bulgaria under prince alexander

Bulgaria under Prince AlexanderAuthor(s): Ellinor F. B. GroganSource: The Slavonic Review, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Mar., 1923), pp. 561-571Published by: the Modern Humanities Research Association and University College London, School ofSlavonic and East European StudiesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4201653 .Accessed: 01/10/2014 08:51

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BULGARIA UNDER PRINCE ALEXANDER.

THE Treaty of Berlin decided the fate of the Balkans for the next four decades, although many of its provisions were never fulfilled and others were flouted within a few years of its signature. Bulgaria herself had in the first place to fight for her liberty once again, and the earliest phase of her history after the emancipation is the record of her struggle with Russia- Bulgaria seeking to retain her newly won independence, Russia seeking, by fair means and by foul, to influence and control, if not to absorb, the new Slav State. Closely interwoven with the national issues at stake is the dramatic story of Bulgaria's first Prince, Alexander of Battenberg. The story has its special interest, as an instance-perhaps the last instance that will ever occur-of the way in which the private personal animosity of one sovereign against another could become a dominant factor in international politics.

It seemed certain at first that Russia would impose her will on Bulgaria. Almost every condition pointed to this end. The Bulgars were bound to Russia by ties of gratitude and kinship;, a Russian Commissary was, under the Treaty of Berlin, appointed as head of the Provisional Government; 50,ooo Russian troops were to occupy the country for some months; Russian officers came to raise and train the Bulgarian army; Russian officials filled all the chief Government posts; the Constitution itself was. drafted by the Russian Commissary, Prince Dondukov-Korsakov; the Prince whom the Constituent Assembly at Trnovo elected was the favorite nephew of Tsar Alexander II. of Russia. In modern language it would be said that Russia had a mandate from the Great Powers to govern Bulgaria. With all this weight of Russian influence imposed on a newly emancipated people, very few of whom had had any experience of public life, whose own language did not even contain words to express official or technical terms, there was a good deal of justification for the Russians, if, from the outset, they regarded Bulgaria as a new dependency of the Imperial Crown.

The Constitution provided the Bulgars with an autocratic ruler, and, at the same time, with a free Parliament, the Sobranje,

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562 THE SLAVONIC REVIEW.

which was to consist of a single Chamber to be elected by universal manhood suffrage, with the right to make laws and to impose taxes. The most approved liberal principles were embodied in the Constitution :-equality of all men before the law, freedom of the press, liberty of worship, right of public assembly, compulsory free education. On the other hand, the Prince, as Head of the Army, could appoint and dismiss all army officers; he could also appoint and dismiss his Cabinet, who were not necessarily members of the Sobranje, and who were responsible to him alone; the Prince could dissolve the Sobranje and order fresh elections; all laws must have his assent. No provision was made for the contingency of a disagreement between the Sobranje and the Prince. It was thought that, when Prince Dondukov drafted the Constitution, he was hoping that he himself might be elected first Prince of Bulgaria, and that he was consequently careful to safeguard his own position, but that, when he learnt that no Russian candidate would be eligible, he modified the Constitution so as to limit the Prince's power. Besides the ordinary Sobranje, there was the Grand Sobranje, an elected assembly which was to be called together to decide special questions only-territorial, constitutional, or dynastic changes.

Much additional light has been thrown on the reign of Prince Alexander by the recent publication of many of his own letters and other private papers. These papers were entrusted by Prince Alexander's widow, Countess Hartenau, to the compiler, Signor Corti, who is her son-in-law. The book is of great interest,1 not only because it gives a full length portrait of the unfortunate Prince himself, but also because it includes hitherto unpublished -and sometimes amazing-letters from Queen Victoria, the Emperor William I., the Tsars Alexander II. and III. of Russia, King Milan of Serbia, as well as records of conversations with Bismarck and most of the leading statesmen of the time. This book of Corti's and two books by von Huhn, which give a detailed contemporary account of the epoch, are the best available authorities for the events of Prince Alexander's reign.

Prince Alexander of Battenberg was the son of Prince Alex- ander of Hesse; he was brother of Prince Louis of Battenberg, the British Admiral who later was known as the Marquis of Milford Haven, and also of Prince Henry of Battenberg, who married Princess Beatrice. His father's sister was married to Tsar Alexander II. of Russia, and he was their favourite nephew. He was an officer in the Prussian Guards, but had served as a

1 See very full review in No. I of SLAVCNIC REVIEW.-ED.


BULGARIA UNDER PRINCE ALEXANDER. 563

volunteer with the gth Russian Dragoons in the Russo-Turkish War-a fact which no doubt influenced the Constituent Assembly at Trnovo in his favour.

The Prince, who at the time of his election was only twenty-two years of age, was tall and extremely handsome. Impetuous, high-handed, open-hearted and unable to conceal his feelings, he had not the makings of a diplomat; on the other hand, he had winning manners, quick intelligence and insight; he was courageous and upright and he was, above all, a keen soldier.

At first, the Prince seems to have regarded Russia as his Suzerain as a matter of course. The Tsar himself did not leave the Bulgarian delegates who came to St. Petersburg after the Prince's election in any doubt. " Take your Prince from my hands," he said, " and love him as I love him." On certain points, the Prince, young and inexperienced as he was, was under no illusions. He realised that the separation of the Bulgarian people into three distinct categories was unnatural and could not last. At an early date he characterised the Treaty of Berlin as " that monstrous monument of European diplomatic ignorance." Count Andr'assy, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, advised him " to respect the Treaty as long as he could manage to do so," and Lord Beaconsfield himself remarked to the Empress Frederick that " the business without Eastern Rumelia would not last more than seven years." Again, as all the wisest of Balkan and Southern Slav statesmen have done, the Prince soon came to realise that the best hope for the Balkans lay in confederation rather than in mutual rivalry. From the outset, too, the Prince looked on the Constitution as unsuitable- senseless, he called it-for a new state. Almost his first diffi- culties with Russia arose from the Tsar's unwillingness to allow any modifications in the form of the Constitution. After the death of his aunt, the Tsaritsa, and after the murder, in i88i, of Tsar Alexander II., the Prince lost all personal support and encouragement from the Russian Court. The fact that he had sanctioned the construction of the Caribrod-Vakerel railway, in preference to the line SviAtov-Trnovo-Sofia which had been proposed by Russia, had already given offence, and it is said that Alexander III. had bitterly resented Prince Alexander's criticism of the Russian Army at the end of the Russo-Turkish war, and that he was jealous of his father's affection for him. Be this as it may, it is certain that the Tsar's hostility towards the Prince increased so violently that, in the end, his emissaries, in their efforts to get rid of him from Bulgaria, only stopped

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short of actual murder. The Prince complained that, among all the Russian officials in Bulgaria, there was only one whom he could trust; the officers treated him with open insolence, and made it clear that to be in disgrace with him was the surest recommendation for promotion in Russia. With the people at large, the Russians quickly lost the popularity they had gained during the war: they did not conceal their contempt for the unlettered peasants and kept all the best billets for themselves; the officers attended debates in the Sobranje and shouted down speakers whom they did not like. The Prince, after a few years, spoke of the " burning hatred " of his people against their Russian masters. But however strong may have been in those days the resentment against Russian interference, Bulgarian sympathy with the Russian people-as distinct from Russian politicians and officials-has never died, and at the present time this feeling of kinship between the two peoples constitutes one of the chief assets of the Bolshevik propaganda which is being carried on from Moscow in Bulgaria.

The Bulgars themselves were not easy to work with. The Bulgarian Revolutionary Committee which had had its head- quarters at Bucarest, had claimed the functions of a provisional Government after the Treaty of San Stefano, but the Powers had paid small heed to these pretensions. Some of the Bulgars had had previous experience in minor public offices under the Turks, many had had an excellent education in Constantinople or in Russia or elsewhere abroad. and some had been schoolmasters, and the leadership in the Sobranje quite naturally fell into the hands of the more educated members. Politicians in Bulgaria, it should be noted, have, until the advent to power in I919 of the present Agrarian Government, always been men of the towns as opposed to peasants. Bulgars are as a rule fluent speakers, and they took to debate and to party politics with a zest which did not always stop short at words. At first, parties were, broadlv speaking, divided into Russophobe and Russophil -they have since become almost as numerous and as difficult to distinguish as parties are in this country-but it cannot be said that the same statesmen remained consistently in one party throughout the whole of their career. Three men, Cankov, Karavelov and Stambulov, stand out conspicuously among the politicians of the first two decades of this period of Bulgarian history. Cankov, who had been an official under the Turks, was reputed to have a talent for intrigue and to be able but unreliable, and an opportunist; Karavelov, a schoolmaster, who



had been educated in Russia and had studied philosophy, was a doctrinaire rather than a man of action; he was looked upon as incorruptible and it should be noted that both he and Cankov died in poverty. Both Cankov and Karavelov were as a rule pro-Russian; the former told Mr. Bourchier many years later that, in his opinion, Russia ought to have taken Bulgaria more seriously in hand from the first. Stambulov, the most notable part of whose career lies beyond the limits of Prince Alexander's reign, was perhaps the most remarkable man of a peculiarly Bulgarian type as yet produced by his country. Unscrupulous, extremely cruel and tyrannical as he undoubtedly was, Stambulov, with his ability, obstinacy and courage. was destined for ten years to hold his own against the intrigues of Russia and to complete the work which Prince Alexander had begun, and to die a terrible death at the hands of hired assassins in I895. That the Prince found the internal situation difficult enough, is proved by the fact that within two years he had tried to work with seven different Cabinets-sometimes with Conservatives and sometimes with Liberals-and two Sobranjes. In his letters he speaks of the politicians as unscrupulous, and of the officials as " corrupt from the highest down to the last gendarme," but he draws a definite distinction between the officials and the peasants. " The Bulgarian people," he writes, " is good, honest and industrious." A good deal has been said lately in the newspapers about Communism and Bolshevism in Bulgaria. It is hard to see what the peasants, three-fourths of whom are already peasant proprietors, would stand to gain by dividing up each other's land. The general tendency is all against any violent upheaval. In addition to the characteristics of the Bulgar-his industry, his sobriety, his strength of purpose, his obstinacy-no trait is more marked than his intense attachment to his own village and to his own holding.

In May, i88i, the chaos in the country had become so dan-- gerous that the Prince decided to take the Government into his own hands; with the Tsar's approval, he suspended the Consti- tution, made the Russian General Ehrenroth Prime Minister and obtained the assent of a packed Sobranje to a seven years' period of absolute rule. Prince Alexander, or his Russian and Bul- garian advisers, certainly had a short way of managing elections; the Constitution, which provided for manhood suffrage, secret ballot and all approved methods, was openly set at nought; Opposition voters or candidates were thrown into prison or hounded out of the country, until the elections were over. The



Sopadzis or Cudgellers, who were employed to belabour all sup- porters of the Opposition with their clubs, were a recognised institution, indeed practically government officials, until very recent times. Such conditions were, no doubt, tolerated because each party in turn hoped to profit by them. It is a matter of great concern that, at the present moment, a number of Bul- garian ex-Ministers are in prison and soon to be tried for their lives, but it must be remembered that, if, later on, these men return to power, they will probably deal in exactly the same way with the present holders of office. Byzantine traditions die hard, and it can hardly be too much emphasised that the Bulgars have been trained in two bad schools of politics-Turkish and Russian.

The Prince, however, was soon to find that a so-called autocracy was no solution of his difficulty. The Tsar recalled Ehrenroth because the Prince liked him, and sent in his place two Generals, Sobolev and Kaulbars. Two years under their espionage and tyranny and the general anarchy to which the country was reduced, convinced the Prince that he must make an end of Russian interference and that his only policy must be "Bulgaria for the Bulgars." Cankov and the Liberal Party, whose indignation had known no bounds when, two years before, the Prince had suspended the constitution, now consented to join a Coalition Government provided that the Constitution were restored. The Russian Generals, after an undignified attempt to kidnap the Prince, departed, and it was evident that the Prince had finally burnt his boats as regards Russia.

Throughout his reign the Prince made every effort to gain the support, or at all events to obtain the advice, of the represent- atives of the Great Powers. He undertook many painful pil- grimages to St. Petersburg and to Berlin and to Vienna, and always with the same result. Bismarck, the main object of whose policy was, at this time, to preserve friendship with Russia, was specially cruel in his treatment of the " Battenberger " as he called him; he could scarcely find words to express the depth of his indifference to all that might happen in Bulgaria. His attitude had not altered since the Congress of Berlin, when he observed: " Gentlemen, we are assembled not to secure the happiness of Bulgaria, but the peace of Europe." The Emperor William I., when the Prince, in despair, spoke of abdication, replied: " Well, then, go by all means; that won't upset me." The situation became yet more difficult when, in I883, Prince Alexander and Princess Victoria, the Crown Prince of Prussia's



daughter, fell in love with each other. The attachment was warmly, even enthusiastically, encouraged by the Crown Princess and by Queen Victoria; it was uncompromisingly and even brutally opposed by the old Emperor, by the Princess's brother, later William II., and by Bismarck himself. The vicissitudes of the affair were canvassed by the whole of Europe during the four years it lasted, and this denial of personal happiness to the Prince was not the least of his sorrows.

The inevitable crisis in Eastern Rumelia came within the period prophesied by Lord Beaconsfield. Ever since the day when the Treaty of Berlin decreed the separation of the Bulgars of Eastern Rumelia from those of Free Bulgaria, the Bulgars who had been left under Turkish rule-prompted sometimes, no doubt, by Russian agitation-had not ceased to petition for reunion with their kinsmen. They had, however, gained the right, under the Treaty, to a considerable degree of self-government and the hand of the Turks had not borne heavily on them. The two Christian Governors who had in turn ruled over the Pro- vince had both been chosen by the Porte on account of their sympathy with the Bulgars. Aleko Pasha was the son of their great protector, Prince Bogoridi, and Gavril Pasha Krstovic had himself taken a leading part in the Exarchate movement. On i8 September, r885, a bloodless revolution took place in Philippopolis; the Turkish Governor-General, Gavril Pasha, was quietly placed in his carriage with the horses' heads turned towards the Turkish frontier, and the union of the two Bulgarias under Prince Alexander was proclaimed by Bulgarian officers. It may well be asked why the British Government had apparently taken no heed of the machinations of Russia in Bulgaria, when, in I877, the approach of the Russian Army to Constantinople had brought both countries to the brink of war. Mr. Gladstone, however, who came into office in i88o, retained much of his old sympathy for Russia as the Christian Power who had driven out the unbeliever, and, on the other hand, as Ambassador at Con- stantinople, we had Sir William White, who understood that the Bulgars would carry out the policy which was to our interest without our taking direct steps ourselves. The Prince had always foreseen that the union must take place, and he had received warnings that the crisis was imminent. He now ascertained, as best he could, what public opinion was in the country, and then deliberately placed himself, certainly with the cognizance of Karavelov, then Prime Minister, at the head of the movement. He could not do otherwise. Stambulov, indeed, told him that



two roads lay before him, " the one to Philippopolis and as much further as God may lead, the other to the Danube and to Darmstadt." His reception in Philippopolis was most enthus- iastic and, when he visited the Mosque and promised the Moslems his personal protection, it was evident that all the inhabitants of the country were with him.

The news of the Union produced a considerable commotion in Europe, for it was a direct breach of the Treaty; but its effect on the Powers was contrary to all anticipations. The Porte, from which the Bulgars expected a declaration of war, was unable or unwilling to resent their action and confined itself to a protest. Russia, the Power which had in i876-77 strained every nerve to create a far greater Bulgaria, in spite of the Prince's appeal for support for his people in the realisation of their national ideal, denounced the union and immediately recalled all Russian officers from the Bulgarian armies, and soon after removed Prince Alexander's name from the Russian Army List. Great Britain, acting on the advice of Sir William White, one of the wisest Ambassadors she has ever had at Constantinople, firmly supported the Prince and the Union, for by this time it was realised that a strong Bulgaria would mean, not a dangerous Russian outpost, but a powerful buffer against Russia. Bulgaria's neighbours, however, were alarmed at the change of the balance of power in the Balkans. Greece mobilised, but was restrained by the Powers from taking action. King Milan of Serbia, who a few months before had been writing the very indiscreet and very amusing letters to Prince Alexander which are quoted in Corti's book, used an insignificant frontier question as a pretext and, on November I4, declared war on Bulgaria. Austrian influence was strong at this time in Serbia, and there is no doubt the declaration of war was prompted by Austria.

It was an extremely difficult moment for the country. The Union of the two Bulgarias was barely two months old and the process of reorganisation was not complete. The recall of the Russian General who had acted as War Minister, and of the 23o Russian officers, had left the Bulgarian Army with hardly an officer above the rank of captain. Most of the troops were in Eastern Rumelia, where a Turkish attack was expected, and the nearest point of the railway was I2o kilometres from the Serbian frontier. But national enthusiasm was aroused; the peasants, including many Turks and Macedonians, came at once to the colours, two men often riding one horse; transport was improvised from country carts; by means of forced marches,



reinforcements began to reach the troops in the Slivnica lines three days after fighting had begun. Those first days had been extremely critical; the Bulgars had at first been outnumbered, and had retreated before the Serbs; heavy fogs had descended on the mountains and some of the troops had lost their wav; Sofia itself was threatened. But under the personal command of Prince Alexander, who was now in his element, the Bulgars, with the reinforcements from East Rumelia, drove the Serbs back through the Dragoman Pass, recaptured Caribrod, crossed the frontier and took Pirot within a fortnight of the declaration of war. An advance on Nis and Belgrade seemed possible, for the Army was full of enthusiasm and confidence, but on November 27, Count Khevenhiiller, the Austro-Hungarian diplomatic repre- sentative at Belgrade, who a fortnight before had incited King Milan to make war, met the Prince with the warning that, if he advanced further, he would find himself face to face with Austrian troops who were at the moment ready to enter Serbia. There was nothing for it but to acquiesce. Bulgaria derived no advantage from her victories at the Treaty of Bicarest, which was signed in March, i886. Serbian and Bulgarian casualties were almost equal and each country paid the cost of her own campaign. The Bulgarian success was due in part to the Prince's leadership and to his wise choice of officers, and in part to the enthusiasm of the troops and to their six years' training under Russian officers. The Serbian campaign brought Bulgaria great prestige and, when the Sultan solved the Eastern Rumelian question by appointing the Prince Governor-General of the Province for five years, Russia alone was found to oppose the decision. Never had the situation seemed more auspicious; the Bulgars north of the Rhodope were at last united, the Prince was at the height of his popularity after his successful campaign. The Tsar, however, was only the more incensed by his triumph, and his downfall was decreed. An attempt by a Russian officer to kidnap or murder him had failed, but Russian agents found willing tools among some of the Bulgarian officers who were dissatisfied with their promotion after the late war. On August 2I, I886, less than a year after the Slivnica campaign the Struma Regiment was induced, probably on false pretences, to disarm some loyal troops and to surround the Palace during the night. A party of cadets, many of whom were intoxicated, burst into the Prince's room and forced him to sign his abdication. He was driven to a port on the Danube and his own yacht conveyed him to Russian territory. The conspiracy was not the



work of military discontents alone; Cankov and his party had never forgiven the Prince for his suspension of the Constitution, and it was Cankov who, with Karavelov and the Metropolitan Clement, formed at once the Provisional Government. But, as soon as the news of the abdication spread, a storm of protest arose. Within a few hours of his departure, telegrams from the Army and from all parts of the country and, not least important, from Stambulov who, with Karavelov, had assumed the Regency, were sent to the Prince entreating him to return. He yielded and within ten days of his abdication he was again in Bulgaria. At each stage of his drive to Sofia a great concourse of peasants was waiting to welcome him back. But he had already taken a false step; from Ruscuk, at the instigation of the Russian Consul there, he had telegraphed to the Tsar, saying that even now he was willing to return his crown to Russia, from whom he had received it, if it were best for his country The Tsar replied coldly that he could not approve the Prince's return and that he must refrain from all further intervention in the sad state of affairs to which the country had been reduced. To those who saw him in Sofia the Prince seemed a changed man. The long strain of fighting intrigue at home and abroad, the poisonous atmosphere with which the scurrilous Cankovist press had surrounded him, the treachery of some of his own officers and Ministers, together with the indignities and sleeplessness of the last few days and nights, had broken his spirit and he felt he could no longer sustain the conflict with Russia. He took his leave of Bulgaria with these words: " Having become convinced of the painful truth that my departure from Bulgaria will facilitate the re-establishment of good relations between Bulgaria and Russia, and having received from Russia the assurance that the independence, freedom and rights of our State shall remain intact, I declare to my much loved people that I have renounced the Bulgarian throne." A British eyewitness told me that he saw the Prince leaving Sofia with his face set like a stone. A long train of mourning peasants went with him on his journey to Vidin.

There is an epilogue to the tragedy of Prince Alexander's life. Some time after it had become perfectly clear that his projected marriage with Princess Victoria of Prussia could never take place, he married an actress of the Darmstadt Court Theatre, with whom he spent five years in peaceful retirement under the title of Count Hartenau. He died suddenly at Graz in I893, and was buried at Sofia with royal honours and deep mourning.



The Prince was probably r-ight in deciding to leave Bulgaria. The Russian Government looked on him as the incarnation of Bulgarian ingratitude and as the main obstacle in the way of Pan-Slav designs. He realised that, although he had the support of Stambulov, who was already the strongest man in the country and of the majority of the people, Bulgaria would have no peace with Russia while he remained, and he resigned in what he thought the best interest of his adopted country. His reign was no failure, though it had ended in his abdication. He had throughout helped to stimulate national consciousness among the Bulgars; he had fought a victorious war, which had placed the new State on an equality with her Balkan neighbours; he had, at the cost of his own throne, refused to allow Bulgaria to become a dependency of Russia. The people themselves, over whose heads this game of high politics had been played, showed, for the most part, the calm indifference of the peasant to politics and politicians. Three-fourths of the population were agricul- turists, and it was enough for them that they could cultivate their land under better conditions. Each village had its church schools had multiplied, communications had improved, a railway had been built, the Treasury was not empty, and the Turks were no longer their masters.

ELLINOR F. B. GROGAN.


Article Contentsp. [561]p. 562p. 563p. 564p. 565p. 566p. 567p. 568p. 569p. 570p. 571

Issue Table of ContentsThe Slavonic Review, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Mar., 1923), pp. i-iv+497-704Front Matter [pp. i-iv]On Slavonic Reciprocity [pp. 497-503]Klyuchevsky and His Course of Russian History [pp. 504-522]Slavistic Studies: An Addendum [pp. 523-524]Early Russian Folk Epics [pp. 525-532]Transylvania. (II) [pp. 533-551]The Early Diplomatic Relations of Great Britain and Serbia. (III) [pp. 552-560]Bulgaria under Prince Alexander [pp. 561-571]Labour Conditions in Modern Poland [pp. 572-583]The Peasant in Polish Literature. (I) [pp. 584-597]The Polish Peasants. (II) [pp. 598-603]At the Feast of the Gods: Contemporary Dialogues [pp. 604-622]PoemsAn Episode from Pushkin's Fairy Tales [pp. 623-631]

ObituariesJosef Vclav Myslbek[pp. 632-636]Alois Ran[pp. 636-639]Antonn Kalina[pp. 639-641]The Bishop of Stara Zagora [pp. 641-642]Ivan Tavar[pp. 643-644]Jan Urban Jarnk[pp. 644-645]

Chronicle Notes [pp. 646-658]Economic Notes [pp. 659-665]ReviewsPessimism "in Excelsis" [pp. 666-672]Review: untitled [pp. 673-675]Review: untitled [pp. 675-680]Review: untitled [pp. 680-683]Review: untitled [pp. 684]Review: untitled [pp. 684-685]Review: untitled [pp. 685-686]Review: untitled [pp. 687]Review: untitled [pp. 688-690]Review: untitled [pp. 690-691]The Moscow Art Theatre Abroad [pp. 691-692]Review: untitled [pp. 693-695]

Bibliographical Notes [pp. 696-699]Notes on Other Slavonic Reviews [pp. 700-702]The Anglo-Russian Literary Society [pp. 703-704]

bulgaria under prince alexander

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