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The Shipping News: Canada's Arctic Sovereignty Not on Thinning IceAuthor(s): Franklyn GriffithsSource: International Journal, Vol. 58, No. 2 (Spring, 2003), pp. 257-282Published by: Canadian International CouncilStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40203841Accessed: 15/04/2010 15:59

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The shipping news Canada's Arctic sovereignty not on thinning ice

FRANKLYN GRIFFITHS

C ^JlNCE 1 1 SEPTEMBER 2001, Canadians have produced an extraor-

dinary amount of comment on security, sovereignty, and policy towards the United States. In the midst of it all, a particular concern has arisen over what could happen to the Northwest Passage and to Canada's sovereignty if global warming opens the waters of the Arctic

archipelago to increased foreign navigation, US commercial vessels included. As one who has seen Canadian interest in the Arctic and in Arctic sovereignty wax and wane since the 'northern vision' of the 1958 federal election, my inclination is not to ask what Canadians should be doing to affirm Canada's claim against an impending chal-

lenge, be it from the United States or another maritime power. Instead, my question is why southern Canadians so exaggerate the threat to sovereignty over the Northwest Passage. My answer is that we slip all too easily into the realm of motivated error when it comes to the Passage and challenges to our jurisdiction there. Arctic ice is

decidedly not what it used to be. But neither is the threat of commercial shipping to Canada's Arctic sovereignty.

To show that the sovereignty-on-thinning-ice thesis is misguided, I will outline the argument and make clear what is wrong with it. Then I will attempt to account for systematic error and show some of what it costs us. Finally, the elements of an alternative and more productive southern Canadian approach to what goes on in and around the Northwest Passage are outlined.

Franklyn Griffiths is Ignatieff Chair Emeritus of Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Toronto.

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL Spring 2003

Franklyn Griffiths

ERROR

Canadians who should know better have begun to propagate a wisdom that could soon become conventional. Consider the following para- phrases (when I did not take down the exact wording) and quotations from a few of the Arctic-related meetings I attended in 2002. Referring to a heavily attended conference on climate change and Arctic sover-

eignty that it co-sponsored in January, the Canadian Arctic Resources Committee reported views to the effect that the Northwest Passage might become 'navigable for much of the year within the next three decades/ and that possibly 'other nations will ignore Canada's claims to sovereignty over waters between the Arctic islands.'1 At the

University of British Columbia's Liu Centre in May, a member of the Canadian Polar Commission declared that the possibility of a sover-

eignty challenge had never been greater; an ambassador commented that it was now likely that the Northwest Passage would be opened to

shipping; and a former foreign minister was of the opinion that Canada's northern waters would become increasingly navigable, bring- ing security and sovereignty questions down like a sledgehammer on a Canada that needed to be prepared.

Later in the year, Louis Fortier of Laval University stated that: 'A climate-induced extension of the ice-free season could open the Northwest Passage to intercontinental navigation as early as 2015- 2025/ This remark was made in the context of a proposal to convert the icebreaker Sir John Franklin into a state-of-the-art research vessel that would, among many other things, serve to 'build predictive ice

dynamics and distribution models to develop management strategies for decreasing the risk of marine disasters while maximizing the potential shipping season.'2 Further comment along these lines might be considered, but let me simply refer to Mel Hurtig who in December drew the attention of a sovereignty conference in Toronto to his latest book in which it's stated that 'the Northwest Passage ... in a few years will be navigable for commercial or military vessels for most or all of the year/3

l 'On thinning ice/ Northern Perspectives 27(spring 2002), 1.

2 Louis Fortier, 'A Canadian research icebreaker to study the changing Arctic Ocean/ Meridian, fall/winter 2002, 2.

3 Mel Hurtig, The Vanishing Country: is It Too Late to Save Canada? (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart 2002), 329.

258 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL Spring 2003

Canada's Arctic sovereignty

Although not everyone is saying the same thing, opinion-makers are

convincing themselves and could go on to convince a good many others that Canada is faced with a shipping-cum-sovereignty challenge that stems from the effects of unprecedented global warming in the Arctic archipelago and its eastern and western approaches. How can all these varied talents be, in greater or lesser degree, misguided?

As I see it, bias is at work both in the making of individual judgments and in the way they are structured to form an overall assessment. When we unpack the sovereignty-on-thinning-ice thesis we find that it is based on a number of mutually supporting judgments on matters of considerable uncertainty. A useful starting place is an article by Professor Rob Huebert, which remains the most elaborate presentation of the case for an Arctic sovereignty challenge connected with

global warming.4 Not many years ago, I would have found Huebert s views greatly appealing. A believer in the use-it-or-lose-it approach to Arctic sovereignty, I would have taken a sovereignty challenge to heart and urged anticipatory action, which is to say proaction, from Ottawa.5 But I am no longer convinced that defence-of-sovereignty thinking serves us well in the Arctic. What follows is, therefore, offered in a spirit of vigorous and friendly debate, not just with Rob Huebert but with my former self.

Huebert cites evidence of climate change and decreasing ice cover in the Arctic, presents information on increasing foreign interest in and use of the waterways that make up the Northwest Passage, highlights vulnerabilities in Canada's sovereignty claim in international law and

politics, and concludes that Canada will be presented with great chal-

lenges as the Passage opens. Though his presentation is studded with

qualifications, Huebert seems certain that Canada has a serious problem. As he puts it: 'It is impossible to know who will make the first

challenge/6 But why should Canadians expect a challenge in the first

place? I say it is largely because southerners are predisposed to view

things Arctic in a certain way and to set aside considerations that do not fit. This can be seen at work in three interrelated issue-areas in

4 Rob Huebert, 'Climate change and Canadian sovereignty in the Northwest Passage/ Isuma 2(winter 2001-2002).

5 See, for example, Franklyn Griffiths, ed, Politics of the Northwest Passage (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press 1987).

6 Hubert, 'Climate change and Canadian sovereignty/ 91.

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL Spring 2003 259

Franklyn Griffiths

Huebert s account: ice conditions, the likely calculations of shippers, and the Canada-US relationship.

According to the Canadian Ice Service, there was a summer-months decrease in the coverage of sea ice in the Canadian Arctic of about 15

per cent between 1969 and 2001. This is a substantial rate of change for the Northwest Passage including the route through Fury and Heda Strait from northernmost Hudson Bay. As well, the extent of sea-ice cover at the summer minimum has diminished at a rate of eight per cent per decade in the eastern and western Arctic regions.7 Sea ice in the archipelago is clearly in retreat. If, for purposes of illustration, the

present rate of ice-cover reduction is assumed to persist for two addi- tional 33-year intervals, we could expect the worst summer months around the mid-2060s to yield less ice than the lightest ice year experi- enced to date.8 Increasingly clear sailing evidently lies ahead for the warmest part of the year. Sea ice also seems likely to ease up at both ends of the summer months as the Arctic 'summer' is extended. The same surely applies, to a lesser extent, to navigation in the archipelago during what are now winter months. All of this, assumptions of con- tinuous warming included, seems reasonable enough as a first impres- sion of ice conditions in the archipelago. As Huebert and others right- ly say, the ice is thinning.

But global warming cannot banish the polar night. Even when we look beyond mid-century with assumptions of linear change, we are still constrained to speak of ice conditions, which is to say 'ice.' To

mid-century we are also talking about something that exists today: a summer-months window of maximum ice reduction. In the archipelago, sea ice will not go away altogether any time soon, maybe never. As the Ice Service puts it: 'the Canadian Arctic will never be ice-free year- round; there will always be at least a winter ice cover because of the lack of solar radiation in the winter months.'9 But, actually, why say never?

Why not imagine residents of Resolute sweltering in darkness at noon

7 John Falkingham, Richard Chagnon, and Steve McCourt, 'Trends in sea ice in the Canadian Arctic/ paper presented at the 16th iahr International Symposium on Ice, Dunedin, New Zealand, 2-3 December, 2002, 1, 4. The Canadian Ice Service is part of the Meteorological Service, Environment Canada.

8 John Falkingham, Canadian Ice Service, communication to the author, 27 January 2003.

9 John Falkingham, Richard Chagnon, and Steve McCourt, 'Sea Ice in the Canadian Arctic in the 21st Century/ paper presented at the 16th International Conference on Port and Ocean Engineering under Arctic Conditions, Ottawa, 12-17 August 2001, 8.



on a December day when the lights and the air conditioners have cut off? This could well come to pass, but anything like it in our lifetimes has to be improbable. Instead, the real questions concern the where and the when of how much less ice in the diverse waterways that make

up the Northwest Passage. As to 'where,' suffice it to say that summer- month conditions have varied and no doubt will vary substantially within and between regions of the Canadian Arctic.10

To lend precision to a discussion of the 'when* of less ice, it is useful to follow the Canadian Ice Service in defining 'summer months' as the 17-week period between 25 June and 1 5 October.11 The 'shipping season' is taken to mean the number of weeks in that 17-week period dur-

ing which the ice extent is a specified percentage, or less, of the total accumulated ice coverage.12 In the eastern Arctic, for example, the season is on when ice coverage is 30 per cent or less of the total area of Davis Strait, Baffin Bay, Lancaster Sound, and the eastern archipelago.13 The season may, however, open and close several times during the 'summer.' This happens when the effects of wind and other forces in various regions, subregions, and indeed across the Northwest

Passage as a whole cause the ice to move above and below the area percentage limit. Accordingly, a shipping season of so many weeks does not necessarily mean consecutive weeks, or for that matter days, dur-

ing which shippers, particularly operators of non- ice-strengthened vessels, can expect to traverse the archipelago without difficulty.

In 2001, the Service reported an increase of about one week to ten

days in the average shipping season in the three regions of the Canadian Arctic between 1969 and 1998.14 Now, however, calculations that take into account the favourable summers of 1 999-200 1

10 Sea-ice coverage in Hudson Bay, for example, decreased 13 per cent per decade between 1971 and 2001, whereas the reduction was five per cent per decade in the eastern Arctic. Within the western Arctic, rates of reduction between 1969 and 2001 varied from 11 per cent per decade for the Western Arctic Waterway, to three per cent for the Viscount Melville area. Furthermore, while the eastern Arctic has seen a sea- ice reduction of five per cent per decade, in Lancaster Sound in particular there is 'no evidence of a decrease in total accumulated ice coverage over the period 1971- 2001/ Falkingham et al, 'Trends,' 4, 5, 6.

11 Falkingham et al, 'Sea Ice/ 5.

12 Ibid, 6. 'Total accumulated ice coverage' is the areal extent of sea ice multiplied by the average concentration inside the ice edge, all measured weekly and summed up for the 17-week period. Ibid, 5.

13 Ibid, 7.

14 Ibid, 6 (figure 6).


Franklyn Griffiths

have established a two-week increase, from five to seven weeks, in the

length of the average season since 1969.15 If the pattern holds over the next three decades, and we exclude other variables, an eight-week season may be anticipated nine years out often in the 2030s.16 On the other hand, the Service also reports Substantial' and Extreme' interannual variation in the sea-ice cover.17 One year can be twice as difficult, or easier, than the previous. Nor is there any expectation that this

uncertainty will ease.18 In my view, interannual variation trumps a

longer shipping season in an integrated assessment of what is going on. To support this assertion, we need consider only how uncertainty sur-

rounding the 'when' of shipping has prevented any systematic relax- ation of the regime for navigation in Canadian Arctic waters.

A year after the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act came into force in 1970, regulations were introduced to see to it that shipping conformed to the new law. The regulations divided the Arctic waters of Canada into zones that vessels of varying capability could enter

only during specified periods. The zones and dates of entry were based on 'normal' ice conditions as of 1971. Given the undeniable thinning of ice in and about the archipelago, we might expect the zone-date

regime to have been eased after three decades of ice-cover reduction. But no. Mariners have seen the 'normal' year give way to more fre-

quent, and random, extremes of ease and difficulty in ice conditions.19 Interannual variability prevails. The zone-date regime of 1971 is therefore still in effect.20 What global warming has thus far brought to the Northwest Passage is unpredictability rather than conditions favourable to navigation.

Not only may a given shipping season include intervals during which sea-ice conditions make navigation slow and risky in one region

15 John Falkingham, communication to the author, 23 January 2003.

16 Ibid.

17 Falkingham etal, 'Trends/ 2, and 'Sea Ice/ 3, 6 and 8.

18 Falkingham et al, 'Trends/ 2, and 'Sea Ice/ 3.

19 Victor Santos-Pedro, director, Control and Equipment Standards, Marine Safety, Transport Canada, communications to author, 24 March and 14 April 2003.

20 In response to increased variability, Transport Canada has instituted an ice-date system that allows non-ice-strengthened ships with an ice navigator aboard to gain the benefit of favourable ice conditions by sailing outside the zone-date regime. The future could see the ice-date system become mandatory for navigation in the archipelago, the zone-date regime being relegated essentially to guidance for mariners. Ibid.



or another, but would-be shippers will not be able to rely on use of the

Passage from one year to the next in the coming decades. That means no assured summer-months transit and no regular use of the Passage unless shippers buy ice-strengthened vessels and Canada provides ice-

breaking and other support as required. Shippers could however dis-

patch non- ice-strengthened ships at the last minute when conditions

permit. But the just-in- time intercontinental dispatcher would need a forecast of clear sailing from one end of the Passage to the other for the

requisite number of consecutive days (about five). The forecast would also have to provide enough lead time to allow for the voyage from, say, Yokahama to the North Slope. This kind of thing might indeed be ven- tured, but it does not suggest greatly more than intermittent use of the

Passage as long as shippers hold to non- ice-strengthened vessels. Meanwhile, even when assumptions of linear change are employed to

anticipate an eight- week shipping season of 56 consecutive days near-

ly every summer in the 2030s, the ratio for shipping season to unfavourable weeks of the year would still be only 8:44.

Where, I ask, is the physical basis for a sovereignty challenge? The facts and the uncertainties are there for all to see. Southerners of the

thinning-ice persuasion seem nevertheless to start from global warm-

ing and reduction of Arctic Ocean ice cover and proceed to an analo-

gous retreat of sea ice in the archipelago to a point where the Northwest Passage becomes powerfully attractive for summer-months and even year-round intercontinental shipping. But what s going on with sea ice in the Canadian Arctic is neither so rapid nor so pre- dictable. The sovereignty-on-thinning-ice thesis is built on untenable

assumptions of relatively speedy and undifferentiated ice-cover reduction throughout the archipelago and indeed the Arctic region as a whole. It minimizes variation and relies on assumptions of uniformity in constructing grounds for an international challenge to Canada's

jurisdiction. In my view, the unexpected will have to happen if major shippers are to be attracted to the archipelago, and if Canadians and the Canadian government are to start spending in earnest to prepare for such an eventuality any time soon. Which brings me to ice conditions beyond 2030.

Suppose that 50 years from now the ice cover had thinned out con-

siderably more in the Arctic Ocean than in the constricted channels of the Canadian archipelago, and the trend was accelerating. Indeed,

multi-year ice was being driven into the archipelago in some amounts


Franklyn Griffiths

as the Ocean warmed up.21 In that situation, which is not too implau- sible and could be foreseen well before 2053, shippers and governments would be faced with the option of comparatively fast and cheap transpolar navigation, albeit with icebreaker support even in the summer months, directly between Bering Strait and Fram Strait. But, if that were the accepted outlook in 2033, why would Canada go to significant expense in previous years to manage, support, and even pro- mote foreign shipping in an ice-infested labyrinth when it would be

incomparably cheaper and easier to wait for the Arctic Ocean to open up? Given a favourable assessment in 2033, or for that matter in 2003, of the outlook for transpolar shipping, any expenditure of money, time, and effort by Canada to make the Northwest Passage into a viable Arctic shipping route under Canadian law would have to be

regarded at best as a stop-gap or transitional investment. Unlike the St Lawrence Seaway, a Northwest Passage seaway would

be something of a write-off from the beginning, that is, in 2003. New

expenditures could nevertheless be required to increase Canada's Arctic marine search and rescue capabilities, to chart the depths throughout all the main waterways, to heighten readiness for environmental disaster. Moreover, if Canada wanted not merely to respond to but to

encourage intercontinental shipping, substantial new money would be needed to provide icebreaker support to individual ships and/or con-

voys in harsh summer seasons and to extend the shipping season in

spring and autumn. Proponents of a new seaway might therefore have to ask Canadians to support the acquisition of new Arctic icebreaking capability at a time of Arctic ice reduction. Or Ottawa could drive business away by requiring interested shippers to do their own ice-

breaking subject to Canadian regulations and at their own expense. Whatever the specifics of a proposed Northwest Passage seaway, a stop- gap project will not get the support it needs, alarmist predictions of for-

eign shipping notwithstanding. Nor is it likely that a Canadian Arctic

seaway could be supported as a defence-of-sovereignty commitment when there is so much uncertainty about the physical preconditions for

21 Falkingham et al, 'Sea Ice/ 7 and 8. Multi-year Ice is a hazard even for ice- strengthened ships. As of 2002, space vacated by greater breakup of first-year ice could already be responsible for a 76 per cent increase in the seasonal coverage of multi-year ice in Lancaster Sound since 1971 (albeit an increase from low levels to begin with) as old ice moves south and east through the archipelago. Falkingham et al, 'Trends/ 6-7.



a sovereignty challenge, no matter how many alarm bells are rung in forecasts of trouble in the Passage.

To turn directly to alarmism in the handling of ice-condition variables in the sovereignty-on-thinning-ice thesis, let us look at a report prepared for the US Department of the Navy (DON) by the Office of Naval Research and other agencies in 2001 . Although the document is entitled 'Naval Operations in an Ice-Free Arctic/ the summary makes clear that the focus of attention is not an 'ice-free Arctic/ but rather 'a

navigable Arctic with ice-infested waters/22 There is quite a difference. Nevertheless, as suggested by the retention of 'ice- free' in the title, the

report inclines to an exaggerated reading of the potential for early Arctic ice reduction. It suggests that by mid-century 'The Northwest

Passage though the Canadian Archipelago and along the coast of Alaska will be ice-free and navigable every summer by non-icebreaking ships/23 That far off and with no specification of the length of the season, the estimate here cannot really be called exaggerated. On the other hand, the report tells us that 'Within 5-10 years, the Northwest

Passage will be open to non-ice-strengthened vessels for at least one month each summer/24 That is an exaggeration. As with Canadian

exponents of the thinning-ice scenario, US naval analysts should be asked to explain what has happened to interannual variability and what exactly is meant by 'at least one month/

Part of the explanation is suggested in the following bits of bureau- cratese from the Navy's report: 'The ... group recognized that energizing DON interest in resourcing operations related to future Arctic operations requires validation and ongoing refinement of the existing chronological forecasts/ Similarly, 'A more precise forecast that shifts the time window of probable occurrence to the left would present a more compelling argument to DOD/DON leadership for enhanced interest and subsequent planning activities related to the associated

contingencies.'25 Translated into English, there are good political and bureaucratic reasons to mute uncertainty and to argue that Arctic ice conditions will ease up sooner rather than later. The reasons are summed up in the phrase 'energizing ... interest/

22 Naval Operations in an ice-free Arctic. Symposium 17-18 April 2001. Final Report (Arlington va: Office of Naval Research 2001), 12.

23 Ibid, annex, 8.

24 Ibid, 12.

25 Ibid, 43, 44.


Franklyn Griffiths

Translated to the Canadian context, this suggests that, whether or not they are aware of it, there is reason for exponents of the thinning- ice thesis to raise the alarm about rapidly changing conditions. (I will return to how well alarmism works within Canada.) But does it serve the cause of Canadian sovereignty internationally for Canadians to underwrite an exaggerated view of change in the Passage? Indeed, why are we part of the chorus affirming not only an 'ice-free' vision of the Arctic Ocean, but the prospect of considerably eased, if not ice-free,

navigation in and through the archipelago before long? Does this not serve to bring on the ships? Does it not contribute to the sovereignty challenge that the sovereignty-on-thinning-ice thesis would like to pre- vent or overcome? Shouldn't we instead be saying loud and clear that the

archipelago is a special case, that we have studied it for years and are

continuing to observe closely, and that there is no sure basis in fact for

anyone to expect an early and substantial opening of the Northwest

Passage to regular intercontinental navigation? Where ice conditions are concerned, the thinning-ice thesis goes too

far and not far enough. It goes too far in relying on assumptions and

interpretations about ice conditions that overstate the likelihood of

foreign shipping to Canadians and not far enough in stating the diffi-

culty of navigation to others. It narrows the focus of attention to conditions in the archipelago and its approaches, sees them as subject to a linear and uniform improvement over the long term, and stops short of the decades-long view that includes differential effects of warming in the Arctic Ocean as distinct from the Canadian archipelago.

Moving now to the place of potential shippers in the thinning-ice view, we find Huebert saying that 'an ice-free Northwest Passage, even for a limited time, would be of tremendous interest to major international shipping companies as well as the countries that avail themselves of their services.'26 Whether or not shippers would be tremendously interested in an 'ice-free' Passage understood as an ice-infested but nav-

igable waterway (which it is today) is open to discussion. In my view,

shipping firms that take a hard look at projected ice conditions in the

Passage are likely to balk unless they are driven by non-commercial considerations or until more promising ice-science results are available. Nevertheless, for the sake of argument, let us join the US Navy in its forecast that non-ice-strengthened ships will be able to make regular

26 Huebert, 'Climate change and Canadian sovereignty/ 91.



use of the Passage for a least one month each summer beginning at some point between 2007 and 2012. To give further benefit of the doubt to the thinning-ice thesis, let us also assume no shipping glut and that the economics of marine transportation steadily favour intercontinental use of the Passage throughout the five-year period and

beyond. What then might Canada expect of shipping companies? Is there a substantial sovereignty problem, even under a permissive ice- conditions and economic forecast?

Rogues and fools aside, shippers prepared to make regular use of constricted waters would attach high value to reliable navigation assis- tance and to stable and fair regulatory arrangements. Rogues of course have no interest in such things. But, unless there are many of them, which seems unlikely, they will present security, health, environmental, and other problems, but no greater threat to sovereignty than the

landing of a human-smuggling vessel on the Nova Scotia shore. The

challenge would be one of law enforcement and emergency response, not sovereignty. The same applies to the fool who, after witnessing a series of three unusually light ice seasons in a row, gets into trouble with an inexperienced captain in the fourth. Nor of course would Canadian vessels present sovereignty problems, or for that matter for-

eign ships carrying Canadian Arctic resources to southern destinations under contract to companies registered in Canada.

But major commercial enterprises engaged in intercontinental marine transportation, whether they operate crude-oil tankers or Panamax-size container vessels, will as a rule need to be satisfied as to the stability and fairness of the regulatory environment and the quali- ty of support for navigation before they enter the Canadian archipelago. Otherwise they accept risk in the form of avoidable uncertainty, delay, liability, increased insurance and other costs, and greater chance of accident and disaster. How might they respond today if they were

presented with reliable knowledge that non-ice-strengthened ships will be able to transit the archipelago for a 30-day period sometime

during the summer of 2010 and that it will be economic to do so? Would the shipper pause to think about whether or not its actions lent

support to the Canadian sovereignty claim? Would major firms be prepared to come through under Canadian law and not merely when the waters are predicted to be ice-free but also in year-round mode with

heavily ice-strengthened vessels and icebreaker support? On the other hand, might it be in the shippers' best interest to obtain international


Franklyn Griffiths

backing for a challenge to the Canadian claim so as to exercise rights of transit passage under international law? Or to walk away from the whole business? Might shippers' calculations vary substantially, depending on whether the cargo was oil or containers?

To cut a long story short, it's my expectation that container ships either accept Canadian jurisdiction or, without spending any time on the matter, decide to go no further into a potentially messy business. Given continued limitations on Canada's ability to support navigation in the archipelago (bathymetry, for example, relies in part on charts made during the search for the Franklin expedition in the 1850s), declining not only to challenge Canadian sovereignty but to sail in the first place seems the most likely option even when an ice-free period of 30 consecutive days is assumed. By 2010, however, it is conceivable that Canada could have in place the prerequisites for container-vessel and tramp use of the Passage in a good summer, provided that the ships in question are adequately strengthened against ice. If so, the shipper of non-strategic goods could steam through the archipelago at very short notice, as mentioned, under Canadian law. In short, even under an assumption of favourable circumstances, a challenge to Canada's

sovereignty is unlikely when commercial considerations are upper- most. That said, commercial considerations do not exist in isolation.

What then of the shipper backed by or acting on behalf of one or more governments, for example in an energy crisis? Today, it is a reali-

ty of world politics that no third party can deliver a frontal challenge to Canadian Arctic sovereignty without the backing of the United States.

Japanese vessels, for example, will not penetrate the North American

security perimeter and appear in the archipelago without US approval. If they did appear, it would be as surrogates for the United States, in which case Ottawa would in reality be dealing with Washington. Quite simply, any international confrontation over the Passage would be an outcome of the Canada-US relationship. This we will come to in a moment. But first we should consider still further evidence of bias in the thinning-ice thesis.

For one thing, and contrary to what the thesis suggests,- the origins of a major confrontation over Arctic sovereignty that centred on commercial shipping would have little or nothing to do with thinning ice. Canada has been living with the potential for a direct challenge since the voyages of the US supertanker Manhattan in 1969 and 1970. Some

warming of some ice-infested waters in and about the archipelago is



not going to bring large-scale intercontinental shipping, or a clash over

sovereignty, much closer than they have been all along. If a combina- tion of shipping firms and states were to make use of the Northwest

Passage without regard for Canada's sovereignty claim, it would surely be for year-round navigation in the ice-breaking mode. Accordingly, when it comes to an outright challenge to Canada's Arctic sovereignty there is an outright disconnection between sovereignty and thinning ice. To affirm a strong connection is to bias the assessment of threat in favour of growing magnitude and certainty when in reality the funda- mentals of the sea-ice regime in the archipelago have not changed.

Second, why would shippers and the governments that backed them want to use Canada's Arctic waters instead of Russia's Northern Sea Route?27 The US Navy report cited earlier offers a prediction that the Northern Sea Route will be open to non-ice-strengthened vessels for at least two months each summer within five years, as distinct from one month within five-ten years for the Passage.28 If the thinning-ice view favours forecasts for increasing ease of Arctic navigation, why only for the Passage? Not only is there a disconnect between thinning ice and

sovereignty when the thesis focuses on shipping, but, when the Northern Sea Route is added to the potential calculations of shippers and their backers, thinning ice elsewhere in the Arctic could reduce the

sovereignty threat to Canada. An international shipping threat to Canadian sovereignty cannot be

derived from ice-reduction data. If a new, all-year intercontinental

shipping route is to be established, presumably in crisis conditions, the

prospect of thinning ice in the summer months would not cut much ice in an informed deliberation. The shipping news tells us that Canada should start preparing more actively for intermittent commercial transits in conformity with Canadian law. But it does not report new danger to Canada's Arctic sovereignty.

And now to Canada-US relations. Canadian thinking about sovereignty over the Northwest Passage

crystallized in the cold war when Canada found itself participating in

joint defence arrangements with an ally that contested Canadian jurisdiction over a small but significant portion of the space to be defended

27 On the Russian route, see Lawson W. Brigham, 'The Northern Sea Route, 1999- 2000/ Polar Record 37(2001), 329-36; and Willy 0streng, 'Looking ahead to the Northern Sea Route,' Scandinavian /?ewew99(spring 2002), 77-85.

28 'Naval Operations/ 11-12


Franklyn Griffiths

against an adversary that broadly supported Canada's Arctic waters claim. Since the fall of the Soviet Union and then, more startlingly, 11 September 2001, the geopolitical economy of Canadian- American relations has changed, and with it the politics of the Northwest Passage. Today Canada is dealing with the United States in a setting in which, on the one hand, Washington would expect Ottawa to be helpful in an emergency and, on the other, an outright US violation of Canada's Arctic sovereignty claim would needlessly diminish US security.

When obliged to focus on the matter, Washington should not find it difficult to see that any forcible action by US state or commercial vessels to affirm the status of the Northwest Passage as an international strait would run counter to the new priority of protecting the homeland against terrorist and other non-traditional attack. Canadians would be outraged, embittered, and predictably so, by a forced entry. If successful as a denial of sovereignty, it could be regarded as a symbolic decapitation of the northernmost part of the country. The effects on continental security co-operation, especially on oil and gas supply to the US market, would be detrimental and, being foreseeable to

Washington, avoidable. Accordingly, a replay of the Manhattan

episode, but this time with perennial international shipping to follow, is not more but less likely today.

Furthermore, when Washington and Ottawa are joined in a common endeavour to build what amounts to a security perimeter around North America, what sense would it make for Washington to run an international strait through Arctic Canada? Whatever the Canadian reaction, wouldn't it compromise the perimeter? Would it not give something of a free ride through the northernmost reaches of the continent to such security risks as human smugglers, criminals, and ter- rorists bent on moving material south of the Canada-US border or

attacking critical continental infrastructure within Canada? Isn't the US interest better served by a regime that treats the central portion of the Northwest Passage as internal Canadian waters subject to Canadian law and law enforcement? It is early days for understanding intercon- nections between the war on terror and how to handle the Northwest

Passage in Canada-US relations. Still, something is happening, to the benefit of Canada's position. The very idea of the Passage as an international strait is being overtaken by altered US security requirements. US decision-makers could still opt to run roughshod over the



Canadian claim and ignore the security effects of a transit passage regime in Arctic North America. But my guess is that they are a lot smarter than that, if only because it is not necessary to get rough in the first place.

Pipelines continue to be favoured in moving North Slope oil to southern markets in the United States. Over the next few years, under a Russian-US commitment to strengthen energy ties, Russia could start to supply substantial amounts of oil to the United States by non- ice-

strengthened tankers sailing westwards from Murmansk.29 Neverthe- less, let us assume that Washington decides it needs the Northwest

Passage to move oil and/or liquefied natural gas year-round by sea from Prudhoe Bay to the eastern seaboard. This scenario, I would add, has

virtually nothing to do with thinning ice and everything to do with US

security, except for one thing: US decision-makers, with Canadian

help, could misperceive the Northwest Passage as an 'ice-free' water-

way. Otherwise, there is nothing surprising here. A can-do mentality would prevail in the US government. Given Canada's huge trade

dependence on the United States and the importance of security co-

operation to both countries, Washington could reasonably expect Ottawa to be accommodating. For its part, Ottawa could expect the US to prefer options that avoided confrontation. The scene would be set for creative obfuscation.

One solution would be to extend the 1988 Canada-US icebreaker- transit agreement to commercial vessels, and indeed warships, without

prejudice to the position of either country in international law.30 The United States would be able to move hydrocarbons as needed, as would allies under without-prejudice arrangements extended to third parties. Canada's sovereignty would be sustained. Shipping could surge in the Canadian archipelago under Canadian law. The central portion of the Northwest Passage from Bering to Davis would become an open Canadian waterway managed at Canadian expense and with full regard for local environmental and socio-economic effects. In due course, a

29 On Murmansk and a Russian aim to supply 13 per cent of us oil imports, see Sabrina Tavernise, 'Russia plans oil pipeline to Arctic port/ New York Times, 28 November 2002. Also in the 'could be' category is a Russian plan to construct a new crude oil pipeline to Nakhodka on the Sea of Japan, which could supply California. Tavernise, 'Russia to build 2 pipelines in the east/ ibid, 11 February 2003.

30 'Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Canada on Arctic Cooperation/ u January 1988, in International Legal Materials 28()anuary 1989), 141-2.


Franklyn Griffiths

tripartite transit management authority governed by the United States, Canada, and Denmark could regulate and support surface-ship activi-

ty according to common criteria throughout the entire route from Point Barrow to the Greenland shore.

Or Canada might take the initiative well before the US needed to make use of the Passage for hydrocarbon shipping. For example, after

preliminary discussion, Canada's deputy prime minister, John Manley, could inform the US secretary for homeland security, Thomas Ridge, that Canada had issued an order to mariners making it mandatory for them to report prior to entering the archipelago and its surrounding waters. At present, reporting by foreign vessels is voluntary in Canada's Arctic waters and mandatory off the east and west coasts,31 evidently because of Canadian deference to longstanding US sensitivities about the status of the Northwest Passage in law. As a result, Canada does not know as much as it should about passengers, cargo, and vessel purposes. For instance, Canadian officials in Resolute do not necessarily have

passenger and crew lists of transiting vessels to check for security purposes and to recheck against passenger lists on the next flights south.

Mandatory reporting could, therefore, become part of a systematic Canadian effort to tighten security against terrorist and other threats in northernmost North America. To assist its partner, Canada could also affirm unilaterally that mandatory notification was without prejudice to US and Canadian claims as to the status of the Passage in international law, thereby reducing any precedent-setting effect of the new

regime on US naval mobility elsewhere in the world. It is hard to see how Ridge could object or insist on continued voluntary reporting of the entry of foreign vessels into Arctic North American waters. The

navy and its friends would resist. But, overall, new needs of homeland defence in US national security policy could warrant a reappraisal of the

long-established naval need to insist on rights of transit passage in Arctic North America.

31 In January 2003, amidst much fanfare, four federal ministers announced a new set of marine safety measures as part of Canada's continuing response to 11 September 2001 and the global threat of terrorism. Included were an increase to 96 hours in the requirement for advance notice by vessels entering Canadian waters, near real-time surveillance of marine traffic, and screening of passengers and crew on inbound ships. 'Government of Canada Announces up to $172.5 Million in New Marine Security Projects/ News Release gc 0001/03, January 22, 2003. Not only did none of this apply in the Arctic, but the international security value of enhanced pro- tection on two of Canada's coasts is subverted when the third is left wide open.



Whatever the solution, the two governments are in a position to handle an American need to make use of the Northwest Passage for commercial shipping, without detriment to Canada's sovereignty claim. What is at stake for Canada is not the status of the Passage in international law, but the expenses and risks associated primarily with safe and efficient management of any foreign shipping that does

appear. Actually, Huebert says something similar as he ends his article:

'Regardless of the nature of the international status, it is clear that Canada will face tremendous challenges in adapting to the opening of the Passage/32 But just as there is nothing tremendous in the challenge of some summer-months commercial navigation by some non- ice-

strengthened ships in some years, we can deal with a major US initiative for year-round hydrocarbon shipping in icebreaking tankers. The

prospect has been with us, almost always out of sight, for years. If it

reappears it will owe nothing to global warming, except perhaps for an

increasingly widespread and unfounded belief in an 'ice-free' Northwest Passage, which we have helped to construct.

Rob Huebert claims that current Canadian efforts to maintain sov-

ereignty are 'unlikely to succeed' if climate change leads to further reduction of ice cover and shipping becomes more viable.33 In my view, Canadian jurisdiction is in good shape when it comes to commercial traffic. As well, there is time for Canada to prepare to exert control and lend support to summer-months shipping as it presents itself.

MOTIVATION But does Canada have the will to prepare? Is it capable of proaction in the Arctic when the need to act is so uncertain? Can it act without relying heavily on appeals to sovereignty? One way to get at answers is to

go beyond a critique of the sovereign ty-on-thinning-ice thesis and try to understand its appeal. An appreciation of what is leading us into ill- conceived, exaggerated, alarmist, and generally ineffectual thinking about Arctic waters may better equip us to devise and follow through on actions worthy of Canada as keeper of the Passage.

Two points to begin. First, in speaking of Canadian approaches to the Arctic and to the Northwest Passage in particular we should recog- nize that the reference is largely to the thoughts, preferences, and prac- tices of the vast southern majority and those they have elected and

32 Huebert, 'Climate change and Canadian sovereignty/ 94.

33 Ibid, 86.


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employed to manage the work of central government. We'll come later to northerners, particularly Inuit, but, until then, the reference is to southern Canadians, and more likely anglophones than francophones.34

Second, what I find misguided in the thinning-ice thesis is suffi-

ciently systematic to suggest a syndrome. Motivated error is the term for it. It leads us to consider bias in the way southern Canadians

process Arctic-related information, bias that stems from emotional as well as cognitive distortion in the handling of uncertainty. A propensity to motivated error inclines Canadians, when they pay attention, to

exaggerate threats, to emphasize potential loss over potential gain, and to oscillate between alarm and passivity, neither of which lends itself to sustained action and both of which depend more on external forces than on any particular Canadian ambition.

Since much has already been said about distortion in the thinning- ice thesis, let us consider how it is brought about. For the sake of brevi-

ty, I will focus on two sets of variables, substantive and procedural, that bear on the propensity to error in matters related to the Northwest

Passage. Substantive sources of error centre on questions of identity. Procedure directs us to a striving for rhetorical effect in difficult circumstances, to the 'energizing [of] interest' that's already been cited. What then does identity have to do with the sovereignty-on-thinning- ice thesis?

Deep down, the identification of Canadians with the Arctic is Victorian. There is a vision here of the Arctic sublime.35 Today, 'sublime' suggests a place, thing, or emotion that is extraordinarily exalted, even transcendent, in its greatness or beauty. A couple of hundred years ago, when the British returned to the search for a Northwest Passage, it meant something different. It referred to the contrary feelings of being attracted and uplifted on the one hand, and threatened with suffering and destruction on the other, by a being or place that is at once utterly staggering in its beauty and absolutely pitiless in the working of its forces. Where the Arctic, and particularly the Northwest Passage, is

34 Quebecers, it seems to me, think more in terms of north than Arctic. Obvious exceptions notwithstanding, the imagination runs north to Ungava and then veers east to the Nordic countries.

35 The theme is developed in Griffiths, Politics of the Northwest Passage. It stems from an essay by Chauncey C. Loomis, 'The Arctic sublime/ in U.C. Knoepfelmacher and G.B. Tennyson, eds, Nature and the Victorian Imagination (Berkeley: University of California Press 1977), 95-112.



concerned, we southerners even now feel awed by association with such magnificence. For example, in the words of the government statement of September 1985 on sovereignty, 'the Arctic is not only a part of Canada, it is a part of Canadian greatness. The policy of the Government is to preserve that Canadian greatness undiminished.'36 We have also been transfixed and daunted by the severity of what

might befall us there, as suggested by the enduring interest in the fate of the Franklin expedition. At once appealing and appalling, the Arctic

simultaneously attracts and holds us off. As I see it, this archaic and

contradictory identification with the Arctic is a prime source of the vacillation and inconstancy that is characteristic of our approach to the Northwest Passage.

On the whole, we are held off. Staying away in droves, we prefer to

contemplate our Arctic spaces from a safe distance. But let someone

challenge our sovereignty there or threaten to mar our pristine Arctic

possessions, and we are suddenly moved to ardent attachment, to

urgent demands that the Canadian government 'do something.' Then, typically, the challenge recedes, and we revert to inaction. Attention and interest drift away. Government is all too ready to return to normal.

Meanwhile, fate has created a situation in which the country that offers the gravest challenge to Canada's identity and ambition to thrive as a distinct society on the continent of North America also poses the clearest threat to Canada's Arctic sovereignty. In such circumstances, the Northwest Passage is symbolic of Canada's destiny. The more we seem to be losing it' as a distinct society, the more some of us are disposed to

worry on hearing of a potential sovereignty challenge in the Arctic. Canadians are operating with a received view that makes it difficult

to do anything much about the Northwest Passage until there is a perception that it may be taken away from us. Pose such a threat, and our attachment quickly becomes ardent. Let the threat ease, and we lapse into indifference born of fear and aversion. If we are to seek out sources of the bias that makes for the sovereignty-on-thinning-ice thesis, and for an uncritical acceptance of it, identification with the Arctic sublime is, I suggest, a key part of the diagnosis.

36 'Statement on Sovereignty/ 10 September 1985/ reproduced in Griffiths, Politics of the Northwest Passage, 270.


Franklyn Griffiths

Moving to the procedural as a source of bias and error, we have

already seen that there is no social base for constancy on Arctic-waters issues as far as Canadian identity politics are concerned: we can get all wound up, but we cannot really persist. If, to this, we add cost, remote-

ness, and the paucity of votes in the north, we have a script for inaction or minimal action by political leaders.

When leaders disengage, what is left of the initiative passes to senior

officials, who, in my experience, tend to be highly competent and car-

ing. They do well, sometimes exceedingly well,37 in the circumstances. But the circumstances are heavily biased against proaction. Consider the following paraphrase from a member of the Arctic Security Interdepartmental Working Group, a twice-yearly gathering of federal and territorial officials concerned with security and sovereignty which I attended as an observer in November 2002: 'The visibility of the north in [department deleted] is very low, as you know, and that's sure-

ly the same for all departments. Resources will go to the south ever before they go to the north. There is to be no ringing of alarm bells, no

embarrassing the department/ This is what happens in a bureaucratic context when public interest and political leadership are lacking. But in such a setting - not so different from that of the concerned member of the general public - 'alarm bells' and exaggeration are hard to avoid.

Sovereignty talk lends itself to a rhetoric of alarm and exaggeration aiming to 'energize' others.

Say the word, and our problem or concern is immediately located in a shared understanding that implies significant stakes, honour at risk, and the public good. Speak of sovereignty over the Northwest Passage and still more meaning is accessed. Since the cause is noble, the appeal to sov-

ereignty tends to be heartfelt. People are more inclined to believe what

they are hearing when it comes to alarming ice-condition forecasts, shipping danger ahead in the Passage, and so on. All the while, the essence of a rhetorical appeal to sovereignty is to enhance the significance of our views beyond what might otherwise be achieved. Fertile grounds for error are created when attentive observers exaggerate together in an alarmist discourse of sovereignty to make their case to inattentive others. In shared exaggeration we see the herd starting to form.

37 Consider, for example, the admirable constancy of a team of officials in the Legal Bureau of the Department of External Affairs as told by D.M. McRae in 'The negotia- tion of article 234/ in ibid, 98-114.



Then consider the further potential for exaggeration and bias when new information and apprehensions associated with global warming are factored into a pre-existing public discourse on Arctic sovereignty. Sovereignty tends to take over, and we get skewed forecasts of ice conditions and so on, as already discussed. At the same time, Arctic sover-

eignty and global warming are a heady mix. On the one hand are climate change and a policy agenda that all right-minded Canadians should take to heart; on the other are the unsullied reaches of our

country that could be taken away and opened to who knows what use. Now doubly disposed to a rhetoric of alarm, members of the attentive

public may be further disinclined to exercise critical judgment, and members of the general public could start to join the herd in numbers. Furthermore, in a departure from previous Arctic sovereignty episodes, global-warming effects and their potential to excite the imagination are here to stay. Joined to the appeals of sovereignty, global warming and Arctic ice reduction are all too likely to maintain southern Canadians in a state of suspended animation (or is it animated suspen- sion?) over the Passage.

In no way do I suggest that defence of sovereignty can be over- looked. If jurisdiction and title to it are not cared for, they may be

negotiated away carelessly or simply lost. Nor does the foregoing suggest that the appeal to sovereignty is out of order in discussions of public policy. Quite the contrary, sovereignty talk can help get good things done. My point is different. It is that a framing regime keyed to sover-

eignty has no, will not have any, and indeed cannot be of any great value in providing motivation and guidance in dealing with the big picture in Arctic North America.

Not only does a discursive practice of sovereignty make for error in the particulars, but it keys awareness to symbols and myths that are

incapable of producing sustained action, to say nothing of proaction, in the archipelago. As Louis-Edmond Hamelin has put it,' 'as long as there is not enough North in the minds of Southerners, not enough North can come out of those minds through attitudes and legisla- tion.'38 The identity or identification with the north to support a defence of Arctic sovereignty in conditions of considerable uncertain-

ty is lacking. Nor can rhetoric make up for the deficit in identity. All

38 'Speaking Notes by Dr Louis-Edmond Hamelin, Award Recipient, at the Presentation of the Centenary Medal for Northern Science/ diand Information, 19 November 1986.


Franklyn Griffiths

the while, commercial shipping poses no great sovereignty problem. Surely we can figure out a better approach.

BEYOND SOVEREIGNTY

Stripped of its extravagance, the sovereignty-on-thinning-ice thesis

points to a modest need for preparedness to cope with an irregular increase in summer-months shipping by non-ice-strengthened and

preferably ice-strengthened foreign vessels sailing essentially on their own under Canadian authority. The need is modest not only because the volume of shipping is likely to grow gradually, but because some of the elements of a regime of independent navigation are already in place for Canada's Arctic waters.39 Southern Canadians have however shown themselves incapable of sustaining the necessary interest to obtain effective proaction even for this minimal scenario. If anything is to be done, it will be done by the federal government, acting with relative

independence from Canadian society. That government could, however, soon be led by a prime minister who only recently divested himself of a shipping company, in favour of his sons, to ensure the perception of impartiality. He would surely want to distance himself from anything to do with shipping. We could, therefore, be doubly ill-advised in framing the problem in the Northwest Passage as one of shipping and sovereignty. But let us not go overboard in critique of sovereignty. For the Canadian state to venture into the archipelago, it will have to be largely on the basis of familiar thinking, not with anything very new in mind. Accordingly, in sketching out a way ahead, let us start where the case for Arctic sovereignty leaves off.

In part, Canada's sovereignty claim is an appeal to historic title. As the 1985 Statement on Sovereignty puts it: "Canada's sovereignty in the Arctic is indivisible. It embraces land, sea and ice. It extends without interruption to the seaward-facing coasts of the Arctic islands. These islands are joined, not divided, by the waters between them.

39 Depending on ice-strengthening and other characteristics, ships are permitted to sail in specified zones at specified times of the year. With an ice navigator aboard, non-ice-strengthened ships may also sail outside the zone-date regime as conditions permit. Year-round independent voyages by ice-breaking tankers and other ice-strengthened vessels could readily be accommodated under this regime. But there is no thought of convoy shipping with Canadian icebreaker support. An Arctic Shipping Control Authority, composed of senior personnel from the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, and Transport Canada, does the job of regulation. Victor Santos-Pedro, communication to the author, 24 March 2003. The regulator assigns capability requirements primarily to the users of the Northwest Passage.



They are bridged for most of the year by ice. From time immemorial Canadas Inuit people have used and occupied the ice as they have used and occupied the land/40 The case relies on the occupancy of ice, land, and water by Inuit, now Canadians, since what for us are prehistoric times. Why not increase Canadian preparedness in the archipelago on the basis of this established and defensible position? Why not a special relationship between the federal government and Canadas Inuit, one in which Inuit are accorded a progressively wider consultative part in situation assessment, political decision, implementation, and in repre- senting to others Canadas purposes in Arctic North America?

Both on ethical grounds and in terms of practicality, Canadas Inuit should no longer be confined to a historical role in the federal government's endeavour to make a sovereignty claim in law. The Inuit should instead take on new, forward-looking responsibilities in the

design and management of Canadas high Arctic activity in an era of

global change. The advantages of partnership between the federal government and

Inuit are many and varied. Inuit reside in the area of concern. They have immediate and superior knowledge of it. They are most directly affected by central decision on what happens in and to it. Their attachments to it are practical and durable, not symbolic and variable. Their interest does not vacillate or depend primarily on a visible external threat. And their association is essential in making Canadian environmental and other requirements credible and persuasive to others. If there is a major problem here, it is that Canada's Inuit lack the human resources to take an active part in a Canadian preparedness effort. But so do the Canadian majority and the Canadian government. There should be time for us all to gain new capacities together as needs evolve.

What Inuit have to offer, above all, is a new imagination. Histor-

ically and culturally, that imagination is given to openness and sharing, not closure and exclusion. With brothers and sisters in three other Arctic countries, the outlook of Inuit tends to be transnational. Thus, it is suited to Arctic problems, whose origins more often than not

ignore borders and whose solutions typically require more international co-operation than unilateral action behind national frontiers. In no

way do I suggest that Inuit are not interested in sovereignty and what it allows. Decidedly they are. But their interest is practical rather than

symbolic. If there is to be shipping in the Canadian Arctic, for example,


Franklyn Griffiths

the question is likely to be what happens in the landfast ice zone, not whether Canadian regulations are in force. Inuit are broadly inclined to wise (including local) use, not to sole possession and vigorous exploitation for distant beneficiaries. In short, their interest is in stew-

ardship as opposed to remote control. It is in the notion of stewardship in contrast to sovereignty that we begin to glimpse an alternative way of thinking about and dealing with Canada's high Arctic.

Inuit propensities to stewardship are distinguished by a certain civil-

ity or respect for others and for the natural environment. Stewardship and civility both urge care for context, for the human and natural set-

ting in which a particular activity unfolds. Taking to heart an injunc- tion to care about context, Canadians might well cease their fixation on the Northwest Passage and begin to consider themselves as stewards of the entire Arctic archipelago, especially as it may be affected by global warming. This has less to do with sovereignty and a lot more to do with the opening of Canada onto its northernmost lands and its third ocean as climate and geopolitical change proceeds.

We might, therefore, follow Hamelin, and refer to the 'total archi-

pelagic dimension and to the 'indivisible whole' of the archipelago as Canada's 'northern cone.' We might take note of his call for a 'new "national dream," based solidly on respect for both the natural environment and native cultures, a respect which nevertheless will not pro- hibit political and economic development.'41 Southerners might also take care to listen to Inuit not only when there is something we want to know from them, but also to work out an authentic partnership in

determining the future of the archipelago. All in all, we might expect the Northwest Passage and sovereignty over it to be subsumed into an

enduring and achievable Canadian ambition that is notable as much for the way it is done as for its aims. But how might a new partnership in preparedness be expressed? And why should the federal government show any interest in the idea?

Briefly, the key to a new start in the archipelago is to bring the Arctic Council home. Canada's aim for the Council from the beginning was to ensure that Arctic indigenous peoples had a say in the workings of a

regional intergovernmental forum.42 We should now practice what we

40 'Statement on Sovereignty/ 270.

41 Hamelin, 'Speaking Notes/ 5, 8

42 Arctic Council Panel, To Establish an International Arctic Council. A Framework Report (Ottawa: Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, May 1991).



have preached by setting up an analogous body in Canada. Confined to a narrow agenda to begin with, a consultative committee on the Arctic archipelago would comprise all relevant federal departments, the government of Nunavut, Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated, the Inuvialuit Regional Council, the government of the Northwest Territories, and national non-governmental Inuit organizations. It could meet once a year and set up working groups on priority issues with participation from other stakeholders as necessary. It would report to parliament through the lead federal department, presumably the

Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND). As with the Arctic Council, proceedings would be by consensus, federal

departments stating the consensus after all had been heard. The aims of the committee would be to establish priorities for col-

lective action, to undertake policy development in working groups, and to make better use of existing resources rather than create a basis for new funding any time soon. The committee could well thrash out a consensus on the likelihood and desirability of international shipping in the Northwest Passage, determine what needs to be done now to delineate Canada's continental shelf in the Arctic Ocean, or establish

capacity-building preconditions for the committee's own success. Overall, its purpose would be to further stewardship and wise use of Canada's Arctic archipelago in an era of accelerating physical change and accessibility to human purpose.

The federal government would be wise to establish such a forum because Ottawa is on thin ice ethically in its sovereignty claim. On the one hand, it makes use of Inuit in arguing the case for historic title. On the other hand, as in the Nunavut land claim agreement, it takes care to deny Inuit any real say in the use of Canada's Arctic waters, who is to bear the risks, and who is to take the gains. To be sure, there is the

promise of some consultation. But in essence the federal government has reserved a free hand for itself in the management of Canada's Arctic offshore. Its behaviour is not unlike that of the US Navy. Through the State Department, Ottawa has been put on notice that the Northwest

Passage is an international strait over which Canada has little say beyond what's allowed under the transit passage regime. Through DIAND, Inuit are told that they have little say in the current status and future handling of the same waters.

It is hypocritical (indeed shameful) to rely on Inuit when making a claim for exclusive jurisdiction but to exclude them from the exercise


Franklyn Griffiths

of that jurisdiction. It shows lack of respect and incivility when Canada's ability to act as steward in the Arctic requires partnership between Ottawa and Inuit. It is also foolish because Inuit do have it within their power to embarrass and shame the government of Canada, internationally as well as nationally, over its two-faced

approach to Arctic sovereignty. It should not be so difficult for Ottawa to authorize a new relation-

ship with Inuit in the management of Canada's Arctic waters and indeed the Arctic archipelago in its entirety. A little prompting, especially from Nunavut, would, however, be indispensable in producing consistency in the role of Inuit in Canada's Arctic sovereignty claim, in the governance of Arctic waters that Canada believes to be internal, and in a new institution for partnership in forward planning for the

archipelago in its entirety. Inuit will presumably see something like this as desirable. If not, and if they should decline to lead where southern Canadians cannot, many of the rest of us will no doubt continue our

misguided and futile handwringing over the future of the Northwest

Passage. I hope not.


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