case digest intro topic 4

8/12/2019 Case Digest Intro Topic 4

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THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, vs. GREGORIO PERFECTO

G.R. No. L-18463, October 4, 1922

Ponente: Malcolm, J.

Facts:

On August 20, 1920, the Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando M. Guerrero, discovered

that certain documents which constituted the records of testimony given by witnesses in the

investigation of oil companies, had disappeared from his office.

Mr. Gregorio Perfecto editor of the newspaperLa Nacion published an article concerning the

Philippine Senate and its members and was accused of violating the aticle 256 of the Spanish

Penal Code.

However, the Libel Law abrogated certain portion of the Spanish Penal Code. Act No. 292 of the

Philippine Commission, the Treason and Sedition Law, may also have affected article 256.

The Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code is also abrogated by the change from Spanish to

American sovereignty over the Philippines and because it is inconsistent with democratic

principles of government.

Issue:

Whether or not article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code is still in force.

Ruling:

Article 256 of the Penal Code is contrary to the genius and fundamental principles of the

American character and system of government. The gulf which separates this article from the

spirit which inspires all penal legislation of American origin, is as wide as that which separates a

monarchy from a democratic Republic like that of the United States. This article was crowded out

by implication as soon as the United States established its authority in the Philippine Islands.

Penalties out of all proportion to the gravity of the offense, grounded in a distorted monarchical

conception of the nature of political authority, as opposed to the American conception of the

protection of the interests of the public, have been obliterated by the present system of

government in the Islands.

The American system of government is calculated to enforce respect and obedience where such

respect and obedience is due, but never does it place around the individual who happens to

occupy an official position by mandate of the people any official halo, which calls for drastic

punishment for contemptuous remarks.

The crime of lese majestedisappeared in the Philippines with the ratification of the Treaty of

Paris. Ministers of the Crown have no place under the American flag.


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BERNARDITA R. MACARIOLA vs. HONORABLE ELIAS B. ASUNCION

A.M. No. 133-J May 31, 1982

Ponente: Makasiar, J.

Facts:

In 1963, Macariola and her sisters from her fathers second marriagehad a dispute over their

inheritance involving parcels of land located in Leyte. A trial ensued and Judge Macariola, after

determining the legibility of the parties to inherit rendered a decision in the civil case. Thereafter,

the counsels of the parties submitted a project partition reflecting the preference of the parties.

The project partition was, however, unsigned by Macariola. But her lawyer assured Asuncion that

he is duly authorized by Macariola as counsel. The judge then approved the project partition. The

decision became final in 1963 as well.

Reyes et al sold some of their shares to Arcadio Galapon, who later sold the property to judge

Asuncion in 1965.

On 6 Aug 1968, Macariola filed a complaint against Judge Asuncion with acts unbecoming ajudge on the ground that he bought a property (formerly owned by Macariola) which was

involved in a civil case decided by him; this act by Asuncion is averred by Macariola to be against

Art. 1491, par 5 of the Civil Code which provides:

Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial action,either in person or through the mediation of another:

(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers

and employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or

levied upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise theirrespective functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to

lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which theymay take part by virtue of their profession.

Also, Macariola said that Asuncions act tainted his earlier judgment. Macariola said that the

project partition was unsigned by her and that what was given to her in the partition were

insignificant portions of the parcels of land.

Issue:

Whether or not Judge Asuncion violated said provision.

Ruling:

No. The prohibition only applies if the litigation is under pendency. The judge bought theproperty in 1965 2 years after his decision became final. Further, Asuncion did not buy the

property directly from any of the parties since the property was directly bought by Galapon, who

then sold the property to Asuncion. There was no showing that Galapon acted as a dummy of

Asuncion.

Also, Macariola did not show proof that there was a gross inequality in the partition; or that what

she got were insignificant portions of the land. The Supreme Court however admonished Judge

Asuncion to be more discreet in his personal transactions.


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PANFILO M. LACSON vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF

THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MYRNA ABALORA, NENITAALAP-AP, IMELDA PANCHO MONTERO, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 128096, January 20, 1999

Ponente: Martinez, J.

Facts:

On May 18, 1995, eleven members of Kuratong Baleleng gang, an organized crime syndicate involved inbank robberies in Metro Manila were slain by elements of Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence TaskGroup. On media expose however, it was alleged that what actually transpired was a summaryexecution. The office of the Ombudsman conducted an investigation and recommended the indictment

for multiple murder charged as principals before the Sandiganbayan. This information was amendedafter re-investigation and petitioner herein was charged as accessory.

The constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Act No. 8249 an act which further defines the

jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is being challenged in this petition for prohibition and mandamus.

The law was authored by Lagman and Neptali Gonzales. Lacson assailed the law as it was introduced bythe authors thereof in bad faith as it was made to precisely suit the situation in which petitioners caseswere in at the Sandiganbayan by restoring jurisdiction thereover to it, thereby violating his right to

procedural due process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

Petitioner Panfilo Lacson joined by others also seeks to prevent the Sandiganbayan from proceedingswith the trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057 (for multiple murder) against them on the ground oflack of jurisdiction.

Issue:

Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the multiple murder case

Ruling:

The amendment in RA no 8249 that in cases where none of the accused are occupying positions

corresponding to Salary grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said RA 6758, or military and PNP officersmentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper Court, as the case maybe in pursuant to BP 129. The previous law vests jurisdiction in the RTC where none of the principal accused

are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade 27. The term principal was deleted so that under theamendment, if an accomplice belongs to Salary grade 27, then jurisdiction is with the Sandiganbayan even ifnone of the principals belong to a lower salary grade. The amendment was applied retroactively.

Action of the Court when determined that is had no jurisdiction

1. Under its supervisory authority, the Supreme Court, even the Court of Appeals may properly refer the case to thecourt of proper jurisdiction.

2. Courts of the 1 and 2 level are without authority to order the transfer. If the courts believe that it has no jurisdictionover the subject matter, its jurisdiction is limited to simply dismissing the case.


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JAIME HERNANDEZ vs. DELFIN ALBANO, HERMOGENES CONCEPCION, JR., City Fiscal of Manilaand CARLOS C. GONZALES, Second Assistant City Fiscal of Mania

G.R. No. L-19272, January 25, 1967

Ponente: Sanchez, J.

Facts:

Isabela Rep. Delfin Albano (respondent-appellee) filed a complaint with the Manila city fiscal againstFinance Secretary & Central Bank Monetary Board Presiding Officer Jaime Hernandez (petitioner-appellant)

for violating RPC Art. 216 (possession of prohibited interest by a public officer), Commonwealth Act 626*which provides for the penalty for violations of Article VII, Section 11, subsection (2) of the Constitution) orRA 265 (Central Bank Act).

The complaint involved Hernandezs alleged shareholdings inUniversity of the East, Bicol Electric Co.,Rural Bank of Nueva Caceres, DMG inc., and University of Nueva Caceres and the claim that saidcorporations obtained dollar allocations from the Central Bank, through the Monetary Board, during

Hernandezsincumbency as presiding officer thereof.

In total, there were five charges docketed in the fiscals office.

After joint investigation of the charges before Second Assistant City Fiscal of Manila Carlos Gonzales(respondent), Albano moved to exclude the alleged violation of RP Art 216 as the applicability of the statutewas pending before the SC in Solidum v Hernandez (it had since been resolved adversely against

Hernandez). The fiscal granted the motion.

Hernandez sought the dismissal of the remaining charges on the grounds that (a)violation of Article VII,Section 11, subsection (2) of the Constitution, punishable under Commonwealth Act 626, should beprosecuted at the domicile of the private enterprises affected there by; and that (b) violation of Section 13 of

Republic Act 265 is not criminal in nature. Dismissal and reconsideration denied.

Hernandez went to the Court of First Instance Manila on certiorari and prohibition praying for preliminary

injunction to restrain the fiscals office from continuing the investigation.

The CFI dismissed the petition

Issue:

Whether or not the Manila fiscal be restrained from proceeding with the investigation of the charges againstHernandez.


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Ruling:

By statute, the prosecuting officer of the City of Manila and his assistants are empowered to

investigate crimes committed within the city's territorial jurisdiction. Not a mere privilege, it is

the sworn duty of a Fiscal to conduct an investigation of a criminal charge filed with his office.

The power to investigate postulates the other obligation on the part of the Fiscal to investigatepromptly and file the case of as speedily.

A rule was formulated that ordinarily criminal prosecution may not be blocked bycourt prohibition or injunction.

However, in extreme cases, a relief in equity could be availed of to stop a purported

enforcement of a criminal law where it was necessary: (a) for the orderly administration

of justice; (b) to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and

vindictive manner; (c) to avoid multiplicity of actions; (d) to affordadequate protection to

constitutional rights; and (e) in proper cases, because thestatute relied upon isunconstitutional, or was "held invalid."

Commonwealth Act 626 provides the penal sanction for a violation of Constitution Art VIIsec.

11(2): a fine of not than P5000 or imprisonment of not more than 2 years, or both.

The legal mandate in Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of the Court is that "[i]n all

criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the

municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential

ingredients thereof took place. Where an offense is wholly committed outside theterritorial limits wherein the court operates, said court is powerless to try the case.

Similarly, the Manila fiscal could not investigate a crime committed within the exclusive

confines of another province. Otherwise, they would be overreaching the territorial limits

of their jurisdiction, and unlawfully encroach upon powers and prerogatives of fiscals of

the province.

Based on the facts of the case, Possession of prohibited interests is but one of the essential

components of the offense. As necessary an ingredient thereof is the fact that petitioner

was head of a department: Secretary of Finance. So also, the fact that while head of

department and chairman of the Monetary Board he allegedly was financially interested

in the corporations aforesaid which so the dollar allocations, and that he had to act

officially, in his dual capacity, not in Camarines Sur, but in Manila where he held his

office.

Since criminal action must be instituted and tried in the place where the crime or an

essential ingredient thereof, took place, it stands to reason to say that the Manila under

the facts obtained here, have jurisdiction to investigate the violation complained

of.

Violation of RA 265 sec. 13 was criminal in nature, as the law clearly provided the penalsanction

for violating its provisions.


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Equal Protection KBG Cases Before the Sandiganbayan

On 18 May 1995, alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang were shot to death. The incident was latersensationalized as a rub out. This implicated Lacson among others as guilty for multiple murder. The case was raised

before the Sandiganbayan. In 1996, Lacson et al filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of theSandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the RTCpursuant to Sec 2 (par a and c) of RA 7975 An Act To Strengthen The Functional And Structural Organization Of The

Sandiganbayan, Amending For That Purpose Presidential Decree 1606, As Amended. They contend that the said lawlimited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more of the principal accused are government

officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (BrigadierGeneral) or higher. The highest ranking principal accused in the amended informations has the rank of only a ChiefInspector, and none has the equivalent of at least SG 27. In 1997, RA 8249 was passed which basically expanded the

jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The law was authored by Lagman and Neptali Gonzales. Lacson assailed the law asit was introduced by the authors thereof in bad faith as it was made to precisely suit the situation in whichpetitioners cases were in at the Sandiganbayan by restoring jurisdiction thereover toit, thereby violating his right to

procedural due process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Further, from the way the Sandiganbayanhas foot-dragged for nine (9) months the resolution of a pending incident involving the transfer of the cases to the

Regional Trial Court, the passage of the law may have been timed to overtake such resolution to render the issuetherein moot, and frustrate the exercise of petitioners vested rights under the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975).

ISSUE: Whether or not the right to equal protection by Lacson et al has been violated with the passage of RA 8249.

HELD: The SC ruled that RA 8249 did not violate the right of Lacson et al to equal protection. No concrete evidence

and convincing argument were presented to warrant a declaration of an act of the entire Congress and signed into lawby the highest officer of the co-equal executive department as unconstitutional. Every classification made by law ispresumed reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness. It is an established

precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation basedon reasonable classification. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when there is concurrence of fourelements, namely:

(1) it must rest on substantial distinction;

(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;

(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and

(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class

The classification between those pending cases involving the concerned public officials whose trial has not yetcommenced and whose cases could have been affected by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under

R.A. 8249, as against those cases where trial had already started as of the approval of the law, rests on substantialdistinction that makes real differences. In the first instance, evidence against them were not yet presented, whereas inthe latter the parties had already submitted their respective proofs, examined witness and presented documents.

Since it is within the power of Congress to define the jurisdiction of courts subject to the constitutional limitations, itcan be reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction would necessarily affect pending cases, which iswhy it has to provide for a remedy in the form of a transitory provision. Thus, Lacson et al cannot claim that Secs 4

and 7 placed them under a different category from those similarly situated as them.

Precisely, par A of Sec 4 provides that it shall apply to all cases involving certain public officials and, under the

transitory provision in Sec 7, to all cases pending in any court. Contrary to petitioner and intervenors arguments,the law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover

cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in any court. It just happened that the Kuratong Baleleng cases areone of those affected by the law. Moreover, those cases where trial had already begun are not affected by thetransitory provision under Sec 7 of the new law (R.A. 8249).


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Case 1

It cannot admit of doubt that all those provisions of the Spanish Penal Code having to do with such subjects as treason, lese majeste, religion

and worship, rebellion, sedition, and contempts of ministers of the crown, are not longer in force. Our present task, therefore, is a

determination of whether article 256 has met the same fate, or, more specifically stated, whether it is in the nature of a municipal law or

political law, and is consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States and the characteristics and institutions of the American

Government.

It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated.

"Political" is here used to denominate the laws regulating the relations sustained by the inhabitants to the sovereign. (American Insurance Co.

vs. Canter [1828], 1 Pet., 511; Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Co. vs. McGlinn [1885], 114 U.S., 542; Roa vs. Collector of Customs

[1912], 23 Phil., 315.) Mr. Justice Field of the United States Supreme Court stated the obvious when in the course of his opinion in the case of

Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Co. vs. McGlinn, supra, he said: "As a matter of course, all laws, ordinances and regulations in conflict

with the political character, institutions and Constitution of the new government are at once displaced. Thus, upon a cession of political

jurisdiction and legislative power and the latter is involved in the former to the United States, the laws of the country in support of an

established religion or abridging the freedom of the press, or authorizing cruel and unusual punishments, and he like, would at once cease to be

of obligatory force without any declaration to that effect." To quote again from the United States Supreme Court: "It cannot be admitted that

the King of Spain could, by treaty or otherwise, impart to the United States any of his royal prerogatives; and much less can it be admitted that

they have capacity to receive or power to exercise them. Every nation acquiring territory, by treaty or otherwise, must hold it subject to the

Constitution and laws of its own government, and not according to those of the government ceding it." (Pollard vs. Hagan [1845], 3 Hos., 210.)

In the United States such publications are usually not punishable as criminal offense, and little importance is attached to them, because they

are generally the result of political controversy and are usually regarded as more or less colored or exaggerated. Attacks of this character upon

a legislative body are not punishable, under the Libel Law. Although such publications are reprehensible, yet this court feels some aversion to

the application of the provision of law under which this case was filed. Our Penal Code has come to us from the Spanish regime. Article 256 of

that Code prescribes punishment for persons who use insulting language about Ministers of the Crown or other "authority." The King of Spain

doubtless left the need of such protection to his ministers and others in authority in the Philippines as well as in Spain. Hence, the article

referred to was made applicable here. Notwithstanding the change of sovereignty, our Supreme Court, in a majority decision, has held that this

provision is still in force, and that one who made an insulting remark about the President of the United States was punishable under it. (U.S. vs.

Helbig, supra.) If it applicable in that case, it would appear to be applicable in this case. Hence, said article 256 must be enforced, without fear

or favor, until it shall be repealed or superseded by other legislation, or until the Supreme Court shall otherwise determine.

On American occupation of the Philippines, by instructions of the President to the Military Commander dated May 28, 1898, and by

proclamation of the latter, the municipal laws of the conquered territory affecting private rights of person and property and providing for the

punishment of crime were nominally continued in force in so far as they were compatible with the new order of things. But President McKinley,in his instructions to General Merritt, was careful to say: "The first effect of the military occupation of the enemy's territory is the severance of

the former political relation of the inhabitants and the establishment of a new political power." From that day to this, the ordinarily it has been

taken for granted that the provisions under consideration were still effective. To paraphrase the language of the United States Supreme Court

in Weems vs. United States ([1910], 217 U. S., 349), there was not and could not be, except as precise questions were presented, a careful

consideration of the codal provisions and a determination of the extent to which they accorded with or were repugnant to the "'great principles

of liberty and law' which had been 'made the basis of our governmental system.' " But when the question has been squarely raised, the

appellate court has been forced on occasion to hold certain portions of the Spanish codes repugnant t democratic institutions and American

constitutional principles. (U.S. vs. Sweet [1901], 1 Phil., 18; U.S. vs. Balcorta [1913], 25 Phil., 273; U.S. vs. Balcorta [1913], 25 Phil., 533; Weems

vs. U.S., supra.)

Effect of the Philippine Libel Law, Act No. 277, on article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code. The Libel Law, Act No. 277, was enacted by the

Philippine Commission shortly after organization of this legislative body. Section 1 defines libel as a "malicious defamation, expressed either in

writing, printing, or by signs or pictures, or the like, or public theatrical exhibitions, tending to blacken the memory of one who is dead or toimpeach the honesty, virtue, or reputation, or publish the alleged or natural deffects of one who is alive, and thereby expose him to public

hatred, contempt or ridicule." Section 13 provides that "All laws and parts of laws now in force, so far as the same may be in conflict herewith,

are hereby repealed. . . ."

the Supreme Court spoke of the Libel Law as "reforming the preexisting Spanish law on the subject of calumnia and injuria

Sir J. F. Stephen is authority for the statement that a libel is indictable when defaming a "body of persons definite and small enough for

individual members to be recognized as such, in or by means of anything capable of being a libel." (Digest of Criminal Law, art. 267.)


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But in the United States, while it may be proper to prosecute criminally the author of a libel charging a legislator with corruption, criticisms, no

matter how severe, on a legislature, are within the range of the liberty of the press, unless the intention and effect be seditious. (3 Wharton's

Criminal Law, p. 2131.) With these facts and legal principles in mind, recall that article 256 begins: Any person who, by . . . writing, shall defame,

abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown or other person in authority," etc.

The Libel Law is a complete and comprehensive law on the subject of libel. The well-known rule of statutory construction is, that where the

later statute clearly covers the old subject-matter of antecedent acts, and it plainly appears to have been the purpose of the legislature to give

expression in it to the whole law on the subject, previous laws are held to be repealed by necessary implication. (1 Lewis' Sutherland Statutory

Construction, p. 465.) For identical reasons, it is evident that Act No. 277 had the effect so much of this article as punishes defamation, abuse,

or insults by writing.

"Any person who, by word, deed, or writing, shall defame, abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown or other person in authority, while

engaged in the performance of official duties, or by reason of such performance, provided that the offensive minister or person, or the

offensive writing be not addressed to him, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor," that is, the defamation, abuse, or insult of any Minister

of the Crown of the Monarchy of Spain (for there could not be a Minister of the Crown in the United States of America), or other person in

authority in the Monarchy of Spain.

Case 2

Finally, while it is. true that respondent Judge did not violate paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion

of Lot 1184-E which was in litigation in his court, it was, however, improper for him to have acquired the same. He should be reminded of

Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which requires that: "A judge's official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, andhis personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond

reproach." And as aptly observed by the Investigating Justice: "... it was unwise and indiscreet on the part of respondent to have purchased or

acquired a portion of a piece of property that was or had been in litigation in his court and caused it to be transferred to a corporation of which

he and his wife were ranking officers at the time of such transfer. One who occupies an exalted position in the judiciary has the duty and

responsibility of maintaining the faith and trust of the citizenry in the courts of justice, so that not only must he be truly honest and just, but his

actuations must be such as not give cause for doubt and mistrust in the uprightness of his administration of justice. In this particular case of

respondent, he cannot deny that the transactions over Lot 1184-E are damaging and render his actuations open to suspicion and distrust. Even

if respondent honestly believed that Lot 1184-E was no longer in litigation in his court and that he was purchasing it from a third person and not

from the parties to the litigation, he should nonetheless have refrained from buying it for himself and transferring it to a corporation in which

he and his wife were financially involved, to avoid possible suspicion that his acquisition was related in one way or another to his official

actuations in civil case 3010. The conduct of respondent gave cause for the litigants in civil case 3010, the lawyers practising in his court, and

the public in general to doubt the honesty and fairness of his actuations and the integrity of our courts of justice" (pp. 395396, rec.).

Political Law has been defined as that branch of public law which deals with the organization and operation of the governmental organs of

the State and define the relations of the state with the inhabitants of its territory(People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]). It may be

recalled that political law embraces constitutional law, law of public corporations, administrative law including the law on public officers and

elections. Specifically, Article 14 of the Code of Commercepartakes more of the nature of an administrative law because it regulates

the conduct of certain public officers and employees with respect to engaging in business: hence, political in essence.

While municipal laws of the newly acquired territory not in conflict with the, laws of the new sovereign continue in force without the express

assent or affirmative act of the conqueror, the political laws do not. (Halleck's Int. Law, chap. 34, par. 14). However, such political laws of the

prior sovereignty as are not in conflict with the constitution or institutions of the new sovereign, may be continued in force if the conqueror

shall so declare by affirmative act of the commander-in-chief during the war, or by Congress in time of peace. (Ely's Administrator vs. United

States, 171 U.S. 220, 43 L. Ed. 142). In the case of American and Ocean Ins. Cos. vs. 356 Bales of Cotton (1 Pet. [26 U.S.] 511, 542, 7 L. Ed. 242),

Chief Justice Marshall said:

On such transfer (by cession) of territory, it has never been held that the relations of the inhabitants with each other undergo any change. Their

relations with their former sovereign are dissolved, and new relations are created between them and the government which has acquired their

territory. The same act which transfers their country, transfers the allegiance of those who remain in it; and the law which may be denominatedpolitical, is necessarily changed, although that which regulates the intercourse and general conduct of individuals, remains in force, until altered

by the newly- created power of the State.

Likewise, in People vs. Perfecto (43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]), this Court stated that: "It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of

territory the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated. "

Art 14 (Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, effective Aug 1888) of the Code of Commerce, prohibiting judges from engaging in commerce

was political in nature and so was automatically abrogated with the end of Spanish rule in the country (Change of Sovereignty to the US by

virtue of cession, 1898).


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It is also argued by complainant herein that respondent Judge violated paragraph H, Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as

the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which provides that:

Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the

following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection with which heintervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any Iaw from having any interest.

Respondent Judge cannot be held liable under the aforestated paragraph because there is no showing that respondent participated or

intervened in his official capacity in the business or transactions of the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. In the case at bar,

the business of the corporation in which respondent participated has obviously no relation or connection with his judicial office. The

business of said corporation is not that kind where respondent intervenes or takes part in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance.

As was held in one case involving the application of Article 216 of the Revised Penal Code which has a similar prohibition on public officers

against directly or indirectly becoming interested in any contract or business in which it is his official duty to intervene, "(I)t is not enough to

be a public official to be subject to this crime; it is necessary that by reason of his office, he has to intervene in said contracts or transactions;

and, hence, the official who intervenes in contracts or transactions which have no relation to his office cannot commit this crime.' (People

vs. Meneses, C.A. 40 O.G. 11th Supp. 134, cited by Justice Ramon C. Aquino; Revised Penal Code, p. 1174, Vol. 11 [1976]).

On the contention of complainant that respondent Judge violated Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, We hold that the Civil Service

Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260) and the Civil Service Rules promulgated thereunder, particularly Section 12 of Rule XVIII, do not apply to themembers of the Judiciary. Under said Section 12: "No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or profession

or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the Head of Department

..."

It must be emphasized at the outset that respondent, being a member of the Judiciary, is covered by Republic Act No. 296, as amended,

otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948 and by Section 7, Article X, 1973 Constitution.

Under Section 67 of said law, the power to remove or dismiss judges was then vested in the President of the Philippines, not in the

Commissioner of Civil Service, and only on two grounds, namely, serious misconduct and inefficiency, and upon the recommendation of the

Supreme Court, which alone is authorized, upon its own motion, or upon information of the Secretary (now Minister) of Justice to conduct the

corresponding investigation. Clearly, the aforesaid section defines the grounds and prescribes the special procedure for the discipline of judges.

And under Sections 5, 6 and 7, Article X of the 1973 Constitution, only the Supreme Court can discipline judges of inferior courts as well as other

personnel of the Judiciary.

It is true that under Section 33 of the Civil Service Act of 1959: "The Commissioner may, for ... violation of the existing Civil Service Law and

rules or of reasonable office regulations, or in the interest of the service, remove any subordinate officer or employee from the service, demote

him in rank, suspend him for not more than one year without pay or fine him in an amount not exceeding six months' salary." Thus, a violation

of Section 12 of Rule XVIII is a ground for disciplinary action against civil service officers and employees.

However, judges cannot be considered as subordinate civil service officers or employees subject to the disciplinary authority of the

Commissioner of Civil Service; for, certainly, the Commissioner is not the head of the Judicial Department to which they belong. The Revised

Administrative Code (Section 89) and the Civil Service Law itself state that the Chief Justice is the department head of the Supreme Court (Sec.

20, R.A. No. 2260) [1959]); and under the 1973 Constitution, the Judiciary is the only other or second branch of the government (Sec. 1, Art. X,

1973 Constitution). Besides, a violation of Section 12, Rule XVIII cannot be considered as a ground for disciplinary action against judges because

to recognize the same as applicable to them, would be adding another ground for the discipline of judges and, as aforestated, Section 67 of the

Judiciary Act recognizes only two grounds for their removal, namely, serious misconduct and inefficiency.

Of course it is highly desirable for a member of the judiciary to refrain as much as possible from maintaining close friendly relations with

practising attorneys and litigants in his court so as to avoid suspicion 'that his social or business relations or friendship constitute an element in

determining his judicial course" (par. 30, Canons of Judicial Ethics), but if a Judge does have social relations, that in itself would not constitute a


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ground for disciplinary action unless it be clearly shown that his social relations be clouded his official actuations with bias and partiality in favor

of his friends (pp. 403-405, rec.).

In conclusion, while respondent Judge Asuncion, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, did not violate any law in acquiring by purchase

a parcel of land which was in litigation in his court and in engaging in business by joining a private corporation during his incumbency as judge

of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, he should be reminded to be more discreet in his private and business activities, because his conduct as a

member of the Judiciary must not only be characterized with propriety but must always be above suspicion.

CASE 3

On March 5-6, 1996, all the accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the

amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of Republic

Act No. 7975. 7 They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more of the "principal

accused" are government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General)

or higher. The highest ranking principal accused in the amended informations has the rank of only a Chief Inspector, and none has the

equivalent of at least SG 27.

RA 7975 (AN ACT TO STRENGTHEN THE FUNCTIONAL AND STRUCTURAL ORGANIZATION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, AMENDING FOR THAT

PURPOSE PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1606, AS AMENDED)

Section 2. Section 4 of the same Decree is hereby further amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

"a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and

Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the following

positions in the government, whether in permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

"(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the

Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

"(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other

provincial department heads;

"(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;

"(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

"(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

"(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;

"(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

"(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational

institutions or foundations;

"(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

"(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

"(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and

"(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

"b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their

office.

"c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.

"In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said

Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be


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vested in the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be,

pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

Republic Act No. 8249 February 5, 1997

AN ACT FURTHER DEFINING THE JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1606, AS AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Section 4. Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows:

"a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and

Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following

positions in the government whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

"(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade '27' and higher, of

the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

"(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers and other

provincial department heads;

"(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors engineers and other city department heads;

"(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

"(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

"(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior

superintendent or higher;

"(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

"(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or -controlled corporations, state universities or educational

institutions or foundations;

"(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade'27'and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

"(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

"(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and

"(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade'27'and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

Section 5. Section 7 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows:

'SECTION 7.Form, Finality and Enforcement of Decisions. - All decisions and final orders determining the merits of a case or finally disposing of

the action or proceedings of the Sandijanbayan shall contain complete findings of the facts and the law on which they are based, on all issues

properly raised before it and necessary in deciding the case.

"A petition for reconsideration of any final order or decision may be filed within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice of the final order

on judgment, and such motion for reconsideration shall be decided within thirty (30) days from submission thereon.

"Decisions and final orders ofthe Sandiganbyan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari raising pure

questions of law in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Whenever, in any case decided by the Sandiganbayan, the penalty of

reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death is imposed, the decision shall be appealable to the Supreme Court in the manner prescribed in

the Rules of Court.

"Judgments and orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be executed and enforced in the manner provided by law.


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"Decisions and final orders of other courts in cases cognizable by said courts under this decree as well as those rendered by them in the

exercise of their appellate jurisdiction shall be appealable to, or be reviewable by, the Sandiganbayan in the manner provided by Rule 122 of

the Rules of the Court.

"In case, however, the imposed penalty by the Sandiganbayan or the regional trial court in the proper exercise of their respective jurisdictions,

is death, review by the Supreme Court shall be automatic, whether or not accused files an appeal."

Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws. 46 R.A. 8249 is not penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is

not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations; 47 or

those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide dor their punishment. 48 R.A 7975, which amended P.D. 1606 as regards the

Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a

procedural statute, i.e. one which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. 49

Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.

Definition of Civil Law

Civil Law branch of law which has for its double purposes that organization of the family and regulation of property.

Mass of precepts which determine and regulate the relations of assistance, authority, and obedience among the members of a family, and

those which exist among members of a society for the protection of private interests.

Four concepts:

1. It was equivalent to the national law or the law applicable to the individuals of each particular city exclusively

2. It was used to distinguish that body of law composed of plebiscites, imperial constitutions and others from the jus honorarium or

pretorium

3.

It was understood to mean the law applicable to the citizens of rome, as distinguished from that applicable to foreignersor the jus

gentium

4. Used to designate the opinionsof authorized jurisconsults.

Commercial Law it is the branch of private law governing acts of commerce (business intercourse) and/or the juridical relations arising from

such commercial acts. Principal chac: Uniform universal equitable customary progressive.


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Mariveles Shipyard Corp. v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 144134, November 11, 2003, 415 SCRA 573

Ponente: Quisumbing, J.

Facts:

Petitioner Mariveles Shipyard Corporation engaged the services of Longest Force Investigation

and Security Agency, Inc. (hereinafter, Longest Force) to render security services at its

premises. Pursuant to their agreement, Longest Force deployed its security guards, the private

respondents herein, at the petitioners shipyard in Mariveles, Bataan.

According to petitioner, it religiously complied with the terms of the security contract with

Longest Force, promptly paying its bills and the contract rates of the latter. However, it found the

services being rendered by the assigned guards unsatisfactory and inadequate, causing it to

terminate its contract with Longest Force on April 1995. Longest Force, in turn, terminated the

employment of the security guards it had deployed at petitioners shipyard.

On September 2, 1996, private respondents filed a case for illegal dismissal, underpayment of

wages pursuant to the PNPSOSIA-PADPAO rates, non-payment of overtime pay, premium pay for

holiday and rest day, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay and attorneys fees, against both

Longest Force and petitioner, before the Labor Arbiter.

For its part, Longest Force filed a cross-claim against the petitioner. Longest Force admitted that

it employed private respondents and assigned them as security guards at the premises of

petitioner from October 16, 1993 to April 30, 1995, rendering a 12 hours duty per shift for the said

period. It likewise admitted its liability as to the non-payment of the alleged wage differential in

the total amount of P2,618,025 but passed on the liability to petitioner alleging that the service fee

paid by the latter to it was way below the PNPSOSIA and PADPAO rate, thus, contrary to the

mandatory and prohibitive laws because the right to proper compensation and benefits provided

under the existing labor laws cannot be waived nor compromised.

The petitioner denied any liability on account of the alleged illegal dismissal, stressing that no

employer-employee relationship existed between it and the security guards. It further pointed out

that it would be the height of injustice to make it liable again for monetary claims which it had

already paid. Anent the cross-claim filed by Longest Force against it, petitioner prayed that it be

dismissed for lack of merit. Petitioner averred that Longest Force had benefited from the contract,

it was now estopped from questioning said agreement on the ground that it had made a bad deal.

The labor Arbiter decided that respondents Longest Force Investigation & Security Agency, Inc.

and Mariveles Shipyard Corporation jointly and severally liable to pay the money claims of

complainants representing underpayment of wages and overtime pay.

Petitioner appealed the foregoing to the NLRC in NLRC NCR. The labor tribunal, however,

affirmed in toto the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but this

was denied by the NLRC. The petitioner then filed a special civil action for certiorari assailing the

NLRC judgment for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion with the Court of

Appeals. The Court of Appeals, however, denied due course to the petition and dismissed itoutright.


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Issue:

Whether or not petitioner is jointly and severally liable with Longest Force

Ruling:

Yes, Petitioners liability is joint and several with that of Longest Force, pursuant to Articles

106,107 and 109 of the Labor Code. When the petitioner contracted with Longest Force, petitioner

became an indirect employer of private respondents pursuant to Article 107. Following Article

106, when the agency as contractor failed to pay the guards, the corporation as principal becomes

jointly and severally liable for the guards wages. This is mandated by the Labor Code to ensure

compliance with its provisions, including payment of statutory minimum wage. The security

agency is held liable by virtue of its status as direct employer, while the corporation is deemed the

indirect employer of the guards for the purpose of paying their wages in the event of failure of the

agency to pay them. This statutory scheme gives the workers the ample protection consonant with

labor and social justice provisions of the Constitution. Petitioner cannot evade its liability by

claiming that it had religiously paid the compensation of guards as stipulated under the contract

with the security agency. Labor standards are enacted by the legislature to alleviate the plight of

workers whose wages barely meet the spiraling costs of their basic needs. Labor laws areconsidered written in every contract. Stipulations in violation thereof are considered null.

Similarly, legislated wage increases are deemed amendments to the contract. Thus, employers

cannot hide behind their contracts in order to evade their (or their contractors orsubcontractors) liability for noncompliance with the statutory minimum wage.


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Labor code

ART. 106. Contractor or subcontractor Whenever an employer enters into a contract with another

person for the performance of the formers work, the employees of the contractor and of the latters

subcontractor, if any, shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of this Code.

In the event that the contractor or subcontractor fails to pay the wages of his employees in accordance

with this Code, the employer shall be jointly and severally liable with his contractor or subcontractor to

such employees to the extent of the work performed under the contract, in the same manner and extent

that he is liable to employees directly employed by him.

The Secretary of Labor may, by appropriate regulations, restrict or prohibit the contracting out of labor

to protect the rights of workers established under this Code. In so prohibiting or restricting, he may make

appropriate distinctions between labor-only contracting and job contracting as well as differentiations

within these types of contracting and determine who among the parties involved shall be considered the

employer for purposes of this Code, to prevent any violation or circumvention of any provision of thisCode.

In such cases labor-only contracting, the person or intermediary shall be considered merely as an agent

of the employer who shall be responsible to the workers in the same manner and extent as if the latter

were directly employed by him.

ART. 107. Indirect employer. The provisions of the immediately preceding Article shall likewise apply

to any person, partnership, association or corporation which, not being an employer, contracts with an

independent contractor for the performance of any work, task, job or project.

ART. 109. Solidary liability. The provisions of existing laws to the contrary notwithstanding, every

employer or indirect employer shall be held responsible with his contractor or subcontractor for any

violation of any provision of this Code. For purposes of determining the extent of their civil liability under

this Chapter, they shall be considered as direct employers.


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DOMINADOR B. BUSTOS vs. ANTONIO G. LUCERO

G.R. No. L-2068, October 20, 1948

Ponente: Tuason, J.

Facts:

The petitioner herein, an accused in a criminal case, filed a motion with the Court of First

Instance of Pampanga after he had been bound over to that court for trial, praying that the record

of the case be remanded to the justice of the peace court of Masantol, the court of origin, in order

that the petitioner might cross-examine the complainant and her witnesses in connection with

their testimony, on the strength of which warrant was issued for the arrest of the accused. The

motion was denied and that denial is the subject matter of this proceeding.

According to the memorandum submitted by the petitioner's attorney to the Court of First

Instance in support of his motion, the accused, assisted by counsel, appeared at the preliminary

investigation. In that investigation, the justice of the peace informed him of the charges and asked

him if he pleaded guilty or not guilty, upon which he entered the plea of not guilty. "Then his

counsel moved that the complainant present her evidence so that she and her witnesses could be

examined and cross-examined in the manner and form provided by law." The fiscal and theprivate prosecutor objected, invoking section 11 of rule 108, and the objection was sustained. "In

view thereof, the accused's counsel announced his intention to renounce his right to present

evidence," and the justice of the peace forwarded the case to the court of first instance.

case digest intro topic 4

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