COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2015COA49 Court of Appeals No. 14CA0403 Arapahoe County District Court No. 09CV1327 Honorable Charles M. Pratt, Judge ______________________________________________________________________________ L & R Exploration Venture; Loeb Partners Corporation, as agent for the participants in L & R Exploration Venture; Judith L. Chiara; Peter Dixon, as Executor of the Estate of W. Palmer Dixon; Margaret L. Kempner; Thomas L. Kempner; Jerome A. Manning, as Trustee of the Carl M. Loeb Trust f/b/o Ann L. Bronfman; John A. Levin, as Trustee of the Carl M. Loeb Trust f/b/o Ann L. Bronfman; Jerome A. Manning, as Trustee of the Carl M. Loeb Trust f/b/o Deborah L. Brice; John A. Levin, as Trustee of the Carl M. Loeb Trust f/b/o Judith L. Chiara; Jerome A. Manning, as Trustee of the Carl M. Loeb Trust f/b/o Judith L. Chiara; John A. Levin, as Trustee of the Carl M. Loeb Trust f/b/o Deborah L. Brice; Jerome A. Manning, as Trustee under the will of Frances L. Loeb f/b/o John L. Loeb, Jr., Estate of Henry A. Loeb; John A. Levin, as Trustee under the will of Frances L. Loeb f/b/o John L. Loeb, Jr., Estate of Henry A. Loeb; John L. Loeb, Jr., as Trustee of the Virginia Bloomgarden Trust; TROF, Inc., f/k/a Marshall Petroleum; Larry C. Serr, as Trustee of the Robineau Trusts; John S. Rodgers; Columbia University Trust Administration, as Executor of the Estate of Daniel Silberberg; John S. Rodgers, as Trustee of the Audrey Holly Trust; Mal L. Barasch, as Trustee of the Audrey Holly Trust; John S. Rodgers, as Trustee of the Virginia Bloomgarden Trust; John L. Loeb, Jr., as Trustee of the Virginia Bloomgarden Trust; M. Wellman, as Trustee of the Mark J. Millard Trust; Frederick Lubcher, as Trustee of the Diana von Mueffling Trust and the William von Mueffling Trust; and Ann B. Lesk, as Trustee of the Diana von Mueffling Trust and the William von Mueffling Trust, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. CCG, LLC; Gadeco, LLC; Pricaspian Development Corporation; and Celeste C. Grynberg, Intervenors-Appellants.

ORDER AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division VI Opinion by JUDGE J. JONES Fox and Plank*, JJ., concur

Announced April 23, 2015

Holland & Hart LLP, Jonathan S. Bender, Christina F. Gomez, Denver, Colorado; Simon Lesser PC, Leonard F. Lesser, New York, New York, for Plaintiffs-Appellees Appel, Lucas & Christensen, P.C., Garry R. Appel, Denver, Colorado, for Intervenors-Appellants *Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2014.

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¶ 1 This is the second appeal related to a garnishment proceeding.

In the first appeal, Intervenors1 challenged the district court’s order

allowing garnishment of their bank accounts to satisfy an

underlying judgment in favor of plaintiffs, L & R Exploration

Venture (L & R) and its participants (collectively, the L & R

plaintiffs). A division of this court affirmed that order, concluding,

as now relevant, that (1) the district court did not err in determining

that Intervenor CCG is the alter ego of the judgment debtor, Jack J.

Grynberg; (2) the district court did not err in concluding that Mr.

Grynberg and his alter egos had made voidable fraudulent transfers

to Intervenors Gadeco, Pricaspian, and Mrs. Grynberg; and (3) the

district court did not err in allowing the L & R plaintiffs to garnish

the bank accounts of those Intervenors. L & R Exploration Venture

v. CCG, LLC, (Colo. App. No. 13CA0563, Jan. 30, 2014) (not

published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(f)).

¶ 2 In this appeal, Intervenors CCG, Gadeco, Pricaspian, and Mrs.

Grynberg challenge the district court’s order awarding the L & R

1 The Intervenors bringing the appeal are CCG, LLC (CCG), Gadeco, LLC (Gadeco), Pricaspian Development Corporation (Pricaspian), and Celeste C. Grynberg (who is the wife of the judgment debtor, Jack J. Grynberg).

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plaintiffs attorney fees and costs under C.R.C.P. 103 § 8(b)(5). That

provision states that “[a]t any hearing upon a traverse, the court

shall make such orders as to reasonable attorney fees, costs and

expense of the parties to such hearing as are just.” We agree with

Intervenors that the district court erred in awarding attorney fees

and costs not incurred to prepare and file the traverses of the

Intervenors’ challenges to the garnishments or to subsequently

prosecute the traverse proceeding. We hold that an award of

attorney fees and costs under C.R.C.P. 103 § 8(b)(5) is limited to, if

a traverse is successful, the attorney fees and costs incurred by the

garnishor to prepare, file, and prosecute the traverse, or, if the

traverse is unsuccessful, the attorney fees and costs incurred by

the putative garnishee to defend against the traverse. We therefore

vacate the order as to the amount of the attorney fees and costs to

be awarded and remand for further proceedings on that issue. We

reject Intervenors’ other contentions, however, and therefore affirm

the order in all other respects.

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I. Background

¶ 3 This case has a long and tortured history, but only the

following is relevant for present purposes.2 Mr. Grynberg and the

individual plaintiffs began their business relationships as

participants in L & R, a joint venture, in 1960. Decades later, they

had a falling out. After much procedural wrangling, the L & R

plaintiffs obtained an award against Mr. Grynberg in arbitration. A

New York state court subsequently confirmed that award, and

ordered Mr. Grynberg to pay the unpaid portion of the award,

$1,691,111.11, plus postjudgment interest. (The original award

totaled $3,067,783.)

¶ 4 In June 2009, the L & R plaintiffs domesticated the judgment

against Mr. Grynberg in Colorado pursuant to the Uniform

Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, sections 13-53-101 to -108,

C.R.S. 2014. Mr. Grynberg contested the domestication of the

judgment, but a district court rejected his arguments and a division

of this court affirmed. L & R Exploration Venture v. Grynberg, 271

P.3d 530, 537 (Colo. App. 2011).

2 The history of the underlying case is more fully recounted in L & R Exploration Venture v. Grynberg, 271 P.3d 530 (Colo. App. 2011).

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¶ 5 While the domestication appeal was pending in this court, the

L & R plaintiffs began efforts to collect the unpaid portion of the

judgment against Mr. Grynberg. They served a writ of garnishment

on a bank with an account in the name of Grynberg Petroleum

Company (GPC), but the account yielded only $3371.64.3 So, they

conducted discovery to locate Mr. Grynberg’s assets. Intervenors

unsuccessfully sought to intervene to contest the L & R plaintiffs’

discovery efforts.

¶ 6 Based on the fruits of their discovery efforts, the L & R

plaintiffs served writs of garnishment on five financial institutions

and Mr. Grynberg. Four garnishee banks answered that they held

no funds belonging to Mr. Grynberg, and the fifth garnishee bank

answered that the money it held for Mr. Grynberg was pledged as

collateral. The L & R plaintiffs traversed the answers, alleging that

Mr. Grynberg and his alter egos had made fraudulent transfers to

Intervenors (the named owners of the bank accounts) to avoid

paying the judgment.

3 A New York state court had previously determined that GPC is Mr. Grynberg’s alter ego.

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¶ 7 Intervenors moved to intervene to claim ownership of the

contested funds. The district court granted that motion and

subsequently conducted a four-day evidentiary hearing on the

traverses. See C.R.C.P. 103 § 8(b)(2). Following the hearing, the

court entered the order which Intervenors challenged in the prior

garnishment appeal.

¶ 8 The L & R plaintiffs then filed a motion for an award of

attorney fees and costs under C.R.C.P. 103 § 8(b)(5), seeking, as

relevant here, more than $1,000,000 in attorney fees and $175,000

in costs. Those attorney fees and costs included, in addition to

those incurred in connection with the traverses, substantial fees

and costs incurred in domesticating the judgment, defending the

appeal of the domestication judgment, litigating a related Wyoming

case,4 investigating Mr. Grynberg’s assets, and garnishing the

various bank accounts. Intervenors objected on several bases,

including that the L & R plaintiffs sought recovery of attorney fees

and costs that had not been incurred in connection with the

4 See Grynberg v. L & R Exploration Venture, 261 P.3d 731 (Wyo. 2011). In their reply in support of their motion the L & R plaintiffs withdrew any request for fees incurred in the Wyoming case. But it is not clear from the district court’s order whether it took that into account and denied those fees.

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traverses, had not provided information sufficient for the court to

determine the reasonableness of the requested fees and costs, and

were seeking recovery of some fees and costs that were clearly

unreasonable. Intervenors requested a hearing on the motion. See

C.R.C.P. 121 § 1-22(2)(c).

¶ 9 The court granted Intervenors’ request for a hearing, limited to

the reasonableness of the time spent on various tasks and the fees

and costs charged for those tasks; the court disallowed any

evidence “concerning the subject matter for which fees and costs

are requested, as such was sufficiently covered in the briefs.” The

court also ordered Intervenors to file a “chart listing separately each

and every particular activity or event for which they contend either

or both the amount of the fee charged or the time spent was not

reasonable; an explanation as to why such is their position; and

legal citations and references to attached documents which they[,]

or any expert they retain, contend support their position.” Only

those matters identified on the chart would be considered at the

hearing.

¶ 10 Intervenors submitted a chart, the L & R plaintiffs submitted a

responsive chart, and Intervenors submitted a reply chart. The

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parties then stipulated that the court could decide the issues based

on the briefs, charts, and stipulated exhibits (including expert

reports and deposition transcripts).

¶ 11 The district court subsequently issued a detailed written order

awarding the L & R plaintiffs $824,092.80 in attorney fees and

costs. In so ordering, the court disallowed approximately $420,000

in requested attorney fees. Of that amount, approximately

$185,000 was billed by the L & R plaintiffs’ New York attorney, who

had assisted in the cases. The court disallowed $200,000 of fees

billed by plaintiffs’ Colorado attorneys. The remainder of the

disallowed fees were for duplication of work and work billed at

unnecessarily high rates. The court disallowed $71,000 in

requested costs, primarily because the L & R plaintiffs had not

shown that they were necessary or reasonable.

¶ 12 Intervenors filed a motion for reconsideration of the order

awarding attorney fees and costs, which the district court

summarily denied.

II. Discussion

¶ 13 On appeal, Intervenors contend that the district court erred

by: (1) awarding attorney fees and costs not awardable under

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C.R.C.P. 103 § 8(b)(5); (2) shifting the burden of proof to them to

show that the fees and costs sought by the L & R plaintiffs were

unreasonable; and (3) awarding the fees and costs jointly and

severally against them. We agree with Intervenors’ first contention,

but reject the other two.

A. Scope of C.R.C.P. 103 § 8(b)(5)

1. C.R.C.P. 103 § 8 and Its Context

¶ 14 C.R.C.P. 103 addresses garnishment to satisfy a judgment. It

is a lengthy rule, divided into thirteen sections. The first five

sections address different kinds of writs of garnishment;

specifically, what may be garnished and how garnishment may be

attempted in different contexts. The next seven sections address

the procedure that applies following issuance of a writ of

garnishment. The last section governs garnishment of a public

body.

¶ 15 As most relevant here, section 8 governs the procedure that

applies when a garnishee, judgment debtor, or intervenor claiming

an interest in the personal property sought to be garnished has

answered a writ of garnishment challenging the garnishment. It

allows a judgment creditor to file and serve a “traverse” to any such

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answer, thereby contesting the challenge to the garnishment. The

court then resolves the dispute (following a hearing, if requested),

makes findings and, if appropriate, enters a judgment. C.R.C.P.

103 § 8(b)(2), (3). Subsection (b)(5) of C.R.C.P. 103 § 8, the last

subsection of section 8, provides that “[a]t any hearing upon a

traverse, the court shall make such orders as to reasonable

attorney fees, costs and expense of the parties to such hearing as

are just.”

2. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 16 Ordinarily, we review a district court’s order awarding attorney

fees and costs under C.R.C.P. 103 § 8(b)(5) for an abuse of

discretion. See Law Offices of Andrew L. Quiat, P.C. v. Ellithorpe,

917 P.2d 300, 305 (Colo. App. 1995); United Bank of Denver, Nat’l

Ass’n v. Colo. State Treasurer, 797 P.2d 851, 853 (Colo. App. 1990).

But the issue raised by Intervenors requires us to construe the

meaning of the rule. That is an issue that we review de novo. DCP

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Midstream, LP v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., 2013 CO 36, ¶ 24;

Maslak v. Town of Vail, 2015 COA 2, ¶ 10.5

¶ 17 In construing a rule of procedure, we apply the same

principles as those which apply when we construe a statute.

Willhite v. Rodriguez-Cera, 2012 CO 29, ¶ 9; Leaffer v. Zarlengo, 44

P.3d 1072, 1078 n.6 (Colo. 2002). We first look to the language of

the rule as a whole, consider the context of the rule, and attribute

to the words and phrases used in the rule their plain and ordinary

meanings. See Willhite, ¶ 9; Hiner v. Johnson, 2012 COA 164, ¶ 13;

see also Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Equalization v. Gerganoff, 241 P.3d

932, 935 (Colo. 2010). If doing this demonstrates that the meaning

of the rule is clear, we apply it as written. Watson v. Fenney, 800

P.2d 1373, 1375 (Colo. App. 1990). But if doing this demonstrates

that the rule is ambiguous, we apply additional rules of statutory

interpretation to resolve the ambiguity. People in Interest of R.D.,

259 P.3d 562, 565 (Colo. App. 2011); see also Gerganoff, 241 P.3d

at 935.

5 A court necessarily abuses its discretion if it misconstrues or misapplies the law. Stulp v. Schuman, 2012 COA 144, ¶ 10; Payan v. Nash Finch Co., 2012 COA 135, ¶ 16.

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3. Analysis

¶ 18 The question presented is whether C.R.C.P. 103 § 8(b)(5)

allows a court to award attorney fees and costs other than those

incurred to prepare and file a traverse and prosecute the traverse

proceeding. The plain language of the rule does not unambiguously

answer that question. Rather, it ambiguously provides that a court

may award attorney fees, costs, and expenses “as are just.”

Nothing in C.R.C.P. 103 § 8, or in the remainder of C.R.C.P. 103 for

that matter, explains what attorney fees, costs, and expenses may

be considered “just.”

¶ 19 We therefore look beyond the Rule’s language. We conclude

that an award of attorney fees, costs, and expenses under C.R.C.P.

103 § 8(b)(5) is limited to those fees, costs, and expenses incurred

to prepare and file the traverse and prosecute the traverse

proceeding. We reach this conclusion for two reasons.

¶ 20 First, subsection (b)(5) is in derogation of the common law.

Colorado follows the common law “American Rule” regarding

attorney fees: as a general rule, in the absence of a statute, court

rule, or private contract expressly saying to the contrary, each party

in a lawsuit bears its own legal expenses. See Allstate Ins. Co. v.

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Huizar, 52 P.3d 816, 818 (Colo. 2002); Bernhard v. Farmers Ins.

Exch., 915 P.2d 1285, 1287 (Colo. 1996). Because C.R.C.P. 103

§ 8(b)(5) is in derogation of the common law American Rule, we

must construe it narrowly. See Crandall v. City & Cnty. of Denver,

238 P.3d 659, 662 (Colo. 2010) (“We narrowly construe limitations

of the American Rule . . . .”); see also Henisse v. First Transit, Inc.,

247 P.3d 577, 579 (Colo. 2011) (a statute in derogation of the

common law must be construed “strictly”); BLSNI, Inc. v. Russ T.

Diamonds, Inc., 2012 COA 214, ¶ 8 (applying strict construction to

attorney fee-shifting statutes); Hiner, ¶ 16 (“Because C.R.C.P. 102

[relating to attachments] is in derogation of the common law . . . we

must construe it strictly.” (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted)). C.R.C.P. 103 § 8(b)(5) does not clearly or expressly allow

for recovery of pre-traverse attorney fees, and therefore it would be

inappropriate to read it broadly to allow for recovery of such fees.

¶ 21 Second, we consider the context and placement of the

subsection. See Ryals v. St. Mary-Corwin Reg’l Med. Ctr., 10 P.3d

654, 659-60, 662 (Colo. 2000) (considering the structure of the

statutory scheme); Douglas Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs v. Pub. Utils.

Comm’n, 829 P.2d 1303, 1312-13 (Colo. 1992) (considering

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placement of a statutory provision). As noted, it is in the section of

C.R.C.P. 103 — section 8 (entitled “TRAVERSE OF ANSWER”)6 —

dealing specifically with procedures applicable to a traverse to a

garnishee’s answer or an intervenor’s challenge to a writ of

garnishment. The other subsections of section 8 deal only with

procedures for filing, serving, and resolving a traverse. This

indicates that subsection (b)(5) is intended to provide for an award

relating to those matters.

¶ 22 The placement of the provision carries even more significance

when we consider the history of C.R.C.P. 103 and a related statute,

section 13-16-123, C.R.S. 2014. See Bynum v. Kautzky, 784 P.2d

735, 737 (Colo. 1989) (history of a statute may be useful in

determining legislative intent); Carruthers v. Carrier Access Corp.,

251 P.3d 1199, 1205 (Colo. App. 2010) (same). Prior to 1983, there

was no provision in law which allowed for an award of attorney fees

in a garnishment proceeding, though a number of provisions

addressed costs. As relevant here, former C.R.C.P. 103(n), C.R.S.

6 Because the title of section 8 was adopted as part of the Rule, it is also relevant to determining the scope of subsection (b)(5). See U.M. v. Dist. Court, 631 P.2d 165, 167 (Colo. 1981); Allely v. City of Evans, 124 P.3d 911, 913 (Colo. App. 2005).

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1973, entitled “Trial of Traverse Issue; Judgment,” provided that if

the court found in favor of the garnishee “he shall recover costs of

the proceeding against the [judgment creditor],” but if the court

found in favor of the judgment creditor, the judgment creditor “may

recover costs against the garnishee.” Similarly, former C.R.C.P.

103(y), C.R.S. 1973, provided that “[t]he court may order the costs

of the proceedings in any garnishment to be paid by the plaintiff . . .

or by the garnishee, or may apportion the same as shall appear to

be just and equitable.”7

¶ 23 In Commercial Claims, Ltd. v. First Nat’l Bank of Glenwood

Springs, 649 P.2d 736 (Colo. App. 1982), a division of this court

held that C.R.C.P. 103(y) (which the Colorado Supreme Court had

repealed in 1981) did not allow an award of attorney fees to a

garnishee. The division also held that section 13-17-101, C.R.S.

1973, which allowed for an award of attorney fees where a claim or

defense was frivolous, did not allow such an award in a

garnishment proceeding because such a proceeding is not a “suit

involving money damages” within the meaning of the statute.

7 See also C.R.C.P. 103(l), C.R.S. 1973 (providing for an award of “costs” to a judgment creditor upon a garnishee’s failure to answer the writ and a finding of liability).

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¶ 24 In apparent response to the decision in Commercial Claims, in

1983 the General Assembly enacted section 13-16-123. See Ch.

161, sec. 1, § 13-16-123, 1983 Colo. Sess. Laws 616. It states:

In any action before the court in which a garnishee incurs attorney fees in excess of the cost of preparing and filing his answer, the court may order that the costs of the proceeding, mileage fees as a witness, and reasonable attorney fees be paid to the garnishee when the court finds that the bringing, maintaining, or defense of the action involving the garnishee was frivolous, groundless, or without reasonable basis. The award of costs and fees may be allocated among the parties as the court deems just.

¶ 25 In 1985, the Colorado Supreme Court repealed C.R.C.P. 103

and readopted it in its current thirteen-section form, with

substantial changes. See C.R.C.P. 103, C.R.S. 1985. The court

thereby added two attorney fees provisions. The first is in section 7

at subsection (b)(4), which provides that when a garnishee fails to

answer a writ, and a hearing is subsequently held to determine the

garnishee’s liability, the court “shall make such orders as to

reasonable attorney’s fees, costs and expense of the parties to such

hearing, as are just.” The second is C.R.C.P. 103 § 8(b)(5). No

other provision of C.R.C.P. 103 allows for an award of attorney fees,

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or even of costs. So if a garnishee answers a writ admitting that the

garnishee holds funds or personal property belonging to the

judgment debtor (and, in certain cases, tenders funds to the clerk of

the court), or if a judgment debtor objects to a calculation of exempt

earnings or claims an exemption from garnishment, see C.R.C.P.

103 § 6, attorney fees and costs are not awardable to any party

under C.R.C.P. 103.

¶ 26 In light of all this, it seems relatively clear that, at least in

situations not covered by section 13-16-123, the Colorado Supreme

Court sought to confine awards of attorney fees and costs to those

incurred in only two types of proceedings — those addressed in

sections 7 and 8. Contrary to the L & R plaintiffs’ suggestion,

nothing in the rule indicates an intent by the Colorado Supreme

Court to make attorney fees and costs otherwise not awardable

(though incurred in garnishment proceedings) awardable upon a

failure to answer or a traverse. We perceive no rational reason why

a failure to answer or a traverse should, to use the L & R plaintiffs’

term, “trigger” an award of attorney fees and costs which, though

incurred (indeed, routinely incurred) in a garnishment proceeding,

would not otherwise be awardable.

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¶ 27 We recognize that a judgment creditor must incur attorney

fees and costs before a traverse becomes necessary, and that the

efforts reflected by those fees and costs might be necessary to

prevail in a hearing on any subsequent traverse. But absent a

traverse, the judgment creditor could not, as the L & R plaintiffs

concede, recover those fees and costs. Again, we perceive no reason

why they would become recoverable merely upon the filing of a

traverse. It seems more reasonable, and therefore more likely what

the Colorado Supreme Court intended, that an award of fees and

costs attributable to the traverse — that is, fees and costs beyond

those incurred in other garnishment proceedings — be allowed so

as to compensate a party when battle is joined over the

garnishment. And we observe that if, as the L & R plaintiffs argue,

the mere fact that a traverse could not occur unless fees and costs

were first incurred to attempt garnishment were sufficient to allow

an award of such fees and costs, the same could be said of fees and

costs incurred to obtain the underlying judgment. After all, absent

the judgment there would be no garnishment and no traverse. We

believe it extremely unlikely that the supreme court intended such

a far-reaching result.

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¶ 28 We are not persuaded that cases cited by the L & R plaintiffs

compel the conclusion that the entirety of the fees and costs the

district court awarded are allowable under C.R.C.P. 103 § 8(b)(5).

None of those cases addressed the limits of an award under that

subsection. See Idaho Pac. Lumber Co. v. Celestial Land Co., 2013

COA 136; Hoang v. Monterra Homes (Powderhorn) LLC, 129 P.3d

1028 (Colo. App. 2005), rev’d, 149 P.3d 798 (Colo. 2007); Law

Offices of Andrew L. Quiat, 917 P.2d 300; United Guar. Residential

Ins. Co. v. Dimmick, 916 P.2d 638 (Colo. App. 1996); United Bank of

Denver, 797 P.2d 851.

¶ 29 In sum, we conclude that C.R.C.P. 103 § 8(b)(5) only

authorizes an award of attorney fees and costs incurred by a

judgment creditor to prepare and file a traverse and litigate the

traverse proceeding. The district court awarded substantial

attorney fees and costs incurred on pre-traverse matters, and

therefore we vacate the district court’s order to the extent it awards

such fees and costs. On remand, the court shall determine the

reasonable amount of fees and costs the L & R plaintiffs incurred to

prepare and file the traverses and to litigate the traverse

proceeding. To be clear, such fees and costs may not include fees

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and costs incurred to domesticate the underlying judgment, defend

the appeal of the domestication judgment, litigate the Wyoming

case, determine the sources of any funds allegedly belonging to Mr.

Grynberg, or prepare, file, and serve the writs of garnishment. We

leave to the district court’s discretion the procedure to be followed

on remand.

B. Burden of Proof

¶ 30 Intervenors also contend that the district court improperly

placed the burden of proof on them to prove that the attorney fees

and costs sought by the L & R plaintiffs were unreasonable. This

contention is belied by the record.

¶ 31 As Intervenors concede, the district court articulated the

correct burden of proof, stating in its order that the burden of proof

was on the L & R plaintiffs to establish by a preponderance of the

evidence that their fees and costs were reasonable. Intervenors

argue, however, that the court did not actually apply that burden

because it required them to identify specific objections to the

amount of fees requested though, in many instances, they did not

have sufficient information to do so. We are not persuaded.

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¶ 32 Not only did the court articulate correctly the burden of proof,

it also concluded that “for the most part,” the L & R plaintiffs “did

present evidence that a good portion of the fees and costs were

reasonable and necessary.” And the court concluded that the L & R

plaintiffs had “not sufficiently demonstrated the need for all of the

fees requested,” ultimately disallowing several hundred thousand

dollars in requested fees and costs. Thus, the district court clearly

held the L & R plaintiffs to their burden of proof.8

¶ 33 Nonetheless, Intervenors complain that the use of “block

billing” by the L & R plaintiffs’ attorneys left them unable to

meaningfully contest many of the billing entries. Though the block

billing entries often do not say precisely how much time was

devoted to each specific task identified, we are not convinced that

this necessarily precluded Intervenors from challenging the

reasonableness of the time claimed. Indeed, they noted numerous

objections to tasks included in the block billing entries. And many

of the block billing entries consisted essentially of specific

descriptions of work related to a more general matter, as to which

8 The L & R plaintiffs amply documented much of their fees request and provided an opinion of an expert attesting to the necessity and reasonableness of the fees they requested.

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Intervenors (and the court) could assess the reasonableness of the

total time spent. We therefore conclude that the district court did

not improperly shift the burden of proof.

C. Joint and Several Liability

¶ 34 Lastly, Intervenors contend that the district court unjustly

ordered that they are jointly and severally liable for the attorney

fees and costs award. We reject this contention.

¶ 35 As noted, under C.R.C.P. 103 § 8(b)(5), a court “shall make

such orders as to reasonable attorney fees, costs and expense of the

parties . . . as are just.” What is just under the circumstances is

necessarily a matter within the district court’s discretion. See Law

Offices of Andrew L. Quiat, 917 P.2d at 305; United Bank of Denver,

797 P.2d at 853.

¶ 36 The court had previously found that Intervenors GPC and CCG

were Mr. Grynberg’s alter egos, and that Mr. Grynberg and his alter

egos had made fraudulent transfers to all of the other Intervenors.

Given Intervenors’ participation in Mr. Grynberg’s efforts to hide his

assets, and the fact that each Intervenor actively participated in the

traverse proceeding in attempts to shield the funds they held from

garnishment, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its

22

discretion in determining that imposing joint and several liability

was “just.”

III. Conclusion

¶ 37 We vacate that portion of the district court’s order awarding

attorney fees and costs for pre-traverse activities (as explained

above), and remand for a redetermination of the correct amount of

the award. We affirm the order in all other respects.

JUDGE FOX and JUDGE PLANK concur.