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Gross Deutschland Panzer: An Analysis of Hitler’s Elite

By Roger Mason

Origins & Combat History

I n general, in the early and mid-1930s the German military was divided into two groups. The first

was a false front of units that repre-sented the forces allowed post World War I treaties. The second group was made up of the ever more powerful and numerous sea, air and ground forces being developed behind the scenes.

More particularly, Berlin was a center of international attention as Hitler gained and consolidated power, and the face of the German Army there was the Wachtruppe Berlin (Berlin Guard Troop). Drawn from regiments across the country on a rotating basis, that unit provided ceremonial and military security in the capital city. Starting

with the arrival of Hitler, the unit was continually expanded throughout the rest of the decade. By January 1939 it was renamed Infantry Regiment Gross Deutschland (Greater Germany). It was by then a stand-alone regiment with a full complement of support and administrative units. The soldiers of the regiment were allowed to wear green and silver cuff and shoulder tabs bearing their unit’s name and initials as evidence of their elite status. The unit was also unique in that, even as it expanded, it was allowed to continue to draw from the pick of recruits from all over Germany, while the other formations in the army were territorially recruited.

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By the end of June the division was in pursuit of the Soviet units retreating into Voronezh, while much of the rest of Army Group South moved across the Donets River and then toward Stalingrad and the Caucasus. During August the division was withdrawn and sent north to Rzhev to reinforce Army Group Center.

The Soviets began putting pressure on Rzhev to prevent the establishment of a German base for a new assault on Moscow. In that sector the division became part of XXVII Army (Infantry) Corps. After a month of inconclusive fighting, the division was again pulled back to rest and refit. Parts of it were sent to reinforce several infantry divisions that had been mauled in the fighting.

In November the Soviets launched a major offensive in which the 86th Infantry Division was crushed. The only unit close enough to intervene was 2nd Battalion of the Grenadier Regiment of Gross Deutschland. Bitter fighting occurred in the Lutchessa River valley, lasting nearly a month, with the panzer grenadiers suffering serious losses. The division was withdrawn once again to rest and refit.

1943The division moved to Smolensk and

then railed to Volchansk, near Belgorod. By February the Gross Deutschland was back on the attack between Belgorod and Kharkov. At that time the division received its first Tiger tanks and an additional artillery battalion, just in time for the new German offensive to retake Belgorod and Kharkov. The Germans recaptured those places, thereby achiev-ing their last major victory in Russia.

From mid-March to the end of June the division was refitted and reinforced, with the infantry given greater numbers of halftracks to improve cross-country mobility. The Gross Deutschland was also redesignated Panzer Grenadier Division Gross Deutschland, and it was moved to positions north of Tomarovka in preparation for Operation Citadel. The panzer regiment received new Mark V Panther tanks.

Operation Citadel was intended to reduce the Kursk salient, which posed a threat along the boundary line between Army Groups Center and South. The plan for the offensive was to pinch off the salient from the north and south, thereby destroying the forces the Soviets would need for their next winter offensive.

The Gross Deutschland was selected as the spearhead of the southern attack. The division moved

France & the BalkansThough the regiment didn’t take part

in the 1939 Polish campaign, by the next year the high command determined it was ready for more than ceremonial and security duties. Hitler was also interested in seeing his favorite units received a mixture of combat and parade ground experience. The regiment was therefore attached to Panzer Group Kleist. That larger formation spearheaded the invasion of the West and crossed the Meuse River to participate in the decisive flanking maneuver beyond the north end of the Maginot Line.

After the surrender of France the regiment prepared to take part in the invasion of England. When that opera-tion was cancelled, it was transferred to a camp at Le Valdahon on the Swiss border. There the mission was to train for Operation Felix, a projected attack on Gibraltar. That was cancelled when Hitler decided to invade the Balkans.

In early April 1941 the regiment was moved by rail first to Vienna, then to Budapest, and then to Szegedin in Romania. On 11 April it participated in the invasion of Yugoslavia. Resistance was light and Gross Deutschland moved quickly, seizing the town of Pancevo on the Danube. Its battalions were detailed to provide security during the initial occupation of Belgrade. On 15 June the regiment was moved to Warsaw. There it was assigned to the reserve of 2nd Panzer Army.

BarbarossaOn 27 June 1941 the regiment

crossed into Russia as part of Army Group Center. After heavy fighting around Minsk the unit crossed the upper Dnepr River, advancing as far as the town of Yelnya, where a large-scale Soviet counterattack stymied further German movement east toward Moscow. Fighting continued through the summer, including a deflection to the south to take part in the Kiev encircle-ment. The regiment was then ordered

back north to take part in the renewed drive on Moscow. By mid-October it had reached the city of Tula, south of Moscow. Tula was an important rail and road junction, and its capture was criti-cal to the final assault on Moscow. The regiment took part in repeated attempts to capture the city, but the overall offensive ground to a halt with the onset of winter weather and Tula remained in Soviet hands. That period was significant because it marked the first time a major portion of the unit had to be replaced due to deaths and injuries.

1942Fighting continued with the regiment

on the defensive, which further reduced its strength until, by the end of February, it was spent. The 2nd Battalion was disbanded and the two remaining bat-talions were reformed into a single unit. By the end of that month the last assault gun in the regiment had been destroyed.

The regiment was then pulled out of the line and reorganized, and a decision was made to upgrade it to divisional strength. Tanks, artillery, flak, engineers and support staff were added. It was redesignated Motorized Infantry Division Gross Deutschland. The various new components were brought together, and in the first week of June the division joined XXIV Panzer Corps as part of Army Group South.

An officer of the II Panzer Regiment “Grossdeutschland” sporting the Grossdeutschland cuff title.

Men of the panzer regiment check their equipment. GD grenadiers moving cross-country on foot.

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Organization & Equipment of the Panzer Grenadiers

The purpose of the panzer grenadier divi-sions was to provide a mobile combined-arms force that could fight in concert with armored divisions as well as on their own. Army plan-ners originally intended those divisions would be fully equipped with mechanized infantry transport as well as tanks; however, in 1939 the mechanization process remained far from com-plete. The Polish campaign included everything from fully mechanized divisions to others exclu-sively using horses pulling wagons for their transport. For average units that kind of mix didn’t change throughout the course of the war.

Panzer grenadier divisions were intended to provide a force that could operate at the same speed as tanks; so elite divisions such as Gross Deutschland were well equipped with the vehicles needed to make possible that type of rapid movement. In 1943 the division was composed of four regiments: the panzer regiment, the grenadier regiment, the fusilier regiment and the artillery regiment.

The panzer regiment was equipped with Mark IV, V and VI tanks. The Mark IVs were armed with excellent long-barrel 75mm cannon. The Mark V was known as the “Panther,” weighed 44 tons and had better sloped armor than its predecessors. In May 1943 the first Tigers were delivered to the Gross Deutschland Division.

The Mark VI Tiger was a heavy tank weighing 62 tons and armed with an 88mm cannon. The division’s panzer regiment had four companies of Mark IVs and Vs and two companies of Mark VIs. Tigers assigned directly to a division were rare, because most of them were deployed in separate battalions that were kept under direct control of army or army group commanders (for commitment at decisive times and places within larger battles).

The grenadier regiment had its troops mounted in SdKfz. 251 Hanomag halftracks. Those vehicles were lightly armored and could carry 12 infantrymen. The grenadier units were also supplied with trucks and other prime movers. The prime mover was the SdKfz. 9 Famo heavy halftrack. They could pull artillery, supply wagons or even tow disabled tanks. Unlike the Hanomag, it had no side armor and was equipped with three open bench seats for its crew. Flatbed Famo could mount a light flak gun, a crane for vehicle repair and engineering tasks, or serve as a tank recovery vehicle.

The fusilier regiment had more troops in Hanomags, a full flak section and an anti-tank battalion. They also had a variety of trucks, both German and captured enemy models. The flak section had more Famo with towed 88mm multi-purpose (anti-armor/anti-aircraft) guns along with smaller caliber rapid-fire weapons on flatbeds.

The anti-tank battalion was equipped with towed anti-tank guns and the Jagdpanzer SdKfz.139 Hetzer. The Hetzer

was a small tank destroyer, based on captured Czech chasses, which was also used successfully as an infantry-support assault gun. The Hetzer carried a 76mm gun.

The artillery regiment was equipped with both towed and self-propelled artillery (SPA). The regiment had two batteries of SdKfz 124 Wespes and one battery of SdKfz 165 Hummels. The Wespe was based on a Mark II Panzer chassis and armed with a 105mm how-itzer. The Hummel was based on both Mark III and IV chassis and carried a 150mm howitzer. The Hummels were often accompanied by Munitionstrager, which were gunless models used to carry extra ammunition. Those ammuni-tion carriers could be converted by giving them guns retrieved from disabled Hummels.

The division was further strengthened by an assault gun brigade comprised of three batteries of Sturmgeschutz IIIs. They were based on the Panzer Mark III chassis, with first a short-barrel and then a long-barrel 75mm gun. The low silhouette made it difficult to target and an effective tank killer. For Kursk the regi-ment had 35 of those guns with long-barrel 75s.

The table of organization was rounded out by an engineer battalion that had one Hanomag-mounted and three truck-mounted companies. The rest of the division was com-prised of miscellaneous support troops. Some of the most important were the vehicle recovery crews with mobile workshops that returned damaged tanks and vehicles to the fight. ★

The famous Hanomag transport.

Hummel Wespe

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off on the morning of 4 July, but the effort literally bogged down when the new Panthers became trapped by muddy conditions and previously undetected minefields. In eight days of fierce fighting the division suffered heavy casualties and was pulled back.

After a short rest the division was sent north to Karachev to stabilize the front in that area. From there the division fought a continuous rearguard action back to the Dnepr River. That included heavy fighting during August at Akhtyka. The division covered the withdrawal to the Kremenchug bridgehead, then south through continuous fighting to Mischurin Rog. The year ended with German retreats along the entire front, during which the division gained the nickname the “Fire Brigade” for its repeated deployment to the points of greatest threat.

1944 In January the division moved

south toward the Crimea to slow the advance there of 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts. The division was relieved and sent to Hungary in March. Next they participated in heavy defensive fighting in the Carpathian Mountains at Targul Frumos, where some of its formations were entirely wiped out. The remnants of the division were pulled back for refitting and regrouping. By summer the Gross Deutschland had moved back to the front and took part in the defense of East Prussia. In October the division fought in the Memel bridgehead. In November the unit was redesignated a panzer corps, combining the Gross Deutschland and Brandenburg Divisions.

1945 By March the division was down to

4,500 men and a handful of vehicles, with most finally surrendering to the Soviets at Pillau; however, approximately 800 escaped west and surrendered to the British. Those who surrendered to the Soviets remained in various gulags until the mid-1950s. Only a handful of survivors returned to Germany. ✪

SELECTED SOURCESErickson, J. (1983). The Road to Berlin. London, UK: Cassell

Books.Hastings, M. (2005). Armageddon: The Battle for Germany,

1944-45. New York, NY: Random House. Hoffmann, P. (2000). Hitler’s Personal Security. New York,

NY: De Capo Press.Lucas, J. (1982). War on the Eastern Front: 1941-1945, The

German Soldier in Russia. New York, NY: Bonanza Books.

Sajer, G. (2000). The Forgotten Soldier. Dulles, VA: Potomac Books.

Scheibert, H. (1987). Panzer Grenadier Division Gross Deutschland. Carrollton, Tx: Squadron Publications

Inc.Schneider, W. (2005). Panzer Tactics: German Small Unit

Armor Tactics in World War Two. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books.

US War Department (1990). Handbook on German Military Forces. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State Univ. Press.

Williamson, G. (2002). German Army Elite Units, 1939-45. Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing.

Bull, S. (2005). World War Two Infantry Tactics: Company and Battalion. Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing.

Glantz, D. & House, J. (1999). The Battle of Kursk. Lawrence, KA: Univ. of Kansas Press.

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The stalled advance toward Kursk.

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heavy flak units. Those flak formations were detailed to provide anti-aircraft protection for Hitler when he was in Berlin, on his train, or at his mountaintop retreat at Obersalzburg.

The regiment fought in France and the early stages of the Russian campaign. They wore a standard German army uniform with Luftwaffe wings on the breast and a blue cuff band with “Hermann Goering” sewn on it. The heavy flak units were attached to panzer units in Army Group South during 1941, until they were withdrawn to transition into a brigade. Goering then decided he rated an entire division named after him. So various miscellaneous units were collected and supplemented by experienced armored crew from the army. Thus the Hermann Goering Parachute Panzer Division was born.

In early 1943 components of the division were sent to North Africa, where they were captured when Axis forces surrendered in Tunisia. The division was then sent with new Tiger I tanks to Sicily, where it fought stubbornly against the Allied invasion. The division suc-cessfully retreated to mainland Italy, where it fought at Salerno and Anzio. It was withdrawn from Italy and rebuilt in time to defend Warsaw against the Soviet offensive there.

In late 1944 the division was divided into separate panzer and panzer grenadier divisions and was redesignated Panzerkorps Hermann Goering. During the final weeks of the war it fought a delaying action back to Dresden, where it was finally surrounded by the Soviets. The survivors were shipped to Siberia, where most perished in the gulags. ★

Hitler’s Other Favorites

Gross Deutschland was one of a group of German Army and Air Force units that came to be considered elite by Hitler and the high command. They were often connected directly to Hitler in some way, and their (often officially declared) elite status indicated an elevated sense of personal loyalty to him. Hitler’s favorites were thus bestowed with unique uniform items that helped distinguish them from the soldiers of other units. They also received a steady stream of the best equipment available. At the same time, though, they were committed to relentless combat that often decimated their ranks. In cycles of near-destruction and regrouping that ran to the end of the war, Hitler always found the resources and personnel to rebuild them.

As regular units shrank from combat losses, the elites grew in relative combat power and battlefield significance. While a regular army panzer division might be reduced to two-dozen tanks and assault guns, an elite unit would be kept much nearer to full strength. Because of Hitler’s confidence in their abilities, they were routinely sent to emergencies that developed on every front. That practice in turn often resulted in heavy losses to the units, which would then restart the cycle of rebuilding and emergency recommitment.

Feldherrnhalle DivisionThe Feldherrnhalle (Commanders’ Hall) was

originally a ceremonial pavilion on the main plaza in Munich, Bavaria. The location became the flashpoint of a bloody confrontation during the failed 1923 Munich “Beer Hall” Putsch. Later, Hitler made it into a Nazi shrine commem-orating the storm troopers killed in the incident.

Hitler had earlier planted the seed of this division when he established a special Sturm Abteilung (SA or Assault Detachment) guard unit to protect the offices of the Nazi Party. They were soon unofficially called the “Brownshirts,” due to their distinctive uniforms. With the start of the war the SA was folded into the regular German Army. Many of the members of the original guard unit were then formed into the 271st Infantry Regiment, which was in turn attached to the 60th Infantry Division. That regiment was given the honorary title of the Feldherrnhalle Regiment.

After the 1940 fighting in France, the regi-ment was bounced from division to division and served on the Russian front. In 1943 it returned to the 60th Division, which was then being reorganized as a panzer grenadier unit. That entire reorganized formation received the title Feldherrnhalle, along with a unique brown cuff band with the name inscribed in silver thread.

In 1944 the division was absorbed into the 13th Panzer Division, which then took on the honorific title. Additional panzer units were added, and the division was broken

into two new panzer divisions and upgraded again to a panzer corps. In May 1945 the corps surrendered in Czechoslovakia.

Hoch und Deutschmeister Division

The Hoch and Deutschmeister (Infantry) Division traced its roots to elite units of the Austrian Army formed in the 18th century to com-bat the Turks, and which were fully incorporated into the German Army at the time of the 1938 Anschluss. (The name is probably best translated as the “Supreme and German Master Infantry Division.”) The division participated in the inva-sion of Poland and France, and was eventually transferred to the eastern front where it was assigned to 6th Army for the drive on Stalingrad. There it was cited for bravery while attempting to prevent the encirclement of 6th Army. That sacrifice was favorably noted by Hitler.

The division was therefore reconstituted after Stalingrad and reorganized under the title Reich Grenadier Division Hoch and Deutschmeister, and was awarded a black cuff band bearing that name. A blue Maltese cross

with the word “Stalingrad” on it was worn on the soldiers’ shoulder straps and garrison caps. The division spent much of 1943 and 1944 fighting in Italy before being transferred to Hungary, where it remained until retreating west and surrendering to the US Army in 1945.

Infantry Regiment “List”

Hitler wanted to commemorate his World War I unit, the 16th Bavarian Reserve Regiment “List” (named for its founding colonel). Though disbanded in 1919, by 1939 the unit had been reactivated and incorporated into the 57th Infantry Division, and it fought in the invasion of France. It participated in the invasion of Russia and fought at Kursk in 1943. The entire division was awarded a dark green cuff band with its name in silver embroidery.

In February 1944 the division was trapped in the Cherkassy Pocket and only escaped after suffering heavy casualties. It was trapped again at Minsk with nearly a total loss of personnel. It was reconstituted and sent back to Russia, where it barely escaped destruction during the follow-on Soviet offensive. The remnants of the division continued fighting until 8 May 1945, when they surrendered to the Soviets.

Hermann Goering Parachute Panzer Division

In 1933 Hermann Goering became the head of all police in Prussia, which included Berlin. He raised a battalion for special assignments and to serve as his personal guard unit. In 1934 that unit was enlarged and given full military training. It was then called Landespolizeigruppe General Goering (National Police Group General Goering). When Goring took over the Luftwaffe, the unit went with him. It became a full regiment that included paratroops and

Offensive Operations

The Germans gave great thought to the development of their offensive doctrine during the prewar years. The foundation of it was Auftragstaktik (mission-oriented tactics), a system originally devised by the Prussian Army in the mid-19th century. That meant orders to small units provided the overall objective and the intention of the higher-level commander, but the small-unit commanders were in turn left free to develop a solution based on the situation as they saw it evolving during combat.

Because Gross Deutschland was a panzer grenadier (mechanized infantry) unit, its particular offensive doctrine became a mixture of armor and infantry solutions. The mid-war addition of armored transport vehicles for the infantry allowed them to cooperate more closely with the tanks.

All offensive planning began with the identification of a Schwerpunkt (main point of concentration). Within and near that Schwerpunkt, units were assigned specific avenues of advance to decrease confusion and the possibility of friendly fire situations.

Armored offensive tactics were in turn based on the idea of continual move-ment. Three specific forms of attack were: meeting engagement, hasty attack and deliberate attack. The meeting engagement was intended to allow lead units to quickly transition, upon first contact with a moving enemy, to offensive operations before the surprised enemy could organize his response.

The doctrine further dictated that, in fluid tactical environments, battalion commanders must be prepared to attack even when their units weren’t at optimal strength or properly concentrated. German armor units therefore conducted extensive training in transition from march columns to hasty attack formations.

Deliberate attack was used when facing an enemy in a prepared defense. Different parts of the overall attacking formation would then be assigned individual Schwerpunkt, based on the exact type of defensive position each one would be facing.

That general approach in turn led to the development of the Kampfgruppe (KG or battle-group) concept. In theory it involved carefully selecting units, equipment and personnel from as wide an overall spectrum as possible in order to optimally customize a force for the mission at hand. By 1944, however, KG had generally deteriorated in practice into hastily collecting any survivors and vehicles and throwing them back into battle as ad hoc reinforcements. ★

Men of Infantry Regiment List.

HG Division in Italy.

Final preparations for an attack.

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Defensive Operations

While Hitler had envisioned staying on the strategic offensive until final victory, by the winter of 1941-42 the issue of large-scale defensive operations was current and contentious. Hitler generally insisted ground once taken must be held at all costs. His com-manders preferred the ebb and flow of elastic defense, which offered greater opportunities for preserving personnel and equipment while generating chances for eventual counterattack. For the Gross Deutschland Division, defensive tactics became the key to survival.

From the German doctrinal perspective the ultimate goal of defensive operations was the deployment of available forces in such a way as to create the opportunity to counterattack. Defenders were to fight from blocking positions with the coordination of personnel, equipment and resources coming from “coordination points” (Anschlusspunkt). Those coordination points were the flipside of the offensive Schwerpunkt.

The primary mission of the coordination point was to maintain the cohesion of the overall defense. It maintained contact with neighboring units and shared local intelligence. That was especially important in regard to observed changes that might impact neighboring units, such as enemy forces redeploying. Whenever possible, that reporting was facilitated by hardwire communication lines.

Forward blocking positions were hardened sites sometimes supported by tanks. “Hardened” on the eastern front, however, was a far cry from Atlantic Wall type fortifications. They were usu-ally just dug in positions that made use of local terrain advantages. The mission of the blocking positions was to break up the overall momentum of the enemy attack and channel it into smaller areas that counterattacks could then destroy piecemeal. Blocking positions might use tanks, assault guns or towed guns for support.

Once the enemy got past the forward blocking positions, they hit the main defensive area. That was ideally to be set up as a defense in depth with three lines: the forward security position, the main battle line and the rear area.

The forward security area was usually only lightly held. The German goal within that area was to further harass the enemy forces that had already been broken up and channelized by the blocking positions.

The overall depth of a properly constructed German defensive position meant attackers were never to be sure when they would hit the main battle line. That initial contact was intended to be a severe shock to them.

The rear areas were organized to resupply the forward defense positions and provide staging areas for further counterat-tacks. The access routes were chosen to provide the greatest protection for troops and equipment moving between them.

In the main defensive line, tanks were used in three types of positions: open, hull down and concealed. Open was never the best option because of the obvious threat to survivability. Hull down offered the best protection for tanks and assault guns, because full concealment (which restricted mobility) was only good until the shooting started. Tanks hull down on the edge of towns or in tree lines were sometimes able to get off the first shot during enemy attacks and then get away before heavy return fire could be brought against them.

Counterattacks came in two forms: planned and hasty. Planned counterattacks often coincided with favorable terrain features that allowed the defenders opportunities to try to stop their retreat and retake the initiative. Decisions were made ahead of time establishing what the limits of such counterattacks would be. Hasty counterattacks were based on local condi-tions and opportunistic timing. Commanders were expected to seize unanticipated opportuni-ties to attack and thereby regain the initiative.

As the war progressed the issue of fighting from encirclements also grew in importance. When encircled the first step was the preserva-tion of morale and the prevention of “encircle-ment fever” (Kesselfieber). It was found that the knowledge among the soldiers their unit was cut off could easily result in panic that greatly diminished their survival potential. The key was providing as much information as possible to

the soldiers. The better they understood the situation, the more they were likely to hang on.

If the encircled force was relying on outside forces for their rescue, an airfield generally had to be maintained. Resupply was prioritized as ammunition then food. Any planes that landed always left with whatever wounded could be carried. Aerial resupply proved successful in smaller pockets, but was unsuccessful for large pockets like Stalingrad.

The Germans developed three defensive strategies for breaking encirclements. The first was a hedgehog defense, where troops dug in to await relief from outside forces That was used when holding a position deemed critical or when trapped units were too weak to conduct their own breakout.

If the position was critical, the problem became determining when the defenders had become too weak to assist in, or conduct on their own, a break out. Indecision in that regard ultimately determined the fate of 6th Army at Stalingrad.

The second type of encirclement defense involved conducting active operations to break the enemy line and thus regain freedom of movement. Initially all disabled vehicles were cannibalized to provide maximum fuel and spare parts for the others. The point of greatest weakness in the enemy line was determined, and the breakout was coordinated with the nearest friendly force.

The third strategy was the mobile pocket. That approach was selected when the nearest friendly forces weren’t strong enough to attack toward the pocket, or if the distance that had to be covered in order to escape was too great for a single thrust from inside the pocket. As the pocket moved, battlegroups were sent out to shield it from the direct impact of an attack and conceal the intent of the movement.

As the war progressed, training and equipment were developed to deal with the realities of defensive operations. Gross Deutschland recruit training included extensive practice in preparing hasty defensive positions

and the use of the panzerfaust man-carried anti-tank weapon. The panzerfaust was a 13 lb. disposable steel tube with an explosive shaped-charge on its end. When fired, a rocket charge propelled the explosive head up to 200 feet and, when well handled, it was capable of defeating any tank armor of the day.

The problem with German defensive techniques was they required time to effectively prepare. As the pace of Soviet offensives accel-erated in late 1943, there was less and less time to do that. In practice, then, when attacked, the strongest surviving units were hastily collected in groups and rushed to locations where break-throughs were occurring. That usually meant a handful of tanks or assault guns were rapidly shifted from crisis to crisis as the defenders tried to slow the enemy offensive. Defensive operations based on strategy and training were thus replaced by hasty improvisation. The strength of the Soviet offensives, combined with the diminishing resources of the defenders, resulted in the defeat of the German Army. ★

Oberst Karl Lorenz, commander of the Grossdeutschland Panzer Regiment, meeting with the crew of a Panther in south Russia.

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Command & Control

Elite units like the Gross Deutschland were prized by the high command for their ability to move rapidly while engaging in a variety of operational and tactical situations. Efficient command and control was critical to those high-tempo operations. When the Germans used mission-oriented tactics, battalion commanders had great latitude in how their operations were conducted. To accomplish that, a standard headquarters organization for the battalion was developed.

Each battalion had its headquarters company. The headquarters company had four platoons: signals, armored reconnaissance, engineer, and air defense. Later in the war the signals platoon was sometimes placed directly within the command group.

In an armored unit the battalion commander had three tanks: the command tank in which he rode, the secondary tank with the battalion adju-tant, and a third reserve tank commanded by a senior non-commissioned officer. While leading the battalion from a tank seemed initially attrac-tive, many commanders came to find halftracks allowed them more space and the ability to better access radios and maps during a battle.

When a command post was established, the senior officer of the headquarters company was in charge there and reported directly to the battalion commander. Radio communication was maintained in the command tank or halftrack with the aid of a radio truck. There were two fre-quencies: the battalion frequency allowed com-pany commanders to communicate with battal-ion headquarters; the other frequency connected the battalion commander to higher authority.

The range of German battlefield wireless communications varied with conditions. If a unit was unable to maintain radio communications, a

secondary unit was placed midway to relay mes-sages. That became more and more important on the eastern front, where subordinate units were often spread over large frontages.

One problem with the battalion radio net came from the fact over a dozen sub-units and their personnel had access to it. That included everyone from company commanders to forward air controllers. Combat situations demanded strict radio discipline, and radio silence while on the move often also needed to be maintained. Units might be ordered to set their sets only to receive; however, that stricture could be broken if a unit discovered the enemy was moving forward to make contact.

Besides radios, command and control was also conducted using hand signals, flags and lights. Hand signals were common among smaller units. Flag signaling was eventually discarded due to the difficulty of manipulating them while vehicles were moving and during combat. Lights (red, green and white) were most often used at night. Individual units often developed their own light shields from discarded cans and boxes to try to ensure their signals wouldn’t be easily spotted by the enemy.

When a battalion from the Gross Deutschland was on the move, the platoon or company commanders had the authority to open fire and attack. They were expected to immediately report the following by radio: enemy strength and location, the current posi-tion and course of action of their own units, and any recommendations of the reporting officer.

At battalion headquarters a signals officer would filter the incoming data to provide the commander a summary of vital information. That prevented the com-mander from becoming overwhelmed with confusing and overlapping reports.

When advancing, the company com-manders would lead in their vehicles. If reconnaissance platoons located the enemy, the company command vehicles would move to the location providing the greatest visual access. The rest of the company would move forward and past them to the attack.

Good reconnaissance was an important part of command and control. Armor and panzer grenadier units conducted two types of reconnaissance. Combat reconnaissance was always focused on providing the commander knowledge of the whereabouts and strength of the enemy. Terrain reconnaissance identified the roads and paths the follow-on units should take. That included the location of river fords, the quality of the roads, and terrain suitable for blocking positions if the advance turned into a defensive operation.

When transitioning to hasty attack, the bat-talion commander had to rely on the platoon and company commanders who were closest to the action. A main objective was quickly identified, and follow-on units were given instructions on their line of approach to it. A decision was necessary whether to eliminate or bypass any enemy position that was encountered. If bypassed, the battalion commander had to identify it as an enemy strongpoint and select the follow on force to destroy it.

In the end the German troops on the eastern front were defeated by a less sophisticated enemy. The Soviets who faced the Gross Deutschland Division had few of the advantages of flexible command and control supported by modern communication technology. Their overwhelming numbers, constant resupply from an ever-larger Soviet and Allied economic base, and their willingness to accept frightful levels of casualties proved decisive. ★

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GROSS DEUTSCHLAND PANZERThe Famous Divisions Series, featuring Gross Deutschland

Panzer (FDGDP) in its first installment, is a new evolution in design that brings tactics to operational simulations. Recreating four battles from the eastern front in 1943-44, it includes: Lutchessa Valley, Kursk, Akhtyrka and Mischurin Rog. Each is played on its own detailed and historically accurate map. It was designed by John Schettler and has been developed by Eric Harvey and Ty Bomba.

Combat is governed by 140 Event Chits. They introduce the element of chaos. Certain chits may be nullified by the play other chits; so you never know how an attack will be resolved based on odds and terrain. The number of chits a given side may hold and draw also serves as a measure of its elite or non-elite status.

Each hex represents 550 yards from side to opposite side. Each turn represents six hours, but they’re not divided into friendly and enemy player turns. Rather, each is made up of numerous head-quarters activations. All HQ activation chits are placed in a cup, and they’re drawn one at a time to activate (movement and combat) a particular headquarters and its associated units. When that activation is finished, a new HQ is drawn and its activation takes place.

FDGDP is a “special edition” game that includes two counter-sheets (560 counters) and four maps (on two 34x22” sheets) of the various battlefields where the highlighted battles were fought. Combat units (iconic) are individual companies featuring distinct vehicles and weapons. Play is tactical: units have individual ranges, different movement capabilities depending on type (wheeled, tracked or leg), and rules cover such things as demolishing bridges, pontoon bridges, weather, overrun, supply, infantry riding tanks, direct and ranged fire, artillery barrage, opportunity fire, night, bunkers, trenches, mines, dragons teeth, engineers, armor recovery vehicles, airpower and anti-aircraft artillery.

$50 US Customers$56 Canadian Customers$58 Overseas Customers

All prices include postage for first class or airmail shipping. CA residents add $3.19 sales tax.

Send to: Decision GamesATTN: WaW Game OfferPO Box 21598Bakersfield, CA 93390

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