china 1911-1939

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Yuan Shih-Kai’s Republic – China 1912-1916

1. Dictatorial policies: appointed his own followers in gov. positions to

strenghthen position against Tongmenghui.

2. Assassination of Song Jiaoren in (March 1!1" (after generalelection.

". Jul# 1!1" $ Second %evolution $ &MT armed re'ellion to depose

uan) following loan deal signed '# onl# him with the *ive +owers

(impl#ing further political in,uence. %e'els easil# defeated and &MT

dissolved. %easons for failure:

• &MT divided and penniless

• -ritishforeign help to uan (uan or chaos

• uan/s 0orthern Arm# (Divisions was stronger $ in num'ers

and arms.• +eople didn/t support &MT $ didn/t understand the re'ellion.

• entr#) wanting to protect their interests) did not lie the

re'els.3. 1!13 $ uan creates 4onstitutional 4ompact that maes him into a

dictator.5. 6n 1!1271!1") uan had ver# little control over the decentrali8ed

provinces $ laced power to appoint o9cials) received on 5 of ta;

and provincial leaders dealt directl# with foreigners) even issuing

paper mone# with no value guarantee.<. After 1!1" %evolution) gaining more control over the Souther

provinces) uan attempts centrali8ation of political power: greater

+eing control of ta;es) separation of civil and militar# duties

(reduced power to militar# leaders) reducing power of local

assem'lies and esta'lishing national currenc#.=. *ailed to crush deep7rooted power of decentrali8ed provices) onl#

controling them through his -ei#ang arm#) loans to satisf# his

generals and friendship with generals.

>. uan attempts restoration of monarch# in 1!15) under the advice ofhis American and Japanese advisers) nowing that ?urope was at

war) &MT gone and that Japan would have no pro'lem) given their

21 Demands satis@ed) also counting on the consevatism of 4hinese

societ#.!. uan/s attempt fails $ man# of the provinces declared independence

from his gov. *ailure came 'ecause: the provincial gentr# feared a

monarch# would tr# centrali8ation) the progressive intellectuals

distrusted uan) his generals were not entirel# lo#al to him (made

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use of him for power) he was unpopular in 4hina due to the 21

Demands) Japan 'ri'ed his generals) -ritain refused to pa# salt ta;.

Failure of the Republic – China 1912-1916

1. %evolutionaries considered the repu'lic the most advanced and

modern form of gov.) that could save 4hina from its 'acwardness

and foreign e;ploitation) there was no alternative) and under arepu'lic the independent provinces/ interests could 'e represented

(political condition.2. %easons for failure include uan/s dictatorial policies: he had no

intention of woring for the repu'lic) 'ut ruled lie a dictator) using

'ri'e and murder. The repu'lic 'ecame a ground for sel@sh struggle

for power.". 4hina/s lac of democratic tradition pla#ed a maor role: there was a

traditional dislie for political parties) seen as sel@shl# struggling for

power. 4hina was used to the rule of men) not the rule of law. Also)

intellectual part# leaders eno#ed little popular support) social

conservatism was strong. Democrac# had di9cult# in taring root.3. +rovincial gentr# and militarist were concerned with their own

interests and power) and had little wish to help the creation of a

strong gov. in +eing. +olitical decentrali8ation started with the

Taiping) and followed '# uan/s failed monarch#.5. Disunit# and political ine;perience of intellectuals and li'erals) who

lost man# opportunities to eep uan/s power in chec. Man# had as

a greater goal the uni@cation and centrali8ation) not the creation of

a democratic repu'lic.<. The urgent need for social and economic reforms was neglected)

and the repu'lic was wea) corrupt and divided) inviting more

foreign control and Japanese agression. 6t/s failure 'rought a'out the

warlord era and turned man# intellectuals towards radical ideas lie

4ommunism.

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The Warlor !ra – China 1916-192"

1. A great in,uence in the inception of this period was 4hina/s histor#

and geograph#. Barge) with diCerent local regions) geographical

conditions and historical developments) 4hina had in fact man# local

cultures.2. The countr# previousl# 'eing held together '# the central 4ivil

Service ?;amination which produced o9cials) and the gov7'aced

4onfucianism that emphasi8ed lo#alt# and o'edience to the d#nast#

in rule (who had the mandate of heaven) no eCective wa# of

political control was availa'le after 1!11. The traditional centralstructure (the 'ac'one of 4hina was removed.

". Administrative weaness of the ing and the decentrali8ing

concessions of the Taiping %e'ellion gave increasing power to

provincial scholar7gentr# and militar# leaders who controlled the

new armies (lie uan Shih7ai. These resisted an# form of

government and wished themselves as local leaders.3. Another factor in the inception of the warlord era was the gradual

dissapearance of the traditional dislie for the militar# profession)

'ecause: foreign imperialism demanded more militari8ation) the

ing deli'eratel# tried to increase the reputation of the arm# to save

face) the discipline of the late ing armies (compared to corruption

of old armies 'rought it good reputation) the elimination of the 44?

in 1!E5 made it impossi'le for #oungsters to compete for civil

positions.5. The failure of the repu'lic to achieve real uni@cation. 6t laced

reputation and real power) and allowed militar# leaders and

provincial scholar7gentr# the accumulation of more power.

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<. -efore his death in 1!1<) uan Shih7ai was still in power to

command his generals of the -ei#ang arm# he created. The -ei#ang

arm#) strong enough to dominate other non7-ei#ang provincial arm#

and the scholar7gentr#) Fuicl# disintegrated into warring warlords

struggling for power after uan/s death. Some unit# still e;istedwhen uan was alive) for he stimulated some degree of nationalist

feeling) which was gone once he was dead.=. The warlords acted more or less independentl#) using oppression)

murdeer) and e;cessive ta;ation to acFuire wealth. Some

su'seFuentl# retired to safet#.>. +ower in the hands of warlords was @cle. The# often allowed their

commanders to rule some territories) who 'ecame increasingl#

independent) then warlords themselves. The# had no ideolog#) and

unrelia'le soldiers) conscripted '# force and hungr#. And although a

warlord ruled over the province) individual villages were led '# the

scholar7gentr#. There was no clear militar# s#stem) so armies relied

on individual o9cers $ the murder of one could completel#

desta'ili8e an arm#.!. Garlords often fought among themselves for more territorr# and

power) alliances were made and changed. Some fought to protect

their (desira'le land) others to win it) or to win +eing to have

access to foreign loans and trade) as the +eing gov. could represent

the nation in international matters.1E. 0orthern warlords fought for +eing in the name of the

uni@cation) while the southern warlords spoe strongl# for a federal

s#stem. *rom 1!1< to 1!2>) 4hina had more than = heads of state)

another = 'rief periods of caretaer governments) and 25 ca'inets in

Fuic succession.11. 6n a'sence of a centrali8ed gov) the foreign powers could

e;pand their economic concessions) 'ut found it unsafe (due to the

disorder to eno# their e;isting rights.12. *oreign policies and activities encouraged the isunit# of

4hina) where in 1!1=71> Japan provided a large loan to the +eing

gov) and other foreign powers as well during the era. Although the

Arms ?m'argo Agreement of 1!1! prohi'ited the sale of weapons to

4hina) man foreign powers did) sometimes even choosing to support

one warlord. (Japan $ Hhang Huolin) %ussia $ *eng u;iang of

Manchuria1". $olitical e%elop&ents' After uan/s death) the warlords

were split in two groups $ uan/s generals in the north and thosewho refused to o'e# uan in the south. The# fought for territor# and

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for +eing) mem'ers of those cliFues often changing sides. 6n 1!1>)

the northern group was itself divided into two: Anhui and Hhili.13. 6n 1!23) *eng 'etra#ed Gu of Hhili and oined Anhui) starting a

militar# struggle against Hhang Huolin. ?ven Sun at7sen oined the

warlord era struggle politicall# and militaril#.15. The warlord era had negative on 4hinese econo&#) where

a(ricultural crops was destro#ed '# warfare and disorder and

much land was taen for the production of opium. Trae was put oC

'# the man# ta;es) dictatorial sei8ure of goods) handling of currenc#

and warlord control of transportation s#stems. )nustrialists were

forced to mae Idonations and as future was uncertain) few

industrialists pursued long7term economic proects.1<. Social e*ects: the common people were seriousl# e;ploited

through ta;es (< times higher and 5< #ears in advance andprovision of other services. Man# lives were lost in warlord wars. *or

safet#) peasants oined secret peasant societies (set up '#

4ommunists and growing in num'ers.17. Social changes: tranditionally, the scholar-gentry led villages

and commanded respect from peasants. During the WE, they were

allied and subservient to the warlords, losing the condence of the

people who turned more easily to communism.1!. Social disorder " brea#down of $hina%s social fabric. &uman

relationships were based less on moral bounds '$onfucianism( and

more on e)pectation of reward. *reater social and geographical

mobility meant that people moved from lower classes to upper ones

and from region to region.1+. +&on( intellectuals, there was a growth in nationalism) due

to the nationalist slogans of the warlords) and the disunit# that

caused them to stand to save 4hina in movements lie Ma# 3th.

nder the warlords there was no single national ideology, so

intellectuals had freedom to e)periment with new ideas, li#e$ommunism. -ut) 'ecause of the corruption and insta'ilit# of the

+eing gov) man# a'le #oung people didn/t choose to do politics)

and engaged themselves with impractical academic stud#. Knlie

Mao Hedong.. $olitical e*ects' it 'ecame clear to intellectuals that repu'lic

on the Gestern model was not feasi'le in 4hina) which made them

consider 4ommunism. 6t was also made clear that power stood in

the militar# and not in empt# political ideas) where the militr#

profession gained importance. Decentrali8ation that 'egan duringthe ing was made worse and even the &MT (after the nominal

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and growing) due to advancements in education and Gestern ideas

taught in schools. + class of &oern citiens 0illin( to brea

0ith traition 0as tain( shape33. The failure of political re%olution was clear in that the 1!11

Linhai revolution failed to strenghthen 4hina) leading man# toconsider necessar# a more fundamental change and an intellectual

revolution.5. The warlord period/s disorder provided an atmosphere of

intellectual freeo&) where intellectuals could e;periment with

new ideas) such as 4ommunism.<. )&&eiate causes were tied to the ersailles 4onference of 1!1!)

where the 4hinese hoped that the former 4er&an concessions of

Shantun() sei8ed '# the Japanese during the war) would 'e given

'ac to 4hina as a reward for it/s war eCort. -ut -ritain) *rance and6tal# had alread# agreet with the +eing warlord to leave it under

Japan. This angered students) and a'out 5EEE of them held a large7

scale protest.=. The protesters 'urned the house of a pro7Japanese 4hinese minister

and ased students from other parts of 4hina to organi8e protests

with these aims: arouse s#mpath# of all 4hinese) force 4hinese gov

not to sign the ersailles treat#) dissmiss pro7Japanese gov. o9cials

in +eing. Merchants oined) and there was a 'o#cott of Japanese

products.>. 6mmediate results were limited: the great powers at ersailles still

left Shantung in Japenese hands) 'ut 4hinese representatives did

withhold from signing the treat#. Demonstrations cooled down soon

and patriotic societies failed to cooperate) 'ut the# em'arrassed the

+eing warlord gov.!. Bong7term eCects (71!2" were [email protected]. )ntellectual achie%e&ents' Ma# 3th populari8ed Gestern

ideas lie democrac#) li'eralism) socialism) pragmatism and

utilitarianism. Ghile 4onfucian tradition of cutural self7su9cienc#

and superiorit# made 4hinese scholars unwilling to accept foreign

ideas) after Ma# 3th the# criticall# measured themselves against and

accepted modern) Gestern ideas. A willingness to critici8e 4hina/s

tradition and regard it as a part of world histor#. There was also a

rise in democratic spirit.11. 6ntroduction of the pai-hua 0ritin( s#ste& and reection of

traditional chinese writing increased literac# rate among

commoners.

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12. Social si(ni5cance' %ise of the modern pu'lic opinion) due

to increased literac# and popular education. Social traditions were

attaced: the old famil# s#stem) discrimination against women)

arranged marriage. Modern merchants) industrialists and cit#

worers 'ecame politicall# conscious. %ise of class7consciousnessagainst local7provincial feeling. +rogressive #oung intellectuals rose

to the leadership of pu'lic opinion) challenging power of scholar7

gentr#.1". $olitical si(ni5cance' +olitici8ed and strenghthened 4hinese

nationalism) people were more interested and activel# participating

in political matters. %ise of student movements. 6mportance of

politici8ed masses) unlie previous politics (made '# few for few.

Mao Hedong and others too advantage of this. reat concern for

4hina/s uni@cation (anti7warlord protests) helping its cause.

Democratic meaning of the anti-warlord protests: the gov.

should have the people’s condence to be legitimate (vs.

Mandate of Heaven. &MT was much less involved in Ma# 3th than

other political groups) leading to increasing conservatism on its part)

and ultimatel#) to its failure after 1!2>.13. i&itations' lac of determination) coordination and

plannning made the movement short7lived) plus ineCective for

worers who participated in riots. 6t was mainl# an ur'an movement)ignoring peasants. The intellectuals/ criticism of 4hinese tradition

were Ioversimpli@ed and shallow) failing to create a new 4hinese

culture) 'ut readil# accepting Gestern culture without consideration

of its suita'ilit# for 4hina/s conditions. Bimited practical

achievements) e;cept 'ringing down a warlord government. 0othing

reall# changed afterwards.

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Rise of Co&&unis& in China – 1911 on

13 )t 0as an attracti%e bo# of thou(ht for Chinese

intellectuals'

•

The principle of class struggle oCered a simplistice;planation of 4hina/s 2Eth centur# pro'lems. 4ompared to

Gestern democrac#) 4ommunism had &ore inclusi%e,

co&plete an co&prehensi%e ieas.

• 6t @tted well with China’s national ientit# an traition

of o0npla#in( the i&portance of &aterial (oos an

e&pasis on &orals. Nn 'ecoming 4ommunist leaders)

intellectuals could see themselves as guardians of moralit#)

given the 4ommunist advocation of self7sacri@ce and

unsel@shness. To nationalists) the class anal#sis could e;plain 4hina/s

'acwardness as a result of the shortcomings of the old

ruling class) avoiding the implication that the 4hinese as a

race were corrupt. Thus, national prie an self-respect

coul be restore3

• 4ommunism was ne0er and not #et achieved in ?urope or

America) giving the 4hinese a sense of 'eing ideologicall#

ahead of Gestern countries. +lus) 4ommunism seemedmore modern and scienti@c than capitalism) and so made

the 4hinese communists ps#cholo(icall# superior3

7!hina’s historical ego

• Benin/s emphasis on the role of colonial peoples of the

world @lled the 4hinese with a sense of &ission an

i&portance. 4hina would not accept Gestern culture) 'ut

will have a sa# in determining the manind/s future. This

suited their anti7imperialist feeling.

23 The suitabilit# an applicabilit# of Co&&unis& to China’sconitions'

• 4ommunism paid more attention to social pro'lems (more

important to the !hinese" whose main issue was

social unrest at the time.

• Bie %ussia) 4hina had man# poor peasants who formed a

good revolutionar# force.

• Traditionall# 4hinese peasants (and people in general were

used to passivel# o'e#ing the leadership of a small group of

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people (the scholar7gentr#. (!hina’s !onfucian tradition

of obedience.

• Chinese societ# 0as funa&entall# (roup-base) so

the 4ommunist principle of group unit# was agreea'le and

attractive) and was a weapon to @ght agaist the imperialistsand warlords.

• -# the earl# 1!2E/s capitalism failed to esta'lish itself @rml#

in 4hina) as a result of foreign imperialism and disincentives

that resulted from the warlord rule. All the same) the gov. in

+eing 'ecame a pla#thing 'etween warlords) losing it/s real

meaning and failing to support an# form of democrac#.

osin( faith in these Western s#ste&s) 4hinese

intellectuals turned to 4ommunism.". The First Worl War: Seeing as even ?uropean countries fought

among each other) intellectuals drew the conclusion that Gestern

democrac# has serious weanesses too and that the 4ommunist

prediction a'out the decline of capitalism was right. Moreover) the#

thought the origins of the war to 'e the Gest/s sel@sh material

culture) so looed for a modern #et moral s#stem to save 4hina. The

Shantung concessions also angered them) so the# lost con@dence in

democrac#.

3. The 8olshe%i success' %ussia was similar in 'acwardness to4hina) and 4ommunism showed e9cienc#) eCectiveness and

popularit# there. Also) the KSS% announced twice it/s wish to give up

previous imperialist privileges in 4hina) so 4hinese intellectuals

'ecame more s#mpathetic of 4ommunism5. a# T: popularie Co&&unsi&' destruction of old traditions

cleared the wa# for new ideologies) while it also produces an

atmosphere of radical spirit and intellectual curiosit# for a easier

acceptance. 6t saw the rise of new classes of politicall#7conscious

citi8ens (students) 'usinessmen) middle7class mem'ers or worerswho were later mo'ili8ed '# 4ommunism and encouraged to mae

political groupings (lie 44+. 6t also showed 4hina/s pro'lems were

urgent.<. Conclusion – raicaliation of intellectuals3 -efore) the#

thought 4hina/s pro'lems could 'e solved in an evolutionar#

manner. -# 1!1!) the# felt that onl# more revolutionar# and radical

eCorts could save 4hina.

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For&ation of the Chinese Co&&unist $art# – China

1921

1. Mar;ism was pro'a'l# introduced in 4hina starting 1!E5) 'ut was

not populari8ed until the Ma# *ourth Movement.2. Bi Da8hao) a li'rarian at the universit# of +eing) 'ecame a

communist in 1!1> and organi8ed stud# groups until 1!2E) of which

Mao Hedong was a mem'er.". The Soviet Knion) through oitins# of the 4omintern) came to 4hina

to discuss with Bi Da8ha and 4hen Du;iu the possi'ilit# of organi8ing

a uni@ed 4ommunist part# in 4hina) later founded in 1!21 in

Shanghai '# these two.3. ?arl# weaness: 'ecause the Mar;ist stud# groups came from

diCerent areas of 4hina) the 44+ was not uni@ed and centrali8ed and

often disagreed on its earliest policies. 4hen Du;iu 'elieved)

mirroring orthodo; Mar;ism) that the ur'an worers should 'ring the

4ommunist revolution) while Bi Da8hao argued for #oungintellectuals to mo'ili8e the peasants) and that those should stand

at the 'ase of the revolution. Mao carried on Bi/s ideas after his

death in 1!2= '# a warlord) 'ut from 1!21 4hen/s ideas were put

into practice) given the KSS%/s 'acing.

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The Three $rinciples of the $eople 7Sun Yat-Sen;

1. 4reated in at the 'eginning of the 1!EEs '# Sun at7Sen) the#

contained some 'raod political) social and economic programs for

sa%in( China. Their initial aim was to attract &ore people to

the anti7Manchu revolutionar# movement) as well as prepare for

re-construction of the countr# after revolutionar# success.

2. +fter 192, Sun e<pane this bo# of beliefs in great

detail) with the conviction that a more complete ideolog# which

set out goals and laid down plans to achieve them was needed

after repeated failure to reform the nation after 1!11.

/3 The Three +rinciples had their roots in Wilson’s fa&ous speech

Igov. of the people) '# the people) for the people. The# were:

=ationalis&, >e&ocrac#, Socialis&3

3. =ationalis& 7in Tsu;' After 1!11) nationalism was rede@ned

from meaning anti7Manchuism to anti7imperialism to suit the

da#/s goals. Sun also aimed to restore 4hina/s racial spirit and

pride) through a return to the ancient moralit# and learning) a

strengthening of the old clan and famil# s#stem as the smallest

'onds of national unit#) 'o#cotting of Gestern goods as refusal of

foreign economic imperialism and (incongruousl# adoption of

Gestern science and technolog#. Sho0s that Sun 0asn’t so

&uch concerne 0ith the refor&ation of China as 0ith its

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stren(hthenin( to re(ain its presti(e an place a&on(

international po0ers3

5. >e&ocrac# 7in Chuan;' 0ational right would alwa#s 'elong to

the people) 'ut the people would e&po0er a fe0 able leaers who would act in their 'ene@t. The s#stem devised '# him was

the *ive +ower 4onstitution: ?;ecutive) Begislative) Judiciar#) 4ivil

4ervice ?;amination) 4ontrol. First /, &oern (o%3 branches?

last t0o, traitional Chinese3 +olitical powers of the people:

suCrage) recall) initiative) referendum.

<. Sun/s orderl#) revolutionar# time7ta'le: a period of &ilitar#

uni5cation of the countr#) militar# rule. Then) period of part#

tutela(e) when &MT would educate the population a'outdemocrac# and appoint trained men to help in local self7rule.

Third) period of constitutional e&ocrac#.

=. Sun put nationalis& before democrac# as he 'elieved the

4hinese have had too much freedom and laced unit# and

nationalistic feelings. Oe) therefore) emphasi8ed iscipline an

or(aniation to strengthen unit#.

>. Socialis& 7in Shen(;' Sun wored out a social program notonl# to attract worers and peasants) 'ut also to satisf# some of

the more conservative &MT mem'ers $ not too conser%ati%e

but not too raical3

!. Socialis& containe' e@ualiation of lan ri(hts '#

controlled land) @;ing of prices and pseudo7economicsP

encouragement of a(riculture '# use of chemical fertili8ers and

modern machiner#P control of capital so that there won/t 'e a

class of wealth# capitalists e;ploiting the people? state-planneinustrialiation and rail0a# construction for the 'ene@t of all.

1E. Sun planned to implement these measures graduall#) through

reform. Knlie the Mar;ist socialist revolution) Sun wanted a

socialist refor&3

11. Merits:

• *inding a common enem# (imperialists) the principles werean eCective propaganda for the nationalist revolution. The

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detailed plans for 4hina/s future as a repu'lic oCered

guidelines) good ideological weapons to compete with

4ommunism.

• The ideas were simple and complete for 4hina/s ,e;i'le

pro'lems. The# were not put forward as a'solute truth andhad their origins in 'oth Gestern and 4hinese culture)

therefore gathering supporters of diCerent opinions. 4hinese

tradition 'eing one of the main pillars of The Three

+rincipals) the &MT could claim moral authorit# to represent

the 4hinese nation.

• 6t was the @rst 'od# of thought produced '# a popular

leader to aproach social and economic pro'lesms) which

increasingl# high num'ers of intellectuals paid attention to.

12. Geanesses:

• The# onl# set goals for 4hina) 'ut didn/t wor out speci@c)

practica'le and tested methods. ?.g. Kse of gov. control to

eFuali8e land rights accross 4hina was impractica'le as

eCective gov. power rarel# penetrated villages) contolled on

a local 'asis and dominated '# landlords.

• +aid little attention to countr#side) and onl# refered to the

large treat#7ports and cities) 'ecause Sun wasn/t familiarwith the countr#side. 0eglected a large portion of societ#.

• Some of Sun/s ideas (especiall# economic were not alwa#s

logical and he made little allowance for the dangers of an

unreal democrac#) where the Ifew a'le leaders chosen '#

the people would tr# to eep power for themselves and act

in their interest rather than the people/s.

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KAB)=T+=4 uner Sun Yat-sen

1. 6n 1!12) Song Jiaoren founds &uomintang) a'sor'ing some smaller partiesinto the Tongmenghui) in the conte;t of Sun/s and Osing/s inactivit# (due

their lac of politcal sills) as revolutionaries.2. Kpon uan Shih7ai/s orders) Song Jiaoren is assassinated in 1!1" and Sun

rises to the leadership of &MT. The same #ear was the setting of &MT/s

and Sun/s so7called ISecond %evoluton) an attempt to tae uan down)

following his negotiation of a loan from the foreign powers without

parliamentar# approval. 4rushed in late 1!1") it led to a 'an on &MT.". 6n 1!13) Sun forms the 4hinese %evolutionar# part# in an attempt to

continue an un@nished revolution. As he 'elieves disunit# was the main

cause of &MT/s failure) he ass all mem'ers to swear an oath of allegiance

to him and he empasi8es the Three +rinciples and his own political ideas in

the part#. To centrali8e the part#.3. Due to these measures) man# original Tongmenghui mem'ers (including

Ouang Osing refrained from oining the part#. Also) Sun/s eagerness for

foreign help) including Japanese) came to the dissatisfaction of man#

mem'ers and friends who a'andoned Sun. (Ghen Japan issued the 21

Demands) Sun/s attitude was uncertain: neigther condemning nor

supporting them. As a result) the part# was Fuite inactive. Nnl# a few

failed armed uprisings and an insigni@cant participation in the 1!1< anti7 uan movement.

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5. 6n 1!1=) Sun sets up a 0ational Militar# ov. at 4anton and proclaims

himself eneralissimo. Marches troops northward 'ut fails and wages war

on erman# to deprive the +eing warlord of the claim to represent 4hina.

Oowever) his power depends on the sel@sh uangdong warlords and the

part# is divided into factions) the rightist even preferring to 'argain withthe warlords. The part# is wea and ineCectual) the rightists a'andoning

Sun in 1!1> leading to the part# d#ing out.<. Sun was ver# much aCected '# the success of the Ncto'er 1!1=

revolution (having admired Mar;/s wors in his #outh. 6n 1!1>) he sent

Benin a telegram) e;pressing his profound admiration for the di9cult

struggle of the revolutionar# masses of %ussia. An ineradica'le impression

was made on him '# KSS%/s friedl# polic# towards 4hina) it/s renunciation

of all rights and privileges eno#ed under Tsarist %ussia and the energetic

and sel,ess aid to the revolutionar# forces of S. 4hina. Oe characteri8ed

the %ussian revolution as the 'irth of Ihumanit#/s great hope.=. 6n 1!1!) Sun re7organi8es the &MT. Oe considers the reason for past

failures as 'eing limited and divided part# mem'ership and is convinced

'# the Ma# the *ourth 6ncident that the masses need to made use of and

that the e# lies in 4hinese nationalism. Oe) therefore) sees to attract the

gentr#) worers) merchants) students and cit# middle class to his cause.>. Sun was allied with the warlord of uangdong) who had little interest for

the uni@cation of 4hina and preferred local self7rule. Disagreements with

Sun (especiall# Sun/s 1!22 attempt to form an alliance with Hhang Huolin

of Manchuria caused the warlord to drive him out of 4anton. 6n 1!2")however) Sun hired mercenar# soldiers who drove 4hen out of 4anton)

where Sun re7esta'lished his fov.!. Oowever) &MT/s grip of 4anton was still wea and Sun was dissapointed

'# warlords) diso'edient &MT mem'ers and the +eing gov. Oe reali8ed

that his revolutionar# dreams were onl# possi'le with a solid territorial

'ase) a centrali8ed part# and a strong arm#. -# 1!2") he was prepared to

consider new wa#s of revolution.1E. 4oncrete cooperation with the KSS% started 1!2" (Sun7JoCe

Manifesto) stating that the# would not impose the Soviet s#stem on 4hina

'ut fought for its uni@cation) when it sent a group of militar# specialists

headed '# +.A. +avloc) and M.M. -orodin as adviser. The# re7organi8ed the

&MT into a coalition of antifeudal and anti7imperialist forces) including the

44+.11. %ussia/s reasons for supporting a 44+7&MT alliance: &MT would help

it spread communism internationall# and 44+ grow Q a stronger 4hina

would help safeguard its 'oarders against Japanese agression (after the

%usso7Japanese Gar. 6t would help increase its in,uence in 4hina faster.12. 6n,uenced '# the ideas of the Ncto'er revolution) the national

li'eration movement) 44+/s activit# and his own e;perience) he enrichedthe Three +rinciples) giving them increasingl# Mar;ist features. 6n 1!23) he

8/9/2019 China 1911-1939


announced three 'asic political orientations: un'reaa'le alliance with the

KSS%) alliance with the 44+ and a (mar;ist reliance on the masses of

worers and peasants in 4hina. This colla'oration was called the *irst

Knited *ront.1". 6n 1!23) &MT founded the Ghampoa Militar# Academ# with 4hiang

&ai7she as commandant of the 0ational %evolutionar# Arm#) to train

cadets for the 0orthern ?;pedition.13. Toward the end of his life) he overcame the idea of 4hinese great7

power chauvinism) which was widespread among 4hinese 'ourgeois

nationalists. Died in 1!25 of liver cancer.15. Begac#: +ower struggle within the &MT as it included people with

profoundl# diCerent views and supporting diCerent ideologies) eventuall#

leading to the split and 4ivil Gar of 1!2=. 4ult of personalit# as Sun

'ecame a s#m'ol to which &MT mem'ers would 'ow and which was used

'# 4hiang in an attempt to attract supporters under the 'anner of nationalism and national unit#.

KAB)=T+=4 uner Chian( Kai She

13 The ieolo(ical basis of the KT under 4hiang were Sun’s three

principles) 4hiang himself giving them strong endorsement) relating

them to human emotion) law and reason and dissmissing the popular

notion that 4hina was used to the rule of &an, not the rule of la032. James Sheridan: less than 1> of provinces had esta'lished regular

political commitees '# 1!""P part# or(aniational po0er went onl#

as far as 4hiang/s 'a#onets) especiall# 0ea in the countr#sie3

8/9/2019 China 1911-1939


". KT’s +i&s' Knif#ing 4hina) promote nationalism) root out foreign

imperialism) moderni8e communication) industr# and transport. Q The

Three +rinciples of the +eople: 0ationalism) Democrac#) Socialism.3. 6n 1!2<) 4hiang 'egan the =orthern !<peition (thought out '# Sun

with nota'le well7trained cadets of the Ghampoa Academ#. )n less

than half a #ear) the 0ational %evolutionar# Arm# had defeated the

Hhili cliFue (Gu +eifu of the 4entral +lains and Sun 4huanfand of the

?ast 4oast. This was 'ecause the 0%A was seen as a progressive force

@ghting on 'ehalf of the people) so it (arnere &uch support fro&

orinar# citiens and peasants) its force growing from 1EE)EEE to

25E)EEE.5. )n 192.) following the 0aning 6ncidents) where foreign concession

were attaced and looted) &MT right wing and western powers were

worried of the 44+/s actions. As the Hhili 4liFue was defeated and

4ommunist Support was no longer crucial) 4hiang &ai7she 'egan thepur(e of the Co&&unists (nown as the Shanghai Massacre)

startin( the Chinese Ci%il War.

As a result) the 0%A/s forces were

in disarra# at the end of 1!2=.<. After the leftist &MT gov. at Guhan

also 'roe wiht the 4ommunists

(upon Gang/s discover# of a secret

order from Stalin to 'ring the 44+

to power at Guhan) the &MTreunite uner Chian’s

leaership at =anin(. Then) in

1!2> during the second 0orthern

?;pedition) &MT defeated Hhang

Huolin) captured +eing and

no&inall# uni5e all China

uner the KT. The onl# faction

elimnated was Hhili) the other

0arlors s0ore alle(iance tothe KT and ept power through

the "E/s when their wars continued

to claim victims) weaening &MT..3 The &MT was recogni8ed '# the

international communit#) southern 4hina and parts of 0orthern 4hina)

altough it had no control over Manchuria and did not have perfect

control over man# of ther former warlords. As a result) b# 1929, ci%il

strife broe out again as warlords maneuvered to retain their

in,uence) creating a discontent that the 44+ would later e;ploit. ittle

refor& 0as carrie out3

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>. 6n 1!2!) 4hiang held a 0ational %eorgani8ation and Demo'ili8ation

4onference) to proposing the tri&&in( of ar&ies fro& 2,DDD,DDD

to "DD,DDD in an attempt to reduce rival armies and achieve 'etter

control o%er the 0arlors. Oowever) it e;acer'ated suspicions of

4hiang and led) among others to a war 'etween him and a coalition of northern warlods.

!. T:! S!CB=> S)=B-E+$+=!S! W+R 719/. – 19;' 6gnoring the

Japanese threat in Manchuria ( Eapan in%ae anchuria in 19/1)

setting up pupet state Manchuou ) 4hiang went on to attac

communist 'ases and forced them out of Eian(<i in 19/ on the

on( arch to unnan in Shaan;i province.

• China 0as not prepare for a total 0ar) with little militar#7

industrial strength) no mechani8ed divisions and little armed

forces. 6n adition) &MT was mired in a ci%il 0ar with the 44+. Kp

until the middle 1!"E/s) 4hina had hope the ea(ue of

=ations would provide countermeasures to Japan/s aggression.

6ts strateg# of Gtrain( space for ti&eH, intentionall# causing

massive ,ooding and putting up @ghts) dela#ed the Japanese

troops.

4hiang insisted Ithe Eapanese are a isease of the sin, but

the co&&unists are a isease of the heart3’

• &idnapped in the 19/6 Ji’an )ncient) 4hiang was forced '#

rival &MT mem'ers to a'andon oCensives against the 44+ and

for& the Secon Anite front with them) in order to @ghtincreasing growing Japanese agression. The Second Knited *ront

was ne%er trul# uni5e) as each side was preparing for

showdown with the other once the Japanese were driven out.

• 4hiang reali8ed that to win support from the KS and other foreign

powers) 4hina had to prove it could @ght $ hence the three-

&oths &oraliin( battle of Shan(hai in 19/..

• )n 19/6 an into the follo0in( #ear) the situation improved

politicall# and economicall#) an authorit# even stating a Rnew

sense of opti&is& an national unit# suCused the nation/(?astman.

1E. 4orruption in the &MT: 0otwithstanding the 4ensor uan) 'ri'e and

nepotism were rife among the &MT 'ureaucrac#) leading 4hiang

himself to state that a failure to root out their own corruption will lead

to a revolution against them. 4hiang was concerned that power should

lie in his hands and those of his supporters the 44 4liFue and the

Ghampoa cliFue (-lue Shirts) secret police and others. 0either

totalitarian or democratic) 4hiang surel# had autocratic tendencies

leading to a corrupt and oppresive regime.

11. +opulation: the 0aning Decade was a period of population growth.

8/9/2019 China 1911-1939


12. ?conom#: the 'eginning of the 0aning decade saw serious drought

and famine) especiall# in the northwestern provinces) getting oC to a

reall# 'ad start) this could 'e seen as a result of worldwide depression

which caused man# 4hinese 'an and industries to go 'anrupt.1". ?conomic reform: however) '# 1!"57=) economic conditions

improved greatl#) with higher production of rice and wheat) readil#

availa'le credits and a rise in agriculture prices. The gov. carried out a

currenc# reform) which consisted in a'andoning the silver standard.13. ?conomic conditions during the 0aning decade: despite

considera'le improvements in communication and transportation) with

over 1EE)EEE m of highwa# '# 1!"= and growth of net product of

modern industries) the standard of living accross 4hina has remained

ver# low) especiall# for the !E living in villages. Mortalit# rate was

still the highest in the world) with peasants suCering the most. Serious

ineFualit#) povert# and landlordism were widespread pro'lems. Nn theother hand) there was de@nitel# some growth) and the persistent

povert# should not divert some credit from 4hiang/s regime.15. Struggle to achieve aims: 4hiang achieved the national uni@cation

through negotiation with the warlords and governors) whose

cooperation remained su'ect to renegotiation. 6nternal strife caused

'# the warlords/ am'itions shoo 4hiang/s 4hina for man# #ears after

1!2> and their shiphoning of ta; income to fund their own armies

deprived 4hian of important mone#) needed to implement the reforms

and moderni8ation proects the countr# desperatel# needed.1<. Despite growing Japanese aggression) worldwide depression)

internal strife and the 4ommunist challenge) the &MT did achieve some

real successes 'efore full7scale war 'roe out with Japan in 1!"=. -#

1!"=) 4hina had in place most 'ranches of 'asic industr# including the

a'ilit# to design) construct and operate its own railwa#s. The need for

imports of rice and wheat were virtuall# eliminated and a modern

'aning s#stem too shape in 4hina.1=. Japan/s interests in Manchuria: Ghat prompted Japan to act was the

fear that the uni@cation of 4hina might cause Manchuria to 'e

reintegrated into the countr#. 6t was an area considered '# man#

Japanese theirs '# right) as man# soldiers had died there during the

%uso7Japanese war. Also) with its vast territories) fertile land and

natural resources could easil# provide Japan with much needed mineral

resources) create new 'usiness opportunities for its industrialists and

help solve the ill eCects of the worldwide depression. As the &MT gov.

was 'ogged down with internal strife and the international communit#

enmesshed in the reat Depression) Japan decided to act.

8/9/2019 China 1911-1939


Successes an Failures of the Kuo&intan(

1. Aims:

• Knif# 4hina.

• ain complete authorit# over 4hina.

• 4ontinue the Three Stages of %evolution.

• %esist foreign in,uence) Japan and the comintern.

• +romote nationalism.

• Moderni8e communications and industr#.

2. Successes' • The uni@cation of 1!2>) even if nominal and achieved through

negotiation.7 0ationali8ation and centrali8ation (relative of 0%A.7 A'sorption of warlords through negotiation.

•Modern @nancial and 'aning s#stem $ new mone# of 1!"".7 6ntroduced new currenc#) eliminated the old silver standard as

a reaction to the eCects of the red Depression.7 0ew Bife Movement

• Agrarian technological level improved.

7 +roduction of rice) wheat and other commodities rose $

eliminating the need for imports.7 4redits for agriculture were more readil# availa'le) and

agricultural prices rose.7

• Man# (higher education institutions esta'lished.• %ecogni8ed as world power in 1!3" (4airo and after 1!35.

7 %ecogni8ed as a legitimate gov. '# the KSA (successful in

eeping control) 4hina/s autonom# and @nall# since the ing

found its place in international relations.7 6ncrease of tariC for foreign trade within 4hina) promised '#

foreign countries including KSA) erman# and -ritain.7 A place on the K0 Securit# 4ouncil.7 ?nd of imperialist +olic# of ?;traterritorialit# and KneFual

Treaties 7+ATB=BY;3

oernie transportation, inustr# an &ilitar#'+ost7Mao scholars viewed thsi more positivel#.

8/9/2019 China 1911-1939


7 ?ntered the Sino7erman cooperation to o'tain raw materials

and erman advisiors to supervise militar# training 77U elite

arm# that contri'uted during the Sino7Japanese Gar.7 *err# S#stem in 0aning.7 %ailwa# from >)EEE to 1")EEE (5)EEE m. Bung7Oai %ailwa#

e;tended 'oth east and west Q entire uang8hou7Oanou line

completed in 1!"<.7 +ostal and telephone services e;panded signi@cantl#) and air

routes increased.7 Oighwa# networ incresed to 115) =E" '# 1!"<7 Tim Gright: the statistical record of the modern sector up

1!"< shows su'stantial growth) 'oth of the total output and of

the 4hinese7owned sector.-KT) ?astman: onl# ")3 of 4hina/s domestic product la# in

the modern secotor of manufacturing) mining and utilities.7 Oowever) the gov. spending was de@cit spending $ lac of

funds due to ta; shiphoning '# local warlords.

The motives of the Manchurian invasion stood partl# in Japan/s fear of a uni@ed

4hina that would assimilate Manchuria. The eventualit# of the invasion rests on

the premise that these fears were legitimate) and therefore is an insight into

4hina/s situation during the 0aning Decade.

". Failures'• =E of population illiterate.

• +revalent povert# and ineFualit# accross 4hina.7 ?astman: 4hina/s death rate was among the highest in the

world.7 Bandlordism was still prevalent especiall# in the rice7growing

south: however) the 0ational Agricultural %esearch -ureau

sa#s in 1!"5 that: 33 owned their land) 2" were part7

owners) and onl# "" rented it.7 Bac of social and economic reforms.

• %ampant corruption within the &MT.7 -ri'er# and neportism were rife in the &MT gov.7 4hiang had autocratic tendencies.7 &MT tended to place right7wing mem'ers in e# positions)

leading to plotting '# left7wind mem'ers.7 Gas not at all democratic) 'ut one7part#.

• 0o parliament was ever called.7 Although democratic spirit was 'oasted through propaganda)

people had no real power and the state was run '# a one7

part# gov.

• Most peasant population was still povert#7stricen and opressed.• Boss of support of the people

8/9/2019 China 1911-1939


7 0ew Bife Movement promoted traditional values seen as

'acward '# the intellectuals.7 Biterature of the period tended to critici8e the gov.

• The war against the 44+7 Diverted mone# and attention from real social and economic

pro'lems.7 4aused high num'ers of civillian deaths) which led to loss of

support from population and arm#VV7 The lac of attention given to the Manchurian 4risis angered

'oth civilians and the militar# and created tensions wthin &MT

itself.

ao’s on( arch of 19/

1. 6nstead of giving up) faced with the destruction of their repu'lic) Mao and

his %ed Arm# started a 12)EEE m long march which too them in an

enormous arc to the northern Shaan;i +rovince.2. Mao Hedong claimed that the signi@cance of the Bong March la# in the fact

that it was Rthe @rst of its ind in the annals of histor#./". Ghile earl# accounts such as Dic Gilson/s glorif# Mao/s March) later

studies such as Sun/s portra# Mao as not so much interested in ideolog#

and people/s welfare as in power. These are critical of the human cost (5

of the 1EE)EEE survived the March and the lac of reward the# received

once 44+ was in government.3. Along the wa#) the# treated local people with a respect matched neither

'# the warlordds or the 0ationalist troops) and so their reception was

generall# positive.3 The 44+/s courage in the face of unimagina'le hardship and the

communists ultimate victor# despite their decimated rans pla#ed an

i&portant role in the process of le(iti&iin( the CC$ rule3<. Si(ni5cance' the long march too the 44+ to a region that provided

them the isolation the# needed to re'uild its arm# and recuperate. 6t also

gained the 44+ the support of the peasants) as on their ourne#) the %edArm# was ordered to never loot peasants/ homes and ased for permision

to 'oard at houses or tae supplies) in contrast with the &uomintang who

freFuentl# con@scated supplies) were rude and disrespectful and 'oarded

in civilian houses without permission. Small acts of indness made the

4hinese %ed Arm# a distinctive and e;ceptionall# popular force) some of

whom later oined the %ed Arm#. Accordint to historian Stephen

Ahalle#) these actions were decissive in gaining the 44+ the 4hinese

people/s support) that proved more important than the &MT/s raw

manpower once eno#ed) and ultimatel# led to the victor# of the 44+ in1!3!. (?ight +oints of Attention) ordered '# Mao

8/9/2019 China 1911-1939


.3 )n the 0ors of ao' GThe on( arch is a &anifesto3 )t has

proclai&e to the 0orl that the Re +r&# is an ar&# of heroes3H>. ?d Jocel#n and AndreF Mc?wan retraced the route of the Bong March)

@nding it to 'e <)EEE m instead of the 12)EEE estimated '# Mao. ao

an his follo0ers t0iste the tale of the on( arch for their o0n

ens3 aoLs role 0as &#tholo(ie to the point 0here 333 it

see&e he ha sin(le-hanel# sa%e the Re +r&# an efeate

Chian( Kai-she3!. Ase for $RB$+4+=>+' Sun Sh#u#un: I/f you nd it hard, thin# of the

0ong arch.2 The 'attle for Buding 'ridge was portra#ed as glorious and

heroic) 'ut Sun Sh#un Fuotes a witness who sa#s the enem# force was

small) ill7eFuipped and scared. Deng Lueping himself admitted to the

'attle 'eing Ia ver# eas# militar# operation) insisting that the 44+

needed to Ie;press the @ghting spirit of their forces.

1E. The m#ths of the march are di9cult to uncover) 'ecause 'eing apillar of the 4hinese 4ommunist %evolution) the gov. has allowed few

indepedednt historians to research it. Still) Gestern scholars tend to focus

on the aspects of the march rarel# portra#ed '# 4hinese propaganda)

sunc as instances of the %ed Arm# idnapping locals in desperate

attempts to recruit new soldiers) and stealing food along the wa# 7Sun

Shu#un;. These were perhaps isolated incidents) and not uniFue to the

4ivil Gar) for the &MT was nown to freFuentl# resort to such acts.

The CC$’s Win an KT’s oss13 CC$’s Win'

• 44+ was at the forefront of resistance against Japan (Document

issued in Aug 1!"5) advocating for a second united front.

Declared war @rst) s#m'olic.

• The Bong March and its proof of courage and leadership (a

s#m'ol.

• uerilla @ghting techniFues.

•

Mo'ili8ation of the peasant masses (the dominant section of 4hinese societ# num'er7wise and the most opressed

• iving a voice to the rights of women) ecouraging greater

freedom of marriage and divorce.

• Band redistri'ution polici#:7 Beaving untouched the land of the numerous middle income

peasants) 'ut taing from the rich and givng to the poor.7 -ecame the 'asis for the 44+/s 'roader rural class struggles.

• The Secon Sino-Eapanese War 719/.-19;:7 ?;panded territor#) arm# and part# mem'ership.

7 Their guerilla war 'ooststed 44+/s standing in the e#es of ordinar# 4hinese.

8/9/2019 China 1911-1939


23 KT’s oss'• 4hiang/s polic# of conciliation against Japan.

• +rioriti8ation of eradication of 4ommunism over @ghting the

Japanse $ maor issue for 4hinese nationalism and cause of

internal con,ict involving warlords.• Militar# weaness.

• KT’s Response to the Stru((les of the Ti&e' The 0ew Bife

Movement 'rought negative perception and student protest.7 6ntended to create an instinc for uni@ed 'ehaviour.7 Gomen/s rights were not listened to.7 4onfucianism was regarded '# man# as 'acward since Ma#

3th.

• The -lue Shirt/s show of totalitarian and autocratic 'ehaviour:7 +olitical assasinations.

7 Secret +olice7 *iercel# lo#al to 4hiang &ai7she and inspired '# fascism.7

The Rise of the CC$

1. The Shanghai and su'seFuent attacs had 'adl# weaened the 44+) with

part# mem'ership dropping from 5>)EEE to less than 1E)EEE. Their

in,unce in cities and within ur'an la'our movements had also 'een

diminished. Spurred '# Stalin) the remaining communists attempted

several failed uprisings) namel# the 0anchang Kprising and the Autumn

Oarvest Kprising (1!2=. Mao learned from the latter that no uprising

could 'e successful without the support of the peasant masses.2. 6n 1!2!) the 44+ retreated to %uiin in Jiang;i province) where the#

founded the Jiang;i Soviet. During the Jiang;i Soviet period) the 44+

e;perimented with governing and administration. The policies developed

during this period were to signi@cantl# impact 44+ future governing

theories.". The move also provided the communists with a greater ,ow of supplies)

revenues and recruits) thus their arm# growing to include =E)EEE soldiers.6t was aslo a time when the 4omintern/s in,uence over their policies

waned) as a result of harder communication and a loss of interest on the

part of the Soviets.3. 6n 1!"E) Mao conducted a stud# of a count# of Jiang;i in order to Fauntif#

the level of class tension) noting the trou'les of peasants) the plight of

women and the ind of 'usinesses prevalent in the countr#side and the

mone# the# generated. Thus) the 44+ turned peasants/ economic

discontent into class warfare.

8/9/2019 China 1911-1939


5. Ois policies in the Jiang;i Soviet proved ver# popular) as was the 44+/s

s#m'olic declaration of war against Japan. Oowever) Mao still faced

opposition to his Agrarian %evolution ideas within the 44+.<. *ive Suppression 4ampaigns were needed for the &MT to @nall# encircle

the Jian;i Soviet. The communists had no choice 'ut to retreat through the

weaest point and start what has 'een m#thologi8ed as the Bong March in

44+ histor#.=. The Bong March lasted for appro;. 2 #ears 'efore the 44+) still divided 'ut

with Mao emerging as the leader) set its 'ase at an/an in Shaan;i

province. The 44+/s courage in the face of unimagina'le hardship and the

communists ultimate victor# despite their decimated rans pla#ed an

important role in the process of legitimi8ing the 44+ rule.>. Nne of the most important meetings that too place during the long

march was the 1!"5 Hun#i 4onference) where the communists discussed

reasons for their failure in Jiang;i) coming to the conclusion that the#should have adopted a more oCensive) guerilla @ghting stateg#) as

advocated '# Mao. This vindication of his militar# strategies was an

important step in Mao/s rise to the leadership of the 44+. Oe was

appointed full mem'er of the ruling Standing 4ommittee of the +olit'uro)

and slowl# too over militar# leadership.!. Stalin supported an alliance with the &MT in 1!"< 'ecause of: a fears of

growing fascism across the world) ' the 'ene@t of protecting %ussia/s

,an of Japanese agression.1E. After the Li/an 6ncident) 4hiang agreed to form the Second Knited

*ront.11. 6t was during the a/nan period and the Sino7Japanese war that the

44+ developed and put into practice man# of the social policies that were

to form the cru; of their ruling philosoph# after coming to power.

)&pact of anchuria an WW))

1. The &uomintang lost support of the people due to its hated polic# of W*irst

unif# from within then resist enem# from without.W The concept of 4hinese

illing other 4hinese seemed illogical and morall# wrong) e;acer'ated '#

the situation of a foreign invasion (especiall# a Japanese one) who were

nown for their ruthlessness against 4hinese. To the pu'lic opinion it

seemed increasingl# a situation of fratricide on the &MT/s part) and of

patriotrism and nationalism on the part of the 44+ who s#m'ollicl#

declared war against Japan in 1!"3.

33&e-me4u agreement saw ve provinces given to 5apan as collonies by

the 6 gov.82. 6n the 'ene@t of the 44+:

8/9/2019 China 1911-1939


• Soldiers (especiall# Manchurian who wanted to @ght the

Japanese enlisted in the 44+) increasing their num'ers.

• Mutin# of Hhang Lueliang 'rought the Second Knited *ront) a

'reath of fresh air to the 44+ weaened after the Bong March.

•

Knited front meant 44+ could move freel# across 4hina and re7esta'lish contacts.

• The 44+ could conscript soldiers in the name of @ghting against

Japan.

• The# could spread propaganda) spread their in,uence and recruit

new patriots.

• Just lie the 0orthern ?;pedition made 4hiang a hero) the Gar

against Japan gave Mao a chance for eFual glor#. 0ow) 4hinag

was not the onl# via'le leader.

• The Japanese and the &MT used similar @ghting strategies) so the

war ena'led the 44+ to gain e;perience and perfect the guerilla

warface the# would later use against the &MT. Testing

administration techniFues would prove useful when the 44+ had

to later command an arm# of one million.". 6n the detriment of &MT:

• Kna'le to resist Manchurian invasion properl#) &MT started 'eing

viewed as impotent) and undeserving of the traditional IMandate

of Oeave.

• During GG66) 4hiang 'ecame the Supreme Allied 4ommander of

the 4hina theater) he 'ecame responsi'le for the defence of 6ndochina) Thailand and -urma. Sending troops there weaened

his arm# and the potential force against the su'seFuent

continuation of the 4ivil Gar.

• As Japan oined the A;is powers) colla'oration with 0a8i erman#

stopped) removing important strategic advice) militar# training

and opening to Gestern Garface. Nnl# little American aid was

left. 8AT the CC$ in’t recei%e it3

• Japan planned to win the war '# capturing 4honging and forcing

4hiang to surrender) so onl# fought the &MT) not 44+. This wascrucial) 'ecause it came towards the end of the war) when 44+

and &MT were preparing to war for the control of 4hina.

• 44+ too refrained from @ghting when it could suCer catastrophic

losses. Much of the 44+/s elite was saved for after the war) lie

4hiang/s) onl# his was critici8ed 'ecause as the gov. it had an

o'ligation to @ght oC Japan and his full7time soldiers were more

visi'le than 44+/s militia. 44+ were seen as patriotic) while

4hiang lost troops and support.

8/9/2019 China 1911-1939


• The Southern Anhui incident led to a loss of prestige for 4hiang.

Ghere previousl# seen as a leader and hero) he was not

portra#ed as cold) vicious) devious and scheming.

• Japan/s control of coastal areas cause the gov. to move from

0aning to 4honging) also removing important sources of income. 6ndustrial output fell too) and the &MT/s response was to

print more mone#) which caused devastating in,ation.

• Time: Ipeasant lo#alt# had 'een hollowed to nothingness)

especiall# important after GG66) where peasants misguided the

&MT with false directions) leasing to am'ushes '# the 44+.

• 4orruption of the &MT. Ghere a 4hinese division should have had

1E)EEE soldiers) it onl# conscripted 2)EEE) the rest 'eing false

names whose wages fell into the hands of the corrupt generals.

•

Ane@ual Treaties an !<terioralit#

1. After the *irst Npium Gar) the Treat# of 0aning speci@ed the following:

• +a# 21 million dollars in reparations.

• To cede control of the island of Oong &ong to -ritain.

• Npen four new cities to trade with -ritain.

• Treat -ritain as an eFual in diplomatic negotiations.• ?;clude Gesterners from prosecution under 4hinese Baw.

• *i;ed tarriC rate for trade with Gestern countries at 5.

• Most *avoured 0ation 4lause: allow -ritain to also have an# new

privilege gained '# another countr# in 4hina.2. Signi@cance:

• Npium trade continued unhindered.

• 4ause anti7imperialist sentiment among 4hinese and growth of

nationalism.

• Made it more politicall# and ps#chologicall# di9cult for 4hinese

to adopt an# aspect of Gestern culture.

8/9/2019 China 1911-1939


!hina was used to the rule of man" not the rule of law.

china 1911-1939

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