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CHAPTER IV

THE PROGRESSIVE GROUPS’ RESPONSE

A. Introduction

On June 1, 2008, a number of pluralist activists in Jakarta affiliated to a

group called Aliansi Kebangsaan untuk Kebebasan Beragama (AKBB) or

National Alliance for the Freedom of Religion, marched along main roads in

Jakarta to commemorate and celebrate the birth of Pancasila, the Indonesian

state foundation, which is seen as a common platform for plurality and

diversity of Indonesian society. The march, meant to be a peaceful action,

culminated in violence.1 A group of people that were later identified as the

members of Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defender Front) attacked the

marching group which left several prominent activists injured. Many

speculation related to the motives behind the violence emerged. However,

most related this incident to MUI’s fatwā that deemed pluralism, liberalism,

and secularism forbidden (ḥarām).2

It is pertinent to highlight two issues relating to the fatwā. Firstly, the

fatwā aims at guarding the unity of the umma against division and dissent. It

intended to serve as guidance for the Muslim community in identifying,

1 Please refer to Ahmad Setiyaji, Tragedi Monas Berdarah (Jakarta: Semesta Investigasi,

2008). 2 Interview with Moh. Shofan, 29 May 2013, in Jakarta. Moh. Shofan is an activist and

research fellow at Paramadina Foundation. He was formerly a lecturer of Islamic studies at

Muhammadiyah University of Gresik, East Java. However, he was dismissed from the

university after he published his article on religious pluralism in a local newspaper.

According to university authority, Shofan’s article contradicts Islamic values, and on this

basis his dismissal from the university was done.

132

dealing with and anticipating any interpretations, discourses and practices of

religion which are deemed to potentially threaten the purity of the faith.3

Secondly, in doing so, the fatwā has also induced negative social

repercussions that transcend the domain of faith.4 Its negative impact has

mainly affected members of the community, many of whom are from the

educated class who have the potential to contribute to the development of the

society. Moreover, such fatwā has also adversely contributed to cultural

stagnation and human creativity.5 This chapter seeks to analyze the response

of competing ideas advanced by Muslim social groups and individuals which

form the object of the fatwā. In so doing it will attempt to examine their ideas

as a function of mode of thought of the groups concerned. The implications

on their ideas on the well-being of Indonesia’s plural society will also be

examined. To what extent the ideas espoused by these groups reflect values

that can creatively synthesize with religious traditions and facilitate Muslims’

response to the changing social milieu and unprecedented social changes that

are taking place in Indonesian society, will also be discussed.

In prevailing discourse, pluralism as defined by scholars generally

encompasses social, political, and cultural domains. Raimundo Panikkar, a

leading authority in religious studies, for example, defines pluralism as

3 Tim Sekretariat Majelis Ulama Indonesia (ed), Mengawal Aqidah Umat, Fatwā MUI

tentang Aliran-Aliran Sesat di Indonesia (Jakarta: MUI-Pusat, 2009). See also Imam

Subkhan, Hiruk Pikuk Pluralisme di Yogya: City of Tolerance (Yogyakarta: Impulse, 2007),

31. 4 Dawam Rahardjo, “Dampak Fatwā MUI”, in Ahmad Suaedy, et.al (eds), Kala Fatwā Jadi

Penjara (Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, 2006), 2-4; and M. Guntur Romli, “Kekerasan Atas

Nama Fatwā”, in Ahmad Suaedy, et.al (eds), Kala Fatwā Jadi Penjara (Jakarta: The Wahid

Institute, 2006), 212-215. See also special report on social violence addressed to Ahmadiyah

community in Tempo Weekly Magazine, 5 May 2008 Edition. 5 Husein Muhammad, Mengaji Pluralisme kepada Mahaguru Pencerahan (Bandung: Mizan,

2011), 63.

133

“…the awareness of the legitimate coexistence of systems of thought, life and

action which on the other hand, are judged incompatible among

themselves…”6

Similarly, Diana L. Eck formulates pluralism as “the

dynamic process through which we engage with one another in and through

our very deepest difference.”7 Pluralism can also be viewed as an institution.

Mohamed Fathi Osman, for example, puts forward the view that pluralism is

an institution through which the acceptance of diversity takes place in a

certain society.8 In modern society, pluralism also is what Abdulaziz

Sachedina calls a “catchword” for a new world order where many kinds of

diversity exist,9 and have even intensified; and therefore, attempts at

encouraging religious communities to accept pluralism is “vitally

important.”10

Many believe that pluralism is not an exclusive modern

phenomenon. Speaking of religious pluralism, Harold Coward argues that

other than as “a special challenge facing world religions today,” religious

pluralism has always been part of the life of human beings.11

Similarly,

6 Raimundo Panikkar, “Philosophical Pluralism and Plurality of Religion”, in Thomas Dean

(ed.), Religious Pluralism and Truth (New York: State University of New York Press, 1995),

34. 7 Diana L Eck, A New Religious America: How A Christian Country has Become the World’s

Most Religiously Diverse Nation (San Fransisco: Harper San Fransisco, 2001), 29. 8 Mohamed Fathi Osman, Islam, Pluralisme dan Toleransi Keagamaan: Pandangan

al-Qur’an, Kemanusiaan, Sejarah dan Peradaban (Jakarta: Democracy Project, 2012), 2. 9 Abdulaziz Sachedina, The Islamic Roots of Democratic Pluralism (Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 2001), 22. 10

David Ray Gruffin, “Religious Pluralism: Generic, Identist and Deep”, in David Ray

Griffin (ed), Deep Religious Pluralism (Louisville and Kentucky: Westminster John Knox

Press, 2005), 3. 11

Harold G. Coward, Religious Pluralism and the World Religions (Madras: Dr S.

Radhakrishnan Institute for Advance Study in Philosophy, University of Madras, 1983), 113.

In the context of Western academia, pluralism is generally related to the work of Imannuel

Kant and Jeremy Bentham, see Pamela E. Klassen and Courtney Bender, “Introduction:

Habits of Pluralism”, in Courtney Bender and Pamela E. Klassen (eds), After Pluralism:

Reimagining Religious Engagement, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).

134

Mahmoud Ayoub maintains that it is “a normal human situation”,12

which

precedes the coming of Islam. As a religion, Islam was revealed in a

pluralistic situation where many earlier religions, faiths, and beliefs had been

practiced by different peoples and tribes in pre-Islamic Arabia.13

As Islam

did not emerge in vacuum and the Qurʼān as the canon for Muslims also

constitutes a historical response to the social context of that period,14

the idea

of pluralism and tolerance are also integral to the Qurʼān as well as the

Prophetic tradition (hadith), two most fundamental Islamic sources on law

and teachings. However, classical and contemporary Muslim scholars are

diversely divided regarding the Qur’anic standing and formulation of

religious pluralism both for inter-religious and intra-religious contexts.15

In

12

Mahmoud M Ayoub, “The Qur’an and Pluralism” in Roger Boase (ed), Islam and Global

Dialogue: Religious Pluralism and The Pursuit of Peace (Farnham and Burlington: Asghate

Publishing, 2010), 273-284. 13

See Ira M. Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies (Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 2002, 2nd

Edition). See also, Mathew S. Gordon, The Rise of Islam (Westport:

Greenwood, 2005). On variety of tribes in the Arab world in the past and present, see Umar

Ridho Kahhalah, Mu’jam Qabail al-Arabiy (Beirut: Mu’asasat al-Risalah, 1995) five

volumes. On general history of Islam and specially history of pre-Islamic Arabia, see Hasan

Ibrahim Hasan, Tarikh al-Islam al-Siyasi wa al-Dini wa al-Thaqafi wa al-Ijtima’i (Cairo:

Maktabah al-Nahdlah al-Mishriah, 1992), in four volumes. In 10 volume, Dr. Jawad Ali has

treated the history of pre-Islamic Arabia very extensively. See Jawad ‘Ali, al-Mufashal fi

Tarikh al-‘Arab Qabla al-Islam 1-10 (Baghdad: Jami’ah Baghdad, 1993, 3rd

Edition). 14

In describing this situation, Ingrid Mattson calls it in a phrase of “God speaks to

humanity”, in which it also include “God hears and responds”. See Ingrid Mattson, The Story

of the Qur’an: Its History and Its Place in Muslim Life (Malden and Oxford:

Wiley-Blackwell, 2013, 2nd

Edition), chapter 1. The Qur’anic response to specific events is

technically called as asbab al-nuzul, which can literally and loosely be translated as the cause

of revelation. A popular book on this subject is written by Jalaludin al-Suyuthi (d.1505),

Lubab al-Nuqul fi Asbab al-Nuzul (Beirut: Mu’asasah al-Kutub al-Thaqafiah, 2002). See also

Muhammad Abdul Adhim al-Zarqani, Manahil al-Irfan fi Ulum al-Qur’an (Beirut: Dar

al-Kutub al-‘Arabi, 1995), especially chapter 5, 89-103. 15

For variety of views on Islam and pluralism, these two edited volumes provide important

and rich exchanges. Those are: Abdou Filali-Ansary and Sikeena Karmali Ahmed, The

Challenge of Pluralism: Paradigms from Muslim Contexts (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University

Press, 2009), and Zulfikar Amir Hirji, Diversity and Pluralism in Islam: Historical and

Contemporary Discourses Amongst Muslims (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2010). See

also Farid Esack, Qur’an, Liberation & Pluralism: An Islamic Perspective of Interreligious

Solidarity against Oppression (Oxford: Oneworld Publication, 1997). For classical Muslim

scholars views on pluralism, see Husein Muhammad, Mengaji Pluralisme pada Mahaguru

Pencerahan (Bandung: Mizan, 2011).

135

other words, Islam is a battle-field of competing concepts and interpretations

although these are based on the same textual sources. The difference is

conditioned by religious orientations or perspectives of groups in responding

to their socio-historical milieu.16

Debate on the meaning of pluralism in religious discourse abound.

While some scholars are of the view that it did not exist, others deem

otherwise. Yohanan Friedmann in tracing the evolution of concept and

practice of tolerance in Islam opined that the Qurʼān does not explicitly

mention the term “tolerance” (Ar. tasamuh).17

In a similar vein, Anis Malik

Thoha contends that the term pluralism is not known in Islamic vocabulary

until the beginning of the twentieth century. He argues that in classical

literature of Islam, the term ta’adudiya, an Arabic word for pluralism, was

not found.18

Similarly, Adnan Aslan argues that in classical Islamic

disciplines such as kalam (theology), fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), the topic

of pluralism did not to exist as an independent theme.19

However, the

absence of this concept in basic terminology of pluralism in the Qurʼān or

classical works does not mean that the idea is non-existent in the Qurʼān.20

As Abdulaziz Sachedina rightly argues “…the major argument for religious

pluralism in the Qurʼān is based on the relationship between private faith and

its public projection in the Islamic polity. Whereas in matters of private faith,

16

Ahmad S. Moussalli, The Islamic Quest for Democracy, Pluralism and Human Rights

(Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2001), 84. 17

Yohanan Friedmann, Tolerance and Coercion in Islam: Interfaith Relation in the Muslim

Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 18

Anis Malik Thoha, Tren Pluralisme Agama (Jakarta: Perspektif, 2005), 181-183. 19

Adnan Aslan, Religious Pluralism in Christian and Islamic Philosophy: The Thought of

John Hick and Seyyed Hossein Nasr (Surrey: Curzon Press, 1998), 186. 20

Ibid, 186.

136

the position of the Qurʼān is non-interventionist, in the public projection of

that faith, the Qur’anic stance is based on the principle of coexistence, the

willingness of a dominant community to recognize self-governing

communities free to run their internal affairs and coexist with Muslims.21

According to Sachedina, this Qur’anic formulation has been very

fundamental in leading the establishment of pluralistic vision of Islam. In his

words: “It is important to keep in mind that without the Qur’anic

endorsement of the essential guiding principle of a religiously pluralistic

society, namely the acknowledgement of salvific value in other religions, the

story of Islam’s treatment of its religious minority throughout history would

not have been any different than Europe’s treatment of the non-Christian

“other”.22

Sachedina’s view is also held by many other Muslim scholars. Ahmad S.

Moussalli, for instance, posits that the Qurʼān has clearly mentioned the

basic principles of pluralism, among which is “the freedom to believe or not

to believe”.23

In agreement with this opinion, Mohsen Kadivar, an Iranian

pluralist intellectual also holds the view that the Qurʼān clearly “recognizes

people’s right to freely choose their own religions while forcefully

renouncing the compulsion to impose specific religion on others.”24

While

some scholars mentioned above describe the principle of Islam and pluralism

21

Abdulaziz Sachedina, The Islamic Roots of Democratic Pluralism (Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 2001), 23-24. 22

Ibid, 25. 23

Ahmad S. Moussalli, The Islamic Quest for Democracy, Pluralism and Human Rights

(Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2001), 84. 24

Mohsen Kadivar, “Freedom of Religion and Belief in Islam,” in Mehran Kamrava (ed),

The New Voice of Islam, Reforming Politics and Modernity: A Reader (London and New

York: I.B. Tauris, 2006), 120.

137

in very broad terms, Abdou Filai-Ansary goes further to identify five

principles that the Qurʼān has laid with regard to pluralism. These are as

follows: “each community has been given a way of life and system of rules

(content and methods); the diversity of ways of life and systems of rules are a

means of testing the capacity of each community to face challenges; Had God

willed it, He would have made humanity a singular community; what is

strongly encouraged is competition in doing good –not fighting about

differences and lastly, God is the final arbiter and it is He who will uncover

the ultimate truth behind the difference between communities (at the end of

time)”.25

Since Qur’anic formulations are normative, Filali-Ansary has

attempted to relate these principles in a parallel way to contemporary society

as follows: that “diversity is a fact and ought to be accepted as such,

emphasis to compete to do good things in life; that the various forms of life

are like experiments for building the good life; (e)ach community should

make the best of its own customs and habits; no community can claim to

possess ultimate, most valuable form of life and lastly, “the final words on

these matters cannot be determined in history”.26

In similar vein, Roger

Boase identifies certain principles of interfaith derived from the Qurʼān, such

as: a) that Islam does not impose coercive approach in spreading its faith; b)

ridiculing other beliefs is forbidden in Islam; c) the Qurʼān also forbids

Muslims to associate with those who ridicule their religion.27

25

Abdou Filali-Ansary, “Introduction: Theoretical Approaches to Cultural Diversity,” in

Abdou Filali-Ansary and Sikeena Karmali Ahmed (eds), The Challenge of Pluralism:

Paradigms from Muslim Contexts (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press and Institute for

the Study of Muslim Civilizations, Aga Khan University, 2009), 4. 26

Ibid, 5 27

Roger Boase, “Ecumenical Islam: A Muslim Response to Religious Pluralism”, in Roger

138

These universal principles are the values which are fundamental for

Muslim societies in their treatment of other communities of belief.

Empirically, it finds evidence in the practice of tolerance in the early history

of Islam with the establishment of the Muslim community at Medina under

the supremacy of Sahifa Madina (Constitution of Medina) which guaranteed

the rights of members of the community regardless of their status and

religions.28

On par with this historical precedent is Islam’s treatment of other

religious communities which are popularly referred to as ahl al-‘ahd that

consists of ahl al-dhimma, ahl al-hudna, and ahl al-amni. The most popular

among all these is the concept of ahl al-dhimma which broadly refers to

non-Muslim members of community entitled to Muslim rulers’ protection

under certain conditions.29

More specifically, ahl al-dhimmy, is often

described as part of the political compromise made between the ruling

authorities and minority groups that became subjected to the Muslim

sovereign. Anver Emon concludes that the dhimmy rules “were a legal

expression of the way in which the Muslim polity contended with the fact of

diversity and governed pluralistically.”30

The historical precedence leaves little doubt that the idea of pluralism is

part of the inherent teaching of Islam. In contemporary complex societies the

Boase (ed), Islam and Global Dialogue: Religious Pluralism and The Pursuit of Peace

(Farnham and Burlington: Asghate Publishing, 2010), 247-266. 28

Maher Y. Abu-Munshar, “The Compatibility of Islam with Pluralism: Two Historical

Precedents”, Islam and Civilisational Renewal, Vol. 1, Issue 4, July 2010, 613-628. Compare

to Muhammad Said Ramadhan al-Buti, “Mu’amalat daulah al-Islamiyyah li ghair

al-muslimin: al-Quds namudhajan,” Journal of Islamic Jerusalem Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1,

(1999), 4-5. 29

See Bat Ye’or, The Dhimmi: Jews and Christians Under Islam (Cranbury: Associated

University Presses, 1985). For a comparison, see Abdul Rahman Awang, The Status of

Dhimmi in Islamic Law (Kuala Lumpur: International Book Service, 1994). 30

Anver M. Emon, Religious Pluralism and Islamic Law: Dhimmi and Others in the Empire

of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 4.

139

importance of pluralism cannot be underestimated. Hence, Ansary sees an

urgency “to address diversity in new ways, and to explore new approach to

pluralism.” The positive attitude of agencies in understanding religious

pluralism in history has bearing on the freedom of religion and its practice

today given the complexity of modern society. Hence Mohamed Talbi, a

respected Tunisian intellectual, maintains that “…today religious liberty is, as

a matter of fact, definitely rooted in our social life... Moreover, we already

live in a pluralistic world, and our world is going to be more and more

pluralistic in the near future. In this new world, which is expanding rapidly

before our eyes, there is no longer room for exclusiveness. We have to accept

others as we are. Diversity is the law of our time...”31

B. Competing Religious Ideas and Orientation

Contrary to ideas on Islam and pluralism discussed above, MUI’s fatwā

has denounced pluralism as incompatible with Islam. Such reflections on

religious pluralism are completely overlooked or negated in the fatwā on

pluralism which essentially contradict contemporary realities and social fact.

As discussed in Chapter II, fatwā is basically a form of interpretation of

fundamental religious sources and traditions in relation to specific issues or

problems confronting Muslims in the contemporary period. Studying the

mode of thought or religious orientations of groups which formulate fatwā is

vital in avoiding the reductive view of fatwā reflects a “pure form” or “true

Islam”. As a mode of thinking, the fatwā espoused by MUI can be seen as a

31

Mohamed Talbi, ibid, 107.

140

conscious attempt by the agencies that formulate it to conserve and preserve

the integrity of its own system of thought and values and secure it against the

encroachment of rival or competing ideas. Under the sanctity of religion, it

claims the completeness of its thought as justification for self-sufficiency

while at the same time dereligionizing its opponents’ ideas. In many ways

this group’s thought is marked by conservatism and utopian elements in

contrast to the progressive mode of thinking of competing groups and ideas

they espouse within Indonesia. For the purpose of the thesis, these competing

groups thought are referred to as progressive. Characterizing a group’s

thought as progressive requires theoretical clarification. While some scholars

such as Omid Safi, for example, identifies such evaluative concept on the

basis of ideas advocated on issues such as gender equality, democracy and

pluralism,32

the characteristics utilized here include ideas and perspective

distinguished for their inclusiveness, respect for diversity and tolerance,

emphasis on commonalities of belief and principles, universal humanism

based on absolute morality, social dimension of religion, respect for pluralism

in religious thought, respect for the dignity of the individual, freedom of

belief and thought, significance of reason in understanding and application of

religious teachings, belief in distinction between universal principle and

value of religion and historically determined expressions of religiosity,

accommodation and assimilation of new ideologies deemed compatible with

Islam.

In the Indonesian context, these distinct traits associated with

32

Omid Safi, “Introduction”, in Omid Safi (ed), Progressive Muslims on Justice, Gender

and Pluralism (Oxford: Oneworld Publication, 2003), 1-32.

141

progressive mode of thought are seen as threats against the dominant

understanding of Islam. MUI’s fatwā is an example of direct challenge and

attack against such mode of thinking and social groups which has resulted in

serious social repercussions including pejorative labelling and demonizing.

Among these groups are Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL),33

Paramadina,34

and

many other civil society groups that share common visions with them.

Factually, both before and after the issuance of fatwā, these groups have

developed counter-discourses to challenge exclusivist and conservative

tendencies of Indonesian Muslims based on Islamic religious sources and

traditions. While MUI’s fatwā have marginalized and delegitimized them

within the context of popular Muslim discourse in the country, they continue

to lead in the realm of ideas in discourse on Islam and contemporary issues

such as pluralism, liberalism and secularism. Though the whole range and

development of progressive thought in contemporary Indonesia extends

beyond the birth and ascendance of groups such as Jaringan Islam Liberal

(JIL) which began in 2000s, this development has been misleadingly

attributed to this group.35

This identification is inaccurate and misleading

33

For comprehensive study on different aspects of Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL), please refer

to Nicolaus Teguh Budi Haryanto, Islam and Liberalism in Contemporary Indonesia: The

Political Ideas of Jaringan Islam Liberal, Master Thesis, Ohio University, 2003; Ahmad Ali

Nurdin, “Islam and State: A Study of the Liberal Islamic Network in Indonesia, 1999-2004”,

New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies 7, 2 (December, 2005): 20-39; Ahmad Bunyan Wahib,

“Jaringan Islam Liberal: Towards Liberal Islamic Thought in Indonesia”, Profetika, 2004;

Muhammad Ali, “The Rise of the Liberal Islam Network (JIL) in Contemporary Indonesia”,

The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 22: 1, 1-27; Zuly Qodir, Islam Liberal:

Paradigma Baru Wacana dan Aksi Islam Indonesia (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2003);

Sohirin Mohammad Solihin, Emergence and Development of Liberal Islam in Indonesia: A

Critical Evaluation (Kuala Lumpur: IIUM Press, 2009); Haidar Bagir, “Islib Butuh

Metodologi”, Republika, 20 Maret 2002. 34

On Paramadina Institute, please refer to Ahmad Gaus AF, Api Islam Nurcholish Madjid:

Jalan Hidup Seorang Visioner (Jakarta: Penerbit Kompas, 2010), especially chapter 9,

148-175. 35

There is a tendency among Islamist groups in Indonesia to equate all progressive groups

142

since JIL constitutes one among many other Muslim groups that uphold and

is committed to the importance of pluralism, and have been struggling to

disseminate this belief throughout the modern history of Indonesia. The

proponents of the discourse on religious pluralism, liberalism and secularism

in Indonesia can be found in many Islamic social groups exist In his study,

Budhy Munawar-Rachman, a very close disciple of the late Nurcholish

Madjid, a prominent Muslim reformer in Indonesia, identifies a number of

progressive Muslim circles that share common concerns on religious

pluralism and liberalism. Other than Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL), they

include Lembaga Studi Agama dan Filsafat (LSAF), Yayasan Paramadina

(The Paramadina Foundation), International Institute for Islam and Pluralism

(ICIP), Perhimpunan Pengembangan Pesantren dan Masyarakat (P3M), The

Wahid Institute, Maarif Institute, Jaringan Intelektual Muda Muhammadiyah

(JIMM), Lakpesdam NU, Lembaga Kajian Islam dan Sosial (LKIS), Kalijaga

State Islamic University of Yogyakarta and Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic

University of Jakarta.36

It is also pertinent to note that while these groups

share common concerns on these issues, variations in their social background

into one single entity. For example, although Jaringan Islam Liberal, better known as JIL, is

only one group, other progressive groups would be labeled as JIL, although factually they are

not part of JIL. On criticism and the tendency to regard all progressive-liberal groups as one,

some books on liberal Islam by conservative groups or individual can be easily found. For

example, Adian Husaini and Nuim Hidayat, Islam Liberal: Sejarah, Konsepsi,

Penyimpangan dan Jawabannya (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 2002); Adian Husaini,

Membedah Islam Liberal: Memahami dan Menyikapi Manuver Islam liberal di Indonesia

(Bandung: Syamil Cipta Media, 2003); Adnin Armas, Pengaruh Kristen-Orientalis terhadap

Islam Liberal: Dialog Interaktif dengan Aktivis Jaringan Islam Liberal (Jakarta: Gema

Insani Press, 2003). Budi Handrianto, 50 Tokoh Islam Liberal Indonesia: Pengusung Ide

Sekularisme, Pluralisme, dan Liberalisme Agama (Jakarta: Hujjah Press, 2007). 36

Budhy Munawar-Rachman, Reorientasi Pembaruan Islam: Sekularisme, Liberalisme dan

Pluralisme (Jakarta: Paramadina and LSAF, 2010); and Sekularisme, Liberalisme dan

Pluralisme: Islam Progresif dan Perkembangan Diskursusnya (Jakarta: Grasindo, 2010). For

variety of progressive Muslim groups in Indonesia, please refer to Imam Tolkhah and Neng

Dara Affiah (eds), Gerakan Keislaman Pasca Orde Baru: Upaya Merambah Dimensi Baru

Islam (Jakarta: Balitbang Departemen Agama RI, 2007).

143

and ideological affiliation exist. These condition and impact their thought on

specific issues.

C. On Diversity and Tolerance

The Problem of Semantic Confusion

Since MUI’s fatwā on pluralism, secularism and liberalism has directly

been addressed to progressive Muslim groups, the fatwā has become one of

the most important topics discussed and responded by these groups.37

The

factor combined with their positive attitude toward diversity and pluralism

and their inclination to promote tolerance has led them to reject and to

severely criticize the fatwā. At the same time, they have also offered

alternative understanding that challenges MUI’s conception.

The most fundamental response to the fatwā is the critique of MUI’s

simplified understanding and conception of pluralism. In contrast to MUI’s

assumption of pluralism as “unity of religion” or the belief that all religions

are the same, which in their understanding is unacceptable in Islam, these

competing groups maintain that pluralism is not a philosophy which regards

37

Among many responses, a systematic attempt was made by Yayasan Paramadina and

Lembaga Studi Agama dan Filsafat (LSAF). They compiled the response of progressive

intellectuals in Indonesia to the fatwā on pluralism, liberalism and secularism. This

compilation has resulted in two big volumes containing views of prominent progressive

Muslims from diverse background. These volume is the first comprehensive work on the

subject. In addition some other works are also produced to accompany this work. Those

works are: Budhy Munawar-Rachman (ed), Membela Kebebasan Beragama: Percakapan

tentang Pluralisme, Liberalisme dan Sekularisme (Jakarta: LSAF and Paramadina, 2010),

Book 1 and 2; Budhy Munawar-Rachman, Reorientasi Pembaruan Islam: Sekularisme,

Liberalisme dan Pluralisme (Jakarta: Paramadina and Lembaga Studi Agama dan Filsafat,

2010); Budhy Munawar-Rachman, Sekularisme, Liberalisme dan Pluralisme: Islam

Progresif dan Perkembangan Diskursusnya (Jakarta: Grasindo, 2010); Budhy

Munawar-Rachman, Argumen Islam untuk Pluralisme (Jakarta: Penerbit Grasindo, 2010);

Budhy Munawar-Rachman, Argumen Islam untuk Liberalisme (Jakarta: Penerbit Grasindo,

2010); and Budhy Munawar-Rachman, Argumen Islam untuk Sekularisme (Jakarta: Penerbit

Grasindo, 2010). I take benefit from all these works in identifying the response of

progressives to the fatwā.

144

all religions as one and the same, since it is clear that from the very beginning,

all religions are inherently distinctive. In other words, pluralism takes the

reality of difference as its starting point. The aim is not to obliterate these

differences or celebrate the diversity. It is to find ways of living with these

differences. In this view, differences cannot be taken as a reason for being

hostile to nor merely tolerating one another. Rather, paradigms and principles

must be worked out to allow for the creation of a harmonious society despite

differences and disagreements not only between but within religious

communities.38

In this sense, these competing ideas reveal MUI’s partial and

selective understanding of pluralism and its implications on the well-being of

plural society.39

Its understanding of pluralism as unity suggests a type of

thought that parallelizes pluralism with syncretism, which does not

objectively capture the thinking of competing ideas that are the target of the

fatwā.

Another significant aspect of the meaning of religious pluralism

emphasized within this competing mode of thinking is inclusivity justified on

the basis of theology. Jalaluddin Rakhmat’s explication of the concept

illustrates the point. He maintains that pluralism is not about smoothing out

differences in religion to ensure sameness or unity of religions.40

Rather, it is

an idea that regards all religions have equal opportunity to achieve salvation

38

Maman Imanul Haq Faqih, Fatwā dan Canda Gus Dur (Jakarta: Kompas, 2010), 149. See

also Masdar Farid Mas’udi, “Tentang MUI dan Fatwā Kontroversialnya”, in Ahmad Suaedy

(ed), Kala Fatwā Jadi Penjara (Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, 2006), 132. 39

Ibid. 40

Although it is rarely the case that Shi’ism in Indonesia is associated with liberalism, the

fact that Jalaluddin Rakhmat is often classified as a liberal Muslim thinker, both before and

after his affiliation to Shi’ism, could possibly affect general Muslims’ perception of the

parallelism between them. In general, both “liberal” and “Shi’a” are two terms used in a

pejorative sense by general Muslims in Indonesia. Therefore, with or without the “liberal”

label, Shi’ism is already perceived in negative ways.

145

which in academic term is known as soteriology. Integral to this

understanding of pluralism is the fundamental acknowledgment of the

salvatory value of various religious paths, instead of merely a single path or a

single understanding within that one path to God. This clearly opposes

dominant view strongly implied in MUI’s fatwā that salvation is just for the

Muslims.41

Such competing mode of thinking directly opposes the fatwā

which denies the soundness or divinity of other religious traditions.

Furthermore, within this mode, commonalities in the realm of values

between all religious traditions are not only strongly cherished but provide a

pertinent basis for practices that can contribute to meaningful engagement

and co-existence. Universal values such as commitment to humanity, equality,

social justice, concern for the environment, rendering aid to the weak, needy,

the poor and the oppressed and many other virtues found in most religions

provide the basis upon which concrete institutions can be realized.42

Consequently, rather than uniting religion in one single entity, pluralism

basically means seeking common platforms and values for human

development and progress among different religious traditions. Hence, in this

mode of thinking, the concept of common bonds (kalimatun sawāʼ’) or

meeting point with other faiths, which is built on the foundation of tawhīd,

the oneness of God is overriding. Such an understanding is believed will

41

Jalaluddin Rakhmat, “Percakapan dengan Jalaluddin Rakhmat” in Budhy

Munawar-Rachman (ed.), Membela Kebebasan Beragama: Percakapan tentang Pluralism,

Liberalisme dan Sekularisme (Jakarta: LSAF and Paramadina, 2010), Book 1, 813. See also

Jalaludin Rakhmat’s work on Islam and pluralism which examines important basis of

pluralism in Islam in many aspect, Islam dan Pluralisme: Akhlak Qur’an Menyikapi

Perbedaan (Jakarta: Serambi Ilmu Semesta, 2006). 42

M. Amin Abdullah, Dinamika Islam Kultural: Pemetaan Atas Wacana Islam Kontemporer

(Bandung: Mizan, 2000), 75-79.

146

provide strong encouragement for people of diverse religious traditions to

harness, share and develop commonalities with one another towards common

good rather than accentuate differences.43

Recourse to this ideal allows for

the concretization of religious pluralism on an exoteric level such as in the

social dimension rather than confined merely to the esoteric level of

theological discourse or rituals or doctrines. In short, the meaning of unity of

religions within this mode of thought strongly entails the idea of universal

humanism, since it is premised on the belief that all religions do not dispute

on what is fundamentally ethically good or bad.44

The distinction and meaning accorded by MUI’s fatwā also strongly

connotes that pluralisme (pluralism) is distinguished from pluralitas

(plurality), as the former refers to specific ideology, “faham” or “aliran”

which in its view, has a tendency to combine different religious tradition into

one single entity or practice; while the latter refers to social fact of diversity

be it religiously, socially, politically or culturally which is integral to all

human societies. Based on such a concept, therefore, it asserts that pluralism

is contradictory to Islam. In contrast, competing mode of thought challenges

this distinction as arbitrary, and has a tendency to overlook pluralism

contained within religious texts and traditions. Rachman’s argument

illustrates the point. In his view, pluralism is closely intertwined with

plurality, as pluralism is basically the actualization of plurality of society.45

43

Azyumardi Azra, “Toleransi Agama dalam Masyarakat Majemuk: Perspektif Muslim

Indonesia” in Elza Peldi Taher (ed), Merayakan Kebebasan Beragama: Bunga Rampai 70

Tahun Djohan Effendi (Jakarta: ICRP and Kompas, 2009), 18. 44

Ibid, 18. 45

Dawam Rahardjo, “Preface” in Budhy Munawar-Rachman, Argumen Islam untuk

Pluralisme (Jakarta: Penerbit Grasindo, 2010), xlix.

147

Pluralism as an understanding of diversity or plurality is inseparable from the

diversity or plurality itself as both are inexorably linked.46

The progressives’ responses to the meaning of pluralism as mentioned

above clearly underlines the point that intellectual capacity is crucial in

providing a clear and objective understanding of issues of significance in the

religious life of the community. This is in stark contrast to MUI’s penjelasan

fatwā in which it stipulated that the concepts of pluralism, liberalism and

secularism are empirical and not intellectual definitions. This type of

reasoning reveals a clear attempt to distance itself from engaging in an

intellectual exchange that is vital in clarifying these concepts. MUI and its

opponents provide an interesting case of difference of meaning accorded by

groups to the concept of pluralism which has serious social consequences on

the lives and well-being of individuals and groups within and between

religious communities. MUI’s fatwā does not merely ignore the broader

understanding of pluralism such as socio-cultural aspects; it is also

simplistically presumed that the concept refers to mixing of teachings of

different religions that will obliterate the truth about Islam. It is also

presumed to mean that certain teachings and traditions of specific religions

must be altered or adjusted to accommodate doctrines of other religions.47

This popular misunderstanding of the concept of pluralism in Indonesia are

clearly reflected in MUI’s fatwā.

46

Dawam Rahardjo, “Kala MUI Mengharamkan Pluralisme”, Koran Tempo, 01 August

2005. 47

See Imam Subkhan, Hiruk Pikuk Pluralisme di Yogya: City of Tolerance (Yogyakarta:

Impulse, 2007), 28.

148

Challenging Authoritarian

Competing ideas against religious orthodoxy exemplified by MUI’s

fatwā also addressed the issue of authoritarianism in perspectives and ideas

on religion among Indonesian Muslim religious leaders. They perceive the

fatwā as strongly exemplified by elements of oligarchy and monopoly in the

interpretation of religious doctrines. Assuming itself as the fountain of and

conferring authority of moral and spiritual legitimacy, MUI’s orientation

renders Islam losing its liberating characteristics. In this respect, the

progressive mode of thinking emphasizes firmly the belief that Islam should

not rest on the meaning defined by custodians who do not uphold or

champion religion on intellectual grounds. On the contrary, Muslims should

have equal freedom to interpret their religion. Religious texts and experiences

in their view are multifaceted and inevitably admit a multitude of

interpretations. Furthermore, Islam within this mode of thought does not

impose conditions based on the status of the interpreters, but more on the

social impact of the interpretations, especially in bringing maslaḥa (public

welfare) for human beings. This, they maintain, is the ultimate criterion of

religious laws or fatwā and not how textually sophisticated and well-crafted

they are. If the fatwā creates public unrest or triggers violence and social

tensions among members of the society, it defeats its fundamental purpose in

contributing to the well-being of people who are subjected to it.48

That MUI

has also restricted the scope of the Qurʼān in its fatwā based on its own

selective interpretation with adverse without recourse to effect of fatwā in

48

Abd Moqsith Ghazali, “Oligarki Penafsiran Agama”, Dawam Rahardjo, “Dampak Fatwā

MUI”, in Ahmad Suaedy, et.al (eds), Kala Fatwā Jadi Penjara (Jakarta: The Wahid Institute,

2006), 23-26.

149

society on others, is also highlighted by competing groups.49

In this progressive mode of thought, there is no exclusive authority in

interpreting and understanding the Qurʼān or that the Qurʼān can only be

read by official religious authority. Lessons from Muslim history are cited in

support of their claim whereby all leaders of Sunni legal schools of thought

(Hanafi, Malik, Shafi’i and Ahmad ibn Hanbal) derived their authorities as

imam not from the state, but from the recognition of the umma.50

In this

context, progressive thought critically argued that MUI’s demonstration of its

position as the sole custodian of Islamic religious authority negates the

plurality of thought within Islam and the multitudes of dimensions of

religious experiences, thought and interpretations which the scriptures and

traditions upheld,51

since Islam is a religion which pays attention to all

dimensions of life. Domination in the interpretation of religion through

conferring upon oneself the sole and legitimate authority on Islam is viewed

within competing mode of thought as opening the door to religious

authoritarianism at the expense of being authoritative. The denial or

discrediting of rival ideas of religious legitimacy by declaring them as

un-Islamic or deviant without intellectual basis, reinforces the political

motives in their orientation.52

While the idea of the authoritative is

commonly associated with wisdom, tolerance, and inclusiveness,

49

Ibid, 23-26. 50

Masdar Farid Masudi, “Perbincangan dengan Masdar Farid Masudi,” in Budhy

Munawar-Rachman (ed.), Membela Kebebasan Beragama: Percakapan tentang Pluralism,

Liberalisme dan Sekularisme (Jakarta: LSAF and Paramadina, 2010), Book 2, 1180. 51

Farid Mas’udi, “Tentang MUI dan Fatwā Kontroversialnya”, in Ahmad Suaedy, et.al (eds),

Kala Fatwā Jadi Penjara (Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, 2006), 132. 52

Budhy Munawar-Rachman, “Percakapan dengan Budhy Munawar-Rachman” in Budhy

Munawar-Rachman (ed.), Membela Kebebasan Beragama: Percakapan tentang Pluralisme,

Liberalisme dan Sekularisme (Jakarta: LSAF and Paramadina, 2010), Book 1, lix.

150

authoritarianism is characterized by the lack of intellectual interest and the

desire to assert power using any possible methods and medium.53

In the Indonesian context, it might be debated whether or not MUI is

granted with authority over ruling on religious issues in the country. However,

the “imagined authority” it resorts to position itself as the authoritarian voice

that claims the right to define the validity of interpretations of religion; while

at the same time suppressing others who uphold different philosophical or

epistemological basis to it. Furthermore, progressives relate the authoritarian

nature of MUI’s fatwā to the fact that the fatwā has ignored fundamental

social considerations which must be seriously taken into account before a

fatwā is finally issued.54

In addition, the fact that Islam does not have a

clergy system implies that no single religious body in Islam is privileged to

subordinate any kinds of interpretations offered by other Muslim groups.55

Although some within competing groups of activists do not reject religious

authority in a paternalistic society governed by patron-client relations such as

in Indonesia, they nevertheless maintain that intellectual ability of the

authority is the only basis for its justification failing which authoritarianism

in religious understanding and thought will prevail to the detriment of the

well-being of members of the community. In other words, the holders of

authority have to be authoritative and at the same time refrain from being

authoritarian.56

53

Budy Munawar-Rachman, in Budhy Munawar-Rachman, lix 54

Interview with Moh. Shofan, Jakarta, 29 May 2013. 55

Interview with Khoiruz Zimam, Gresik, 5 June 2013. Khoiruz Zimam is a

progressive-minded Muhammadiyah activist in Gresik, East Java, and a strong supporter of

JIMM. Interview with Moh. Shofan, Jakarta, 29 May 2013. 56

For a more detailed discussion on these concepts, read Khaled M Abou El Fadl, Speaking

151

Such a conviction from progressive wing is strengthened by the fact

that MUI has failed to evaluate and examine the concepts it declares as

ḥarām in its fatwā. Fatwā-making is a serious intellectual endeavour or

ijtihād. Hence, MUI should have examined the issues and the implications it

bears on society very deeply and seriously. For progressives, the reasons

which MUI proposed in labelling pluralism, liberalism, and secularism as

ḥarām does not reveal depth in understanding the diversity of thought within

the scriptures and contemporary ideas bearing on the problem as well as their

relevance for Indonesian Muslims and non-Muslims as a whole. Rather than

an intellectual endeavour, it is much more motivated by hatred and political

competition with certain groups within MUI.57

While MUI’s members may

have the capacity to determine the issues at stake objectively, MUI’s fatwā is

marred by its strong ideological stance at the expense of objectivity in

dealing with richness and variety of religious expressions in Indonesia.58

M

Syafii Anwar, the director of International Centre for Islam and Pluralism

(ICIP) in Jakarta, agrees that the fatwā is partly motivated by political factor.

The fatwā, he maintains, has been capitalized by hardliner Muslim groups for

the sake of their own interest, or in more exact phrase, for the sake of

political interests of certain religious group.59

in God’s Name: Islamic Law, Authority and Women (London: Oneworld Publication, 2001). 57

Ahmad Suaedy, “Perbincangan dengan Ahmad Suaedy,” in Budhy Munawar-Rachman

(ed.), Membela Kebebasan Beragama: Percakapan tentang Pluralism, Liberalisme dan

Sekularisme (Jakarta: LSAF and Paramadina, 2010), Book 1, 163-164. 58

Siti Ruhaini Dzuhayatin, “Perbincangan dengan Siti Ruhaini Dzuhayatin,” in Budhy

Munawar-Rachman (ed.), Membela Kebebasan Beragama: Percakapan tentang Pluralism,

Liberalisme dan Sekularisme (Jakarta: LSAF and Paramadina, 2010), Book 2, 1498. 59

M. Syafii Anwar, “Perbincangan dengan M. Syafii Anwar,” in Budhy Munawar-Rachman

(ed.), Membela Kebebasan Beragama: Percakapan tentang Pluralism, Liberalisme dan

Sekularisme (Jakarta: LSAF and Paramadina, 2010), Book 2, 1083.

152

Progressives and Social Harmony

Progressives criticized MUI’s fatwā from the point of view of social and

interreligious harmony in a pluralistic Indonesia. In their view, rather than

creating harmony among different social groups in a plural Indonesia, MUI

has been actively fuelling the fire of disharmony and tensions among them.

MUI’s fatwā has played determinant role in creating socio-religious

destabilization of the country60

and deterioration of religious harmony. No

less than the late Abdurrahman Wahid agreed with this. In his view, the fatwā

on the ban of pluralism is a great irony.61

While ideally MUI, consisting of

scholars with different background and orientations, has the strong potential

to play a mediating role for different and contradicting religious views, it has

instead partially taken the side of certain groups at the expense of others62

incurring in the process of serious intra-community conflicts. From this

perspective, the fatwā is clearly an error since it fails to internalize the

realities of plurality that have been integral to human life and experience.

Other groups have concurred with the view that the fatwā has created further

negative consequence for intra-religious harmony in Indonesia as well as the

larger society more generally.63

The issuance of such a controversial fatwā

has contributed to impose risks and vulnerability of certain social groups

which easily trigger and perpetrate demonizing and violence against them.

The fatwā provides fuel to those who are already prone to violence and serve

60

Muhammad Irsyad, “Kritik Atas MUI”,

http://islamlib.com/?site=1&aid=1421&cat=content&title=reportase, accessed on 9 April

2013. 61

Abdurrahman Wahid, “Lain Zaman, Lain Pendekatan”, in Ahmad Suaedy, et.al (eds), Kala

Fatwā Jadi Penjara (Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, 2006), xviii. 62

Interview with Fuad Fanani, Jakarta, 14 December 2012. 63

Ahmad Suaedy, et.al (eds), Kala Fatwā Jadi Penjara, p. xxvii.

153

as justification and legitimacy for their actions. It is difficult not to point

MUI’s fatwā as the fodder for the eruption of social violence based on faith

differences.64

Amin Abdullah, the former rector of Sunan Kalijaga State

Islamic University of Yogyakarta, maintains that fatwā issued by religious

institutions such as MUI should consider both private and public dimensions

that are inexorably linked though different. Abdullah argues that fatwā should

rigorously and carefully consider kinds of social implications and

consequences it bears on human relationships and interactions among people

of diverse religious backgrounds. Religion is not solely a matter of doctrine,

but also involves connecting, relating, respecting one another within and

between communities.65

The problem of neglect of the social implications of fatwā was also

sanctioned by others. Wahid, for instance, argued that MUI should have

played a role in assisting the government in finding solutions to alleviate

multidimensional problems that Indonesia is facing. However, it has instead

exacerbated the problem by its fatwā which has undermined relations within

the Muslim community in particular.66

The social impact of MUI’s fatwā has

even reached the Muslims in rural areas, who though not seriously impacted

by it, are nevertheless joining the bandwagon in labelling, rejecting and

severely blaming progressive groups for threatening their faith and unity of

the Muslims. The pejorative attacks on liberal Islam illustrate the problem.

64

Masdar Farid Mas’udi, in Ahmad Suaedy, et.al (eds), Kala Fatwā Jadi Penjara (Jakarta:

The Wahid Institute, 2006), 132. 65

M. Amin Abdullah, “MUI, Fatwā dan Otoritas Keagamaan di Indonesia”, in Ahmad

Suaedy, et.al (eds), Kala Fatwā Jadi Penjara (Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, 2006), 47. 66

Abdurrahman Wahid, “Lain Zaman, Lain Pendekatan”, in Ahmad Suaedy, et.al (eds), Kala

Fatwā Jadi Penjara (Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, 2006), xviii.

154

The term “liberal” used by them is strongly associated with the lack of piety,

corrosion of religious belief and devotion, and the absence of commitment to

Islam as the sole religion for Muslims. The labelling is intended to socially

exclude those who have been labeled as such. It creates a social stigma which

obstructs acceptance into community. According to Moh. Shofan of

Paramadina Foundation, this problem would not have deteriorated if not for

MUI’s fatwā prohibiting pluralism, liberalism and secularism.67

Shofan

himself is an interesting case in point. In 2006, he was dismissed from his

position as a lecturer at a university, due to his piece in a local newspaper

supporting pluralism. In the same way Dawam Rahardjo lost his membership

in Muhammadiyah due to his pluralistic vision.68

In Defence of Freedom of Thought

Yet, another significant trait in the mode of progressive thought is the

emphasis given to the value of freedom of thought in Islam. Within this

discourse, the fatwā is perceived as transgressing this value by banning

certain kinds of thought. Hence, Ulil Abshar, the former coordinator of JIL

maintained that the fatwā is “the strangest fatwā” that has ever been issued as

it disqualifies certain ideas (gagasan) as ḥarām (forbidden). Fundamental

legal principles in Islamic legal theory, it is maintained, acknowledges that

adult Muslims are morally responsible for their own deeds and thought

(khitāb-u Llah-i al-muta’ālliq bi al-afʽāl al-mukallafīn). He questions how

67

Interview with Moh. Shofan, 29 May 2013, in Jakarta. 68

For more detail data and discussion on this subject, please refer to my earlier study,

Pradana Boy ZTF, “In Defense of Pure Islam: The Conservative-Progressive Debate within

Muhammadiyah,” M.A. Thesis, Australian National University, 2007.

155

ideas on pluralism, secularism and liberalism can be judged and forbidden.69

In the same vein, Mustofa Bisri, a respected Nahdlatul Ulama’s religious

scholar pointed out that as types of thought, it is useless to forbid pluralism,

liberalism and secularism. Forbidding these ideas, Bisri argues, is equal to

banning people to think, which is impossible. As opposed to banning, he

strongly maintains that ideas should be comparatively challenged with ideas.

Furthermore, he contends that ideas cannot be judged and tried until they

have been implemented in the forms of deeds and actions and their effects on

people’s rights and interests are analyzed.70

Rejection and criticism to MUI’s

fatwā in defence of freedom of thinking is also expressed by Dawam

Rahardjo. He maintains the significance of the use of reason in religion. He

argues that banning thought is equal to restricting freedom of thought.71

The progressives also evaluated the fatwā on the basis of the level of

intellectual capacity of MUI. MUI through the fatwā has revealed to the

public its partiality and limitations in reasoning. Abdurrahman Wahid argued

that the narrow-minded thinking of MUI’s elites is adverse to all segments of

Indonesia as a nation.72

Rahardjo perceives that the fatwā reflects MUI’s

perception of Indonesian Muslims as weak in preserving their identity in all

sense of the term. Since they are weak and unable to withstand cultural

elements that are constantly impacting upon them in the pluralistic society in

69

Ulil Abshar-Abdalla, “Fatwā MUI dan Konservatisme Agama”, Media Indonesia, 3

August 2005. 70

Mustofa Bisri, “Fatwā MUI, Refleksi Ketidakpercayaan Diri: Wawancara dengan K.H.

Mustofa Bisri”, in Ahmad Suaedy, et.al (eds), Kala Fatwā Jadi Penjara (Jakarta: The Wahid

Institute, 2006), 253. 71

Interview with Dawam Rahardjo, Jakarta, 12 December 2012. See also Dawam Rahardjo,

“Dampak Fatwā MUI”, in Ahmad Suaedy, et.al (eds), Kala Fatwā Jadi Penjara (Jakarta: The

Wahid Institute, 2006), 2-4. 72

Abdurrahman Wahid, “Lain Zaman, Lain Pendekatan”, in Ahmad Suaedy, et.al (eds), Kala

Fatwā Jadi Penjara (Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, 2006), xviii.

156

which they live, MUI’s sees the need to protect them from these potential

threats that would undermine and threaten their identity. However, MUI’s

very response as exemplified in its fatwā is revealing of its own insecurities

and limitations in facilitating the community towards assimilating and

adapting to the processes of change constantly impacting upon Indonesian

society. Rahardjo sees the fatwā as a strong indication of the lack of

confidence on the part of MUI in facing the realities of contemporary

influences presented in ideas such as liberal democracy.73

This phenomenon can also be attributed to the reluctance or hostility of

Muslim elites and masses in facing the impact of globalization. Generally,

Muslims in Indonesia are experiencing insecurity and anxiety in the midst of

massive social change. The lack of certainty and deterioration in the rule of

law in Indonesia has contributed to lack of trust in government. The distrust

is clearly manifested in assertions for Islam as the basis for solution to the

problems. In this context, fatwā has become a powerful instrument in

providing quick direction and path towards helping the Muslims adjust to

deal with issues that they are confronted with. Yet, MUI’s fatwā has impeded

this serious challenge. Its fatwā has created a hostile attitude towards the

reality of socio-cultural life of the Muslims. Instead of harnessing modern

concepts to facilitate Muslims’ adaptation to the modern world, the fatwā has

instead impeded the possibility of synthesizing and harmonizing the religious

traditions and values with relevant contemporary ideas that will create and

improve the well-being of Muslims.

73

Interview with Dawam Rahardjo, 12 December 2012, Jakarta.

157

D. Competing Ideas and Mode of Thinking on Liberalism

It is important to note that in the context of contemporary Indonesian

Islamic landscape, the term liberalism and liberal Islam is often used and

understood synonymously. Hence, although liberalism is used more broadly

in scholarship to encompass other dimensions of society,74

MUI’s usage of

the term liberalism in its fatwā basically refers to the religious aspect or what

it perceives as liberal tendency in understanding Islamic doctrines and

traditions. This essentialist and monolithic meaning of the terms are, however,

incongruent with the broader meaning that has been delineated within the

discourse on liberalism in Indonesia which extends beyond the domain of

religion or theology. Munawar-Rachman’s delineation of the concept is

instructive. For him liberals as those who: a) resist theocracy and any ideas

related to the establishment of an Islamic state; b) support the idea of

democracy; c) defend the rights of women; d) defend the rights of

non-Muslims; e) defend the freedom of thought; and f) and strive for the idea

of progress.75

More importantly, it is pertinent to note that MUI’s usage of the term

refers essentially to ideas and understanding of Islam upheld by groups that

differ or depart from its own selective interpretations or preference. It must

74

In fact, liberalism is not only related to religion, since this term can also be liberally

applied to any other field such as politics and economy. For discussion on the dynamics of

liberalism as a philosophical concept of freedom, see Ludwig von Mises, Liberalism (San

Fransisco: Cobden Press, 2002). Also Paul Kelly, Liberalism (Cambridge and Malden: Polity

Press, 2005). 75

Budhy Munawar-Rachman, Islam dan Liberalisme (Jakarta: Friedrich Nauman Stiftung,

2010), 26. It is important to note that by liberalism, it seems that MUI refers only to Islamic

liberalism, in spite of the fact that liberalism is not one. For this reason, in this chapter, the

term liberalism and liberal Islam will be used interchangeably.

158

be made clear that as with the case of pluralism, those who are deemed

liberals or identify themselves as such, do not discard Islam as major source

of their philosophy. While they uphold competing views and orientations on

specific issues relating to the above, these are consciously supported by

recourse to religious sources and traditions. It is on this basis that the

competing groups whose views are targeted in the fatwā base their responses

to the very understanding of the term by MUI. For example, liberalism in

MUI’s concept is equated with al-ibaḥiyya or permissiveness or relativist

ideology.76

This equation is based on the presumption that since that the

basic value of liberalism is freedom, it must admit relativism. Interestingly,

although both MUI and competing groups agree that the basic value of

liberalism is freedom, the articulation of the term and the expression of

underlying meanings of the value by both parties differ. MUI equates

freedom with absolute freedom or freedom without restriction. As such it

assumes that liberalism allows people to do as they please without bounds or

restrictions. In other words, freedom is pejoratively perceived as

permissiveness.

In contrast, competing mode of thought perceives freedom as a positive

element of human beings and society. Liberalism within this mode has

nothing to do with permissiveness. More accurately, liberalism is perceived

as a philosophy that seeks to extend the areas of individual freedom and

enhance social progress. It accords human beings the right of choice subject

76

Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Himpunan Fatwā MUI Sejak 1975 (Jakarta: MUI Pusat and

Penerbit Erlangga, 2011), 93.

159

to certain fundamental principles,77

namely mutual respect for the rights of

the members of society and the rule of law. In line with this conviction,

liberalism emphasizes the cultivation of reason and social awareness of

individuals in fulfilling their obligations. It also aims at building an

independent society without excessive state intervention.78

It is reiterated

that these competing views on liberalism captured in responses of progressive

Indonesian Muslims are grounded in perceptions of Islamic values and

tradition.

Such alternative discourse finds no place in the thinking of MUI which

misleadingly presumes that a society adopting liberalism is unbounded by

restraints and values thereby instilling fear and anxiety and opposition to it.

In Ulil Abshar Abdalla’s analysis, this fear basically stems from distrust of

human beings apart from a humiliation of man’s rational and intellectual

abilities. The fear of liberalism and freedom also carries the connotation that

human beings are unable to think, to manage and to control their ability if

they are granted freedom.79

Moreover, the meaning of liberalism as freedom

is often pejoratively equated to moral decay such as free sex practice and

non-obedience to religion. Zuly Qodir, for example, strongly resists this

perception by arguing that liberalism is fundamentally about revealing the

liberating forces of Islam often hidden by Muslims themselves.80

More

fundamentally, the ethics of freedom or liberation is a fundamental value in

77

Budhy Munawar-Rachman, Islam dan Liberalisme (Jakarta: Freidrich Naumann Stiftung,

2011), 3. 78

Ibid, 3. 79

Ulil Abshar-Abdalla, “Islam dan Kebebasan”, in Hamid Basyaib, Membela Kebebasan:

Perbincangan tentang Demokrasi Liberal (Jakarta: Freedom Institute and Pustaka Alvabet,

2006), 228. 80

Interview with Zuly Qodir, Yogyakarta, February 2013.

160

Islam, and it is human beings that are granted with this freedom, including

freedom of choice and free will. Therefore, the doctrine of freedom or

liberation is nothing alien to Islamic tradition since it can be traced from the

classical Islamic disciplines such as theology and philosophy.81

This basic meaning of freedom underlines competing groups’ positive

attitude of the concept. However, since “freedom” itself is negatively viewed

and forms a major reason for rejecting liberalism, it is pertinent to have a

clearer understanding of what it means. Conceptually, the most important

element of freedom is the absence of coercion both external and internal that

requires people to do or abstain from. This external force could possibly

come from an authority outside of an individual such as politics, religion,

tradition, community or others. Moreover, the concept of freedom is also

associated with obedience.

This view is contested by competing progressive thought which

submits that freedom, in whatever meaning, does not contradict obedience

since obedience is basically an initial condition and freedom is the result of

this initial situation. Consequently, contrasting freedom with obedience does

not make sense. According to Ulil while emphasizing obedience, the Qurʼān

also pays considerable attention to the idea of freedom as the initial condition

for being obedient.82

On this basis, he opines that freedom in Islam can be

expressed in at least in three contexts: a). freedom to embrace any certain

religion or to leave it; b) the absence of coercion in adopting any religion also

81

Budhy Munawar-Rachman, Argumen Islam untuk Liberalisme: Islam Progresif dan

Perkembangan Diskursusnya (Jakarta: Grasindo, 2010), 145. 82

Ulil Abshar Abdalla, “Argumen Islam untuk Kebebasan”, paper presented for Public

Lecture, Freedom Institute, Jakarta, July 15, 2013.

161

suggests the freedom of corporation; and c) freedom of interpretation.83

Underlying all these is overriding principle of the freedom of the human

being. The misunderstanding of freedom will lead people to rebel against

religion and revelation, thereby, restrict freedom that has been doctrinally

endorsed by revelation. Ulil further maintains that such an understanding will

restrict what has been acknowledged in religion and erroneously confine its

application.84

The challenge to understanding liberalism as an absolute freedom also

comes from Maman Imanulhaq, a leader of al-Mizan Islamic Boarding

School, in Majalengka, West Java, who strongly believes that liberalism is

not absolute freedom. It would be more accurate to comprehend it as an

attempt to place individual rights in a sacred position as God has granted all

individuals with fundamental rights such as right to live, freedom of

expression, and freedom of religion. Maman maintains that if liberalism is

understood in this way, it will not be perceived as a threat but will turn

religion into a living force (élan vital) for positive changes.85

Although

freedom in Islam is a virtue, Muslims themselves have ignored or

misunderstood this. According to competing mode of thought, this fact

basically betrays historical precedence as exemplified by the liberating

attitude of earlier generation of Muslims who had suffered from misery in

83

Saidiman Ahmad, “Argumen Islam untuk Kebebasan”, Koran Tempo, 15 April 2011. 84

Ulil Abshar-Abdalla, “Agama, Akal dan Kebebasan: Tentang Makna ‘Liberal’ dalam

Islam Liberal”, Foreword in Abd Moqsith Ghazali (ed), Ijtihad Islam Liberal: Upaya

Merumuskan Keberagamaan yang Dinamis (Jakarta: Jaringan Islam Liberal, 2005), xvii. 85

Maman Imanulhaq Faqieh, “Perbincangan dengan Maman Imanulhaq Abdulfaqih”, in

Budhy MUnawar-Rachman (ed.), Membela Kebebasan Beragama: Percakapan tentang

Pluralism, Liberalisme dan Sekularisme (Jakarta: LSAF and Paramadina, 2010), Book 2,

1105.

162

Mecca for thirteen years. As they experienced this misery, they understood

the meaning of and appreciated freedom well. However, when Muslims came

into power and assumed a position as a ruling class, they committed the same

fault as other power holders, namely oppression. For this reason, progressives

believe that Islamic liberalism and the value of freedom must be revived in

society. More than a virtue, competing groups often describe the teaching of

freedom in Islam as a pearl of wisdom.86

Related to this point is the

connection between liberalism and happiness. The progressives maintain that

earlier generation of liberal Muslim believed in the correlation between

liberalism and happiness. Freedom is seen as the key to happiness, not only

for individual, but also happiness for communities and even a state.87

The above discussion on freedom signifies the moral autonomy of the

individual in Islamic tradition and teachings. Competing ideas maintain that

in Islam the individual subject is fully responsible for himself and that based

on this responsibility, individuals gain freedom. As the individual is a

responsible subject who has consciousness, he cannot be forced. Freedom, in

their thought, necessitates responsibility. Therefore, progressives argue that

when people are granted freedom, they at the same time do not ignore their

responsibilities.88

The basis of the concept of freedom and responsibility,

according to progressives, can also be traced through Islamic legal tradition.

Legally speaking, Islamic legal provision states that those who are under

coercion do not have any obligation. In such a context, awareness of the

86

Hamid Basyaib (ed), Membela Kebebasan: Percakapan tentang Demokrasi Liberal

(Jakarta: Alvabet, 2006), 225. 87

Luthfi Assyaukani, “Dua Abad Islam Liberal”, in Bentara Kompas, 2 Maret 2007. 88

Hamid Basyaib (ed), Membela Kebebasan: Percakapan tentang Demokrasi Liberal

(Jakarta: Alvabet, 2006), 225.

163

importance of individual rights, the maintenance of pluralism and tolerance,

the limitation of state’s role, and willingness to regulate political activities as

a rational contract between the rulers and the ruled will emerge.89

According

to Ahmad Sahal, the former activist of Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL), this is

the essence of liberalism.90

Other than freedom, progressives also relate liberalism to independence.

As Dawam Rahardjo posits that in the field of economy, liberalism has

resulted in capitalism or free market economy system that will bring

prosperity to the nations, which has brought about exploitation of the strong

against the weak. Liberalism can also be manifested in the idea of freedom

and independence. The difference between freedom and independence is that

the former touches more on micro-individual, while the latter operates more

on macro-collective level. Therefore, it is not surprising that liberalism is

basically an inspiration for independence.91

Yet, another dimension of the meaning of liberalism which relates to

freedom advanced by competing groups is the freedom of thought. Amien

Rais, the former leader of Muhammadiyah in 1990s, maintains that liberalism

is an inspiration for freedom of thought for members of society who seek for

solutions to variety of problems confronting it.92

Therefore, if there is

competition of ideas and rivalry in dealing with or concrete problems, it

89

Ibid, 225-228. 90

Ahmad Sahal, “Anti-Liberalisme dari Kanan: Untung Ada Mas Dawam”, in Ihsan

Ali-Fauzi, et.al (eds), Demi Toleransi, Demi Pluralisme (Jakarta: Yayasan Abad Demokrasi,

2012), 411. 91

M. Dawam Rahardjo, Kritik Nalar Islamisme dan Kebangkitan Islam (Jakarta: Freedom

Institute, 2012), 6. 92

Amien Rais, “Perbincangan dengan Amien Rais”, in Budhy Munawar-Rachman (ed.),

Membela Kebebasan Beragama: Percakapan tentang Pluralism, Liberalisme dan

Sekularisme (Jakarta: LSAF and Paramadina, 2010), Book 2, 1016.

164

should be praised and even advisable.93

Returning to history, competing

groups maintain that that freedom of thought is an integral aspect of Islamic

teachings that has its roots in the earliest practice of Islam. Quraish Shihab, a

leading exegete in Indonesia, contends that thinking is a religious obligation.

In Islam, he suggests, it is not the validity of thought that becomes a central

issue, but the seriousness in thinking, responsibility and benefits carried by

certain thought. Allah will not punish any thought, even though it is wrong,

when these three basic considerations have been fulfilled.94

By referring back to the history of earlier generation of Muslim

philosophers, progressives reveal the significance Islam paid to the freedom

of thought. The practices of liberalism in the meaning of freedom of thought

have been introduced since the classical era as exemplified by Muslim

philosophers, legal scholars and theologians.95

In an Islamic context,

liberalism refers to freedom of thought and expression. In Islamic philosophy,

for example, freedom of thought emerged as an alternative to orthodox

understanding. In Islamic mysticism, the same doctrine also exists. Therefore,

it is inevitable that some scholars maintain that the root of Islamic liberalism

could be traced to these two disciplines: Islamic philosophy and mysticism.

Philosophy gives intellectual and rational basis, while Islamic mysticism

serves as the spiritual foundation.96

Freedom of thought is also seen as a

93

Budhy Munawar-Rachman, Reorientasi Pembaruan Islam, 430 94

M. Quraish Shihab, Secercah Cahaya Ilahi: Hidup Bersama al-Qur’an (Bandung, Mizan,

2013, 2nd

edition), 451. 95

Zuly Qodir, Islam Liberal: Varian-Varian Liberalism Islam di Indonesia 1991-2002

(Yogyakarta: LKIS, 2010), 84-85. 96

Luthfi Assyaukani, “Perbincangan dengan Luthfi Assyaukani,” in Budhy

MUnawar-Rachman (ed.), Membela Kebebasan Beragama: Percakapan tentang Pluralism,

Liberalisme dan Sekularisme (Jakarta: LSAF and Paramadina, 2010), Book 2, 1002-1004.

165

medium through which more progressive understanding of Islam can be

achieved. Through the project of liberalism, progressive Muslims aim at

presenting a liberal-progressive type of Islam through the employment of

certain method which includes hermeneutics.97

Liberalism can be treated as a

focus in the study of Islam, in order to make Islam contextual and perform

dialogues with all contexts and contemporary realities productively.98

Closely associated with the basic concept of freedom of thought,

competing groups also advance how religious texts are understood in Islam.

Being liberal within this mode also means to understand religious texts by

way of rational-contextual reading. A liberal Muslim, within this view, is not

imprisoned and bound by texts. Rather, he will comprehend the text rationally.

Rationality is any organization of knowledge which is in accordance with

logic. As long as the ideas are based on the application of reason as opposed

to dogmatic and emotive influences it should not be denied, but

encouraged.99

Therefore, progressives declare that if what is understood by

liberalism is atheism, it should be rejected. It is reiterated that the ideas and

mode of thinking of those who defend and uphold liberal Islam reveals

evident attempt at creatively synthesizing basic teachings, doctrines and

values of Islam with other philosophies or selective aspects of them that are

compatible with it. It is through such assimilation and synthesis that Islam is

able to respond to undeterred social changes that are taking place within the

97

Budhy Munawar-Rachman, Argumen Islam untuk Liberalisme: Islam Progresif dan

Perkembangan Diskursusnya (Jakarta: Grasindo, 2010), 68. 98

Luthfi Assyaukani, Islam Benar versus Islam Salah (Depok: Kata Kita, 2007), 60. 99

Zainun Kamal, “Perbincangan dengan Zainun Kamal,” in Budhy MUnawar-Rachman

(ed.), Membela Kebebasan Beragama: Percakapan tentang Pluralism, Liberalisme dan

Sekularisme (Jakarta: LSAF and Paramadina, 2010), Book 2, 1704-1705.

166

context of modern society.100

It must be highlighted that MUI’s attitude

towards liberalism and its presumption of what it means strongly conditioned

by its notion that liberalism is a western concept. This view has been

analysed within competing group thought. Luthfi Assyaukanie, for example,

argues that liberal Islam is basically a rejuvenation of Islamic reform

movements in nineteenth century in almost all parts of the world. Identical to

Assyaukani’s position, Rahardjo goes further back in history to support his

view that the roots of Islamic liberalism (in the meaning of freedom of

thought) lies in the Prophetic tradition. Utilising religious sources such as

hadīth, he argues that the fundamental values of freedom of thought based on

reason and moral responsibility and accountability underlying liberalism can

be found in the dialogue between the Prophet and Mu’adz bin Jabbal when

the latter was appointed a governor in Yemen which emphasized and

endorsed the significance of ijtihād. Another hadīth used by Rahardjo relates

to the Prophet’s dialogue with a farmer who had misunderstood his opinion.

The hadīth narrated that the Prophet had asserted antum a’lāmu bi umūri

dunyākum (you are more knowledgeable in your worldly issues).101

The

reference to basic Islamic doctrines and principles consistent with the values

of liberalism is also evident from Imanulhaq’s interpretation of the term. He

views that the basic spirit of liberalism has been laid down by the Prophet

himself, by liberating his people, and understanding their individual rights. In

this context, he sees that liberalism is fundamental to the purpose of Islamic

100

Ibid, 1704-1705. 101

M. Dawam Rahardjo, “Preface” in Budhy Munawar-Rachman, Argumen Islam untuk

Liberalisme (Jakarta: ), xxxvi.

167

religiosity.102

Differing from Assyaukani, Rahardjo and Imanulhaq, Ahmad

Syafii Maarif and Masdar Mas’udi acknowledges that liberalism, be it

politically or economically defined, did not originate from Islam. They,

however, maintained that this does not mean that Islam does not have any

correlation with liberalism.103

In its most basic meaning, liberalism is a

challenge to the dogma that the scripture can only be read and interpreted by

church authority. It does not mean unbounded authority as strongly implied in

MUI’s thinking.104

By and large, it can be concluded that while MUI sees liberalism as a

potential danger for Indonesian Muslims, progressives perceive it as a

necessity. It is not surprising, as a consequence, that in contrast to MUI that

labelled liberalism as ḥarām, the progressive mode of thought views it as

basically part of Islamic teachings. In this respect, an important question to

be posed is that if the meaning of liberalism as understood by progressives is

more positive rather than negative, what factors could have led to the

rejection of the concept. Tholhah Hasan, the former minister of religion

offers a hypothesis. He views that the pejorative meaning of liberalism in

Indonesia as followed by MUI is a result of simplistic way of thinking.105

In

102

Maman Imanulhaq Faqieh, “Perbincangan dengan Maman Imanulhaq Abdulfaqih”, in

Budhy MUnawar-Rachman (ed.), Membela Kebebasan Beragama: Percakapan tentang

Pluralism, Liberalisme dan Sekularisme (Jakarta: LSAF and Paramadina, 2010), Book 2,

1105. 103

Budhy Munawar-Rachman, Argumen Islam untuk Liberalisme: Islam Progresif dan

Perkembangan Diskursusnya (Jakarta: Grasindo, 2010), 13. 104

Masdar Farid Mas’udi, “Perbincangan dengan Masdar Farid Mas’udi,” in Budhy

Munawar-Rachman (ed.), Membela Kebebasan Beragama: Percakapan tentang Pluralism,

Liberalisme dan Sekularisme (Jakarta: LSAF and Paramadina, 2010), Book 2, 1179. 105

Muhammad Tholhah Hasan, ““Percakapan dengan Muhammad Tholhah Hasan”, in

Budhy Munawar-Rachman (ed.), Membela Kebebasan Beragama: Percakapan tentang

Pluralisme, Liberalisme dan Sekularisme (Jakarta: LSAF and Paramadina, 2010), Book 2,

1281.

168

other words, MUI’s position and progressives’ stand reflect contrasting styles

of thought.

In summary, liberalism is not a monolithic or simplistic concept as

resumed by MUI and reflected in its fatwā. On the contrary, it comprises a

variety of meanings captured in competing modes of thinking in discourse of

Indonesian Muslim groups. Essentially for MUI, liberalism is taken to mean

anti-religion. This understanding is not only simplistic but partial as MUI has

arbitrarily and dogmatically presumed it to mean only that which is negative

regardless of its variety of meanings and nuances in discourse on the concept.

At the same time, its understanding is also elusive without recourse to serious

analysis and systematic research of its meaning and application even in

Muslim history and religious traditions. MUI’s views and mode of thinking

has been strongly critiqued by competing ideas, based on historical

precedents and alternative ways of interpreting Muslim history and traditions.

The simplistic and elusive understanding of liberalism as shown by MUI’s

fatwā induces and reinforces fear and tension of what it deems as potent

threat to Islam and the Muslims.

On the one hand, competing views reveal contrasting conceptual

understanding of liberalism. Grounded in religious traditions, they challenge

the simplistic notions of the concept and metaphorically bridges religious

teachings with contemporary challenges through rational and contextual

interpretation of Islam. In this way, they attempt to ensure the relevance of

Islam and its dynamism within changing condition of Indonesian society. The

perspectives they offer attempt to adapt religious traditions to contemporary

169

world in which Muslims live.106

E. Progressives on Secularism in Indonesia

The third important aspect of MUI’s fatwā is secularism. It is evident

that in the fatwā, secularism is perceived as the separation of state and

religion as well as marginalization of religion from public life. In contrast,

competing views maintain that MUI’s understanding of secularism is

misleading, if not erroneous. Within this mode of thinking, secularism is

elucidated as not synonymous with anti-religious attitude or the

marginalization of religion from public life. It is an exaggeration to perceive

secularism as anti-religion. Those who oppose MUI’s understanding explain

that the concept is theoretically not tantamount to a denial of religion but

admits that religion should be separated from the state. This does not

automatically mean that secularism is anti-religion in concept and practice.107

According to Azyumardi Azra, misperception of the proper meaning of

secularism emerges, among other factors, from the fact that it is basically a

theory of separation of religion and state. This basic formulation carries

meaning that religion is part of private dimension of society, on the one hand,

and that state should refrain from regulating religious issues, on the other. By

this understanding, Azra argues, it should not be understood that in a state

which adopts the principle of secularism, religion will decline, become

106

Budhy Munawar-Rachman, “Perbincangan dengan Budhy Munawar-Rachman”, in

Budhy Munawar-Rachman (ed.), Membela Kebebasan Beragama: Percakapan tentang

Pluralism, Liberalisme dan Sekularisme (Jakarta: LSAF and Paramadina, 2010), Book 1,

xlix. 107

A. Munir Mulkhan, “Percakapan dengan A. Munir Mulkhan”, in Budhy

Munawar-Rachman (ed.), Membela Kebebasan Beragama: Percakapan tentang Pluralisme,

Liberalisme dan Sekularisme (Jakarta: LSAF and Paramadina, 2010), Book 1.

170

marginalized, and oppressed.108

In support of his understanding, Azra

compares the nature of religious practice in Turkey and the United States.

Although both are declared as secular countries, the significance of the

influence of religion in the lives of people remains pervasive. Furthermore,

differences exist in the way the states manage religion in the public sphere.

While in Turkey secularism is implemented in the form of elimination of

religious symbols in public life; in the United States, secularism is manifested

in the state refraining from active intervention and management of religious

affairs which opens possibilities for the expression of religious practices and

symbols in public life.109

This means that secularism does not inevitably

involve the marginalization of religion from public life.

A similar perception is found in the thinking of Husein Muhammad

who strongly disagrees with the presumption that secularism is negative

because it means the separation of religion and state. Muhammad maintains

that this does not mean that Islam rejects secularism. For Muhammad a key

ingredient in secularism is the orientation towards the reality of the world and

its significance to man’s existential conditions.110

He argues that Islamic

teachings and texts acknowledge the fundamental differentiation between

worldly life and hereafter,111

and the importance of man’s rootedness and his

struggle in his specific socio-historical condition which is the major element

108

Azyumardi Azra, “Percakapan dengan Azyumardi Azra,” in Budhy Munawar-Rachman

(ed.), Membela Kebebasan Beragama: Percakapan tentang Pluralisme, Liberalisme dan

Sekularisme (Jakarta: LSAF and Paramadina, 2010), Book 1, 192. 109

Azyumardi Azra, Dari Harvard Hingga Makkah (Jakarta: Republika, 2005), 10-11. 110

A. Syafii Maarif, “Percakapan dengan A. Syafii Maarif”, in Budhy Munawar-Rachman

(ed.), Membela Kebebasan Beragama: Percakapan tentang Pluralisme, Liberalisme dan

Sekularisme (Jakarta: LSAF and Paramadina, 2010), Book 1, 172. 111

Husein Muhammad, “Percakapan dengan Husein Muhammad”, in Budhy

Munawar-Rachman (ed.), Membela Kebebasan Beragama: Percakapan tentang Pluralisme,

Liberalisme dan Sekularisme (Jakarta: LSAF and Paramadina, 2010), Book 1, 676.

171

of secularism.

While MUI views secularism as a dangerous force for Indonesian

Muslims, the competing groups perceive the concept from a broader

socio-political dimension, argues for stress its vital importance in Indonesian

society. Quoting Indonesian founding father Sukarno, Rahardjo maintains

that secularism is basically an important and a fundamental element which

binds Indonesia as a nation. The basis for this argument is that only through

secularism can there be equal opportunity for different social groups to live

and unite despite the vast diversity of its people.112

In this context, Rahardjo

points out that rather than understanding secularism from a religious point of

view, secularism should be understood from a wider perspective which

encompasses the values of freedom, rights, democracy and equality within

Indonesia’s plural society.113

Furthermore, Rahardjo explains that secularism

as a matter of principle, secularism has ensured freedom of religion and

conscience and justice to all religions and beliefs as long as they do not

violate the constitution, the creation of laws on the basis of social consensus

and moral and ethical norms and tolerance amongst different beliefs, worship

and religious practices.114

Based on this conviction, Rahardjo denounces its

presumption that secularism is anti-religion or inherently leads to the decline

and marginalization of religion.115

Like Azra, Rahardjo pointed out that

112

Dawam Rahardjo, “Preface” in Budhy Munawar-Rachman, Reorientasi Pembaruan

Islam: Sekularisme, Liberalisme dan Pluralisme (Jakarta: Grasindo, 2010), xxix-xxx. 113

Rahardjo in Rachman, Ibid. 114

Ibid, xxxi. 115

Dawam Rahardjo, “Percakapan dengan Dawam Rahardjo”, in Budhy Munawar-Rachman

(ed.), Membela Kebebasan Beragama: Percakapan tentang Pluralism, Liberalisme dan

Sekularisme (Jakarta: LSAF and Paramadina, 2010), Book 1, 9.

172

secularism is managed in various ways such as in the case of Turkey.116

The notion that secularism is not incompatible with religion also finds

support in the view of Komaruddin Hidayat who maintains that secularism is

essentially a rational approach in understanding state dynamic and political

activity through modern political theory. In this sense, religion stands on

moral ground. Seen in this way, secularism is not incompatible with Islam.117

Others maintain that secularism is intertwined strongly with democracy.

Djohan Effendi’s view illustrates the point. He views that as far as democracy

is concerned, secularism is an essential element, since the principles of

democracy cannot be fully implemented without secularism. He argues that

secularism places all religions on equal position without any particular

religion being privileged or having the upper hand. This equality in the

treatment of religions, he emphasized, is a fundamental principle of

democracy.118

Furthermore, Effendi also contends that secularism is a

pre-requisite for achieving more subtle values of civic life.119

Some Indonesian scholars have attempted to distinguish between

secularism and secularization and their relationship with Islam. Although

some aspects of their views appear to support the understanding that

secularism creates distance between man and God and in that sense is

incompatible with religion, conceptual distinctions and categorization of

116

Dawam Rahardjo, “Preface” in Budhy Munawar-Rachman, Reorientasi Pembaruan

Islam: Sekularisme, Liberalisme dan Pluralisme, Paradigma Baru Islam Indonesia (Jakarta:

LSAF dan Paramadina, 2010), lx. 117

Budhy Munawar-Rachman, Argumen Islam untuk Sekularisme, 29. 118

Djohan Effendi, “Percakapan dengan Djohan Effendi”, Budhy Munawar-Rachman (ed.),

Membela Kebebasan Beragama: Percakapan tentang Pluralism, Liberalisme dan

Sekularisme (Jakarta: LSAF and Paramadina, 2010), Book 1, 291. 119

See also Husein Muhammad, “Percakapan dengan Husein Muhammad,” in Budhy

Munawar-Rachman (ed.), Membela Kebebasan Beragama: Percakapan tentang Pluralism,

Liberalisme dan Sekularisme (Jakarta: LSAF and Paramadina, 2010), Book 1, 676.

173

thought reflected in their views reveal sophisticated nuances that cannot be

said to be similar to MUI’s simplistic over-generalisation and judgement. The

debate over the distinction between secularization and secularism and its

consequences on Islam dates back to the 1970s in the midst of the resurgence

of Islam in Indonesia in which the clamour for the rejection of secularism

was rife. Deemed a western philosophical model that has contributed to the

decline and degeneration of the Muslims, the scare of secularism was

accompanied by the demand for the return to Islam as al-dīn. It was in this

context that the late Nurcholish Madjid distinguished secularization as a

process of change from secularism as a philosophy and urged for Indonesian

Muslims not to reject the former as it is an inevitable process of change

induced by modernization. According to Madjid who is popularly known as

Cak Nur, secularization is not an ideology as is the case with secularism

which potentially creates distance between self and the God.120

Furthermore, Madjid also evaluates secularization as a “liberating

development.” This liberation is urgently needed for Muslims as consequence

of Islam’s historical progress. It is inevitable that this process has contributed

to the dynamic evolution of Muslims as they confront new conditions and

challenges. As a result, many Muslims are no longer able to differentiate

values that are thought as Islamic, which is transcendental and which one is

temporal.121

Although this type of distinction is often criticized by those who

reject secularism and secularization, Madjid’s differentiation of secularization

and secularism can be theoretically validated. Jose Casanova, a leading

120

Nurcholish Madjid, Islam, Kemodernan dan Keindonesiaan (Bandung: Mizan, 1987),

221. 121

Ibid, 207.

174

sociologist of religion, for example, emphasizes the importance of clarity in

understanding secularization and secularism to avoid confusion.

Secularization usually refers to actual or alleged empirical-historical patterns

of transformation and differentiation of ‘the religious’…, while secularism

“refers more broadly to a whole range of modern secular worldviews and

ideologies which may be consciously held and explicitly elaborated into

philosophies of history…”122

An important point that can be drawn from the discussion on Islam and

secularism in Indonesia is that in the Indonesian context, secularism is a

contested concept with a variety of meanings attributed to it. MUI’s fatwā

that denounces secularism as with the case of pluralism and liberalism

overlooks and ignores this complexity and sophistication of thought and ideas

pertaining to this issue. Mulkhan argues that the attitude of MUI on

secularism rests on its imagination of its roots in western European history.

Stemming from the West it has been essentialized as atheistic and rejected on

the ground that it threatens the identity and belief of Muslims. This type of

thinking has created a paradox for Muslims in Indonesia. While on the one

hand they are trying to modernize by employing reason, taking benefit of

tradition as well as experience of Western countries, on the other hand, they

reject the west which they have caricatured as irreligious.123

The fatwā in

effect denies the reality of historical context which has created the need for

man to understand and manage the condition of his life and adapt to it. The

ambivalent attitude towards reason and empiricism, that are imbued into the

122

Jose Casanova, “The Secular, Secularizations, Secularisms”, in Craig Calhoun, et. al.

(eds), Rethinking Secularism (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 54-55. 123

Ibid, 104.

175

concept of secularism in association for human action are presumed as

working to overthrow religion.

In conclusion, it can be asserted that the fatwā on pluralism, secularism

and liberalism substantially contradicts contemporary realities as well as

contributions of Islam in human development. It has basically revealed the

conservative streak of MUI and groups alike. It cannot be denied that far

from allowing religious principles and values to help adapt Muslims to the

realities of the world in which they live and contribute to its progress, the

fatwa, on the contrary, has ignited, provoked and contributed to unfounded

suspicions and mistrust amongst Muslims which basically contradicts the

teachings and values Islam.124

It is also clear that MUI’s understanding of

pluralism, liberalism and secularism is ideological in the sense that it is

functions to guard its position against competing groups’ ideas. It ignores and

overlooks intellectual thought and reasoning on the subject matter widely

debated and discussed by scholars and thinkers both within and beyond

Indonesia. The critical understanding of these concepts from progressive

Muslim scholars in Indonesia basically represents different religious

perspectives and orientations in interpreting and making sense of

contemporary concepts and ideas, its compatibility with religious traditions

and principles and their relevance to Indonesian society. Essentially, they

reveal a more inclusive, rational and humanistic orientation based on the

centrality of man and his moral judgment and responsibility. In further

contrast to the revivalist mode of thinking reflected in MUI’s fatwā, the

124

Ibid, 61.

176

competing mode is socio-historically grounded when upholding the eternal

values of Islam.