-
7/31/2019 Building Africa's Airlift Capacity: A Strategy for Enhancing Military Effectiveness
1/8
AFRICA SECURITY BRIEFA P u b l i c A t i o n o f t h e A f r i c A c e n t e r f o r S t r A t e g i c S t u d i e S
no. 22 / AuguSt 2012
Building Africas Airlift Capacity:A Strategy for Enhancing MilitaryEffectivenessByBirame Diop, DaviD m. peyton, anD Gene mcconville
u African states ability to respond to violent conflict, transnational threats, natural disasters, and other securitychallenges is severely constrained by limited airlift capacity.
u Like multilateral institutions elsewhere, the African Union and Africas Regional Economic Communitiesshould look to partnerships and resource-pooling arrangements to leverage airlift capabilities.
u In the near term, large-scale African peacekeeping and humanitarian operations will rely on a combinationof airlift support from anchor states and external partners, the mobilization of which can be streamlinedby creating strategic airlift framework agreements.
H I G H L I G H T S
In April 2012, the Economic Community o West
Arican States (ECOWAS) declared its readiness to deploy
3,000 troops to northern Mali in response to seizures o
territory by Tuareg separatists and Islamist militias. Let
unanswered was the question o how ECOWAS would
transport these troops and their equipment to Mali. Only
airlit resources would be able to deliver personnel and
heavy equipment into the area o operations (AO) in a
timely manner, provide operational mobility within theAO against dispersed and heavily armed irregular orces,
monitor a geographic area larger than France, and sustain
operations or months or years. The inability to respond
to these challenges to territorial control, in turn, urther
emboldens such separatists and other spoilers.
Similar challenges are aced in other inaccessible
contexts o instability in Arica, including Somalia, the
Democratic Republic o the Congo (DRC), and Darur,
Sudan, where poor roads and rugged terrain make convoys
slow, ineective, and vulnerable to landmines or ambush.
In certain cases, the government or rebel ghters may
deny peacekeepers and aid workers access to land-based
inrastructure, making air transport the only viable method
o moving personnel and supplies.
For each Arican Union (AU) peacekeeping mission
over the past decade, the AU has been required to engage
in complex and lengthy negotiations with internationalpartners to secure the airlit assets needed to transport
Arican troops and material into and out o the AO. These
delays oten occur at the height o a crisis, precluding
decisive action and putting civilian lives at increased risk.
The Arican Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in
Darur (UNAMID), or example, took nearly 2 years to
reach just 68 percent o its mandated deployment levels
due to stalled political negotiations and a lack o helicopter
-
7/31/2019 Building Africa's Airlift Capacity: A Strategy for Enhancing Military Effectiveness
2/8
Colonel Birame Diop is the Regional Director of the
African Institute for Security Sector Transformation in
Dakar as well as a member of the Senegalese Air Force with
more than 7,000 flying hours. David M. Peyton is a Writer-
Editor at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS).
Colonel Gene McConville is a career U.S. Army Foreign
Area Officer and a Senior Military Advisor at ACSS. Special
thanks to the Program on Irregular Warfare and Special
Operations Studies at the Institute for National Strategic
Studies for its support of this research.
22
dicult to halt without aircrat capable o detecting vessels
on illicit transit routes. Estimates are that approximately
80 percent o cocaine traveling rom Latin America to
Arica moves by sea and the remaining 20 percent by air.5
Without air assets to monitor these routes, transnational
criminals will continue to make the apt calculation that
Arican states are enabling environments or illicit activi-
ties.
Airlit is particularly important to Aricas security
context given the geography o the continent. Arica rep-
resents one-th o the worlds total land mass and is home
to 30,490 kilometers (18,945 miles) o coastline, dense
tropical areas, and expansive deserts, rendering land-based
transportation an expensive and inecient alternative
to air travel. In short, airlit capacity is a strategic orce
multiplier or resource-constrained Arican security sectors.
THE AUS AIRLIFT VISION
Airlit capacity entails both strategic airlit to deliver
troops and material to an AO, usually by large jet-powered
aircrat, and tactical airlit to support operations thereater,
typically by turboprop aircrat and helicopters. Recognizing
this and the scope o complex emergencies that it aces,
the AU set the goal o establishing a Rapid Deployment
Capability o the Arican Standby Force (ASF) in 2007
that would rely on airlit to deploy 2,500 personnel, includ-ing peacekeepers, police, and civilians, to a crisis within 30
days o an AU mandate.6
Depending on the operational
demands o a given crisis, this could be achieved with a
mixture o airlit assets.
At the continental level, airlit platorms such as the
Antonov An-124, Boeing C-17, and Ilyushin Il-76 (see
table 1), which are capable o transporting equipment
into and out o an AO or 1 brigade (approximately 3,000
troops), would be most ecient. Military airliters are
congured to transport equipment and palletized cargo
more eciently than passengers, so commercial aircrat
are needed to transport personnel. This requires aircrat
capable o carrying at least 1 company (130 troops) that
can make multiple roundtrips in rapid succession.
At the subregional level, airlit capacity is needed to
respond to crises and other transnational security chal-
lenges that exceed individual states capacity, such as
narcotics tracking, stabilization operations, and major
transport to support peacekeepers in remote regions o
Darur.1
Once deployed, the ability o Arican peacekeepers to
carry out civilian protection mandates is severely limited
by a lack o strategic and tactical airlit. UNAMID mis-
sion commanders have consistently reported an inability
to deend civilians without helicopters to transport troops
and equipment over Darurs vast and dicult terrain.2
During the rainy season, many roads in Darur become
impassible, severely curtailing peacekeepers maneuver-
ability and eectiveness.
Airlit resources are also needed to protect the lives o
Arican peacekeepers. In July 2008, a UNAMID convoy
was ambushed by armed militants or almost 3 hours, re-
sulting in 7 deaths and 19 casualties. Without helicopters
to stage a rescue or reinorcement mission, the convoy
was let deenseless. Tactical airlit is needed to ensure thatpeacekeepers are, at a minimum, capable o providing se-
curity or themselves, a prerequisite or deending civilians.
United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Ban Ki-
moon has similarly called or more helicopters in the
DRCs Kivu region,3
where a UN stabilization mission
has struggled to prevent armed groups rom targeting civil-
ians in remote areas.
Insucient airlit assets have also impeded Arican
governments ability to interrupt transnational crime,
including piracy, illegal shing, oil bunkering, toxic wastedumping, and illicit tracking. Reports o piracy o the
coast o Nigeria have more than doubled since 2011.4
Moreover, piracy incidents o o Aricas west and east
coasts oten occur more than 70 nautical miles rom shore,
making them dicult to monitor using land- and sea-based
surveillance equipment.
Aricas growing narcotics tracking threat will be
-
7/31/2019 Building Africa's Airlift Capacity: A Strategy for Enhancing Military Effectiveness
3/83
natural disasters. This requires medium-sized aircrat such
as the Airbus A400M and C-130 Hercules to transport 1 to
2 battalions (at least 1,500 personnel) and their equipment
over medium distances on short notice, ideally 14 days.
Once in an AO, security orces require airlit support
rom helicopter systems, ideally large rotary-wing airliterssuch as the CH-47 Chinook. Helicopters enable troops
and equipment to be inserted into and extracted rom
rugged areas as well as provide ground units mobile aerial
surveillance. Most xed-wing aircrat, in contrast, require
well-maintained runways and provide more transient,
intermittent reconnaissance.
At the national level, Arican states must be pre-
pared to airlit troops and material or disasters, respond
to localized crises beore they escalate, patrol borders,
monitor maritime areas as part o antipiracy and exclu-
sive economic zone surveillance, and conduct evacu-
ations. The ideal size o a national airlit feet varies
greatly according to a countrys geography, population,
and overall security environment. Smaller Arican states
should at a minimum maintain the ability to transport a
company-sized orce anywhere within their territory in
a single day. Larger Arican states or those that regularly
ace national security emergencies should be capable
o transporting a battalion-sized orce in the same timeperiod, making successive roundtrip fights as needed.
Platorms that meet these criteria include the C-130
Hercules, EMB 110 Bandeirante, CASA C-295, and
small- or medium-sized helicopters such as the Mi-17,
SA 330 Puma, and UH-60 Black Hawk (see tables 1
and 2).
Low and slow airliters are well suited to the con-
tinents unconventional security threats and should be
prioritized over costly attack aircrat that risk draining
deense budgets o limited resources. Contemporary
warare in Arica rarely involves airspace challenged
by an adversaries ghter aircrat, making attack and air
deense systems virtually irrelevant. Instead, Arican
countries must have the capacity to ace threats posed
by irregular orces.
At present, the majority o Aricas air orces are not
equipped with the needed spectrum o air systems and
trained personnel to support national or regional mis-
Arrat Apprxmate st per arrat Spefatns
Antonov An-124 $30-32 Mil lionMax paylad: 300,000 lbsSeatn: 350Ntes: Large cargo aircrat capable o transporting heavy, oversized loads.
HeavyAirliftBoeing C-17
Globemaster III$202270 million
Max paylad: 164,900 lbsSeatn: 134Ntes: Capable o rapid strategic delivery o troops and cargo to main operating bases orto orward bases.
Ilyushin Il-76 $3050 millionMax paylad: 114,640 lbsSeatn: 140Ntes: Designed to deliver heavy vehicles and machinery to remote, poorly-servicedairfelds.
Airbus A400M $120130 millionMax paylad: 81,600 lbsSeatn: 116Ntes: Capable o perorming tactical airlit, long-range transport, and air-to-air reueling.
Medium-SizedAirlift
Lockheed C-130H $1248 mil lionMax Paylad: 42,000 lbsSeatn: 92Ntes: Capable o operating rom rough, dirt strips and airdropping troops and equipment.
EADS CASA C-295 $2435 million
Max paylad: 20,400 lbsSeatn: 71Ntes: Capable o rapid-response missions with cargo, equipment and soldiers, as well asmedevac duties and airdrop delivery.
Embraer EMB 110Bandeirante
$1 millionMax take weht: 12,500 lbsSeatn: 18Ntes: General purpose light transport aircrat.
LightAirliftHawker Beechcrat
Super King Air 350$7 million
Max take weht: 15,000 lbsSeatn: 15Ntes: Modular crat commonly used or surveillance and reconnaissance.
TAbLE 1 . F IxEd-WINg A IRLIFT PLATFORmS
Source: Cost and specications vary by model, age, capabilities, and other customizations. Ranges listed are approximations gatheredromJanes All the Worlds Aircraft, military procurement records, and other databases.
contemporary warare in Aricararely involves airspace challenged by
an adversaries fghter aircrat
-
7/31/2019 Building Africa's Airlift Capacity: A Strategy for Enhancing Military Effectiveness
4/84
sions. These emerging capacity air orces are comprised
o aircrat that may be aging, out o service, or operated
even when they do not meet the International Civil
Aviation Organizations widely accepted saety stan-
dards. Such air orces ace serious resource constraints,have limited access to specialized training, and have
less developed air inrastructure, especially maintenance
acilities.
Moderate capacity air orces in countries like Ango-
la, Nigeria, and Tunisia have the ability to transport sev-
eral companies o troops and heavy equipment around
the entirety o their national territory and within their
respective subregions. However, transporting troops and
heavy payloads on a continent-wide scale would be slow
and impractical. Their feets are comprised o a varietyo aircrat that are generally reliable, though some may
be aging or out o service.
High capacity air orces in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco,
and South Arica have the ability to transport large troop
contingents and heavy equipment over long distances
in short periods o time. Aircrat in these countries are
regularly maintained and operated by highly trained
personnel. Their air transport inrastructure, including
runways, radar systems, and maintenance acilities, is
modern and conducive to long-range airlit sorties.
To maximize its airlit capabilities, the AU is devel-
oping a Strategic Mobility Package (SMP) to coordinate
transportation services (including and especially airlit)
or the ASF. Although the AU would administer airlit
operations, it would rely entirely on the assets o member
states. The AUs objective is not to create its own stand-
ing air orce but to assemble airlit resources rom con-
tributing member states and deploy them appropriately.
This requires the AU to secure airlit agreements
rom member states in advance, especially rom high
capacity airlit anchor states. These agreements would
speciy the scope o a countrys airlit support and would
be activated via the AU mandating process. To ensuremission readiness, the SMP will need an airlit asset
verication program to conrm the airworthiness and
availability o assets pledged to AU missions. This pro-
gram would unction
similarly to the certi-
ication o troops and
equipment that support
UN missions.
Like other Re-
gional Economic Com-munity (REC) and AU
mechanisms, the suc-
cess o the SMP will de-
pend on member states
commitment to collec-
tive security and deci-
sionmaking. The SMPs
airlit activities would
also require a unction-
ing cost-sharing acility
that enables airlit con-
tributing countries to
receive compensation
or the use o their as-
sets. Aricas airlit anchor states are natural choices
or the provisions o airlit to AU missions. However,
they cannot be expected to render airlit support without
member states sharing the deployment cost.
Rwandas EarthqakeRespnse
In 2008, 2 powerul earthquakeswith magnitudes o 6.1 and5.0 struck Rwandas southwestborder, resulting in 37 deaths andover 600 injuries. The RwandaDeence Force (RDF) immediatelydispatched helicopters andairlited earthquake victims tohospitals in the capital, Kigali.Helicopters were also employedto transport medical personnelto aected areas. RDF airlitoperations were coordinatedby the Rwandan DisasterManagement Task Force, whichalso oversaw the distributiono ood aid, water supplies, andmedicine. Rwandas responsedemonstrated how even modestlevels o airlit capacity can yieldsignifcant results when pairedwith a well-coordinated strategy.
TAbLE 2 . ROTARy-WINg A IRLIF T PLATFORmS
Source: Cost and specications vary by model, age, capabilities, and other customizations. Ranges listed are approximations gathered
romJanes All the Worlds Aircraft, military procurement records, and other databases.
Arrat Apprxmate st per arrat Spefatns
Boeing CH-47SD/D Chinook $3032 millionMax take weht: 54,000 lbsSeatn: 44Ntes: Capable o carrying cargo internally or sling loaded.
Mil Design Bureau Mi -17 $1720 mi ll ionMax take weht: 25,000 lbsSeatn: 35Ntes: Twin-turbine transport heli copter that can also act as a gunship.
Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawk $1021 million
Max take weht: 21,884 lbs
Seatn: 12Ntes: Capable o transporting troops, equipment, and supplies.
Eurocopter AS332 Super Puma $16 millionMax take weht: 18,959 lbsSeatn: 24Ntes: Twin-engine, medium transport or utility helicopter.
-
7/31/2019 Building Africa's Airlift Capacity: A Strategy for Enhancing Military Effectiveness
5/85
CONSTRAINTS TO AIRLIFT dEVELOPmENT
Most Arican security structures remain overwhelm-
ingly land-centriclegacies o their colonial and inde-
pendence-movement origins. Altering these precedents
requires deepening military planners understanding o
how airlit capacity amplies the ecacy o ground orces
by enabling troops to access remote territories quickly,
extract troops rom hostile environments, and receive sup-
plies and heavy equipment in an AO. Conversely, ground
orces with insucient airlit support are slow to deploy
and operationally constrained. Thus, while commonly
viewed as too expensive, airlit capacity enables Arican
militaries with limited resources to cover more territory
or longer periods o time. Gabon and Cape Verde, or
example, have employed light turboprop aircrat such as
the Embraer EMB 110 Bandeirante to transport troopsand conduct aerial surveillance over regions experiencing
high levels o maritime and transborder tracking. At a
cost o about $1 million per aircrat, such airlit platorms
are an ecient means o expanding military eectiveness.
Arican air orces are also leveraging light and medium
airlit systems that have been discontinued such as the
Russian-made Antonov An-24 and Dutch-made Fok-
ker F27, both o which are inexpensive and reliable i
adequately maintained.
Despite its strategic advantages, building political
will or airlit systems is a serious challenge when the cost
o larger, more sophisticated airlit platorms is taken into
consideration. The AUs operating budget in 2011 was
$260 million, the approximate cost o just one Boeing
C-17 transport jet. Procuring advanced airlit systems is
a complex process that involves nancing multimillion
or even multibillion dollar agreements with manuactur-
ers. In 2009, the South Arican Parliament cancelled its
order o eight Airbus A400M aircrat as opposition grew
in response to the systems rising costs, which exceeded the
initially negotiated price o almost $2.5 billion.
In addition to high costs, airlit platorms need support
over the long term. The liecycle cost o airlit systems,
including maintenance, uel, and crew expenses, oten
exceeds the initial purchase price o individual aircrat.
Overlooking these costs has resulted in aircrat that are
requently out o service or operated while ailing to meet
saety standards.
The long-term cost o maintaining airlit systems is
urther compounded by the diversity o Arican air orce
feets. Arican air orces include assets manuactured in
ormer colonial powers, Eastern Europe, Brazil, and the
United States, all o which have discrete maintenance
requirements. This has led Arican air orces to outsource
maintenance work to Arican countries with high capacity
air orces or to overseas partners.
The steep cost o quality fight training is a urther
impediment to building Arican airlit capacity. Aricanpilots, crews, and technicians are trained mainly by Aricas
high capacity air orces, while others receive training in
Europe and the United States. These overseas training op-
portunities are limited, however, and may not correspond
to the diverse equipment o Arican air orces, necessitating
a second round o training when Arican pilots and crew
members return to their home countries.
Airlit capacity development has also been hindered
by a shortage o air transport inrastructure such as air
trac control acilities and navigational aids, among othercomponents. Air-to-ground communication is one o the
continents most pressing needs. Aircrat can fy or more
than an hour in parts o Arica without being able to com-
municate with ground control.7
These actors have com-
bined to make Arica the continent with the poorest air
saety record in the world, with an average o 4.31 aircrat
losses per million departures, compared to 0.65 worldwide.8
PRIORITIES FOR AIRLIFT dEVELOPmENT
Addressing Aricas immediate security concerns
while simultaneously building long-term airlit capacity
requires Arican states, RECs, and the AU to advance a
combination o measures.
Build African airlift partnerships. Arican states
possessing advanced airlit capabilities, namely Algeria,
Egypt, Morocco, and South Arica, are capable o serving
as pillars or bilateral partnerships thanks to their advanced
while commonly viewed as tooexpensive, airlit capacity enables
Arican militaries with limitedresources to cover more territory or
longer periods o time
-
7/31/2019 Building Africa's Airlift Capacity: A Strategy for Enhancing Military Effectiveness
6/86
air feets. Providing leadership or airlit partnerships oers
these countries an opportunity to promote stability in their
respective subregions and to shape the development o
airlit on the continent more broadly. They also stand to
develop more specialized airlit systems, air maintenance
acilities, and fight schools as neighboring countries draw
on them or support.
Airlit partnerships should involve pooling assets,
conducting joint exercises, sharing maintenance acilities,
and providing support to a partner country. Among other
advantages, shared maintenance acilities enable Arican
states to keep their air assets fying saely or longer, e-
ectively extending their capacity at a raction o the cost
o purchasing new planes. Several Arican air orces are
already seizing the opportunities that bilateral partner-
ships oer, such as the Senegalese and Royal Moroccan
Air Forces, which have successully collaborated on train-ing exchanges and maintenance activities. Algeria and
Burkina Faso have a similar air partnership.
Nevertheless, such partnerships occur too inrequent-
ly. This act stems in part rom the reluctance o neighbor-
ing countries to exchange inormation about their air orce
capabilities. Building Arican airlit capacity is as much a
matter o building trust as it is securing nancial resources
or airlit investments. One way to address this challenge
is to start with modest airlit partnerships that are then
expanded to support regional eorts over time.Pool airlift resources within the AU and RECs.
To overcome air domain constraints, the AU and RECs
should emulate air partnership models such as NATOs
Strategic Airlit Capability initiative, in which a consor-
tium o 10 NATO countries plus 2 partner countries have
purchased and share 3 Boeing C-17 strategic transport air-
crat. NATO members have also pooled resources to orm
the Strategic Airlit Interim Solution (SALIS), a coopera-
tive agreement that maintains two Antonov An-124-100
aircrat on ulltime charter. The SALIS agreement is also
capable o dispatching two additional An-124-100 air-
crat on 6 days notice and another two on 9 days notice.
NATOs pooling initiatives have enabled member states
to share the high costs o needed airlit systems and deploy
airlit assets to a variety o missions and locations.
Build capacity by collaborating with external part-
ners. External partners, mainly in the United States and
Europe, have demonstrated a willingness to partner bilater-
ally with Arican air orces and oer a variety o capacity-
building and procurement programs. The U.S. Depart-
ment o Deense provides partner countries with access to
its Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Financing, and
Excess Deense Articles programs, which can be leveraged
to nance and procure needed airlit systems. The Bo-
tswana Deence Force, or example, successully purchased
C-130B transport aircrat using the Foreign Military Sales
program. These programs have also been used to procure
smaller turboprop aircrat such as the Beechcrat Super
King Air 350, used or light airlit and surveillance. Many
Arican air orces also operate European aircrat procured
via security assistance programs and receive specialized
training and maintenance services rom European partners.
A recurring weakness o external bilateral support,
however, is its tendency to be episodic, creating planning
and coordination challenges or Arican air chies. Crat-ing more ormal security cooperation agreements that
center on shared interests can help to promote consistency.
These agreements should emphasize Aricas airlit capacity
development over other assets such as expensive and less
useul attack aircrat.
Streamline airlift agreements with international or-
ganizations.To strengthen air support to uture peacekeep-
ing missions, the AU should strengthen its relationship to
the UN. The UNs Department o Peacekeeping Opera-
tions has been a key partner in securing airlit resources orjoint missions in Arica, such as in Darur with UNAMID.
Despite this partnership, AU-UN collaboration has been
suboptimal due to communication gaps and disagreements
over mission mandates. To improve this partnershipa
task that both organizations recognize is neededthe UN
and AU should consider adopting a strategic ramework
or airlit operations.
The AU should also strengthen its relationship with
NATO to secure needed airlit in the near term. NATO
has the capacity to transport multiple brigade-sized orces
to hostile environments and provide sustained airlit over
the lie o a peacekeeping mission. During the AU Mission
in Sudan, NATO coordinated the airlit o 31,500 troops
and personnel into and out o Darur. Airlit support rom
NATO has also been vital to the deployment o Burundian
and Ugandan troops to Somalia in support o AMISOM
and its 17,000 personnel. The AUs Peace and Security
Council and its Peace Support Operations Division have
-
7/31/2019 Building Africa's Airlift Capacity: A Strategy for Enhancing Military Effectiveness
7/87
expressed eagerness to expand cooperation with NATO
on uture peacekeeping deployments. This is a step in the
right direction, and should be reinorced by additional
eorts to streamline AU-NATO collaboration.
Engage the private sector. The private sector has a
critical role to play in providing strategic airlit to Arican
security operations. Even the worlds leading air orces rely
on commercial airlines to provide airlit or large-scale
operations. NATO countries regularly transport person-
nel and equipment using privately chartered fights and
the U.S. maintains the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF),
a consortium o U.S. commercial air carriers that can be
called upon to provide airlit services to the U.S. military
in an emergency. European, Asian, and South American
air orces also use private sector air carriers to transport
troops and equipment to crisis situations.
At present, there is untapped potential or public-private partnerships to ll Aricas airlit gap. Aricas com-
mercial air industry is led by ecient air carriers such as
EgyptAir, Ethiopian Airlines, Kenya Airways, Royal Air
Maroc, and South Arican Airways. The AU, RECs, and
individual Arican states should establish relationships
with these carriers to secure vital airlit capacities or se-
curity operations as well as reinorce the protability o
Aricas commercial air industry. Arican policymakers may
also consider contracting with non-Arican commercial
airlines, which have proven their ability to operate saelyand at low cost on the continent.
A prevailing challenge when recruiting support rom
commercial air carriers is the high cost o insurance pre-
miums or aircrat landing in an AO. The AU can help
minimize this cost by negotiating better collective rates
with insurance providers and by creating a und to cover all
or a portion o war-risk insurance premiums. An example
that the AU might consider is the Aviation War Risk
Insurance Program managed by the U.S. Federal Aviation
Administration, which provides reasonably priced insur-
ance coverage or losses due to war, capture, vandalism,
and other confict-related damages.
Air trac in Arica has surged over the past decade
and is projected to grow at a rate o 5.7 percent per year,
signicantly aster than the international average o 4.9
percent.9
Platorms such as CASA C-295s, C-130s, and
larger airliters requently depend on the same air inra-
structure that commercial air trac utilizes, such as run-
ways, ueling stations, maintenance acilities, radar, and
other secondary air systems, so growth in the commercial
sector augurs well or Aricas airlit capacity decit.
Nevertheless, subregional disparities have emerged,
with booming air hubs in Southern and Eastern Arica
and signicantly less commercial air trac in Central and
Western Arica (see gure 1). To build airlit capacity incountries and regions with less developed air transport
industries, thereore, Arican security ocials should sup-
port civilian counterparts eorts to implement cooperative
agreements created to sustain commercial air industry
growth. One such measure is the Yamoussoukro Decision,
an agreement signed in 2000 and ratied by 48 Arican
states by 2004. Implementation o this expansive techni-
cal ramework, which stipulates the liberalization o air
services, broadening o air trac rights, and reductions in
taris, has underpinned Aricas booming air transport in-
dustry but remains uneven and incomplete.11
The Arican
Civil Aviation Commissions ongoing eorts to realize ull
application o the Yamoussoukro Decision and develop an
integrated air transport system on the continent are vital
to building Arican airlit capacity.
Inventory existing African airlift assets.Inormation
gaps are obstructing Arican policymakers rom optimizing
air partnerships and making judicious procurement deci-
Source: Bonger 2009.10
The thickness o the lines is on a
continuous scale, with the thickest line (South Arica-Zambia)representing nearly 1 million seats or 2007 and the thinnest(Ethiopia-Ghana) representing 62,000 seats. The size o the end
points results rom the thickness o the lines.
FiguRE 1. ToP 60 AiR RouTES WiTHiN Sub-SAHARAN AFRicA
-
7/31/2019 Building Africa's Airlift Capacity: A Strategy for Enhancing Military Effectiveness
8/888
The Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) supports the
development of U.S. strategic policy toward Africa by providing high-
quality academic programs, undertaking policy-relevant research
and analysis, and fostering awareness of and open dialogue on U.S.
strategic priorities and African security issues. Toward these aims,
the ACSS is committed to building networks of African, American,
European, and international military and civilian leaders and
articulating African perspective to U.S. policymakers.
The Africa Security Briefs series presents research and analysis
by ACSS experts and outside scholars with the aim of advancing
understanding of African security issues. The opinions, conclusions,
and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of
the contributors and do not necessarily reect the views of the
U.S. Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal
Government. For more information on ACSS, visit the Web site at
http://www.africacenter.org.
AfricA center for StrAtegic StudieS
hp://www.aa.
fricA center for
trAtegic StudieS
irector: Ambassador William
M. Bellamy (Ret.)
National Deense University
00 Fith Avenue, Building 20ort McNair
Washington, D.C. 20319-5066
hone: + 1 202-685-7300
Website: www.aricacenter.org
fricA center regionAl
ffice in dAkAr
egional Manager:
Gerald Lefer
hone: 221 33 869 61 57
mail: [email protected]
fricA center regionAl
ffice in AddiS AbAbA
egional Manager:rad Anderson
hone: 251 11 130 6683
mail: [email protected]
fricA Security briefS
ditor: Joseph Siegle, Ph.D.
hone: +1 202-685-6808
mail: [email protected]
iSSn 2164-4047
sions. Sharing inormation about Arican airlit feets, their
airworthiness, and the availability o spare parts would
create opportunities or Arican air orces with similar
air assets to collaborate. This would also allow Arican
countries to avoid procuring redundant systems or aircrat
that pose interoperability challenges when conducting
joint operations.
The AU has stated the need to develop a database o
the continents airlit platorms or the purpose o standing
up its SMP.12
Like other security cooperation activities,
however, this priority is challenging due to member states
concerns that inormation about their strategic capabilities
will be used against them. More subtly, some AU mem-
ber states are reticent to divulge the true extent o their
limited airlit capabilities. Overcoming these concerns
is a long-term project that the AU should undertake by
demonstrating the advantages o inormation sharing andairlit cooperation. Conversely, the AU need not oblige
member states to share inormation about all air systems,
such as ghter aircrat, missile systems, or other sensitive
capacities. The AU should rather compile a limited and
targeted database o workhorse airlit platorms and spare
parts.
The AU can also build momentum or its inorma-
tion-sharing eorts by emphasizing existing bilateral and
subregional security cooperation agreements. Airlit inor-
mation sharing between countries that are already cooper-ating will be easier to establish than inormation-sharing
agreements between states that interact inrequently or
not at all. Their willingness to share inormation about
their airlit systems will set a powerul example or the rest
o the continent.
NOTES
1 Report of the Secretary-General on the deployment of the
African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UN
Security Council: S/2009/352, July 13, 2009).2 Mashood Issaka and Elijah Dickens Mushemeza,
Operationalizing the Arican Standby Force, International
Peace Institute, January 2010.3 DR Congo: UN Peacekeeping Mission Receives Tactical
Helicopters From Ukraine, UN News Centre, March 7, 2012.4 Six Month Drop in World Piracy, IMB Report Shows,
International Chamber o Commerce Commercial Crime
Service, April 23, 2012.5 Liana Sun Wyler, Nicolas Cook, Illegal Drug Trade in
Africa: Trends and U.S. Policy (Washington, DC: Congressional
Research Service, February 26, 2010)6 Arican Union, Specialized Technical Committee on
Deense, Saety and Security, 4th Meeting, Progress Report on the
Status of the Operationalization of the African Standby Force(Addis
Ababa: AU, December 3-7, 2010). Jakkie Cilliers, The African
Standby Force: An Update on Progress, ISS Paper 160 (Pretoria:
Institute or Security Studies, March 2008).7
Airport Runways and Terminal Capacity Are GenerallyAdequate, but Air Trac Control and Surveillance Facilities
Need Substantial Improvement, Arican Development Bank,
available at .8 A Poor Saety RecordLargely Attributable to Low
Standards and Lax SupervisionIs the Greatest Challenge
Facing the Air Transport Industry in Arica Today, Arican
Development Bank available at .9 Charles Schlumberger, Open Skies for Africa: Implementing
the Yamoussoukro Decision (Washington, DC: The World Bank,
2010).10 Heinrich C. Bonger, An Unsteady Course: Challenges
to Growth in Aricas Air Transport Industry, in Africa
Infrastructure Country Diagnostic, ed. Vivien Foster and Cecilia
Briceo-Garmendia (Washington, DC: The World Bank, July
2009), 261.11 Schlumberger.12 Arican Union, 2010.