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1
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
A. Background
This thesis seeks to examine fatwā in the post-New Order (Orde Baru)
Indonesia issued by three major fatwā-making agencies (dār al-iftāʼ) in the
country namely Majelis Ulama’ Indonesia (MUI), Lajnah Baḥth al-Masāil
Nahdlatul Ulama’ (LBM-NU), and Majelis Tarjih Muhammadiyah. It
elucidates the key features of these agencies and the distinctive methods they
utilize in crafting their fatwā. Major factors conditioning the genesis of fatwā
selected are also examined, although it should also be made clear from the
outset that this thesis does not aim at in-depth socio-historical analysis
conditioning the making of fatwā. Another central issue analysed is how
competing modes of thought condition as well as reflect the production of
fatwā within the respective agencies. Furthermore, how fatwā serves as a site
for competing mode of thought of dominant agencies within the Muslim
community of Indonesia will be explored. The overriding interest is in
understanding the implications of fatwā on Indonesia’s plural society and the
extent to which it facilitates adaptation to the demands of rapid social change
confronting the community. While there have been a vast number of fatwā
pronounced by these organisations within the period selected, this thesis will
focus on fatwā that have strong implications on the lives of Muslims within
Indonesian society as they attempt to adapt and adjust to the demands of
change and challenges of the plural society in which they live. Fatwā on
2
sectarianism and inter-religious relations, major aspects of rituals and
religious practices as well as those dealing with issues of modernity will be
examined.
In Indonesia, fatwā-making agencies are generally integral to Islamic
groups or movements. For example, Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama’
(NU) are equipped with fatwā-making bodies called Majelis Tarjih and
Lajnah Baḥth al-Masāil respectively. Other organizations such as Persatuan
Islam (Persis) also founded the Dewan Hisbah which is responsible for the
production of fatwā within the organization.1 In some organisations such as
Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) where no specific fatwā-making institution
exists, the organisation nonetheless frequently functions as fatwā-making
body for its members.
The three organisations selected for this thesis are highly influential in
society. Of these, the most prominent is perhaps Majelis Ulama’ Indonesia
(MUI) which is active in producing fatwā relating to various issues for
contemporary Muslim society in Indonesia as a whole. MUI is a state-
affiliated religious body that represents both the state and the majority of
Muslim groups in Indonesia. As MUI is an organization representing almost
all Muslim groups in the country, Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama’
constitute part of this umbrella organisation. MUI provides a forum for
discussion for Muslim scholars and leaders and is seen as the most competent
1 For study on Persatuan Islam and the Dewan Hisbah, please refer to Howard M. Federspiel,
Persatuan Islam: Islamic Reform in the Twentieth Century Indonesia (Singapore: Equinox
Publishing, 2009); Syamsul Falah, Pandangan Keagamaan Persatuan Islam: Studi atas
Fatwa-Fatwa Dewan Hisbah Tahun 1983-1997: Laporan Penelitian (Bandung: Pusat
Penelitian: IAIN Sunan Gunung Djati, 1998); and Uyun Kamiluddin, Menyorot Ijtihad
Persis: Fungsi dan Peranannya dalam Pembinaan Hukum Islam di Indonesia (Bandung:
Tafakur, 2006).
3
council in giving guidance and rules on religious problems and questions
(iftā’).2 In general, MUI proclaims itself as a successor of the Prophet
(warathatu al-anbiyāʼ) which functions to fulfil his legacy. Hence, it assumes
the roles as fatwā-giver (mufti), guide and servant for the umma (riʽāya wa
khādim al-umma), movement for reform and improvement (al-iṣlāḥ wa
tajdīd) devoted to amr bi al-maʽrūf wa nahy ʽan al-munkar (inviting to do
good and forbidding evil).3 In its specific function as fatwā agency, MUI
established a special agency responsible for dealing with fatwā called Komisi
Fatwa (Fatwā Commission).
Historically, MUI is founded in May 1975 as the representative-body
for Muslims nationwide. As the creation of MUI was strongly supported by
former President Suharto, many believe that MUI is a politically created
religious institution aimed by the regime at gaining legitimacy from the
ulamā in justifying strategic and potentially controversial policies it
introduced.4 Suharto’s support for its founding was formulated in terms of
concern for the unity of Indonesian Muslims in meeting and resolving
challenges they face with the support and participation of the ulamā’.5
Through this political will, MUI was finally established with branches
spreading across all Indonesian provinces and regencies which have
expanded to more than thirty. As a country with a majority Muslim
2 Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Himpunan Fatwa MUI Sejak 1975 (Jakarta: Penerbit Erlangga,
2011), 13. 3 See MUI’s website, www.mui.or.id
4 The current chairman of NU, Said Agil Siradj, is among those who believe in this
conviction. See Iip D Yahya, Ajengan Cipasung: Biografi K.H. Moh Ilyas Ruhiat
(Yogyakarta: LKIS Pelangi Aksara, 2006), 197. 5 Atho’ Mudzhar, Fatwas of the Council of Indonesian Ulama : a study of Islamic legal
thought in Indonesia, 1975-1988, Ph.D Thesis, University of California, Los Angeless, 1990,
92
4
population, matters relating to Islam occupy a central place in politics.
Although the administration of religious affairs in Indonesia has been
formally assigned to the Ministry of Religious Affairs (Kementrian Agama),
at the practical level, this ministry does not deal with specific issues
confronting Muslims. Since such a role is assumed by MUI, it can be said
that MUI represents the state and its fatwā stands as the formal legal position
of the state on issues relating to Islam.
The other organization which this study focuses on is Muhammadiyah.
This group has been widely associated with a puritan-reformist strand of
Islam, and for such a reason it is also often associated with Wahhabism and
Salafism. However, this description might fail to describe the whole range of
Muhammadiyah movement. In some extent, especially in terms of faith, the
association of Muhammadiyah with Wahhabism is not really misleading.
Similarly, the terms Salafism might also be applied to Muhammadiyah, when
it refers to group which adhere to the principle of returning to the Qur’ān and
Sunna.6 It has also been rendered as the representative of reformist Islamic
movement in Indonesia. Some scholars studied on this movement have also
pointed to its current conservative inclinations. Founded in 1912,
Muhammadiyah was set up as an Islamic movement aimed at ‘purifying’
Islam as practiced by Javanese society in the beginning of 20th
century,
featured by syncretic amalgamation of Javanese traditions with Islamic
teachings.
6 More detail and comprehensive discussion on the multiplicity of Muhammadiyah’s
orientations will be presented in Chapter 7 of this thesis.
5
Although currently labelled as puritan, studies reveal that in its initial
phase, Muhammadiyah was often described as accommodative towards local
tradition. Its rigidity in dealing with local cultures and traditions only
occurred about a decade after its foundation. This paradigmatic shift is
believed to have been conditioned by the establishment of Majelis Tarjih.
Consequently, in addition to being a think tank of this organization, Majelis
Tarjih is also frequently identified as the agent of puritanism within this
group. This ambiguous nature of Majelis Tarjih is relevant to understanding
its mode(s) of thought and how it is reflected in fatwā issued. Majelis Tarjih
is founded in 1927 with the basic function of issuing fatwā or legal
determination for certain problems. Nevertheless, it should also be
emphasized here that Majelis Tarjih does not deal only with religious
problems in a narrow sense. Rather, it also claims to deal with all
contemporary problems by referring back to the principles of the Qurʼān and
Sunna,7 and urges for ijtihād in resolving contemporary issues confronting
Muslim societies.
The other movement, Nahdlatul Ulama’, has been long known as the
representative of traditionalist Muslim groups in Indonesia. It is for this
reason that it is selected for this study. Interestingly, its characterisation as
traditionalist is currently questioned in view of competing mode of thought
that have merged within the movement. The extent to which this
development within NU impacts upon fatwā will be examined. Within NU,
the Baḥth al-Masāil has played a very significant role in constructing
7 See official website of Majelis Tarjih, http://tarjih.muhammadiyah.or.id/content-3-sdet-
sejarah.html accessed on 3 April 2012.
6
religious strand of NU since its foundation in 1926. Literature on the history
of this body indicates that in its initial phase, Baḥth al-Masāil was essentially
a kind of discussion that took place in pesantren as part of a mechanism in
solving problems within society. As a kind of activity, its inception is
concurrent with the founding of NU.8 Subsequently, it was formalized as an
autonomous structure within NU called Lembaga Baḥth al-Masāil or Lajnah
Baḥth al-Masāil.9
Historically, NU is founded partly in response to the ascendance of the
new political power in Saudi Arabia which marked a shift from the Shafi’ite
oriented to a Wahhabi-inclined political leadership. This shift of power was
seen as a potential threat to traditionalistic Islam and its practices as
Wahhabism served as ideological basis for the new regime which harboured
hostility to traditions maintained by traditionalist groups. At about the same
time, the call for religious reforms in Indonesia had begun to take place
spearheaded by several groups. It has inevitably created anxiety among
traditional Muslim leaders which culminated in the foundation of NU. NU’s
formal institutionalization rendered it both as jamīʽa (community) adhering to
traditional practice of Islam as well as jamʽiyya (organization), meaning those
who formally joined NU as its members. For both, NU developed specific
understanding of religion conditioned by as well as reflecting its predominant
mode of thought.
8 See Martin van Bruinessen, Kitab Kuning, Pesantren dan Tarekat: Tradisi-tradisi Islam di
Indonesia (Bandung: Mizan, 1996), 34. 9 Ahmad Zahro, Tradisi Intelektual NU: Lajnah Bahtsul Masa’il 1926-1999 (Yogyakarta:
LKIS), 69.
7
Apart from their significance in the life of Indonesian society, these
three fatwā-making agencies also reflect the interplay of competing mode of
thought in the formation of their legal thought as reflected in the fatwā-
making processes as well as substance of fatwā issued. The selection also
provides a view of their impact on fatwā-making.
Fatwā relating to religious beliefs and practices posed by challenges in
the advancement of scientific knowledge is a case in point. It can be
illustrated by the fatwā on the determination of the beginning of Islamic
calendar (hijriya), especially with reference to the holy Ramadan and Idul
Fitri. For decades Idul Fitri has not been celebrated concurrently by different
groups of Muslims, Islamic organizations and government. It should be borne
in mind that in the Indonesian context, managing religious matters is part of
the government’s responsibility.10
Not surprisingly, Eid celebration is always
preceded by an official meeting held by the Ministry of Religious Affairs that
involves representatives from all Islamic organizations in Indonesia including
MUI. The meeting popularly known as Sidang Isbat is designed to determine
the exact date of Eid. Once an agreement is achieved, it will be followed by
an official announcement by the Minister of Religious Affairs.
It is usually the case that the government’s decision differs from some
Islamic organizations in Indonesia. This dispute is due to different methods
adopted by Islamic organizations and the government in determining the new
10
According to classical Islamic jurisprudence, a product of ijtihad is not binding. However,
in order to prevent any dispute, state or government’s intervention is often required. Ibrahim
Hosein, a respected Indonesian scholar argued that government should only be allowed to
intervene in social matters and not in matters of worship. See Ibrahim Hosen, Fiqih
Perbandingan Masalah Nikah (Jakarta: Pustaka Firdaus, 2003), 13-15.
8
date of the Islamic calendar that is based on the lunar system.11
The most
notable disputants are Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama’.12
As widely
known, the former adopts the method of calculation (ḥisāb)13
based on
astronomical and mathematical principles, while the later believes in the
ru’ya method which involves direct vision of the crescent (hilāl). NU rejects
ḥisāb based on a conviction that this method was never practiced during the
Prophet Mohammad’s lifetime.14
The 2011 Eid was not an exception. But
unlike previous years, the controversy in that year was much more intense.
Muhammadiyah, which celebrated Eid on August 30, 2011, a day earlier than
government’s decision, was blamed as the source of tension and confusion
among Indonesian Muslims since it firmly insisted on the results of its own
ijtihād. The controversy intensified as the Sidang Isbat was broadcasted live
by a number of Indonesian national television stations. Comments were
obtained from Thomas Jamaluddin, a scientist interviewed in the programme
who maintained that Muhammadiyah’s method is outdated.
11
For an example of how the dispute is examined by Indonesian scientists, please refer to
Farid Ruskanda, Seratus Masalah Hisab dan Rukyat (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 1996). See
also, Farid Ismail, Selayang Pandang Hisab Rukyat (Jakarta: Direktorat Pembinaan Peradilan
Agama, Departemen Agama Republik Indonesia, 2004); Syamsul Anwar, Hari Raya dan
Problematika Hisab-Rukyat (Yogyakarta: Suara Muhammadiyah, 2008); Heri Ruslan,
“Penetapan Awal Bulan, Seperti Apa Aturannya?”, Dialog Jumat Republika, 5 November
2010; and Farid Ruskanda (et. al), Rukyat dengan Teknologi: Upaya Mencari Kesamaan
Pandangan tentang Penentuan Awal Ramadhan dan Syawal (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press,
1994). 12
Other smaller Islamic organizations such as Persatuan Islam have their own method of
determining the new Islamic calendar determination. However, in general they follow the
government’s decision in determining the day of Eid celebration. Although generally
Nahdlatul Ulama’ members follow government’s decision, some NU-affiliated pesantrens
celebrate Eid and performed Eid prayer on the same day with Muhammadiyah’s decisions.
This is based on my personal observation. 13
Etimologically, hisab (Arabic) means calculation. It is a derivative form of h-s-b means “to
calculate. For explanation on hisab, see Susiknan Azhari, Ensiklopedi Hisab Rukyat,
(Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2005). 14
Detailed explanation on Nahdlatul Ulama’s position regarding ru’ya can be found in A.
Aziz Masyhuri, Masalah Keagamaan: Hasil Muktamar dan Munas Ulama Nahdlatul Ulama
Kesatu/1926 s/d Ketigapuluh/2000 (Depok: Qultum Media, 2004), 52-53.
9
Muhammadiyah’s insistence in adopting the method it employed was also
blamed as the factor for the irreconcilable dispute.15
The scientist further
asserted that by using a more advanced technology the dispute can actually
be avoided. In other words, according to him, it is the reluctance of
Muhammadiyah to adopt a more modern technology that had worsened the
situation. As a result, unlike other Muslim countries such as Malaysia, Saudi
Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Qatar, Indonesia had two versions of the
Eid in that year: Muhammadiyah’s Eid coincided with the majority of
Muslim countries while NU and the government’s version was a day later.16
While the Eid celebration ran peacefully despite differences and
controversies on the grass-root level, the dispute resumed at another level.
Having been accused of employing outdated method, Syamsul Anwar of
Muhammadiyah’s Majelis Tarjih maintained in defence that the method
employed by NU which the government endorsed is much more outdated.17
Moreover, some commentators even confidently argued that if the moon’s
appearance is considered, Muhammadiyah’s version of Eid day is much
closer to the truth.18
However, none of government officials and others who
endorsed the opposite position responded to Muhammadiyah.
15
http://tempointeraktif.com/hg/kesra/2011/08/28/brk,20110828-353968,id.html; see also
http://nasional.inilah.com/read/detail/1769952/perbedaan-idul-fitri-karena-penyimpangan-
astronomi; http://www.muhammadiyah.or.id/id/news-392-detail-penjelasan-majelis-tarjih-
dan-tajdid-pp-muhammadiyah-soal-penetapan-idul-fitri-besok.html. Accessed on September
10, 2011. 16
Based on Decree of Minister of Religious Affair of the Republic of Indonesia, Number 148
Year 2011. The copy of the document can be accessed through:
http://kemenag.go.id/file/dokumen/keputusanmenagno148tahun2011tentangpenetapan1syaw
al1432h.pdf. Accessed on September 10, 2011. 17
http://www.dakwatuna.com/2011/09/14341/otoritas-dan-kaidah-matematis-refleksi-atas-
perayaan-idul-fitri-1432-h-tanggapan-atas-kritik-thomas-djamaluddin/. Accessed on
September 10, 2011. 18
http://lemlit.uhamka.ac.id/index.php?pilih=news&mod=yes&aksi=lihat&id=53&judul=pur
nama-dan-awal-bulan-qomariyah.html. Access was done on September 10, 2011.
10
This description is a factual example of how modes of thought
influence fatwā. It has long been acknowledged that the ḥisāb method is
regarded as modern since it is based on astronomical and mathematical
calculations while ru’ya only accepts direct vision of the crescent, although
the vision also involves the use of advanced technology. The debate,
therefore, has wider implications on the issue of compatibility of Islamic law
and modern science. The method adopted also mirrors and conditions
divergent modes of thought of groups concerned.
In the study of fatwā issued by these selected fatwā-agencies, this thesis
confines itself to the period of post-New Order Indonesia for several reasons.
The foremost is the collapse of New Order reign in 1998. This collapse has
ushered considerable changes in political and religious life in Indonesia. Two
most significant and particularly relevant of these are political openness or
political liberalization and freedom of religious expression. Suharto’s Orde
Baru was featured by authoritarianism and strict political surveillance. When
the regime collapsed, political openness was clearly manifested in the
mushrooming of political parties. In the first election in the post-Suharto
Indonesia (1999), forty eight parties participated with a significant number of
them being Islamic political parties. Although the number of participating
political parties fluctuated from one election to another, they nonetheless
indicate the climate of political liberalization in the country. Moreover,
political liberalization is also featured in the emergence of democracy in
Indonesian political life. Relatively transparent elections and freedom of
11
speech are among a few consequences that have accompanied the new
climate of political change.
Post-Suharto Indonesia also manifests in the emergence of more open
space for diverse religious expressions, especially from Muslim groups,
including more formalistic and bold expressions of demands for Islamic law
and legal principles in government and administration.19
Accordingly,
Islamic organizations in Indonesia found spacious room to freely elaborate
and express their positions, principles and attitudes regarding significant
issues affecting Indonesian society. Martin van Bruinessen, for instance,
noted that the face of Islam in post-Suharto Indonesian society diametrically
differ from the previous era.20
The space has also witnessed a “conservative
turn” evident in religious violence and inter-religious conflicts as well as the
emergence of transnational Islamic movements attempting to influence
mainstream Islamic organizations such as Muhammadiyah and NU.21
This changing condition has also impacted on religious discourse and
practice of Islamic law in Indonesia. Inevitably, Islamic law has been
witnessing a considerable shift from earlier decades. During the era of
political authoritarianism and oppression under Suharto’s New Order (Orde
Baru) in which political restriction was an integrated feature of the regime,
19
For more discussion on Islamic law dynamic within the context of contemporary
Indonesian setting, please refer to Jan Michiel Otto (ed), Sharia Incorporated: A
Comparative Overview of the Legal Systems of Twelve Muslim Countries in Past and Present
(Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2010), especially Chapter 10. Comparative perspective on
the subject can also be found in Arskal Salim and Azyumardi Azra (eds), Shari’a and
Politics in Modern Indonesia (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003). 20
Martin van Bruinessen, “Introduction: Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam
and the
“Conservative Turn” of the Early Twenty-First Century”, in Martin van Bruinessen (ed),
Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam: Explaining the “Conservative Turn”
(Singapore: ISEAS, 2013), 1-3. 21
Ibid.
12
open expressions of Islam in public space was perceived as a threat to the
stability of the state. Moreover, in the early days of Suharto’s ascension to
power, relationship between Islam and the state was characterized by hatred
and suspicion. When massive student demonstration in 1998 forced Suharto
to step down from presidency and many restrictions were lifted, a new phase
of Indonesian politics was revealed. It was accompanied by unprecedented
challenge to Muslims who continue to seek religious guidance and rulings
from religious elite in resolving uncertainties and complexities of life
encompassing many domains. While this has been ongoing long before the
fall of Suharto, the changing context created less restriction on the expression
of religious opinions including the domain of law and legal thought. This
signifies the basis for selection of post-New Order Indonesia as point of
departure for this study.
B. Mode of Thought
One of the major issues examined in this thesis is the function of mode
of thought in conditioning fatwā. In its relation to religion, mode of thought is
reflected in groups’ perspective of religion including what aspects of religion
are deemed significant and what are marginalised or overlooked. It is also
manifested in how religious teachings are conceived and applied. While
mode of thought of groups may shift over time and may not be monolithic at
any point in time, it is nonetheless possible to discern dominant modes of
thought as manifested in ideas, views, opinions, and judgment held by the
groups as they respond to their milieu as opposed to those that are marginal.
13
Three major mode of thought are relevant to this study, namely
traditionalism, revivalism and reformism. The meanings attributed to these
terms must be clarified at the outset to avoid confusion as they have been
used by various scholars in diverse ways. Against the backdrop of Indonesian
Islam’s complex diversity, these typologies of mode of thought in
understanding religious experience might be viewed as an oversimplification.
However, such categorizations are ideal types which do not ignore the
dynamic interaction within and between a particular social group’s religious
outlook while facilitating analyses of interplay and contestation among
variety of modes of thought. As ideal types, these constructions are also
meant to capture the main tendencies of mode of thought in the context of
Indonesian Muslim society without over-generalising. In general, Nahdlatul
Ulama’ is widely associated with traditionalistic Islam as opposed to
Muhammadiyah which is predominantly classified as a reformist Islamic
movement. MUI, on the other hand, being the amalgamation of all
Indonesian Muslim groups and supported by the state, is often highlighted for
its traditionalistic and conservative bent in Indonesian Islam. The meaning of
these modes of thought as defined in this thesis and their usage in analysing
fatwā will elucidate the extent to which such dominant perceptions of their
mode of thought hold sway, although this in itself is not the major aim of the
thesis.
14
Traditionalism
According to Robert Towler, traditionalism is “a style of religiousness
which clings on the old ways.”22
Its main tendency is maintaining tradition it
has received unquestioningly from generations of the past. Similarly, Karl
Mannheim formulated traditionalism as “a tendency to cling to vegetative
patterns, to old ways of life.” Given its dogmatism in according the ways of
the past at the core of its religious belief, traditionalism can be seen as a
potential as well as a manifest “reaction against deliberate reforming
tendencies and is characterised by fear of innovation”.23
Similarly,
traditionalism in William Graham’s understanding refers to “an emphasis
upon the historical authority of, and the continuity with or recovery of, norms
and institutions basic to a particular cumulative tradition.”24
All these
concepts of traditionalism indicate an attitude of reluctance in dealing with
contemporary situation which shares the attitude of conservatism. However,
Karl Mannheim viewed traditionalism and conservatism as two distinct
concepts. For him, traditionalism is not “necessarily bound up with political
or other sorts of conservatism”.25
It is also obvious that traditionalism is closely related to tradition
although the two can be clearly distinguished. Edward Shils describes
tradition as “anything which is transmitted or handed down from the past to
22
Robert Towler, The Need for Certainty: A Sociological Study of Conventional Religion
(London: Routledge and Keagan Paul, 1984), 83. 23
Karl Mannheim, “Conservative Thought” in Kurt H Wolff, From Karl Mannheim
(London: Transaction Publishers, 1993), 281. 24
See William A Graham, “Traditionalism in Islam: An Essay in Interpretation”, The
Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 23, 3 (1993), 496. 25
Karl Mannheim, “Conservative Thought” in Kurt H Wolff, From Karl Mannheim
(London: Transaction Publishers, 1993), 281.
15
the present”.26
This formulation underlines the continuity or linkage with the
past as an important element of tradition. Similarly, Bauman asserts another
possible understanding of tradition as “the element of historical continuity or
social inheritance in culture, or the social process by which such continuity is
achieved.”
More fundamentally, tradition can also be interpreted as “the collective
social inheritance of particular people, culture, society, group or collectivity
and as such stands as the referent of its collective identity.”27
Similar in a way
is a definition of the term offered by Harry B Acton who defines tradition as
“belief or practice transmitted from one generation to another and accepted as
authoritative, or deferred to, without argument.”28
In its derivative form,
William A Graham refers “traditional” to “those societal norms and
institutions that a culture perceives as congruent with or continuing older
precedents and values…” while Phillips and Schochet argue that in most
cases tradition is identified with “enduring social practices” and “tacitness is
often regarded as its signature”.29
Shaharuddin Maaruf’s formulation of
tradition is also instructive. He maintains that it is the “cultural or value
system which have been influential in moulding or shaping the world-view of
a given people for a significant period in their cultural history. The cultural or
26
Edward Shils, Tradition (London and Boston: Faber and Faber, 1981), 12. 27
R. Bauman, “Anthropology of Tradition”, in Neil J Smelser and Paul B. Baltes (eds),
International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences (New York: Elsevier, 2001),
15819. 28
See William A Graham, “Traditionalism in Islam: An Essay in Interpretation”, The Journal
of Interdisciplinary History, 23, 3 (1993), 496. 29
Mark Salber Phillips and Gordon Schocet, “Preface” in Mark Salber Phillips and Gordon
Schocet (eds), Questions of Traditions (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2004), ix.
16
value system represents the stable core, which provides the basis for the
society’s responses to contemporary and future challenges.”30
It cannot be denied that above-mentioned understanding portrays
tradition in neutral and positive rather than negative ways. The basic
understanding of tradition connotes neutral and even positive meanings but
an analogous meaning cannot be applied to traditionalism, since
traditionalism is often understood in a pejorative sense. 31
Jeroslav Pelikan,
for instance, makes a very sharp distinction between the two. For him,
tradition is “the living faith of the dead,” while traditionalism is “the dead
faith of the living”.32
However, as tradition is intrinsically related to the past,33
it is also
sometimes pejoratively perceived. For example, it is sometimes used in
comparison with Enlightenment and Renaissance movements that promote
discontinuation with the past, since the past is perceived as a symbol of
30
Saharuddin Maaruf, One God, Many Paths: Essay on the Social Relevance of Religion in
Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Aliran Publication, 1980), 242-243. 31
In an Islamic context, both positive and negative connotations of traditionalism could also
be found. Scholars such as Seyyed Hossein Nasr and his disciple Malaysian philosopher
Osman Bakar, for example, are often categorized as the defenders of “traditional Islam” that
engaged in promoting positive meanings of tradition. For Nasr, tradition is “…the principal
milestone for spiritual authenticity and an infinite source of grace”. Tradition in Nasr’s
thought is understood as spirituality and perennial philosophy of Islam that should be
renewed and revived in facing the challenge of modernity. Furthermore, Nasr writes: “…at
once al-din in the vastest sense of the word, which embraces all aspects of religion and its
ramifications, al-sunnah, or that which, based upon sacred models, has become tradition as
this word is usually understood, and silsilah, or the chain which relate each period, episode
or stage of life and thought in the traditional world to the Origin, as one sees so clearly in
Sufism. Tradition, therefore, is like a tree, the root of which are sunk through revelation in
the Divine Nature and from which the trunk and branches have grown over the ages.” See
Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Traditional Islam in the Modern World (London and New York: KPI
Limited), 13. 32
Jersolav Pelikan, The Vindication of Tradition: The 1983 Jefferson Lecture in the
Humanities (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1984), 65. 33
Edward Shils, Tradition (London and Boston: Faber and Faber, 1981), 12.
17
backwardness and primitiveness.34
Tradition is also at times perceived
negatively due to confusion in mistaking it with traditionalism35
as the
traditionalists have also irresponsibly hijacked traditions for their interests.
Robert Towler describes traditionalism in terms of several salient
features such as: a) firmly holding on to the past and shutting the gate of
critical inquiry; b) cherishing the certainty of the stable and secure order
lodged in the past; c) resistant to any kind of innovation; d) affirms and
reinforces the established order; d) hostile to any change and alert in pressing
innovative endeavours back into the established mould; e) strong tendency to
avoid or dismiss all questions by directing all questions to an exclusive
custodial authority.36
In the context of Islam in Indonesia, apart from the above traits,
traditionalism is also used to refer to the practice of religion that blends with
adat, “local practice” or “the way of the ancestors”.37
Concomitantly, the late
Abdurrahman Wahid, the former leader of Nahdlatul Ulama, described
traditionalist Muslims as follows:
…[they] are widely supposed to be rather backward in orientation
and ossified in their understanding of Islamic society and thought.
It is held that their persistence in upholding orthodox Islamic
law… leads them to reject modernity and a rational approach of
life. Similarly, in matters of theology, their determined adherence
to the scholasticism of al-Asy’ari and al-Maturidi is said to have
resulted in a fatalistic understanding of submission to God’s will
and disregard for the exercise of free-will and independent
34
William A Graham, “Traditionalism in Islam: An Essay in Interpretation”, The Journal of
Interdisciplinary History, 23, 3 (1993). 35
Jeroslav Pelikan, The Vindication of Tradition: The 1983 Jefferson Lecture in the
Humanities (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1984). 36
Robert Towler, The Need for Certainty: A Sociological Study of Conventional Religion
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984), 82. 37
Martin van Bruinessen, “Traditions for the Future: The Reconstruction of Traditionalist
Discourse within NU”, in Greg Fealy and Greg Barton (eds), Nahdlatul Ulama, Traditional
Islam and Modernity in Indonesia (Melbourne: Monash Asia Institute, 1996), 165.
18
thinking. Traditionalists are furthermore accused of being too
other-worldly in their practice of ritual Islamic mysticism
(tasawuf)… Thus the commonly held view of traditionalists is that
they are wholly passive community unable to cope with the
dynamic challenges of modernisation, the sort of community that
scholars regarded as belonging to a dying tradition.38
In the Indonesian context, Islamic religious traditionalism is manifested
in the reverence for tradition or adat and its incorporation into religious
teachings and practice. Moreover, it is also associated with adherence to
mystical orientation of Islam and its influence on the attitude towards worldly
life. Despite the influence of modernism, traditionalism as a religious
orientation in Islam continues to be a major type of religious orientation
among Muslims. In general, Muslim traditionalists are characterised by
certain common traits:
Firstly, they adhere dogmatically to selective interpretations of the
Qurʼān and Sunna without engaging with competing views.39
As Binyamin
Abrahamov noted, traditionalism is built on several foundations of which
strict adherence to selective teachings of the Qurʼān and Sunna of the
Prophet is a major one. Consequently, any kinds of interpretations not in
accord with its selected meaning are disregarded although traditionalists do
not object to the diversity in the understanding of Islamic teachings. In
understanding the Qurʼān, the use of reason is very limited. Hence,
38
Abdurrahman Wahid, “Foreword”, in in Greg Fealy and Greg Barton (eds), Nahdlatul
Ulama, Traditional Islam and Modernity in Indonesia (Melbourne: Monash Asia Institute,
1996), xv. 39
Karim Douglas Crow, Roots of Radical Sunni Traditionalism Fear of Reason and the
Hashwiyah (Singapore: Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2008), 19; George
Makdisi, “Remarks on Traditionalism in Islamic Religious History”, in Carl Leiden (ed), The
Conflict of Traditionalism and Modernism in the Muslim Middle East (Austin: The
Humanities Research Center the University of Texas, 1966); and Binyamin Abrahamov,
Islamic Theology: Traditionalism and Rationalism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,
1998).
19
traditionalist can only accept certain types of interpretations of the Qurʼān
and do not evaluate competing views on ground of principles. As Seyyed
Hossein Nasr explicates, traditional Islam accepts “…the Noble Quran as the
Word of God in both content and form: as the earthly embodiment of God’s
Eternal Words, uncreated and without temporal origin. It also accepts the
traditional commentaries upon the Quran, ranging from the linguistic and
historical to the sapiental and metaphysical.”40
This strict adherence to
selective readings of the Qurʼān and Sunna is termed as isnad41
paradigm of
traditional Islam. This paradigm is based on derivation of authority primarily
or even solely from linkage to a sacred tradition through a chain of personal
transmission linking intervening authorities to an original source. 42
For
traditionalists, the meaning of the Qurʼān is self-fulfilling prophecy in nature,
and for this reason it does not need any complicated interpretation. In
technical terms, traditionalists believe that the Qurʼān is both qath’iy al-
wurūd (transmitted in very fixed and unquestionable method) and qath’iy al-
dalāla, which means that the meaning of the Qurʼān is also fixed and
undisputable.43
Secondly, Islamic traditionalism stands on the perception that pious
forebears of Islam are unchallenged. Azhar Ibrahim calls this tendency as
40
Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Traditional Islam in the Modern World (London and New York:
KPI Limited), 14. 41
Isnad is a technical term in the study of hadith that basically means chain. This term refers
to the chain of scholars or ulama’ in transmitting hadith. 42
William A Graham, “Traditionalism in Islam: An Essay in Interpretation”, The Journal of
Interdisciplinary History, 23, 3 (1993), 502. 43
Manbaul Ngadhimah, “Potret Keberagamaan Islam di Indonesia (Studi Pemetaan
Pemikiran dan Gerakan Islam)”, Innovatio, Vol. VII, 14, (2008), 272.
20
“romanticism of the medieval past”.44
Conditioned by this attitude, Islamic
traditionalism has a tendency to give overriding importance to religious
knowledge of the past which it deems as perfect and complete. Moreover,
traditionalists believe that ideas, knowledge and values propagated by
forebears are at the same time relevant and constitute truth which cannot be
ignored. The same attitude is also applied to the formulation and product of
thinking of ulamā’of the past deemed as complete, final and absolute. As a
result, any attempts to contextually understand Islam or interpret its teachings
contextually is forbidden on the basis that such interpretations were never
practiced by pious forebearers (salaf al-salīh). Hence, traditionalists are also
often trapped in a symbolic type of Islam. For example, in certain circles of
traditionalist Muslims, emphasis is given to genealogical origin in the belief
that only descendants of the Prophet are authorised to teach Islam. In
Indonesian history, the debate over privilege accorded of sayyids and habaib
(the descendants of the Prophet) instanced by Jami’at Khair and al-Irsyad is
illustrative. While the latter give importance to Muslims based on quality of
their devotion to God (taqwa), genealogy signifies a significant factor in the
mode of thinking of the former.45
Thirdly, Islamic traditionalism is ambivalent to reason and generally
perceives it as limited. Amidst the significance of rationality in the
contemporary context of modernity traditionalism is becoming much more
assertive in limiting the role of reason in interpreting religious text. Its
44
Azhar Ibrahim, Contemporary Islamic Discourse in the Malay-Indonesian World: Critical
Perspective (Petaling Jaya: SIRD, 2014), 18. 45
See Deliar Noer, “Introduction” in Khamami Zada, Islam Radikal: Pergulatan Ormas-
Ormas Islam Garis Keras di Indonesia (Jakarta: Teraju, 2002), xv.
21
attitude towards reason is based on the conviction of intrinsic limitations of
reason which prevents it from determining truth.46
Azhar Ibrahim argues that
this trait of traditionalism resembles medieval mysticism which sees reason
as the enemy of human beings in achieving spirituality.47
He also maintains
that the reluctance and also suspicion of traditionalists in employing reason is
influenced by Sufi theosophical speculation which “draws sharp distinction
between reason and revelation, in which the former is seen as absolutely
fallible.”48
As the result of this limited employment of reason, traditionalists
are characterised by “uncritical and dogmatic reliance on religious
traditions”.49
The fourth characteristic of traditionalism featured in Muslims mode of
thought is the fear of innovation.50
It should be made clear that innovation in
this context refers to innovation in thought and social practices and not in
terms of religious rituals. This distinction is important, since traditionalist,
despite their fear of innovation, often create rituals that are deemed as bid’a
(heresy) by revivalist and reformist.51
This fear of innovation is further
strengthened by the tendency of glorifying the past and of perceiving the past
as the only ideal that Muslims must refer to. Consequently, this mode of
thought defines their reluctant attitude toward social change. As Hisham
46
Wan Muhammad Ali and Muhammad Uthman Ali, Islam dan Modernisma (Kuala
Lumpur: Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia, 1977), 17-18 47
Azhar Ibrahim, Contemporary Discourse, 5. 48
Ibid, 6. 49
Noor Aisha Abdul Rahman, “Changing Roles, Unchanging Perceptions and Institutions:
Traditionalism and Its Impact on Women and Globalization in Muslim Societies in Asia,”
The Muslim World, 97 (July 2007), 481. 50
Benyamin Abrahamov, Islamic Theology: Traditionalism and Rationalism (Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 1998), chapter 2, 1-11. 51
In the section on reformism, I will discuss types of orthodoxies that among other things
pertaining ritual innovation.
22
Sharabi argues, traditionalists are usually bound with historicism as they see
the past as the locus and not the future. Therefore, as Azhar asserts,
traditionalists’ views “are generally the opposite of the ideas of the reformists
who advocate progressive change in society.”52
Fifthly, traditionalists are usually closely linked to traditional Islamic
institutions and use those institutions as medium in the spread of their ideas
transmitted from the past. They tend to dominate religious institutions such as
mosques, religious learning centres, madrasa and pesantrens. In Indonesia,
traditionalists also often dominated state-affiliated Islamic institution. Fatwā
institution in Indonesia represented by Majelis Ulama’ Indonesia is an
example of state-affiliated religious institution dominated by traditional-
minded religious scholars. This mode of thinking impact on religious thought
including fatwā.
The dominance of traditionalism bears implications on the attitude
towards social change. They are reluctant to accept social change since from
their point of view surrendering to present needs implies compromising
Islamic belief. Although they resist change, traditionalists often gradually
accommodate and adjust to changing conditions. However, they do this on
the ground of exigency rather than principles. They continue to uphold
selected religious formulations they deem “authentic” as they pragmatically
adapt to the demands of their milieu.
52
Azhar Ibrahim, Contemporary Discourse, 5.
23
Revivalism
Revivalism refers to a type of mode of thought which is politically
assertive and reflects a more conscious intellectual and political formulation
compared to religious traditionalism. Some revivalists are engaged in
political activism and use politics as a means to achieve their ideals. They
include, but not limited to, personalities such as Abul A’la al-Mawdudi,53
Hasan al-Banna,54
Sayyid Qutb55
and Taqiyuddin an-Nabhani who are
identified with the agenda of institutionalising an Islamic order or Islamising
society through political means. The founding of Islamist political parties and
organizations with such a mode of thought has intensified their immense
influence in the global spread of Islamic revivalism in the contemporary
Muslim world, including Southeast Asia.56
Basically, Islamic revivalism is
another response of Muslims to the challenges of modernity which is featured
by its strong hostility towards the West. The seeds of religious revivalism
have taken place more than a century ago in the context of colonialism in the
19th
century. It is from this point that puritanical stance of revivalist mode of
53
On Mawdudi’s thought and role in the making of Islamic revivalism, see Seyed Vali Reza
Nasr, Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press);
Seyed Vali Reza Nasr, “Mawlana Mawdudi’s Biography” The Muslim World Journal, 85, 1-
2 (1995), 49–62. 54
For further account on Hasan al-Banna see Gudrun Krämer, Hasan al-Banna (London:
Oneworld Publications, 2009). 55
On Sayyid Qutb’s political thought see Sayyid Qutb and William E Shepard, Sayyid Qutb
and Islamic Activism: A Translation and Critical Analysis of Social Justice in Islam (Leiden
and New York: E.J. Brill, 1996); Muhammad Hafiz Diyab, Sayyid Qutb: al-Khitāb wa al-
Iduyulujiyya (Cairo: Dar al-Thaqafa al-Jadida, 1989); Sayed Khatab, The Power of
Sovereignty: The Political and Ideological Philosophy of Sayyid Qutb (London and New
York: Routledge, 2006); Adnan A Musallam, From Secularism to Jihad: Sayyid Qutb and
the Foundation of Radical Islamism (Westport: Praeger Publisher, 2005); John Calvert,
Sayyid Qutb and the Origin of Radicalism Islamism (New York: Columbia University Press,
2010); Ibrahim M Abu Rabi’, “Discourse, Power and Ideology in Modern Islamic Revivalist
Thought: Sayyid Qutb” The Muslim World Journal, 81, 3-4 (1991), 283–298. 56
Ira M Lapidus, “Islamic Revival and Modernity: The Contemporary Movements and the
Historical Paradigms”, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 40, 4
(1997), 444-460.
24
thought emerged. In the attempt to alleviate the socio-economic plight of the
Muslims ravaged by the impact of colonial policies, these groups maintained
the conviction that religion can facilitate the progress of the community.
However, their revivalist orientation conditioned their view that the way
forward was to return to the pristine past of Islam which was constructed
based on their image of Muslim history and Islamic culture. In this mode of
thinking, Islam as practiced by Muslims has been corrupted by the influence
of local and popular cultures. This syncretic type of Islam to their mind had
contributed to the stagnation of Muslims and had to be “reformed” in order
for Muslims to progress.57
In the contemporary period, this mode of thought is rooted in internal
and external factors impacting on newly independent Muslim states and
societies in meeting the demands and challenges of social change. Since the
1970s in Indonesia, revivalist ideas had begun circulating among student
circles and some groups. However, restrictions that the New Order regime
imposed upon dissenting voices had suppressed their demands. In the
subsequent period, the fall of Suharto’s regime has facilitated the space for
their manifestations in the religious landscape of Islamic thought in
contemporary Indonesia. While this mode of thought dominates radical
movements and political groups such as Hizbut Tahrir and Front Pembela
Islam, its salient traits are not confined to such groups.
A central motive in this mode of thinking is the notion that the
advancement of Western modernism has induced secularism of state and
57
Fauzan Saleh, Fauzan Saleh, Modern Trends in Islamic Theological Discourse in 20th
Century Indonesia: A Critical Survey (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 2-3.
25
society which revivalists associate pejoratively with relativity of human
values, objectification of the world or nature and the overthrow of religion. 58
Therefore, revivalist discourse is strongly bent on “reviving and returning to
the fundamental teachings and precepts of the Islamic faith.”59
However, in
this mode of thought, what is deemed fundamental in religious teachings is
exclusively defined by the group at the expense of others.
This exclusive trait in revivalist mode of thought is manifested in its
credo that Islam is not a mere religion but al-dīn, a comprehensive religion, a
total way of life and the only path to salvation and that the “Islamic system”
is the most legitimate and authentic. While generally Muslim do not object to
these formulations, the meaning that revivalists accord to these, however, are
markedly different and which they alone have the prerogative of defining to
the exclusion of all others. The claim of absoluteness in its formulation of
Islam is also manifested in its strong tendency to regard other Muslims who
adhere to other interpretations and practice of Islam as un-Islamic or even
worse, outside the fold of Islam. 60
In this mode of thought, Islam and state are not separable. This doctrine
is best described in terms of Islam as dīn wa dawla, or that Islam embodies
not only religious matters but also defines how a state is run. The separation
of dīn (religion) and dawla (state) is inconceivable as religion is perceived as
both a polity and a method of government. Their denouncement of the
58
Shaharudin Maaruf , 2001, p 3 59
Hussin Mutalib, Islam in Malaysia: From Revivalism to Islamic State (Singapore:
University of Singapore Press, NUS, 1993), 1. 60
Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, “Mawdudi and the Jama’at-I Islami: The Origins, Thoery and
Practice of Islamic Revivalism”, in Ali Rahnema (ed), Pioneers of Islamic Revival (Kuala
Lumpur and Beirut: SIRD and World Book Publishing, 2005), 105-106.
26
present social order and insistence on what they define as the Islamic
alternative reflect elements of utopian mode of thinking. 61
Revivalists do not see the relevance of classical Islamic tradition as a
legacy that should be preserved or revaluated so that it can contribute to the
development of the community. At the same time they adopt the popular
credo of “returning to the Qurʼān and Sunna”. In fact, this relegates the entire
vista of classical learning to the margins with the exception of few scholars
like Ibn Taymiyya and al-Mawardi. 62
Unlike the traditionalists who cherish
and adhere strictly to the opinions of savants of the classical period,
revivalists reject this as taqlīd and attempt to reconstruct the past based on
ijtihād which they consider pristine and authentic. However, their lack
adequate grounding in both religious sciences and modern knowledge impairs
their capacity for genuine reform.
Revivalism is not anti-modernity. Zainah Anwar, for instance,
maintains that in contrast to stereotypes that “most Islamic revivalists are not
educated, anti-modern, and society misfits, they are in fact well-educated,
upwardly mobile and motivated individuals.”63
It is hence unsurprising that
while harbouring strong hostility to the West and the existing order it deems
secular, western concepts including those of state and government are heavily
61
Hussin Mutalib, “Islamic Revivalism in ASEAN States”, Asian Survey, 30, 9 (1990), 877-
891. 62
R. Hrair Dekmejian,“Islamic Revival: Catalysts, Categories, and Consequences”, in
Shireen T Hunter (ed), The Politics of Islamic Revivalism: Diversity and Unity (Bloomington
and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1988), 4. 63
Zainah Anwar, Islamic Revivalism in Malaysia: Dakwah among the Students (Petaling
Jaya: Pelanduk Publication, 1987), 2.
27
utilised in conceiving what they imagine as an Islamic state, system or
order.64
In their fixation of returning to the pristine Islam of the past, the
revivalist mode of thought tends to reject local religious traditions and
practices which have syncretised with Islam. These include religious rituals
and ceremonies long observed by Muslim such as kenduri or slametan,
maulud, ratib, barzanji and many others which they pronounce as bid’a
(innovation). Their preoccupation with creating a Muslim identity that is
untainted by un-Islamic elements is strongly manifested in their version of
aurat, insistence on what they regard as halal, gender interaction, attitude
towards cultural forms and expression and many other domains of life. The
halal movement and awareness is not only confined to food, but has also
extended to other dimensions such as banking, insurance and economic
practices, in general. Furthermore, in the Indonesian case, as in Malaysia,
Islamic revivalism is manifested in the form of sexual segregation in
attending schools or religious classes, lectures or other public functions.
Recently, some bylaws are imposed to restrict women activities. The
Indonesian National Commission for Women identifies that there have been
at least 154 bylaws that discriminate women. Among these is the obligation
to wear the veil for all women in Bangkalan, Madura. The same obligation is
also imposed on civil servants in Bulukumba, Sulawesi. According to
Indonesian National Commission for Women, there are at least 15 regions in
Indonesia that have applied rules or bylaws that potentially or even have been
64
Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, “Mawdudi and the Jama’at-I Islami: The Origins, Thoery and
Practice of Islamic Revivalism”, in Ali Rahnema (ed), Pioneers of Islamic Revival (Kuala
Lumpur and Beirut: SIRD and World Book Publishing, 2005), 106.
28
proven to be discriminative against women. These regions include Nanggroe
Aceh Darussalam, Banten, Gorontalo, Central Java, East Java, Lampung,
South Borneo, and North Sumatra.65
The assertiveness of Islamic revivalism in public life is also evident in
the strong demand for a stricter Islamic observance almost in all aspects of
life. Such idea as Islamic or sharī’a economy as mentioned earlier can be
attributed to this mode of thought. As Timur Kuran analyses, the idea and
practice of Islamic economy cannot be separated from revivalist tendency of
Mawlana Abul A’la al-Mawdudi.66
However, their project of Islamizing all
realms of life is more rhetorical than substantive. The movement for
Islamization suffers important internal debates and conflicts. For instance,
while some uphold the belief that Islamization of society has to precede
Islamization of the state, 67
others opine otherwise. The demand for
Islamization of society, through the application and the formalization of
sharī’a is a case in point68
as it is maintained that without such participation,
sharī’a formalization is difficult to achieve.
Revivalist mode of thought is also manifested in the puritanical stance
in understanding religious teachings. They condemn all practices and ideas
65
http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2010/01/29/063222253/Komnas-Perempuan-Desak-154-
Perda-Diskriminatif-Dibatalkan, accessed on 31 December 2011. 66
Among the strong supporters of this view is Timur Kuran. He sees that there is a strong
linkage between Islamic economics with Islamic revivalism and fundamentalism. See Timur
Kuran, Islam and Mammons: The Economic Predicaments of Islamism (Princeton University
Press, Princeton, 2004); also Timur Kuran, “The Economic Impact of Islamic
Fundamentalism”, in Marty, M.E., Appleby, R.S. (Eds.), Fundamentalisms and the State:
Remaking Polities, Economies, and Militance (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993),
302–341. 67
Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, “Mawdudi and the Jama’at-I Islami: The Origins, Thoery and
Practice of Islamic Revivalism”, in Ali Rahnema (ed), Pioneers of Islamic Revival (Kuala
Lumpur and Beirut: SIRD and World Book Publishing, 2005), 106-107. 68
For discussion on the stages of shari’a formalization according to Partai Keadilan
Sejahtera’s method, see Nandang Burhanuddin, Penegakan Syariah Islam Menurut Partai
Keadilan Sejahtera (Jakarta: Pustaka al-Jannah, 2004), 107-118.
29
deemed as un-Islamic or anathema to the Islamic tawhīd. This can be seen in
their attitude towards democracy. The Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia’s insistence
on the revitalization of caliphate is not only motivated by utopian aspiration
about the reviving Islamic golden age through the re-establishment of
caliphate, but also accompanied by condemnation of democracy as un-
Islamic. It can be argued that like traditionalism, revivalism depicts an
ambivalent attitude towards innovation. However, the fields of innovation
that traditionalist and revivalist fear are distinctive. While the ambivalence of
traditionalists has more to do with contemporary social change that
aggressively penetrates society which is perceived as threatening tradition,
the latter’s concern is with innovation in the realms of ibāda (bid’a).
Furthermore, while traditionalists are innovative in creating rituals regarded
as ibāda, as represented in practices such as Barzanji, revivalists condemn
such innovations as un-Islamic.
Reformism
Reformism as used in this thesis refers to a type of mode of thought
which seeks to revitalize religion amidst contemporary challenges and
contextualize religious teachings and values with the aim of improving the
well-being of man and society. Elements of this mode of thought are reflected
in the views of Muhammad Abduh, an Egyptian Muslim reformer who
maintains that reform aims
“…to direct the faith of Muslims in such a way as to make Muslims
better and to improve their social condition. It seeks to put an end to
errors and misunderstanding of religious texts so well that once the
30
beliefs are fortified, actions will be more in conformity with
morality.”69
Reformist mode of thought is featured by some of the following
indicators: a) a strong intellectual basis; b) a focus on substance over form; c)
strong social philosophy informed critically by social sciences; d) grounded
in contextual local needs and challenges; e) clear and consistent in the
commitment to pedagogical strategies and planning; f) contain multiple and
diverse approaches and strategies in meeting its objectives.70
Reformist mode of thought is not a denial of or opposition to tradition.
Its main objective lies in creatively synthesising religious teachings and value
with the demands of the modern world. In the domain of religion, reformist
mode of thought does not devalue ideas of pious savants of the past nor the
eradication of their achievements and contributions. It simply means that
ideas including legal thought of the scholars must be revaluated where
necessary, even if they arose from influential ulamā’ of that time. Hence, in
reformist mode of thinking, contributions of the past scholars that are of
value are to be revived, modified and developed even if they have been
marginalized by the weight of conservatism. Although it is not anti-tradition,
reformist mode of thought is anti-dogma. This means it rejects emotive
overreliance on ideas and practices of the past that have outlived their
purpose.
69
Ibid, 81. 70
Azhar Ibrahim, “The Idea of Religious Reform: Perspective of Singapore Malay-Muslim
Experiences”, in Syed Farid Alatas (ed), Muslim Reform in Southeast Asia: Perspective from
Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore (Singapore: Majelis Ugama Islam Singapura, 2009), 84-
87.
31
Another salient trait of reformist outlook is the distinction it makes
between universal and eternal values prescribed by the religion from
teachings which are historically determined. Hence, reformist thought
denounces uncritical adherence to religious traditions and dogma of the past.
This mode of thought contradicts traditionalism in approach and
conceptualisation of heritage of the past or local traditions (adat). While
traditionalist clings onto traditions without question, reformists advocate the
need for its revaluation on basis of principles.71
In reformist orientation, the
basic, humanistic and eternal aspects of the teachings and values of Islam
must be harnessed and concretized to deal with problems that have emerged
within the specific historical and socio-cultural contexts of a given
community. Hence, its emphasis is on critical appraisal of ideas that were
themselves inevitably conditioned by their own contextual conditions.
Also, reformist orientation is inclusive. While it is grounded in
humanitarian and religious traditions based on the teachings of Islam, it does
not ignore the intellectual contributions of others that are of value. Reformist
mode of thinking, therefore, entails the assimilation of contributions of
mankind that are consistent with religious philosophy. It acknowledges that
no society has the monopoly of knowledge and that ideas that contribute to
the betterment of man cannot be denied. This essential aspect of reform is
supported by ample historical evidence as far back as the inception of Islam
71
The syncretic nature of Islam in Indonesia is linked to preIslamic element of Hinduism and
Buddhism. Although the exact date of the coming of Islam to Nusantara is still debated by
historians it cannot be denied that Hinduism and Buddhism preceded Islam in forming the
system of values of Indonesian societies. In view of this Islamic missionaries chose to
accommodate local practices with lslamic doctrine. It is believed that from this point, Islamic
syncretism started to emerge. See Merle C Ricklefs, Mystic Synthesis in Java: A History of
Islamization from the Fourteenth to the Early Nineteenth Centuries (Norwalk: East Bridge,
2006).
32
itself in the seventh century. Historical records reveal how Muslims have
borrowed, assimilated, refined and modified law and ideas originating from
other nations and societies for its own people where these were found to be
useful and compatible for their purpose.
Yet, another important attribute of reformist orientation is the
importance it gives to thought and practices that lead to outcomes better than
what exist in terms of its impact on human life. In this mode of thought, it is
meaningless for any group simply to assert that their initiatives are reformist
unless it can be demonstrated that these have brought about improvements to
human lives and condition. This important criterion means that mere use of
the term reform with reference to a particular set ideas of a group without an
evaluation of its relevance and impact on human lives merely breeds
confusion.
The reformist mode of thinking rejects the slogan of returning to the
Qur’ān and hadīth as unconstructive as it fails to discern what aspects of
these sources one should return to and how these are to be construed in the
context of the contemporary world. As has been briefly indicated earlier, the
dark age of Muslim intellectualism was among other factors due to
widespread belief that religious interpretations has been completely
formulated by earlier generation of ulamāʼ, and as such, no further ijtihād is
needed for Muslims today. Reformists severely criticise this doctrine and
strongly urge for the use of reason in the application of religious teachings
and values to the current context. In reformist thought, ijtihād is not limited
33
to certain course of period in Islamic history.72
Unavoidably, this stance
which effectively rejects taqlīd preserved by the traditionalist wing has had
adverse consequences on the influence of this mode of thought 73
Historically, the pejorative labelling of Kaum Muda in Malaya in the early
20th
century as those who subscribe to erroneous theology and deviant
practices is a case in point.
Ijtihād, as advocated by reformists, is the “exertion of mental energy in
the search for legal opinion to the extent that the faculties of the jurist
become incapable of further effort.”74
The vitality of ijtihād advocated by
reformist underscores the importance of reason in understanding religious
doctrine. This emphasis on reason as a tool in understanding and appreciating
religious values is a marked feature that distinguishes reformist mode of
thinking from competing orientations.75
By employing rationalistic approach to religion, reformists view the
urgent need to see religious teachings in its historical context, and the need
for religious thought of the present to address the current challenges. As a
result, the legitimacy of ijtihād in formulating current laws and practices is
unchallenged. Socially, reformist group generally emerged from within the
progressive strand of the religious circles. In most cases they also receive
72
Wael B Hallaq, “Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?”, International Journal of Middle East
Studies, 16, 1 (1984), 3-41; J. Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1964), 70-71. 73
On taqlid and stagnation of Muslim thought, see Syaykh Taha Jabir al-Alwani, Issues in
Contemporary Islamic Thought (Herndon: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2005),
70-80; and Indira Falk Gesink, Islamic Reform and Conservatism: Al-Azhar and the
Evolutuion of Modern Sunni Islam (London and New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 2010). 74
Wael B Hallaq, “Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?”, International Journal of Middle East
Studies, 16, 1 (1984), 3-41. 75
Benyamin Abrahamov, Islamic Theology: Traditionalism and Rationalism (Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 1998), vii.
34
training in classical Islam as do traditionalists. But their openness and
exposure to exogenous ideas stimulate their drive to introduce reform from
within. A rational approach to Islam to them is the answer to enable Muslim
to confront the present challenge of development. This can be seen from how
Muhammad Abduh, among earliest reformist Muslim, carried out his
religious reforms.76
In Southeast Asian context, reform sparked by Abduh
and al-Afghani in Egypt and Middle East in general also found its fertile soil
through local reformists who were inspired by reform in the Arab world. In
Malaya, the ideas of Muslim reformers such as al-Hadi illustrate the point.
His contributions to diagnosing the causes of socio-economic backwardness
and remedies prescribed reveal a strong grounding in progressive religious
traditions and their relevance to alleviating the plight of the Malays in the
context of imperialism. Some aspects of his reform ideas can be found in the
journal al-Imam which he and his circle of ulamā’ spearheaded. The ideas
they expounded on the problems and impediments to modernisaton including
religious life, the nature of elite, economic stagnation, modern education and
the role of women among others reveal serious attempts at reviewing the
relevance of religious values in facilitating adaptation to the modern world.
Another key feature of reformist orientation is their approach to
understanding texts. Interpretation of texts is instrumental in the thought of
reformist since it is determinant in defining reformist attitude towards a
number of issues. Fazlur Rahman,77
Mohammad Sahrour, Nasr Hamid Abu
76
Indira Falk Gesink, Islamic Reform and Conservatism: Al-Azhar and the Evolutuion of
Modern Sunni Islam (London and New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 2010), 165-196. 77
Fazlur Rahman’s method of Qur’anic text interpretation is popularly known as “double
movements” which firstly consists of viewing the message of Qurʼān and the Hadith as a
35
Zayd, Mohammed Arkoun, Hassan Hanafi, Amina Wadud and Asma Barlas,
for example, are among those who approach Qur’anic text that enable them to
relate the Qur’anic formulation to current situation and context.78
In general,
these thinkers propose hermeneutical approach in understanding Qur’anic
text that will enable Muslims to comprehend Qurʼān beyond its textual
meanings. They believe that if Muslims are trapped in textual meanings of
the text without any attempt at reproducing new meanings that correspond to
the contemporary situation, Islam will lose its relevance. Reformist mode of
thought also advocates the use of concepts and theories of modern knowledge
in understanding religious texts and traditions. As M.K. Nawaz argues, “the
application of sociological methodology to the Qur’ān and Sunna simply
means that legal norms embodied in those sources should be interpreted in
their social context.”79
unity and should be understood by paying particular attention to the social context of their
inception. Next, understanding the interpretation of Qurʼān by several scholars that always
incorporated those interpretations to the context of their time, by doing this the eternal
principles of the Qurʼān can be extracted and finally those principles could be applied for
contemporary setting of Muslim societies. See Fazlur Rahman, Major Themes of Qur’an
(Minneapolis, MN: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1994); Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an
Intellectual Tradition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984); Jon Armajani, Dynamic
Islam: Liberal Muslim Perspective in a Transnational Age (Lanham, University of America
Press, 2004), 80-82; Riffat Hassan, “Islamic Modernist and Reformist Discourse in South
Asia,” in Shireen T Hunter (ed), Refomist Voice of Islam: Mediating Islam and Modernity
(New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2009), 170-172. 78
Approaches and methods of those intellectual in Qur’anic interpretation can be found in
their works such as: Fazlur Rahman, Major Themes of Qur’an (Minneapolis, MN:
Bibliotheca Islamica, 1994); Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, Tekstualitas al-Qur’an: Kritik terhadap
Ulumul Qur’an (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 200), Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, Naqd al-Khitab al-Dini
(Cairo: Sina’i Nasr, 1990), and Reformation of Islamic Thought: A Critical Historical
Analysis (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006); Mohammad Sahrour, Al-Qur’an
wa al-Kitab: Qira’a al-Mu’ashira (Damascus: al-Ahli li al-Taba’a wa al-Nashr wa al-Tauzi’,
1990), and Dirasat Islamiyyat al-Mu’ashira fi al-Dawla wa al-Mujtama’ (Damascus: al-Ahli
li al-Taba’a wa al-Nashr wa al-Tauzi’, 1990); Asma Barlas, Believing Women in Islam:
Unreading Patriarchal Interpretation of the Qur’an (Austin: University of Texas Press,
2002); Amina Wadud, Qur’an and Women (Kuala Lumpur: Fajar Bakti, 1992). 79
M.K. Nawaz, “Some Aspects of Modernization of Islamic Law”, in Carl Leiden (ed), The
Conflict of Traditionalism and Modernism in the Muslim Middle East (Austin: The
Humanities Research Center the University of Texas, 1966), 71.
36
Lastly, it should also be mentioned that reformist attempts to renew
religious understanding is not always a success-story. As the main reformist
agenda is to eliminate traditional and conservative tendencies within Muslim
societies, it is inevitable that their efforts have aroused backlash from their
opponents. In many instances, reformists are confronted by the challenge of
the strong grip religious traditionalism in contemporary society. Their critical
insights tend, therefore, to be relegated to the margins of society.
C. Significance of the Study
Studies on fatwā in Indonesia can be broadly categorized into three
groups, namely those focusing on methodological aspects of fatwā-making,
studies on economic issues and those which examine socio-political issues.
Falling under the first category is the pioneering work by M Atho’ Mudzhar
published more than two decades ago. Mudzhar’s study focuses on MUI’s
fatwā during the period of 1975-1988. He describes his study as an
“endeavour to identify the nature of the MUI’s fatwā in terms of their
methodological formulations, their socio-political surroundings, and societal
reaction to fatwā”.80
Another research within this category is the one done by
M.B. Hooker which analyses fatwā81
spanning from 1920s to 1990s issued
by four main fatwā-making institutions in Indonesia: Majelis Ulama’
Indonesia (MUI), Persatuan Islam (Persis), Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul
Ulama’. Hooker relates the problems of fatwā to the challenge of modernity.
80
Atho’ Mudzhar, Fatwas of the Council of Indonesian Ulama : a study of Islamic legal
thought in Indonesia, 1975-1988, Ph.D Thesis, University of California, Los Angeless, 1990,
8. 81
M. B. Hooker, Indonesian Islam: Social Change through Contemporary Fatawa (Crows
Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2003).
37
Among his findings are that fatwā issued by those institutions reveal
variations and similarities on certain issues. In terms of fatwā institutions
being studied, this study is similar to Hooker’s. However, it differs in terms
of aims and focus. Yet, another research that falls within this category is
Fathurrahman Djamil’s study which critically assessed the method employed
by Majelis Tarjih Muhammadiyah in its ijtihād.82
Although Djamil’s study
did not focus on fatwā, his study nonetheless provides useful backdrop of this
institution and can be drawn upon in better understanding how fatwā is
deduced by Muhammadiyah’s Majelis Tarjih. In 2005, Syamsul Anwar,
current head of Majelis Tarjih of Muhammadiyah, undertook a study on
contemporary fatwā-making process (iftā’) in Muhammadiyah.83
An
important point noted by Anwar is that Majelis Tarjih’s fatwā reflects
reformist inclination of Muhammadiyah. In his words: “Muhammadiyah’s
fatwā formulated by Majelis Tarjih thus promote the reformist ideology of
the movement which aim to purify faith and dynamize social life.” This study
contributes to understanding Majelis Tarjih and its fatwā in the contemporary
period which this thesis draws upon for critical analysis of Muhammadiyah’s
fatwā.
Similar to Djamil’s study is Ahmad Zahro’s research on Bahth al-
Masāil, a fatwā institution within Nahdlatul Ulama’.84
One of the most
important findings that Zahro presented in this study is the wide range of
82
Fathurrahman Djamil, Metode Ijtihad Majlis Tarjih Muhammadiyah (Jakarta: Logos,
1995), based on his Ph.D dissertation, State Islamic University Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta. 83
Syamsul Anwar, “Fatwa, Purification and Dynamization: A Study of Tarjih in
Muhammadiyah”, Islamic Law and Society, 12, 1 (2005), 28-44. 84
Ahmad Zahro, Tradisi Intelektual NU: Lajnah Bathsul Masail 1926-1999 (Yogyakarta:
LKIS, 2004).
38
NU’s fatwā which not only encompass normative and religious matters, but
non-ritual, social and cultural issues as well. This study also examines the
methods employed by Bahth al-Masāil and its position within Nahdlatul
Ulama’. It contributes to understanding the intellectual tradition within NU
which this thesis revaluates. In 2004, another study on Bahth al-Masāil was
carried out by Ahmad Kemal Reza.85
This study portrays the dynamics of
Bahth al-Masāil in East Java. It fills lacunae in fatwā studies at the local
level.
Several related studies employed a comparative approach. Among these
are Rifyal Ka’bah’s study on Muhammadiyah’s Majelis Tarjih and NU’s
Bahth al-Masāil.86
Another recent study with a similar approach was carried
out by Muhammad Shuhufi.87
This study critically examines the methods
adopted by Indonesian fatwā-making bodies, the significance of fatwā
institutions and how the fatwā produced are implemented by general Muslims
in Indonesia. Recently, a study on fatwā that focuses on the role of fatwā in
realizing maṣlaḥa was carried out by Nurul Huda in 2010. The main concern
of this study is how Indonesian fatwā-making institutions specifically Majelis
Ulama’ Indonesia (MUI), Bahth al-Masāil Nahdlatul Ulama’, and Majelis
Tarjih Muhammadiyah adopt maṣlaḥa as their main objective. Using Ibn
Ashur concept of maṣlaḥa this study argues that maṣlaḥa should be the main
85
Ahmad Kemal Reza, Continuity and Change in Islamic Law in Indonesia: The Case of
Nahdlatul Ulama’ bahtsul masail in East Java, Master Thesis, Australian National
University, 2004. 86
Rifyal Ka’bah, Hukum Islam di Indonesia: Perspektif Muhammadiyah dan NU (Jakarta:
Universitas YARSI, 1999). This book is based on his PhD dissertation at the Faculty of Law,
the University of Indonesia. 87
Muhamamd Shuhufi, Metode Ijtihad Lembaga-lembaga Fatwa (Studi Kritis Terhadap
Implementasi Metodologi Fatwa Keagamaan di Indonesia), Ph.D dissertation, Alauddin
State Islamic University, 2011.
39
objective in fatwā-making. The work provides insights into yet another
dimension in this field of study which this thesis draws upon.
The second category of studies on fatwā, especially those of MUI’s
encompass those dealing with insurance, finance and banking. The focus of
these studies mirrors the growing interest among Indonesian researchers in
developments in this domain since the formation of Dewan Syariah Nasional
(National Sharī’a Council) and the popularity of Islamic economic practices.
Amongst these are the works of Andi Cahyono on the application of DSN-
MUI’s fatwā on murābaḥa practice in sharī’a micro financial institutions;88
Alwan Sobari’s research on DSN-MUI’s methodology in issuing fatwā
relating to Islamic banking practices,89
Diah Eka Pratiwi’s study on the
influence of MUI’s fatwā on bank interest and Muslims’ attitude toward
conventional banking90
and Priambodo Trisaksono’s research on the
implementation of DSN-MUI’s fatwā in the practice of banking in
Indonesia.91
Apart from these, the study by Rahayu Hartini which traces the
position of MUI’s fatwā in resolving disputes in religious court can also be
included.92
These studies are useful in revealing ideas on Islam and modern
88
Andi Cahyono, Aplikasi fatwa DSN-MUI tentang Murabahah terhadap praktik pembiayaan
murabahah pada lembaga keuangan mikro syariah di Surakarta periode tahun 2010, 89
Alwan Sobari, Studi Metode Ijtihad Dalam Fatwa-Fatwa Dewan Syari`ah Nasional (DSN)
Tentang Pembiayaan Di Perbankan Syari`ah Tahun 2000-2005. 90
Diah Eka Pratiwi, Pengaruh Munculnya Fatwa MUI tentang Pengharaman Bunga Bank
Terhadap Minat Umat Islam Menabung, Bachelor thesis, Muhammadiyah University of
Surakarta, 2007. 91
Priambodo Trisaksono, Kesalahan penerapan fatwa DSN nomor.45/DSN MUI/II/2005
dalam perbankan Syariah di Indonesia: analisa terhadap penerapan akta wa'ad: studi kasus
pada Bank Syariah X & Y, Master thesis, University of Indonesia, 2009. 92
Rahayu Hartini, Kedudukan Fatwa MUI Mengenai Penyelesaian Sengketa Melalui
Basyarnas Pasca Lahirnya UU No. 3 Tahun 2006 tentang Pengadilan Agama, Research
Report, Muhammadiyah University of Malang, 2007.
40
banking and finance through fatwā. The focus of these studies differs from
this thesis.
The third category of fatwā studies encompass works on fatwā and
socio-political factors. Here, the main thrust is a sociological understanding
of fatwā and its position in the context of Indonesian national legal system.
Included in this category is Moch. Nur Ichwan’s study that traces the
dynamics of MUI after New Order period. The author examines the
transitional period following the fall of New Order regime and its
implications on MUI’s orientation. The study discussed the interplay between
ulamā’ and politics in the contemporary settings. Although it does not deal
with methodological aspects of MUI’s fatwā, it is relevant in contributing to
the backdrop of this study.93
Another work that can be included within this
category is by Kadarusman which attempts to reconcile fatwā and the politics
of religion in post-New Order Indonesia.94
In the midst of constitutional
reforms and the unprecedented significance of fatwā, a number of studies
were also carried out to examine fatwā within the context of the Indonesian
constitution. Most of these researches are concerned with the position of
fatwā within the national legal system. Studies by Oky Candra Aditya95
and E
Hajar Abra96
fall into this category.
93
Moch. Nur Ikhwan, “Ulama, State, and Politics: Majelis Ulama Indonesia After Suharto”,
Islamic Law and Society, 12, 1 (2005): 46-72. 94
Kadarusman, Rekonsiliasi Fatwa dan Politik Keagamaan di Indonesia (Kajian Fatwa-
Fatwa Keagamaan Majelis Ulama Indonesia Pasca Orde Baru), Ph.D dissertation, Sunan
Kalijaga State Islamic University. 95
Oky Candra Aditya, Kedudukan Fatwa Majelis Ulama’ Indonesia (MUI) dalam Sistem
Perundang-undangan di Indonesia, Undegraduate thesis, Muhammadiyah University of
Yogyakarta, 2006. 96
E Hajar Abra, Kedudukan Fatwa MUI dalam Sistem Perundang- Undangan di Indonesia,
undergraduate thesis, Muhammadiyah University of Yogyakarta, 2009.
41
Generally, these studies are useful in contributing to shed insights into
various dimensions of fatwā. As a whole they provide a more comprehensive
understanding of the role and dynamics of this institution. This thesis departs
from many of these studies in its aims and focus. However, it distinguishes
itself in the central problems which it seeks to address. These include in
particular how fatwā is deduced by various institutions and the genesis of
their formation. This study also provides a sociological understanding of how
fatwā is conditioned by group’s dominant mode of thought, ideas and values.
How mode of thought mirrors in as much as they condition fatwā is
examined. The inter-play between competing orientations and their impact on
fatwā is also explored. This thesis also investigates the extent to which fatwā
facilitates Indonesian Muslims to adjust effectively to the plural and changing
contexts in which they live. These central problems as a whole are not
generally duplicated in existing studies. Furthermore, this thesis focuses on
fatwā in the post-New Order period of Indonesia. Although many of the
studies above are useful in shedding insights into various aspects of fatwā,
they do not cover recent developments in which fatwā has assumed a more
complicated constellation in Indonesian politics and legal discourse.
Hooker’s study, for instance, ends with the 1990s which marks the beginning
period of this study.
D. Methodology
This study does not deal with determining theological validity or
correctness of fatwā from a religious point of view. Rather, it seeks to analyse
42
fatwā as ideas emanating from diverse and competing groups within
Indonesian society. As a study of group thought, some aspects of the
sociology of knowledge are useful in guiding the approach of this thesis.
Essentially, the sociology of knowledge maintains that ideas, beliefs and
values within society are never coincidental or arbitrary nor do they emerge
in abstract. On the contrary, they are rooted in concrete socio-historical
contexts. In Mannheim’s words, the sociology of knowledge “seeks to
analyse the relationship between knowledge and existence” and “trace the
forms in which this relationship has taken in the intellectual development of
mankind.”97
Contrary to understanding ideas in abstract or as “narratives”
which “simply sets out to show their development”,98
the sociology of
knowledge examines ideas as conditioned by background of social groups
within a given social structure and historical context. As Mannheim
explicates “…there are modes of thought which cannot be adequately
understood as long as their social origins are obscured”99
Understanding the socio-historical basis of ideas requires identifying
specific human agencies responsible for its making, their inter-play and
ramifications within a given society. For Mannheim, man’s ideas do not exist
independently from social groups of which he is a part of. Man “speaks the
language of his group; he thinks in the manner in which his group thinks”.
Divergences in ideas do not simply represent plurality of divergent
conceptions of the world. On the contrary, they reflect unconscious
97
Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to Sociology of Knowledge
(London: Routledge & Keagan Paul, 1949), 237. 98
Kurt H Wolff (ed), From Karl Mannheim, (New Brunswick and London: Transacation
Publishers, 1993), 260. 99
Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, 2
43
situational motives in group thinking or the worldview and interests of social
groups. In Mannheim’s words, “it is not men in general who think, or even
isolated individuals who do the thinking, but men in certain groups who have
developed a particular style of thought in an endless series of responses to
certain typical situations characterizing their common position. On the
contrary they act with and against one another in diversely organized groups,
and while doing so they think with and against one another. These persons,
bound together into groups, strive in accordance with the character and
position of the groups to which they belong to change the surrounding world
of nature and society or attempts to maintain it in a given condition.”100
Two dominant styles of thought which Mannheim developed in
unmasking thought are ideology and utopia. The concept of ideology reflects
the idea that dominant groups can in their thinking become so intensively
interest bound to a situation that they are simply no longer able to see certain
facts which would undermine their domination. There is implicit in the word
that in certain situations the collective unconscious of certain groups obscures
the real condition of society both to itself and others and thereby stabilise.
The concept of utopian thinking “reflects the opposite discovery of the
political struggle, namely that certain oppressed groups are intellectually so
strongly interested in the destruction and transformation of a given condition
that they unwittingly see only those elements in the situation that tend to
negate it. Their thinking is incapable of correctly diagnosing an existing
condition. They are not at all concerned with what really exists; rather in their
100
Ibid, 3.
44
thinking they already seek to change the situation that exists…” 101
These
aspects of the sociology of knowledge contributes to explain the social basis
and meaning of competing or conflicting religious opinions. It avoids the
inadequacy of seeing religious thought merely as a reflection of certain
theological viewpoints and avoids the pitfall of labelling.
Based on some aspects of this approach, this thesis examines
competing ideas among dominant Muslim groups in Indonesia in formulating
fatwā and Islamic legal thought as not mere reflections of divergent opinions
that emerge in vacuum.102
Rather, fatwā is viewed as conditioned by styles of
thought and religious orientation of the specific agencies that enunciate them.
These styles of thought characterising fatwā functions not only as reflection
of the life situation of the group that expresses them but also reveals their
basic intention which it to promote and defend what exists or radically
transform it. As Mannheim explains:
“…the ideas expressed by the subject are thus regarded as
functions of his existence. This means that opinion, statements,
propositions and systems of ideas are not taken at their face value
but are interpreted in the light of the life-situation of the one who
expresses them. It signifies further that the life –situation of the
subject influence his opinions, perceptions and interpretations.”103
The approach used in this study thus examines how modes of thinking
or religious orientations characterised as reformist/ progressive, traditionalist
101
Mannheim, p.36 102
On the role of social circumstance in the forming of knowledge, see Peter L Berger and
Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in Sociology of
Knowledge (Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday, 1966). 103
Mannheim , p.50
45
and revivalist manifested in significant fatwā-making agencies impact upon
fatwā-making and their ramifications on society. 104
This research utilises numerous primary and secondary sources
including books, journal articles, academic exercises and other materials
obtained from traditional and new media. Apart from relevant theoretical and
empirical works, both contemporary and historical, primary data on fatwā
issued by respective fatwā-making agencies in Indonesia provide another
major material for this study. In this respect, I visited the office of MUI in
2012 and 2013 to obtain primary information relating to fatwā. In addition,
the MUI official statements covered widely by various Indonesian media and
websites were also utilised.
In order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the subject
matter, this study also embarked on empirical investigation in the form of
fieldwork consisting of in-depth interviews with selected respondents were
selected based on their knowledge, expertise and involvement in the
problems of fatwā. Essentially they comprise Muslim thinkers and religious
leaders who belonged to Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama. In addition,
prominent personalities and scholars within the Shi’a and Ahmadiyah
community were also interviewed. These interviews were conducted in
several cities in Indonesia, including Jakarta, Yogyakarta, Garut (West Java),
Tasikmalaya (West Java), Bangil (East Java), Tulungagung (East Java) and
Malang (East Java). Through the interviews I was able to access data that are
not easily available elsewhere. The interviews with the leaders within the
104
Kurt H Wolff (ed), From Karl Mannheim, (New Brunswick and London: Transacation
Publishers, 1993), 260.
46
movements selected also provided deeper insights into competing perceptions
of fatwā, their genesis and actual effects of their implications on the
community. My visit to Ahmadiyah community in Tasikmalaya right after
the eruption of violence against the community also provided me with the
opportunity of witnessing first hand, the intensity of the problem closely
related to fatwā against them.
E. Thesis Structure
This thesis is organized into eight chapters including an introductory
and a concluding chapter. This introductory chapter consists of an
explanation of the aims and objective of the study, its significance, a
literature review on existing works that have been done on the subject matter
and definition of key concepts and methodology utilized for the purpose of
this thesis.
In the next chapter, I will discuss fatwā in two ways: normative and
empirical. The first involves tracing fatwā within the context of Islamic legal
theory. This includes a discussion on the nature of fatwā, its development in
the history of Islamic legal system, and how fatwā has been conceived by
Muslim jurists and scholars. It will also include a discussion on how fatwā
differs from and resembles other forms of Islamic legal thought. At the
empirical level, the discussion is oriented towards the position of and
discourse on fatwā within Indonesian legal system and legal history.
Chapter Three discusses MUI’s fatwā in relation to the nature of the
pluralistic society of Indonesia. Indonesia is a multicultural country with
47
wide ranging understanding, interpretations, and orientations of Islam. This
undeniable fact is often overlooked or denied by dominant religious
authority. This chapter examines the problem by focusing on the extent to
which fatwā contributes to nurturing Indonesia’s plural society and creating
tolerance among Muslims. Three fatwā issued by MUI relating to issues of
religious pluralism will be examined in this chapter. They include fatwā on
the prohibition of pluralism, liberalism and secularism.
Chapter Four examines the social impact of the fatwā. It devotes
attention to the response of several social groups in Indonesia to the fatwā
analysed in chapter 3 pronounced by the three major fatwā-making agencies.
The groups which are the subject of the fatwā have been the target of public
anger. Muslim groups such as Ahmadiyah and Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL),
for instance, suffered public violence and attack due to fatwā on the infidelity
of Ahmadiyah and the prohibition of liberalism and secularism. Examining
the response of such groups to the fatwā will provide a balanced
understanding of the discourse and competing mode of thought within
Indonesian Muslim groups.
In Chapter Five, I deal with the fatwā on Ahmadiyah and the deviance
of Shi’a issued by MUI. MUI’s fatwā on the deviance of these two groups,
how they are arrived at, and their impact on the well-being of the targeted
groups will be explored. The chapter also examines responses of Ahmadiyah
and Shi’a groups to the fatwā proclaimed against them by the Central Board
of MUI Jakarta and East Java Province’s MUI respectively. The chapter also
discusses Ahmadiyah’s and Shi’a’s fundamental doctrines which are seen as
48
having deviated from Islamic faith. They include the controversy of Mirza
Ghulam Ahmad’s position and the position of Taḍkira within the tradition of
Ahmadiyah. Shi’ite insider perspective on such issues as the position of
Prophet’s companions, imāma, and the allegedly Shi’ite version of the
Qurʼān will also be discussed.
Chapter Six focuses on the dynamics of fatwā-making in Nahdlatul
Ulama’ (NU) by examining the fatwā issued by Lajnah Bahth al-Masāil, the
fatwā-making body of NU. Widely known as the voice of traditional Islam,
this chapter analyses the factors conditioning the dominant orientation of this
agency and its manifestations in the credo and fundamental dogmas of the
movement. The extent of the influence of its dominant orientation on fatwā
making is then explored. How these impact upon the well-being of Muslims
is also examined. The chapter will also explore competing orientations within
the movement, if any.
Chapter Seven analyses fatwā issued by Majelis Tarjih
Muhammadiyah. It begins by critically analysing dominant features of
Muhammadiyah’s religious orientation as reflected in its basic motifs and
well established doctrine. The chapter will also examine the methods
employed by Majelis Tarjih in determining legal rulings and fatwā. How the
salient features of its religious orientation influence its conceptualisation of
fatwā will also be examined. As with the case with NU, the impact of its
fatwā in facilitating effective response to social change will also be analysed
as would the significance of competing orientations within the movement as
manifested in fatwā.