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Claiming National Membership in Multiethnic Malaysia

- The Role of Dominant Ethnicity

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Authors)

In-Jin Yoon, Chich Thiang Koo

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아세아연구 58(2), 2015.6, 274-310 (37 pages)

The Journal of Asiatic Studies 58(2), 2015.6, 274-310 (37 pages)

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Publisher)

고려대학교 아세아문제연구소

Asiatic Reaserch Institute, Korea University

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APA Style

In-Jin Yoon, Chich Thiang Koo (2015). Claiming National Membership in Multiethnic Malaysia.

아세아연구, 58(2), 274-310.

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274 아세아연구 제58권 2호 (2015년)

Claiming National Membership

in Multiethnic MalaysiaThe Role of Dominant Ethnicity

1)

In-Jin Yoon

Korea University

Chich Thiang Koo

Kedah Korean Language Center

Ⅰ. Introduction

In multi-ethnic Malaysia, the non-Malays are allowed to maintain theirethnic identities while enjoying the privileges of Malaysian citizenship.

However, the issue of social integration remains unsolved. Ironically, the

policies promoting social integration seem to have invoked conflict and

mistrust among ethnic groups and worsened the situation. For instance,

the New Economic Plan launched for the purpose eliminating the wealth

gap between the Malays and the non-Malays and promoting social in-tegration has become one of the major sources of conflict between the

Malays and the non-Malays. Its emphasis on one national language and

※ This work was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea Grant funded

by the Korean Government (NRF-2013S1A3A2055251). We thank anonymous

reviewers for their constructive comments.

한국학중앙연구원 | IP: 112.216.205.154 | Accessed 2015/12/22 10:52(KST)



Claiming National Membership in Multiethnic Malaysia : The Role of Dominant Ethnicity 275

national education failed to win support from the non-Malays and further

disintegrated them from the Malays. It exacerbated the on-going conflict

between the Malays and the non-Malays on the issue of vernacular

school preservation, a prolonged struggle triggered by the establishment

of Malay language as the national language. Our study suggests that the

insensitivity of such policies is rooted in the failure to construct a mutual

understanding between the Malays and the non-Malays on the meaning

of national membership, which serves as the condition for becoming a

genuine Malaysian. To prove our argument, we will demonstrate that the

Malays and the non-Malays have different meanings of national member-

ship, and that the cultural hegemony of the Malays and struggle against it

by the non-Malays are the main cause of different interpretations of na-

tional membership.

Membership is often equated with oneness, sameness, belonging and

identity. It is crucial to distinguish between state membership and na-tional membership, although they are sometimes interchangeable. The

more familiar term for state membership is citizenship, which entails well

codified obligation and social and political rights, whereas national mem-

bership is relative and subjective in nature. According to Brubaker

(2010), it is possible to analytically distinguish the politics of citizenship

in the nation-state and the politics of belonging to the nation-state.Hence a person with formal state membership could contest his/her sub-

stantive status as a full member of the nation. Nonetheless, in its most ra-

tional form, national membership may resemble state membership. Here,

we define national membership as the state of being a member of a na-

tion which involves a sense of belonging to and identity with a nation.

Because in a multi-ethnic nation-state, a nation is a political entity that




276 아세아연구 제58권 2호 (2015년)

consists of multiple ethnic groups, ethnic membership is defined as the

state of being a member of an ethnic group that has unique cultural tradi-

tions and a sense of belonging.

As reflected in the ‘cricket metaphor’ (Yuval-Davis 2006, 210), the dis-

tinction is more remarkable in the entitlement of membership. Unlike

state membership, there is no explicit way to exhibit the qualification of

national membership. In 1990, Norman Tebbit, a British politician and a

member of the Conservative Party, suggested that, ‘if people watched a

cricket match between Britain and the team of the country from which

they or their family originated and cheered the latter team, it meant that

those people did not really “belong” to the British collectivity’

(Yuval-Davis 2006, 210). In this sense, the criteria of becoming a genuine

national member may vary along ethnic lines. Thus, an ethnic group may

regard itself as the national member but it may not be recognized as such

by other groups.In Malaysia, the Malays are the dominant ethnic group and attempt to

impose their own cultural principles as the criteria for membership, while

other ethnic groups tend to promote unity by downplaying cultural

difference. In most cases, the non-Malays regard themselves as true

members of nation Malaysia by claiming their emotional attachment and

belongingness to the nation regardless of ethnicity. For them, it is notcultural markers such as language preference, religion and Islamic his-

tory, but nationality, modern law, contribution, and the history of war

against enemies and nation-building that have constructed the nation.

Chinese and Indian students often complain about the overemphasis of

Islamic history in both subjects of World History and National History.

These students also urge that for the sake of national development and





globalization, English should be stressed over Malay language.

On the other hand, as shown in the Malay proverb used as prop-

aganda for the national language campaign, ‘bahasa jiwa bangsa’ (literally

meaning ‘language as the spirit of nation’), Malay language is an indis-

pensable component of the nation for the Malays. Together with Islamic

principles and Islamic history, they form the core of nation Malaysia

based on Malay's principles of culture. The Islamic elements penetrate

through every important national feature such as the symbolic power of

the King, national anthem, national flag, national history and ‘Rukun

Negara’ (National Principles). In order to become a true member of the

nation, Chinese and Indians confine their ethnic features to the private

sphere but conform to the ‘national’ features in public. For instance,

many Malays urge Chinese and Indian parents to send their children to

national schools instead of vernacular ones. Chinese and Indians are also

encouraged to speak with each other in Malay language rather than

English or their mother tongue.

In this context, Chinese and Indians are likely to be seen and treated

as ‘secondary citizens’. They are often labeled as ‘pendatang’ (immigrant)

because they are assumed to be not fluent in Malay language and not

ready to integrate into Malay culture and society. Consequently, the

non-Malays have doubts about their status as full-fledged national mem-bers in Malaysia. It is obvious that national membership claimed by the

non-Malays differs from that by the Malays, as the latter tend to include

the cultural criteria based on their own ethnicity. Here, the refusal of

Chinese and Indians to give up vernacular schools and be absorbed into

national education is a sign that they demand national membership that

is not based on specific Malay traits.




278 아세아연구 제58권 2호 (2015년)

The main cause of the different interpretations of national member-

ship rests on cultural hegemony of one group over the others in the

process of nation-building. The understanding of nation as a form of cul-

tural hegemony (Smith 1986) underlies this argument. In this context,

dominant ethnicity emerged when a core ethnic group played a leading

role in the process of nation formation (Kaufmann 2004). Dominant eth-

nicity is a key concept to understand how a dominant ethnic group de-

fines national membership. National membership defined by other ethnic

groups could be theoretically based on the definition of the dominant

ethnic group. Dominant ethnicity is distinguished from political or eco-

nomic domination because it is a sense of collectivity that cuts across so-

cial classes in an ethnic group, whereas political and economic domi-

nation are largely confined to upper-class ethnic members (Husin 1984).

From this perspective, we may expect that the dominant ethnic group

tends to de-emphasize the distinction between national and ethnic iden-tity and defines a nation in terms of ethnicity - as the continuation of the

precursor ethnic community. In opposition to the dominant group, dia-

sporic communities like Chinese and Indians in Malaysia strategically at-

tach themselves to the nation by endorsing national membership that is

constructed by non-ascriptive common features shared across all groups,

such as nationality, modern law, and contribution to the nation. By doingso, they could claim national membership without losing their ethnic

identity. This is a strategy to survive within an alien cultural hegemony,

and in this process their object of loyalty or obligation is transferred from

the origin society to the local society while preserving their root culture.

In a multi-ethnic society, these two modes of national membership

are incompatible with each other. This explains why policies of social in-





tegration frequently fail to serve the interest of the non-Malays. The

Malays do not understand why Chinese and Indians refuse to accept

‘national language’ and ‘national education’, whereas the non-Malays do

not understand why they are not considered as genuine national mem-

bers by the Malays.

Our study will demonstrate that national membership perceived by

the non-Malay is not the same as that of the Malays. To support our argu-

ment, we employ social identity theory to predict the relationship be-

tween identity and attitudes (Tajfel 1978; Turner 1982). If national mem-

bership correlates with exclusive ethnicity, stronger identification to the

nation will increase social distance with other ethnic groups. On the oth-

er hand, if national membership is constructed along with other common

features such as nationality and contribution to nation, it should embrace

all the Malays, Chinese and Indians. In other words, stronger identi-

fication with the nation will entail intimacy with members of other ethnicgroups that belong to the nation (Fleischmann et al 2011; Verkuyten and

Khan 2012).

Ⅱ. Theoretical Framework

1. Formation of Dominant Ethnicity and National Identity

According to Kaufmann (2004), dominant ethnicity emerges when a

particular ethnic group exercises cultural and symbolic dominance within




280 아세아연구 제58권 2호 (2015년)

a nation. The dominant ethnic group is the core ethnic group that played

a leading role in the process of nation-state formation. The domination

normally entails political dominance but is not necessarily accompanied

by economic dominance. This observation is based on Anthony Smith's

(1991) concept of ‘core ethnie’, which links the asymmetric nature of eth-

nicity to the formation of nation.

A dominant ethnic group never ceases from manifesting its domi-

nation in contemporary nation after its pre-modern predecessors and re-

tains its ethnicity(Kaufmann and Zimmer 2004). One remarkable modern

characteristic of dominant ethnicity is the tendency to conceal its eth-

nicity in nationalist discourse, while imposing its ethnic practices on to

others. In his study of American ethnicity, Kaufmann (2006) shows how a

dominant ethnic group in the United States absorbs diverse immigrant

populations to its ethnic core while maintaining its ethnic boundaries.

The process is occasionally concealed by the ideological value ofliberalism. Meanwhile, Juteau (2004) criticized the trans-ethnic citizen-

ship that was promoted by the dominant ethnic group in Canada. By

adopting the trans-ethnic citizenship, the dominant group in Canada

might think that they had overcome ethnicity and no longer regard them-

selves as an ethnic group. However, evidence showed that ethnic iden-

tity of the dominant group in Canada persists and is still operative on theground level.

The above observation suggests that as a core ethnic group in a na-

tion, the dominant ethnic group tends to correlate national identity with

ethnic identity and identifies ‘authentic’ national member on the basis of

exclusive dominant ethnicity while claiming inclusive national identity.

Though ethnicity is concealed underneath national identity, it is what





functions in reality. In this context, diasporas like Chinese have no choice

but to strategically endorse the national membership that separates their

ethnicity from national identity.

2. Dominant Ethnicity in Malaysia

The Malays, Chinese, and Indians constitute the major population of

the Malaysia Peninsula. The state leaders are ambitious in constructing a

national identity that embraces all ethnic groups. For instance, former

Prime Minister Mahathir's idea of ‘Vision 2020’ aims at a truly united

‘Malaysian race’ by 2020. Despite the ambitious vision, Malay's domi-

nance never ceases to prevail in the state defined national identity. Ethnic

relations in Malaysia are diagnosed to be still in a “worrying and fragile

state” or in the state of “stable tension” (Shamsul and Yusoff 2011, 5-7).Existing literature lists several events that contributed to the con-

temporary social configuration and the status of dominant Malay.

Hirschman (1987) and Banton (1994) emphasized the role of the

Colonial Office in shaping ethnic divisions before independence. The

British Colonial Office had adopted the ‘divide and rule’ policy on the

Malay Peninsula. This included the arbitrary assignment of ethnic cat-egory to the population according to physical appearance and country of

origin. Segregated residential areas were deliberately planned to avoid

direct contact between ethnic categories. Division of labor was artificially

drawn along ethnic lines, where most of Malays were confined to coun-

tryside agriculture and high strata colonial administrative office. Chinese

were concentrated in mining, business and trading, while Indians were in




282 아세아연구 제58권 2호 (2015년)

small estates and low strata colonial administrative office. Malay rulers

held symbolic power. Nonetheless, the rise of multiethnic middle-class

during the 1980s has significantly relieved occupational segregation

along ethnic lines.

On the contrary, Khoo (2009) argued that the British did not deliber-

ately separate the ethnic groups. Evidences show that Malays and

Chinese immigrants had little social intercourse with each other at places

where their communities lived in quite close proximity, even before the

era of British administration. Due to different values and religion, the two

groups only had superficial social intercourse in the marketplace, offices,

non-ethnic clubs, English-medium schools and during sports activities.

The British might have taken for granted the social configuration to favor

their rule and further crystallized the division of ethnic groups.

Then how ethnic Malays turned into the dominant group and later

transformed to the Malay nation? Shamsul (as quoted in Yusoff 2011) ex-amined the epistemological aspect of colonial inheritance. Colonial

knowledge, including concepts of census, map, ethnic difference and na-

tionalism, influenced the Malay intelligentsia and the way they con-

structed modern social reality. Before the post-war period, Chinese and

Indians had no political and social interests on the Malay Peninsula.

Instead, they endorsed nationalism in their mother countries of Chinaand India. On the contrary, influenced by colonial knowledge and in re-

sponse to the growing ethnic cleavages, the Malay intellectuals started to

assert their indigenousness. Around the post-war period, there was mas-

sive ethnic mobilization among the Malays, initiated by Malay

intellectuals. Shamsul (1998) and Milner (1998) illustrated debates about

national identity between factions of Malay intellectuals on the press. It





was possible to distinguish between acculturationist discourse and assim-

ilationist discourse. The former asserted a non-ascriptive and inclusive

notion of nation. Nonetheless, the fear of losing ethnic identity was evi-

dent in both discourses.

The year 1946 marks the most critical event in the history of Malay

dominance. The Colonial Office proposed the plan of ‘Malayan Union

State’, but they were strongly opposed by Malay nationalists on the

ground that the plan would offer equal citizenship to the non-Malays.

Aligning with the Malay nationalism movement, the Colonial Office dis-

carded the Malayan Union and drafted the Federation of Malaya made up

of only Malay representatives. It is not clear why Chinese and Indians

were excluded from the committee, but there is strong historical evi-

dence showing that the British were in favor of the Malay (Wade 2009).

In the framework of the Federation, the Constitution stated the privilege

status of the Malay. The Constitution, which continues to privilege theMalay's dominant status, took effect on 15 August 1957. The status of

dominance manifests in the form of social consensus, where non-Malays

recognize Malay primacy in exchange for equal citizenship rights.

Malay nationalism entered another phase when Mahathir proposed

the notion of ‘Malaysian race’. His earlier notion of ‘the new Malays’ in-

tended to liberate the Malays from the inferior image. In his ambitiousnational identity project, ‘the new Malays’ would be embedded in the

modern and highly industrialized nation flourished with economic

achievements. In other words, the national identity serves to locate Malay

ethnic identity in a rapidly developing globalized world, while recogniz-

ing the other ethnic identities as parts of it. Peculiarly, any form of

non-Malay nationalism never exists on the Malaysia Peninsula.




284 아세아연구 제58권 2호 (2015년)

In fact, we have witnessed a transition from ethno-nation to civic na-

tion during the late 1990's when Mahathir successfully instilled the uni-

versal values such as tolerance, harmony and peace to the national

identity. The effort was accompanied by the slogan ‘Malaysia Can’, which

boasted the psychological state for being a confident Malaysian regard-

less of ethnic group. Consequently, the Malays, Chinese and Indians

share a common identity as Malaysian. However the national identity di-

verges when it has to inevitably deal with the issues of religion, lan-

guage, and culture.

Non-Malays endorse a multi-lingual nation, in which vernacular edu-

cation would be embraced in the national framework. This is especially

true for the Chinese. The Chinese educationists started lobbying for mul-

ti-lingual policy since 1940. It would grant full sponsorship on all types of

vernacular school from the government. In response to the Chinese

movement, radical Malays stressed the government to secure the status ofMalay language as the sole national language. Eventually, the govern-

ment never passed the bill but in contrast restricted the establishment of

new vernacular school.

Today, Malay dominance retains its form in an unchallengeable

‘ketuanan Melayu’ (literally meaning Malay supremacy) discourse. It

claims Malay's indigenousness and the unconditional way of definingMalaysian nation with Malay ethnicity. The discourse not only embodies

Malay dominance in history textbooks (Ting 2009), but also in symbolic

resources such as sultanate, mythology, national language, and religion.

Cultural features of other ethnic groups are in turn downplayed within

the national framework.





3. Social Distance and Identification

The criteria for belonging inevitably entail a process of inclusion and

exclusion that generates a range of emotional distance. The concept of

‘social distance’ (Bogardus 1933) helps explicate emotional distance.

Social distance is ‘the sympathetic understanding that exists between per-

sons, between groups, and between a person and each of his groups …

[social distance] may take the form of either farness or nearness. Where

there is a little sympathetic understanding, social farness exists. Where

sympathetic understanding is great, nearness exists’ (Bogardus 1993,

268). Social distance is not limited to spatial distance. Evaluation of social

distance is possible even when the target is physically far from the

evaluator.

Karakayali (2009) distinguishes four dimensions of social distance: af-

fective, normative, interactive, and cultural. Because this study examinesa sense of belonging, we focus on the affective dimension and

aimstomeasuresubjectiveintimacybetweenindividuals.

The indicator of Bogardus social distance scale is how much social

contact the informants from one social group are willing to have with

members of other specific social groups. The Bogardus Scale is built on

the implicit assumption that informants have a general, collective under-standing of ‘who belong and does not belong to their own group.’ This

suggests that informants already perceive the target as being intimate

with or distinct from their own group. This in turn allows the detection of

how informants define who belongs to their own group and who does

not.

Social identity not only links self to social group, but also differ-




286 아세아연구 제58권 2호 (2015년)

entiates between in-group and out-group (Tajfel 1978; Turner 1982).

According to social identity theory, social identities are cognitively con-

structed through the processes of self-categorization and self-enhance-

ment. The self cognitively distinguishes significant categories such as

gender, ethnicity, and nationality; and divides them into in-group and

out-group based on the self's locus. Self-enhancement is then achieved

though social comparison by accentuating differences between in-group

and out-group, whereby one favors membership to his/her own group.

In effect, the self develops a strong attachment and commitment towards

the in-group and increases distinction from the out-group.

This indicates that the process of identification leads to the separation

of members and non-members. This is followed by the affective evalua-

tion of increased intimacy among in-group members compared to

out-group members. The affective evaluation, however, is only valid as

long as it is used for the purpose of comparison. An absolute evaluationis misleading because an individual may feel intimate with a stranger, as

rightly pointed out by Karakayali (2009).

Other studies have explained the variance of social distance by nu-

merous other factors. Odell, Korgen, and Wang (2005) compared the role

of college students' grade, year, experience of staying in hostel and num-

ber of friends from other ethnic groups, based on the contact hypothesis.The result showed that only the number of friends from other ethnic

group had a statistically significant effect. Westie (1952) confirmed that

both occupations of informant and target were positively related with the

degree of intimacy. Meanwhile, Gonzalez et al. (2008) identified per-

ceived symbolic threat as a significant predictor of prejudice towards

Muslims, but the predictor variable was influenced by identification with





in-group. That is, a stronger identification with in-group generated more

perceived symbolic threat, and in effect increased prejudice towards

Muslims. On the other hand, Pettigrew (1960) found that stronger au-

thoritarianism led to greater social distance. Other factors such as gender,

education level, and frequency of visiting oversea country showed incon-

sistent association with social distance (Hello et al. 2006; Muir and Muir

1988; Parrillo and Donogue 2005; Randall and Delbridge 2005).

Based on the above theoretical and historical reviews, we propose

the following hypotheses regarding relationships among ethnic identity,

national identity, and social distance.

Hypothesis (1): The degree to which a person identifies with his/her ethnic

group is positively associated with social distance towards

other ethnic groups. The stronger ethnic identification one

has, the greater social distance he/she feels towards other

ethnic groups.

Hypothesis (2): The degree to which a person identifies with nation is differ-

entially associated with social distance towards other ethnic

groups depending on his/her ethnicity.

Hypothesis (2a): For Malays, the stronger national identification one has, the

greater social distance he/she feels towards Chinese and

Indians.Hypothesis (2b): For Chinese, the stronger national identification one has, the

smaller social distance he/she feels towards Malays and

Indians.




288 아세아연구 제58권 2호 (2015년)

Ⅲ. Data and Methods

1. Demographic Analysis

The study collected data by conducting a survey-study in three na-

tional universities in Malaysia: University Malaya, University Putra

Malaysia, and National University of Malaysia. University students were

chosen for this study because we could control for their age, income, and

other individual characteristics that could affect their perceptions and re-

lationships with members of other ethnic groups. We fully understand,

however, this sample has limited generalizability because they are more

likely to have a higher level of education and more liberal views than or-

dinary people. In some sense, they can be viewed as a group that ex-

hibits the upper limit in terms of perceptions of national membership.The three national universities were chosen because they offer broad

ranges of disciplines including natural, humanities, and social sciences.

Also, unlike private universities that attract a particular ethnic group at a

higher rate, these three universities accept the Malays, Chinese, and

Indians without any special preference to a specific ethnic group. In oth-

er word, the university college students are exposed to a multi-ethnic en- vironment, in which they make choices among various ethnic groups in

their daily lives. Five hundreds and eighty one students from various eth-

nic groups participated in the survey. A sample of respondents was ob-

tained from lecture halls where the lecturers accepted our request to con-

duct the survey during the lectures. Quota sampling was used as a sam-

pling method to represent the ethnic composition of the Malays, Chinese





and Indians in Malaysia. The intended sample size was 600 persons,

where 58.1% Malays, 28.2% Chinese and 10.0% Indians would be

included. The numbers of respondents actually drawn from University

Malay, University Putra Malaysia and National University of Malaysia

were 262, 209, and 110, respectively. Female participants constituted

74.5% of the total sample, which corresponds to the higher ratio of fe-

male students in the three universities. Three hundred and twenty four

respondents (56% of the total sample) identified themselves as ethnic

Malay, 157 (28% of the total sample) Chinese and 63 (11% of the total

sample) Indian. The remainder identified with other ethnicities such as

Iban, Dusun, Melanau, Sikh among others. These proportions resemble

the actual ethnic composition of Malaysia. However, those who identi-

fied themselves as Iban, Dusun, Melanau and Sikh were not included in

the analysis because it would require another chapter to examine the re-

lationship between the native minorities and the Malays. Although thesample was not a probability sample and hence has limited ability to

generalize the findings, we believe it can still help us understand how

university students of the three ethnic groups feel towards each other

and how ethnic/national identity affects social distance toward other eth-

nic groups.

A comparison among the three ethnic groups in <Table 1> indicatesthat the Malay respondents are culturally more homogenous than their

Chinese and Indian counterparts, especially in terms of religion and

language. For example, 98% of Malay respondents speak Malay and

100% of them believe in Islam, while Chinese and Indian respondents

have more diverse language use patterns and religions. There is no clear

hierarchy in social status among the groups, although the Malays show




290 아세아연구 제58권 2호 (2015년)

<Table 1> Descriptive Characteristics of Respondents

Malay

(N=319)

Chinese

(N=157)

Indian

(N=63)

GenderMale 23.8% 31.9% 12.7%

Female 76.2% 68.2% 87.3%

Household

gross

income

Less than RM1000 29.0% 15.9% 15.9%

RM1000~RM2000 30.9% 34.4% 33.3%

RM2000~RM3000 14.8% 23.6% 23.8%

RM3000~RM5000 12.7% 16.6% 22.2%

More than RM5000 12.3% 9.6% 9.5%

Family social

class

Lower class 12.0% 9.6% 6.3%

Middle class 87.3% 89.8% 93.7%

Upper class 0.7% 0.6% 0.0%

Language

Malay(97.8%)

English(1.9%)Melanau(0.3%)

English(6.4%)

Mandarin(79.6%)Others(14.0%)

Tamil(84.1%)

English(11.1%)Malay(3.2%)

Telugu(1.6%)

Religion

Islam(100.0%) Buddhism(73.2%)

Protestant(15.3%)

Taoism(8.3%)

Others(3.2%)

Hinduism(87.3%)

Catholic(6.3%)

Baha'l(4.8%)

Islam(1.6%)

greater income difference within the group than Chinese and Indians.

Except for income, there is no remarkable difference in socioeconomic

status among the three ethnic groups in this sample.

2. Measurement of Variables

The dependent variable in this study is relative social distance, whichis also used as a tool to measure member intimacy. Social distance was

measured by using a modified Bogardus social distance scale (Bogardus

1933). The original Bogardus scale is one-dimensional and Gutmann

scale that comprised of seven statements extracted through Thurstone's

extraction method. The original statements were modified because they

do not reflect the students' everyday life. The modified statements are as





follows: 1. To marry with; 2. To date with; 3. To live in the same room; 4.

To live in the same house; 5. To eat on same table in a cafeteria; 6. To do

group assignment together; 7. To sit beside in class; 8. To attend the

same university.

The original Gutmann scale was changed to a six-level Likert scale

because it was proved that a cultural factor does play an important role

especially in non-White society (Ogundale 1980; Weinfurt and

Moghaddam 2001). The original scale is grounded in the assumption of

the statements' hierarchy, and the hierarchy is constructed based on

White's judgment. Meanwhile, if the assumption of Gutmann scale is cor-

rect, we can conclude that a respondent who scores higher for a group is

socially closer to the group.

Social distance was measured for the three target groups: the Malays,

Chinese, and Indians. Factor analysis of the eight statements measured

for the three target groups showed that all of the statements could form asingle factor. Cronbach's a coefficient of the eight items ranged from

0.831 to 0.964, indicating high reliability. Mean scores were obtained for

each target group, with higher score indicating closer relationship. Mean

social distance for other ethnic group was deducted from mean social

distance for respondent's ethnic group, yielding two relative social dis-

tance variables for each ethnic group. Higher score means larger relativedistance, hence less intimacy.

Means and standard deviation of relative social distance are summar-

ized in <Table 2>. The results indicated that on average people felt more

intimate with co-ethnic members than members of other ethnic groups.

The independent variables in this study are identification with ethnic

group and identification with nation. Both of the variables are measured




292 아세아연구 제58권 2호 (2015년)

by using a modified scale of Multigroup Ethnic Identity Measure –

Revised (MEIM-R) (Phinney and Ong 2007). To compare both identi-

fications, ethnic identification and national identification were measured

by using exactly the same scale by changing the subject (i.e. ethnic group

or nation).

The original scale consists of six items: 1. I have spent time trying to

learn about my ethnic group, such as its history, traditions, and customs;

2. I have often done things that will help me understand my ethnic back-

ground better; 3. I have often talked to other people in order to learn

more about my ethnic group; 4. I have a strong sense of belonging to my

own ethnic group; 5. I understand pretty well what my ethnic group

membership means to me; 6. I feel a strong attachment towards my own

ethnic group.

Two statements were added to the original scale: I have often put pri-

ority to learn my mother tongue than other languages; I am happy that Iam a member of the ethnic group I belong to. The eight items were used

to measure identification with nation by changing ‘ethnic group’ to

‘nation’ or ‘Malaysia’. The corresponding item for mother tongue was re-

phrased to match national identification: I have put effort to learn Bahasa

Malaysia because it is my ‘bahasa kebangsaan’ (national language). Items

were measured by the four-level Likert scale.Factor analysis showed that the eight items construct a factor for both

ethnic and national identification. Cronbach's α coefficient of the eight

items ranged from 0.819 to 0.901, indicating high reliability in both cases.

The eight items were then summed up to construct two variables of eth-

nic identification and national identification. Representative score was

obtained through mean score of the eight items ranging from 1 to 4,





<Table 2> Distributions of Dependent, Independent and Control Variables

Malay (N=319) Chinese (N=157) Indian (N=63)Remark

Means S.D Means S.D Means S.D

Gender 1.76 .429 1.68 .467 1.87 .336 Nominal

Household gross

income2.50 1.357 2.69 1.202 2.40 1.314 5-Likert

Frequency of

going to other

countries

.84 1.537 2.32 3.254 .68 1.156 Open-end

Experience of

staying with other

ethnic group

1.64 .502 1.39 .489 1.32 .469 Nominal

Frequency of

talking with other

ethnic group

2.83 .745 2.99 .767 3.41 .663 4-Likert

Perceived threat 2.05 .521 2.15 .474 1.94 .502 4-Likert

Ethnic

identification3.16 .376 3.05 .386 3.42 .469 4-Likert

Nation

identification3.37 .414 2.97 .405 3.40 .467 4-Likert

Social distance

Malay5.08 .802 - - - - 6-Likert

Social distance

Malay-Chinese1.25 1.112 - - - - -5~5

Social distance

Malay-Indian1.63 1.183 - - - - -5~5

Social distance

Chinese- - 5.33 .743 - - 6-Likert

Social distance

Chinese-Malay- - 1.97 1.183 - - -5~5

Social distance

Chinese-Indian- - 2.06 1.288 - - -5~5

Social distance

Indian- - - - 5.50 .728 6-Likert

Social distance

Indian-Malay- - - - 1.63 1.046 -5~5

Social distance

Indian-Chinese- - - - 1.20 1.036 -5~5

Note: S.D = Standard deviation

where higher score means higher degree of identification.

The distribution of ethnic identification and national identification for

the three ethnic groups is shown in <Table 2>. It is quite surprising that

the Indian respondents scored the highest means for both ethnic identi-




294 아세아연구 제58권 2호 (2015년)

fication and national identification. However, a closer examination re-

veals that the standard deviations of both variables for the Indian re-

spondents are also the greatest. This could be explained by larger in-

dividual differences among the Indian respondents. The difference be-

tween the Malay and Chinese respondents is quite noticeable: the Malay

respondents have higher national identification than ethnic identification

whereas the opposite is true for the Chinese respondents. Among the

three groups, Chinese have the lowest score of national identification.

The two types of identities are strongly correlated with each other for the

Malay respondents with Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.643

(significant at the 0.01 level), while the corresponding correlation co-

efficient for Chinese is only 0.183 (significant at the 0.01 level). This result

shows that both ethnic and national identification overlap for the Malay

respondents while they do not coincide for the Chinese respondents.

The control variables of this study include gender, family income, fre-quency of going to other countries, experience of staying with other eth-

nic group member, frequency of talking with other ethnic group mem-

bers, and perceived threat. According to existing literature, these varia-

bles are known to affect social distance between different racial and eth-

nic groups. A more detailed explanation and operationalization of these

variables are provided in a later section of this article. Methods of meas-urement, means and standard deviations for each control variable are dis-

played in <Table 2>.





Ⅳ. Results

1. Correlation Analyses

In Malays-Chinese relation, correlation test showed that Pearson cor-

relation coefficients of relative social distance with ethnic identification

and national identification were 0.184 and 0.161, respectively. Both were

significant at the 0.01 level. While in Malays-Indians relation, results in-

dicated that Pearson correlation coefficients of relative social distance

with ethnic identification and national identification were 0.167 and

0.098, respectively. However, only ethnic identification was significant at

the 0.01 level. This means ethnic identification was positively correlated

with both Malays-Chinese and Malays-Indians social distance, but na-

tional identification was positively correlated only with Malays-Chinesesocial distance. In other words, the Malay respondents who had stronger

identification with co-ethnic group felt less intimacy with Chinese and

Indians; while those who had stronger identification with nation felt less

intimacy with Chinese but not with Indians.

In Chinese-Malays relation, Pearson correlation coefficients of relative

social distance with ethnic identification and national identification were0.307 and -0.226, respectively. Both were significant at the 0.01 level.

While in Chinese-Indians relation, Pearson correlation coefficients of rela-

tive social distance with ethnic identification and national identification

were 0.312 and -0.195, respectively. Both were also significant at the

<0.05 level. This suggests that the Chinese respondents who had stronger

identification with co-ethnic group felt less intimacy with Malays and




296 아세아연구 제58권 2호 (2015년)

Indians, while those who had stronger identification with nation felt

more intimacy with Malays and Indians.

Finally, in Indians-Malays relation, Pearson correlation coefficients for

ethnic identification and national identification were 0.229 and 0.070,

respectively. While in Indians-Chinese relation, Pearson correlation co-

efficients for ethnic identification and national identification were 0.218

and 0.178, respectively. All were not statistically significant. This means

that both types of identification were not correlated with relative social

distance for the Indian respondents. As mentioned earlier, the Indian re-

spondents consisted of many different sub-ethnic groups and thus in-

ternal variation in characteristics and social attitudes were greater than

the Malay and Chinese respondents. In this regard, it is worth mentioning

the report of Lee and Rajoo (1987) who found that varieties of factors

such as caste system, regional origins, religious affiliation and socio-

economic status interwoven with sub-ethnicity make Indian identity com-

plex and heterogeneous.

2. Multiple Regression Analyses

We conducted multiple regression analyses to test the independenteffect of either ethnic or national identification on relative social distance

between a pair of ethnic groups. Other variables known to affect relative

social distance between ethnic groups were included in the analyses as

control variables. They were gender, family income, frequency of going

to other countries, experience of staying with other ethnic group mem-

ber, frequency of talking with other ethnic group member, and perceived





threat.

According to the contact hypothesis, as opportunities to contact

members of other ethnic groups increase, prejudice against them is likely

to decrease when contacts are continuous and made on equal terms.

Three variables were used as measures of contact: frequency of going to

other countries, experience of staying with members of other ethnic

groups, and frequency of talking with members of other ethnic groups.

Frequency of going to other countries was an open-ended question while

the experience of staying with members of other ethnic groups was cod-

ed as ‘yes’, ‘no’, and ‘not sure’. Frequency of talking with members of oth-

er ethnic groups was a 4-Likert scale variable. Means and distribution are

listed in <Table 2>.

Perceived ethnic threat was included as a control variable because it

is known to transform prejudice and stereotypes against a particular eth-

nic group into antagonism against it (Blalock 1967; Coenders et al. 2003;Noel 1968; Reijman and Semyonov 2004; Stephan and Stephan 2001).

Measurement of perceived ethnic threat was adapted from Scheepers,

Gijsberts, and Coenders's (2002) study on ethnic exclusionism. The scale

was constructed out of five items: 1. In schools where there are too many

children from other ethnic groups, the quality of education becomes low;

2. People from other ethnic groups abuse the system of social benefits; 3.The religious practices of people from other ethnic groups threaten our

way of life; 4. The presence of people from other ethnic groups is a

cause of insecurity; 5. The presence of people from other ethnic group

increases unemployment in Malaysia. Each item was measured by a

four-level Likert scale ranged from ‘1-strongly disagree’, ‘2-disagree’,

‘3-agree’, and ‘4-strongly agree’. Factor analysis showed that the five items




298 아세아연구 제58권 2호 (2015년)

<Table 3> Multiple Regression Analysis for Social Distance between the Malays and Chinese

Model I Model II Model III Model IV

Gender .052 .058 .073 .069

Household gross income .083 .076 .085 .080

Frequency of going to other

countries.-.160** -.158** -.159** -.158**

Frequency of talking with other

ethnic group -.254*** -.274*** -.272*** -.277***

Experience of staying with

other ethnic group .130* .119* .120* .118*

Perceived ethnic threat .129** .168** .192** .183**

Ethnic identification .200*** .127(.071)

Nation identification .198*** .116(.104)

Number of cases 287 287 286 286

Adjusted R2 .155 .195 .192 .202

F 8.579*** 9.640*** 9.467*** 8.763***

Note: Values shown areβ, significant level in parentheses; *p< .05, **p< .01, ***p< .001

were valid in constructing a single factor. Cronbach's a coefficient rangedfrom 0.692 to 0.767 for the three ethnic groups, indicating satisfactory

reliability.

The five items were then summed up and their means obtained,

where higher score showed stronger perceived threat. Means and stand-

ard deviations for each ethnic group are summarized in <Table 2>.

The result of multiple regression analysis for Malays-Chinese relationis summarized in <Table 3>. In model I, only control variables were

loaded. The adjusted R 2 for the model was 0.195 and the model was sig-

nificant at the 0.001 level. Gender and household gross income were not

significantly related with the relative distance between the Malay and

Chinese respondents. Contact-related variables were all significantly re-

lated with the dependent variable, but the directions of relationships





<Table 4> Multiple Regression Analysis for Social Distance between the Malays and Indians


Gender .042 .047 .055 .050

Household gross income .022 .017 .024 .019


countries .-.050 -.048 -.049 -.048


ethnic group -.203** -.221*** -.214*** -.222***


other ethnic group .113* .105 .107 .104

Perceived ethnic threat .174** .177** .191** .180**

Ethnic identification .170** .155*

Nation identification .124* .024


Adjusted R2 .105 .133 .119 .133

F 5.451*** 6.112*** 5.381*** 5.329***

Note: Values shown areβ; *p< .05, **p< .01, ***p< .001

were different for each variable. The frequency of going to other coun-tries and frequency of talking with members of other ethnic groups tend-

ed to reduce the relative social distance between Malays and Chinese,

but the experience of staying with members of other ethnic groups in-

creased the relative social distance. As expected, perceived threat was

positively related with the dependent variable, indicating that fear of

threat from another ethnic group widens social distance between the twogroups.

In model II and III, ethnic identification and national identification

were added to the control variables, alternately. The size and direction of

regression coefficients of the control variables remained basically the

same with the addition of either ethnic or national identification variable.

Both ethnic and national identification variables were positively and sig-




300 아세아연구 제58권 2호 (2015년)

<Table 5> Multiple Regression Analysis for Social Distance between Chinese and the Malays


Gender -.040 -.016 -.081 -.065

Household gross income -.115 -.109 -.104 -.094


countries .039 .003 .053 .014


ethnic group -.174* -.164* -.135 -.109


other ethnic group-.014 .016 -.017 .019

Perceived ethnic threat .254** .200* .244** .175*

Ethnic identification .241** .296***

Nation identification -.191* -.256**


Adjusted R2 .134 .187 .166 .242

F 3.647** 4.626*** 4.009*** 5.593***


nificantly related with the dependent variable, indicating that the Malayrespondents who identified more strongly with co-ethnicity and nation

were more likely to feel less intimate with Chinese.

Finally, in model VI, where both ethnic and national identification

variables were added, the coefficients of the two variables became stat-

istically insignificant, suggesting multicollinearity between the two. In

fact, the Pearson correlation coefficient between the two was 0.653. Thisresult indicates that the Malay respondents who strongly identified with

co-ethnicity also strongly identified with nation and felt less intimate with

Chinese.

Similar patterns emerged when we analyzed Malays-Indians relations.

As we can see in <Table 4>, both ethnic and national identification tend-

ed to increase relative social distance between the Malay and Indians.





<Table 6> Multiple Regression Analysis for Social Distance between Chinese and Indians


Gender -.046 -.021 -.083 -.068

Household gross

income-.122 -.116 -.112 -.101

Frequency of

going to other

countries

.039 .001 .052 .011

Frequency of

talking with other

ethnic group

-.113 -.102 -.077 -.050

Experience of

staying with other

ethnic group

-.021 .011 -.024 .013

Perceived ethnic

threat .212* .155 .203* .132

Ethnic

identification .251** .302***

Nation

identification-.173* -.239**


Adjusted R2 .090 .147 .116 .196

F 2.328* 3.481** 2.651* 4.266***


When these two variables were added simultaneously, only ethnic identi-

fication became significant, suggesting that ethnic identification has a

greater effect on relative social distance. This result suggests that the

Malay respondents who strongly identified with Malay ethnicity felt less

intimate with Indians. When we analyzed Chinese-Malays and Chinese-Indians relations,

however, quite different patterns emerged. Not only were both ethnic

and national identification significant when each variable was added re-

spectively, but they also remained significant when added together in the

regression model as shown in <Table 5>. This means that unlike the

Malay respondents who showed strong multicollinearity between ethnic




302 아세아연구 제58권 2호 (2015년)

and national identification, the Chinese respondents had somewhat in-

dependent conceptions of ethnic and national identification. We also

need to pay attention to the different signs of regression coefficients of

the two variables. The positive sign of ethnic identification means that

the Chinese respondents who strongly identified with co-ethnicity felt

less intimate with Indians, but those who strongly identified with nation

felt more intimate with the Malays.

The same pattern is true with Chinese-Indians relations. As we can

see in <Table 6>, identification with Chinese ethnicity widened relative

social distance from Indians while identification with nation reduced so-

cial distance from Indians.

Ⅴ. Conclusion

While much research has paid attention to the role of government in

ethnic relations in Malaysia, in this study we focus on the social psycho-

logical dimension of ethnic relations. The results of statistical analyses

support the three hypotheses regarding the relationships between eth-

nic/national identification and relative social distance. We found thatthose who strongly identified with their own ethnic group felt less in-

timate with members of other ethnic groups. This is true for the Malay,

Chinese, and Indian respondents. We also found that national identi-

fication had different effects on relative social distance depending on

ethnicity. For the Malay respondents, those who strongly identified with

nation felt less intimate with Chinese and Indians. For Chinese, however,





strong identification with nation reduced social distance from Malays and

Indians. These results suggest that the Malays do not distinguish clearly

between ethnicity and nation, and their ethnic identity often takes the

form of national identity. On the contrary, Chinese have differential con-

ception of ethnicity and nation, and national membership claimed by

them embraces all Malays, Chinese, and Indians, regardless of ethnicity.

For them, ethnicity, which embodies cultural features, is not the utmost

criterion in determining national membership.

The findings also imply that ethnic identity and national identity are

not always a clear cut dichotomy. Instead, national identity may contain

ethnic identity and appears as a hybrid of sense of local and ethnicity.

This happens because the dominant ethnic group employs national iden-

tity as an instrument to safeguard its ethnic identity. Fearing of losing

their ethnic identity, elites of the dominant ethnic group employ the re-

source and coercion power of the state to impose their ethnic identityonto members of the dominated ethnic groups. In response, diaspora

groups that are often the dominated ethnic groups challenge the domi-

nant ethnic group to protect their ethnic identities from being ignored or

lost. In most cases, the dominant ethnic group has upper hands over the

diaspora groups in nationalizing their own ethnic features. However,

some diaspora groups that possess sufficient bargaining power over thedominant group in terms of population size and political and economic

power, like the Chinese in Malaysia, try hard to keep nationhood and na-

tional identity from being too parochial and ascriptive and instead make

them as universal and rational as possible in order to be recognized and

treated as full national members. Other dominated diaspora groups that

have less bargaining power are less likely to challenge the status quo and




304 아세아연구 제58권 2호 (2015년)

more likely to take the course of assimilation into the dominant culture.

The limitation of this study is that it has a limited generalizability due

a sample of university students who are likely to have a higher level of

education and more liberal views than ordinary people. We may need a

separate and larger-scale research to determine how ordinary people per-

ceive national membership and their relationships with members of other

ethnic groups. Despite this limitation, our research demonstrated that

university students have different understanding of national membership

according to their ethnicity. It also highlights a significant effect of differ-

ent interpretation of national membership on social distance between

members of different ethnic groups. Based on our research finding we

question the effectiveness of social integration policy of the government.

Understanding the way that both the dominant ethnic group and dia-

spora groups define national membership helps us distinguish differential

meanings of national membership and national identity and comprehendhow national identity could become so instrumental in protecting ethnic

identity. The difference between national membership and national iden-

tity is very significant, and social scientists and policy makers should ad-

dress this issue when they deal with social integration in a multiethnic

society. They should also make efforts to find principles of inclusive na-

tional membership and solidarity that embrace all members of a nationand provide them with equal opportunities for participation and con-

tribution to the nation.





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Abstracts

Claiming National Membership in Multiethnic Malaysia

The Role of the Dominant Ethnicity

In-Jin Yoon

Chich Thiang Koo

In multiethnic Malaysia, policies promoting social integration seem to

have evoked conflict and mistrust among ethnic groups. Our study sug-

gests that such policy failures rooted in their insensitivity towards the dif-

ferent meaning national membership possesses for Malays and

non-Malays. Because Malays are the dominant ethnic group, they often

do not distinguish between nation and ethnicity and hence tend to in-

clude Malay cultural features as part of national membership. Non-Malays

strategically endorse a national membership that embodies only non-as-

criptive criteria. To examine the relationships among ethnic and national

identifications, and relative social distance, we conducted a sample sur-

vey of 581 college students from three Malaysian universities with differ-

ent ethnic backgrounds. Our results show that a strong identification with

ethnicity creates a distance from members of other ethnic groups. On the

contrary, while a strong national identification makes Malays somewhat

remote from Chinese and Indians, it brings Chinese closer to Malays and

Indians.




Key word : National membership, Ethnic identification, National

identification, Dominant ethnicity, Social distance

(투고일: 2015. 4. 10,심사일: 2015. 5. 29,게재확정일: 2015. 6. 15)

claiming national membership in multie쨌쨌

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