building africa's airlift capacity: a strategy for enhancing military effectiveness

7/31/2019 Building Africa's Airlift Capacity: A Strategy for Enhancing Military Effectiveness

1/8

AFRICA SECURITY BRIEFA P u b l i c A t i o n o f t h e A f r i c A c e n t e r f o r S t r A t e g i c S t u d i e S

no. 22 / AuguSt 2012

Building Africas Airlift Capacity:A Strategy for Enhancing MilitaryEffectivenessByBirame Diop, DaviD m. peyton, anD Gene mcconville

u African states ability to respond to violent conflict, transnational threats, natural disasters, and other securitychallenges is severely constrained by limited airlift capacity.

u Like multilateral institutions elsewhere, the African Union and Africas Regional Economic Communitiesshould look to partnerships and resource-pooling arrangements to leverage airlift capabilities.

u In the near term, large-scale African peacekeeping and humanitarian operations will rely on a combinationof airlift support from anchor states and external partners, the mobilization of which can be streamlinedby creating strategic airlift framework agreements.

H I G H L I G H T S

In April 2012, the Economic Community o West

Arican States (ECOWAS) declared its readiness to deploy

3,000 troops to northern Mali in response to seizures o

territory by Tuareg separatists and Islamist militias. Let

unanswered was the question o how ECOWAS would

transport these troops and their equipment to Mali. Only

airlit resources would be able to deliver personnel and

heavy equipment into the area o operations (AO) in a

timely manner, provide operational mobility within theAO against dispersed and heavily armed irregular orces,

monitor a geographic area larger than France, and sustain

operations or months or years. The inability to respond

to these challenges to territorial control, in turn, urther

emboldens such separatists and other spoilers.

Similar challenges are aced in other inaccessible

contexts o instability in Arica, including Somalia, the

Democratic Republic o the Congo (DRC), and Darur,

Sudan, where poor roads and rugged terrain make convoys

slow, ineective, and vulnerable to landmines or ambush.

In certain cases, the government or rebel ghters may

deny peacekeepers and aid workers access to land-based

inrastructure, making air transport the only viable method

o moving personnel and supplies.

For each Arican Union (AU) peacekeeping mission

over the past decade, the AU has been required to engage

in complex and lengthy negotiations with internationalpartners to secure the airlit assets needed to transport

Arican troops and material into and out o the AO. These

delays oten occur at the height o a crisis, precluding

decisive action and putting civilian lives at increased risk.

The Arican Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in

Darur (UNAMID), or example, took nearly 2 years to

reach just 68 percent o its mandated deployment levels

due to stalled political negotiations and a lack o helicopter


2/8

Colonel Birame Diop is the Regional Director of the

African Institute for Security Sector Transformation in

Dakar as well as a member of the Senegalese Air Force with

more than 7,000 flying hours. David M. Peyton is a Writer-

Editor at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS).

Colonel Gene McConville is a career U.S. Army Foreign

Area Officer and a Senior Military Advisor at ACSS. Special

thanks to the Program on Irregular Warfare and Special

Operations Studies at the Institute for National Strategic

Studies for its support of this research.

22

dicult to halt without aircrat capable o detecting vessels

on illicit transit routes. Estimates are that approximately

80 percent o cocaine traveling rom Latin America to

Arica moves by sea and the remaining 20 percent by air.5

Without air assets to monitor these routes, transnational

criminals will continue to make the apt calculation that

Arican states are enabling environments or illicit activi-

ties.

Airlit is particularly important to Aricas security

context given the geography o the continent. Arica rep-

resents one-th o the worlds total land mass and is home

to 30,490 kilometers (18,945 miles) o coastline, dense

tropical areas, and expansive deserts, rendering land-based

transportation an expensive and inecient alternative

to air travel. In short, airlit capacity is a strategic orce

multiplier or resource-constrained Arican security sectors.

THE AUS AIRLIFT VISION

Airlit capacity entails both strategic airlit to deliver

troops and material to an AO, usually by large jet-powered

aircrat, and tactical airlit to support operations thereater,

typically by turboprop aircrat and helicopters. Recognizing

this and the scope o complex emergencies that it aces,

the AU set the goal o establishing a Rapid Deployment

Capability o the Arican Standby Force (ASF) in 2007

that would rely on airlit to deploy 2,500 personnel, includ-ing peacekeepers, police, and civilians, to a crisis within 30

days o an AU mandate.6

Depending on the operational

demands o a given crisis, this could be achieved with a

mixture o airlit assets.

At the continental level, airlit platorms such as the

Antonov An-124, Boeing C-17, and Ilyushin Il-76 (see

table 1), which are capable o transporting equipment

into and out o an AO or 1 brigade (approximately 3,000

troops), would be most ecient. Military airliters are

congured to transport equipment and palletized cargo

more eciently than passengers, so commercial aircrat

are needed to transport personnel. This requires aircrat

capable o carrying at least 1 company (130 troops) that

can make multiple roundtrips in rapid succession.

At the subregional level, airlit capacity is needed to

respond to crises and other transnational security chal-

lenges that exceed individual states capacity, such as

narcotics tracking, stabilization operations, and major

transport to support peacekeepers in remote regions o

Darur.1

Once deployed, the ability o Arican peacekeepers to

carry out civilian protection mandates is severely limited

by a lack o strategic and tactical airlit. UNAMID mis-

sion commanders have consistently reported an inability

to deend civilians without helicopters to transport troops

and equipment over Darurs vast and dicult terrain.2

During the rainy season, many roads in Darur become

impassible, severely curtailing peacekeepers maneuver-

ability and eectiveness.

Airlit resources are also needed to protect the lives o

Arican peacekeepers. In July 2008, a UNAMID convoy

was ambushed by armed militants or almost 3 hours, re-

sulting in 7 deaths and 19 casualties. Without helicopters

to stage a rescue or reinorcement mission, the convoy

was let deenseless. Tactical airlit is needed to ensure thatpeacekeepers are, at a minimum, capable o providing se-

curity or themselves, a prerequisite or deending civilians.

United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Ban Ki-

moon has similarly called or more helicopters in the

DRCs Kivu region,3

where a UN stabilization mission

has struggled to prevent armed groups rom targeting civil-

ians in remote areas.

Insucient airlit assets have also impeded Arican

governments ability to interrupt transnational crime,

including piracy, illegal shing, oil bunkering, toxic wastedumping, and illicit tracking. Reports o piracy o the

coast o Nigeria have more than doubled since 2011.4

Moreover, piracy incidents o o Aricas west and east

coasts oten occur more than 70 nautical miles rom shore,

making them dicult to monitor using land- and sea-based

surveillance equipment.

Aricas growing narcotics tracking threat will be


3/83

natural disasters. This requires medium-sized aircrat such

as the Airbus A400M and C-130 Hercules to transport 1 to

2 battalions (at least 1,500 personnel) and their equipment

over medium distances on short notice, ideally 14 days.

Once in an AO, security orces require airlit support

rom helicopter systems, ideally large rotary-wing airliterssuch as the CH-47 Chinook. Helicopters enable troops

and equipment to be inserted into and extracted rom

rugged areas as well as provide ground units mobile aerial

surveillance. Most xed-wing aircrat, in contrast, require

well-maintained runways and provide more transient,

intermittent reconnaissance.

At the national level, Arican states must be pre-

pared to airlit troops and material or disasters, respond

to localized crises beore they escalate, patrol borders,

monitor maritime areas as part o antipiracy and exclu-

sive economic zone surveillance, and conduct evacu-

ations. The ideal size o a national airlit feet varies

greatly according to a countrys geography, population,

and overall security environment. Smaller Arican states

should at a minimum maintain the ability to transport a

company-sized orce anywhere within their territory in

a single day. Larger Arican states or those that regularly

ace national security emergencies should be capable

o transporting a battalion-sized orce in the same timeperiod, making successive roundtrip fights as needed.

Platorms that meet these criteria include the C-130

Hercules, EMB 110 Bandeirante, CASA C-295, and

small- or medium-sized helicopters such as the Mi-17,

SA 330 Puma, and UH-60 Black Hawk (see tables 1

and 2).

Low and slow airliters are well suited to the con-

tinents unconventional security threats and should be

prioritized over costly attack aircrat that risk draining

deense budgets o limited resources. Contemporary

warare in Arica rarely involves airspace challenged

by an adversaries ghter aircrat, making attack and air

deense systems virtually irrelevant. Instead, Arican

countries must have the capacity to ace threats posed

by irregular orces.

At present, the majority o Aricas air orces are not

equipped with the needed spectrum o air systems and

trained personnel to support national or regional mis-

Arrat Apprxmate st per arrat Spefatns

Antonov An-124 $30-32 Mil lionMax paylad: 300,000 lbsSeatn: 350Ntes: Large cargo aircrat capable o transporting heavy, oversized loads.

HeavyAirliftBoeing C-17

Globemaster III$202270 million

Max paylad: 164,900 lbsSeatn: 134Ntes: Capable o rapid strategic delivery o troops and cargo to main operating bases orto orward bases.

Ilyushin Il-76 $3050 millionMax paylad: 114,640 lbsSeatn: 140Ntes: Designed to deliver heavy vehicles and machinery to remote, poorly-servicedairfelds.

Airbus A400M $120130 millionMax paylad: 81,600 lbsSeatn: 116Ntes: Capable o perorming tactical airlit, long-range transport, and air-to-air reueling.

Medium-SizedAirlift

Lockheed C-130H $1248 mil lionMax Paylad: 42,000 lbsSeatn: 92Ntes: Capable o operating rom rough, dirt strips and airdropping troops and equipment.

EADS CASA C-295 $2435 million

Max paylad: 20,400 lbsSeatn: 71Ntes: Capable o rapid-response missions with cargo, equipment and soldiers, as well asmedevac duties and airdrop delivery.

Embraer EMB 110Bandeirante

$1 millionMax take weht: 12,500 lbsSeatn: 18Ntes: General purpose light transport aircrat.

LightAirliftHawker Beechcrat

Super King Air 350$7 million

Max take weht: 15,000 lbsSeatn: 15Ntes: Modular crat commonly used or surveillance and reconnaissance.

TAbLE 1 . F IxEd-WINg A IRLIFT PLATFORmS

Source: Cost and specications vary by model, age, capabilities, and other customizations. Ranges listed are approximations gatheredromJanes All the Worlds Aircraft, military procurement records, and other databases.

contemporary warare in Aricararely involves airspace challenged by

an adversaries fghter aircrat


4/84

sions. These emerging capacity air orces are comprised

o aircrat that may be aging, out o service, or operated

even when they do not meet the International Civil

Aviation Organizations widely accepted saety stan-

dards. Such air orces ace serious resource constraints,have limited access to specialized training, and have

less developed air inrastructure, especially maintenance

acilities.

Moderate capacity air orces in countries like Ango-

la, Nigeria, and Tunisia have the ability to transport sev-

eral companies o troops and heavy equipment around

the entirety o their national territory and within their

respective subregions. However, transporting troops and

heavy payloads on a continent-wide scale would be slow

and impractical. Their feets are comprised o a varietyo aircrat that are generally reliable, though some may

be aging or out o service.

High capacity air orces in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco,

and South Arica have the ability to transport large troop

contingents and heavy equipment over long distances

in short periods o time. Aircrat in these countries are

regularly maintained and operated by highly trained

personnel. Their air transport inrastructure, including

runways, radar systems, and maintenance acilities, is

modern and conducive to long-range airlit sorties.

To maximize its airlit capabilities, the AU is devel-

oping a Strategic Mobility Package (SMP) to coordinate

transportation services (including and especially airlit)

or the ASF. Although the AU would administer airlit

operations, it would rely entirely on the assets o member

states. The AUs objective is not to create its own stand-

ing air orce but to assemble airlit resources rom con-

tributing member states and deploy them appropriately.

This requires the AU to secure airlit agreements

rom member states in advance, especially rom high

capacity airlit anchor states. These agreements would

speciy the scope o a countrys airlit support and would

be activated via the AU mandating process. To ensuremission readiness, the SMP will need an airlit asset

verication program to conrm the airworthiness and

availability o assets pledged to AU missions. This pro-

gram would unction

similarly to the certi-

ication o troops and

equipment that support

UN missions.

Like other Re-

gional Economic Com-munity (REC) and AU

mechanisms, the suc-

cess o the SMP will de-

pend on member states

commitment to collec-

tive security and deci-

sionmaking. The SMPs

airlit activities would

also require a unction-

ing cost-sharing acility

that enables airlit con-

tributing countries to

receive compensation

or the use o their as-

sets. Aricas airlit anchor states are natural choices

or the provisions o airlit to AU missions. However,

they cannot be expected to render airlit support without

member states sharing the deployment cost.

Rwandas EarthqakeRespnse

In 2008, 2 powerul earthquakeswith magnitudes o 6.1 and5.0 struck Rwandas southwestborder, resulting in 37 deaths andover 600 injuries. The RwandaDeence Force (RDF) immediatelydispatched helicopters andairlited earthquake victims tohospitals in the capital, Kigali.Helicopters were also employedto transport medical personnelto aected areas. RDF airlitoperations were coordinatedby the Rwandan DisasterManagement Task Force, whichalso oversaw the distributiono ood aid, water supplies, andmedicine. Rwandas responsedemonstrated how even modestlevels o airlit capacity can yieldsignifcant results when pairedwith a well-coordinated strategy.

TAbLE 2 . ROTARy-WINg A IRLIF T PLATFORmS

Source: Cost and specications vary by model, age, capabilities, and other customizations. Ranges listed are approximations gathered

romJanes All the Worlds Aircraft, military procurement records, and other databases.

Arrat Apprxmate st per arrat Spefatns

Boeing CH-47SD/D Chinook $3032 millionMax take weht: 54,000 lbsSeatn: 44Ntes: Capable o carrying cargo internally or sling loaded.

Mil Design Bureau Mi -17 $1720 mi ll ionMax take weht: 25,000 lbsSeatn: 35Ntes: Twin-turbine transport heli copter that can also act as a gunship.

Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawk $1021 million

Max take weht: 21,884 lbs

Seatn: 12Ntes: Capable o transporting troops, equipment, and supplies.

Eurocopter AS332 Super Puma $16 millionMax take weht: 18,959 lbsSeatn: 24Ntes: Twin-engine, medium transport or utility helicopter.


5/85

CONSTRAINTS TO AIRLIFT dEVELOPmENT

Most Arican security structures remain overwhelm-

ingly land-centriclegacies o their colonial and inde-

pendence-movement origins. Altering these precedents

requires deepening military planners understanding o

how airlit capacity amplies the ecacy o ground orces

by enabling troops to access remote territories quickly,

extract troops rom hostile environments, and receive sup-

plies and heavy equipment in an AO. Conversely, ground

orces with insucient airlit support are slow to deploy

and operationally constrained. Thus, while commonly

viewed as too expensive, airlit capacity enables Arican

militaries with limited resources to cover more territory

or longer periods o time. Gabon and Cape Verde, or

example, have employed light turboprop aircrat such as

the Embraer EMB 110 Bandeirante to transport troopsand conduct aerial surveillance over regions experiencing

high levels o maritime and transborder tracking. At a

cost o about $1 million per aircrat, such airlit platorms

are an ecient means o expanding military eectiveness.

Arican air orces are also leveraging light and medium

airlit systems that have been discontinued such as the

Russian-made Antonov An-24 and Dutch-made Fok-

ker F27, both o which are inexpensive and reliable i

adequately maintained.

Despite its strategic advantages, building political

will or airlit systems is a serious challenge when the cost

o larger, more sophisticated airlit platorms is taken into

consideration. The AUs operating budget in 2011 was

$260 million, the approximate cost o just one Boeing

C-17 transport jet. Procuring advanced airlit systems is

a complex process that involves nancing multimillion

or even multibillion dollar agreements with manuactur-

ers. In 2009, the South Arican Parliament cancelled its

order o eight Airbus A400M aircrat as opposition grew

in response to the systems rising costs, which exceeded the

initially negotiated price o almost $2.5 billion.

In addition to high costs, airlit platorms need support

over the long term. The liecycle cost o airlit systems,

including maintenance, uel, and crew expenses, oten

exceeds the initial purchase price o individual aircrat.

Overlooking these costs has resulted in aircrat that are

requently out o service or operated while ailing to meet

saety standards.

The long-term cost o maintaining airlit systems is

urther compounded by the diversity o Arican air orce

feets. Arican air orces include assets manuactured in

ormer colonial powers, Eastern Europe, Brazil, and the

United States, all o which have discrete maintenance

requirements. This has led Arican air orces to outsource

maintenance work to Arican countries with high capacity

air orces or to overseas partners.

The steep cost o quality fight training is a urther

impediment to building Arican airlit capacity. Aricanpilots, crews, and technicians are trained mainly by Aricas

high capacity air orces, while others receive training in

Europe and the United States. These overseas training op-

portunities are limited, however, and may not correspond

to the diverse equipment o Arican air orces, necessitating

a second round o training when Arican pilots and crew

members return to their home countries.

Airlit capacity development has also been hindered

by a shortage o air transport inrastructure such as air

trac control acilities and navigational aids, among othercomponents. Air-to-ground communication is one o the

continents most pressing needs. Aircrat can fy or more

than an hour in parts o Arica without being able to com-

municate with ground control.7

These actors have com-

bined to make Arica the continent with the poorest air

saety record in the world, with an average o 4.31 aircrat

losses per million departures, compared to 0.65 worldwide.8

PRIORITIES FOR AIRLIFT dEVELOPmENT

Addressing Aricas immediate security concerns

while simultaneously building long-term airlit capacity

requires Arican states, RECs, and the AU to advance a

combination o measures.

Build African airlift partnerships. Arican states

possessing advanced airlit capabilities, namely Algeria,

Egypt, Morocco, and South Arica, are capable o serving

as pillars or bilateral partnerships thanks to their advanced

while commonly viewed as tooexpensive, airlit capacity enables

Arican militaries with limitedresources to cover more territory or

longer periods o time


6/86

air feets. Providing leadership or airlit partnerships oers

these countries an opportunity to promote stability in their

respective subregions and to shape the development o

airlit on the continent more broadly. They also stand to

develop more specialized airlit systems, air maintenance

acilities, and fight schools as neighboring countries draw

on them or support.

Airlit partnerships should involve pooling assets,

conducting joint exercises, sharing maintenance acilities,

and providing support to a partner country. Among other

advantages, shared maintenance acilities enable Arican

states to keep their air assets fying saely or longer, e-

ectively extending their capacity at a raction o the cost

o purchasing new planes. Several Arican air orces are

already seizing the opportunities that bilateral partner-

ships oer, such as the Senegalese and Royal Moroccan

Air Forces, which have successully collaborated on train-ing exchanges and maintenance activities. Algeria and

Burkina Faso have a similar air partnership.

Nevertheless, such partnerships occur too inrequent-

ly. This act stems in part rom the reluctance o neighbor-

ing countries to exchange inormation about their air orce

capabilities. Building Arican airlit capacity is as much a

matter o building trust as it is securing nancial resources

or airlit investments. One way to address this challenge

is to start with modest airlit partnerships that are then

expanded to support regional eorts over time.Pool airlift resources within the AU and RECs.

To overcome air domain constraints, the AU and RECs

should emulate air partnership models such as NATOs

Strategic Airlit Capability initiative, in which a consor-

tium o 10 NATO countries plus 2 partner countries have

purchased and share 3 Boeing C-17 strategic transport air-

crat. NATO members have also pooled resources to orm

the Strategic Airlit Interim Solution (SALIS), a coopera-

tive agreement that maintains two Antonov An-124-100

aircrat on ulltime charter. The SALIS agreement is also

capable o dispatching two additional An-124-100 air-

crat on 6 days notice and another two on 9 days notice.

NATOs pooling initiatives have enabled member states

to share the high costs o needed airlit systems and deploy

airlit assets to a variety o missions and locations.

Build capacity by collaborating with external part-

ners. External partners, mainly in the United States and

Europe, have demonstrated a willingness to partner bilater-

ally with Arican air orces and oer a variety o capacity-

building and procurement programs. The U.S. Depart-

ment o Deense provides partner countries with access to

its Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Financing, and

Excess Deense Articles programs, which can be leveraged

to nance and procure needed airlit systems. The Bo-

tswana Deence Force, or example, successully purchased

C-130B transport aircrat using the Foreign Military Sales

program. These programs have also been used to procure

smaller turboprop aircrat such as the Beechcrat Super

King Air 350, used or light airlit and surveillance. Many

Arican air orces also operate European aircrat procured

via security assistance programs and receive specialized

training and maintenance services rom European partners.

A recurring weakness o external bilateral support,

however, is its tendency to be episodic, creating planning

and coordination challenges or Arican air chies. Crat-ing more ormal security cooperation agreements that

center on shared interests can help to promote consistency.

These agreements should emphasize Aricas airlit capacity

development over other assets such as expensive and less

useul attack aircrat.

Streamline airlift agreements with international or-

ganizations.To strengthen air support to uture peacekeep-

ing missions, the AU should strengthen its relationship to

the UN. The UNs Department o Peacekeeping Opera-

tions has been a key partner in securing airlit resources orjoint missions in Arica, such as in Darur with UNAMID.

Despite this partnership, AU-UN collaboration has been

suboptimal due to communication gaps and disagreements

over mission mandates. To improve this partnershipa

task that both organizations recognize is neededthe UN

and AU should consider adopting a strategic ramework

or airlit operations.

The AU should also strengthen its relationship with

NATO to secure needed airlit in the near term. NATO

has the capacity to transport multiple brigade-sized orces

to hostile environments and provide sustained airlit over

the lie o a peacekeeping mission. During the AU Mission

in Sudan, NATO coordinated the airlit o 31,500 troops

and personnel into and out o Darur. Airlit support rom

NATO has also been vital to the deployment o Burundian

and Ugandan troops to Somalia in support o AMISOM

and its 17,000 personnel. The AUs Peace and Security

Council and its Peace Support Operations Division have


7/87

expressed eagerness to expand cooperation with NATO

on uture peacekeeping deployments. This is a step in the

right direction, and should be reinorced by additional

eorts to streamline AU-NATO collaboration.

Engage the private sector. The private sector has a

critical role to play in providing strategic airlit to Arican

security operations. Even the worlds leading air orces rely

on commercial airlines to provide airlit or large-scale

operations. NATO countries regularly transport person-

nel and equipment using privately chartered fights and

the U.S. maintains the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF),

a consortium o U.S. commercial air carriers that can be

called upon to provide airlit services to the U.S. military

in an emergency. European, Asian, and South American

air orces also use private sector air carriers to transport

troops and equipment to crisis situations.

At present, there is untapped potential or public-private partnerships to ll Aricas airlit gap. Aricas com-

mercial air industry is led by ecient air carriers such as

EgyptAir, Ethiopian Airlines, Kenya Airways, Royal Air

Maroc, and South Arican Airways. The AU, RECs, and

individual Arican states should establish relationships

with these carriers to secure vital airlit capacities or se-

curity operations as well as reinorce the protability o

Aricas commercial air industry. Arican policymakers may

also consider contracting with non-Arican commercial

airlines, which have proven their ability to operate saelyand at low cost on the continent.

A prevailing challenge when recruiting support rom

commercial air carriers is the high cost o insurance pre-

miums or aircrat landing in an AO. The AU can help

minimize this cost by negotiating better collective rates

with insurance providers and by creating a und to cover all

or a portion o war-risk insurance premiums. An example

that the AU might consider is the Aviation War Risk

Insurance Program managed by the U.S. Federal Aviation

Administration, which provides reasonably priced insur-

ance coverage or losses due to war, capture, vandalism,

and other confict-related damages.

Air trac in Arica has surged over the past decade

and is projected to grow at a rate o 5.7 percent per year,

signicantly aster than the international average o 4.9

percent.9

Platorms such as CASA C-295s, C-130s, and

larger airliters requently depend on the same air inra-

structure that commercial air trac utilizes, such as run-

ways, ueling stations, maintenance acilities, radar, and

other secondary air systems, so growth in the commercial

sector augurs well or Aricas airlit capacity decit.

Nevertheless, subregional disparities have emerged,

with booming air hubs in Southern and Eastern Arica

and signicantly less commercial air trac in Central and

Western Arica (see gure 1). To build airlit capacity incountries and regions with less developed air transport

industries, thereore, Arican security ocials should sup-

port civilian counterparts eorts to implement cooperative

agreements created to sustain commercial air industry

growth. One such measure is the Yamoussoukro Decision,

an agreement signed in 2000 and ratied by 48 Arican

states by 2004. Implementation o this expansive techni-

cal ramework, which stipulates the liberalization o air

services, broadening o air trac rights, and reductions in

taris, has underpinned Aricas booming air transport in-

dustry but remains uneven and incomplete.11

The Arican

Civil Aviation Commissions ongoing eorts to realize ull

application o the Yamoussoukro Decision and develop an

integrated air transport system on the continent are vital

to building Arican airlit capacity.

Inventory existing African airlift assets.Inormation

gaps are obstructing Arican policymakers rom optimizing

air partnerships and making judicious procurement deci-

Source: Bonger 2009.10

The thickness o the lines is on a

continuous scale, with the thickest line (South Arica-Zambia)representing nearly 1 million seats or 2007 and the thinnest(Ethiopia-Ghana) representing 62,000 seats. The size o the end

points results rom the thickness o the lines.

FiguRE 1. ToP 60 AiR RouTES WiTHiN Sub-SAHARAN AFRicA


8/888

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) supports the

development of U.S. strategic policy toward Africa by providing high-

quality academic programs, undertaking policy-relevant research

and analysis, and fostering awareness of and open dialogue on U.S.

strategic priorities and African security issues. Toward these aims,

the ACSS is committed to building networks of African, American,

European, and international military and civilian leaders and

articulating African perspective to U.S. policymakers.

The Africa Security Briefs series presents research and analysis

by ACSS experts and outside scholars with the aim of advancing

understanding of African security issues. The opinions, conclusions,

and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of

the contributors and do not necessarily reect the views of the

U.S. Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal

Government. For more information on ACSS, visit the Web site at

http://www.africacenter.org.

AfricA center for StrAtegic StudieS

hp://www.aa.

fricA center for

trAtegic StudieS

irector: Ambassador William

M. Bellamy (Ret.)

National Deense University

00 Fith Avenue, Building 20ort McNair

Washington, D.C. 20319-5066

hone: + 1 202-685-7300

Website: www.aricacenter.org

fricA center regionAl

ffice in dAkAr

egional Manager:

Gerald Lefer

hone: 221 33 869 61 57

mail: [email protected]

fricA center regionAl

ffice in AddiS AbAbA

egional Manager:rad Anderson

hone: 251 11 130 6683


fricA Security briefS

ditor: Joseph Siegle, Ph.D.

hone: +1 202-685-6808


iSSn 2164-4047

sions. Sharing inormation about Arican airlit feets, their

airworthiness, and the availability o spare parts would

create opportunities or Arican air orces with similar

air assets to collaborate. This would also allow Arican

countries to avoid procuring redundant systems or aircrat

that pose interoperability challenges when conducting

joint operations.

The AU has stated the need to develop a database o

the continents airlit platorms or the purpose o standing

up its SMP.12

Like other security cooperation activities,

however, this priority is challenging due to member states

concerns that inormation about their strategic capabilities

will be used against them. More subtly, some AU mem-

ber states are reticent to divulge the true extent o their

limited airlit capabilities. Overcoming these concerns

is a long-term project that the AU should undertake by

demonstrating the advantages o inormation sharing andairlit cooperation. Conversely, the AU need not oblige

member states to share inormation about all air systems,

such as ghter aircrat, missile systems, or other sensitive

capacities. The AU should rather compile a limited and

targeted database o workhorse airlit platorms and spare

parts.

The AU can also build momentum or its inorma-

tion-sharing eorts by emphasizing existing bilateral and

subregional security cooperation agreements. Airlit inor-

mation sharing between countries that are already cooper-ating will be easier to establish than inormation-sharing

agreements between states that interact inrequently or

not at all. Their willingness to share inormation about

their airlit systems will set a powerul example or the rest

o the continent.

NOTES

1 Report of the Secretary-General on the deployment of the

African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UN

Security Council: S/2009/352, July 13, 2009).2 Mashood Issaka and Elijah Dickens Mushemeza,

Operationalizing the Arican Standby Force, International

Peace Institute, January 2010.3 DR Congo: UN Peacekeeping Mission Receives Tactical

Helicopters From Ukraine, UN News Centre, March 7, 2012.4 Six Month Drop in World Piracy, IMB Report Shows,

International Chamber o Commerce Commercial Crime

Service, April 23, 2012.5 Liana Sun Wyler, Nicolas Cook, Illegal Drug Trade in

Africa: Trends and U.S. Policy (Washington, DC: Congressional

Research Service, February 26, 2010)6 Arican Union, Specialized Technical Committee on

Deense, Saety and Security, 4th Meeting, Progress Report on the

Status of the Operationalization of the African Standby Force(Addis

Ababa: AU, December 3-7, 2010). Jakkie Cilliers, The African

Standby Force: An Update on Progress, ISS Paper 160 (Pretoria:

Institute or Security Studies, March 2008).7

Airport Runways and Terminal Capacity Are GenerallyAdequate, but Air Trac Control and Surveillance Facilities

Need Substantial Improvement, Arican Development Bank,

available at .8 A Poor Saety RecordLargely Attributable to Low

Standards and Lax SupervisionIs the Greatest Challenge

Facing the Air Transport Industry in Arica Today, Arican

Development Bank available at .9 Charles Schlumberger, Open Skies for Africa: Implementing

the Yamoussoukro Decision (Washington, DC: The World Bank,

2010).10 Heinrich C. Bonger, An Unsteady Course: Challenges

to Growth in Aricas Air Transport Industry, in Africa

Infrastructure Country Diagnostic, ed. Vivien Foster and Cecilia

Briceo-Garmendia (Washington, DC: The World Bank, July

2009), 261.11 Schlumberger.12 Arican Union, 2010.

building africa's airlift capacity: a strategy for enhancing military effectiveness

Documents