texas garnishment law

Texas Garnishment LawStatutes, Court Rules, Cases, Commentary & Forms

By: Tom Fox, J.D.

Incomplete working version. Pre-publicationVersion 0.33

(Last revision May 24, 2014)

Southern Specialty Law Publishing CompanyLouisville, Kentucky

Copyright May, 2014

Contents

Part I – OverviewGarnishment process – generallyBank accounts – co-owners – husband and wifeState of Texas exempt from garnishmentAttorney’s escrow accountNo garnishment for unliquidated damagesMotion for restitutionTypes of bonds to stay executionAppeal from summary judgment in garnishment – standard of reviewAppeal from motion to dissolve garnishment – standard of reviewGarnishment pending appeal

Part II - Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code - GarnishmentSection 63.001. Grounds

Notes for Section 63.001Generally.Procedural Due Process.Strict statutory constructionSufficiency of affidavitDefective affidavit not jurisdictionalWaiver of objectionWrongful garnishmentAffidavit by agentPriority of claimsAppealBankruptcy discharge

Section 63.002. Who may issue.Notes: for Section 63.002

JurisdictionSecection 63.003. Effect of service

Notes for Section 63.003.Section 63.004. Current wages exempt

Notes for Section 63.004Appeal – Standard of reviewCurrent wagesCurrent wages – severance packagesCurrent wages - exemption may be lostIndependent contractors

Section 63.005. Place for trialNotes to Section 63.005

Section 63.006. Administrative fee for certain cost incurred by employersNotes for Section 63.006

Attorney’s feesSection 63.007. Garnishment of funds held in inmate trust fund

Notes for Section 63.007Due ProcessProperty interest in inmate trust account

Texas Government Code, Section 501.014 0 – Inmate MoneySection 63.008. Financial institution as garnishee

Notes for Section 63.008Texas Finance Code Section 59.008

Part III - Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 659 – 679 - GarnishmentRule 657. Judgment final for garnishmentRule 658. Application for writ of garnishment and orderRule 658a. Bond for garnishmentRule 659. Case docketedRule 660. Repealed effective December 31, 1947]Rule 661. Form of writRule 662. Delivery of writRule 663. Execution and return of writRule 663a. Service of writ on defendantRule 664. Defendant may repleveyRule 664a. Dissolution or modification of writ of garnishment

Notes for Rule 664aBurden of proofStandingPleadings required

Rule 665. Answer to writRule 666. Garnishee discharged

Notes for Rule 666Rule 667. Judgment by defaultRule 668. Judgment when garnishee indebtedRule 669. Judgment for effectsRule 670. Refusal to deliver effects[Rule 671. Repealed effective December 31, 1947]Rule 672. Sale of effectsRule 673. May traverse answerRule 674. Trial of issueRule 675. Docket and noticeRule 677. Costs

Notes for Rule 667Attorney’s fees - generallyAttorney’s fees – pleadingAttorney’s fees - GarnishorAttorney’s fees – Judgment debtorAttorney’s fees - Garnishee

Rule 678. Garnishee discharged on proofNotes to Rule 678

Rule 679. AmendmentCases

GeneralWage Garnishment

Part I – Overview

Judgment creditors can seek assistance from the original court in enforcing their judgments.

(a) A judgment creditor may ask a court to order a writ of execution. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 34.001 (Vernon 1997); TEX.R. CIV. P. 621, 622; see Ford v. Wied, 823 S.W.2d 423, 424 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, writ denied).

(b) The court may order attachment. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. §§ 61.001, 61.002, 61.003, 61.021, 61.022 (Vernon 1997); TEX.R. CIV. P. 592; see Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Texarkana Nat'l Bank, 673 S.W.2d 262, 263 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1984, no writ).

(c) The court may order garnishment. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. §§ 63.001, 63.002 (Vernon 1997); TEX.R.CIV. P. 657, 658; see Pitts v. Dallas Nurseries Garden Center Inc. , 545 S.W.2d 34 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana [6th Dist.] 1976, no writ).

(d) The court may also order the turnover of a debtor's property. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 31.002 (Vernon 1997); see Schmerbeck v. River Oaks Bank, 786 S.W.2d 521, 521-22 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1990, no writ); see generally Greiner v. Jameson, 865 S.W.2d 493, 498 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, writ denied).

(e) A charging order is the sole means by which a judgment creditor can reach an individual debtor's partnership interest. TEX.REV.CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, §§ 25(2)(c), 28 (Vernon 1997); Milberg Factors, Inc. v. Hurwitz-Nordlicht Joint Venture, 676 S.W.2d 613, 615 (Tex.App.-Austin 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

Garnishment process – generally

Garnishment is a statutory proceeding whereby the property, money, or credits of a judgment debtor that are in the possession of another are applied to the payment of the debt owed by the judgment debtor. See TEX. CIV. PRAC & REM. CODE §§ 63.001-.008 (West 2008); TEX. R. CIV. P. 657-679; Bank One, Tex. v. Sunbelt Sav., 824 S.W.2d 557, 558 (Tex. 1992).

A garnishment action is commenced by a judgment creditor against a third party garnishee who holds property of the judgment debtor. TEX. R. CIV. P. 658, 659.

Garnishment can only proceed on a prior judgment that is final. TEX. R. CIV. P. 658.

A judgment is final for purposes of a garnishment action when the judge signs the judgment, unless the judgment debtor posts a proper supersedeas bond. TEX. R. CIV. P. 657.

When a garnishment action is commenced, the court may, after hearing or upon final judgment, grant the application for writ of garnishment, entering specific findings of fact to support the statutory grounds found to exist and specifying the maximum value of property or indebtedness that may be garnished and the amount of bond that must be posted by the judgment creditor. TEX. R. CIV. P. 658.

If the court grants the application for garnishment, the writ is served on the garnishee and the judgment debtor. TEX. R. CIV. P. 663, 663a.

The garnishee then files an answer that details any funds it is holding for the judgment debtor. TEX. R. CIV. P. 659, 665.

At this point, the judgment debtor may replevy the funds held by the garnishee by posting sufficient bond. TEX. R. CIV. P. 664.

The only issue to be tried in a garnishment proceeding is who is entitled to the funds involved in the proceeding. Owen Elec. Supply, Inc. v. Brite Day Constr., Inc., 821 S.W.2d 283, 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied) (citing Home Improvement Loan Co. v. Brewer, 318 S.W.2d 673, 677 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1958, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).

If the garnishee holds funds for the judgment debtor and the court determines that the judgment creditor is entitled to those funds, the court may enter a final garnishment judgment directing the garnishee to pay funds it holds for the judgment debtor directly to the judgment creditor. See, e.g., Simulis, L.L.C., 276 S.W.3d at 116; Amegy Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 2009 WL 943758, at *4 n.7.

See: Elliott v. West, No. 01-09-00747-CV, WL ?? (Tex App. - Houston [1st Dist.] March 31, 2011, no pet.(mem. op.))

Bank accounts – co-owners – husband and wife

“Under Texas law, property possessed by either spouse during marriage is presumed to be community property. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.003(a) (West 2006); e.g., Filingim v. Fillingim, — S.W.3d —, No. 10-0013, 2011 WL 117664, *2 (Tex. Jan. 14, 2011); Osborn v. Osborn, 961 S.W.2d 408, 414 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. denied). To overcome that presumption, the party claiming separate ownership of the property must trace and clearly identify the property in question as separate by clear and convincing evidence. Filingim, — S.W.3d at —, 2011 WL 117664, at *2 (citing Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 3.003; McKinley v. McKinley, 496 S.W.2d 540, 543 (Tex. 1973); Tarver v. Tarver, 394 S.W.2d 780, 783 (Tex. 1965)); see Osborn, 961 S.W.2d at 414. Elliott's conclusory assertion that the funds are the sole and separate property of his wife does not satisfy his burden of providing clear and convincing evidence tracing ownership of the property so as to establish his wife's separate ownership of the funds. Cf. Filingim, — S.W.3d at —, 2011 WL 117664, at *2 (holding that property was community property because party failed to offer clear and convincing evidence of separate character of property).”Elliott v. West, No. 01-09-00747-CV, WL ?? (Tex App. - Houston [1st Dist.] March 31, 2011, no pet.(mem. op.))

State of Texas exempt from garnishment1. Public policy exempts from garnishment or execution departments of the state which are performing governmental functions. Delta County Levee Imp. Dist. No. 2 v. Leonard, 516 S.W.2d 911, 912 (Tex. 1974); National Sur. Corp. v. Friendswood Independent School Dist., 433 S.W.2d 690, 694 (Tex.1968); Willacy County Water Control & Imp. Dist. No. 1 v. Abendroth, 142 Tex. 320, 177 S.W.2d 936, 937 (Tex.1944). Addison v. Addison, 530 SW 2d 920 (Tex. Civ. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, no writ)

2. As a state institution, Texas Southern University and its board of regents are exempt from garnishment proceedings. Splawn v. Woodard, 287 S.W. 677, 681 (Tex.Civ.App. — Austin, 1926 [3rd Dist.] no writ); University of Texas v. Booker, 282 S.W.2d 740, 742 (Tex.Civ.App. — Texarkana [6th Dist.] 1955, no writ);Addison v. Addison, 530 SW 2d 920 (Tex. Civ. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, no writ)

Attorney’s escrow account

“It is beyond dispute that the funds in the trust account maintained by Townsend in the First NationalBank were not subject to impoundment by the writ of garnishment. Belva Oil Co. v. Lowe, 27 S.W.2d599, 600 (Tex.Civ.App.1930, no writ); King & King v. Porter, 229 S.W. 646 (Tex.Civ. App.1921)rev'd on other grounds, 113 Tex. 198, 252 S.W. 1022 (Tex.1923).”

Canyon Lake Bank v. Townsend, 649 SW 2d 809 (Tex App. - Austin [3rd Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.)

No garnishment for unliquidated damages

A writ of garnishment may be issued only when the demand is not contingent, is capable of ascertainment by the usual means of evidence, and does not rest in the discretion of the jury. See Cleveland v. San Antonio Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 148 Tex. 211, 215, 223 S.W.2d 226, 228 (Tex. 1949) (appeal of order quashing writ of garnishment); Fogel v. White, 745 S.W.2d 444, 446 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, orig. proceeding [leave denied]); Cook v. Superior Ins. Co., 476 S.W.2d 363 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont [9th Dist.] 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (appeal of summary judgment dismissing injured party's application for writ of garnishment against insurer of judgment creditor).

When damages are unliquidated and in their nature uncertain, the demand is not subject to garnishment. Fogel v. White, 745 S.W.2d 444, 446 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, orig. proceeding [leave denied]);In re Texas American Exp., Inc., 190 SW 3d 720 - Tex. App. -Dallas [5th Dist.] 2005, orig. proceeding))See also Clapper v. Petrucci, 497 S.W.2d 120, 122 (Tex.Civ. App.-Austin [3rd Dist.] 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (appeal of summary judgment dismissing judgment creditor's application for writ of garnishment against third parties who owed debt to judgment debtor).

Motion for restitution.

1. When an erroneous judgment has not been suspended pending appeal and the relief granted has already been obtained, the successful appellant may reclaim what he has been deprived of. Salgo v. Hoffman, 521 S.W.2d 922, 925 (Tex. App.—Dallas [5th Dist.] 1975, no writ). Baca v. Hoover, Bax & Shearer, 823 SW 2d 734 (Tex App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied)

2. Judgment debtor may reclaim what he has been deprived of, but he must do so in the normal course of judicial process by proper pleading, notice to all interested parties, and evidence establishing the denial of his rights. Currie v. Drake, 550 S.W.2d 736, 740 (Tex.App.—Dallas [5th Dist.] 1977, writ refd n.r.e.); Salgo v. Hoffman, 521 S.W.2d 922, 925 (Tex. App.—Dallas [5th Dist.] 1975, no writ).Baca v. Hoover, Bax & Shearer, 823 SW 2d 734 (Tex App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied)

3.” The successful appellant may reclaim relief without resorting to a new suit. It would be unreasonable to impose technical formalities on a party attempting to recover wrongfully taken property to which he is entitled, so long as basic requirements of notice and hearing are met. Currie, 550 S.W.2d at 740. A party may have restitution upon its own motion after an evidentiary hearing establishing with certainty what he has lost.”Salgo v. Hoffman, 521 S.W.2d 922, 925 (Tex. App.—Dallas [5th Dist.] 1975, no writ).Baca v. Hoover, Bax & Shearer, 823 SW 2d 734 (Tex App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied)

Types of bonds to stay execution(a) Supersedeas bond if the case is on appeal. Tex.R.Civ.P. 364;(b) A replevy bond if attempting to replevy the garnished property. Tex.R. Civ.P. 664. (c) An injunction bond upon a stay of enforcement of a judgment pending the outcome of the bill of review. Tex.R.Civ.P. 684. See also: Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 4646 (provides that no injunction to stay execution upon any valid and subsisting judgment shall be granted after the expiration of one year from the rendition of such judgment, unless it be made to appear that an application for such injunction had been delayed in consequence of the fraud or false promises of the plaintiff in the judgment, practiced or made at the time, or after rendition of such judgment or unless for some equitable matter or defense arising after the rendition of the judgment.)Block 145 ,Ltd. v. Pace, 617 SW 2d 820 (Tex. Civ. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 1981) writ ref'd n.r.e.)

Appeal from summary judgment in garnishment – standard of review

“We review summary judgments de novo. Amegy Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. S. Crushed Concrete, Inc., No.01-07-00359-CV, 2009 WL 943758, at *3 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] April 9, 2009, pet. denied)(mem. op.) (affirming summary judgment in garnishment action) (citing Valence Operating Co. v.Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005)). We review the evidence in the summary judgment recordin the light most favorable to the party against whom the summary judgment was rendered, crediting

evidence favorable to that party if reasonable jurors could, and disregarding contrary evidence unlessreasonable jurors could not. Id. (citing City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005)).Traditional summary judgment may be granted only if the movant establishes that no genuine issue ofmaterial fact exists and that judgment should be rendered in the movant's favor as a matter of law. Id.;TEX .R. CIV. P. 166a(c).”Elliott v. West, No. 01-09-00747-CV, WL ?? (Tex App. - Houston [1st Dist.] March 31, 2011, no pet.(mem. op.))

Appeal from motion to dissolve garnishment – standard of review

“We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to dissolve a writ of garnishment for abuse of discretion. Simulis, L.L.C. v. G.E. Capital Corp., 276 S.W.3d 109, 112 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (citing Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. ICO, Inc., 230 S.W.3d 702, 705 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied)). A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts without reference to guiding rules and principles or in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner. Id. (citing Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985)).”Elliott v. West, No. 01-09-00747-CV, WL ?? (Tex App. - Houston [1st Dist.] March 31, 2011, no pet.(mem. op.))

“Precedent from this court dictates that we apply an abuse of discretion standard to resolve whether the dissolution of a writ of garnishment was improvidently granted. See Am. Express Travel Related Servs. v. Harris, 831 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ); see also Kyanize Parts, Inc. v. Denton, No. C14-91-00705-CV, 1992 WL 105764, at *5 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] May 21, 1992, no writ) (not designated for publication). A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts without reference to guiding rules or principles, or in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner. See Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex.1985).”General Electric Capital Corp. v. ICO, INC., 230 SW 3d 702 (Tex App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet.denied)

Garnishment pending appeal

“[If] a judgment debtor has not posted supersedeas bond to prevent enforcement of the underlying judgment during the pendency of appeal, ‘a judgment creditor may pursue post-judgment enforcement by filing for a writ of garnishment once the trial court signs its judgment.’ "Thomas N. Heap, D.D.S., Inc. v. Val-Pak of Greater Houston, No. 01-00-00756-CV, 2001 WL 699944 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] June 21, 2001, pet. denied) (not designated for publication)Elliott v. West, No. 01-09-00747-CV, WL ?? (Tex App. - Houston [1st Dist.] March 31, 2011, no pet.(mem. op.))

Part II - Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code - Garnishment

Section 63.001. Grounds

A writ of garnishment is available if:

(1) an original attachment has been issued;

(2) a plaintiff sues for a debt and makes an affidavit stating that:

(A) the debt is just, due, and unpaid;

(B) within the plaintiff's knowledge, the defendant does not possess property in Texas subject to execution sufficient to satisfy the debt; and

(C) the garnishment is not sought to injure the defendant or the garnishee; or

(3) a plaintiff has a valid, subsisting judgment and makes an affidavit stating that, within the plaintiff's knowledge, the defendant does not possess property in Texas subject to execution sufficient to satisfy the judgment.

Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 959, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1985.

Notes for Section 63.001

Generally.1. "A garnishment proceeding involves at least three parties: (1) the plaintiff (also known as the garnishor or creditor); (2) the defendant or debtor; and (3) the garnishee. The garnishee is a third party who owes a debt to or holds property of the debtor. The plaintiff or garnishor is a creditor of the debtor and requests the court to issue the writ of garnishment to the garnishee. Garnishment is a statutory proceeding whereby property of the debtor that is in possession of the garnishee is applied to the payment of the debt owed by the debtor to the garnishor. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. §§ 63.001.008 (West 2008); TEX.R. CIV. P. 657-79; Thompson v. Harco Nat. Ins. Co., 997 S.W.2d 607, 611 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1998, pet. denied), overruled in part on other grounds by John v. Marshall Health Servs., Inc., 58 S.W.3d 738, 741 (Tex.2001) (per curiam).”National City Bank v. Texas Capital Bank, 353 SW 3d 581 (Tex App. - Dallas [5th Dist.] 2011, no pet.)

2. “The garnishor is subrogated to the rights of the debtor against the garnishee and may enforce, against the garnishee, any rights the debtor could have enforced had he sued the garnishee directly. See Thompson, 997 S.W.2d at 611 (citing Beggs v. Fite, 130 Tex. 46, 106 S.W.2d 1039, 1042 (1937)). The garnishor, however, cannot acquire any greater rights against the garnishee than the debtor, himself, possesses. See id. (citing Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Willis, 70 Tex. 12, 6 S.W. 825, 830 (1888)).”National City Bank v. Texas Capital Bank, 353 SW 3d 581 (Tex App. - Dallas [5th Dist.] 2011, no pet.)

3. It is a well-established and longstanding rule that the validity of judgment in a garnishment action rests upon the finality of the underlying debt judgment. Horst v. City of London Fire Ins. Co., 73 Tex. 67, 11 S.W. 148 (Tex. 1889); Haley v. Young, 541 S.W.2d 217 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston 1976 writ ref'd. n.r.e.).Taylor v. Trans-Continental Properties, Ltd., 670 S.W.2d 417, 419 (Tex. App.—Tyler [12th Dist.] 1984, rev'd on other grounds, 717 S.W.2d 890 (Tex.1986);Tom Benson Chevrolet Co., Inc. v. Beall, 567 S.W.2d 857, 859 (Tex.App.—San Antonio [4th Dist.] 1978, writ refd n.r.e.). Baca v. Hoover, Bax & Shearer, 823 SW 2d 734 (Tex App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied)

4. If the underlying judgment has not reached that stage of the judicial process in which it is not subject to being set aside by the trial or appellate court, then the judgment in the ancillary garnishment action cannot stand.

Taylor v. Trans-Continental Properties, Ltd., 670 S.W.2d 417, 419 (Tex. App.—Tyler [12th Dist.] 1984, rev'd on other grounds, 717 S.W.2d 890 (Tex.1986); Baca v. Hoover, Bax & Shearer, 823 SW 2d 734 (Tex App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied)

Procedural Due Process.1. In 1978, the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure relating to garnishment actions were amended primarily in response to several prejudgment seizure cases decided by the United States Supreme Court. See Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 89 S.Ct. 1820, 23 L.Ed.2d 349 (1969); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972). Based on the holdings in Sniadach and Fuentes, the Texas pre-1978 prejudgment garnishment procedures were declared unconstitutional. Southwestern Warehouse Corp. v. Wee Tote, Inc., 504 S.W.2d 592 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, no writ).

2. When the rules governing garnishment were rewritten, they made no distinction between prejudgment and postjudgment garnishment proceedings.Abdullah v. State, 211 SW 3d 938 (Tex. App. -Texarkana [6th Dist.]. 2007, no pet.)

Strict statutory construction1. The remedy of garnishment did not exist at common law and is created solely by statute.First National Bank in Dallas v. Steves Sash and Door Co., 468 S.W.2d 133, 137 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio [4th Dist.] 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.)

2. Garnishment is an extraordinary remedy and the supreme court has held garnishment proceedings "cannot be sustained unless they are in strict conformity with statutory requirements." Beggs v. Fite, 130 Tex. 46, 106 S.W.2d 1039, 1042 (1937)

Sufficiency of affidavit1. An affidavit under this section is defective if it lacks:

a. A showing that the facts recited therein were sworn to before an officer authorized to administer oaths and officially certified to by the officer under his seal of office;

b. A basis upon personal knowledge of relevant facts as required by Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 658. “The application and any affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge and shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence; provided that facts may be stated based upon information and belief if the grounds of such belief are specifically stated.”, or;

c. The affidavit fails to state that, within the plaintiff's knowledge, the defendant does not possess property in Texas subject to execution sufficient to satisfy the judgment.

Sherry Lane National Bank v. Bank of Evergreen, 715 SW 2d 148 (Tex App. - Dallas [5th Dist.] 1986)

Defective affidavit not jurisdictional1. A document purporting to be an affidavit that lacks the essential elements is defective, but such defects are not fundamental or jurisdictional, and they may be waived.Sherry Lane National Bank v. Bank of Evergreen, 715 SW 2d 148 (Tex App. - Dallas [5th Dist.] 1986)

2. A defective garnishment affidavit does not render the garnishment proceedings void in the absence of objection.Gottesman v. Toubin, 353 S.W.2d 294 (Tex. Civ. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 1962, no writ)

“We have carefully examined the affidavit and have concluded that it is insufficient and that for such reason the garnishment proceedings were subject to being quashed upon motion by the garnishee. It is clear that the affidavit failed to negate under oath that neither of the judgment debtors had property in the state subject to execution.”. Gottesman, supra.

Waiver of objection1. The failure to move to quash a defective garnishment affidavit is a waiver of a right to object to the defect. Gottesman, supra.A failure to appear and answer the garnishment (a default) is a waiver of the right to object to a defective garnishment affidavit. Sherry Lane National Bank v. Bank of Evergreen, 715 SW 2d 148 (Tex App. - Dallas [5th Dist.] 1986).

2. In Hudler-Tye Construction Inc. v. Pettijohn and Pettijohn Plumbing Inc. , 632 S.W.2d 219 (Tex App. - Fort Worth [2nd Dist.] 1982, no writ), the garnishee defaulted and appealed by petition for writ of error. Although the court determined that the garnishment affidavit was not defective, the court went on to say by dicta:

“Moreover, if there is any defect in the respondent's affidavit, such defect was not fundamental or jurisdictional and the petitioner's right to object to any alleged defect has been waived. The petitioner was aware of the respondent's writ of garnishment at all times pertinent and could have objected to the respondent's affidavit in support of its application; instead, it chose to ignore the writ of garnishment, let the time for appeal expire, and to now complain, in this writ of error proceeding.”

3. In Mansfield State Bank v. Fonville, 496 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth [2nd Dist.] 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.)., the garnishee defaulted. The court reasoned that a defaulting garnishee is required to take reasonable steps to protect itself. Failing to do so, it must suffer the consequences. In the absence of such a rule no default judgment would ever become final.

“A negligent garnishee is no more entitled to protection than any other negligent party, and he is as much bound to look after the proceedings against him, and protect himself from an improper judgment, as a defendant in an ordinary suit is. If, by his failure in this respect, the plaintiff gains an advantage over him, he is without relief.” Burke v. Hance, 76 Tex. 76, 79, 13 S.W. 163, 164 (1890)

The requirement an affidavit include the statement the defendant does not possess property in Texas subject to execution sufficient to satisfy the judgment. is for the benefit of the garnishee, to spare the garnishee the expense and vexation of a suit in which he has no interest in the rights and liabilities of the judgment debtor and creditor.Buerger v. Wells, 110 Tex. 566, 222 S.W. 151 (Tex. 1920);Canyon Lake Bank v. Townsend, 649 SW 2d 809 (Tex App. - Austin [3rd Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

Omitting from the affidavit the language the defendant does not possess property in Texas subject to execution sufficient to satisfy the judgment is a matter between the garnishor and the garnishee, and it may serve as a basis for quashing the writ on the garnishee's motion or the omission may be waived by the garnishee's appearance and answer. Bowers v. Continental Insurance Co., Inc., 65 Tex. 51, 52 (Tex. 1885); Gottesman v. Toubin, 353 S.W.2d 294, 299 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston 1962 [1st Dist.] no writ);Canyon Lake Bank v. Townsend, 649 SW 2d 809 (Tex App. - Austin [3rd Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

Wrongful garnishment

Even if the applicant for the writ swears falsely that he knows of no property in the State possessed by the judgment debtor sufficient to satisfy the judgment and subject to execution, before the judgment debtor may recover for wrongful garnishment he must plead and prove that he does, in fact, have in the State sufficient non-exempt property to satisfy the judgment and that the judgment creditor knew as much before he applied for the writ of garnishment. See Griffin v. Cawthon, 77 S.W.2d 700, 702 (Tex.Civ.App. - Fort Worth [2nd Dist.] 1934, writ ref'd); Peerless Oil & Gas Co. v. Teas, 138 S.W.2d 637, 640 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio [4th Dist.] 1940), aff'd 138 Tex. 301, 158 SW2d 758 (1942); King v. Tom, 352 S.W.2d 910, 913 (Tex.Civ.App., -El Paso [8th Dist.] 1961, no writ); Industrial Foundation v. Wylie, 493 S.W.2d 293, 296-97 (Tex.Civ. App.—Beaumont [9th Dist.] 1973, no writ);Canyon Lake Bank v. Townsend, 649 SW 2d 809 (Tex App. - Austin [3rd Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.)

Affidavit by agent“Whenever it may be necessary or proper for any party to a civil suit or proceeding to make an affidavit, it may be made by either the party or his agent or his attorney.”

Texas. Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 14

Priority of claims1. “Garnishment proceedings often involve competing claims to property that must be resolved by applying rules of lien priority. The general rule is that in a contest over rights or interests in property, the party that is first in time is first in right. See AMC Mortg. Services, Inc. v. Watts, 260 S.W.3d 582, 585 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.); World Help v. Leisure Lifestyles, Inc., 977 S.W.2d 662, 668 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1998, pet. denied). Rights under a writ of garnishment are determined by priority in time, which itself is determined by service of the writ. Small Bus. Inv. Co. v. Champion Int'l Corp., 619 S.W.2d 28, 30 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, no writ). Service of the writ on

the garnishee fixes a lien on the debtor's property or debts due him, "subject to prior valid rights and liens against such property or debt." Hubbell, Slack & Co. v. Farmers' Union Cotton Co., 196 S.W. 681, 684 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1917, writ ref'd) (quoting Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure) (emphasis added); United States v. Standard Brass & Mfg. Co., 266 S.W.2d 407, 408 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1954, no writ). In garnishment proceedings, allowable claims that are prior in time are prior in right of payment. See Frankfurt's Tex. Inv. Corp. v. Trinity Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 414 S.W.2d 190, 192 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.).”National City Bank v. Texas Capital Bank, 353 SW 3d 581 (Tex App. - Dallas [5th Dist.] 2011, no pet.)

2. “Texas Capital acquired no greater rights through garnishment than the debtor had. See Beggs, 106 S.W.2d at 1042; Hubbell, Slack, 196 S.W. at 684. Thus when the writ was served, Texas Capital merely stepped into Debtor's shoes and—like Debtor—was subject to National City's prior lien on the account assets. See San Felipe Nat. Bank v. Caton, 668 S.W.2d 804, 805 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ).”

National City Bank v. Texas Capital Bank, 353 SW 3d 581 (Tex App. - Dallas [5th Dist.] 2011, no pet.)

Appeal1. As a general rule, the usual writs and orders used to aid enforcement and collection of a final money judgment are not appealable.Schultz v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 810 S.W.2d 738, 740 (Tex. 1991)

2. In civil actions, post-judgment orders may be appealed as final orders if the order disposes of all matters placed before the court. Wolma v. Gonzalez, 822 S.W.2d 302, 304 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1991, orig. proceeding), disapproved on other grounds, Scott & White Mem. Hosp. v. Schexnider, 940 624*624 S.W.2d 594, 596 n. 2 (Tex.1996); see Cook v. Stallcup, 170 S.W.3d 916, 920 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.) (stating "[p]ost-judgment orders embodying awards to claimants or enforcing the court's judgment itself are appealable orders; they function like judgments"). Both garnishment orders and turnover orders are appealable. Schultz v. Fifth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Appeals, 810 S.W.2d 738, 740 (Tex.1991) (turnover orders appealable).Reed v. State, 269 SW3d 619 (Tex.App. -San Antonio [4th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10598356931965962668

3. Both garnishment orders and turnover orders are appealable. Schultz v. Fifth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Appeals, 810 S.W.2d 738, 740 (Tex.1991) (turnover orders appealable)Reed v. State, 269 SW3d 619 (Tex.App. -San Antonio [4th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10598356931965962668

Bankruptcy discharge

1. When an action is for garnishment of funds to satisfy a prior judgment against the debtor, the action is not considered to be against the garnishee, it is “against the debtor” and it must be stayed by the bankruptcy proceedings of the debtor. Owen Elec. Supply Inc. v. Brite Day Const. Inc. , 821 SW 2d 283 (Tex App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, pet. denied)Baytown State Bank v. Nimmons, 904 SW 2d 902 (Tex App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied)

2. Any judicial proceedings taken against the debtor that are in violation of the automatic stay are void, not merely voidable. Continental Casing Corp. v. Samedan Oil, 751 S.W.2d 499, 501 (Tex. 1988).

The bankruptcy stay deprives state courts of jurisdiction over the debtor and his property until the time the stay is lifted or in some way modified. Southern County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Powell, 736 S.W.2d 745, 748 (Tex.App—Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ).

3. A judgment against a garnishee, entered in a garnishment proceeding, cannot stand when the underlying judgment has been set aside. Tom Benson Chevrolet Co. Inc. v. Beall, 567 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio [4th Dist.] 1978, writ refd n.r.e.) (judgment reversed and take nothing judgment rendered against garnishor where the debtor was granted a new trial on the underlying default judgment).

4. A judgment that is nonexistent will not support a garnishment judgment.Owen Elec. Supply Inc. v. Brite Day Const. Inc. , 821 SW 2d 283 (Tex App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, pet. denied)

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10598356931965962668


Section 63.002. Who may issue. The clerk of a district or county court or a justice of the peace may issue a writ of garnishment returnable to his court.


Notes: for Section 63.002

Jurisdiction

1. Kelly v. Gibbs, 19 S.W. 563, 563-64 (Tex. 1892)

Cited by:

a. “[A] garnishment proceeding may be defeated by a showing that the judgment relied on by the plaintiff does not, in fact, exist, or that it is void.”Stewart v. USA Custom Paint & Body Shop, 870 SW 2d 18 (Tex: 1994)

b. “The trial court in a garnishment proceeding may take judicial notice of the judgment in the original action.”Pitts v. Dallas Nurseries Garden Center Inc. , 545 S.W.2d 34 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana [6th Dist.] 1976, no writ)

c. Post-judgment garnishment is ancillary to the original proceedings and is the extension and enforcement of the trial court's judgment.First State Bank Central Tex. v. Lakeway Regional Medical Center Dev. LLC, No. 03-13-00058-CV, WL ?? (Tex App. - Austin [3rd Dist.] 2014, no pet, (mem. op.))

2. A garnishment is not an original suit, but ancillary to the main one, and for that reason takes its jurisdiction from the main suit. King & King v. Porter, 113 Tex. 198, 252 S.W. 1022 (Tex. 1923); Taylor v. Trans-Continental Properties, Ltd., 670 S.W.2d 417, 419 (Tex. App.—Tyler [12th Dist.] 1984, rev'd on other grounds, 717 S.W.2d 890 (Tex.1986);Baca v. Hoover, Bax & Shearer, 823 SW 2d 734 (Tex App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied)

3. "Suits in garnishment are ancillary to and a part of the original suit, and cannot be separated therefrom.... A garnishment is not an original suit, but ancillary to the main one, and for that reason takes its jurisdiction from the main suit." King & King v. Porter, 113 Tex. 198, 252 S.W. 1022 (Tex. 1923).

4. Thus, when the trial court loses jurisdiction in the main suit by reason of an appeal, it likewise loses jurisdiction in the ancillary garnishment proceeding. Taylor v. Trans-Continental Properties, Ltd., 670 S.W.2d 417, 419 (Tex. App.—Tyler [12th Dist.] 1984, rev'd on other grounds, 717 S.W.2d 890 (Tex.1986);Baca v. Hoover, Bax & Shearer, 823 SW 2d 734 (Tex App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied)

5. If the judgment in the main suit is affirmed, the trial court regains jurisdiction over the garnishment action. Id. If the judgment in the main suit is reversed, the garnishment proceedings become a nullity and the writs issued thereunder are functus officio, or of no further force or authority.Baca v. Hoover, Bax & Shearer, 823 SW 2d 734 (Tex App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied)

Secection 63.003. Effect of service

(a) After service of a writ of garnishment, the garnishee may not deliver any effects or pay any debt to the defendant. If the garnishee is a corporation or joint-stock company,

the garnishee may not permit or recognize a sale or transfer of shares or an interest alleged to be owned by the defendant.

(b) A payment, delivery, sale, or transfer made in violation of Subsection (a) is void as to the amount of the debt, effects, shares, or interest necessary to satisfy the plaintiff's demand.


Notes for Section 63.003.

1. The garnishor cannot acquire any greater rights against the garnishee than the debtor, himself, possesses.National City Bank v. Texas Capital Bank, 353 SW 3d 581 (Tex App. - Dallas [5th Dist.] 2011, no pet.)

2. Admitted a payment of $89,000 to Debtor was void under section 63.003 National City Bank v. Texas Capital Bank, 353 SW 3d 581 (Tex App. - Dallas [5th Dist.] 2011, no pet.)

3. Garnishee is at risk of double liability if it pays funds that the court later determines were rightfully subject to the garnishment writ, but duty to hold funds under this section does not change existing rights.National City Bank v. Texas Capital Bank, 353 SW 3d 581 (Tex App. - Dallas [5th Dist.] 2011, no pet.)

4. "As of the day [Garnishee] was served with the writ, any money or property held by [Garnishee] and belonging to [Judgment debtor] was impounded." Owen Elec. Supply Inc. v. Brite Day Const. Inc. , 821 SW 2d 283 (Tex App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, pet. denied)

5. A bank served with a writ of garnishment may rely on its deposit agreements when determining to whom it is indebted. A "garnishee bank is not indebted to a judgment debtor unless some form of deposit agreement creates a debtor-creditor relationship between the bank and the judgment debtor."Bank One Texas N.A. v. Sunbelt Savings F.S.B. , 824 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. 1992) (per curiam)

6. Thompson v. Fulton Bag & Cotton Mills, 155 Tex. 365, 286 S.W.2d 411, 414 (1956), "did not hold that the garnishee is required to pay into the court funds to which title is in a third party who is not named in the writ of garnishment. This is true even when there is a question of true ownership."Bank One Texas N.A. v. Sunbelt Savings F.S.B. , 824 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. 1992) (per curiam)

7. A garnishee paying funds or debts to the debtor after service of the writ "does so at its peril." See Cohen v. Advance Imports Inc. , 597 S.W.2d 449 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas [5th Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.);Pure Oil Co. v. Walsh-Woldert Motor Co. , 36 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana [6th Dist.] 1931, writ dism'd w.o.j)A garnishee may not ignore a writ of garnishment for the named judgment debtor, but the peril devolves into liability only if the garnishee, after service of the writ and before its answer is due.

8. An intentional disregard of the writ of garnishment, may be enforceable by contemptNational City Bank v. Texas Capital Bank, 353 SW 3d 581 (Tex App. - Dallas [5th Dist.] 2011, no pet.) (fn. 8)

9. The writ of garnishment commands the garnishee "NOT to pay to defendant any debt or to deliver to him any effects, pending further order of this court." See TEX.R. CIV. P. 661 (emphasis added).National City Bank v. Texas Capital Bank, 353 SW 3d 581 (Tex App. - Dallas [5th Dist.] 2011, no pet (fn 7)

10. "The issuance and service of the writ of garnishment fixes the trial court's jurisdiction to determine whether the garnishee holds funds belonging to the judgment debtor."Wrigley v. First National Security Corp., 104 S.W.3d 259 (Tex App. - Beaumont [9th Dist.] 2003, no pet.)Thompson v. Fulton Bag & Cotton Mills, 286 S.W.2d 411, 414 (Tex. 1956) (Calvert, J.)

11. On service of the writ of garnishment, assets of the judgment debtor in the possession of the garnishee are brought within the control of the court.Texas Commerce Bank-New Braunfels v. Townsend, 786 S.W.2d 53 (Tex App. - Austin [3rd Dist.] 1990, writ denied) (recognizing that funds on deposit were subject to writ of garnishment and therefore holding that bank not liable for wrongful-dishonor of check presented by its customer)

12. The funds captured by the writ of garnishment are those held by the garnishee in the account of the judgment debtor on the date the writ is served, and any additional funds deposited through the date the garnishee is required to answerWrigley v. First National Security Corp., 104 S.W.3d 259 (Tex App. - Beaumont [9th Dist.] 2003, no pet.)

Section 63.004. Current wages exempt Except as otherwise provided by state or federal law, current wages for personal service are not subject to garnishment. The garnishee shall be discharged from the garnishment as to any debt to the defendant for current wages.

Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 959, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1985. Amended by Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 466, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1997.


Appeal – Standard of review1. Whether payment is “current wages for personal service” is a question of law.Campbell v. Stucki, 220 SW 3d 562 (Tex App. - Tyler [12th Dist.] 2007, no pet.)

2. Appellate court reviews questions of law de novo. State v. Heal, 917 S.W.2d 6, 9 (Tex. 1996);Barber v. Colorado Indep. Sch. Dist., 901 S.W.2d 447, 450 (Tex.1995).

3. The standard of review for conclusions of law is whether they are correct. Dickerson v. DeBarbieris, 964 S.W.2d 680, 683 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.).

4. Appellate court will uphold conclusions of law on appeal if the judgment can be sustained on any legal theory the evidence supports. Incorrect conclusions of law do not require reversal if the controlling findings of fact support the judgment under a correct legal theory. Material Partnerships, Inc. v. Ventura, 102 S.W.3d 252, 257 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied).

Current wages

1. Article XVI, Section 28 of the Texas Constitution states that "[n]o current wages for personal service shall ever be subject to garnishment, except for the enforcement of court-ordered child support payments." TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 28;

2. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 63.004 (Vernon Supp.2006). This statute should be liberally construed in favor of the wage earner. Davidson Texas, Inc. v. Garcia, 664 S.W.2d 791, 793 (Tex.App.-Austin 1984, no writ); King v. Floyd, 538 S.W.2d 166, 168 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, writ dism'd n.r.e.) (citing Radford Grocery Co. v. McKean, 41 S.W.2d 639, 640 (Tex. Civ.App.-Fort Worth [2nd Dist.] 1931, no writ)).

3. " ‘The garnishment exception for current wages applies without regard to whether compensation isdenominated as `wages' or `salary,' the controlling issue being whether it is compensation for personalservice.’ Davidson Texas, Inc. v. Garcia, 664 S.W.2d 791, 793 (Tex.App.-Austin 1984, no writ). Thisexception should be liberally construed in favor of the wage earner. Id. (citing J.M. Radford GroceryCo. v. McKean, 41 S.W.2d 639, 640 (Tex.Civ.App.1931, no writ); see also Hickman v. Hickman, 149Tex. 439, 234 S.W.2d 410, 413 (1950)) (stating ‘[O]ur exemption laws should be liberally construed infavor of express exemptions, and should never be restricted in their meaning and effect so as tominimize their operation upon the beneficent objects of the statutes. Without doubt the exemptionwould generally be resolved in favor of the claimant’).”General Electric Capital Corp. v. ICO, INC., 230 SW 3d 702 (Tex App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet.denied)

“In Radford [J.M. Radford Grocery Co. v. McKean, 41 S.W.2d 639, 640 (Tex.Civ.App.1931, no writ);], a grocery store was garnished for an amount owing to its employee, Tinsley. 41 S.W.2d at 639. Tinsley's contract provided that he would earn a set amount of money per month, and if Tinsley met the condition of remaining

with the grocery store for more than one year, he would be paid an additional bonus, based on a percentage of his sales. Id. The trial court allowed the garnishment based on the idea that any amount over and above his hourly wage did not constitute "current wages for personal services." Id. The appellate court reversed, relying on the liberal construction to be given exemption statutes. It held that the payment was current wages for personal services within the meaning of the Constitutional and statutory exemptions because the payment was additional consideration for Tinsley's services. Id. at 640.”General Electric Capital Corp. v. ICO, INC., 230 SW 3d 702 (Tex App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet.denied)

“King v. Floyd [King v. Floyd, 538 S.W.2d 166 (Tex.Civ.App.1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.)] extended the Radford line of reasoning. In King, a football player's contract contained a provision that he would be paid while he was injured, so long as the team physician opined that the player was unable to perform due to his injuries. 538 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tex.Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The court held that the payments made to the player after his injury rendered him unable to compete might be considered additional compensation for the services previously rendered, and construed the continuation of salary to be in the nature of a bonus for satisfactory service. Id.”General Electric Capital Corp. v. ICO, INC., 230 SW 3d 702 (Tex App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet.denied)

Current wages – severance packages

“The liberal construction in favor of express exemptions, as illustrated in Radford and King controls our disposition of this issue. When no contradictory contract language exists, we hold that a severance payment should be liberally construed as a bonus for satisfactory service, since such payments might be considered additional compensation for services previously rendered. Here, although the payment of the severance is an amount over and above Gollin's normal salary, the contract does not state that the money is for something other than services already rendered.”General Electric Capital Corp. v. ICO, INC., 230 SW 3d 702 (Tex App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet.denied)

Current wages - exemption may be lost

The protection of the constitutional exemption may be lost when the wages are under the control of the employee and the employee voluntarily leaves them with his employer or collects and deposits them with someone else. Davidson v. F.H. Logeman Chair Co., 41 S.W. 824, 825 (Tex. Civ.App.1897, no writ); see also Sloan v. Douglass, 713 S.W.2d 436, 440 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (stating that voluntariness and control are both elements to be considered in deciding if wages are exempt).”General Electric Capital Corp. v. ICO, INC., 230 SW 3d 702 (Tex App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet.denied)

If employee leaves money with his employer and draws funds only as needed, the sum which had accrued in the employee's account with his employer loses its exempt status because the wages were no longer current.Bell v. Indian Live-Stock Co., 11 S.W. 344 (Tex.1889)

When employee does not collect wages when due, accumulated past wages are not current wages.Davidson v. F.H. Logeman Chair Co., 41 S.W. 824, 825 (Tex. Civ.App.1897, no writ)

Control and voluntariness are the two elements to be considered in whether the current wages exemption has been destroyed. In deciding whether a baseball player's deferred compensation lost its exemption, the court said, “Appellants attach great emphasis to the fact that appellee voluntarily left his wages with the Rangers.

Voluntarily leaving wages with one's employer is only one element . . . as other cases discuss control over the wages as being an additional element to be considered."Sloan v. Douglass, 713 S.W.2d 436, 440 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.)

When wages are left with an employer due to an inability to collect them, they are not left voluntarily. “[T]he purpose of the constitutional provision, is to exempt the wage until it is due and is in possession of the wage-earner, provided that, if he is unable to collect same when due, the exemption then continues to such time when he can collect same in the exercise of ordinary diligence.”Lee v. Emerson-Brantingham Implement Co., 222 S.W. 283, 284 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1920, no writ).

“No precedent holds that a simple right to payment constitutes a right of control sufficient to destroy the current wages exemption. In the leading cases in this area, the exemption has been held destroyed only when the employee has treated his employer as a bank - accruing funds and drawing them out only as needed. See, e.g., Davidson, 41 S.W. at 825; Bell, 11 S.W. at 346.”General Electric Capital Corp. v. ICO, INC., 230 SW 3d 702 (Tex App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet.denied)

Independent contractors1. The term "wages for personal service" necessarily implies a relationship of master and servant, or employer and employee, and 567*567 excludes compensation due to an independent contractor as such. Brasher v. Carnation Co., 92 S.W.2d 573, 575 (Tex.Civ. App.-Austin 1936, writ dism'd).

2. Commissions paid to independent contractors are not "wages for personal service" and are not exempt from garnishment. Pitts v. Dallas Nurseries Garden Center Inc. , 545 S.W.2d 34 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana [6th Dist.] 1976, no writ)Shahan v. Biggs & Co., 123 S.W.2d 686, 690 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth [2nd Dist.] 1938, no writ); Brasher v. Carnation Co., 92 S.W.2d 573 (Tex.Civ.App.— Austin [3rd Dist.] 1936, writ dism'd);Campbell v. Stucki, 220 SW 3d 562 (Tex App. - Tyler [12th Dist.] 2007, no pet.)

Section 63.005. Place for trial(a) If a garnishee other than a foreign corporation is not a resident of the county in which the original suit is pending or was tried and a party to the suit files an affidavit controverting the garnishee's answer, the issues raised by the answer and controverting affidavit shall be tried in the county in which the garnishee resides. The issues may be tried in a court of that county that has jurisdiction of the amount of the original judgment if the plaintiff files with the court a certified copy of the judgment in the original suit and a certified copy of the proceedings in garnishment, including the plaintiff's application for the writ, the garnishee's answer, and the controverting affidavit.

(b) If a garnishee whose answer is controverted is a foreign corporation, the issues raised by the answer and controverting affidavit shall be tried in the court in which the original suit is pending or was tried.


Notes to Section 63.0051. Civil Rule 674 (below): "If the garnishee whose answer is controverted, is a resident of the county in which the proceeding is pending, an issue shall be formed under the direction of the court and tried as in other cases."

2. Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, Section 63.005(a) is jurisdictional. Once a garnishee's answer has been controverted, the only action the trial court can take is to transfer the proceeding to the county of the garnishee's residence. See American Surety Co. v. Bernstein, 105 S.W. 990, 991-92 (Tex.1907), (interpreting predecessor statute to section 63.005).; First National Bank in Dallas v. Steves Sash and Door Co., 468 S.W.2d 133 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio [4th Dist.] 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (interpreting predecessor statute to section 63.005).

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=1495062038442798082SL Crawford Const., Inc. v. Lassiter, 17 SW 3d 379 (Tex: App. – Houston [1st Dist] 2000, no pet.)




3. Once the controverting affidavit was filed, the court lost jurisdiction to proceed further, and any proceedings thereafter were a nullity.First National Bank in Dallas v. Steves Sash and Door Co., 468 S.W.2d 133 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio [4th Dist.] 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (interpreting predecessor statute to section 63.005).

4. The Brazos county court could perform no other act except discharge the garnishee or transfer the matter to Harris County. SL Crawford Const., Inc. v. Lassiter, 17 SW 3d 379 (Tex: App. – Houston [1st Dist] 2000, no pet.)See Reed v. State, 269 SW3d 619 (Tex.App. -San Antonio [4th Dist.] 2008, no pet.)

5. "The pertinent statutes and rules involved may be summarized as follows. Rule 666, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, provides in effect that where it appears from the answer of the garnishee that he is not indebted to the defendant and has not in his possession any effects of the defendant, if such answer is not controverted, the court shall enter judgment discharging the garnishee. Rule 673, T.R.C.P., provides that if the plaintiff is not satisfied with the answer of the garnishee, he may controvert the same by his affidavit stating that he has good reason to believe and does believe that the answer of the garnishee is incorrect, stating in what particulars he believes the same to be incorrect. Rule 674, T.R. C.P., provides that if the garnishee whose answer is controverted is a resident of the county in which the proceeding is pending, an issue shall be formed under the direction of the court and tried as in other cases. [Emphasis supplied]"

First National Bank in Dallas v. Steves Sash and Door Co., 468 S.W.2d 133 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio [4th Dist.] 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (interpreting predecessor statute to section 63.005).

6. If the garnishee whose answer is controverted resides in some other county than the one in which the main case is pending or was heard, upon the filing of a controverting affidavit by any party to the suit, the plaintiff may file in any court in the county of residence of the garnishee having jurisdiction of the amount of the judgment in the original suit, a duly certified copy of the judgment in such regard in such original suit, and of the proceedings in garnishment; and the court where such certified copies are filed shall try the issues made as provided by law.First National Bank in Dallas v. Steves Sash and Door Co., 468 S.W.2d 133 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio [4th Dist.] 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (interpreting predecessor statute to section 63.005).

7. "There is an abundance of authority that where the answer of a nonresident garnishee is controverted, the court of the garnishee's residence is the only court having jurisdiction of the garnishment proceedings."First National Bank in Dallas v. Steves Sash and Door Co., 468 S.W.2d 133 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio [4th Dist.] 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (interpreting predecessor statute to section 63.005). Fidelity Lloyds of America v. Lyday, 5 S.W.2d 553, 555 (Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana [6th Dist.] 1928, no writ)

8. "The garnishee, whose answer was controverted, resided, as admittedly shown, in Houston, Tex., and not in Dallas, Tex., where the main suit was tried. In such facts it would seem that the Dallas court had no jurisdiction to proceed to try the issues made and arising under the traversed answer. Illimitable jurisdiction is not given to all district courts over proceedings or actions of this class, namely, after the plaintiff had controverted the answer of the garnishee, who has denied indebtedness or liability to the defendant. Garnishment is purely of statutory authorization, and the courts have no power to afford litigants the benefits of garnishment or to extend the right thereto beyond its statutory limits."

Fidelity Lloyds of America v. Lyday, 5 S.W.2d 553, 555 (Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana [6th Dist.] 1928, no writ)

9. The court in which the main case is pending or was tried is without jurisdiction to try the issues made and arising under the affidavit controverting the answer of a garnishee not a foreign corporation, residing in a county other than the one in which the main case is pending or was tried. ; Reed v. First State Bank of Purdon, 211 S.W. 333, 335 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1919, no writ), American Surety Co. v. Bernstein, 105 S.W. 990, 991-92 (Tex.1907)

10. This is not a matter of venue, but it is one of jurisdiction. The remedy of garnishment did not exist at common law and is created solely by statute. With the class of statutory remedies:

" . . . . prior to enactment of the statute the `subject-matter' of a suit of this kind could not exist. It can arise and become litigable, as shown, only under and because of the terms of the statute. The suit would not have been cognizable under common law or any pre-existent statute, for neither the cause of action itself nor the remedy could exist. Hence, we think, such jurisdiction as exists in a district court at all is there solely because of the statute, and its vesting is authorized by the last clause of section 8, art. 5, whereby a district court is warranted to exercise `such other jurisdiction, original and appellate, as may be provided by law.' General jurisdiction as to all district courts had been adequately provided for in earlier portions of section 8, and the object of the last clause must have been the authorization of special and restricted powers of which those given by this statute are examples."

Oilmen's Reciprocal Ass'n v. Franklin, 286 SW 195 - 1926, quoted in First National Bank in Dallas v. Steves Sash and Door Co., 468 S.W.2d 133, 137 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.)

11. In Reed v. First State Bank of Purdon, 211 S.W. 333, 335 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1919, no writ), the Court stated: "The bank's domicile is in Navarro county, and it answered the writ of garnishment which entitled it to a discharge, unless its answer was contested, and, if so, the court in Limestone county had no authority to render judgment against it, but the court was only authorized to send the matter of contest for adjudication to some court in Navarro county. It did not do this, so the bank was not called upon to go any further in the matter, but, having answered, the initiative was cast upon the court in Limestone county, and, it having proceeded as it did, its proceeding was a nullity. American Surety Co. v. Bernstein, 101 Tex. 189, 105 S.W. 990. This case is specially in point, and, we think, clearly holds that the court in Limestone county, after the garnishee answered, could perform no other act save to discharge the bank or transfer the matter to Navarro county."

12. In Clay Bldg. Material Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 161 S.W.2d 799, 800 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland [11th Dist] 1941, no writ), the Court stated:

"The answer of the garnishee being such, if true, as to entitle it to a discharge, the controverting answer had the effect, we think, as a matter of law, of depriving the District Court of Erath County of jurisdiction to try the issues raised upon the garnishee's answer and controverting affidavit. Revised Civil Statutes, 1925, Art. 4096; American Surety Co. v. Bernstein, 101 Tex. 189, 105 S.W. 990; General Bonding & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Lawson, Tex. Civ.App., 196 S.W. 346; Reed v. First State Bank of Purdon, Tex.Civ.App., 211 S.W. 333; Johnson v. McDonald, Tex. Civ.App., 73 S.W.2d 128; Subscribers to Fidelity Lloyds of America v. Lyday, Tex.Civ.App., 5 S.W.2d 553."

Section 63.006. Administrative fee for certain cost incurred by employers (a) An employer who is required by state or federal law to deduct from the current wages of an employee an amount garnished under a withholding order may deduct monthly an administrative fee as provided by Subsection (b) from the employee's disposable earnings in addition to the amount required to be withheld under the withholding order. This section does not apply to income withholding under Chapter 158, Family Code.

(b) The administrative fee deducted under Subsection (a) may not exceed the lesser of:

(1) the actual administrative cost incurred by the employer in complying with the withholding order; or

(2) $10.

(c) For the purposes of this section, "withholding order" means:

(1) a withholding order issued under Section 488A, Part F, Subchapter IV, Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. Section 1095a); and

(2) any analogous order issued under a state or federal law that:

(A) requires the garnishment of an employee's current wages; and

(B) does not contain an express provision authorizing or prohibiting the payment of the administrative costs incurred by the employer in complying with the garnishment by the affected employee.

Added by Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 466, Sec. 2, eff. Sept. 1, 1997.


Attorney’s feesSection 63.006 does not provide for recovery of attorney’s fees by judgment debtor.Campbell v. Stucki, 220 SW 3d 562 - Tex: Court of Appeals, 12th Dist., 2007 Campbell v. Stucki, 220 SW 3d 562 (Tex App. - Tyler [12th Dist.] 2007, no pet.)

Section 63.007. Garnishment of funds held in inmate trust fund (a) A writ of garnishment may be issued against an inmate trust fund held under the authority of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice under Section 501.014, Government Code, to encumber money that is held for the benefit of an inmate in the fund.

(b) The state's sovereign immunity to suit is waived only to the extent necessary to authorize a garnishment action in accordance with this section.

Added by Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 1409, Sec. 6, eff. Sept. 1, 1997. Renumbered from Sec. 63.006 by Acts 1999, 76th Leg., ch. 62, Sec. 19.01(4), eff. Sept. 1, 1999.


Due ProcessTexas Government Code Section 501.014, below, allows the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, on "notification by a court," to withdraw from an inmate's trust account any amount the inmate is ordered to pay by order of the court. The statute goes on to provide a prioritized list of items for which money may be withdrawn, including child support, restitution, court fees, fines, and other "court order, judgment, or writ." § 501.014(e).

Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, Section 14.006 allows a trial court to order an inmate who has filed a claim to pay court fees, court costs, and other costs, and § 14.006(e) specifically authorizes those costs to be deducted form the inmate's trust account, § 14.006 applies only to civil actions brought by inmates pursuant to the inmate litigation provisions of Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, Chapter 14 (§ 14.006 through § 14.014) Section 14.006 does not authorize the withdrawal of funds form an inmate's trust fund for the satisfaction of court costs charged against a defendant in the original criminal conviction. The procedures for garnishing an inmate's trust fund are controlled by Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, Section 63.007.

Abdullah v. State, 211 SW 3d 938 (Tex. App. -Texarkana [6th Dist.]. 2007, no pet.)http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=1493502414451314066

When a court attempt to recover the costs of a criminal conviction without following any garnishment procedure, turnover procedure, or any other type of procedure before the trial court entered its order, and there are no pleadings, no proper writ of garnishment, no notifications, no warnings, and no opportunity to respond. It is a viloation of Procedural Due Process.

Abdullah v. State, 211 SW 3d 938 (Tex. App. -Texarkana [6th Dist.]. 2007, no pet.

By definition, a judicial proceeding in which a creditor asks a court to order a third party (the criminal justice system) to turn over funds held by it as trustee for the benefit of a third party (the inmate) to a creditor (the State) constitutes a garnishment proceeding.


Because garnishment is an extraordinary remedy, the Texas Supreme Court has held that garnishment proceedings "cannot be sustained unless they are in strict conformity with statutory requirements."Beggs v. Fite, 130 Tex. 46, 106 S.W.2d 1039, 1042 (1937).


If a judgment-creditor intends to avail himself of the State's aid in effecting a deprivation of property, he must strictly comply with the pertinent rules. See Beggs v. Fite, 130 Tex. 46, 106 S.W.2d 1039 (1937); Hering v. Norbanco Austin I, Ltd., 735 SW 2d 638, at 640-41 (Tex App. - Austin [3rd Dist.] 1987, writ denied)

When the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) proceeds under Texas Government Code Section 500.002 and 501.014 to debit an inmate's trust fund, it is not a garnishment and the standard garnishment procedures do not apply. The TDCJ's "Offender Orientation Handbook" notifies inmates that the damage or destruction of state property may result in the assessment of damages and that the "TDCJ may seize the contents of the offender's trust fund account and award itself damages for the value of the property damaged." This placed the inmate on notice that funds in his account could be seized as a penalty for the destruction of state property. The TDJC disciplinary procedures are sufficient to afforded an appropriate level of process.Wilson v. TDCJ-ID, 268 SW 3d 756 (Tex. App. - Waco [10th Dist.], 2008, no pet.)http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3565659372135934143

Proceedings under Government Code section 501.014(e) to recover court fees and costs assessed against inmates are civil in nature and not part of the underlying criminal case. Such post-judgment collection efforts are designed to reimburse the State, not to punish the inmate, and due process is satisfied if the inmate receives notice and the opportunity to be heard after funds are withdrawn.


Harrell v. State, 286 SW 3d 315 (Tex. 2009)http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13743354384926907897

Property interest in inmate trust accountA prison inmate has a property interest in his inmate trust account. Covarrubias v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice-Institutional Div., 52 S.W.3d 318, 324 (Tex.App. -Corpus Christi [13th Dist.]2001, no pet.); Brewer v. Collins, 857 S.W.2d 819, 823 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no pet.);Abdullah v. State, 211 SW 3d 938 (Tex. App. -Texarkana [6th Dist.]. 2007, no pet.)

Texas Government Code, Section 501.014 0 – Inmate Money (a) The department shall take possession of all money that an inmate has on the inmate's person or that is received with the inmate when the inmate arrives at a facility to be admitted to the custody of the department and all money the inmate receives at the department during confinement and shall credit the money to an account created for the inmate. The department may spend money from an inmate account on the written order of the inmate in whose name the account is established or as required by law or policy subject to restrictions on the expenditure established by law or policy. The department shall ensure that each facility operated by or under contract with the department shall operate an account system that complies with this section, but the department is not required to operate a separate account system for or at each facility.

(b) If an inmate with money in an account established under Subsection (a) dies while confined in a facility operated by or under contract with the department, the department shall attempt to give notice of the account to a beneficiary or known relative of the deceased inmate. On the presentation of a notarized claim to the department for the money by a person entitled to the notice, the department may pay any amount not exceeding $2,500 of the deceased inmate's money held by the department to the claimant. A claim for money in excess of $2,500 must be made under Section 137, Probate Code, or another law, as applicable. The department is not liable for making a payment or failing to make a payment under this subsection.

(c) If money is unclaimed two years after the department gives or attempts to give notice under Subsection (b), or two years after the date of the death of an inmate whose beneficiary or relative is unknown, the executive director, or the executive director's designee, shall make an affidavit stating that the money in the inmate account is unclaimed and send the affidavit and money to the comptroller.

(d) An inmate who escapes or attempts to escape from the custody of the department forfeits to the department all of the money held by the department in the inmate's account at the time of the escape or attempted escape. Money forfeited to the comptroller under Subsection (c) escheats to the state.

(e) On notification by a court, the department shall withdraw from an inmate's account any amount the inmate is ordered to pay by order of the court under this subsection. On receipt of a valid court order requiring an inmate to pay child support, the department shall withdraw the appropriate amount from the inmate's account under this subsection, regardless of whether the court order is provided by the court or another person. The department shall make a payment under this subsection as ordered by the court to either the court or the party specified in the court order. The department is not liable for withdrawing or failing to withdraw money or making payments or failing to make payments under this subsection. The department shall make withdrawals and payments from an inmate's account under this subsection according to the following schedule of priorities:

(1) as payment in full for all orders for child support;

(2) as payment in full for all orders for restitution;


(3) as payment in full for all orders for reimbursement of the Health and Human Services Commission for financial assistance provided for the child's health needs under Chapter 31, Human Resources Code, to a child of the inmate;

(4) as payment in full for all orders for court fees and costs;

(5) as payment in full for all orders for fines; and

(6) as payment in full for any other court order, judgment, or writ.

(f) The department may place a hold on money in or withdraw money from an inmate account:

(1) to restore amounts withdrawn by the inmate against uncollected money;

(2) to correct accounting errors;

(3) to make restitution for wrongful withdrawals made by an inmate from the account of another inmate;

(4) to cover deposits until cleared;

(5) as directed by court order in accordance with Subsection (e);

(6) as part of an investigation by the department of inmate conduct involving the use of the account or an investigation in which activity or money in the inmate's account is evidence;

(7) to transfer money deposited in violation of law or department policy; or

(8) to recover money the inmate owes the department for indigent supplies, medical copayments, destruction of state property, or other indebtedness.

(g) The department shall withdraw money from an inmate's account under Subsection (e) before the department applies a deposit to that account toward any unpaid balance owed to the department by the inmate under Section 501.063.

Added by Acts 1989, 71st Leg., ch. 212, Sec. 2.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1989. Renumbered from Sec. 500.014 and amended by Acts 1991, 72nd Leg., ch. 16, Sec. 10.01(a), eff. Aug. 26, 1991. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 804, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1993; Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 321, Sec. 1.081, eff. Sept. 1, 1995; Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 257, Sec. 2, eff. Jan. 1, 1998; Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 807, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1997; Acts 1997. 75th Leg., ch. 1409, Sec. 7, eff. Sept. 1, 1997; Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 1423, Sec. 8.34, eff. Sept. 1, 1997; Acts 1999, 76th Leg., ch. 62, Sec. 8.10, 19.02(8), eff. Sept. 1, 1999; Acts 1999, 76th Leg., ch. 326, Sec. 1, 2, eff. Sept. 1, 1999.

Amended by:

Acts 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., Ch. 767 (S.B. 865), Sec. 32, eff. June 19, 2009.

Section 63.008. Financial institution as garnishee Service of a writ of garnishment on a financial institution named as the garnishee in the writ is governed by Section 59.008, Finance Code.

Added by Acts 1999, 76th Leg., ch. 344, Sec. 7.004, eff. Sept. 1, 1999.


Texas Finance Code Section 59.008 CLAIMS AGAINST CUSTOMERS OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.

(a) A claim against a customer of a financial institution shall be delivered or served as otherwise required or permitted by law at the address designated as the address of the registered agent of the financial institution in a registration filed with the secretary of state pursuant to Section 201.102, with respect to an out-of-state financial institution, or Section 201.103, with respect to a Texas financial institution.

(b) If a financial institution files a registration statement with the secretary of state pursuant to Section 201.102, with respect to an out-of-state financial institution, or Section 201.103, with respect to a Texas financial institution, a claim against a customer of the financial institution is not effective as to the financial institution if the claim is served or delivered to an address other than that designated by the financial institution in the registration as the address of the financial institution's registered agent.

(c) The customer bears the burden of preventing or limiting a financial institution's compliance with or response to a claim subject to this section by seeking an appropriate remedy, including a restraining order, injunction, protective order, or other remedy, to prevent or suspend the financial institution's response to a claim against the customer.

(d) A financial institution that does not file a registration with the secretary of state pursuant to Section 201.102, with respect to an out-of-state financial institution, or Section 201.103, with respect to a Texas financial institution, is subject to service or delivery of all claims against customers of the financial institution as otherwise provided by law.

Added by Acts 1999, 76th Leg., ch. 344, Sec. 2.016, eff. Sept. 1, 1999.

Part III - Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 659 – 679 - GarnishmentRules 657 through 679

SECTION 4. GARNISHMENT

Rule 657. Judgment final for garnishmentIn the case mentioned in subsection 3, section 63.001, Civil Practice and Remedies Code, the judgment whether based upon a liquidated demand or an unliquidated demand, shall be deemed final and subsisting for the purpose of garnishment from and after the date it is signed, unless a supersedeas bond shall have been approved and filed in accordance with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.

Rule 658. Application for writ of garnishment and orderEither at the commencement of a suit or at any time during its progress the plaintiff may file an application for a writ of garnishment. Such application shall be supported by affidavits of the plaintiff, his agent, his attorney, or other person having knowledge of relevant facts. The application shall comply with all statutory requirements and shall

state the grounds for issuing the writ and the specific facts relied upon by the plaintiff to warrant the required findings by the court. The writ shall not be quashed because two or more grounds are stated conjunctively or disjunctively. The application and any affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge and shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence; provided that facts may be stated based upon information and belief if the grounds of such belief are specifically stated.

No writ shall issue before final judgment except upon written order of the court after a hearing, which may be ex parte. The court in its order granting the application shall make specific findings of facts to support the statutory grounds found to exist, and shall specify the maximum value of property or indebtedness that may be garnished and the amount of bond required of plaintiff. Such bond shall be in an amount which, in the opinion of the court, shall adequately compensate defendant in the event plaintiff fails to prosecute his suit to effect, and pay all damages and costs as shall be adjudged against him for wrongfully suing out the writ of garnishment. The court shall further find in its order the amount of bond required of defendant to replevy, which, unless defendant exercises his option as provided under Rule 664, shall be the amount of plaintiff's claim, one year's accrual of interest if allowed by law on the claim, and the estimated costs of court. The order may direct the issuance of several writs at the same time, or in succession, to be sent to different counties.

Rule 658a. Bond for garnishmentNo writ of garnishment shall issue before final judgment until the party applying therefor has filed with the officer authorized to issue such writ a bond payable to the defendant in the amount fixed by the court's order, with sufficient surety or sureties as provided by statute, conditioned that the plaintiff will prosecute his suit to effect and pay to the extent of the penal amount of the bond all damages and costs as may be adjudged against him for wrongfully suing out such writ of garnishment.

After notice to the opposite party, either before or after the issuance of the writ, the defendant or plaintiff may file a motion to increase or reduce the amount of such bond, or to question the sufficiency of the sureties. Upon hearing, the court shall enter its order with respect to such bond and the sufficiency of the sureties.

Should it be determined from the garnishee's answer if such is not controverted that the garnishee is indebted to the defendant, or has in his hands effects belonging to the defendant, in an amount or value less than the amount of the debt claimed by the plaintiff, then after notice to the defendant the court in which such garnishment is pending upon hearing may reduce the required amount of such bond to double the sum of the garnishee's indebtedness to the defendant plus the value of the effects in his hands belonging to the defendant.

Rule 659. Case docketedWhen the foregoing requirements of these rules have been complied with, the judge, or clerk, or justice of the peace, as the case may be, shall docket the case in the name of the plaintiff as plaintiff and of the garnishee as defendant; and shall immediately issue a writ of garnishment directed to the garnishee, commanding him to appear before the court out of which the same is issued at or before 10 o'clock a.m. of the Monday next following the expiration of twenty days from the date the writ was served, if the writ is issued out of the district or county court; or the Monday next after the expiration of ten days from the date the writ was served, if the writ is issued out of the justice court. The writ shall command the garnishee to answer under oath upon such return date what, if anything, he is indebted to the defendant, and was when the writ was served, and what effects, if any, of the defendant he has in his possession, and had when such writ was served, and what other persons, if any, within his knowledge, are indebted to the defendant or have effects belonging to him in their possession.

Rule 660. Repealed effective December 31, 1947]

Rule 661. Form of writThe following form of writ may be used:

"The State of Texas.

"To E.F., Garnishee, greeting:

"Whereas, in the __________ Court of __________ County (if a justice court, state also the number of the precinct), in a certain cause wherein A.B. is plaintiff and C.D. is defendant, the plaintiff, claiming an indebtedness against the said C.D. of _____ dollars, besides interest and costs of suit, has applied for a writ of garnishment against you, E.F.; therefore you are hereby commanded to be and appear before said court at ______ in said county (if the writ is issued from the county or district court, here proceed: at 10 o'clock a.m. on the Monday next following the expiration of twenty days from the date of service hereof.' If the writ is issued from a justice of the peace court, here proceed: at or before 10 o'clock a.m. on the Monday next after the expiration of ten days from the date of service hereof.' In either event, proceed as follows:) then and there to answer upon oath what, if anything, you are indebted to the said C.D., and were when this writ was served upon you, and what effects, if any, of the said C.D. you have in your possession, and had when this writ was served, and what other persons, if any, within your knowledge, are indebted to the said C.D. or have effects belonging to him in their possession. You are further commanded NOT to pay to defendant any debt or to deliver to him any effects, pending further order of this court. Herein fail not, but make due answer as the law directs."

Rule 662. Delivery of writThe writ of garnishment shall be dated and tested as other writs, and may be delivered to the sheriff or constable by the officer who issued it, or he may deliver it to the plaintiff, his agent or attorney, for that purpose.

Rule 663. Execution and return of writThe sheriff or constable receiving the writ of garnishment shall immediately proceed to execute the same by delivering a copy thereof to the garnishee, and shall make return thereof as of other citations.

Rule 663a. Service of writ on defendantThe defendant shall be served in any manner prescribed for service of citation or as provided in Rule 21a with a copy of the writ of garnishment, the application, accompanying affidavits and orders of the court as soon as practicable following the service of the writ. There shall be prominently displayed on the face of the copy of the writ served on the defendant, in ten-point type and in a manner calculated to advise a reasonably attentive person of its contents, the following:

"To _________________ , Defendant:

"You are hereby notified that certain properties alleged to be owned by you have been garnished. If you claim any rights in such property, you are advised:

"YOU HAVE A RIGHT TO REGAIN POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY BY FILING A REPLEVY BOND. YOU HAVE A RIGHT TO SEEK TO REGAIN POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY BY FILING WITH THE COURT A MOTION TO DISSOLVE THIS WRIT."

Rule 664. Defendant may repleveyAt any time before judgment, should the garnished property not have been previously claimed or sold, the defendant may replevy the same, or any part thereof, or the proceeds from the sale of the property if it has been sold under order of the court, by giving bond

with sufficient surety or sureties as provided by statute, to be approved by the officer who levied the writ, payable to plaintiff, in the amount fixed by the court's order, or, at the defendant's option, for the value of the property or indebtedness sought to be replevied (to be estimated by the officer), plus one year's interest thereon at the legal rate from the date of the bond, conditioned that the defendant, garnishee, shall satisfy, to the extent of the penal amount of the bond, any judgment which may be rendered against him in such action.

On reasonable notice to the opposing party (which may be less than three days) either party shall have the right to prompt judicial review of the amount of bond required, denial of bond, sufficiency of sureties, and estimated value of the property, by the court which authorized issuance of the writ. The court's determination may be made upon the basis of affidavits, if uncontroverted, setting forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence; otherwise, the parties shall submit evidence. The court shall forthwith enter its order either approving or modifying the requirements of the officer or of the court's prior order, and such order of the court shall supersede and control with respect to such matters.

On reasonable notice to the opposing party (which may be less than three days) the defendant shall have the right to move the court for a substitution of property, of equal value as that garnished, for the property garnished. Provided that there has been located sufficient property of the defendant's to satisfy the order of garnishment, the court may authorize substitution of one or more items of defendant's property for all or for part of the property garnished. The court shall first make findings as to the value of the property to be substituted. If property is substituted, the property released from garnishment shall be delivered to defendant, if such property is personal property, and all liens upon such property from the original order of garnishment or modification thereof shall be terminated. Garnishment of substituted property shall be deemed to have existed from date of garnishment on the original property garnished, and no property on which liens have become affixed since the date of garnishment of the original property may be substituted.

Rule 664a. Dissolution or modification of writ of garnishmentA defendant whose property or account has been garnished or any intervening party who claims an interest in such property or account, may by sworn written motion, seek to vacate, dissolve or modify the writ of garnishment, and the order directing its issuance, for any grounds or cause, extrinsic or intrinsic. Such motion shall admit or deny each finding of the order directing the issuance of the writ except where the movant is unable to admit or deny the finding, in which case movant shall set forth the reasons why he cannot admit or deny. Unless the parties agree to an extension of time, the motion shall be heard promptly, after reasonable notice to the plaintiff (which may be less than three days), and the issue shall be determined not later than ten days after the motion is filed. The filing of the motion shall stay any further proceedings under the writ, except for any orders concerning the care, preservation or sale of any perishable property, until a hearing is had, and the issue is determined. The writ shall be dissolved unless, at such hearing, the plaintiff shall prove the grounds relied upon for its issuance, but the court may modify its previous order granting the writ and the writ issued pursuant thereto. The movant shall, however, have the burden to prove that the reasonable value of the property garnished exceeds the amount necessary to secure the debt, interest for one year, and probable costs. He shall also have the burden to prove facts to justify substitution of property.

The court's determination may be made upon the basis of affidavits, if uncontroverted, setting forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence; otherwise, the parties shall submit evidence. The court may make all such orders including orders concerning the care, preservation or disposition of the property (or the proceeds therefrom if the same has been sold), as justice may require. If the movant has given a replevy bond, an order to vacate or dissolve the writ shall vacate the replevy bond and discharge the sureties thereon, and if the court modifies its order or the writ issued pursuant thereto, it shall make such further orders with respect to the bond as may be consistent with its modification.

Notes for Rule 664a

Burden of proofGarnishor (plaintiff) has burden to prove right to writ of garnishment.Huie-Clark Joint Venture v. American States Insurance Co., 629 S.W.2d 109, 110-111 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.)

The "grounds, as expressed in [Sec. 63.001], clearly require that the plaintiff have no knowledge of any property owned by the defendant within the State sufficient to satisfy the judgment. The statute does not expressly or impliedly state that the plaintiff must prove such as a matter of fact. Such an interpretation would, in many cases, place an impossible burden on the plaintiff. Rule 664a provides for the substitution of property by the judgment debtor by stating that "he shall also have the burden to prove facts to justify substitution of property." This provision allowing substitution protects the judgment debtor from having funds unreasonably garnished. Additionally, it acts as an incentive to the debtor, once a writ of garnishment is issued, to produce property in satisfaction of the judgment which might otherwise be extremely difficult or impossible to locate."Black Coral Investments v. Bank of the Southwest, 650 S.W.2d 135(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.)

StandingQuestion whether garnishee has standing to object to writ of garnishment under Rule 664a is a procedural issue and the issue can be waived. Typically, standing is a jurisdictional issue which cannot be waived.Thompson v. Harco Nat. Ins. Co., 997 S.W.2d 607, 611 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1998, pet. denied)

Judgment debtor has a direct interest in the proceedings and is entitled to attack the issued writ by motion to quash. Cleveland v. San Antonio Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 148 Tex. 211, 223 S.W.2d 226, 229 (Tex.1949); Addison v. Addison, 530 SW 2d 920 (Tex. Civ. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, no writ)

Pleadings required"No provision is made for the court to dismiss a writ of garnishment on its own motion, Tex.R. Civ.P. 664a requires that a sworn written motion be filed and, after reasonable notice to the plaintiff, a prompt hearing on the motion, before the court may vacate, dissolve or modify a writ of garnishment, There was no such motion filed here, and the court was without authority to take such action on its own motion. Regardless of the cause number under which the order was entered, it was error to dismiss the garnishments under these circumstances."Block 145 ,Ltd. v. Pace, 617 SW 2d 820 (Tex. Civ. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 1981) writ ref'd n.r.e.)

Rule 665. Answer to writThe answer of the garnishee shall be under oath, in writing and signed by him, and shall make true answers to the several matters inquired of in the writ of garnishment.

Rule 666. Garnishee dischargedIf it appears from the answer of the garnishee that he is not indebted to the defendant, and was not so indebted when the writ of garnishment was served upon him, and that he has not in his possession any effects of the defendant and had not when the writ was served, and if he has either denied that any other persons within his knowledge are indebted to the defendant or have in their possession effects belonging to the defendant, or else has named such persons, should the answer of the garnishee not be controverted as hereinafter provided, the court shall enter judgment discharging the garnishee.

Notes for Rule 666

Summary judgment is an available remedy in garnishment proceedings.Sweeny Bank v. Ritchie, Hopson & Associates, Inc. 628 S.W.2d 175 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] writ ref'd n. r. e.) 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Frankfurt's Texas Invest. Corp. v. Trinity S. & L. Ass'n, 414 S.W.2d 190 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1967, writ ref'd n. r. e.).

Rule 667. Judgment by defaultIf the garnishee fails to file an answer to the writ of garnishment at or before the time directed in the writ, it shall be lawful for the court, at any time after judgment shall have been rendered against the defendant, and on or after appearance day, to render judgment by default, as in other civil cases, against such garnishee for the full amount of such judgment against the defendant together with all interest and costs that may have accrued in the main case and also in the garnishment proceedings. The answer of the garnishee may be filed as in any other civil case at any time before such default judgment is rendered.

Rule 668. Judgment when garnishee indebtedShould it appear from the answer of the garnishee or should it be otherwise made to appear and be found by the court that the garnishee is indebted to the defendant in any amount, or was so indebted when the writ of garnishment was served, the court shall render judgment for the plaintiff against the garnishee for the amount so admitted or found to be due to the defendant from the garnishee, unless such amount is in excess of the amount of the plaintiff's judgment against the defendant with interest and costs, in which case, judgment shall be rendered against the garnishee for the full amount of the judgment already rendered against the defendant, together with interest and costs of the suit in the original case and also in the garnishment proceedings. If the garnishee fail or refuse to pay such judgment rendered against him, execution shall issue thereon in the same manner and under the same conditions as is or may be provided for the issuance of execution in other cases.

Rule 669. Judgment for effectsShould it appear from the garnishee's answer, or otherwise, that the garnishee has in his possession, or had when the writ was served, any effects of the defendant liable to execution, including any certificates of stock in any corporation or joint stock company, the court shall render a decree ordering sale of such effects under execution in satisfaction of plaintiff's judgment and directing the garnishee to deliver them, or so much thereof as shall be necessary to satisfy plaintiff's judgment, to the proper officer for that purpose.

Rule 670. Refusal to deliver effectsShould the garnishee adjudged to have effects of the defendant in his possession, as provided in the preceding rule, fail or refuse to deliver them to the sheriff or constable on such demand, the officer shall immediately make return of such failure or refusal, whereupon on motion of the plaintiff, the garnishee shall be cited to show cause upon a date to be fixed by the court why he should not be attached for contempt of court for such failure or refusal. If the garnishee fails to show some good and sufficient excuse for such failure or refusal, he shall be fined for such contempt and imprisoned until he shall deliver such effects.

[Rule 671. Repealed effective December 31, 1947]

Rule 672. Sale of effectsThe sale so ordered shall be conducted in all respects as other sales of personal property under execution; and the officer making such sale shall execute a transfer of such effects or interest to the purchaser, with a brief recital of the judgment of the court under which the same was sold.

Rule 673. May traverse answerIf the plaintiff should not be satisfied with the answer of any garnishee, he may controvert the same by his affidavit stating that he has good reason to believe, and does believe, that the answer of the garnishee is incorrect, stating in what particular he believes the same to be incorrect. The defendant may also, in like manner, controvert the answer of the garnishee.

Rule 674. Trial of issueIf the garnishee whose answer is controverted, is a resident of the county in which the proceeding is pending, an issue shall be formed under the direction of the court and tried as in other cases.

Annoitation.

"Where, as here, the garnishee's answer is controverted the case is then tried as other cases and a judgment will be issued according to the results of the trial. See TEX.R. CIV. P. 668, 674. The primary issue in a garnishment suit is whether the garnishee is indebted to, or has in its 585*585 possession effects belonging to the debtor. See Buckeye Ret. Co. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 239 S.W.3d 394, 399 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.); Putman Putman, Inc. v. Capitol Warehouse, Inc., 775 S.W.2d 460, 463 (Tex.App.-Austin 1989, writ denied). The burden is on the garnishor to establish the amount of the debt owed to the debtor or the value of the property held by the garnishee. "If the garnishor's proof fails, he can of course recover nothing." Putman, 775 S.W.2d at 463 (citations omitted)."

National City Bank v. Texas Capital Bank, 353 SW 3d 581 - Tex: Court of Appeals, 5th Dist., 2011

Rule 675. Docket and noticeThe clerk of the court or the justice of the peace, on receiving certified copies filed in the county of the garnishee's residence under the provisions of the statutes, shall docket the case in the name of the plaintiff as plaintiff, and of the garnishee as defendant, and issue a notice to the garnishee, stating that his answer has been so controverted, and that such issue will stand for trial on the docket of such court. Such notice shall be directed to the garnishee, be dated and tested as other process from such court, and served by delivering a copy thereof to the garnishee. It shall be returnable, if issued from the district or county court, at ten o'clock a.m. of the Monday next after the expiration of twenty days from the date of its service; and if issued from the justice court, to the next term of such court convening after the expiration of twenty days after the service of such notice.

Rule 676. ISSUE TRIED IN OTHER CASES

Upon the return of such notice served, an issue shall be formed under the direction of the court and tried as in other cases.

Rule 677. CostsWhere the garnishee is discharged upon his answer, the costs of the proceeding, including a reasonable compensation to the garnishee, shall be taxed against the plaintiff; where the answer of the garnishee has not been controverted and the garnishee is held thereon, such costs shall be taxed against the defendant and included in the execution provided for in this section; where the answer is contested, the costs shall abide the issue of such contest.

Notes for Rule 667

Attorney’s fees - generallyIn construing rule 677, the term "costs" has consistently been interpreted to include attorney's fees.

Moody Nat'l. Bank v. Riebschlager, 946 S.W.2d 521, 525 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, writ denied) Henry v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 879 S.W.2d 366, 369 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ)Go Int'l, Inc. v. Big-Tex Crude Oil Co., 531 S.W.2d 208, 211 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1975, no writ)Carter v. Leiter, 476 S.W.2d 461, 463 (Tex. Civ.App.—Dallas 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.)Pan Am. Nat'l Bank v. Ridgway, 475 S.W.2d 808, 809 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).Rowley v. Lake Area Nat. Bank, 976 SW 2d 715 - Tex: Court of Appeals, 1998

A trial court's decision to award attorney's fees is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

Ridge Oil Co., Inc. v. Guinn Invs., Inc., 148 S.W.3d 143, 163 (Tex.2004).

Generally, the prevailing party in a suit may recover costs from the opposing party. TEX.R. CIV. P. 131. However, attorney's fees may not be recovered unless provided for by statute or by contract between the parties. New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 414 S.W.2d 914, 915 (Tex. 1967);First City Bank-Farmers Branch v. Guex, 677 S.W.2d 25, 30 (Tex. 1984);State v. Estate of Brown, 802 S.W.2d 898, 901 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1991, no writ).Dallas Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Seven Inv. Co., 835 S.W.2d 75, 77 (Tex.1992); Henry v. Ins. Co. of N. America, 879 S.W.2d 366, 368 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ).

Garnishment actions are not among the claims for which attorneys' fees may be awarded pursuant to Section 38.001.San Felipe Nat'l Bank v. Caton, 668 S.W.2d 804, 805 (Tex.App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ) (stating "there is no authority under Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat.Ann. art. 2226 (Vernon Supp.1982-83) [predecessor to Section 38.001] for garnishor attorney fees").

Section 38.001 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code provides statutory authority for recovery of its attorneys' fees, if the claim is for a contract. Garnishment is not a cause of action based on a contract. Henry v. Ins. Co. of N. America, 879 S.W.2d 366, 368 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ).

An award of attorneys' fees may not be merely implied, but must be provided for by the express terms of the statute in question. First City Bank-Farmers Branch v. Guex, 677 S.W.2d 25, 30 (Tex.1984).

Attorney’s fees – pleadingIt is necessary to request attorney's fees in a motion to dissolve the writs of garnishment. A judgment must be supported by the pleadings and, if not, it is void. R. Conrad Moore & Assoc., Inc. v. Lerma, 946 S.W.2d 90, 96 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1997, writ denied); State v. Estate of Brown, 802 S.W.2d 898, 900 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1991, no writ);Campbell v. Stucki, 220 SW 3d 562 - Tex: Court of Appeals, 12th Dist., 2007

A party may not be granted relief in the absence of pleadings to support that relief. Stoner v. Thompson, 578 S.W.2d 679, 682, 683-84 (Tex.1979);State v. Estate of Brown, 802 S.W.2d 898, 901 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1991, no writ)

Absent a mandatory statute, a trial court's jurisdiction to render a judgment for attorney's fees must be invoked by pleadings, and a judgment not supported by pleadings requesting attorney's fees is a nullity. State v. Estate of Brown, 802 S.W.2d 898, 900 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1991, no writ);

Attorney’s fees - Garnishor

Nothing in Rule 677 allows the plaintiff/garnishor in a garnishment action to recover his attorneys' fees from the judgment debtor. Again, we may not supply authority to award attorneys' fees by implication. First City Bank-Farmers Branch v. Guex, 677 S.W.2d 25, 30 (Tex.1984) See also Robertson v. Robertson, 608 S.W.2d 245, 247 (Tex.Civ. App.—Eastland 1980, no writ) (stating that court could find no substantive law permitting attorney's fees in a suit to collect on a judgment).

"Although a garnishment action is ancillary to the underlying suit and takes its jurisdiction from the main suit, Baca v. Hoover, Bax, & Shearer, 823 S.W.2d 734, 738, 740 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied), it is a separate suit brought to enforce the judgment, and is not itself based on a contract. Therefore, appellee is incorrect in asserting that its contract with appellants, which provided that they would pay "costs of collection, attorneys' fees, and interest," covers fees incurred in a garnishment action. . . The garnishment action is an enforcement suit, not a suit on a contract."Henry v. Ins. Co. of N. America, 879 S.W.2d 366, 368 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ).

In the rules of civil procedure regarding garnishment, the only rule providing for the recovery of costs allows the garnishee, not a judgment debtor, to recoup attorney's fees under certain circumstances. TEX.R. CIV. P. 677. The civil practice and remedies code does not provide for the recovery of attorney's fees by a judgment debtor. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. §§ 63.001-.003, 63.005 (Vernon 1997), §§ 63.004, 63.006-.008 (Vernon Supp.2006). Moreover, we can find no case law allowing a judgment debtor to recover attorney's fees.

The garnishor is not entitled to recover attorneys' fees in a garnishment action.

Henry v. Ins. Co. of N. America, 879 S.W.2d 366, 368 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ).http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10581141560385594120

If the supreme court had intended that garnishors could recover attorneys' fees under these rules, they would have provided for it, just as the legislature provided for the recovery of attorneys' fees in the Turnover Statute. See Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 31.002(e) (Vernon 1986) (providing for recovery of attorneys' fees in a turnover proceeding).Henry v. Ins. Co. of N. America, 879 S.W.2d 366, 368 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ).

We hold that as a matter of law, attorney fees are not recoverable by the garnishor in a garnishment action.Henry v. Ins. Co. of N. America, 879 S.W.2d 366, 368 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ).

Attorney’s fees – Judgment debtor

Because party did not request attorney's fees and there is no mandatory statute or rule that provides for a judgment debtor to recovery attorney's fees, court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion when it awarded attorney's fees.Campbell v. Stucki, 220 SW 3d 562 - Tex: Court of Appeals, 12th Dist., 2007http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5943902140749540703

Attorney’s fees - GarnisheeTex.R.Civ.P. 677 has consistently been construed to afford the garnishee recovery of attorneys' fees expended in answering the writ of garnishment. Go Int'l, Inc. v. Big-Tex Crude Oil Co., 531 S.W.2d 208, 211 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1975, no writ); Pan Am. Nat'l Bank v. Ridgway, 475 S.W.2d 808, 809 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.); May v. Donalson, 141 S.W.2d 702, 706 (Tex.Civ.App.— San Antonio 1940, no writ);Henry v. Ins. Co. of N. America, 879 S.W.2d 366, 368 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ).

The policy behind this construction is sound: the garnishee is a stranger to the underlying suit who happens to owe a debt to the judgment debtor. However, it is settled law that once a garnishee contests the garnishment proceeding and becomes an active litigant, it is no longer entitled to recover attorneys' fees, because "where the answer is contested, the costs shall abide the issue of such contest."May, 141 S.W.2d at 706. See also: Daniels v. Pecan Valley Ranch, Inc., 831 S.W.2d 372, 386 (Tex.App.— San Antonio 1992, writ denied), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 2944, 124 L.Ed.2d 692 (1993); Holt's Sporting Goods of Lubbock v. American Nat'l Bank of Amarillo, 400 S.W.2d 943, 946 (Tex.Civ.App.— Amarillo 1966, writ dism'd).Henry v. Ins. Co. of N. America, 879 S.W.2d 366, 368 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ).

On the other hand, if the judgment debtor is a party to the suit and unsuccessfully contests the garnishee's answer, the garnishee's attorneys' fees are assessed against him. May v. Donalson, 141 S.W.2d 702, 706 (Tex.Civ.App.— San Antonio 1940, no writ);

Rule 678. Garnishee discharged on proofIt shall be a sufficient answer to any claim of the defendant against the garnishee founded on an indebtedness of such garnishee, or on the possession by him of any effects, for the garnishee to show that such indebtedness has been paid, or such effects, including any certificates of stock in any incorporated or joint stock company, have been delivered to any sheriff or constable as provided for in Rule 669.

Notes to Rule 678“Rule 674 provides that if the garnishee's answer is controverted the issue shall be tried as in other cases, and under rule 678 the garnishee is discharged if it is determined, after trial, that he was not indebted to the defendant and did not have effects belonging to the plaintiff.”

Healy v. Wick Building Systems, Inc., 560 S.W.2d 713, 721 (Tex.Civ. App.—Dallas 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.)


Rule 679. AmendmentClerical errors in the affidavit, bond, or writ of garnishment or the officer's return thereof, may upon application in writing to the judge or justice of the court in which the suit is filed, and after notice to the opponent, be amended in such manner and on such terms as the judge or justice shall authorize by an order entered in the minutes of the court (or noted on the docket of the justice of the peace), provided such amendment appears to the judge or justice to be in furtherance of justice.

Cases

GeneralAMC Mortg. Services, Inc. v. Watts, 260 S.W.3d 582 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.)


(Not a garnishment case - "first in time, first in right" general rule of lien priority)

Bank One, Texas, N.A. v. Sunbelt Sav., F.S.B., 824 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. 1992) (per curiam)


Baytown State Bank v. Nimmons, 904 SW 2d 902 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied)


Beggs v. Fite, 130 Tex. 46, 106 S.W.2d 1039 (1937)

Black Coral Investments v. Bank of the Southwest, 650 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.)


Burke v. Hance, 76 Tex. 76, 13 S.W. 163 (1890)

Carter v. Leiter, 476 S.W.2d 461 (Tex. Civ.App.—Dallas 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.)


Cohen v. Advance Imports, Inc., 597 S.W.2d 449 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.)


Collier Manufacturing & Supply, Inc. v. Interfirst Bank Austin, N.A., 749 S.W.2d 560 (Tex.App.—Austin 1988, no writ)


Holding that garnishee bank violated equitable obligation to garnishor by paying garnished funds to debtor after writ of garnishment was erroneously dissolved.

Continental Casing Corp. v. Samedan Oil, 751 S.W.2d 499 (Tex. 1988)


First State Bank Central Texas v. Lakeway Regional Medical Center Development, LLC, 03-13-00058-CV, Tex: Court of Appeals, 3rd Dist., February 20,2014


Frankfurt's Texas Invest. Corp. v. Trinity S. & L. Ass'n, 414 S.W.2d 190 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1967, writ ref'd n. r. e.)


Go International, Inc. v. Big-Tex Crude Oil Co., 531 S.W.2d 208 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1975, no writ)


Gottesman v. Toubin, 353 S.W.2d 294 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston 1962, no writ)


Henry v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 879 S.W.2d 366 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ)


Hubbell, Slack & Co. v. Farmers' Union Cotton Co., 196 S.W. 681 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1917, writ ref'd)

Hudler-Tye Construction, Inc. v. Pettijohn and Pettijohn Plumbing, Inc., 632 S.W.2d 219 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1982, no writ)


Huie-Clark Joint Venture v. American States Insurance Co., 629 S.W.2d 109, 110-111 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.)


Industrial Indemnity Co. v. Texas American Bank - Riverside, 784 S.W.2d 114 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1990, no writ)


Holding that garnishee's appeal of prior judgment in favor of judgment debtor did not constitute unliquidated debt so as to preclude a judgment in favor of garnishor pursuant to writ of garnishment.

Kelly v. Gibbs, 19 S.W. 563, 563-64 (Tex. 1892)

Mansfield State Bank v. Fonville, 496 S.W.2d 945 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.)


Moody National. Bank v. Riebschlager, 946 S.W.2d 521 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, writ denied)


National City Bank v. Texas Capital Bank, 353 SW 3d 581 - Tex: Court of Appeals, 5th Dist., 2011


* Newsome v. Charter Bank Colonial, 821 SW 2d 283 - Tex: Court of Appeals, 1991


Owen Elec. Supply, Inc. v. Brite Day Const., Inc., 821 SW 2d 283 - Tex: Court of Appeals, 1991


Pan American National Bank v. Ridgway, 475 S.W.2d 808 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.)


Pitts v. Dallas Nurseries Garden Center, Inc., 545 S.W.2d 34 (Tex.Civ.App.-Texarkana 1976, no writ)


Pure Oil Co. v. Walsh-Woldert Motor Co., 36 S.W.2d 802 (Tex.Civ.App.-Texarkana 1931, writ dism'd w.o.j

Ranchers & Farm Liv. Auc. Co. v. First St. Bank, 531 S.W.2d 167 (Tex.Civ.App.— Amarillo 1975, writ ref'd n. r. e.)


Rowley v. Lake Area Nat. Bank, 976 SW 2d 715 - Tex: Court of Appeals, 1998


San Felipe National Bank v. Caton, 668 S.W.2d 804 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ)


Schultz v. Fifth District Court of Appeals, 810 S.W.2d 738 (Tex. 1991)


Sherry Lane National Bank v. Bank of Evergreen, 715 SW 2d 148 - Tex: Court of Appeals, 5th Dist., 1986


Small Business Investment Company of Houston v. Champion International Corp., 619 S.W.2d 28 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, no writ)


Southern County Mutual Insurance Co. v. Powell, 736 S.W.2d 745 (Tex.App—Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ)


Stewart v. USA Custom Paint & Body Shop, 870 SW 2d 18 - Tex: Supreme Court 1994


Sweeny Bank v. Ritchie, Hopson & Associates, Inc. 628 S.W.2d 175 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.)

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9270684838221374707&

Swiderski v. Victoria Bank & Trust Co., 706 S.W.2d 676, 679 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.)


Texas Commerce Bank-New Braunfels v. Townsend, 786 S.W.2d 53 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, writ denied)


Held that garnishee bank was not liable for wrongful dishonor by failing to pay check presented by debtor on his trust account after service of writ but before answer date.

Thompson v. Fulton Bag & Cotton Mills, 286 S.W.2d 411, 414 (Tex. 1956) (Calvert, J.)


Thompson v. Harco Nat. Ins. Co., 997 S.W.2d 607, 611 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1998, pet. denied)


Tom Benson Chevrolet Co., Inc. v. Beall, 567 S.W.2d 857 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1978, writ refd n.r.e.)


United States v. Standard Brass & Mfg. Co., 266 S.W.2d 407 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1954, no writ)


World Help v. Leisure Lifestyles, Inc., 977 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1998, pet. denied)


Wrigley v. First National Security Corp., 104 S.W.3d 259 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2003, no pet.)


Wage Garnishment

This is a collection of links to Texas appellate opinions touching on various aspects of wage garnishment. All links are to Google Scholar. Cases arranged by date. The Texas court system has fourteen Courts of Appeals that review both civil and criminal appeals, except for death penalty cases, a Court of Criminal Appeals that has the final appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases, and a Supreme Court which has the final appellate jurisdiction in civil and juvenile cases.

1. Southwestern Warehouse Corporation v. Wee Tote, Inc. , 504 SW 2d 592 – Tex: Court of Civil Appeals 1974

Issue: Constitutional Due Process of prejudgment garnishment. Not specifically wage garnishment.

2. Prewitt v. Smith , 528 SW 2d 893 – Tex: Court of Civil Appeals, 3rd Dist. 1975

Held that funds of the State’s retirement system are “a part of a member’s compensation or wages which are not subject to garnishment,” citing Byrd v. City of Dallas, 118 Tex. 28, 6 S.W.2d 738, 741 (1928) ; Tex. Const. Art. XVI, Sec. 28. Sydnor v. City of Galveston, 15 S.W. 202 (Tex.App.1890), holds that amounts due a physician for professional services for a specific sum per day are not subject to garnishment. Bonus or commissions payable to a salesman at year’s end in addition to his regular salary is exempt as current wages for personal service. J.M. Radford Grocery Co. v. McKean, 41 S.W.2d 639 (Tex.Civ.App.1931, no writ). Commissions on the sale of gasoline and oil, payable monthly to a service station operator, were exempt. Alemite Co. of North Texas v. Magnolia Pet. Co., 50 S.W.2d 369 (Tex.Civ.App.1932, no writ).

3. King v. Floyd , 538 SW 2d 166 – Tex: Court of Civil Appeals 1976

Money owed by Houston Oilers to former player for breach of an employment contract constituted current wages and therefore exempt from garnishment.

4. United States v. Stelter , 553 SW 2d 227 – Tex: Court of Civil Appeals, 8th Dist. 1977

Issue: Can the ex-wife in a Texas divorce, who has been awarded a portion of the military retirement pay of her ex-husband as her share of the community property, garnish the United States under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 659. Answer: Yes. REVERSED by Texas Supreme Court in United States v. Stelter, 567 SW 2d 797 on grounds of sovereign immunity.

5. United States v. Fleming , 565 SW 2d 87 – Tex: Court of Civil Appeals, 8th Dist. 1978

Military retirement pay is not “current wages,” but is property and it is not exempt from garnishment. Case reversed on other grounds. The procedure followed was in violation of due process rights in that it was a prejudgment garnishment; also, it was carried out under an unconstitutional statute.

6. United States v. Stelter , 567 SW 2d 797 – Tex: Supreme Court 1978






http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?about=4907545595184337405&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006








http://www.courts.state.tx.us/

At the time of this case 42 USC 659 gave consent to suits for “legal obligations to provide child support or make alimony payments,” but 42 USC 662(c) specifically excluded “community property settlement, equitable distribution of property, or other division of property between spouses or former spouses” from the meaning of alimony. 42 USC 662(c) has since been repealed.

7. United States v. Wakefield , 572 SW 2d 569 – Tex: Court of Civil Appeals, 2nd Dist. 1978

(1) “[G]arnishment of military pay involves suit against the United States and raises the issue of sovereign immunity. An order for an allotment does not involve suing the United States. It merely requires LeMaster to direct the United States Air Force to pay the retirement benefits to Mrs. Wakefield. No issue of sovereign immunity is raised.”

(2) “It is well settled that garnishment should be in the amount of the debt absolutely owed at the time the garnishee files his answer. Burkitt v. Glenney, 371 S.W.2d 412 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston 1963, writ ref. n.r.e.). For LeMaster’s retirement pay to accrue he must remain alive. Therefore, the debt being garnished is contingently but not absolutely owed. The trial court erred in ordering garnishment of future accruing military retirement pay.”

8. Texaco, Inc. v. LeFevre , 610 SW 2d 173 – Tex: Court of Civil Appeals 1980

A New York court ordered Texaco to withhold wages. A Texas court ordered Texaco to not withhold wages. Texaco sought to resolve the conflicting court orders by way of interpleader in federal court. The Federal District Court ruled the New York wage garnishment should prevail. The Texas Court of Appeals decided the federal court judgment should be honored.

We hold that Texaco was entitled to submit the cause to the federal district court, that that court was empowered under the above mentioned statutes to determine the questions involved and that our state court was bound to follow the decision of the federal district court even if the effect would be to allow the garnishment of wages, which our state court could not do because of the prohibition of art. 3836 and art. 4099, V.A.C.S., and art. 16, § 28 Constitution of the State of Texas.

9. Benton v. Wilmer-Hutchins Ind. Sch. Dist. , 662 SW 2d 696 – Tex: Court of Appeals, 5th Dist. 1983

A school district decided it had overpaid its teachers by mistake one year and that it would simply deduct the over-payments from salary the next year. The Texas Court of Appeals ruled this to be improper.

The district contends that since it has a duty to recover public funds paid out under a mistake of fact, it may resort to self-help by deducting the overpayments from current salaries due. We do not agree. By such action the district is treating current salaries as already paid to the extent of the previous overpayments, contrary to the common-law rule that mutual debts do not extinguish each other in the absence of agreement or judicial action.

The teachers could either agree to the repayment or the school district could sue the teachers and prove the claim. But, the school district could not just withhold the money.

10. Davidson Texas, Inc. v. Garcia , 664 SW 2d 791 – Tex: Court of Appeals, 3rd Dist. 1984

A creditor sought to garnish money owed by Santa Fe Energy to debtor, who was not an employee. Debtor provided personal service as a leasing agent and real estate title examiner for Santa Fe Energy’s oil and gas business without being on Santa Fe Energy’s payroll. He was paid $200 per day for his services, plus expenses. He did no work for any business other than Santa Fe Energy. He worked for





Santa Fe Energy full time. Santa Fe did not withhold taxes or pay any share of debtor’s Social Security. Although the debtor’s daily activity was self-supervised, he was very specifically directed by Santa Fe Energy to the oil and gas lands they were interested in. The creditor argued that as an independent contractor, and not an employee, the debtor’s payments from Santa Fe Energy were not “wages” exempt from garnishment.

The Texas Court of Appeals stated, “The garnishment exception for current wages applies without regard to whether compensation is denominated as “wages” or “salary,” the controlling issue being whether it is compensation for personal service.” citing King v. Floyd, 538 S.W.2d 166 Tex.Civ.App.1976. Additionally,

In Prewitt v. Smith, 528 S.W.2d 893, 896 (Tex.Civ.App.1975, no writ) this Court held that funds of the State’s retirement system are “a part of a member’s compensation or wages which are not subject to garnishment,” citing Byrd v. City of Dallas, 118 Tex. 28, 6 S.W.2d 738, 741 (1928); Tex. Const. Art. XVI, Sec. 28. Sydnor v. City of Galveston, 15 S.W. 202 (Tex.App.1890), holds that amounts due a physician for professional services for a specific sum per day are not subject to garnishment. Bonus or commissions payable to a salesman at year’s end in addition to his regular salary is exempt as current wages for personal service. J.M. Radford Grocery Co. v. McKean, 41 S.W.2d 639 (Tex.Civ.App.1931, no writ). Commissions on the sale of gasoline and oil, payable monthly to a service station operator, were exempt. Alemite Co. of North Texas v. Magnolia Pet. Co., 50 S.W.2d 369 (Tex.Civ.App.1932, no writ).

Under the specific facts of this case, the court held that the money owed was for personal services and therefore exempt from a garnishment.

11. Hennigan v. Hennigan , 666 SW 2d 322 – Tex: Court of Appeals 1984

The Texas Turnover and do an attorney’s receivables have the characteristics of ‘wages’ exempt from execution? This is the case to look to for some answers. If garnishment is not an effective method for collecting a judgment from canny uncooperative debtors, like lawyers, Texas has Civil Practice &. Remedies Code § 31.002 (former TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 3827a), the Texas Turnover Statute, which allows courts to assist creditors collect judgments by digging a little deeper.

The question of whether attorney fees constitute current wages, thus being exempt from garnishment, was answered negatively in First National Bank of Cleburne v. Graham, 22 S.W. 1101 (Tex.Civ. App.1889, no writ). Almost as if it were anticipating our question, that court stated:

“Can an attorney’s fee for legal services rendered or to be rendered in a single case, or in the transaction of a single matter, or in the transaction of any amount of legal business, in any manner be correctly termed “current wages,” where he has not been hired for his services by the day, week, or month, to be paid at the expiration of the time for which he was hired, and not in proportion to the business done? We think not.”

12. City of Houston v. Nelius , 693 SW 2d 567 – Tex: Court of Appeals 1985

This is another case where an employer (City of Houston) withheld pay from an employee (a police officer) who owed the city money, along the lines of Benton v. Wilmer-Hutchins Ind. Sch. Dist.. Like the Benton case, the employer lost.

13. Sloan v. Douglass , 713 SW 2d 436 – Tex: Court of Appeals, 2nd Dist. 1986

x





14. Barlow v. Lane , 745 SW 2d 451 – Tex: Court of Appeals, 10th Dist. 1988

x

15. Cain v. Cain , 746 SW 2d 861 – Tex: Court of Appeals, 8th Dist. 1988

x

16. Davis v. Raborn , 754 SW 2d 481 – Tex: Court of Appeals 1988

x

17. Schmerbeck v. River Oaks Bank , 786 SW 2d 521 – Tex: Court of Appeals, 6th Dist. 1990

x

18. Caulley v. Caulley , 806 SW 2d 795 – Tex: Supreme Court 1991

x

19. Orange County v. Ware , 819 SW 2d 472 – Tex: Supreme Court 1991

x

20. Tamez v. Tamez , 822 SW 2d 688 – Tex: Court of Appeals, 13th Dist. 1991

x

21. AMERICAN EXP. v. Harris , 831 SW 2d 531 – Tex: Court of Appeals 1992

x

22. Knighton v. IBM , 856 SW 2d 206 – Tex: Court of Appeals 1993

x

23. Bergman v. Bergman , 888 SW 2d 580 – Tex: Court of Appeals, 8th Dist. 1994

x

24. Foreness v. Hexamer , 971 SW 2d 525 – Tex: Court of Appeals, 5th Dist. 1997

x

25. General Elec. Capital Corp. v. ICO, INC. , 230 SW 3d 702 – Tex: Court of Appeals 2007

x

26. TEXAS WORKFORCE COMMISSION v. BUSKE LINES, INC. , Tex: Court of Appeals, 12th Dist. 2010














x

27. Stanley v. Reef Securities, Inc. , 314 SW 3d 659 – Tex: Court of Appeals, 5th Dist. 2010

x

28. Marrs v. Marrs , 401 SW 3d 122 – Tex: Court of Appeals 2011

x

29. Heller v. Heller , 359 SW 3d 902 – Tex: Court of Appeals, 9th Dist. 2012

x

30. Stephens v. DYCK O’NEAL, INC. , Tex: Court of Appeals, 1st Dist. 2012

x

31. Palmer v. Palmer , Tex: Court of Appeals, 2nd Dist. 2012

x

32. Free v. Lewis , Tex: Court of Appeals, 13th Dist. 2012

x

33. Spencer v. GC Services Limited Partnership , Tex: Court of Appeals, 1st Dist. 2013

More cases:

Abdullah v. State, 211 SW 3d 938 (Tex. App. -Texarkana [6th Dist.]. 2007, no pet.)

AMC Mortg. Services Inc. v. Watts, 260 S.W.3d 582 (Tex App. - Dallas [5th Dist.] 2008, no pet.)

American Surety Co. v. Bernstein, 105 S.W. 990, 991-92 (Tex.1907)

Bank One Texas N.A. v. Sunbelt Savings F.S.B. , 824 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. 1992) (per curiam)

Barber v. Colorado Indep. Sch. Dist., 901 S.W.2d 447, 450 (Tex.1995).

Baytown State Bank v. Nimmons, 904 SW 2d 902 (Tex App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied)

Beggs v. Fite, 130 Tex. 46, 106 S.W.2d 1039 (1937)

Black Coral Investments v. Bank of the Southwest, 650 S.W.2d 135 (Tex App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.)

Brasher v. Carnation Co., 92 S.W.2d 573 (Tex.Civ.App.— Austin [3rd Dist.] 1936, writ dism'd)








Brewer v. Collins, 857 S.W.2d 819, 823 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no pet.)

Burke v. Hance, 76 Tex. 76, 13 S.W. 163 (1890)

Campbell v. Stucki, 220 SW 3d 562 (Tex App. - Tyler [12th Dist.] 2007, no pet.)

Carter v. Leiter, 476 S.W.2d 461 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas [5th Dist.] 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.)

Clay Bldg. Material Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 161 S.W.2d 799, 800 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland [11th Dist] 1941, no writ),

Cohen v. Advance Imports Inc. , 597 S.W.2d 449 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas [5th Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.)

Collier Manufacturing & Supply Inc. v. Interfirst Bank Austin N.A. , 749 S.W.2d 560 (Tex App. - Austin [3rd Dist.] 1988, no writ )

Continental Casing Corp. v. Samedan Oil, 751 S.W.2d 499 (Tex. 1988)

Covarrubias v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice-Institutional Div., 52 S.W.3d 318, 324 (Tex.App. -Corpus Christi [13th Dist.]2001, no pet.);

Dickerson v. DeBarbieris, 964 S.W.2d 680, 683 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.)

Fidelity Lloyds of America v. Lyday, 5 S.W.2d 553, 555 (Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana [6th Dist.] 1928, no writ)

First National Bank in Dallas v. Steves Sash and Door Co., 468 S.W.2d 133 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio [4th Dist.] 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.)

First State Bank Central Tex. v. Lakeway Regional Medical Center Dev. LLC, No. 03-13-00058-CV, WL ?? (Tex App. - Austin [3rd Dist.] 2014, no pet, (mem. op.))

Frankfurt's Texas Invest. Corp. v. Trinity S. & L. Ass'n, 414 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas [5th Dist.] 1967, writ ref'd n. r. e.)

Go International Inc. v. Big-Tex Crude Oil Co. , 531 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland [11th Dist.] 1975, no writ)

Gottesman v. Toubin, 353 S.W.2d 294 (Tex. Civ. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 1962, no writ)

Harrell v. State, 286 SW 3d 315 (Tex. 2009)

Henry v. Insurance Co. of N. Am. , 879 S.W.2d 366 (Tex App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ)

Hubbell Slack & Co. v. Farmers' Union Cotton Co. , 196 S.W. 681 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont [9th Dist.] 1917, writ ref'd )

Hudler-Tye Construction Inc. v. Pettijohn and Pettijohn Plumbing Inc. , 632 S.W.2d 219 (Tex App. - Fort Worth [2nd Dist.] 1982, no writ)

Huie-Clark Joint Venture v. American States Insurance Co. , 629 S.W.2d 109 (Tex App. - Dallas [5th Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.)

Industrial Indemnity Co. v. Texas American Bank - Riverside, 784 S.W.2d 114 (Tex App. - Fort Worth [2nd Dist.] 1990, no writ)

Kelly v. Gibbs, 19 S.W. 563 (Tex.1892)

King v. Floyd, 538 S.W.2d 166, 168 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, writ dism'd n.r.e

Mansfield State Bank v. Fonville, 496 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth [2nd Dist.] 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.)

Material Partnerships, Inc. v. Ventura, 102 S.W.3d 252, 257 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied).

Moody National. Bank v. Riebschlager, 946 S.W.2d 521 (Tex App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, writ denied )

National City Bank v. Texas Capital Bank, 353 SW 3d 581 (Tex App. - Dallas [5th Dist.] 2011, no pet.)

Newsome v. Charter Bank Colonial, 821 SW 2d 283 (Tex App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied) ***

Owen Elec. Supply Inc. v. Brite Day Const. Inc. , 821 SW 2d 283 (Tex App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, pet. denied)

Pan American National Bank v. Ridgway, 475 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio [4th Dist.] 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.)

Pitts v. Dallas Nurseries Garden Center Inc. , 545 S.W.2d 34 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana [6th Dist.] 1976, no writ)

Pure Oil Co. v. Walsh-Woldert Motor Co. , 36 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana [6th Dist.] 1931, writ dism'd w.o.j)

Radford Grocery Co. v. McKean, 41 S.W.2d 639, 640 (Tex. Civ.App.-Fort Worth [2nd Dist.] 1931, no writ)

Ranchers & Farm Liv. Auc. Co. v. First St. Bank, 531 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo [7th Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n. r. e.)

Reed v. State, 269 SW3d 619 (Tex.App. -San Antonio [4th Dist.] 2008, no pet.)

Rowley v. Lake Area Nat. Bank, 976 SW 2d 715 (Tex App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. Denied)

San Felipe National Bank v. Caton, 668 S.W.2d 804 (Tex App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ)

Schultz v. Fifth District Court of Appeals, 810 S.W.2d 738 (Tex. 1991)

Shahan v. Biggs & Co., 123 S.W.2d 686, 690 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth [2nd Dist.] 1938, no writ)

Sherry Lane National Bank v. Bank of Evergreen, 715 SW 2d 148 (Tex App. - Dallas [5th Dist.] 1986)

SL Crawford Const., Inc. v. Lassiter, 17 SW 3d 379 (Tex: App. – Houston [1st Dist] 2000, no pet.)

Small Business Investment Company of Houston v. Champion International Corp. , 619 S.W.2d 28 (Tex. Civ. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, no writ)

Southern County Mutual Insurance Co. v. Powell, 736 S.W.2d 745 (Tex App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ)

Stewart v. USA Custom Paint & Body Shop, 870 SW 2d 18 (Tex: 1994)

Sweeny Bank v. Ritchie Hopson & Associates Inc. , 628 S.W.2d 175 (Tex App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.)

Swiderski v. Victoria Bank & Trust Co. , 706 S.W.2d 676 (Tex App. - Corpus Christi/Edinburg [13th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e. )

Texas Commerce Bank-New Braunfels v. Townsend, 786 S.W.2d 53 (Tex App. - Austin [3rd Dist.] 1990, writ denied)

Thompson v. Fulton Bag & Cotton Mills, 286 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. 1956, (Calvert J.)

Thompson v. Harco Nat. Ins. Co. , 997 S.W.2d 607 (Tex App. - Dallas [5th Dist.] 1998, pet. denied)

Tom Benson Chevrolet Co. Inc. v. Beall, 567 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio [4th Dist.] 1978, writ refd n.r.e.)

United States v. Standard Brass & Mfg. Co., 266 S.W.2d 407 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont [9th Dist.] 1954, no writ)

Wilson v. TDCJ-ID, 268 SW 3d 756 (Tex. App. - Waco [10th Dist.], 2008, no pet.)

World Help v. Leisure Lifestyles Inc. , 977 S.W.2d 662 (Tex App. - Fort Worth [2nd Dist.] 1998, pet. denied)

Wrigley v. First National Security Corp., 104 S.W.3d 259 (Tex App. - Beaumont [9th Dist.] 2003, no pet.)

texas garnishment law

Documents