case study rebranding yes or no

Anurag Dugar,Symbiosis Institute of BusinessManagement (SIBM),Symbiosis Knowledge Village,Lavale via Sus Road,Mulshi,Pune 412115,India

Tel: +91 020 39116096 Fax: +91 020 39116060E-mail: [email protected]

Case study

Rebranding: Yes or no?Received: 16th February, 2012

ANURAG DUGARis an associate professor in the marketing area at Symbiosis Institute of Business Management, Pune. He has morethan 12 years of enriching experience with top names in industry and academia, including the Indian Institute ofManagement (Bangalore), NIIT University, ICFAI’s Adam Smith Institute of Management (Hyderabad), Leeds Met India(Bhopal) Amity Business School and Gyan Vihar University among others.Along with a doctorate in marketing fromthe University of Rajasthan, he also holds an MBA (marketing), PGDBM (marketing) and a master’s in commerce(business administration). He has published research papers and articles, and has presented papers at variousnational and international forums.

AbstractMarketing managers have to keep their brands relevant for consumers, and they do this in a variety ofways.Two popular ways are: constantly developing new products that are relevant for consumers; andrefreshing the corporate visual identity (CVI) from time to time. Both strategies have their own plusesand minuses. As students of marketing usually study topics in isolation, they usually fail to appreciatethe intricacies that marketing managers face in real-time when the topics interact with each other andcreate complex decision-making scenarios.This case study has been developed with the objective ofsensitising students of marketing towards the finer nuances of marketing decision making that topmanagers face in real organisations.The case concerns a situation where a top car brand from India isfacing an identity crisis.The brand is handled by a young manager, Raghav, who is the protagonist ofthe story. As expected, he uses a copy-book approach towards handling the problem but finds himself ina very tough situation.The case allows readers to become well-versed in the techniques of criticalanalysis of the situation as well as of the information available. It will also help readers dig deeper intothe domains of new product development and brand repositioning.The case study will aid in triggeringdebate because it touches upon an area of particular interest to marketers. Furthermore, readers(being consumers themselves) have first-hand experience of brand repositioning. As this is a veryinteresting area, the business press and academic research allocate generous space to covering caseswhenever and wherever they occur.Thus, students will not lack material to analyse and on which buildtheir point of view.

Keywordsrebranding, branding, new product development, positioning, logo modification

THE CASERaghav Mandal, Head of Marketing atColumbus Auto Inc, was in a contempla-tive mood while driving back from workin December 2010. It was a good year forthe automobile sector in India, with salesgrowing at about 11.5 per cent over theprevious year, but Columbus, one of thelargest auto-makers, was unfortunatelynot doing well.The Columbus brand was

crumbling, hitting the company hard.Thecompany revenues dipped 21 per cent(see Figure 1) in 2010, and showed signsof further decline. This was unacceptablein a sector where growth of demand wasin double digits. With another bumperyear forecast for the auto sector in 2011,Raghav and his team were struggling toidentify solutions to recharge the brandand reverse this downward spiral.

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BACKGROUNDColumbus was founded in 1879 byHrishikesh Kohli, a visionary Indian busi-nessman, who mastered the art of export/import in that era. Columbus started off asa company that imported automobilesfrom the UK and sold them in India.Initially, it served the niche of super-richpeople, which included the British citi-zens living in India, the Indian royal fam-ilies and some rich Indian businessmenwho could afford an automobile.

In 1950, Columbus set up its first pro-duction facility near Mumbai, which ispresently the capital of Maharashtra state.Asper the demand at that time, this unit wasvery small in terms of production capacity.By today’s standards it can rightly betermed as ‘tiny’. Gradually, not only didColumbus increase its production of cars, italso expanded into the commercial vehiclesegment with respectable success, garneringa 23 per cent share within three years of itsentry in 1970. This success was largelydown to two factors: (1) India was investinghuge amounts in infrastructure during thatperiod, and (2) the rich contacts of MrKohli and his partners.The second phase ofgrowth came with the financial reforms

beginning in early 1990s. These gave amuch-needed impetus to the Indian auto-mobile industry, and Columbus, with itsrich automobile experience and legacy,benefited the most. Throughout this jour-ney, Columbus retained its status as thelargest automobile company in India, andalso the undisputed market leader in thecategory.

In 1996, Columbus entered the over-seas market and commenced operations inAfrica. Since the African market wasunder-developed and had relatively lesspaying capacity, the big players neglectedthis market. Columbus’s ‘value for money’offerings were welcomed by the market.In 1999, Columbus inked a first-of-its-kind agreement with transportation serv-ices departments in a couple of Africancountries, making it the sole supplier ofdelivery vehicles for their operations.Thiswas a big boost for Columbus, which wasable to gain a strong foot-hold in theAfrican market.

As the African operations stabilised,Columbus discreetly entered into selectedeastern European and Australian marketsas well. These markets were carefullyselected according to the unique selling

150 © HENRY STEWART PUBLICATIONS 2045-855X JOURNAL OF BRAND STRATEGY VOL. 1, NO. 2, 149–163 SUMMER 2012

Figure 1 Sales volume comparison with competitors

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REBRANDING:YES OR NO?

point of Columbus, that is, a sturdy auto-mobile offered at a relatively low price,and sold through a relatively intense dis-tribution network.

In other words, Columbus developedan expertise in applying the ‘productionconcept’ of marketing in strategically-selected (developing or under-developed)markets, where this concept works well.

With the aim of expanding its productportfolio, Columbus started offering mid-range automobiles as well. It enteredthis segment by offering automobiles thatwere comparable in features and technicalspecifications, but prices were deliberatelykept lower than the competition. In otherwords, it offered a ‘more for same’ valueproposition.These vehicles were simulta-neously launched in all the markets whereColumbus operated.

While Columbus’s economy range wasdoing very well in almost all the markets itoperated in, the success of its mid-range waslimited in the Australian and easternEuropean markets. This was primarilybecause top brands had strong presence inthis segment and offered stiff competition toColumbus.Secondly,as customers moved upthe ladder (from economy to mid-range),they became more brand-conscious and pre-ferred top global brands over an Indianbrand of automobile. Finally, in these mar-kets, Columbus’s name was synonymouswith ‘low-end vehicles’, which did not helpmuch in fighting the stiff competition.

Recent surveys by the business and auto-mobile press, however, were indicating agrowing awareness of the Columbus brand.Members of the think-tank at Columbuswere also very clear that the gestationperiod in these markets would be long, andthat it would take some real effort to capturea seat in the ‘evoked set of brands’ in thesemarkets.

Top management at Columbus weredetermined to take the Columbus brand

to a global level and by 2006, it had pres-ence in 13 countries with 37 offices out-side India (see Figure 2).

Its brand value was estimated to beINR1,000 crores and growing.Meanwhile,Columbus continued growing in India andheld a market share of 55 per cent in 2007(see Figure 3).

Raghav Mandal joined Columbus in2005 as President, Marketing Divisionand immediately found out that he hadan easy job. He was in charge of a 130-year-old brand that enjoyed high loyalty,awareness and recall, and was synony-mous with the car in India. It wassmooth sailing over the next three years.The first sign of problems came in thefirst quarter of the financial year2008–2009, where the company saw adip in its retail sales compared with itsprevious year’s sales in the same quarter.It was ignored as an anomaly, and thecompany continued regular operations.But after consecutive quarters of dismalresults and declining market share,Raghav decided to take action to arrestthis decline. After an unsuccessful adver-tisement campaign and promotionprogramme, he ordered an investigationinto the matter by the company’s inter-nal marketing department.

Columbus’s marketing division lackedexpertise to carry out the investigation,with the result that the report, filed inDecember 2009 after three months ofresearch, was incoherent and unconvinc-ing. The report concluded that the dipsbeing seen were cyclic short-term varia-tions, which would fade naturally in suc-ceeding years. Raghav was not convincedbut decided to wait and watch as sug-gested in the report.

The downward trend continued overthe next three quarters and it soon becameapparent that something was seriouslywrong. Reports from sales partners and


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Figure 3 Market share comparison with competitors

Figure 2 Columbus’ global presence

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distributors were discouraging. The salesdeclined in almost all passenger and a fewcommercial segments. When Kapoorcouriers, an Indian courier company inbusiness with Columbus for the last tenyears, changed its auto supplier to a rival inSeptember 2010, disaster threatened.Withits passenger and commercial business seg-ments quickly slipping away (see Figures 4and 5), rumours of mismanagement, dyingbrands etc started flying around andinvestors were starting to get edgy.Something had to be done and soon.Another major blow to the company wasthe alarming increase in the employeesjumping ship to join its competitors (seeFigure 6).

MARKETING RESEARCH ANDCONCLUSIONSColumbus hired multiple independentconsultants to identify and rectify theproblem. The idea was that Columbus’sturnaround would require a high-stakesstrategy that would include multiple per-spectives, innovation and cross-checking.

Consequently, two consulting firms,Mumbai-based ‘Tox’ and Bangalore-based‘Xerone’were contracted in October 2010.Both firms specialised in marketing researchand had a string of successes in turningaround declining brands. Each firm waskept unaware of the workings of the otherto ensure that the research and findings ofeach would be unbiased.


Figure 4 Dwindling sales of Columbus

Figure 5 Sales revenue division

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Raghav was in charge of the entireexercise with Tox and Xerone, and withinweeks it became obvious that both firmswere doing a much better job than thatdone by Columbus’ internal division. Bothfirms followed a much more structuredapproach, with the use of in-depth inter-views, wide customer surveys and thematicassociation tests. While the approaches ofboth firms were similar, differing only inthe methodologies used, they provided abetter insight into the problem.

It took two months’ research andanalysis before Tox and Xerone filed theirfinal conclusions and recommendationswith Columbus in the beginning ofDecember 2010. Both reports had identi-cal findings: the Columbus brand wasdecaying from ‘old age’.

Both Tox’s and Xerone’s report statedthat, with its 130-year-old legacy, thepublic perception of Columbus was of anarchaic, antiquated company, competing ina market filled with a younger and moreexciting brood of companies. Moreover,there was a distinct disconnect betweenthe customer’s self-image and Columbus’brand image. Customers saw themselves asmodern upscale people and hence werelooking for products that complemented

their self-image. Columbus’ brand imageclashed with their self-image and theconsequence was the decline in salesColumbus was now experiencing (seeFigure 7).

Another key discovery by both firmswas that Columbus’s brand recognitionwas still quite high but its brand recall wasdipping.This was a classic case of a brandsliding into the ‘Brand Graveyard’ (seeFigure 8). Columbus was absent from thebrand basket of automobiles in the con-sumer’s mind when they wanted to buy anew vehicle.This made the situation a lottougher. If consumers feel that theyalready know about a brand, they mayhave little interest in listening to a newstory about the already familiar brand.

THE CONFUSIONRaghav was quite pleased with the find-ings from both firms as they reinforcedeach other, but the same could not be saidabout their recommendations towards thesolution.Tox and Xerone offered very dif-ferent solutions, and choosing betweenthem was proving to be a headache.

Tox recommended a mammoth rebrand-ing exercise with the objective of giving the


Figure 6 Attrition rate trends in Columbus

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Columbus brand a contemporary look andfeel. Tox suggested that to reconnect withthe customer, a revolutionary change in the corporate visual identity (CVI) ofColumbus was required.This would entailmassive changes to three major organisa-tional elements: its corporate design (logos,uniforms,colours etc), changes to its corpo-rate communication (advertising, publicrelations, information etc), and finallychange in its corporate behaviour (internalvalues, socio-cultural factors etc).Accordingto Tox, this exercise was a quick solutionbut a costly one. Considering the urgency

of the situation and the geographic scale ofColumbus’s operations, Tox estimated thatthis exercise would take anywhere betweensix to seven months to execute and requirea budget of approximately INR700 crores.

On the other hand, Xerone recom-mended product development as its solu-tion.It suggested modification of a large partof Columbus’ product line combined withthe quick launch of a couple of new prod-ucts designed to serve contemporary con-sumers. It also suggested phasing out someof the early models that were underper-forming in the market and replacing them


Figure 7 Quantifying brand equitySource: Ratings undertaken by M/s Cantor Associates, Mumbai

Figure 8 Brand Graveyard modelSource: Brand Graveyard model developed by Young and Rubicam, Europe

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with modern counterparts. Xerone’s ideahad a longer gestation period. Launching anew product from scratch could take 9–12months, and as Columbus had a fairly largeproduct mix (see Table 1), completing mod-ifications to existing product would take ayear and a half. However, the immediatecost of new product development and thefirst batch of production plant upgradescame to about INR 720 crores. In this, twoplants would be responsible for new prod-ucts and two more plants currently produc-ing the flagship models were to bemodified. Staff were to be trained, and newsuppliers were to be identified.

Both ideas had their merits and, aftermulling over them for a few days, Raghavwas finding it increasing difficult to cometo a decision.Tox’s solution was a quick fix:Columbus could roll out the rebrandingexercise pretty quickly in the worst affectedgeographies. Xerone’s suggestion of newproduct development was a better solutionfor the longer term, though the minusculesuccess rate for new products and relativelyshort product life cycle in the Indian auto-mobile industry (Tables 2 and 3) added fur-ther fuel to Raghav’s internal battle. Therisk was that in the months it would take todevelop the new products,Columbus couldend up losing too much market share for itto come back into play.With a budget of alittle over INR700 crores, Raghav did not

have enough financial cover to take bothideas forward.

Given the situation, Raghav decided togo back to his consultants to get their viewson the matter and then come to a decision.By providing each firm with the other’sview (without divulging the source), hehoped that one of the firms would recog-nise the merits in the other and thus closethe issue. Unfortunately, it did not pan outthe way he hoped it would.

Raghav first set up a meeting withXerone and presented them with theoption of doing a thorough global rebrand-ing exercise.This idea was immediately shotdown as a non-starter by the Xerone team.According to them, Columbus’ strong-points were its brand and corporate iden-tity, and tampering with them would diluteColumbus’s corporate persona.Their pointwas reinforced by recent market research,which indicated that customers knew andunderstood the Columbus brand and had apositive association with it. Moreover, theyopined that modern intelligent consumersdo not buy products because the logos areattractive, but instead seek more value andbenefits for their investments. Consumerswould not be convinced by a rebrandingexercise alone, making the rebranding ven-ture a risky proposition.

If rebranding were not fully successful,customers would end up forgetting the


Table 1 Columbus product-mix alignment

Product-Mix Width

Customer segment Commercial segment

Product-line (Length) SUV Sedan Small cars Mini-bus Trucks

Astro MX Forte E4 Fame DX Mastig JumboAstro AX Forte E5 Fame PX Nova HerculesGala MX Velocity SX Fest PXGala AX Velocity VX Fest DX

Pristine Fest GSXEon BTX

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Table 2 Launch and fade of Columbus products

Products Year of launch Year of discarding the model

Astro MX 1989 NAAstro AX 1994 NAGala MX 1998 NAGala AX 2001 NA

Forte E4 1950 1982Forte E5 1968 1991Velocity SX 1980 NAVelocity VX 1990 NAPristine 1930 1970

Fame DX 1985 NAFame PX 1995 NAFest PX 1995 NAFest DX 1995 NAFest GSX 2001 NAEon BTX 2001 NA

Jumbo 1970 1973Hercules 1982 NAMastig 1995 NANova 2001 NA

Table 3 Analysing success of competitors

Vehicles launched by competitors Product (2000–10) receptivity

Ronald – Estel FailureFerero – Echlon ModerateVolkswheel – Polo FailureHikashi – Cruiser FailureSunday – Fever SuccessCavaldi – Pulz FailureImpressa – Inspire FailureAzure – Bastion ModerateMBW – Fury FailureXydan-Fordan Failure

old brand and would not associate them-selves with the new brand either. If thathappened, Columbus would end up withneither a new, strong brand nor a new,strong product line.The cost of failure wasunacceptably high. This would be anINR700-crore gamble and was not some-thing they would recommend. Xeronetopped off their argument with a few

examples of national aviation and soft-drink companies who had recently tem-pered with their visual identity in vain(Table 4).

Convinced by Xerone’s analysis,Raghavthen set up a meeting with Tox’s consult-ants to get their opinion about taking for-ward new product development torecharge Columbus’s brand image instead

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of their original proposition of a rebrand-ing exercise.

Interestingly,Tox’s team mooted the planto use new product development as a strat-egy for improving Columbus’s brandimage.Tox’s think-tank opined that design-ing and launching new products was anequally risky venture with a higher cost offailure.Statistics proved that development ofnew products could not be hurried: theywere costly, time-consuming projectswhere almost 85 per cent of new productsfailed (see Figure 9). The failure of a newproduct at this stage could irreparablydamage the brand reputation.The gestationperiod for product development was quitelong and Columbus could lose too much

market share in that period for it to make acomeback. This, combined with the highmonetary cost of failure, could easily spelldisaster.

Another important factor against thelaunch of new products was the risk oflosing Columbus’ existing set of customers.The current set of customers would beused to certain design features, and elimi-nation of those in any upcoming newproducts would mean Columbus’ existingcustomers could switch loyalty.

Rebranding on the other hand was lessexpensive, took less time to execute andhad a track record of effectiveness.Tox pre-sented cases of some companies (Bank ofBaroda, Shoppers Stop, Ceatetc) who had


Table 4 Comparison of profits of companies who undertook rebranding (pre- and post-rebranding)

Year IUL DFHL Communike Zyke Rodex Absolve

2002–03 560 120 220 650 850 4402003–04 750 140 280 700 940 4802004–05 870 220 350 760 920 5002005–06 890 250 300 870 820 4502006–07 910 300 240 920 800 375

Note: Italicised figures show the profits for the post-rebranding periods; all other figures are forpre-rebranding periods

Figure 9 Receptivity analysis of new products

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successfully modified their corporate iden-tity to give the brand a more contemporarylook and feel. These companies had beensuccessful in establishing a new refreshedconnection with the customers throughtheir new brand identity.

Armed with arguments from both firms,Raghav took both recommendations to theCEO and the board to help make a deci-sion on which one Columbus should betaking forward. Unfortunately the boardwas split down the middle on each optionand the CEO was as confused as Raghav.The only thing they could decide on wasthat Raghav, being head of marketing, wasbest placed to make the decision and theywould go with him on this.

CASE SYNOPSISThis case is about a critical decision-making situation that senior marketershandling a mature brand usually face, thatis, whether or not they should opt forrebranding.

Rebranding is gaining popularity withmarketers in spite of the fact that it is avery risky and costly exercise, and that iswhy opinions on whether this exerciseshould be undertaken or not are usuallybipolar.

In the recent past, Indian companiesfrom diverse industrial sectors have optedfor rebranding. Names like Hero Corp(earlier Hero Honda), Airtel, Videocon,Shoppers Stop,Air India, Bank of Baroda,Canara Bank, Union Bank, Ceat Tyres andmany more who went for rebrandingshow that this is emerging as a popularstrategy for Indian marketers.

In this particular case, an India-basedmature automobile brand (Columbus),which is synonymous with ‘automobile’in India and has a strong presence in mostproduct categories (two-wheelers, cars

and SUVs, and commercial vehicles) isfacing a sharp decline in brand equity andsales. In spite of high brand awareness andrecall, consumers are somehow alienatedfrom the brand as they see a big differencein ‘who they are’ and ‘what the brand is’.

Raghav himself is handling this brand.As most top marketers do, he hires twotop marketing research and consultancyfirms to explore the issue and come upwith a solution.

Interestingly, both these market researchfirms identify the same (aforementioned)problem and suggest the same solution: thatColumbus’s objective should be to make thebrand ‘relevant’ to the ‘new’ consumers.Theproblem starts when both agencies recom-mend completely contrasting strategies toachieve that objective. One firm suggests‘rebranding’, while another proposes keep-ing the brand identity and instead going for‘new product development’ to connect withthe new aspirations of the new generationcustomers.

As the situation of Columbus is deteri-orating at a fast pace, Raghav is runningout of time and has to take a decisionquickly.This results in a typical decision-making situation, wherein both possiblesolutions given by top marketing researchand consultancy organisations are basedon strong logic, but are exactly opposed toeach other and one has to be chosen.

CASE OBJECTIVES(1) To sensitise the students to the

dilemma that marketing heads facewhen it comes to taking strategicdecisions that have the magnitude toaffect the whole organisation.

(2) To make the students think about anddiscuss the pros and cons of rebrand-ing and new product development asstrategies.


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(3) To develop students’ ability to com-prehend issues at the strategic level.

POSITION OF THE CASE IN THECOURSEThe case is ideally suited for MBAsecond-year students specialising in‘Brand Management’ or studying ‘Productand Brand Management’.

RELEVANT READING(1) Muzellec, L. and Lambkin, M. (2006)

‘Corporate Rebranding: Destroying,Transfering or Creating Brand Equity’,European Journal of Marketing, Vol. 40,Nos. 7/8, pp. 803–824.

(2) Stuart, H. (2004) ‘CorporateMakeovers: Can A Hyena BeRebranded?’ Brand Management, Vol.2, No. 6, pp. 472–482.

ASSIGNMENT QUESTIONS(1) If you were in Raghav’s position,

which option would you opt for andwhy?

(2) Is there a middle way for Raghavwherein he can get the best of bothworlds? Critically analyse the conse-quences if he chooses to follow amiddle way.

(3) Does new product developmentalways take time? Give reasons foryour answer.

(4) Changing the Corporate VisualIdentity (CVI) of a brand is not rec-ommended in marketing literaturebut companies do it very often.Discuss a few real-life exampleswhere companies have successfullymodified their logos.

CASE ANALYSIS AND SUGGESTEDSOLUTIONS TO QUESTIONSWhat should Raghav do?

The solution is not as tough as itappears to be. It is almost hidden however,but if one tries to find and analyse thedata, it is clear that companies that havejust changed their logos or CVIs withoutmaking serious efforts to change theproduct/service and/or the culture of theorganisation have not done well, andrightly so.

Tables 2 and 4 need to be analysedtogether, and it will be evident that therebranding has to be holistic in nature andnot ornamental.

Most importantly, the students must beencouraged to define parameters of suc-cess and search data (details given in thenext paragraph) on companies that haveundertaken a) deliberate logo modifica-tion; b) new product development (withan intention to rejuvenate the brand); orc) both a) and b).

Once they do this exercise, they willrealise that some of the most highly-reputed Indian automobile companies(Tata Motors, Bajaj Auto and Mahindra &Mahindra) went in for rebranding at dif-ferent times in the recent past. A lot ofinformation was published about thesecompanies undertaking this exercise.

In addition,many established companiesin India, operating in diverse sectors, tookup rebranding, including Videocon Group,Bank of Baorda, Indian Airlines, Airtel,Union Bank, Department of Post, CeatTyres, Shoppers Stop, Canara Bank etc.Analysis of these cases revealed interestingexamples of both success and failure.

But the most important thing wouldbe for students themselves to assess infor-mation and come to conclusions, under-standing that companies like Tata Motorschanged their positioning in an excellent


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way. They not only changed their logos,but also acquired foreign brands such asJaguar and Land Rover, which are consid-ered ‘premium’ brands in India, and theysimultaneously launched the cheapest car,Nano. Action in all areas positioned TataMotors very strongly as a modern, power-ful company, which is responding to theneeds of all sectors.

Is there a middle way for Raghav?Yes and no. Raghav lacks the time andfinancial muscle to undertake both exer-cises simultaneously, so prima-facie, it lookslike a clear no. However, students areexpected and encouraged to come upwith a creative solution.

One answer could be that if Raghavconvinces the board (which might not bedifficult, as they have given him theauthority to deal with the situation) thatthis problem can be solved with an acqui-sition of a foreign brand (that was onething that Tata Motors did, and if studentshave read carefully about Tata Motors,then they will come up with a solution onthe basis of that information), that acqui-sition will give Raghav access to foreignbrands and foreign products.

Since foreign products are considered‘advanced’ and ‘latest in technology anddesign’, and foreign brands are relativelynew to Indian consumers (they enteredthe Indian market only after the mid-1990s), Raghav can then connect thenewly-acquired brands with theColumbus brand through marketingcommunication. He will therefore get amix of both the things he desires, that is,new products as well as newness in termsof brands.Another benefit of this strategywould be that he will get an opportunityto display the strength of Columbus as acompany and as a brand.

A vital advantage of this strategy wouldbe that it will take relatively little time.Raghav would get access to new prod-ucts, new brands, new technology, newmarkets etc. in less time than he would ifdeveloping these on his own.

Considering the global market condi-tions, executing this strategy would not bethat difficult either. Developed countriesand companies are struggling with reces-sion, and it would be fairly easy forRaghav to identify and take over brandswhich are already established.

However, he will have to make surethat the brands that he intends to takeover must have strong ‘brand awareness’and brand recall in India.That would notbe a problem, because with increasedexposure Indians are more aware of for-eign brands (especially cars) than everbefore.

Does a new product always take a lotof time?It depends on how the term ‘new prod-uct’ is defined by the company. Here students must know/learn/analyse whatare new products.

Usually, if the company is makingornamental innovations in existing prod-ucts to come up with a new product (or‘product modification’ as it is termed inmarketing jargon), then this should nottake much time. However, if there is abreak-through innovation or an invention(‘new to the world’ product in marketingjargon), that may take a lot of time.

In the context of this case, Raghav isrequired to develop a new product thathas to have a significant element of ‘new-ness’ in it. Developing something of thatkind might take time, which Raghav doesnot have. In addition, developing a prod-uct of that type under time pressure, aswell as knowing ‘it must work’, might


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affect the process as well as the conse-quences.

Had the situation been a case where‘product modification’ was required,Raghav would not have worried about itas much, but the situation in the case isinclined towards the other extreme of thecontinuum, and demands a significantnew product to address a specific issue(repositioning the brand) and quickly too,which is a challenge. Moreover, it is likelythat one new product might not serve thepurpose of repositioning Columbus’sbrand and Raghav might need a completerange of new products here. This reasonalso supports and substantiates the strategyrecommended above.

Changing the CVI of a brand is not recommended in marketingliterature but companies do it veryoften. Discuss a few real-lifeexamples where companies have successfully modified their logosThis question has been kept to persuadestudents to find and analyse similar casesin order to develop a better understand-ing of the whole issue. As mentionedabove, rebranding has emerged as a buzz-word with Indian marketers and hence,there is no dearth of such cases.The busi-ness press has been generous in allocatingspace and time to such stories, whichmeans there is no shortage of relatedmaterial either. Students will find andidentify identical cases to come up withsolutions to this case, and that would notonly help them in connecting theorywith application, but will also sensitisethem to how this strategy is devised;when it is appropriate and when it is not;and the reasons behind its increasingpopularity with marketers.

BACKGROUND TO THE CASEBefore this case was developed, many sim-ilar cases in this context were analysed. Itwas found that companies have realisedthat rebranding is definitely a way to revi-talise and rejuvenate the brand, but thattaking up this exercise in isolation is notan advisable strategy. Consumers havebecome more intelligent and they don’t‘buy’ the idea of ‘facelift’ alone.

Companies need to realise that con-sumers buy a bundle of different benefitsand not only a logo or a product. Hence,companies that have been successful inrebranding had one thing in common.All of them ‘followed up’ their rebrandingexercise with ‘new product development’and effective marketing communication.This gave consumers a reason to believethat the brand was not getting just afacelift, but that it was actually doingsomething for to become relevant forthem.This reflection of ‘action’ through aseries of new products has emerged as animportant reason behind the success ofrebranding strategy.

KEY SUCCESS FACTORSUsing new product development alongwith rebranding can be an obvious strat-egy, which can be more fruitful in com-parison with taking up rebranding in anisolated fashion. However, it is easier saidthan done, and that is the reason whymany marketers undertake this strategy bychanging only the logo, or coming upwith a new tagline or brand endorser.

TEACHING SUGGESTIONSThis case could be effective for MBAsecond year students who are specialisingin product and brand management. Forthis case to be discussed in class, it isimportant that students are well-versed in


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the concepts of branding, rebranding andnew product development.

After these concepts have been cov-ered, the students can be divided intogroups and asked to act as if they are theresearch firm that the company has hiredand they need to come up with theirsolutions for company’s problem.

This case can be given to the studentsalong with reading and preparation time ofapproximately one week, in which theycan be asked to collect information on dif-ferent brands that have recently undertaken

rebranding and find out the key success/failure factors. Finally, on basis of thisinformation collection and analysis, thestudents can be asked what they recom-mend Columbus should do.

Author’s noteThe author wishes to acknowledge thesupport of Anushree, Bhaskar,Madhumita, Balachandran, Dinesh andKalyana (students of MBA (finance andbanking) programme 2011–13).


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