing High Hazard Contents Section 34.2.4 - Number of control areas shall comply with Table 34.2.4.2, which allows 1 control area (essentially the floor is considered a single control area) for all floor levels (10th and above). The total quantity of high hazard

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99contents for the control area (in this case the entire floor area) is also reduced to 5 percent of the figures shown in Table 34.1.3.1.

Table 34.1.3.1 allows 90 gal Class IA, 360 gal Class IB&IC, 360 gal Class IA, IB, IC (combined per note 1), 360 gal Class II, 990 gal Class IIIA, 39600 gal Class IIIB (Per note b on the last column the aggregate quantity of use and storage is not permitted to exceed the maximum quantity for storage). The tabular values were increased accumulatively for use of flammable cabinets, safety cans, etc., and fully sprinklered building (notes e and f). These values are permitted per control area (per floor for floors 10 and above). Table 34.2.4.2 reduces the maximum quantity per control area to 5 percent of the tabular values on floors 10 and above. The maximum values for storage are adjusted as follows: 4.5 gal Class IA, 18 gal Class IB & IC, 18 gal Class IA & IB & IC, 18 gal. Class II, 49.5 gal. Class 111A and 1,980 gal. Class IIIB. the adjusted values for use - open systems 1 gal. Class IA, 4.5 gal. Class IB&IC, 3 gal. Class IA&IB&IC, 3 gal. Class II, 8 gal. Class IIIA, 1,320 gal. Class IIIB It should be noted that the quantity of flammable and combustible liquids will reduce the allowable amount stored as per Note b the aggregate quantity in use and stored shall not exceed the quantity listed for storage. As an example, because Table 34.2.4.2 allows only one control area for floors 10 and above, quantities of isopropyl alcohol in a patient care area (assuming patient care and laboratories areas are located on these floors) will impact the amount of flammable and combustible liquids (in use as well as stored) allowed in a health care lab. In addition, Section 34.1.3.2.5 places additional restrictions for the following materials in Day Care, Health Care, Ambulatory Health Care and Detentional and Correctional Occupancies:34.1.3.1.5.1 -Toxic and Highly Toxic Compressed Gases34.1.3.1.5.2 - Oxidizers34.1.3.1.5.3 - Organic Peroxides34.1.3.1.5.4 - Reactive Materials34.1.3.1.5.5 - Flammable and Oxidizing Gases - This section prohibits the use of flammable gases, but Exception 2 flammable gas allows food service operations provided compliance per NFPA 58. There appears to be no allowance for piped laboratory gas.34.1.3.1.5.6 - Flammable and Combustible Liquids - The total quantity of flammable and combustible liquids shall not exceed the amounts necessary for demonstration, treatment, lab work, maintenance and operation of equip. Quantities shall not exceed the adjusted tabular values above.NFPA 99 Chapter 11NFPA 99 Section 11.7.2.3.1 allows the total Class I, II and IIIA in use (outside of approved storage cabinets and safety cans) to be 1 gal per 100 sq ft. As a result a 1000 sq ft lab would allow 10 gallons of Class I, II and IIIA in use.NFPA 99 Section 11.7.2.3.2 allows the total Class I, II and IIIA, including stored quantities to be 2 gal per sq ft. As a result a 1000 sq ft lab would allow 20 gallons of Class I, II and IIIA in use and storage._______________________________________________________________99-441 Log #241 HEA-HCE Final Action: Reject( Chapter 12 & 1.1.1 )________________________________________________________________ Submitter: Thomas T. Bulow, University Medical Ctr., Facilities Mgmt.The TCC is requesting the TC to provide a better committee statement, which explains what is critical for healthcare emergency management. The TCC would also like to know what is unique in NFPA 99, Chapter 12 that is not covered in NFPA 1600.Recommendation: Delete all of Chapter 12. Add a new Section 1.1.1.1 to read as follows: 1.1.1.1 Disasters/emergencies both internal and external shall be considered and planned for under the guidance of NFPA 1600. This shall include integrated planning and drills to measure effectiveness of the program and its required plans. Results of drills shall be used to adjust the program to most current needs.Substantiation: Chapter 12 lacks detail and clarity for proper implementation and measurement of effectiveness. It also lacks a suitable requirement for external coordination with public agencies and other private entities necessary to perform complete disaster/emergency management functions. Chapter 12 falls far short of identifying the necessary elements of a complete program with plans to make it functional and flexible to meet changing needs. NFPA 1600 is comprehensive with the flexibility to meet changing needs. It is global and looks at the disaster/emergency issues as they affect more than just a single isolated entity. These days we must look beyond isolated Cottage Industry Mentality. Recent times should have taught us that, if nothing else. Chapter 12 is internally focused and lacks integration of outside elements that have considerable impact on continued operation.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: The information in the chapter is occupancy specific and is needed. The chapter is being updated and additional annex material is being added to the document which supports the material in the body of the document.Number Eligible to Vote: 11Ballot Results: Affirmative: 6 Vote Not Returned: 5 BREWSTER, ENNIS, KENDIG, SINSIGALLI, VARGO

________________________________________________________________99-442 Log #346 HEA-HCE Final Action: Accept in Principle( Chapter 12 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Peter Brewster, US Department of Veterans AffairsRecommendation: Revise Chapter 12 as follows: Chapter 12 Health Care Emergency Management

12-1* Applicability. 12.1.1 This chapter is applicable to any health care facility that is intended to provide medical care during an emergency or maintain services for patients during a disaster {and for the protection of visitors and staff}. 12.1.2 {*} This chapter provides those with the responsibility for {the} emer-gency management {program}planning in health care facilities with a frame-work to assess, mitigate, prepare for, respond to, and recover from disasters {of any origin}. This chapter is intended to aid in {developing, maintaining and evaluating effective emergency management programs} meeting require-ments for having an emergency management plan. {For additional information on emergency management programs, see NFPA 1600, Standard for Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs.} 12.2 Responsibilities. 12.2.1* Authority Having Jurisdiction (AHJ). The AHJ shall be cognizant of the requirements of a health care facility with respect to its uniqueness for con-tinued operation of the facility in an emergency. 12.2.2 Senior Management. It shall be the responsibility of the senior manage-ment to provide its staff with plans necessary to respond to a disaster or an emergency. Senior management shall appoint an emergency management com-mittee, as appropriate, with the authority for {developing} writing, implement-ing, exercising, and evaluating the emergency management {program} plan. 12.2.3 * Emergency Management Committee. 12.2.3.1{*} The emergency management committee shall have the responsibil-ity for the overall disaster planning and emergency management {program} within the facility, under the supervision of designated leadership. {The pro-gram} Planning shall be based on realistic conceptual events and operating capacity thresholds. that necessitate activation of the plan. 12.2.3.2 {*} The emergency management committee shall model the emergen-cy {operations plan} management plan on the incident command system (ICS) in coordination with local emergency response agencies. 12.3 General Requirements 12.3.1* When a facility declares itself in a disaster mode, or when the authority having jurisdiction declares a state of disaster exists, the emergency {opera-tions plan} management plan shall be activated. Planning shall be based on realistic conceptual events and operating capacity thresholds that necessitate activation of the plan. 12.3.2* The decision to activate the emergency {operations plan} management plan shall be made by the authority designated within the plan, in accordance with the facilityʼs activation criteria. The decision to terminate shall be made by the designated authority in coordination with the authority having jurisdic-tion and other civil or military authorities involved. 12.3.3 The emergency {operations plan} management plan, as a minimum, shall include the components detailed in 12.3.3.1 through 12.3.3.{8}10, {and Training and Drills (12.3.3.9 and 12.3.3.10) are necessary for effectiveness.} 12.3.3.1* Identification of Emergency Response Personnel. All personnel des-ignated or involved in the emergency {operations plan} management plan of the health care facility shall be supplied with a means of identification, which shall be worn at all times in a visible location. Specific means of identification for incident command system (ICS) personnel shall be provided, such as vests, baseball caps or hard hats. 12.3.3.2* Continuity of Essential Building Systems. When designated by the emergency {operations plan} management plan to provide continuous service in a disaster or emergency, health care facilities shall establish contingency plans for the continuity of essential building systems, as applicable: (1)* Electricity (2) Water (3) Ventilation (4) Fire protection systems (5) Fuel sources (6) Medical gas and vacuum systems (if applicable) (7)* Communication systems 12.3.3.3* Staff Management. Planning shall include the alerting and managing of all staff and employees in a disaster, as well as consideration of all of the following:

(1) Housing (2) Transportation of staff and staff family (3) Critical incident stress management. 12.3.3.4* Patient Management. Plan{ning}s shall include provisions for man-agement of patients, particularly with respect to clinical and administrative issues. 12.3.3.5* Logistics. Contingency {P}lanning for disasters shall include as minimum, stockpiling or ensuring immediate or at least uninterrupted access to critical materials such as the following: (1) Pharmaceuticals

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99(2) Medical Supplies (3) Food Supplies (4) Linen supplies (5) Industrial and potable (drinking) waters 12.3.3.6* Security. Security plans shall be developed to meet the needs of the facility. 12.3.3.7* Public Affairs. 12.3.3.7.1 Health care facilities shall have designated media spokesperson to facilitate news releases. 12.3.3.7.2 An area shall be designated where media representatives can be assembled, where they will not interfere with the operations of the health care facility. 12.3.3{8}* Operational Recovery. Plans shall reflect measures needed to restore operational capability to pre-disaster levels. Fiscal aspects shall be con-sidered because of restoral costs and possible cash flow losses associated with the disruption 12.3.3.8{9} Staff Education. 12.3.3.8{9}.1 Each health care facility shall implement an educational pro-gram. This program shall include an overview of the components of the emer-gency management {program} plan and concepts of the incident command sys-tem. Education concerning the staffʼs specific duties and responsibilities shall be conducted upon reporting to their assigned departments or position. 12.3.3.8{9}.2 General overview education of the emergency management {pro-gram} plan and the incident command system shall be conducted at the time of hire. Department/staff specific education shall be conducted upon reporting to their assignments or position and annually thereafter. 12.3.3.9{10}* Drills. Each organizational entity shall implement {two} one or more specific responses of the emergency {operations plan} management plan {during each year} at least semi annually. At least one {of which} semi annual drill shall rehearse mass casualty response for health care facilities with emer-gency services, disaster receiving stations, or both.

Annex A - Explanatory MaterialA.12.1 Such facilities include, but are not limited to, hospitals, clinics, con-valescent or nursing homes, and first-aid stations (disaster receiving stations). Such facilities could be formally designated by a government authority as disaster treatment centers. Such facilities would not normally include doc-tors ̓or dentists ̓offices, medical laboratories, or school nurseries, unless such facilities are used for treatment of disaster victims. {National bioterrorism pre-paredness efforts call for the use of schools and other large public facilities to provide facilities for mass immunization.} {A.12.1.2 An emergency management program (formerly known as a disas-ter plan or internal/external plan) encompasses activities across four phases: mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery. Mitigation activities are those designed to reduce or eliminate the impact of hazards. Preparedness activities include those that build organizational and individual capabilities to deal with disasters. Response activities include all necessary actions to stop on-going negative effects of a disaster, and recovery activities are those that restore the organization, its employees and the community back to normal.The Joint Commission for the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) has incorporated Comprehensive Emergency Management as a cen-tral theme of its emergency management standards. See Annex F for JCAHO publications.NFPA 1600, Standard for Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs is an internationally-accepted framework for an emer-gency program. NFPA 99, Chapter 12 recognizes this overall structure and provides additional information useful to health care organizations. Figure A.12.1.2 illustrates the relationship between the elements of NFPA 99, Chapter 12 and NFPA 1600.

Figure A.12.1.2 How NFPA 99/12 relates to NFPA 1600}

A.12.2.1 In time of disaster all persons are subject to certain constraints or authorities not present during normal circumstances. {The} All emergency {operations} management plans written by a health care facility should be reviewed and coordinated with such authorities so as to prevent confusion. Such authorities include, but are not limited to, civil authorities (such as fire department, police department, public health department, or emergency medi-cal service councils), and {emergency management} civil defense or military authorities. {See Annex F for publications explaining how the out-of-hospital response is organized to multiple, and mass, casualty incidents.}Further, an authority having jurisdiction can impose upon the senior management of the facility the responsibility for participating in a community emergency management {program} plan.

{A.12.2.3.1 Figure A.12.2.3.1 illustrates how the various components of this chapter relate to either the day-to-day emergency management program or the emergency operations plan or EOP.}

Figure A.12.2.3.1 How NFPA 99/12 elements relate to the emergency manage-ment program (EMP) or the emergency operations plan (EOP).}

{A.12.2.3 The membership of the EMC should include: a chairperson, the emergency program coordinator, and representatives from key areas within the organization, including: the directorʼs office, physicians, nursing, infection control, facilities engineering, safety/industrial hygiene, purchasing/fiscal, police and other critical operating unit managers.}

A.12.2.3.1 {The emergency management committee should base the entityʼs program on a hazards vulnerability analysis (HVA)} Hazard identification and risk assessment should {The HVA} determines whether the following types of hazards are applicable {and the impacts each may have on mission critical systems.}: (1) Natural disasters (2) Technological/industrial disasters (3) Civil/political disasters. For further information on {how to conduct the HVA} disaster management, see NPFA 1600, {Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs and other publications listed in Annex F} Recommended Practice for Disaster Management. {See C.12.3.5 for descriptions of sample protocols for common hazards.} A.12.2.3.1.1 By basing the planning of health care emergency management on realistic conceptual events, the {program} reflects those issues or events that are predictable for the environment the organization operates in. Thus, such conceptual planning should focus on issues, such as severe weather typical in that locale; situations that may occur due to close proximity of industrial or transportation complexes; or earthquake possibilities due to local seismic activity. Planning for these events should also focus on the capacity of the health care organization to provide services in such an emergency. Capacity thresholds are different for all facilities, but have to do with issues such as the availability of emergency departments, operating suites and operating beds, as well as logistical response and facility utilities. {Planning should also incorpo-rate knowledge available in the disaster research about how individuals, small groups, organizations, communities and societies behave during emergencies and disasters. See Annex F for information sources on disaster research.} There is no way to plan for all possible emergencies, but by focusing on logical con-ceptual events and operating capacity thresholds, the health care organization can develop realistic plans as well as guidelines for staff to activate those plans. A.12.2.3.2 The incident command system (ICS) (also referred to as the inci-dent management system, or IMS) is a system having an identified chain of command that adapts to any emergency event. {The ICS consists of eight key elements: common terminology, integrated communications, modular organi-zation, unified command structure, manageable span of control, consolidated action plans, comprehensive resource management and pre-designated incident facilities.} ICS establishes common terminology and training for incident man-agement. These allow emergency responders from hospitals and all involved organizations to respond to an incident and be familiar with the management concepts and terminology of other responders. It also facilitates the request and processing of mutual aid requests. A widely accepted structure of an ICS is illustrated in Figure A.12.2.3.2

Figure 12.2.3.2 (See artwork on the following pages)

A policy group consists of senior managers constituted to provide decisions related to items or incident decisions not in the emergency management plan. The command staff consists of the incident commander and support staff. This support staff consists of the public information officer, liaison officer, and safety officer.In addition to the command staff, there are four sections, each with a section chief responding directly to the incident commander: plans section, logistics section, operations section, and finance section.Due to the nature of a health care facility, one deviation from the traditional ICS is made to show a line of medical control. Note the advisory position of the “medical staff officer.”{How an ICS organization accomplishes its work is through a process called Incident Action Planning that is based on management-by-objectives. After a briefing on the current situation and status of response efforts, continuing problems are identified and stated as objectives which are then prioritized, staffed and resourced, forming the Incident Action Plan, or IAP. Not all incidents require an IAP, however, IAPs become important when more than one agency is involved or when the incident cannot be resolved within one operational period.}

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Figure 12.2.3.2 {Incident Command Structure for Health Care Organizations} Model Emer-gency Organization.

99-442 (Log #346) Recommendation

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99{A.12.3.1 In emergency situations that occur without warning and impact the facility, staff at the scene of the problem are expected to follow established protocols to protect life, notify others and conserve property. Senior management may establish an Incident Command Post (ICP) near the scene, or support one that is established by responding public safety agencies.In emergency situations with warning or whose impacts require extended periods to resolve, senior management report to the facilityʼs Emergency Operations Center (EOC). Not all incidents require an EOC.Both the ICP and the EOC provide centralized locations for information collection, display, coordination, documentation and dissemination. When both are established, the ICP focuses on tactical activities currently underway, and the EOC focuses on strategies for the next operational period(s), resource issues, etc.See Annex F for publications on the Incident Command (Management) System.} A.12.3.3.1 Where feasible, photo identifications or other means to assure posi-tive identification should be used. Visitor and crowd control create the problem of distinguishing staff from visitors. Such identification should be issued to all facility personnel, including volunteer personnel who might be utilized in disaster functions. Note that care should be taken to assure that identification cards are recalled whenever personnel terminate association with the health care facility. Members of the news media should be asked to wear some means of identification, such as the press card, on their outside garments so that they are readily identifiable by security guards controlling access to the facility or certain areas therein. Clergy also will frequently accompany casualties or arrive later for visitations and require some means of identification. A.12.3.3.2 For essential building systems, consideration should be given to the installation of exterior building connectors to allow for the attachment of por-table emergency utility modules. Water storage systems should be inventoried and protected tot the greatest extent possible. A.12.3.3.2(1) See Sections 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 for types of essential electrical sys-tems for health care facilities. A.12.3.3.2(7) Emergency internal and external communication systems should be established to facilitate communication with security forces and other authorities having jurisdiction as well as internal patient care and service units in the event normal communication methods are rendered inoperative.The basic form of communication in a disaster is the telephone system. As part of the contingency plan to maintain communication, a plan for restoring telephone systems or using alternate systems is necessary. Typically, the first line of internal defense for a system outage is strategically placed power-failure telephones that are designed to continue to function in the event of system failure. Plans for external outages and load control should include the use of pay phones that have first priority status in external system restoration.Contingency plans should also contain strategies for the use of radio-frequency communications to supplement land-line usage. The plan should include a means to distribute and use two-way radio communication throughout the facility. A plan for the incorporation and use of amateur radio operators should also be considered.It should be recognized that single-channel radio communication is less desir-able than telephone system restoration due to the limited number of messages that can be managed. Cellular telephones, although useful in some disaster situations, should not be considered a contingency having high reliability sue to their vulnerability to load control schemes of telephone companies. {Portable email devices, satellite telephones and audio- and video-conferencing services are useful tools to link key staff and organizations}. A.12.3.3.3 Management of staff and employees allows for the best and most effective use of the entityʼs human resources during disaster operations. Consideration should be given to both personnel on-hand and those that can be altered. Specifically, staff management includes the following: (1) Assignments of roles and responsibilities (2) Method for identifying human resource needs to include status of families (3) Method for recalling personnel and augmenting staff (4) Management of space (housing, day care, etc.) (5) Management of staff transportation (6) Critical incident stress debriefing (Many case histories show that not only

victims but also rescuers and treatment/handler staff bear serious emotional or even mental scars from their traumatic experiences. Emergency room and ambulance staff can also benefit from such help when stress has been acute.) A.12.3.3.4 The plans should focus also on modification or discontinuation of nonessential patient services, control of patient information, and admission/discharge and transfer of patients. Emergency transfer plans need to consider the proper handling of patient personal property and medical records that

will accompany the patient as well as assurance of continuity of quality care. Evaluation of space, patient transport resources, and a process to ensure patient location information should be included. A.12.3.3.5 It will be essential to assess these kinds of resources currently avail-able within the health care facility itself, and within the local community as a whole. Community sources identification can be effectively performed by the local disaster council, through the cooperation of local hospitals individually or collectively through local hospital associations, nursing homes, clinics, and other outpatient facilities, retail pharmacies, wholesale drug suppliers, ambu-lance services, and local medical-surgical suppliers and their warehouses. Knowing the location and amount of in-house and locally available medical and other supply sources, a given health care facility could then desire to stockpile such additional critical material and supplies as could be needed to effectively cope with the disaster situation. Stockpiling of emergency management supplies in carts should be considered as they facilitate stock rotation of outdated supplies, provide a locally secured environment, and are easily relocated to alternate site locations both within and outside the facility.{See Annex F for information about mutual aid and the Emergency Management Assistance Compact.} A.12.3.3.6 Facilities should formally coordinate their security needs {prior to} during a disaster with local law enforcement agencies. This action could be necessary as a means to supplement the facility security capabilities, or to pro-vide all security needs when the facility lacks its own internal security forces. The health care institution will find it necessary to share its {emergency opera-tions plan} disaster plans with local law enforcement agencies, or better still involve them in the process of planning for security support during disas-ters. The information should at least include availability of parking for staff, patients, and visitors, and normal vehicular, emergency vehicular, and pedes-trian traffic flow patterns in and around the facility. The extent of the security and traffic control problems for any given health care facility will depend upon its geographical location, physical arrangement, availability of visitor parking areas, number of entrances, and so forth. Crowd Control. Visitors can be expected to increase in number with the severity of the disaster. They should not be allowed to disrupt the disaster functioning of the facility. Ideally, a visitorʼs reception center should be established away from the main facility itself, particularly in major disasters. Volunteer personnel such as Red Cross, Explorer Scouts, or other helpers can be utilized as liaisons between the visitors and the health care facility itself. Normal visiting hours on nursing units should be suspended where possible. Vehicular Traffic Control. Arrangements for vehicular traffic control into and on the facility premises should be made in the disaster planning period. It will be necessary to direct ambulances and other emergency vehicles carrying casualties to triage areas or the emergency room entrance, and to direct incom-ing and outgoing vehicles carrying people, supplies, and equipment. Charts showing traffic flow and indicating entrances to be used, evacuation routes to be followed, and so forth, should be prepared and included in the {emergency operations plan} Health Care Disaster Plan. Parking arrangements should not be overlooked. Internal Security and Traffic Control. Internal security and traffic control are best conducted by facility trained personnel, that is, regular health care facility trained security forces, with reinforcements as necessary. Additional assistance from the local law enforcement agencies should be coordinated in the disaster planning phase. Upon activation of the {emergency operations plan} Health Care Disaster Plan, security guards should be stationed at all unlocked entrances and exits, as necessary. Entrance to the facility should be restricted to personnel bearing staff identification cards and to casualties. In the case of major access corridors between key areas of the facility, pedestrian traffic should be restricted to one side of the corridor, keeping one side of the corridor free for movement of casualties. Traffic flow charts for internal traffic should also be prepared in the planning phase, as is the case with external traffic control. Other Considerations. The following should also be considered: (1) Notification protocols. (2) Response criteria. (3) Maintaining sensitive areas security. (4) Safeguarding property/equipment. (5) Backup communication. (6) Maintaining critical security systems. (7) Alternate site security. (8) Security to/from evacuated/alternate sites. (9) Security at evacuated facilities. A.12.3.3.7 Because of the intense public interest in disaster casualties, news media representatives should be given as much consideration as the situation will permit. Ideally, news media personnel should be provided with a reception area, with access to telephone communication and, if possible, an expediter who, though not permitted to act as spokesman for news releases, could pro-

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99vide other assistance to those individuals. News media personnel should not be allowed into the health care facility without proper identification. To alert off-duty health care staff and for reassuring the public, use of the broadcast media should be planned. Media representatives should have access to telephone com-munications. Media representatives should be requested to wear some means of identification for security purposes. A.12.3.3.10 {8} Recovery measures could involve a simple repositioning of staff, equipment, supplies, and information services; or recovery could demand extensive cleanup and repair. It can, under certain circumstances, {identify opportunities for structural and non-structural mitigation efforts} present an opportunity to evaluate long-range ideas concerning modifications to the facil-ity. Filing of loss claims might require special approaches. Health care facilities should have access to cash or negotiable instruments to procure immediately needed supplies. A.12.3.3.9 {10} Experiences show the importance of drills to rehearse the implementation of all elements of a specific response including the entityʼs role in the community, space management, staff management, and patient manage-ment activities.To consider an exercise a drill, the following aspects are typically incorporated and documented: a general overview of the scenario, activation of the disaster plan, evaluation of all involved participants/departments, a critique session following the drill, and any identified follow-up training to correct or improve any deficiencies.{See Annex F for publications on exercise design, management and evaluation.}

Annex C – Additional Explanatory Notes for Chapters 1-20

This annex is not a part of the requirements of this NFPA document but is included for informational purposes only. C.12 Additional Information on Chapter 12. C.12.1 {Emergency Management Program Development} General Considerations. {For those new to the emergency management field, and/or for those seeking to re-structure an existing program, a sample program development process is illustrated in Figure C.12.1)

Figure C.12.1 (See artwork shown on the following pages)

{C.12.1.1 Program Development Steps and Activities.

C.12.1.1.1 Designate the Emergency Management Committee (EMC), Identify Operating Unit Roles and Assign Responsibilities. The EMC is a multi-disciplinary committee established to coordinate and oversee the emergency management program, and have a close relationship with the Safety Committee.

The functions of the EMC include: defining the role of the organization in the community wide emergency management program; conducting/reviewing a Hazard Vulnerability Analysis (HVA) which addresses all hazards that threaten the facility; developing/reviewing Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) that address hazards identified in the HVA; developing/reviewing the emergency operations plan and coordinate it with other health care organizations in the community wide emergency management program; assigning roles and responsibilities of operating unit managers and key operators/managers; overseeing the development and maintenance of the EMP; ensuring that all employees have received appropriate training; conducting an annual evaluation of the effectiveness of the program, and ensuring a telephone roster of key personnel responsible for critical operations is kept current. C.12.1.1.2 Conduct a Hazard Vulnerability Analysis (HVA) and complete Operating Unit Templates. The HVA is a systematic approach to assessing the probability and consequence of hazards, threats and events that may affect the continued operation of the health care facility and surrounding community. Figure C.12.1.1.2.1 illustrates a sample HVA format.

Figure C.12.1.1.2.1 (See artwork shown on the following pages)

The emergency management committee oversees the HVA process to ensure that all major threats to the facility are accounted for and assessed. Input to the HVA by operating unit managers is very important. Once a list of priority hazards, threats and events has been compiled, managers should complete an operating unit template for their particular service or department. Some threats to individual operating units are so severe that they may interrupt the continuity of critical operations in the facility. The operating unit template is a unit-level

contingency plan, useful in staff education, drills and actual events. Figure C.12.1.1.2.2 shows a sample operating unit template.


C.12.1.1.3 Review the Hazard Vulnerability Analysis (HVA) and determine priorities for developing Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). Using the input submitted by operating unit managers, the committee must prioritize threats/events and develop a list of SOPs that must be developed to address those hazards. Figure C.12.1.1.3.1 displays a sample Standard Operating Procedure format


C.12.1.1.4 Implement mitigation and preparedness strategies. Using the SOPs developed for prioritized threats/events, develop and implement actions that will eliminate or reduce the impact of adverse events to the facility and build capabilities to manage them. The committee should review the SOPs to identify resources needed for mitigation and preparedness, develop cost estimates or resources required and submit the resource request to the Director for funding. The committee is responsible for tracking mitigation and preparedness planning activities until completed. C.12.1.1.5 Report results of mitigation and preparedness activities to the emergency management committee. Operating unit managers and the emergency program coordinator should regularly report results of mitigation and preparedness activities to the committee. Reports should include: mitigation activities taken which effectively reduced or eliminated adverse impacts to the facility; mitigation activities did not reduce or eliminate adverse impacts to the facility operation and recommendations for mitigation and preparedness activities, budget and timelines. C.12.1.1.6 Develop, publish and distribute the emergency operations plan (EOP). NFPA 1600, Standard for Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs, section 3.6, describes four types of planning: strategic administrative (preparedness) planning, mitigation planning, recovery planning and emergency operations planning. The Federal Emergency Management Agency, now the Department of Homeland Security, issues guidance on the development of emergency operations plans, or EOPs. The EOP is designed to address all hazards and it accomplishes this through its organization by functions, not departments, hazards or individuals. Flexibility is a key feature of this type of format, as only the functions needed to address the problems are activated, not the entire plan. This type of EOP format (a Basic Plan and Functional Annexes) is that used by communities, states, and the Federal Response Plan (Please see Referenced Publications). Figure C.12.1.1.6.1 illustrates the structure of an EOP.


The EOP can be structured using the functions of the incident command system, thus combining the “disaster plan” and the method for implementing it In one national model, these functions have been organized as follows: management and planning/intelligence; logistics and finance, and four operations groups: business continuity; equipment, plant and utilities; safety and security, and health and medical.

Figure C.12.1.1.6.2 illustrates how the various services/departments within a health care facility can be organized under the appropriate functional group based upon their missions and resources.


C.12.1.1.7 Train staff on the emergency operations plan (EOP) (see 12.3.3.8.) C.12.1.1.8 Test and evaluate the emergency operations plan in response to a drill or actual event. (See 12.3.3.9)

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Figure C.12.1 Emergency Management Program Development Process


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Figure C.12.1.1.2.1 Sample Hazards Vulnerability Analysis (HVA) format


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Figure C.12.1.2.2 Sample Operating Unit Template


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Figure C.12.1.1.6.1 Structure of an Emergency Operations Plan


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Figure C.12.1.1.6.2 Department/Service – Function Matrix


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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99C.12.1.1.9 Conduct an annual review of the effectiveness of the emergency management program. See NFPA 1600 for additional information on program evaluation and corrective actions.}The basic plan should be written broadly, providing general but concise coverage of disaster responsibilities and procedures for each facility department and providing detailed responsibilities and procedures for those functions not normally a part of regular routines, for example, operation of the Emergency Operations Center (EOC). Keyed to the basic plan, the departmental annexes of the plan then outline individual department responsibilities in greater detail. Finally, the disaster procedures for each function within each department are described in terms of actual instructions for individual staff members and employees. Individuals should never be mentioned by name in the plan; rather, responsibilities and procedures should be written in terms of job title. The health care occupancy chapters of NPFA 101, Life Safety Code, are relevant for review and rehearsals. C.12.2 Personnel Notification and Recall. Medical staff, key personnel, and other personnel needed will be notified and recalled as required. In order to relieve switchboard congestion, it is desirable to utilize a pyramidal system to recall individuals who are off duty or otherwise out of the facility. Under the pyramidal system, an individual who has been notified will notify two other individuals, who in turn will each notify two other individuals, and so on. A current copy of the notification and recall roster, with current home and on-call telephone numbers, will maintained at the hospital switchboard at all times. In case the pyramidal system is to utilized, each individual involved in the system must maintain a current copy of the roster at all times, in order that each knows whom they are to notify and the telephone numbers concerned. It is essential that key personnel rosters be kept current. C.12.3 Special Considerations and Protocols. C.12.3.1 Fire and Explosion. In the event that the health care facility need not be completely evacuated immediately, the actions staff should take when they are alerted to a fire are detailed in Sections 18.7, 19.7, 20.7, and 21.7 of NPFA 101, Life Safety Code. C.12.3.2 Severe Storm. The warning system operated by the Nation Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration will, in most cases, provide adequate time to permit the health care facility to take certain precautions, and if disaster appears inevitable, to activate the Health Care Emergency Management Plan in advance of the disaster event. Assuming evacuation is not feasible, some precautions include the following: (1) Draw all shades and close all drapes as protection against shattering glass. (2) Lower all patient beds to the low position, whenever possible. (3) Place blankets on patient/residents. (4) Close all doors and windows. (5) Bring indoors those lawn objects that could become missiles. (6) Remove all articles from window ledges. (7) Relocate patients/residents to windowless hallways or rooms. C.12.3.3 Evacuation. Evacuation can be partial or total. It might involve mov-ing from one story to another, one lateral section or wing to another, or mov-ing out of the structure. Even partial evacuations can involve all categories of patients; where these are people who would not routinely be moved, extraordi-nary measures might be required to support life. It is also necessary to ensure movement of supplies in conjunction with any evacuation. Decisions to evacu-ate might be made as s result of internal problems or under menace of engulf-ing external threats. In all cases, the following considerations govern: (1) Move to pre-designated areas, whether in the facility, nearby, or in remote zones. Evacuation directives will normally indicate destinations. Note that it is recommended to predesign a mutual aid evacuation plan with other health care facilities in the community (See Annex F for one document on the subject of health care community mutual aid and evacuation planning.) (2) Ensure movement of equipment, supplies, and medical records to accompany or meet patients and staff in the new location. (3) Execute predetermined staffing plans. Some staff will accompany patients; others will rendezvous in the new location. Maintenance of shifts is more com-plex than normal, especially when some hard-to-move patients stay behind in the threatened location, and staff might be separated from their own relocated families. (4) Protection of patients and staff (during and after movement) against the threatening environment must be provided.(5) Planning must consider transportation arrangements and patient tracking. C.12.3.4 High Profile. Admission of a high profile person to a health care facility in an emergency creates two sets of problems that might require partial activation of the Health Care Emergency Management Plan. These problems are security and reception of the news media. C.12.3.4.1 Security. Provision of security forces in this situation will normally be a responsibility of the U.S. Secret Service or other governmental agency.

However, activation of facility security forces might be required to prevent hordes of curious onlookers from entering facility work areas and interfering with routine facility functioning. Routine visiting privileges and routine visiting hours might need to be suspended in parts of the facility. C.12.3.4.2 Reception of News Media. The news media reception plans will need to be activated. In this instance, additional communications to the news reception center will be required. Additional telephones and telephone lines can be installed in an emergency basis on request to the local telephone company. Such requests for additional telephone connections in the facility should, however, be first coordinated with the senior Secret Service officer or governmental representative accompanying the dignitary. C.12.3.5 Other Protocols as Deemed Desirable. These should follow a number of additional protocols for internal disasters, to be determined by the {hazards vulnerability analysis.} geographical location of the individual health care facility, for example, natural disasters, civil disturbance protocol, bomb threat protocol, hazardous material protocol, loss of central services (power, water and gas). C.12.3.6 Activation of Emergency Utility Resources. In the planning phase, backup utility resources will have been stockpiled and arrangements made for mutual aid when required. Such utilities include electrical power, water and fuel. Through prior coordination with the local office of emergency prepared-ness or fire department, mobile generators and auxiliary pumps can be obtained in the internal disaster situation. Through these same sources arrangements could be made to supply water tank trucks. Obviously, such planning is in addi-tion to routine planning, in which all health care facilities maintain emergency electrical power plants and, in those areas requiring central heating in winter, backup supplies of oil, coal or gas. Priorities for use of available power (e.g., air circulation but not air conditioning) must be determined. Sanitation require-ments can become overriding in prolonged disasters, and even an ordinary strike by garbage collectors can cause difficulties. C.12.3.7 Civil Disturbance. Large-scale civil disturbances in recent years have shown that health care facilities and their personnel are not immune to the direct effects of human violence in such disturbances. Hospitals in large urban areas must make special provisions in their disaster plans to ensure the physical safety of their employees in transit from the hospital exit to and from a secure means of transportation to their homes. In extreme cases it might be necessary to house employees within the health care facility itself during such civil dis-turbances. Examples of direct attacks or sniping are extremely rare. Another aspect of civil disturbances not to be overlooked in facility security planning is the possibility that a given health care facility might have to admit and treat large numbers of prisoners during such emergencies; however, security guards for such patients will normally be provided by the local police department. C.12.3.8 Bomb Threats. The disaster potential inherent in the telephone bomb threat warrants inclusion of this disaster contingency of the Health Care Emergency Management Plan. Experience has shown that facility personnel have to accompany police or military bomb demolition personnel in search-ing for the suspected bomb, since speed is of the essence and only individuals familiar with a given area can rapidly spot unfamiliar or suspicious objects or condition in the area. This is particularly true in health care facilities. The facil-ity switchboard operator must be provided with a checklist to be kept available at all times, in order to obtain as much information as possible from the caller concerning location of the supposed bomb, time of detonation, and other essen-tial data, which must be considered in deciding whether or not to evacuate all or part of the facility. C.12.3.9 Radioactive Contamination. Emergency management planning must consider the possibility of radioactive materials being released from nuclear reactors or transportation accidents, {acts of terrorism,} as well as from internal spills. These incidents could require that health care staff and patients be shel-tered. Shelter areas can be selected in existing structures and should be planned for during the design of new facilities or additions. Similarly, plans must also consider radiation dose control and decontamination of victims or staff person-nel and public safety in connection with nuclear accidents or incidents such as reactor excursions. C.12.3.10 Hazardous Materials. There are at least three major sources of concern with regard to non-radioactive hazardous materials {not related to the intentional use of chemical agents to harm people (see Weapons of Mass Destruction, below)}. The first is the possibility of a large spill or venting of hazardous materials near the facility; this is especially likely near major rail or truck shipping routes, near pipelines, or near heavy manufacturing plants. Second, every facility contains within its boundaries varying amounts of such materials, especially in the laboratory and custodial areas. A spill of highly volatile chemical can quickly contaminate an entire structure by way of the air ducts. Finally, contaminated patients can pose a risk to staff, though on a more localized basis. Usually removal of their clothing will reduce the risk material-

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99ly. In any case, staff must be prepared to seek advice on unknown hazards. This type of advice is not usually available from poison centers, but rather from a central referral, such as CHEMTREC, and its toll free emergency information service number (800-424-9300).{See Annex F for publications concerning hazardous materials regulations and reports on various types of chemical protective equipment.} C.12.3.11 Volcanic Eruptions. Although most of the direct effects of a volcanic eruption are covered in other protocols for disasters (fire, explosion, etc.), it is necessary to make special provisions for functioning in areas of heavy to moderate ash fall. This hazard can exist hundreds of miles downwind from the eruption.Volcanic ash is actually finely pulverized rock blown out of the volcano. Outside the area of direct damage, the ash varies from a fine powder to a coarse sand. General housekeeping measures can exclude much ash. It should be noted, however, that people move about freely during and after ash fall. Ash fall presents the following four problems for health care facilities. 1. People require cleanup (brushing, vacuuming) before entering the building. 2. Electromechanical and automatic equipment and air-filtering systems require special care because of the highly abrasive and fine penetration nature of ash. 3. Increased flow of patients with respiratory complaints can be expected. 4. Eye protection is required for people who must be out in the dust. (No contact lenses should be worn; goggles are suggested.) Dust masks are available, that are approved by the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), and are marked TC-21 plus other digits. {C.12.3.11 Weapons of Mass Destruction. Weapons of Mass Destruction or WMD are defined as any weapon or device that is intended, or has the capabil-ity, to cause death or serious bodily injury to a significant number of people through the release, dissemination or impact of: toxic or poisonous chemicals or their precursors; a disease organism, or; radiation or radioactivity. A com-plete index of chemical, biological and radiological agents and treatment rec-ommendations can be found at the following web site: http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/index.aspMany Federal Departments and agencies are involved in supporting WMD pre-paredness and response activities at the State and local level. The Department of Health and Human Services manages two cooperative grant programs administered by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Health Resources Services Administration (HRSA). These programs are aimed at enhancing the readiness of the public health and hospital system (see the following web link for a description of these initiatives: http://www.bt.cdc.gov/planning/continuationguidance/pdf/activities_attachmentx.pdf. The Department of Justice maintains a help line (1-800-368-6498) offering technical assistance in non-emergency cases providing information on the following subjects: detection equipment; personal protective equipment; decontamination systems and methods; physical properties of WMD materials; signs and symptoms of WMD exposure; treatment of exposure to WMD materials; toxicology information; Federal response assets and applicable laws and regulations. For reporting actual or potential acts of terrorism, health care 890 891 892 893 894 facilities should contact their local or State health departments. The National Response Center (1-800-424-8802) can link callers to technical experts. See Annex F for publications relating to WMD preparedness for health sys-tems.}

Annex F - References and Informatory Publications

F.1 Referenced PublicationsF.1.1 NFPA PublicationsADD (NFPA 473, Professional Competence of Emergency Medical Services Personnel Responding to hazardous Materials Incidents)ADD Introduction to Employee Fire and Life Safety, Developing a Preparedness Plan (for evacuation of all types of occupancies)F.1.2 Other PublicationsF.1.2.1 AATCC Publications. None additional F.1.2.2 ASHRAE Publications. None additional F.1.2.3 ASME Publication. None additional F.1.2.4 ASTM Publications.ADD (ASTM 1288 Standard Guide for Planning for and Responding to a Multiple Casualty Incident. (Committee F 30, 1990)}

http://www.astm.org/cgi-bin/SoftCart.exe/DATABASE.CART/REDLINE_PAGES/F1288.htm?L+mystore+ynxk9509+1054244801

F.1.2.5 CGA Publications. No additional

F.1.2.6 JCAHO Publication.

ADD {Environment of Care, Emergency Management standards Guide to Emergency Management Planning in Health Care, Joint Commission Resources, One Renaissance Boulevard, Oakbrook Terrace, IL. 60181, ISBN 0-86688-755-5}

F.1.2.7 Ocean Systems, Inc. Publication No additional

F.1.2.8 U.S. Government Publications.

ADD (U.S. Department of Defense: U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) http://www.usamriid.army.mil/general/index.html U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense (USAMRICD) http://chemdef.apgea.army.mil/U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command (SBCCOM) http://hld.sbccom.army.mil/ip/detectors

ADD U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Domestic Preparedness, Publications Library http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/library/bulletins.htm

ADD U.S. Department of Health and Human Services: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Public Health Preparedness and Response for Bioterrorism Program http://www.bt.cdc.gov/planning/continuationguidance/index.asp Protecting Building Environments from Airborne Chemical, Biologic and Radiologic Agents (page 9) http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/wk/mm5135.pdf Health Resources and Services Administration, Hospital Bioterrorism Preparedness Program, www.hrsa.gov/bioterrorism National Institute for Occupational Health and Safety, Personal Protection Equipment, http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/emres/ppe.html

ADD U.S. Department of Homeland Security: Federal Response Plan/National Response Plan www.fema.gov/rnr/frp Guide for All Hazards Emergency Operations Planning, http://www.fema.gov/pdf/rrr/slg101.pdf Exercise Design Course http://training.fema.gov/emiweb/IS/is120.asp Capability Assessment for Readiness http://www.fema.gov/pdf/rrr/car.pdf Metropolitan Medical Response System, Resources, http://mmrs.hhs.gov/main/Resources.aspx National Disaster Medical System, Conference Library, http://ndms.dhhs.gov/NDMS%20Conference/conf2k3/previous_confe_03/previous_confe_03.html National Strategic Stockpile, http://www.bt.cdc.gov/stockpile/index.asp

ADD U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Health and Safety Administration, Washington, D.C.: Code of Federal Regulations, Title 29, Part 1910: Employee Protection Plans, 1910.38 Hazardous Materials Subpart H – Hazardous Materials (1910.101-126), specifically 1910.120 – Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response (HAZWOPER) and Appendices A-E. Subpart I – Personal Protective Equipment (1910.132-139 and Appendix B), specifically: 1910.132, General Provisions 1910.133, Eye and Face Protection 1910.134, Respiratory Protection (and appendices A-D) 1910.136, Occupational Foot Protection 1910.138, Hand Protection Subpart Z - Toxic and Hazardous Substances (1910.1000-1450 and Appendix B), specifically 1910.1200 – Hazard Communication (and Appendices A-E).

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99Publication 3114, Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response http://www.osha.gov/Publications/OSHA3114/osha3114.html

Publication 3152, Hospitals and Community Emergency Response – What You Need to Know http://www.osha.gov/Publications/OSHA3152/osha3152.html

ADD U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, Veterans Health Administration, Emergency Management Program Guidebook, Health Care Facility http://www.va.gov/emshg/emp/emp.htm

Biological Threat Interrogatories http://www.va.gov/emshg/page.cfm?ID=BioThreatInterr

ADD Environment Protection Agency, Chemical Emergency Preparedness and Prevention} http://yosemite.epa.gov/oswer/ceppoweb.nsf/content/homelandSecurity.htm?OpenDocument

F.1.2.9 U.S. Pharmacopeia Publication. No additional

F.2 Informational References.

F.2.1 Published Articles on Fire Involving Respiratory Therapy Equipment and Related Incidents No additional

F.2.2 References for A.10.2.13.4.3 No additional

F.2.3 Addresses of Some Other Organizations Publishing Standards or Guidelines

ADD {George Washington University, School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Institute for Crisis, Disaster and Risk Management Medical and Health Incident Management System: A Comprehensive Functional Description for Jurisdictions http://www.seas.gwu.edu/~icdm/MaHIM%20V2%20final%20report%20sec%202.pdf

ADD University of Colorado, Natural Hazards and Information Applications Center, Disaster Research Clearinghouse www.colorado.edu/hazards

ADD University of Delaware, Disaster Research Center http://www.udel.edu/DRC/

ADD National Emergency Management Association, Council of State Governments, Lexington, KY., Emergency Management Assistance Compact} http://www.emacweb.org/emac/index.cfm?CFID=5327&CFTOKEN=28115803

F.2.4 Addresses of Organizations and Agencies that provide health care emergency preparedness educational materials.

F.2.4.1 Publications.

ADD National Interagency Incident Management System, Incident Command System, National Interagency Fire Coordination Center, Boise, Idaho. http://www.nwcg.gov/pms/forms/ics_cours/ics_courses.htm

ADD Standardized Emergency Management System, State of California Governorʼs Office of Emergency Services, 3650 Schreiber Avenue Mather, CA 95655. http://www.oes.ca.gov/Operational/OESHome.nsf/Content/B49435352108954488256C2A0071E038?OpenDocument

ADD Hospital Emergency Incident Command System, State of California Emergency Medical Services Authority, 1930 9th Street Sacramento, CA 95814. http://www.emsa.ca.gov/dms2/heics3.htm

ADD American Red Cross: Family Disaster Planning

http://www.redcross.org/services/disaster/beprepared/familyplan.html Disaster Preparedness for People with Disabilities http://www.redcross.org/services/disaster/beprepared/disability.html

F.2.4.2 Audiovisual materials {Many of the web links listed above contain PowerPoint presentations and/or streaming video.}

F.3 References for Extracts. No additional

Substantiation: The entire chapter was revised to update the techniques used in emergency management for health care facilities.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise text to read as follows: Chapter 12 Health Care Emergency Management 12-1* Applicability. 12.1.1 This chapter is applicable to any health care facility that is intended to provide medical care during an emergency or maintain services for patients during a disaster {and for the protection of visitors and staff}. 12.1.2 {*} This chapter provides those with the responsibility for {the} emer-gency management {program}planning in health care facilities with a frame-work to assess, mitigate, prepare for, respond to, and recover from disasters {of any origin}. This chapter is intended to aid in {developing, maintaining and evaluating effective emergency management programs} meeting require-ments for having an emergency management plan. {For additional information on emergency management programs, see NFPA 1600, Standard for Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs.} 12.2 Responsibilities. 12.2.1* Authority Having Jurisdiction (AHJ). The AHJ shall be cognizant of the requirements of a health care facility with respect to its uniqueness for con-tinued operation of the facility in an emergency. 12.2.2 Senior Management. It shall be the responsibility of the senior manage-ment to provide its staff withEach health care organization shall have plans necessary to respond to a disaster or an emergency. Senior management shall appointEach health care organization shall have an individual or group, often know as an emergency management committee, as appropriate, with the authority for {developing} writing, implementing, exercising, and evaluating the emergency management {program} plan. 12.2.3 * Emergency Management Committee. 12.2.3.1{*} The emergency management committee shall have the responsibil-ity for the overall disaster planning and emergency management {program} within the facility, under the supervision of designated leadership. {The pro-gram} Planning shall be based on realistic conceptual events and operating capacity thresholds. that necessitate activation of the plan. 35 36 37 38 12.2.3.2 {*} The emergency management committee shall model the emer-gency {operations plan} management plan on the an incident command system (ICS) in coordination with local emergency response agencies. 12.3 General Requirements 12.3.1* When a facility declares itself in a disaster mode, or when the authority having jurisdiction declares a state of disaster exists, the emergency {opera-tions plan} management plan shall be activated. Planning shall be based on realistic conceptual events and operating capacity thresholds that necessitate activation of the plan. 12.3.2* The decision to activate the emergency {operations plan} management plan shall be made by the authority designated within the plan, in accordance with the facilityʼs activation criteria. The decision to terminate shall be made by the designated authority in coordination with the authority having jurisdic-tion and other civil or military authorities involved. 12.3.3 The emergency {operations plan} management plan, as a minimum, shall include the components detailed in 12.3.3.1 through 12.3.3.{8}10, {and Training 56 and Drills (12.3.3.9 and 12.3.3.10) are necessary for effectiveness.} 12.3.3.1* Identification of Emergency Response Personnel. All personnel des-ignated or involved in the emergency {operations plan} management plan of the health care facility shall be supplied with a means of identification, which shall be worn at all times in a visible location. Specific means of identification for incident command system (ICS) personnel shall be provided, such as vests, baseball caps or hard hats. 12.3.3.2* Continuity of Essential Building Systems. When designated by the emergency {operations plan} management plan to provide continuous service in a disaster or emergency, health care facilities shall establish contingency plans for the continuity of essential building systems, as applicable: (1)* Electricity (2) Water

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99(3) Ventilation (4) Fire protection systems (5) Fuel sources (6) Medical gas and vacuum systems (if applicable) (7)* Communication systems 12.3.3.3* Staff Management. Planning shall include the alerting and managing of all staff and employees in a disaster, as well as consideration of all of the following: (1) Housing (2) Transportation of staff and staff family (3) Critical incident stress management. 12.3.3.4* Patient Management. Plan{ning}s shall include provisions for man-agement of patients, particularly with respect to clinical and administrative issues. 12.3.3.5* Logistics. Contingency {P}lanning for disasters shall include as minimum, stockpiling or ensuring immediate or at least uninterrupted access to critical materials such as the following: (1) Pharmaceuticals (2) Medical Supplies (3) Food Supplies (4) Linen supplies (5) Industrial and potable (drinking) waters 2.3.3.6* Security. Security plans shall be developed to meet the needs of the facility. 12.3.3.7* Public Affairs. 12.3.3.7.1 Health care facilities shall have designated media spokesperson to facilitate news releases. 2.3.3.7.2 An area shall be designated where media representatives can be assembled, where they will not interfere with the operations of the health care facility. 12.3.3{8}* Operational Recovery. Plans shall reflect measures needed to restore operational capability to pre-disaster levels. Fiscal aspects shall be con-sidered because of restoral costs and possible cash flow losses associated with the disruption 12.3.3.8{9} Staff Education. 12.3.3.8{9}.1 Each health care facility shall implement an educational pro-gram. This program shall include an overview of the components of the emer-gency management {program} plan and concepts of the incident command sys-tem. Education concerning the staffʼs specific duties and responsibilities shall be conducted. upon reporting to their assigned departments or position. 12.3.3.8{9}.2 General overview education of the emergency management {pro-gram} plan and the incident command system shall be conducted at the time of hire. Department/staff specific education shall be conducted upon reporting to their assignments or position and annually thereafter. 12.3.3.9{10}* Drills. Each organizational entity shall implement {two} one or more specific responses of the emergency {operations plan} management plan {during each year} at least semi annually. At least one {of which} semi annual drill shall rehearse mass casualty response for health care facilities with emer-gency services, disaster receiving stations, or both.

Annex A - Explanatory MaterialA.12.1 Such facilities include, but are not limited to, hospitals, clinics, con-valescent or nursing homes, and first-aid stations (disaster receiving stations). Such facilities could be formally designated by a government authority as disaster treatment centers. Such facilities would not normally include doctors ̓or dentists ̓offices, medical laboratories, or school nurseries, unless such facili-ties are used for treatment of disaster victims. {National bioterrorism preparedness efforts call for the use of schools and other large public facilities to provide facilities for mass immunization.} {A.12.1.2 An emergency management program (formerly known as a disas-ter plan or internal/external plan) encompasses activities across four phases: mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery. Mitigation activities are those designed to reduce or eliminate the impact of hazards. Preparedness activities include those that build organizational and individual capabilities to deal with disasters. Response activities include all necessary actions to stop on-going negative effects of a disaster, and recovery activities are those that restore the organization, its employees and the community back to normal.The Joint Commission for the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) has incorporated Comprehensive Emergency Management as a cen-tral theme of its emergency management standards. See Annex F for JCAHO publications.NFPA 1600, Standard for Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs is an internationally-accepted framework for an emer-gency program. NFPA 99, Chapter 12 recognizes this overall structure and provides additional information useful to health care organizations. Figure

A.12.1.2 illustrates the relationship between the elements of NFPA 99, Chapter 12 and NFPA 1600.

0Figure A.12.1.2 H0ow NFPA 99/12 relates to NFPA 1600

A.12.2.1 In time of disaster all persons are subject to certain constraints or authorities not present during normal circumstances. {The} All emergency {operations} management plans written by a health care facility should be reviewed and coordinated with such authorities so as to prevent confusion. Such authorities include, but are not limited to, civil authorities (such as fire department, police department, public health department, or emergency medical service councils), center for disease control, Federal Bureau of Investigations and {emergency management} civil defense or military authorities. {See Annex F for publications explaining how the out-of-hospital response is organized to multiple, and mass, casualty incidents.}Further, an authority having jurisdiction can impose upon the senior management of the facility the responsibility for participating in a community emergency management {program} plan.{A.12.2.3.1 Figure A.12.2.3.1 illustrates how the various components of this chapter relate to either the day-to-day emergency management program or the emergency operations plan or EOP.}

Figure A.12.2.3.1 How NFPA 99/12 elements relate to the emergency manage-ment program (EMP) or the emergency operations plan (EOP).}

{A.12.2.3 The membership of the EMC should include: a chairperson, the emergency program coordinator, and representatives from key areas within the organization, includingsuch as : the directorʼs administration office, physicians, nursing, infection control, facilities engineering, safety/industrial hygiene, purchasing/fiscal, police security and other critical operating unit managers.}

A.12.2.3.1 {The emergency management committee should base the entityʼs program on a hazards vulnerability analysis (HVA)} Hazard identification and risk assessment should {The HVA} determines whether the following types of hazards are applicable {and the impacts each may have on mission critical systems.}: (1) Natural disasters (2) Technological/industrial disasters (3) Civil/political disasters. For further information on {how to conduct the HVA} disaster management, see NPFA 1600, {Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs and other publications listed in Annex F} Recommended Practice for Disaster Management. {See C.12.3.5 for descriptions of sample protocols for common hazards.} A.12.2.3.1.1 By basing the planning of health care emergency management on realistic conceptual events, the {program} reflects those issues or events that are predictable for the environment the organization operates in. Thus, such conceptual planning should focus on issues, such as severe weather typical in that locale; situations that may occur due to close proximity of industrial or transportation complexes; or earthquake possibilities due to local seismic activity. Planning for these events should also focus on the capacity of the health care organization to provide services in such an emergency. Capacity thresholds are different for all facilities, but have to do with issues such as the availability of emergency departments, operating suites and operating beds, as well as logistical response and facility utilities. {Planning should also incorpo-rate knowledge available in the disaster research about how individuals, small groups, organizations, communities and societies behave during emergencies and disasters. See Annex F for information sources on disaster research.} There is no way to plan for all possible emergencies, but by focusing on logical con-ceptual events and operating capacity thresholds, the health care organization can develop realistic plans as well as guidelines for staff to activate those plans. A.12.2.3.2 The incident command system (ICS) (also referred to as the inci-dent management system, or IMS) is a system having an identified chain of command that adapts to any emergency event. {The ICS consists of eight key elements: common terminology, integrated communications, modular organi-zation, unified command structure, manageable span of control, consolidated action plans, comprehensive resource management and pre-designated incident facilities.} ICS establishes common terminology and training for incident man-agement. These allow emergency responders from hospitals and all involved organizations to respond to an incident and be familiar with the management concepts and terminology of other responders. It also facilitates the request and processing of mutual aid requests. A widely accepted structure of an ICS is illustrated in Figure A.12.2.3.2

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99A policy group consists of senior managers constituted to provide decisions related to items or incident decisions not in the emergency management plan. The command staff consists of the incident commander and support staff. This support staff consists of the public information officer, liaison officer, and safety officer.n addition to the command staff, there are four sections, each with a section chief responding directly to the incident commander: plans section, logistics section, operations section, and finance section.Due to the nature of a health care facility, one deviation from the traditional ICS is made to show a line of medical control. Note the advisory position of the “medical staff officer.”{How an ICS organization accomplishes its work is through a process called Incident Action Planning that is based on management-by-objectives. After a briefing on the current situation and status of response efforts, continuing problems are identified and stated as objectives which are then prioritized, staffed and resourced, forming the Incident Action Plan, or IAP. Not all incidents require an IAP, however, IAPs become important when more than one agency is involved or when the incident cannot be resolved within one operational period.}A.12.3.1 In emergency situations that occur without warning and impact the facility, staff at the scene of the problem are expected to follow established protocols to protect life, notify others and conserve property. Senior management may establish an Incident Command Post (ICP) near the scene, or support one that is established by responding public safety agencies.In emergency situations with warning or whose impacts require extended periods to resolve, senior management report to the facilityʼs Emergency Operations Center (EOC). Not all incidents require an EOC.Both the ICP and the EOC provide centralized locations for information collection, display, coordination, documentation and dissemination. When both are established, the ICP focuses on tactical activities currently underway, and the EOC focuses on strategies for the next operational period(s), resource issues, etc.See Annex F for publications on the Incident Command (Management) System.} A.12.3.3.1 Where feasible, photo identifications or other means to assure posi-tive identification should be used. Visitor and crowd control create the problem of distinguishing staff from visitors. Such identification should be issued to all facility personnel, including volunteer personnel who might be utilized in disaster functions. Note that care should be taken to assure that identification cards are recalled whenever personnel terminate association with the health care facility. Members of the news media should be asked to wear some means of identification, such as the press card, on their outside garments so that they are readily identifiable by security guards controlling access to the facility or certain areas therein. Clergy also will frequently accompany casualties or arrive later for visitations and require some means of identification. A.12.3.3.2 For essential building systems, consideration should be given to the installation of exterior building connectors to allow for the attachment of por-table emergency utility modules. Water storage systems should be inventoried and protected tot the greatest extent possible. A.12.3.3.2(1) See Sections 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 for types of essential electrical sys-tems for health care facilities. A.12.3.3.2(7) Emergency internal and external communication systems should be established to facilitate communication with security forces and other authorities having jurisdiction as well as internal patient care and service units in the event normal communication methods are rendered inoperative.The basic form of communication in a disaster is the telephone system. As part of the contingency plan to maintain communication, a plan for restoring telephone systems or using alternate systems is necessary. Typically, the first line of internal defense for a system outage is strategically placed power-failure telephones that are designed to continue to function in the event of system failure. Plans for external outages and load control should include the use of pay phones that have first priority status in external system restoration.

Contingency plans should also contain strategies for the use of radio-frequency communications to supplement land-line usage. The plan should include a means to distribute and use two-way radio communication throughout the facility. A plan for the incorporation and use of amateur radio operators should also be considered.It should be recognized that single-channel radio communication is less desir-able than telephone system restoration due to the limited number of messages that can be managed. Cellular telephones, although useful in some disaster situations, should not be considered a contingency having high reliability sue to their vulnerability to load control schemes of telephone companies. {Portable

email devices, satellite telephones and audio- and video-conferencing services are useful tools to link key staff and organizations}. A.12.3.3.3 Management of staff and employees allows for the best and most effective use of the entityʼs human resources during disaster operations. Consideration should be given to both personnel on-hand and those that can be altered. Specifically, staff management includes the following: (1) Assignments of roles and responsibilities (2) Method for identifying human resource needs to include status of families (3) Method for recalling personnel and augmenting staff (4) Management of space (housing, day care, etc.) (5) Management of staff transportation (6) Critical incident stress debriefing (Many case histories show that not only

victims but also rescuers and treatment/handler staff bear serious emotional or even mental scars from their traumatic experiences. Emergency room and ambulance staff can also benefit from such help when stress has been acute.) A.12.3.3.4 The plans should focus also on modification or discontinuation of nonessential patient services, control of patient information, and admission/discharge and transfer of patients. Emergency transfer plans need to consider the proper handling of patient personal property and medical records that will accompany the patient as well as assurance of continuity of quality care. Evaluation of space, patient transport resources, and a process to ensure patient location information should be included. A.12.3.3.5 It will be essential to assess these kinds of resources currently avail-able within the health care facility itself, and within the local community as a whole. Community sources identification can be effectively performed by the local disaster council, through the cooperation of local hospitals individually or collectively through local hospital associations, nursing homes, clinics, and other outpatient facilities, retail pharmacies, wholesale drug suppliers, ambu-lance services, and local medical-surgical suppliers and their warehouses. Knowing the location and amount of in-house and locally available medical and other supply sources, a given health care facility could then desire to stockpile such additional critical material and supplies as could be needed to effectively cope with the disaster situation. Stockpiling of emergency management supplies in carts should be considered as they facilitate stock rotation of outdated supplies, provide a locally secured environment, and are easily relocated to alternate site locations both within and outside the facility.{See Annex F for information about mutual aid and the Emergency Management Assistance Compact.} A.12.3.3.6 Prior to} during a disaster, fFacilities should formally coordinate their security needs {prior to} during a disaster with local law enforcement agencies. This action could be necessary as a means to supplement the facility security capabilities, or to provide all security needs when the facility lacks its own internal security forces. The health care institution will find it necessary to share its {emergency opera-tions plan} disaster plans with local law enforcement agencies, or better still involve them in the process of planning for security support during disas-ters. The information should at least include availability of parking for staff, patients, and visitors, and normal vehicular, emergency vehicular, and pedes-trian traffic flow patterns in and around the facility. The extent of the security and traffic control problems for any given health care facility will depend upon its geographical location, physical arrangement, availability of visitor parking areas, number of entrances, and so forth. Crowd Control. Visitors can be expected to increase in number with the severity of the disaster. They should not be allowed to disrupt the disaster functioning of the facility. Ideally, a visitorʼs reception center should be established away from the main facility itself, particularly in major disasters. Volunteer personnel such as Red Cross, Explorer Scouts, or other helpers can be utilized as liaisons between the visitors and the health care facility itself. Normal visiting hours on nursing units should be suspended where possible. Vehicular Traffic Control. Arrangements for vehicular traffic control into and on the facility premises should be made in the disaster planning period. It will be necessary to direct ambulances and other emergency vehicles carrying casualties to triage areas or the emergency room entrance, and to direct incom-ing and outgoing vehicles carrying people, supplies, and equipment. Charts showing traffic flow and indicating entrances to be used, evacuation routes to be followed, and so forth, should be prepared and included in the {emergency operations plan} Health Care Disaster Plan. Parking arrangements should not be overlooked. Internal Security and Traffic Control. Internal security and traffic control are best conducted by facility trained personnel, that is, regular health care facility trained security forces, with reinforcements as necessary. Potential aAdditional assistance from the local law enforcement agencies should be coordinated in the disaster planning phase. Upon activation of the {emergency operations plan} Health Care Disaster Plan, security guards should be stationed at all

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99unlocked entrances and exits, as necessaryto the extent possible. Entrance to the facility should be restricted to personnel bearing staff identification cards and to casualties. In the case of major access corridors between key areas of the facility, pedestrian traffic should be restricted to one side of the corridor, keeping one side of the corridor free for movement of casualties. Traffic flow charts for internal traffic should also be prepared in the planning phase, as is the case with external traffic control. Other Considerations. The following should also be considered: (1) Notification protocols. (2) Response criteria. (3) Maintaining sensitive areas security. (4) Safeguarding property/equipment. (5) Backup communication. (6) Maintaining critical security systems. (7) Alternate site security. (8) Security to/from evacuated/alternate sites. (9) Security at evacuated facilities. A.12.3.3.7 Because of the intense public interest in disaster casualties, news media representatives should be given as much consideration as the situation will permit. Ideally, news media personnel should be provided with a reception area, with access to telephone communication and, if possible, an expediter who, though not permitted to act as spokesman for news releases, could pro-vide other assistance to those individuals. News media personnel should not be allowed into the health care facility without proper identification. To alert off-duty health care staff and for reassuring the public, use of the broadcast media should be planned. Media representatives should have access to telephone com-munications. Media representatives should be requested to wear some means of identification for security purposes. A.12.3.3.10 {8} Recovery measures could involve a simple repositioning of staff, equipment, supplies, and information services; or recovery could demand extensive cleanup and repair. It can, under certain circumstances, {identify opportunities for structural and non-structural mitigation efforts} present an opportunity to evaluate long-range ideas concerning modifications to the facil-ity. Filing of loss claims might require special approaches. Health care facilities should have access to cash or negotiable instruments to procure immediately needed supplies. A.12.3.3.9 {10} Experiences show the importance of drills to rehearse the implementation of all elements of a specific response including the entityʼs role in the community, space management, staff management, and patient manage-ment activities.To consider an exercise a drill, the following aspects are typically incorporated and documented: a general overview of the scenario, activation of the disaster plan, evaluation of all involved participants/departments, a critique session following the drill, and any identified follow-up training to correct or improve any deficiencies.{See Annex F for publications on exercise design, management and evaluation.}

Annex C – Additional Explanatory Notes for Chapters 1-20

This annex is not a part of the requirements of this NFPA document but is included for informational purposes only. C.12 Additional Information on Chapter 12. C.12.1 {Emergency Management Program Development} General Considerations. {For those new to the emergency management field, and/or for those seeking to re-structure an existing program, a sample program development process is illustrated in Figure C.12.1)

Figure C.12.1 (See artwork shown on the following pages)

{C.12.1.1 Program Development Steps and Activities.

C.12.1.1.1 Designate the Emergency Management Committee (EMC), Identify Operating Unit Roles and Assign Responsibilities. The EMC is a multi-disciplinary committee established to coordinate and oversee the emergency management program, and have a close relationship with the Safety Committee.

The functions of the EMC include: defining the role of the organization in the community wide emergency management program; conducting/reviewing a Hazard Vulnerability Analysis (HVA) which addresses all hazards that threaten the facility; developing/reviewing Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) that address hazards identified in the HVA; developing/reviewing the emergency operations plan and coordinate it with other health care organizations in the community wide emergency management program; assigning roles and responsibilities of operating unit managers and key operators/managers;

overseeing the development and maintenance of the EMP; ensuring that all employees have received appropriate training; conducting an annual evaluation of the effectiveness of the program, and ensuring a telephone roster of key personnel responsible for critical operations is kept current. C.12.1.1.2 Conduct a Hazard Vulnerability Analysis (HVA) and complete Operating Unit Templates. The HVA is a systematic approach to assessing the probability and consequence of hazards, threats and events that may affect the continued operation of the health care facility and surrounding community. Figure C.12.1.1.2.1 illustrates a sample HVA format.


The emergency management committee oversees the HVA process to ensure that all major threats to the facility are accounted for and assessed. Input to the HVA by operating unit managers is very important. Once a list of priority hazards, threats and events has been compiled, managers should complete an operating unit template for their particular service or department. Some threats to individual operating units are so severe that they may interrupt the continuity of critical operations in the facility. The operating unit template is a unit-level contingency plan, useful in staff education, drills and actual events. Figure C.12.1.1.2.2 shows a sample operating unit template.


C.12.1.1.3 Review the Hazard Vulnerability Analysis (HVA) and determine priorities for developing Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). Using the input submitted by operating unit managers, the committee must prioritize threats/events and develop a list of SOPs that must be developed to address those hazards. Figure C.12.1.1.3.1 displays a sample Standard Operating Procedure format

***Insert Figure C.12.1.1.3.1 Here***


C.12.1.1.4 Implement mitigation and preparedness strategies. Using the SOPs developed for prioritized threats/events, develop and implement actions that will eliminate or reduce the impact of adverse events to the facility and build capabilities to manage them. The committee should review the SOPs to identify resources needed for mitigation and preparedness, develop cost estimates or resources required and submit the resource request to the Director for funding. The committee is responsible for tracking mitigation and preparedness planning activities until completed. C.12.1.1.5 Report results of mitigation and preparedness activities to the emergency management committee. Operating unit managers and the emergency program coordinator should regularly report results of mitigation and preparedness activities to the committee. Reports should include: mitigation activities taken which effectively reduced or eliminated adverse impacts to the facility; mitigation activities did not reduce or eliminate adverse impacts to the facility operation and recommendations for mitigation and preparedness activities, budget and timelines. C.12.1.1.6 Develop, publish and distribute the emergency operations plan (EOP). NFPA 1600, Standard for Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs, section 3.6, describes four types of planning: strategic administrative (preparedness) planning, mitigation planning, recovery planning and emergency operations planning. The Federal Emergency Management Agency, now the Department of Homeland Security, issues guidance on the development of emergency operations plans, or EOPs. The EOP is designed to address all hazards and it accomplishes this through its organization by functions, not departments, hazards or individuals. Flexibility is a key feature of this type of format, as only the functions needed to address the problems are activated, not the entire plan. This type of EOP format (a Basic Plan and Functional Annexes) is that used by communities, states, and the Federal Response Plan (Please see Referenced Publications). Figure C.12.1.1.6.1 illustrates the structure of an EOP.

Figure C.12.1.1.6.1 Structure of an Emergency Operations Plan

The EOP can be structured using the functions of the incident command system, thus combining the “disaster plan” and the method for implementing it In one national model, these functions have been organized as follows: management and planning/intelligence; logistics and finance, and four operations groups: business continuity; equipment, plant and utilities; safety and security, and health and medical.

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Figure C.12.1 Emergency Management Program Development Process

99-442 (Log #346) Committee Action

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Figure C.12.1.1.2.1 Sample Hazards Vulnerability Analysis (HVA) format


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Figure C.12.1.1.2.2 Sample Operating Unit Template


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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 9999-442 (Log #346) Committee Action

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99Figure C.12.1.1.6.2 illustrates how the various services/departments within a health care facility can be organized under the appropriate functional group based upon their missions and resources.

Figure C.12.1.1.6.2 Department/Service – Function Matrix

C.12.1.1.7 Train staff on the emergency operations plan (EOP) (see 12.3.3.8.) C.12.1.1.8 Test and evaluate the emergency operations plan in response to a drill or actual event. (See 12.3.3.9) C.12.1.1.9 Conduct an annual review of the effectiveness of the emergency management program. See NFPA 1600 for additional information on program evaluation and corrective actions.}The basic plan should be written broadly, providing general but concise coverage of disaster responsibilities and procedures for each facility department and providing detailed responsibilities and procedures for those functions not normally a part of regular routines, for example, operation of the Emergency Operations Center (EOC). Keyed to the basic plan, the departmental annexes of the plan then outline individual department responsibilities in greater detail. Finally, the disaster procedures for each function within each department are described in terms of actual instructions for individual staff members and employees. Individuals should never be mentioned by name in the plan; rather, responsibilities and procedures should be written in terms of job title. The health care occupancy chapters of NPFA 101, Life Safety Code, are relevant for review and rehearsals. C.12.2 Personnel Notification and Recall. Medical staff, key personnel, and other personnel needed will be notified and recalled as required. In order to relieve switchboard congestion, it is desirable to utilize a pyramidal system to recall individuals who are off duty or otherwise out of the facility. Under the pyramidal system, an individual who has been notified will notify two other individuals, who in turn will each notify two other individuals, and so on. A current copy of the notification and recall roster, with current home and on-call telephone numbers, will maintained at the hospital switchboard at all times. In case the pyramidal system is to utilized, each individual involved in the system must maintain a current copy of the roster at all times, in order that each knows whom they are to notify and the telephone numbers concerned. It is essential that key personnel rosters be kept current. C.12.3 Special Considerations and Protocols. C.12.3.1 Fire and Explosion. In the event that the health care facility need not be completely evacuated immediately, the actions staff should take when they are alerted to a fire are detailed in Sections 18.7, 19.7, 20.7, and 21.7 of NPFA 101, Life Safety Code.C.12.3.2 Severe Storm. The warning system operated by the Nation Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration will, in most cases, provide adequate time to permit the health care facility to take certain precautions, and if disaster appears inevitable, to activate the Health Care Emergency Management Plan in advance of the disaster event. Assuming evacuation is not feasible, some pre-cautions include the following: (1) Draw all shades and close all drapes as protection against shattering glass. (2) Lower all patient beds to the low position, whenever possible. (3) Place blankets on patient/residents. (4) Close all doors and windows. (5) Bring indoors those lawn objects that could become missiles. (6) Remove all articles from window ledges. (7) Relocate patients/residents to windowless hallways or rooms. C.12.3.3 Evacuation. Evacuation can be partial or total. It might involve mov-ing from one story to another, one lateral section or wing to another, or mov-ing out of the structure. Even partial evacuations can involve all categories of patients; where these are people who would not routinely be moved, extraordi-nary measures might be required to support life. It is also necessary to ensure movement of supplies in conjunction with any evacuation. Decisions to evacu-ate might be made as s result of internal problems or under menace of engulf-ing external threats. In all cases, the following considerations govern: (1) Move to pre-designated areas, whether in the facility, nearby, or in remote zones. Evacuation directives will normally indicate destinations. Note that it is recommended to predesign a mutual aid evacuation plan with other health care facilities in the community (See Annex F for one document on the subject of health care community mutual aid and evacuation planning.) (2) Ensure movement of equipment, supplies, and medical records to accompany or meet patients and staff in the new location. (3) Execute predetermined staffing plans. Some staff will accompany patients; others will rendezvous in the new location. Maintenance of shifts is more com-plex than normal, especially when some hard-to-move patients stay behind in the threatened location, and staff might be separated from their own relocated families.

(4) Protection of patients and staff (during and after movement) against the threatening environment must be provided.(5) Planning must consider transportation arrangements and patient tracking. C.12.3.4 High Profile. Admission of a high profile person to a health care facility in an emergency creates two sets of problems that might require partial activation of the Health Care Emergency Management Plan. These problems are security and reception of the news media. C.12.3.4.1 Security. Provision of security forces in this situation will normally be a responsibility of the U.S. Secret Service or othermight be provided by a governmental agency or private security forces. However, activation of facility security forces might be required to prevent hordes of curious onlookers from entering facility work areas and interfering with routine facility functioning. Routine visiting privileges and routine visiting hours might need to be sus-pended in parts of the facility. C.12.3.4.2 Reception of News Media. The news media reception plans will need to be activated. In this instance, additional communications to the news reception center will be required. Additional telephones and telephone lines can be installed in an emergency basis on request to the local telephone company. Such requests for additional telephone connections in the facility should, however, be first coordinated with the senior Secret Service officer or governmental representative accompanying the dignitary. C.12.3.5 Other Protocols as Deemed Desirable. These should follow a number of additional protocols for internal disasters, to be determined by the {hazards vulnerability analysis.} geographical location of the individual health care facility, for example, natural disasters, civil disturbance protocol, bomb threat protocol, hazardous material protocol, loss of central services (power, water and gas). C.12.3.6 Activation of Emergency Utility Resources. In the planning phase, backup utility resources will have been stockpiled and arrangements made for mutual aid when required. Such utilities include electrical power, water and fuel. Through prior coordination with the local office of emergency prepared-ness or fire department, mobile generators and auxiliary pumps can be obtained in the internal disaster situation. Through these same sources arrangements could be made to supply water tank trucks. Obviously, such planning is in addi-tion to routine planning, in which all health care facilities maintain emergency electrical power plants and, in those areas requiring central heating in winter, backup supplies of oil, coal or gas. Priorities for use of available power (e.g., air circulation but not air conditioning) must be determined. Sanitation require-ments can become overriding in prolonged disasters, and even an ordinary strike by garbage collectors can cause difficulties. C.12.3.7 Civil Disturbance. Large-scale civil disturbances in recent years have shown that health care facilities and their personnel are not immune to the direct effects of human violence in such disturbances. Hospitals in large urban areas must make special provisions in their disaster plans to ensure the physical safety of their employees in transit from the hospital exit to and from a secure means of transportation to their homes. In extreme cases it might be necessary to house employees within the health care facility itself during such civil dis-turbances. Examples of direct attacks or sniping are extremely rare. Another aspect of civil disturbances not to be overlooked in facility security planning is the possibility that a given health care facility might have to admit and treat large numbers of prisoners during such emergencies; however, security guards for such patients will normally be provided by the local police department. C.12.3.8 Bomb Threats. The disaster potential inherent in the telephone bomb threat warrants inclusion of this disaster contingency of the Health Care Emergency Management Plan. Experience has shown that facility personnel have to accompany police or military bomb demolition personnel in search-ing for the suspected bomb, since speed is of the essence and only individuals familiar with a given area can rapidly spot unfamiliar or suspicious objects or condition in the area. This is particularly true in health care facilities. The facil-ity switchboard operator must be provided with a checklist to be kept available at all times, in order to obtain as much information as possible from the caller concerning location of the supposed bomb, time of detonation, and other essen-tial data, which must be considered in deciding whether or not to evacuate all or part of the facility. C.12.3.9 Radioactive Contamination. Emergency management planning must consider the possibility of radioactive materials being released from nuclear reactors or transportation accidents, {acts of terrorism,} as well as from internal spills. These incidents could require that health care staff and patients be shel-tered. Shelter areas can be selected in existing structures and should be planned for during the design of new facilities or additions. Similarly, plans must also consider radiation dose control and decontamination of victims or staff person-nel and public safety in connection with nuclear accidents or incidents such as reactor excursions.

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99C.12.3.10 Hazardous Materials. There are at least three major sources of concern with regard to non-radioactive hazardous materials {not related to the intentional use of chemical agents to harm people (see Weapons of Mass Destruction, below)}. The first is the possibility of a large spill or venting of hazardous materials near the facility; this is especially likely near major rail or truck shipping routes, near pipelines, or near heavy manufacturing plants. Second, every facility contains within its boundaries varying amounts of such materials, especially in the laboratory and custodial areas. A spill of highly volatile chemical can quickly contaminate an entire structure by way of the air ducts. Finally, contaminated patients can pose a risk to staff, though on a more localized basis. Usually removal of their clothing will reduce the risk material-ly. In any case, staff must be prepared to seek advice on unknown hazards. This type of advice is not usually available from poison centers, but rather from a central referral, such as CHEMTREC, and its toll free emergency information service number (800-424-9300).{See Annex F for publications concerning hazardous materials regulations and reports on various types of chemical protective equipment.} C.12.3.11 Volcanic Eruptions. Although most of the direct effects of a volcanic eruption are covered in other protocols for disasters (fire, explosion, etc.), it is necessary to make special provisions for functioning in areas of heavy to moderate ash fall. This hazard can exist hundreds of miles downwind from the eruption.Volcanic ash is actually finely pulverized rock blown out of the volcano. Outside the area of direct damage, the ash varies from a fine powder to a coarse sand. General housekeeping measures can exclude much ash. It should be noted, however, that people move about freely during and after ash fall. Ash fall presents the following four problems for health care facilities. 1. People require cleanup (brushing, vacuuming) before entering the building. 2. Electromechanical and automatic equipment and air-filtering systems require special care because of the highly abrasive and fine penetration nature of ash. 3. Increased flow of patients with respiratory complaints can be expected. 4. Eye protection is required for people who must be out in the dust. (No contact lenses should be worn; goggles are suggested.) Dust masks are available, that are approved by the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), and are marked TC-21 plus other digits. C.12.3.11 Weapons of Mass Destruction. Weapons of Mass Destruction or WMD are defined as any weapon or device that is intended, or has the capabil-ity, to cause death or serious bodily injury to a significant number of people through the release, dissemination or impact of: toxic or poisonous chemicals or their precursors; a disease organism, or; radiation or radioactivity. A com-plete index of chemical, biological and radiological agents and treatment rec-ommendations can be found at the following web site: http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/index.asp Many Federal Departments and agencies are involved in supporting WMD pre-paredness and response activities at the State and local level. The Department of Health and Human Services manages two cooperative grant programs administered by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Health Resources Services Administration (HRSA). These programs are aimed at enhancing the readiness of the public health and hospital system (see the following web link for a description of these initiatives: http://www.bt.cdc.gov/planning/continuationguidance/pdf/activities_attachmentx.pdf. The Department of Justice maintains a help line (1-800-368-6498) offering technical assistance in non-emergency cases providing information on the following subjects: detection equipment; personal protective equipment; decontamination systems and methods; physical properties of WMD materials; signs and symptoms of WMD exposure; treatment of exposure to WMD materials; toxicology information; Federal response assets and applicable laws and regulations. For reporting actual or potential acts of terrorism, health care 890 891 892 893 894 facilities should contact their local or State health departments. The National Response Center (1-800-424-8802) can link callers to technical experts. See Annex F for publications relating to WMD preparedness for health sys-tems.}

Annex F - References and Informatory Publications

F.1 Referenced PublicationsF.1.1 NFPA PublicationsADD (NFPA 473, Professional Competence of Emergency Medical Services Personnel Responding to hazardous Materials Incidents)ADD Introduction to Employee Fire and Life Safety, Developing a Preparedness Plan (for evacuation of all types of occupancies)ADD NFPA 1600, Standard onDisaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs, 2000 Edition

ADD NFPA 1561, Standard onEmergency Services Incident Management System, 2002 EditionF.1.2 Other PublicationsF.1.2.1 AATCC Publications. None additional F.1.2.2 ASHRAE Publications. None additional F.1.2.3 ASME Publication. None additional F.1.2.4 ASTM Publications.ADD (ASTM 1288 Standard Guide for Planning for and Responding to a Multiple Casualty Incident. (Committee F 30, 1990)}

http://www.astm.org/cgi-bin/SoftCart.exe/DATABASE.CART/REDLINE_PAGES/F1288.htm?L+mystore+ynxk9509+1054244801

F.1.2.5 CGA Publications. No additional F.1.2.6 JCAHO Publication.DD {Environment of Care, Emergency Management standards Guide to Emergency Management Planning in Health Care, Joint Commission Resources, One Renaissance Boulevard, Oakbrook Terrace, IL. 60181, ISBN 0-86688-755-5} F.1.2.7 Ocean Systems, Inc. Publication 23062403, For Technical Committee Use Not for Distribution No additional 950 951 952 Environment of Care NewsF.1.2.8 U.S. Government Publications.ADD (U.S. Department of Defense: U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) http://www.usamriid.army.mil/general/index.html U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense (USAMRICD) http://chemdef.apgea.army.mil/U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command (SBCCOM) http://hld.sbccom.army.mil/ip/detectors

ADD U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Domestic Preparedness, Publications Library http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/library/bulletins.htm

ADD U.S. Department of Health and Human Services: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Public Health Preparedness and Response for Bioterrorism Program http://www.bt.cdc.gov/planning/continuationguidance/index.asp Protecting Building Environments from Airborne Chemical, Biologic and Radiologic Agents (page 9) http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/wk/mm5135.pdf Health Resources and Services Administration, Hospital Bioterrorism Preparedness Program, www.hrsa.gov/bioterrorism National Institute for Occupational Health and Safety, Personal Protection Equipment, http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/emres/ppe.html

ADD U.S. Department of Homeland Security: Federal Response Plan/National Response Plan/National Incident Management System www.fema.gov/rnr/frp Guide for All Hazards Emergency Operations Planning, http://www.fema.gov/pdf/rrr/slg101.pdf Exercise Design Course http://training.fema.gov/emiweb/IS/is120.asp Capability Assessment for Readiness http://www.fema.gov/pdf/rrr/car.pdf Metropolitan Medical Response System, Resources, http://mmrs.hhs.gov/main/Resources.aspx National Disaster Medical System, Conference Library, http://ndms.dhhs.gov/NDMS%20Conference/conf2k3/previous_confe_03/previous_confe_03.html National Strategic National Stockpile, http://www.bt.cdc.gov/stockpile/index.asp

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99ADD U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Health and Safety Administration, Washington, D.C.: Code of Federal Regulations, Title 29, Part 1910: Employee Protection Plans, 1910.38 Hazardous Materials Subpart H – Hazardous Materials (1910.101-126), specifically 1910.120 – Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response (HAZWOPER) and Appendices A-E. Subpart I – Personal Protective Equipment (1910.132-139 and Appendix B), specifically: 1910.132, General Provisions 1910.133, Eye and Face Protection 1910.134, Respiratory Protection (and appendices A-D) 1910.136, Occupational Foot Protection 1910.138, Hand Protection Subpart Z - Toxic and Hazardous Substances (1910.1000-1450 and Appendix B), specifically 1910.1200 – Hazard Communication (and Appendices A-E).

Publication 3114, Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response http://www.osha.gov/Publications/OSHA3114/osha3114.html

Publication 3152, Hospitals and Community Emergency Response – What You Need to Know http://www.osha.gov/Publications/OSHA3152/osha3152.html

ADD U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, Veterans Health Administration, http://www.va.gov/emshg/emp/emp.htm Emergency Management Program Guidebook, Health Care Facility

Biological Threat Interrogatories http://www.va.gov/emshg/page.cfm?ID=BioThreatInterr

ADD Environment Protection Agency, Chemical Emergency Preparedness and Prevention} http://yosemite.epa.gov/oswer/ceppoweb.nsf/content/homelandSecurity.htm?OpenDocument

F.1.2.9 U.S. Pharmacopeia Publication. No additional

F.2 Informational References.

F.2.1 Published Articles on Fire Involving Respiratory Therapy Equipment and Related Incidents No additional

F.2.2 References for A.10.2.13.4.3 No additional

F.2.3 Addresses of Some Other Organizations Publishing Standards or Guidelines

ADD {George Washington University, School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Institute for Crisis, Disaster and Risk Management 1080 1081 1082 1083 Medical and Health Incident Management System: A Comprehensive Functional Description for Jurisdictions http://www.seas.gwu.edu/~icdm/MaHIM%20V2%20final%20report%20sec%202.pdf

ADD University of Colorado, Natural Hazards and Information Applications Center, Disaster Research Clearinghouse www.colorado.edu/hazards

ADD University of Delaware, Disaster Research Center http://www.udel.edu/DRC/

ADD National Emergency Management Association, Council of State Governments, Lexington, KY., Emergency Management Assistance Compact} http://www.emacweb.org/emac/index.cfm?CFID=5327&CFTOKEN=28115803

F.2.4 Addresses of Organizations and Agencies that provide health care emergency preparedness educational materials.

F.2.4.1 Publications.

ADD National Interagency Incident Management System, Incident Command System, National Interagency Fire Coordination Center, Boise, Idaho. http://www.nwcg.gov/pms/forms/ics_cours/ics_courses.htm

ADD Standardized Emergency Management System, State of California Governorʼs Office of Emergency Services, 3650 Schreiber Avenue Mather, CA 95655. http://www.oes.ca.gov/Operational/OESHome.nsf/Content/B49435352108954488256C2A0071E038?OpenDocument

ADD Hospital Emergency Incident Command System, State of California Emergency Medical Services Authority, 1930 9th Street Sacramento, CA 95814. http://www.emsa.ca.gov/dms2/heics3.htm

ADD American Red Cross: Family Disaster Planning http://www.redcross.org/services/disaster/beprepared/familyplan.html Disaster Preparedness for People with Disabilities http://www.redcross.org/services/disaster/beprepared/disability.html

F.2.4.2 Audiovisual materials {Many of the web links listed above contain PowerPoint presentations and/or streaming video.}

F.3 References for Extracts. No additionalCommittee Statement: The changes were editorial in nature.Number Eligible to Vote: 11Ballot Results: Affirmative: 6 Vote Not Returned: 5 BREWSTER, ENNIS, KENDIG, SINSIGALLI, VARGO

________________________________________________________________99-443 Log #360 HEA-HCE Final Action: Reject( Chapter 12 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Richard E. Cutts, USAFRecommendation: Chapter 12 should be deleted from NFPA 99.Substantiation: Chapter 12 should be deleted from NFPA 99, the information contained is redundant and is very vague. It resembles policies and procedures rather than codes and standards. All Health Care Facilities must be certified by JCAHO, part of the certification process is a requirement for detailed emergency management plans, also required by most local AHJʼs. Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: The information in the chapter is occupancy specific and is needed. The chapter is being updated and additional annex material is being added to the document which supports the material in the body of the document.Number Eligible to Vote: 11Ballot Results: Affirmative: 6 Vote Not Returned: 5 BREWSTER, ENNIS, KENDIG, SINSIGALLI, VARGO

________________________________________________________________99-444 Log #240 HEA-HCE Final Action: Reject( 12.1.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Thomas T. Bulow, University Medical Ctr., Facilities Mgmt.Recommendation: After the existing words, (management planning in health care facilities) add the following: “...with direction to conform to the requirements of NFPA 1600 including, but not limited to planning, assessing hazards, response to, mitigation of, and recovery from disasters/emergencies both internal and external to the facility. Integrate these elements with local, state, federal, and private agencies involved with public safety and security. And remove Sections 12.2 through 12.3.3.10.Substantiation: Chapter 12 lacks detail and clarity for proper implementation and measurement of effectiveness. It also lacks a suitable requirement for external coordination with public agencies and other private entities necessary to perform complete disaster/emergency management functions. Chapter 12 falls far short of identifying the necessary elements of a complete program with plans to make it functional and flexible to meet changing needs. NFPA 1600 is comprehensive with the flexibility to meet changing needs. It is global and looks at the disaster/emergency issues as they affect more than just a single isolated entity. These days we must look beyond isolated Cottage Industry Mentality. Recent times should have taught us that, if nothing else.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: The information in the chapter is occupancy specific and is needed. The chapter is being updated and additional annex material is

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99being added to the document which supports the material in the body of the document.Number Eligible to Vote: 11Ballot Results: Affirmative: 6 Vote Not Returned: 5 BREWSTER, ENNIS, KENDIG, SINSIGALLI, VARGO________________________________________________________________99-445 Log #156 HEA-HCE Final Action: Reject( 12.3.3 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Donald L. Schmidt, Marsh USA Inc.Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 12.3.3 The emergency management plan, as a minimum, shall include the components detailed in 12.3.3.1 through 12.3.3.10 as well as the requirements of NFPA 1600, Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs.Substantiation: NFPA 1600 has become widely accepted as international standard used both in the public sector and private sectors. It defines the management and program aspects to develop, implement, and maintain a program to mitigate, prepare for, respond to, and recover from disasters and emergencies. Healthcare occupancies may need to customize their approach to disaster/emergency management and business continuity, and NFPA 99 can identify those areas where deviations are necessary. However, the overall approach outlined in NFPA 1600 is valid for healthcare occupancies. The provisions in NFPA 99, Chapter 12, Health Care Emergency Management, do not address all that is required. Adoption of language to reference NFPA 1600 would go a long way towards enhancing the provisions of Chapter 12.Committee Meeting Action: Reject This chapter is very specific for healthcare. Some of the common requirements of NFPA 1600 are discussed in 99-442 (Log #346).Committee Statement: See Committee Action on 99-442 (Log #346).Number Eligible to Vote: 12Ballot Results: Affirmative: 7 Vote Not Returned: 5 ENNIS, KITCHIN, SINSIGALLI, VARGO, WOODFINComment on Affirmative: BREWSTER: Concur with underlined portion of sentence.

________________________________________________________________99-446 Log #377 HEA-HCE Final Action: Accept( 12.3.3.10 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Dale Woodin, ASHE-American Society for Healthcare Engineering of the American Hospital Association (AHA)Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 12.3.3.10* Operational Recovery. Plans shall reflect measures needed to restore operational capability to pre-disaster levels. Fiscal aspects shall be considered because of restoral restoration costs and possible cash flow losses associated with the disruption.Substantiation: Restoral is not a word, I assume this is a typo and the committee meant restoration.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 11Ballot Results: Affirmative: 6 Vote Not Returned: 5 BREWSTER, ENNIS, KENDIG, SINSIGALLI, VARGO________________________________________________________________99-447 Log #24 HEA-ELS Final Action: Accept( 13.3.4 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Burton R. Klein, Burton Klein AssociatesRecommendation: 1. In 13.3.4.1, add title “Electrical Distribution System.” 2. In 13.3.4.2, add title “Essential Electrical Distribution System.”Substantiation: Editorial, for consistency with similar sections in Chapters 14 to 18.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 14Ballot Results: Affirmative: 14 ________________________________________________________________99-448 Log #103 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 13.3.5.1(2)(b) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Corky Bishop, Medical Gas Management, Inc.Recommendation: Revise text as follows: “Patients served by the system(s) are not dependent on mechanical ventilation or assisted mechanical ventilation at any time, including during administration of anesthesia.”Substantiation: The best example of a Level 2 system is an outpatient surgery center. The current wording would force any facility with anesthesia machines in use to be elevated to Level 1 requirements. This also applies to Chapters 14, 17, and 18.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: When mechanical or assisted mechanical ventilation is used, including during administration of anesthesia, level 1 system is needed to ensure the reliability of the system and safety of the patient.

Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-449 Log #399 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 13.3.5.1(2) (a) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Peter Esherick, Patient Instrumentation Corp.Recommendation: Delete the following text: (a)13.3.5.1(a)1 and 2 applySubstantiation: Numbers cannot be found.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle See errata 99-02-1 that states: The Committee on Health Care Facilities notes the following errors in the 2002 edition of NFPA 99, Standard for Health Care Facilities. 1) Revise 5.1.3.6.1.2(5) to read: “Piping between the vacuum pump(s), discharge(s), receiver(s), and the vacuum source shutoff valve shall be in accordance with 5.1.10.2 except that stainless, galvanized or black steel pipe shall be permitted to be used.” 2) Revise 5.1.12.3.8(e) to read: “...dew point shall not exceed 500 ppm (-12°C (10°F)) at 50 psig.” 3) Revise 5.1.12.1.12.2(2) to read: “(2) Medical Air and instrument air sources shall be tested to 5.1.12.3.14.3.” 4) Add a new 5.1.5.16 to read: “WAGD networks shall provide a WAGD inlet at each anesthetizing location.” 5) Revise references in the following paragraphs as follows: 13.3.5.1.(2)(1) should read “13.3.5.1(1) a and b apply.” (3) (a) should read “13.3.5.1(1) a and b and 13.3.5.1(2) b apply.” 14.3.5.1(2) (1) should read “14.3.5.1(1) a and b and 14.3.5.1(2) (b) apply.” (3) (a) should read “14.3.5.1(1) a and b and 14.3.5.1(2) apply.” 17.3.5.1(2) (a) should read “17.3.5.1(1) a and b apply.” (3) (a) should read “17.3.5.1(1) a and b and 17.3.5.1(2) (b) apply.” 18.3.5.1 (2) (a) should read “18.3.5.1(1) a and b apply.” (3) (a) should read “18.3.1.1(1) a and b and 18.3.5.1 (2)(b) apply.” 6) In 17.3.4.1.3 change the reference from “17.3.4.1.3” to “17.3.4.12” 7) In 4.4.3.2.1 change the reference of extracted material from “110: 5.12.5” to “110: 7.12.5” 8) In 4.4.4.1.1.1 and 4.4.4.1.1.2(A) change the reference from “Chapter 6” to “Chapter 8” 9) In 10.2.13.3.2.1 change “10 µA” to “10 ma”Committee Statement: The committee incorporated errata 99-02-1.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).________________________________________________________________99-450 Log #400 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( 13.3.5.1(3) (a) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Peter Esherick, Patient Instrumentation Corp.Recommendation: Delete the following text: (a) 13.3.1(a) 1 and 2 and 13.3.51(b)1 applySubstantiation: Numbers cannot be found.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle See errata 99-02-1 that states: The Committee on Health Care Facilities notes the following errors in the 2002 edition of NFPA 99, Standard for Health Care Facilities. 1) Revise 5.1.3.6.1.2(5) to read: “Piping between the vacuum pump(s), discharge(s), receiver(s), and the vacuum source shutoff valve shall be in accordance with 5.1.10.2 except that stainless, galvanized or black steel pipe shall be permitted to be used.” 2) Revise 5.1.12.3.8(e) to read: “...dew point shall not exceed 500 ppm (-12°C (10°F)) at 50 psig.” 3) Revise 5.1.12.1.12.2(2) to read: “(2) Medical Air and instrument air sources shall be tested to 5.1.12.3.14.3.” 4) Add a new 5.1.5.16 to read: “WAGD networks shall provide a WAGD inlet at each anesthetizing location.” 5) Revise references in the following paragraphs as follows: 13.3.5.1.(2)(1) should read “13.3.5.1(1) a and b apply.” (3) (a) should read “13.3.5.1(1) a and b and 13.3.5.1(2) b apply.” 14.3.5.1(2) (1) should read “14.3.5.1(1) a and b and 14.3.5.1(2) (b) apply.” (3) (a) should read “14.3.5.1(1) a and b and 14.3.5.1(2) apply.” 17.3.5.1(2) (a) should read “17.3.5.1(1) a and b apply.” (3) (a) should read “17.3.5.1(1) a and b and 17.3.5.1(2) (b) apply.” 18.3.5.1 (2) (a) should read “18.3.5.1(1) a and b apply.” (3) (a) should read “18.3.1.1(1) a and b and 18.3.5.1 (2)(b) apply.” 6) In 17.3.4.1.3 change the reference from “17.3.4.1.3” to “17.3.4.12” 7) In 4.4.3.2.1 change the reference of extracted material from “110: 5.12.5” to “110: 7.12.5” 8) In 4.4.4.1.1.1 and 4.4.4.1.1.2(A) change the reference from “Chapter 6” to “Chapter 8”

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99 9) In 10.2.13.3.2.1 change “10 µA” to “10 ma”Committee Statement: The committee incorporated errata 99-02-1.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-451 Log #383 HEA-ELS Final Action: Accept( 13.4.1.2.4(D) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Dale Woodin, ASHE-American Society for Healthcare Engineering of the American Hospital Association (AHA)Recommendation: Delete 13.4.1.2.4 (D).Substantiation: Eliminate this section. It is covered by 8.5.2.1.2..1 and 8.5.2.1.2.2.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 14Ballot Results: Affirmative: 14

________________________________________________________________99-452 Log #23 HEA-ELS Final Action: Accept in Principle( 13.4.1.2.6.1(E) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Burton R. Klein, Burton Klein AssociatesRecommendation: Add the following new sentence: Such lights shall be wired to circuits serving the lighting needs of an operating room.Substantiation: Circuits serving lighting may be interrupted while other circuits may continue to have power. Intent of having these emergency lights activated is to provide lighting whenever regular lighting is interrupted. Power interruption could occur within a facility (e.g., circuit breaker), and thus not activate emergency generators.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise the submitters text to read as follows: Such lights shall be wired to circuits serving general area the lighting. needs of an operating room.Committee Statement: The term operating room was deleted as it applies to all anesthetizing locations. The Committee feels that the light should be connected to the general lighting circuit, rather than to the “OR” lighting circuit.Number Eligible to Vote: 14Ballot Results: Affirmative: 14

________________________________________________________________99-453 Log #CP201 HEA-ELS Final Action: Accept( 13.4.1.2.6.1(E) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Electrical SystemsRecommendation: Add new requirements: testing of these units shall be in accordance with NFPA 101 Sections below: 7.9.3 Periodic Testing of Emergency Lighting Equipment. 7.9.3.1 Required emergency lighting systems shall be tested in accordance with one of the three options offered by 7.9.3.1.1, 7.9.3.1.2, or 7.9.3.1.3. 7.9.3.1.1 Testing of required emergency lighting systems shall be permitted to be conducted as follows: (1) Functional testing shall be conducted at 30-day intervals for not less than 30 seconds. (2) Functional testing shall be conducted annually for not less than 1 1/2 hours if the emergency lighting system is battery powered. (3) The emergency lighting equipment shall be fully operational for the duration of the tests required by 7.9.3.1.1(1) and 7.9.3.1.1(2). (4) Written records of visual inspections and tests shall be kept by the owner for inspection by the authority having jurisdiction. 7.9.3.1.2 Testing of required emergency lighting systems shall be permitted to be conducted as follows: (1) Self-testing/self-diagnostic battery-operated emergency lighting equipment shall be provided. (2) Self-testing/self-diagnostic battery-operated emergency lighting equipment shall automatically perform not less than once every 30 days a test for not less than 30 seconds and a diagnostic routine. (3) Self-testing/self-diagnostic battery-operated emergency lighting equipment shall indicate failures by a status indicator. (4) A visual inspection shall be performed at intervals not exceeding 30 days. (5) Functional testing shall be conducted annually for not less than 1 1/2 hours. (6) Self-testing/self-diagnostic battery-operated emergency lighting equipment shall be fully operational for the duration of the 1 1/2 hour test. (7) Written records of visual inspections and tests shall be kept by the owner for inspection by the authority having jurisdiction. 7.9.3.1.3 Testing of required emergency lighting systems shall be permitted to be conducted as follows: (1) Computer-based, self-testing/self-diagnostic battery-operated emergency lighting equipment shall be provided.

(2) The emergency lighting equipment shall automatically perform not less than once every 30 days a test for not less than 30 seconds and a diagnostic routine. (3) The emergency lighting equipment shall automatically perform annually a test for not less than 1 1/2 hours. (4) The emergency lighting equipment shall be fully operational for the duration of the tests required by 7.9.3.1.3(2) and 7.9.3.1.3(3). (5) The computer-based system shall be capable of providing a report of the history of tests and failures at all times. and renumber accordingly.Substantiation: The testing of emergency lighting in anesthetizing locations is important to assure the functionality of equipment for patient safety.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 14Ballot Results: Affirmative: 14

________________________________________________________________99-454 Log #386 HEA-ELS Final Action: Reject( 14.3.4.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Mark English, Hartford Hospital / Rep. New England Healthcare Enginnerʼs SocietyRecommendation: Delete Section 14.3.4.1.Substantiation: This is an onerous requirement, particularly in our experiences where AHJʼs have required upgrade of existing systems back to the source when renovating a small area. Ambulatory Health Care should not have to meet the same requirements as for hospitals since the frequency of exposure is much less than in a 24-hour facility.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: The requirements for ambulatory health care are correct and address the surgical patientʼs needs. This interpretation is consistent with the definition of ambulatory health care center found in NFPA 101. Number Eligible to Vote: 14Ballot Results: Affirmative: 14

________________________________________________________________99-455 Log #25 HEA-ELS Final Action: Reject( 14.3.4.2.1.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Burton R. Klein, Burton Klein AssociatesRecommendation: Move 14.3.4.2.1.1 (and all subparagraphs) to 14.4.1, numbering it 14.4.1.1 and retitling it “Wiring.”Substantiation:Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: The submitter provided no substantiation for this proposal.Number Eligible to Vote: 14Ballot Results: Affirmative: 14

________________________________________________________________99-456 Log #CP202 HEA-ELS Final Action: Accept( 14.3.4.2.1.1(E) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Electrical SystemsRecommendation: Add new requirements: testing of these units shall be in accordance with NFPA 101 Sections below: 7.9.3 Periodic Testing of Emergency Lighting Equipment. 7.9.3.1 Required emergency lighting systems shall be tested in accordance with one of the three options offered by 7.9.3.1.1, 7.9.3.1.2, or 7.9.3.1.3. 7.9.3.1.1 Testing of required emergency lighting systems shall be permitted to be conducted as follows: (1) Functional testing shall be conducted at 30-day intervals for not less than 30 seconds. (2) Functional testing shall be conducted annually for not less than 1 1/2 hours if the emergency lighting system is battery powered. (3) The emergency lighting equipment shall be fully operational for the duration of the tests required by 7.9.3.1.1(1) and 7.9.3.1.1(2). (4) Written records of visual inspections and tests shall be kept by the owner for inspection by the authority having jurisdiction. 7.9.3.1.2 Testing of required emergency lighting systems shall be permitted to be conducted as follows: (1) Self-testing/self-diagnostic battery-operated emergency lighting equipment shall be provided. (2) Self-testing/self-diagnostic battery-operated emergency lighting equipment shall automatically perform not less than once every 30 days a test for not less than 30 seconds and a diagnostic routine. (3) Self-testing/self-diagnostic battery-operated emergency lighting equipment shall indicate failures by a status indicator. (4) A visual inspection shall be performed at intervals not exceeding 30 days. (5) Functional testing shall be conducted annually for not less than 1 1/2 hours. (6) Self-testing/self-diagnostic battery-operated emergency lighting equipment shall be fully operational for the duration of the 1 1/2 hour test. (7) Written records of visual inspections and tests shall be kept by the owner for inspection by the authority having jurisdiction.

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99 7.9.3.1.3 Testing of required emergency lighting systems shall be permitted to be conducted as follows: (1) Computer-based, self-testing/self-diagnostic battery-operated emergency lighting equipment shall be provided. (2) The emergency lighting equipment shall automatically perform not less than once every 30 days a test for not less than 30 seconds and a diagnostic routine. (3) The emergency lighting equipment shall automatically perform annually a test for not less than 1 1/2 hours. (4) The emergency lighting equipment shall be fully operational for the duration of the tests required by 7.9.3.1.3(2) and 7.9.3.1.3(3). (5) The computer-based system shall be capable of providing a report of the history of tests and failures at all times. and renumber accordingly.Substantiation: The testing of emergency lighting in anesthetizing locations is important to assure the functionality of equipment for patient safety.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 14Ballot Results: Affirmative: 14

________________________________________________________________99-457 Log #104 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( 14.3.5.1(3) a )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Corky Bishop, Medical Gas Management, Inc.Recommendation: Revise text as follows: “Subparagraphs 14.3.5.1(1)a and b and 14.3.5.1(2)a are true.Substantiation: It is redundant to state that subparagraphs (1)a and b be true twice in the same sentence. This also applies to Chapters 13, 17, and 18.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: WAGNER: The existing text is 14.3.5.1(3)a does not refer to subparagraphs 14.3.5.1(1)a and b and 14.3.5.1(2) a twice in the same sentence. The same is true in Chapters 13,17, and 18.Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-458 Log #26 HEA-ELS Final Action: Accept( 17.3.4 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Burton R. Klein, Burton Klein AssociatesRecommendation: 1. Insert new 17.3.4.1 to read: 17.3.4.1 Electrical distribution system. (Reserved) 2. Revise existing 17.3.4.1 to read: 17.3.4.2 Essential electrical distribution system. 3. Renumber existing 17.3.4.1.1 to new 17.3.4.2.1, and change reference within paragraph from 17.3.4.1.2 to 17.3.4.2.2. 4. Renumber existing 17.3.4.1.2 to new 17.3.4.2.2, and change reference within paragraph from 17.3.4.1.1 to 17.3.4.2.1. 5. Renumber existing 17.3.4.1.3 to new 17.3.4.2.3, and change reference within paragraph from 17.3.4.1.3 to 17.3.4.2.2.Substantiation: Editorial. Make numbering in Chapter 17, Section 17.3.4 the same as in Chapter 13, Section 13.3.4. Have titles of sections consistent with similar sections in Chapters 13-18.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 14Ballot Results: Affirmative: 14

________________________________________________________________99-459 Log #90 HEA-ELS Final Action: Accept( 17.3.4.1.4 (New) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Burton R. Klein, Burton Klein AssociatesRecommendation: Add a new 17.3.4.1.4 to read as follows: “If patients are admitted who need to be sustained by electrical life support equipment, the essential electrical system from the source to that portion of the facility where such patients are treated shall conform to a Type 1 system as described in Chapter 4.”Substantiation: 1. Wording in current 17.3.4.1.2(1) states what nursing homes are permitted to do if they do not admit patients who need electrical life support equipment 17.3.4.1.1. is silent on what nursing homes need to conform to (re, the type of essential electrical system) if they do admit patients who need electrical life support equipment. 2. In Chapter 14, other health care facilities, the essential electrical system can be a Type 3 system unless electrical life support equipment is required; then a Type 1 system is required to be installed (per 14.3.4.2.1). Thus, one can conclude that the technical committee believed that a facility that employed electrical life support equipment needs to have a Type 1 system installed (though not if device had a self-contained battery that allowed operation when regular power was interrupted).Committee Meeting Action: Accept

Number Eligible to Vote: 14Ballot Results: Affirmative: 14

________________________________________________________________99-460 Log #27 HEA-ELS Final Action: Accept( 18.3.4 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Burton R. Klein, Burton Klein AssociatesRecommendation: 1. Insert new 18.3.4.1 to read: 18.3.4.1 Electrical distribution system. (Reserved) 2. Revise existing 18.3.4.1 to read: 18.3.4.2 Essential electrical distribution system. 3. Renumber existing 18.3.4.1.1 to new 18.3.4.2.1, and change reference within paragraph from 18.3.4.1.2 to 18.3.4.2.2. 4. Renumber existing 18.3.4.1.2 to new 18.3.4.2.2, and change reference within paragraph from 18.3.4.1.1 to 18.3.4.2.1. 5. Renumber existing 18.3.4.1.3 to new 18.3.4.2.3, and change reference within paragraph from 18.3.4.1.3 to 18.3.4.2.2.Substantiation: Editorial. Make numbering in Chapter 18, Section 18.3.4 the same as in Chapter 13, Section 13.3.4. Have titles of sections consistent with similar sections in Chapters 13-18.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 14Ballot Results: Affirmative: 14

________________________________________________________________99-461 Log #CP1 HEA-HYP Final Action: Reject( 20.2.1.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Hyperbaric and Hypobaric FacilitiesRecommendation: Add a new 20.2.1.1 and renumber the existing 20.2.1.1 and subsequent paragraphs as follows: “20.2.1.1 General building and structure design and construction shall be in accordance with NFPA 5000, Building Construction and Safety Code except as modified herein.”Substantiation: NFPA 5000 represents the minimum baseline for construction requirements and provides requirements for topics not currently covered in the document. Committee Meeting Action: Reject

Committee Statement: Due to the unique requirements for hyperbaric facility construction the committee can not accept the proposal to add the reference to NFPA 5000 at this time without further review of the document.Number Eligible to Vote: 18Ballot Results: Affirmative: 15 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 2 FOREMAN, VINCENTExplanatin of Abstention: SECHRIST: I abstain from voting as I have no involvement with hypobaric facilities or equipment and do not feel qualified to vote on this subject.

________________________________________________________________99-462 Log #CP2 HEA-HYP Final Action: Reject( 20.2.1.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Hyperbaric and Hypobaric FacilitiesRecommendation: Revise existing 20.2.1.1 through 20.2.1.1.5 as follows: 20.2.1.1 For Class A chambers located inside a building, the chamber(s) and all ancillary service equipment shall be protected by Type II (222) construction. 20.2.1.1.1* Freestanding, dedicated buildings containing only a Class A chamber(s) and ancillary service equipment shall not be required to be protected by Type II (222) construction. 20.2.1.1.2 Trailer or vehicle-mounted facilities shall be permitted without a perimeter, fire barrier wall with a 2-hour fire resistance rating. 20.2.1.1.3 When trailer or vehicle-mounted facilities are located contiguous to a health care facility, or another structure, a fire barrier wall with a 2-hour fire resistant rating shall be used between the facility and the contiguous structure. 20.2.1.1.4 Where building exterior walls form part of the facility boundary, that portion of the facility boundary shall not require Type II (222) construction. 20.2.1.1.5* If there are connecting doors through such common walls of contiguity, they shall comply with NFPA 5000, Building Construction and Safety Code, Table 8.7.2. Substantiation: The term “fire-resistant construction” is out dated and was changed to correlate with NFPA 5000, Building Construction and Safety Code. NFPA 5000 specifies the minimum fire protection ratings for openings in fire resistance-rated assemblies.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: Due to the unique requirements for hyperbaric facility construction the committee can not accept the proposal to add the reference to NFPA 5000 at this time without further review of the document.

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99Number Eligible to Vote: 18Ballot Results: Affirmative: 16 Vote Not Returned: 2 FOREMAN, VINCENT

________________________________________________________________99-463 Log #CP9 HEA-HYP Final Action: Accept( 20.2.4.1.3.5 to 20.2.4.5.3 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Hyperbaric and Hypobaric FacilitiesRecommendation: Modify and move 20.2.4.1.3.5 to 20.2.4.5.3 as follows: 20.2.4.5.3 A source of breathable gas allowing unrestricted mobility shall be available outside a Class A or B chamber for use by personnel in the event that the air in the vicinity of the chamber is fouled by smoke or other combustion products of fire. A.20.2.4.5.3 The intent of this requirement is to allow facility staff to evacuate the facility and avoid breathing contaminated air. This requirement can be met using either a self-contained breathing apparatus, smoke hood with intregral filter/air supply, or similar technology. The number of units available should be adequate to meet facility staffing. The breathing duration of the personal protection devices should be predicated upon the time necessary for evacuation of the facility. Facility evacuation time should be determined during fire drills conducted by the hyperbaric facility. In addition, change 20.2.4.5 to read: “20.2.4.5 Emergency Depressurization and Facility Evacuation Capability.”Substantiation: Facility staff should be able to evacuate patients regardless of the type of chamber in use. Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 18Ballot Results: Affirmative: 16 Vote Not Returned: 2 FOREMAN, VINCENT

________________________________________________________________99-464 Log #CP32 HEA-HYP Final Action: Accept( 20.2.4.3.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Hyperbaric and Hypobaric FacilitiesRecommendation: Revise existing 20.2.4.3.1 as follows: 20.2.4.3.1 Warming or cooling of the atmosphere within a Class A chamber shall be permitted by circulating the ambient air within the chamber over or past coils through which a constant flow of warm or cool water or water/glycol mixture is circulated.

Substantiation: The change provides a more efficient option for chamber environmental control.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 18Ballot Results: Affirmative: 15 Negative: 1 Vote Not Returned: 2 FOREMAN, VINCENTExplanation of Negative: REIMERS: Permissible types of glycols must be specified. Propylene is generally considered ok. Ethylene (the most common type) has historically not been permitted in man-rated chambers.

________________________________________________________________99-465 Log #CP10 HEA-HYP Final Action: Accept( 20.2.4.4.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Hyperbaric and Hypobaric FacilitiesRecommendation: Modify section 20.2.4.4.1 to read: Class B chambers shall conform to the ventilation requirements of 20.2.4.1.1.1 and the oxygen monitoring requirements of 20.2.8.4.2.Substantiation: Currently there is no standard on ventilation for oxygen pressurized Class B chambers or for oxygen monitoring for air pressurized Class B chambers.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 18Ballot Results: Affirmative: 14 Negative: 2 Vote Not Returned: 2 FOREMAN, VINCENTExplanation of Negative: PETERSON: The proposed change makes no distinction between types of Class B chambers. While a minimum ventilaton rate might indeed be appropriate for a Class B chamber with risk factors for high oxygen environments similar to those of a Class A chamber, the vast majority of Class B chambers have been designed for use with 100 percent oxygen. Thus, concerns about increasing oxygen levels and the need to control, by increased chamber ventilation, and to monitor oxygen levels in such systems are entirely inappropriate and unnecessary. Further, this requirement, if implemented, would impose a totally unwarranted burden and expense on the many clinical users of oxygen flow-through monoplace chambers. Finally, no need for such a regulation been demonstrated. Thus, we cast an emphatic NO vote on this proposed change.If the Committee would like to reconsider this issue, then it should qualify the type of Class B chamber involved to one in which risks of fire similar to those in Class A chambers exist if the oxygen level in the chamber is elevated

significiantly above 21 percent. SECHRIST: The substantiation given for this new requirement is inadequate. The justification given is the section is being revised because there is no standard for ventilation of oxygen pressurized Class B chambers or for oxygen monitoring for air pressurized Class B chambers. Just because a current standard does not exist does not mean that there has to be one. I submit that there isnʼt one because one is not needed. If one is needed, the substantiation should specifically state what risks are being mitigated by this new requirement. This was not done and no valid reason was provided for implementing a new requirement.The wording of 99-465 (Log #CP10) would require all Class B chambers, whether pressurized with 100 percent oxygen or air, to comply with the ventilation requirements of 20.2.4.1.1.1 and oxygen monitoring requirements of 20.2.8.4.2. This would require both types of Class B chambers to comply with the ventilation and monitoring requirements, however, the substantiation given only mentions ventilation requirements for oxygen pressurized Class B chambers and monitoring of air pressurized Class B chambers. Therefore, the substantiation given does not match the proposed revision.The current requirements for ventilation of Class A chambers and Class B chambers pressurized with air are stated in 20.2.4.1 and 20.2.4.4.1 respectively, and the oxygen monitoring requirement is stated in 20.2.8.4.2. This is intended to prevent the build up of oxygen in air pressurized chambers in excess of 21 percent. The reason is to prevent fire caused by electrical equipment and flammable agents located inside the chamber. Therefore, ventilation and oxygen monitoring of Class B chambers is not needed because no equipment or flammable agents are allowed inside Class B chambers. Additionally, monitoring is specifically not needed for oxygen pressurized Class B chambers as they are pressurized with 100 percent oxygen and already exceed the 21 percent limit. The proposal to require oxygen monitoring of Class B chambers pressurized with 100 percent oxygen does not make sense.This proposal attempts to hold Class B chambers to the same requirements as Class A chambers. Class A and Class B chambers are not the same and have their own specific risks and therefore their own specific risk mitigations. In this case, Class B chambers should not be treated the same as Class A chambers. This new requirement would burden the healthcare facilities with unnecessary and unwarranted additional costs without providing any additional safety factor.Comment on Affirmative: REIMERS: Change last portion to read, “...of 20.2.4.1.1.1 and, if pressurized with air, the oxygen monitoring...”

________________________________________________________________99-466 Log #63 HEA-HYP Final Action: Accept in Principle in Part( 20.2.5.1.4 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Jon Nisja, Northcentral Regional DevelopmentRecommendation: Revise to read: 20.2.5.1.4* A building fire alarm box shall be provided at the chamber operatorʼs control console. 20.2.5.1.4.1 Trailer or vehicle-mounted facilities shall be provided with an approved means to notify the fire department.Substantiation: The proposed wording provides better clarification on the alarm method required. The new section provides guidance for trailer mounted facilities on a method to notify the fd. As currently worded a trailer mounted unit would require a tie in to the building fire alarm system which is an unnecessary burden. The existing requirements does not provide any additional protection to the facility.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle in PartReject part one of the recommendation and modify part two as follows: 20.2.5.1.4.1 Trailer or vehicle-mounted facilities not contiguous to a health care facility shall either: 1) comply with 20.2.5.1.4 or2) have a means for immediately contacting the local fire department.Committee Statement:The first recommendation was rejected because the existing language addresses institutional fire response.The revised wording expands on the submitters recommendation but further clarifies the distinction between contiguous and noncontiguous facilities.Number Eligible to Vote: 18Ballot Results: Affirmative: 16 Vote Not Returned: 2 FOREMAN, VINCENT

________________________________________________________________99-467 Log #CP18 HEA-HYP Final Action: Accept( 20.2.5.5.3 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Hyperbaric and Hypobaric FacilitiesRecommendation: Revise 20.2.5.5.3 as follows: 20.2.5.5.3 A detailed record of the test results shall be maintained and a copy sent to the hyperbaric facility safety director.Substantiation: It is more appropriate that the documentation be maintained by the facility. The authority having jurisdiction has access to the documentation upon his request.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 18

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99Ballot Results: Affirmative: 16 Vote Not Returned: 2 FOREMAN, VINCENT

________________________________________________________________99-468 Log #CP28 HEA-HYP Final Action: Accept( 20.2.6.2, 20.2.6.2.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Hyperbaric and Hypobaric FacilitiesRecommendation: Add new 20.2.6.2 and 20.2.6.2.1 as follows: 20.2.6.2 A fire alarm signaling device shall be provided within the room housing the chamber(s) for signaling the emergency fire/rescue network of the institution containing the hyperbaric facility. 20.2.6.2.1 Trailer or vehicle-mounted facilities not contiguous to a health care facility shall either: 1) comply with 20.2.6.2 or 2) have a means for immediately contacting the local fire department.Substantiation: The requirements for Class B chambers are now coordinated with Class A chambers.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 18Ballot Results: Affirmative: 16 Vote Not Returned: 2 FOREMAN, VINCENT

________________________________________________________________99-469 Log #CP19 HEA-HYP Final Action: Accept( 20.2.7.1.3 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Hyperbaric and Hypobaric FacilitiesRecommendation: Modify 20.2.7.1.3 to read as follows: 20.2.7.1.3 Console or module spaces containing both oxygen piping and electrical equipment shall be either: 1) mechanically or naturally ventilated or 2) continuously monitored for excessive oxygen concentrations whenever the electrical equipment is energized.Substantiation: This change was made to be consistent with Chapter 5, ventilation requirements.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 18Ballot Results: Affirmative: 16 Vote Not Returned: 2 FOREMAN, VINCENT

________________________________________________________________99-470 Log #CP20 HEA-HYP Final Action: Accept( 20.2.7.2.1.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Hyperbaric and Hypobaric FacilitiesRecommendation: Delete paragraph 20.2.7.2.1.1 Modify existing 20.2.7.2.1 and 20.2.7.2.2 to read as follows: 20.2.7.2.1 All hyperbaric facilities shall contain an electrical service that is supplied from two independent sources of electric power. 20.2.7.2.1.2 For hyperbaric facilities using a prime-mover-driven generator set, it shall be designated as the “emergency system” and shall meet the requirements of Chapter 4, Electrical Systems, of this standard for hyperbaric systems based in health care facilities.Substantiation: The primary requirement already specifies two independent sources of power allowing a variety of solutions.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 18Ballot Results: Affirmative: 16 Vote Not Returned: 2 FOREMAN, VINCENTComment on Affirmative: REIMERS: Change, “All hyperbaric facilities shall...” to read “All hyperbaric facilities intended for human occupancy shall...”. There is not need for this requirement to apply to a table top animal research chamber.

________________________________________________________________99-471 Log #CP8 HEA-HYP Final Action: Accept( 20.2.7.4.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Hyperbaric and Hypobaric FacilitiesRecommendation: Revise paragraph to read as follows: 20-2.7.4.1 The chamber shall be grounded according to the requirements of NFPA 70, National Electrical Code, Article 250, Grounding. All chamber hulls shall be grounded to an electrical ground or grounding system that meets the requirements of NFPA 70, National Electrical Code, Article 250, Grounding, section H. Grounding Electrode System. 20-2.7.4.1.1 Resistance between the chamber and ground point shall not exceed 1 ohm. Grounding conductors shall be secured as required by Article 250, section K. Grounding Conductor Connections. 20-2.7.4.1.2 The material, size, and installation of the grounding conductor shall meet the requirements of Article 250, section J. Grounding Conductors, for equipment grounding conductors. 20-2.7.4.1.3 The resistance between the grounded chamber hull and the electrical ground shall not exceed 1 ohm.

Substantiation: The proposed change is to clarify chamber grounding and bonding requirements based on questions that often arise during chamber installations.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptCommittee Statement: The committee will need to update the references to specific sections of NFPA 70.Number Eligible to Vote: 18Ballot Results: Affirmative: 16 Vote Not Returned: 2 FOREMAN, VINCENT

________________________________________________________________99-472 Log #CP30 HEA-HYP Final Action: Accept( 20.2.8.6.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Hyperbaric and Hypobaric FacilitiesRecommendation: Modify existing 20.2.8.6.2 as follows: 20.2.8.6.2 As a minimum, the air supplied to Class A chambers shall meet the requirements for CGA grade D. Add new 20.2.8.6.3 as follows: 20.2.8.6.3 As a minimum, the air supplied to Class B chambers shall meet the requirements for CGA grade D with the additional limit of no condensable hydrocarbons.Substantiation: Original reference to Chapter 3 was incorrect. Dewpoint limits specified in Chapter 5 for medical air are too restrictive for hyperbaric compressed air. Class B chambers, if compressed with oxygen or air, need a limit on condensed hydrocarbons allowed in the air.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 18Ballot Results: Affirmative: 14 Negative: 2 Vote Not Returned: 2 FOREMAN, VINCENTExplanation of Negative: HAMILTON: The addition to the CGA specifications for Grade D air says “with the additional limit of no condensable hydrocarbons.” This is commendable, but unenforceable without specifics on the method of determining that there are none. I suggest that this refer to the community standard for Air to be Mixed with Oxygen, which calls for a limit of 0.1 mg per M3. This is attainable and can be documented. REIMERS: CGA grade D air is permitted to have condensed water in it. This is NOT suitable for the controls on most monoplace chambers. CGA grade N is the grade listed in CGA G-7 “Compressed Air for Human Respiration” as being suitable to “for air USP used for medical purposes”.

________________________________________________________________99-473 Log #CP11 HEA-HYP Final Action: Accept( 20.2.9.2.3, 20.2.9.2.4 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Hyperbaric and Hypobaric FacilitiesRecommendation: Modify 20.2.9.2.3 to read: The point of exhaust shall be protected by the provision of a minimum of 0.3 cm mesh screen and situated to prevent the intrusion of rain, snow or airborne debris. Add new 20.2.9.2.4 to read: The point of exhaust shall be identified as an oxygen exhaust by a sign prohibiting smoking or open flame.Substantiation: The objectives are met by the protective screen and signage.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 18Ballot Results: Affirmative: 16 Vote Not Returned: 2 FOREMAN, VINCENT

________________________________________________________________99-474 Log #CP22 HEA-HYP Final Action: Accept( 20.3.1.4.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Hyperbaric and Hypobaric FacilitiesRecommendation: Revise paragraph 20.3.1.4.1 as follows: General. The administrative, technical, and professional staffs shall jointly develop policies for management of the hyperbaric facility.Substantiation: This change removes the ambiguity over the meaning of control of personnel.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 18Ballot Results: Affirmative: 16 Vote Not Returned: 2 FOREMAN, VINCENT

________________________________________________________________99-475 Log #CP23 HEA-HYP Final Action: Accept( 20.3.1.4.1.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Hyperbaric and Hypobaric FacilitiesRecommendation: Revise 20.3.1.4.1.1 as follows: 20.3.1.4.1.1 Upon adoption, policies shall be available in the facility.Substantiation: It was not the intent of this requirement that policies be literally posted.Committee Meeting Action: Accept

99-121

Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99Number Eligible to Vote: 18Ballot Results: Affirmative: 16 Vote Not Returned: 2 FOREMAN, VINCENT

________________________________________________________________99-476 Log #CP16 HEA-HYP Final Action: Accept( 20.3.1.5.1, 20.3.1.5.1.1, and 20.3.1.5.1.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Hyperbaric and Hypobaric FacilitiesRecommendation: Revise 20.3.1.5.1 to read as follows: “Potential Ignition Sources.” New 20.3.1.5.1.1 as follows: “The following shall be prohibited from inside the chamber and the immediate vicinity outside the chamber: (1) Smoking (2) Open flames (3) Hot objects (4) Ultraviolet sources” New 20.3.1.5.1.2 to read as follows: “The following shall be prohibited from inside the chamber: 1) personal warming devices (i.e. therapeutic chemical heating pads, handwarmers, pocket warmers) 2) cell phones and pagers 3) sparking toys 4) personal entertainment devices Substantiation: The items listed have contributed to specific fatal fires.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 18Ballot Results: Affirmative: 16 Vote Not Returned: 2 FOREMAN, VINCENT

________________________________________________________________99-477 Log #CP12 HEA-HYP Final Action: Accept( 20.3.1.5.2.2(5) )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Hyperbaric and Hypobaric FacilitiesRecommendation: Add new 20.3.1.5.2.2 (5) as follows: The antistatic procedures of 20.3.1.5.3.2 shall be employed by patient(s) and attending care giver(s).Substantiation: Testing has shown that volatiles can be ignited by a static spark.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 18Ballot Results: Affirmative: 15 Negative: 1 Vote Not Returned: 2 FOREMAN, VINCENTExplanation of Negative: REIMERS: This is unreasonable. This could require the fixing of antistatic arm bands to both patient and attendant just to open a sealed alcohol towelette. Can we reasonably expect anyone to adhere to that. The amount of volatile fuel is very tiny and ignitable even with a good spark only if it is maintained in a confined space.

________________________________________________________________99-478 Log #CP13 HEA-HYP Final Action: Accept( 20.3.1.5.4.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Hyperbaric and Hypobaric FacilitiesRecommendation: Modify section 20.3.1.5.4.2 to read as follows: 20.3.1.5.4.2 Garments fabricated of 100 percent cotton or a blend of cotton and polyester fabric shall be permitted in Class A chambers equipped with fire protection as specified in 20.2.5, and in Class B chambers.Substantiation: The intent was to reduce static discharges but there has never been a documented case of a synthetic material causing an ignition.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 18Ballot Results: Affirmative: 15 Negative: 1 Vote Not Returned: 2 FOREMAN, VINCENTExplanation of Negative: REIMERS: No disagreement with the idea in principle. However, the faction of the material that is permitted to be polyester needs to be specified.

________________________________________________________________99-479 Log #CP14 HEA-HYP Final Action: Accept( 20.3.1.5.6 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Hyperbaric and Hypobaric FacilitiesRecommendation: Modify 20.3.1.5.6 to read as follows: 20.3.1.5.6 All other fabrics used in the chamber such as sheets, drapes, and blankets shall conform to 20.3.1.5.4.1 and 20.3.1.5.4.2.Substantiation: The intent was to reduce static discharges but there has never been a documented case of a synthetic material causing an ignition.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 18Ballot Results: Affirmative: 16 Vote Not Returned: 2 FOREMAN, VINCENT

________________________________________________________________99-480 Log #CP15 HEA-HYP Final Action: Accept( 20.3.1.5.7 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Hyperbaric and Hypobaric FacilitiesRecommendation: New 20.3.1.5.7 material to read as follows: 20.3.1.5.7 Clothing worn by patients in Class A or B chambers and personnel in Class A chambers shall: 1) be issued by the hyperbaric facility or specifically approved by the safety director for hyperbaric use 2) be uncontaminated 3) be devoid of prohibited articles prior to chamber pressurization.Substantiation: Several fatal fires have occurred because patients have brought prohibited articles such as hand warmers, cigarette lighters and matches into the chamber in their pockets or otherwise hidden in their clothing. Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 18Ballot Results: Affirmative: 16 Vote Not Returned: 2 FOREMAN, VINCENT

________________________________________________________________99-481 Log #CP3 HEA-HYP Final Action: Reject( 20.3.3.4 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Hyperbaric and Hypobaric FacilitiesRecommendation: Revise 20.3.3.4 as follows: 20.3.3.4 Quantities of oxygen stored in the chamber shall be kept to a minimum and shall not exceed the quantity listed in NFPA 5000, Building Construction and Safety Code, Table 34.1.3.1. Substantiation: NFPA 5000 limits the amount of hazardous material per control group.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: The recommended amount of stored gases in a chamber is excessive.Number Eligible to Vote: 18Ballot Results: Affirmative: 16 Vote Not Returned: 2 FOREMAN, VINCENT________________________________________________________________99-482 Log #CP29 HEA-HYP Final Action: Accept( 20.3.3.4, A.20.3.3.4 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Hyperbaric and Hypobaric FacilitiesRecommendation: Modify 20.3.3.4 and A.20.3.3.4 as follows: 20.3.3.4* Pressurized containers of gas shall be permitted to be introduced into the hyperbaric chamber, provided that the container and its contents are approved for such use by the safety director. A.20.3.3.4 Quantities of oxygen stored in the chamber should be kept to a minimum.Substantiation: The original requirement was unenforceable. Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 18Ballot Results: Affirmative: 16 Vote Not Returned: 2 FOREMAN, VINCENT________________________________________________________________99-483 Log #345 HEA-HYP Final Action: Accept( 20.3.4.1.4 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Corky Bishop, Medical Gas Management, Inc.Recommendation: Add to the following after paragraph 20.3.4.1.4: Reserve supplies and master alarm signals shall meet the requirements of Section 5.2 of Chapter 5.Substantiation: This will emphasize the importance of reserve oxygen supplies and master alarm signals in either a stand-alone facility or one enclosed in a level 1 facility. A single master alarm panel would be sufficient for a stand-alone facility. This would not require duplexed medical air compressors, if used.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 18Ballot Results: Affirmative: 15 Negative: 1 Vote Not Returned: 2 FOREMAN, VINCENTExplanation of Negative: REIMERS: This is a good idea, but too broad. It needs further review to be sure it will not have unintended consequences. I feel it is much better to refer to specific paragraphs only.________________________________________________________________99-484 Log #CP25 HEA-HYP Final Action: Accept( 20.3.5.1.1, 20.3.5.1.1.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Hyperbaric and Hypobaric FacilitiesRecommendation: Modify 20.3.5.1.1 and 20.3.5.1.1.1 to read as follows: 20.3.5.1.1 All electrical circuits shall be tested in accordance with the routine maintenance program of the facility.

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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99 20.3.5.1.1.1 Electrical circuit test shall include the following: (1) A ground fault check to verify that no conductors are grounded to the chamber (2) A test of normal functioning (see 20.2.7.2.2)Substantiation: Such testing is part of a regular maintenance program.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 18Ballot Results: Affirmative: 16 Vote Not Returned: 2 FOREMAN, VINCENT

________________________________________________________________99-485 Log #CP26 HEA-HYP Final Action: Accept( 20.3.6.3.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Hyperbaric and Hypobaric FacilitiesRecommendation: Delete existing 20.3.6.3 and itʼs annex and renumber 20.3.6.3.1 as 20.3.6.2.4.Substantiation: This change removes ambiguity of the implied requirement for testing conductive accessories.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 18Ballot Results: Affirmative: 16 Vote Not Returned: 2 FOREMAN, VINCENT________________________________________________________________99-486 Log #CP27 HEA-HYP Final Action: Accept( 20.3.6.5.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Hyperbaric and Hypobaric FacilitiesRecommendation: Revise 20.3.6.5.1 as follows: 20.3.6.5.1 The persons assigned to this task shall be trained in the following: 1) potential damage to the equipment from cleaning procedures 2) potential personal injury 3) specific cleaning procedures 4) equipment not to be cleanedSubstantiation: Improper cleaning procedures can pose hazards to both the equipment and to the personnel.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 18Ballot Results: Affirmative: 16 Vote Not Returned: 2 FOREMAN, VINCENT

________________________________________________________________99-487 Log #378 HEA-PIP Final Action: Reject( 65.1.1.3 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Dale Woodin, ASHE-American Society for Healthcare Engineering of the American Hospital Association (AHA)Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 5.1.1.3 An existing system that is not in strict compliance with the provisions of this standard shall be permitted to be continued in use as long as the authority having jurisdiction has determined that such use does not constitute a distinct hazard to life.Substantiation: This section is very open and subject to great variation in enforcement. Who is implied as responsible for obtaining the determination that use does not constitute a distinct hazard to life? This needs clarification.Committee Meeting Action: RejectThis is section 5.1.1.3Committee Statement: There was no proposed recommendation made.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-488 Log #280 HEA-ELS Final Action: Accept in Principle( *A.4.4.1.1.18.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Harold Jarrett, Omni Metrix LLCRecommendation: Add a new paragraph: It is often desirable to have Level 1 and Level 2 EPS and ATS functions monitored offsite. Monitoring stations can include pagers, cell phones, and internet connected devices.Substantiation: Service personnel in charge of EPSS equipment should be notified immediately when abnormalities occur. Having data transmitted directly to the service personnelʼs wireless personal communication devices can reduce response times. A similar proposal is being made to NFPA 110, A.5.6.6.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle As a supplement to hard wired alarm annunciations, it is permissible often

desirable to have Level 1 and Level 2 EPS and ATS functions monitored offsite. Monitoring stations can include pagers, cell phones, and internet connected devices.Committee Statement: The Committee wanted to emphasize the need for hard wired alarm annunciation.Number Eligible to Vote: 14Ballot Results: Affirmative: 14

________________________________________________________________99-489 Log #50 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( Figure A.5.1.3.4, A.5.1.3.5, A.5.1.3.6 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Mark Allen, Beacon Medical ProductsRecommendation: Revise figures as shown on the following pages:Substantiation: Figures reflect omissions in 2002 version.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise figures as shown on the following pages:Committee Statement: The figures were modified to reflect the requirements of the chapter.Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-490 Log #232 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( A.5.1.3.4.5 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Robert M. Sutter, BOC GasesRecommendation: Add text to read as follows: The preferred option is to have two relief valves of full capacity installed on a three way valve.Substantiation: Information to be placed in the annex to aid in meeting the proposed requirement of “installed so that it can be maintained.”Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Action on Proposal 99-110 (Log #CP313).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-491 Log #105 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( Figure A.5.1.3.4.11 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Corky Bishop, Medical Gas Management, Inc.Recommendation: Show a third required reserve cylinder in solid black lines.Substantiation: See NFPA 99, 2002; 5.1.3.4.11.4(2).Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-492 Log #414 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( A.5.1.9.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Russell Chun, Holden Hospital SupplyRecommendation: Add new text to read as follows: For master alarm: Nitrogen main line pressure low NEEDS A CODE.Substantiation: Code 5.1.9.2.4(6) states that you need a high and low alarm for master alarm.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Action on Proposal 99-493 (Log #85).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention:

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Figure A.5.1.3.5 Elements of a Typical Duplex Medical Air Compressor Source System (Level 1 Gas Systems)


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Figure A.5.1.3.6 Elements of a Typical Duplex Vaccuum Source System (Level 1 Vacuum Systems)


99-125


Figure A.5.1.4 Arrangement of Pipeline Components


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Figure A.5.1.3.5 Elements of a Typical Duplex Medical Air Compressor Source System (Level 1 Gas Systems)


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Figure A.5.1.3.6 Elements of a Typical Duplex Vaccuum Source System (Level 1 Vacuum Systems)


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Figure A.5.1.4 Arrangement of Pipeline Components


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Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99 CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-493 Log #85 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( Table A.5.1.9.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Keith Ferrari, PraxairRecommendation: Revise text to read as follows: “Nitrogen main line pressure low 5.1.9.2.4(6)”.Substantiation: The text in 5.1.9.2.4(6) does indicate a low alarm. This was (I assume) accidentally deleted from the table.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-494 Log #426 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept in Principle( Table A.5.1.9.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Tom Spremo, Medical Gas SolutionsRecommendation: Add text to read as follows: Nitrogen Mainline Pressure Low 5.1.9.2.4(6) *Refer to Table A.5.1.9.2 Requirements for Level 1 Master Alarms.Substantiation: This table excludes the language for Nitrogen Mainline Pressure Low per NFPA 99 standards. Add this below the Nitrogen Mainline Pressure High verbiage found at the top of the table.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Action on Proposal 99-493 (Log #85).Number Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-495 Log #CP306 HEA-PIP Final Action: Accept( A.5.3.10.10.3 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Piping SystemsRecommendation: Delete text as follows: A.5.3.10.10.3 One of the major concerns is the cross-connection of piping systems of different gases. The reason for different sizes is to prevent cross-connections, not for capacity concerns. The problem of cross-connection of oxygen and other gases such as air, and nitrogen can readily be recognized/prevented by the use of different sizes of tubing. It is recommended that piping and manifolds for oxygen service be a different size from the piping intended for other gas services. The piping for other than oxygen can be of a smaller size. Generally, oxygen is installed in 1/2 in. O.D. tube size and other gases with 3/8 in. O.D. tube size.Substantiation: This clarifies the requirements.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 23Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Vote Not Returned: 1 CAVANAUGHExplanation of Negative: ALLEN: See my Explanation of Negative on 99-374(Log #18).Explanatin of Abstention: CUTTS: See my Explanation of Abstention for 99-1 (Log #47).

________________________________________________________________99-496 Log #66 HEA-HCE Final Action: Reject( A.12.2.3 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Robert Bourke, Northeastern Regional Fire Code Dev.Recommendation: Revise the current text to reflect current and up to date ICS systems.Substantiation: The committee should change the ICS chart and wording to more closely follow nationally recognized standards and systems. These include the Fire Resources of California Organized for Potential Emergencies (FIRESCOPE) system or a system specific to healthcare such as the Hospital Emergency Incident Command System (HEICS), which was also developed in California.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: The chart in the annex is given as one example of a deviation of an ICS. Further the chart is explained in the annex.Number Eligible to Vote: 11Ballot Results: Affirmative: 6 Vote Not Returned: 5 BREWSTER, ENNIS, KENDIG, SINSIGALLI, VARGO

________________________________________________________________99-497 Log #5 HEA-HYP Final Action: Accept in Principle( A.19.2.4.1, 19.2.8.7 and A-4.3.1.1.9 (i) 3 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Ray L. Weiss, Perry BaromedicalRecommendation: In order to resolve conflict in the next edition, it is suggested that Chapter 2-2 “Definition of Terms Used in the Standard” of NFPA 99 be amended to add: A) Hyperbaric Compressed Air is air that complies with the following: 1. Total hydrocarbons Liquid non-detectable Gaseous < 25 ppm 2. Permanent particulates 5 mg/m3 at normal atmospheric pressure of particulate at 1 micron size or greater. 3. Compressed Gas Association Grade “D” or “E” 4. Pressure dew point @ 50 psig between 50 to 64 degrees F, equivalent to 50 percent relative humidity or above for static electricity control. Further suggested changes are as follows: B) NFPA 19-2.8.7 As a minimum, the air supplied to Class A and B chambers shall meet the requirements for medical hyperbaric compressed air as defined in Chapter 2. C) NFPA 99 A-4-3.1.1.9(i) 3 If the air is found to exceed the values in the definition of medical hyperbaric compressed air in Section 2-2, the facility can elect to install purification apparatus for the contaminants in question. Note: Current A-4-3.1.1.9(i) 3 references “medical compressed air” in Section 2-2. Section 2-2 only calls it “medical air”.Substantiation: The United States Food and Drug Administration, Florida District Office has advised Perry Baromedical Corporation that it is their opinion that compressed air used for hyperbaric chamber pressurization is considered to be Medical Air USP. If hyperbaric chamber air compressors are required to produce Medical Air USP, the dew point requirement listed in NFPA 99, Chapter 2-2, “Definition of Terms Used in the Standard”, as less than 39°F results in chamber pressurization air that will have a humidity level of approximately 33 percent. This requirement is in conflict with the need for static electricity control. NFPA 99, in A-19-2.4.1 states that: The air handling system of all Class A chambers should be capable of maintaining relative humidity in the range of 50 to 70 percent during stable depth operations. 50 to 70 percent relative humidity is obtained with a dew point between 50 and 64°F. Please advise which requirement should have precedence, as the industry needs a resolution of this conflict. NOTE: Supporting material available for review upon your request at NFPA Headquarters.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in PrincipleCommittee Statement: See Committee Proposal 99-499 (Log #CP17).Number Eligible to Vote: 18Ballot Results: Affirmative: 15 Negative: 1 Vote Not Returned: 2 FOREMAN, VINCENTExplanation of Negative: HAMILTON: The proposed standard for liquid hydrocarbons has an unenforceable and unrealistic component, the “not detectable” in the first item (A.1). This is bad for two reasons. First, in itself it is ambiguous since the method of analysis or detection is not specified. More important, there is now an informal community standard for “Air to be Mixed with Oxygen.” The upper limit for liquid hydrocarbons selected by consensus of the technical diving community is 0.1 mg/m3. This level is attainable by filtration or use of a proper compressor, detectable by contemporary methods, and not a fire hazard.It may not be necessary to clean to this level for the air used to fill a hyperbaric chamber, but if liquid hydrocarbons are covered this should be done in a realistic manner.[This reference appears to be from the 1999 edition in which HYP was in chapter 19.]

________________________________________________________________99-498 Log #252 HEA-HYP Final Action: Accept( A.20.2.7.3.17 )________________________________________________________________Note: Since the ballot on this Proposal did not confirm the Committee Action, the Committee is soliciting public comment for review when the proposal is reconsidered by the Committee as a Public Comment.Submitter: Wilbur T. Workman, Workman Hyperbaric Services, Inc.Recommendation: Add new second paragraph as follows: “Refer to Figure A.20.2.7.3.17 for guidance to evaluate equipment for hyperbaric chamber use.” Figure is shown on the following page.Substantiation: There is no standardized equipment/material evaluation protocol used by the hyperbaric community. The protocol developed by the US Navy is suggested as an example to help standardize methods used to

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Figure 3 Protocol for Hyperbaric Testing.

99-131

Report on Proposals — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 99evaluate equipment/materials for hyperbaric chamber use.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 18Ballot Results: Affirmative: 15 Negative: 1 Vote Not Returned: 2 FOREMAN, VINCENTExplanation of Negative: GODFREY: While I agree that an example of an evaluation method might be valuable, I do not think the proposed example is appropriate for inclusion in the NFPA document. The hyperbaric community is extensive and varied, and the Navy document provided may be confusing to many people as it contains too much material that is only applicable to the Navy. If we are to provide a suggested evaluation process, it should be a generic evaluation plan that is simple and easily adapted for use by the entire hyperbar-ic community. It should also not contain an references to a particular company or organization, or their internal processes. KINDWALL: This proposal is not complete and must be discussed by the committee before approved. PETERSON: The proposed change does not recognize what would seem to be the logical first line of evaluation of equipment for hyperbaric chamber use. That is to consider such equipment, as appropriate, from the standpoints of ba-sic suitability for clinical application, existing hyperbaric safety codes and/or guidelines, and basic physics and chemistry. If an existing medical monitoring system, for instance, involves electrical power levels below those permitted by NFPA 99, Chapter 20 in the hyperbaric chamber environment in which it is to be used, has in-chamber elements that would be unaffected by exposure to the maximum pressure to which it would be exposed, and all of the materials com-posing the in-chamber elements are compatible with enriched oxygen environ-ments, then a formal test program along the lines presented in this proposal would seem unnecessary. Further, the imposition of such a test requirements, when unnecessary, could stifle the use of perfectly safe and effective equip-ment in hyperbaric environments because the cost of such testing could be prohibitively expensive, particularly in comparison to the likely return on such an investment. This would not be of benefit to patients requiring hyperbaric therapy. Consequently, we must vote NO on this proposal. If an appropriate “front end” were put on a suitable decision tree, however, so that equipment might be qualified for hyperbaric medical use based on first principles and/or existing safety codes and guidelines such as NFPA 99 without the necessity for formal testing, then we would certainly reconsider our position. REIMERS: Too complicated. SHEFFIELD: My negative vote on this proposal is based on the following: 1. The proposed chart is highly specific to one Navy testing facility and has little applicability to a civilian hospital-based clinical hyperbaric facility. 2. The process as shown is extremely complex and time consuming. By the time a piece of equipment is approved for in-chamber use, the patient for whom it was intended would have long since died of old age. 3. Recommend that the HEA-HYP Committee hold this item for consideration at the next meeting..

________________________________________________________________99-499 Log #CP17 HEA-HYP Final Action: Accept( A.20.2.8.6 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Hyperbaric and Hypobaric FacilitiesRecommendation: Replace existing annex material A.20.2.8.6 as follows: The purity of the various gas supplies should be assured. It is recommended that air be sampled at the air intake location at times when the intake air is likely to have maximum impurities (e.g., when vehicles or stationary engines upwind of the intake are running). A purity statement for any cryogenic or high pressure cylinder gas should be supplied by the vendor. Gas cylinder purity statements should be cross referenced, where possible, with the delivered gas. For additional verification, some facilities have installed sampling ports for monitoring oxygen and other gases.Substantiation: Quality assurance of breathing gases are enhanced by these recommendations.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 18Ballot Results: Affirmative: 16

Vote Not Returned: 2 FOREMAN, VINCENT

________________________________________________________________99-500 Log #CP21 HEA-HYP Final Action: Accept( A.20.3.1.3.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Hyperbaric and Hypobaric FacilitiesRecommendation: Add a new paragraph to A.20.3.1.3.2 as follows: Due to a conflict of responsibility, the same individual should not serve as Medical Director and Safety Director.Substantiation: The recommendation provides further guidance on the assignment of roles.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 18Ballot Results: Affirmative: 16 Vote Not Returned: 2 FOREMAN, VINCENT

________________________________________________________________99-501 Log #CP24 HEA-HYP Final Action: Accept( A.20.3.1.4.4.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Technical Committee on Hyperbaric and Hypobaric FacilitiesRecommendation: Replace A.20.3.1.4.4.1 as follows: All full and part-time personnel should receive training in emergency management appropriate to their job description.Substantiation: Training should be applicable to all personnel.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 18Ballot Results: Affirmative: 16 Vote Not Returned: 2 FOREMAN, VINCENT

________________________________________________________________99-502 Log #384 HEA-GAS Final Action: Accept in Principle( C.9.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Dale Woodin, ASHE-American Society for Healthcare Engineering of the American Hospital Association (AHA)Recommendation: Delete C.9.1.Substantiation: Eliminate this section. These are patient care issues and are not relevant to fire and life safety.Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Keep sections C.9.1.1.1, C.9.1.1.4 and C.9.1.4.8 and delete sections C.9.1.1.2, C.9.1.1.3, C.9.1.2 through C.9.1.4.7 inclusive. Renumber the remainder.Committee Statement: Some of the areas are related to patient safety and they should remain. The other sections were deleted as recommended.Number Eligible to Vote: 8Ballot Results: Affirmative: 5 Vote Not Returned: 3 CROWLEY, MILLS, SOMMERS

________________________________________________________________99-503 Log #385 HEA-GAS Final Action: Reject( C.9.2 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Dale Woodin, ASHE-American Society for Healthcare Engineering of the American Hospital Association (AHA)Recommendation: Delete C.9.2.Substantiation: Eliminate this section. This is not relevant to fire and life safety.Committee Meeting Action: RejectCommittee Statement: The target audience is inspectors and others and this provides additional guidance on terminology.Number Eligible to Vote: 8Ballot Results: Affirmative: 5 Vote Not Returned: 3 CROWLEY, MILLS, SOMMERS

________________________________________________________________99-504 Log #161 HEA-ADM Final Action: Accept( F.1.1 )________________________________________________________________Submitter: Burton R. Klein, Burton Klein AssociatesRecommendation: Update NFPA references to latest edition.Substantiation: This was not done in all instances (e.g., NFPA 70). While annexes are not intended for requirement purposes, it has been pointed out by several students attending a workshop that it did cause them some confusion as to which edition of an NFPA document they should be reviewing.Committee Meeting Action: AcceptNumber Eligible to Vote: 5Ballot Results: Affirmative: 3 Vote Not Returned: 2 DIMANNO, TRUDZINSKI

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