breaching the marianas - the battle for saipan

8/7/2019 Breaching the Marianas - The Battle for Saipan

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B reaching the M arianas :Th e B attle for Saipanby Captain John C . Chapin, USMCR (Ret)

guns. The LVTs could negotiate th ereef, but the rest could not andwere forced to turn back until apassageway through the reef coul dbe discovered .

Earlier, at 0600, further north, afeint landing was conducted offTanapag harbor by part of the 2dMarines in conjunction with the 1s tBattalion, 29th Marines, and the24th Marines . The Japanese werenot really fooled and did not rus hreinforcements to that area, butit did tie up at least one enemyregiment .

When the LVT(A)s and troop-car-rying LVTs reached the reef, i tseemed to explode . In every direc-tion and in the water beyond on th eway to the beaches, great geysers ofwater rose with artillery and morta rshells exploding. Small-arms fire, ri-fles, and machine guns joined th emounting crescendo. The LVTsground ashore .

Confusion on the beaches, partic-ularly in the 2d Marine Divisionarea, was compounded by thestrength of a northerly current flowwhich caused the assault battalion sof the 6th and 8th Marines to lan dabout 400 yards too far north . Thi scaused a gap to widen between th e2d and 4th Marine Divisions . AsColonel Robert E . Hogaboom, theoperations officer of the Expedi-tionary Troops commented : "Theopposition consisted primarily o fartillery and mortar fire fromweapons placed in well-deploye dpositions and previously registeredto cover the beach areas, as well a sfire from small arms, automaticweapons, and anti-boat guns sitedto cover the approaches to andthe immediate landing beaches . "

t was to be a bruta lday. At first light on 15June 1944, the Navyfire support ships ofthe task force lying off

Saipan Island increased their previ -ous days' preparatory fires involv-ing all calibers of weapons . At 0542Vice Admiral Richmond KellyTurner ordered, "Land the landingforce." Around 0700, the landingships, tank (LSTs) moved to withinapproximately 1,250 yards behin dthe line of departure . Troops in theLSTs began debarking from them inlanding vehicles, tracked (LVTs) .Control vessels containing Navyand Marine personnel with thei rradio gear took their positions dis-playing flags indicating whichbeach approaches they controlled .

Admiral Turner delayed H-hourfrom 0830 to 0840 to give the "boa twaves" additional time to get intoposition. Then the first wav eheaded full speed toward th ebeaches. The Japanese waited pa-tiently, ready to make the assaul tunits pay a heavy price .

The first assault wave containedarmored amphibian tractor s(LVT[A]s) with their 75mm guns fir -ing rapidly. They were accompaniedby light gunboats firing 4 .5-inchrockets, 20mm guns, and 40mm

On the Cover : A Marine enters the out -skirts of Garapan, Saipan, through the tori igate of a Shinto Shrine . Department of De-fense Photo (USMC) 92993At left: The first assault wave has hit th ebeach from the LVT (amphibious tractor)that brought it ashore, and the Marines nowprepare to fight their way inland . Depart-ment of Defense Photo (USMC) 8326 1


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As a result, five of the 2d Ma- (first objective) line, the deluge of mangled and grotesque posi -rine Division assault unit corn- Japanese fire and natural obstacles tions; blasted and burnt-outmanders were soon wounded in prevented this. A few units in the pillboxes; the burning wrecksthe two battalions of the 6th center of the 4th Division made it, of LVTs that had been knockedMarines (on the far left), and in the but fierce enemy resistance pinned out by Jap high velocity fire ;two battalions of the 8th Marines . down the right and left flanks . The the acrid smell of high explo -With Afetan Point in the middle two divisions were unable to make sives; the shattered trees ; andspitting deadly enfilade fire to the direct contact . the churned-up sand litteredleft and to the right, the next units A first lieutenant in the 3d Battal- with discarded equipment .across the gap were two battalions ion, 24th Marines, John C . Chapin, When his company movedof the 23d Marines and, finally, on later remembered vividly the extra- land a short distance, it quickly ethe far right, two battalions of the ordinary scene on the beach when perienced the frightening precisi25th Marines . he came ashore on D-Day : of the pre-registered Japanese aAlthough the original plan had All around us was the tillery fire :been for the assault troops to ride chaotic debris of bitter combat : Suddenly, WHAM! A shel ltheir LVTs all the way to the 0-1 Jap and Marine bodies lying in hit right on top of us! I was too

surprised to think, but instinc-"D-Day at Saipan" tively all of us hit the deck andWaterc olor by SSgt John Fabion in Marine Corps Art C ollection began to spread out. Then the

shells really began to pourdown on us: ahead, behind, o nboth sides, and right in ourmidst. They would come rock-eting down with a freight-trai nroar and then explode with adeafening cataclysm that is be-yond description .

It finally dawned on methat the first shell bursts we'dheard had been ranging shots ,and now that the Japs were"zeroed in" on us, we werecaught in a full-fledged bar -rage . The fire was hitting u swith pin-point accuracy, and i twas not hard to see whytowering 1500 feet above us


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insisting, "Wake up!" I jerkedbolt uprightin combat yourreflexes act fast and you neve rgo fully to sleep. A glance a tmy watch showed that it wa salmost dawn .

I turned to my runner whowas lying against me, asleep ."Let's go!" I said, "Pass theword to the squad leaders toget set ." He didn't stir. I shookhim. He still didn't move . Hewas dead . With the callousnessthat war demands, I rolled himover, reached for his canteen,and poured the precious waterinto my own canteen. Then Ileft him lying there . . . .All the assault regiments were

taking casualties from the constan tshelling that was zeroed in by spot -ters on the high ground inland.Supplies and reinforcing units pile dup in confusion on the landingbeaches . Snipers were everywhere.Supporting waves experienced th esame deadly enemy fire on thei rway to the beach . Some LVTs losttheir direction, some received directhits, and others were flipped ontheir sides by waves or enemy firespilling their equipment and per-sonnel onto the reef. Casualties inboth divisions mounted rapidly .

was Mt. Tapotchau, with Jap Marines dig in on the beachhead, consolidating their positions, and at the same tim eobservation posts honeycomb- preparing to move out on the attack inland .ing its crest . Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 8191 7That night the lieutenant and hi s

ow foxholen

. Death came close :Slowly, very slowly, thehours of my watch passed,and at last I leaned over andshook my runner awake . "It'stime for your watch," I whis-pered. "Look out for that plac eover there, maybe Japs in it .Keep awake." With that Irolled over on the ground andwas asleep in an instant .

Right away, it seemed,someone was shaking me and


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Japanese . The commander of th e4th Division, Major General HarrySchmidt, came ashore at 1930 andlater recalled, "Needless to say, the

Col James A. Donovan Collection

We entered a little villag ecalled Charan-Kanoa . Wepaused there to get somewater. We had been pinched

out of our zone of action . Wewere washing up and restin gwhen all of a sudden morta rshells started to fall on us . Wedidn't know it at the time, butin a tall smokestack nearbywas a Japanese forward ob-server. He was directing th efire, looking right down on us .It didn't occur to us that some-body could be up in thatsmokestack after all th epreparatory naval gunfire andeverything that had been firedinto the area, but he was upthere all right. He reallycaused a great number ofcasualties in G Company

He caught us without fox -holes. We had that false senseof security from having bee npinched out of the line . Wethought we had a chance t orelax. We didn't. So all had todig holes in a hurry, and it' shard to dig a hole when you'r elying on your stomach diggingwith your chin, your elbows ,your knees, and your toes . It ispossible to dig a hole that way,I found, but we lost far moreMarines than we should have

Members of the Japanese garrison on Saipan pose for a photograph during a more peacefu ltime before the Marine landing .

Evacuating them to the ships wasextremely dangerous and difficult .Medical aid stations set up ashorewere under sporadic enemy fire .

As the Marine artillery alsolanded in the late afternoon of D-Day and began firing in support ofthe infantry, it received deadly ac -

command post during that time didnot function very well . It was thehottest spot I was in duringthe war . . . . "

Major James A. Donovan, execu-tive officer of the 1st Battalion, 6thMarines, endured a mortar barragethat had uncanny timing and

curate counter-battery fire from the precision :

Lieutenant General Holland M .Smith, one of the most famou sMarines of World War II, wa sborn in 1882. He was commissioneda second lieutenant in 1905 . Therefollowed a series of overseas assign-ments in the Philippines, Nicaragua ,Santo Domingo, and with the Marin eBrigade in France in World War I . Be -ginning in the early 1930s, he becameincreasingly focused on the develop-ment of amphibious warfare con-cepts. Soon after the outbreak of warwith Japan in 1941, he came to a cru -cial position, command of allMarines in the Central Pacific .As another Marine officer later de -scribed him, "He was of mediumheight, perhaps five feet nine or te ninches, and somewhat paunchy. Hi sonce-black hair had turned gray. Hi sonce close-trimmed mustache was

somewhat scraggly . He wore steel -rimmed glasses and he smoked cigar sincessantly." There was one other fea -ture that characterized him : a fero-cious temper that earned him th enickname "Howlin' Mad" Smith, al -though his close friends knew himas "Hoke . "

This characteristic would usuallyemerge as irritation at what he fel twere substandard performances. Onefamous example of this was his relie fof an Army general on Saipan. A hugeinterservice uproar erupted !Less than two years later, after 4 1years of active service, during whic hhe was awarded four Distinguishe dService Medals for his leadership infour successive successful amphibiousoperations, he retired in April 1946 ,as a four-star general . He died i nJanuary 1967 .

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 8988LtGen Smith in his command post ashore oSaipan uses a high-powered telescope to observe his troops in action .


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The 2d Marine DivisionThe origins of this division layin the activation of the 2d Ma-rine Brigade as part of th eFleet Marine Force on 1 July 1936 . Ayear later the brigade deployed toShanghai, China, returning in 19 3 8to San D iego, California .

On 1 February 1941, the unit wa sredesignated as the 2d Marine Divi-sion. Its component regiments, th e2d, 6th, 8th, and 10th Marines ,brought with them impressive histo -ries of service in Vera Cruz (Mex-ico), World War I in France, and theCaribbean .

In World War II, elements of thedivision served in Iceland, in Hawaiiduring the attack on Pearl Harbor,and on Samoa, then the full divisionin the Guadalcanal campaign, fol-lowed by the bloody assault of

Tarawa for which it was awarded aPresidential Unit Citation, and on t oSaipan, Tinian, and Okinawa .

The 2d M arine Division Patc hThis 2d Marine Division shoulder patchwas worn on Saipan. Designed and ap -proved in late 1943, the insignia is inthe official Marine Corps colors of scar -let and gold. The insignia displays aspearhead-shaped scarlet backgroundwith a hand holding aloft a lighted goldtorch. A scarlet numeral "2" is superim -posed upon the torch, and the torchand hand are encircled by five whit estars in the arrangement of the South-ern Cross constellation; under this thedivision's first World War II comba ttook place at Guadalcanal . Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A41299 2

before someone finally locatedthat observer up in the smoke -stack. I don't know how tal lthe smokestack was, but Iwould say probably the equiv-alent of two or three storieshigh. From up there he coul dsee the entire picture, and hereally gave it to us .The night of D-Day saw continu-

ed-

Division zon e. The

lf

. About 2,000m

hey were. Led by tanks the

et by a wall of fir e.30-caliber machine guns,

. It was too much and they fel l0

. Thee

hatch. A bullet had gone straight uphis bugle !

One of the crucial assets for theMarine defense that night (and onmany subsequent nights) was the il-lumination provided by star shellsfired from Navy ships. Japaneserecords recovered later from thei rThirty-first Army message file re-vealed, " . . . as soon as the night at -tack units go forward, the enem ypoints out targets by using the larg estar shells which practically turnnight into day. Thus the maneuver-ing of units is extremely difficult . "

As the weary Marines finallytried to get some sleep, all alon gtheir irregular line of foxholes, twothings were very clear to them :they had forced a precarious beach-head in the teeth of bitter enemyfire, and a long, tough battle obvi-ously lay ahead .

While the thoughts of the rifle -men focused on survival and theimmediate ground in front of them ,the senior command echelons sawthe initial success of the landings asa culmination of months of plan-ning, training, and organization for

a strategic strike on a crucial Japan-ese stronghold. The opportunity fo rthis sprang from earlier Central Pa-cific victories .

The Marine conquest of Tarawain the Gilbert Islands in Novembe r1943, followed by the joint Marine -Army capture of Kwajalein an dEniwetok atolls in the Marshall Is-lands in January-February 1944 ,had broken the outer ring of Japan-ese defenses and set the stage fo rsucceeding operations .

These earlier victories ha dmoved up the entire American op-erational timetable for the Centra lPacific by three valuable months .After discussions of various alterna-tives (such as an attack on the vas tJapanese base at Truk), the Join tChiefs of Staff had settled on th enext objective : the Mariana Islands .There were to be three principaltargets: Saipan, Tinian, and Guam. Itwas a daring decision, for Saipan was1,344 miles from the Marshalls and3,226 miles from Hawaii, but onl y1,250 miles from Japan. Furthermore,the islands were linchpins in the re-vised inner defense line which the

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The 4th M arine DivisionThis division had its roots in th eshifting and redesignation o fseveral other units . The 23 dMarines began as infantry detachedfrom the 3d Division in February19 43, the same m onth that an artillerybattalion becam e the genesis of th e14th M arines and engineer elementsof the 19th Marines formed the star tof the 20th Marines . In March the24th Marines was organized, an dthen in May it was split in two t osupp ly the men for the 25th Marines .This war-time shuffling providedthe major building blocks for a ne wdivision. The units were originallyseparated, however, with the 24t hMarines and a variety of reinforcingunits (engineer, artillery, medical ,motor transport, special weapons ,tanks, etc.) at Camp Pendleton i nCalifornia . The rest of the units wereat Camp Lejeune, North Carolina .This East Coast echelon moved to

Pendleton by train and also by shi pthrough the Panama Canal in July an dAugust 1943. All the units were now fi -nally together, and thus the 4th MarineDivision was formally activated on 14August 1943 .

After intensive training, it shippedout on 13 January 1944, and in 1 3short months made four major assaul tlandings : Roi-Namur, Saipan, Tinian ,and Iwo Jima, suffering over 17,000casualties. It was awarded two Presi-dential Unit Citations and a NavyUnit Commendation, and then deacti -vated 28 November 1945. In February1966, however, it was reactivated a sthe lead division in the Marine Corp sReserve, and it furnished essentia lunits to Desert Storm in the liberationof Kuwait .The 4th Ma rine Division Patc hWorn on Saipan, it had a gold "4" on ascarlet background, the official colors

Department of Defense Photo (USMC)of the U .S . Marine Corps . Thi semblem was designed by SSgt JohnFabion, a member of the division' spublic affairs office before the Mar-shalls campaign . His commandingofficer was astonished to find that ,when the division attacked Roi isletin Kwajalein Atoll in the MarshallIslands (January 1944), the layout o fthe runways on the Japanese airstripthere were an exact replica . "

Japanese felt they absolutely had tohold after their previous losses inthe Central and Southwest Pacific .

Saipan represented a wholly newkind of prickly problem for a nAmerican assault. Instead of a small ,flat coral islet in an atoll, it was alarge island target of some 72 squaremiles, with terrain varying from flatcane fields to swamps to precipitouscliffs to the commanding 1,554-foot-high Mount Tapotchau. Moreoverthe Japanese considered it "thei rown territory," in spite of the fac tthat it was legally only a mandat eprovided by the terms of the Ver-sailles Treaty following World War I .The fact that Japan held the islandsled it to install a policy of exclusio nof all outsiders and the start of mili-tary construction, forbidden by thetreaty, as early as 1934 .

Attacking a formidable objectivesuch as Saipan called for comple xplanning and much greater forc ethan had previously been needed i nthe Central Pacific. An elaborate or-ganization was therefore assem-

bled. Admiral Raymond A . Spru-ance was in overall command of th eforce detailed to invade the Mari-anas as well as the naval unit sneeded to protect them . AdmiralTurner was in command over theamphibious task force, while Ma-rine Lieutenant General Holland M .Smith was to direct the landingforces on Saipan and then on th eneighboring island of Tinian . (Asimilar command structure, butwith different combat units, was setup for the attack on Guam tothe south . )

The operation plan for Saipan ,code-named Forager, called for anassault on the western side of the is -land, with the 2d Marine Divisionon the left and the 4th Marine Divi-sion on the right. The Army's 27thInfantry Division was in reserve ,ready to be fed into the battle i fneeded. While each of the two Ma-rine divisions had previousl yfought as a complete unit, the 27thhad experienced only two minorlandings (at Makin and Eniwetok

islets) for some of its regimentand battalions .

The intensive training for thesthree divisions took place in thHawaiian Islands with Major General Harry Schmidt's 4th Marine Dvision on Maui, Major GeneraThomas E. Watson's 2d Marine Dvision on the "Big Island" oHawaii, and Army Major GeneraRalph C. Smith's 27th Infantry Division on Oahu. As LieutenanChapin described it:

(These) months were busyhard-working ones . The re -placements that arrived to fil lthe gaps left by Namur's casu-alties (in the Kwajalein battle)had to be trained in all thecomplexities of field work .Most of these replacement swere boys fresh from bootcamp, and they were ignoran tof everything but the barest es-sentials. Week after week wa sfilled with long marches, fiel dcombat problems, live firing,obstacle courses, street fight-

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The Army 27th Infan try DivisionT his division, before the na-tional emergency was de-clared in 1940, was a State o fNew York N ational Gu ard organiza -tion . It contained many famous ol dregiments, some dating from the Rev -olutionary and Civil Wars . In Worl dWar II, the division's 165th Infantryhad been the renowned old 69th Ne wYork Infantry, also known as th e"Fighting 69 th" and "Fighting Irish" ofWorld War I fame. The first unit o fthis regiment was organized in 177 5 .As the war in Europe grew in in -tensity, the Selective Service Act gavethe President the power to federaliz ethe National Guard . Thus, the 27thDivision was activated by PresidentRoosevelt on 25 September 1940 . I twas first sent to Fort McClellan, Al-abama, for intensive training, andthen, in Dece mber 1941, to Cal i fornia .

On 28 February 1942, the first ele-ments of the division sailed from SanFrancisco and landed at the town ofHilo on the "Big Island" of Hawaii .During the next two months, the di-vision units were scattered through -out the island for local defense andtraining. That was the start of th elongest wartime overseas service ofany National Guard division in theUnited States Army

In the fall of 1942, the divisio nwas directed to assemble on the is -land of Oahu . MajGen Ralph C .Smith took over command at that

time . Then in midsummer 1943, or -ders came to prepare the 165th In-fantry Regiment, reinforced by a bat -talion of the 105th Infantry and anartillery battalion, for an assault t ocapture the coral atoll of Makin, i nthe Gilbert Islands chain . Followinga four-day battle there, in Novembe r1943, the division furnished a battal-ion of the 106th Infantry for the un-opposed occupation of Majuro in th eMarshall Islands in January 1944 .

The final prelude to Saipan fo runits of the 27th came the nex tmonth. Two battalions of the 106thfought at Eniwetok Atoll in th eMarshalls .

After the division's struggle onSaipan, it went on to the battle fo rOkinawa in April 1945, and the nto the occupation of Japan in Sep-tember 1945 .

The final chapter came in Decem -ber 1946 when the 27th InfantryDivision was deactivated .

ing, judo, calisthenics, nightand day attacks and defenses ,etc. There were also lecture son the errors we'd made atNamur. Added emphasis wasplaced on attacking fortifie dpositions. We worked with de-molition charges of dynamite,TNT, and C-2 [plastic explo-sive], and with flame throwerstill everyone knew them for -ward and backward .The month of May 1944 brought

. The op-ion plan looked neatly andciently organized on paper.

In practice it looked different t othat lieutenant :

To us in the lower echelonsit was just the same old stuf fthat we'd been doing for asolid year: filing up from com-partments below decks to yourassigned boat station, goingover the side, hurrying dow nthe net to beat the stopwatch,into the heaving LCVP (Land-ing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel) ,and away. Then the inter-minable hours of circling,meanwhile getting wet, hun-gry and bored . The K rations(in a waxed box) tasted like

sawdust; the weather gotrougher and rougher. Some ofthe men got seasick, and all o fus were soaking wet and cold .

Finally we headed back t oour transport and clambere dup the cargo net with a sigh o frelief. The next day it was thesame thing all over again, ex-cept that this time we wentashore. This, too, had an aw-fully familiar feeling: wadingthrough the surf, getting youronly pair of shoes and sockswringing wet, and then ont othe beach where all the sandmigrated inside your shoes . Aseries of conflicting and confus-ing orders flowed downthrough the chain of command :halt and move on, halt andmove on, go here, go there .The vast attack force now gath-

ered at Pearl Harbor. Althoughthere were unfortunate accidents t osome of the landing craft, over 800ships set out in the naval compo-nent, some for direct fire suppor tof the troops, some for transport ,and some (the fast carrier taskforce) to make advance air strikesand then to deal with the attackwhich the landing probably woul dincite from the Japanese Navy.Holland Smith's V AmphibiousCorps, totalling 71,034 Marine an dArmy troops, sailed with someslow elements starting on 25 May.The specialized craft for theground forces ran the gamut ofacronym varieties . After stagingthrough the Marshalls, the armadaheaded for the target : Saipan .

At sea the troops got their fina lbriefings: maps of the island (basedon recent American aerial and sub-marine photographs of a hitherto"secret island"), estimates of 15,00 0enemy troops (which turned out inthe end to be 30,000 under the com -mand of Lieutenant General Yoshi-tsugu Saito and Vice Admiral Chi-uchi Nagumo), and detailed attackplans for two Marine divisions .

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Simultaneously, the Americanfast carriers' planes began, on 1 1June, their softening-up bombing ,combined with attacks on Japanes eland-based air. Two days later, th emain enemy fleet headed for theMarianas for a decisive battle . Then,on 14 June, the "old battleships" ofthe U .S . Navy, reborn from thePearl Harbor disaster, moved inclose to Saipan to pound the Japan-ese defenses with their heavy guns .That night underwater demolitionteams made their dangerous swimin close to the assault beaches tocheck on reefs, channels, mines, andbeach defenses. All was now inreadiness for the landings .

The bloody business of D-Daywas, as the troops well realized ,only a beginning, for the long, gru-elling fight which began the nextmorning.

D+1-D+2,16-17 JuneThe next two days saw the Ma-

rine attack resumed all along the ir-regular front . The 2d Division, afte rreorganizing, pushed its 6thMarines northeast toward Moun tTipo Pali, its 2d Marines north to -wards Garapan, and its 8th Marineseast into the swamps around Lak eSusupe. Direct contact with the 4thDivision was finally established .

Close combat was the normThere were no exceptions for bat-talion commanders. LieutenantColonel Justice M. Chambers, corn-

manding the 3d Battalion, 25thMarines in the 4th Division late rdescribed two of his experienceson D + 1 :

We came to a big bombcrater . The soil had all beenthrown up, and around it therewere three Marines protectedby the dirt . I called up to oneof these Marines and askedhim what was going on . Oneof them said that there was anantiaircraft gun right down infront of them. I crawled upwithin two or three feet of th etop of the dirt and raised up onmy hands to see what wasdown there .

Within about 25 to 30 yards ,I was looking right into th emuzzle of an 88mm antiair-craft/antitank gun . They hadswung the damn thing around ,and it was pointing right u pthe hill . I was looking rightdown its muzzle. I dropped ashard as I could and then thedamn gun went off . The shelltore through the far side of thebomb crater, came through thedirt on the near side of thebomb crater where I was . I ttook the head off the Marin ewith whom I had been talking .The shell went on back andlanded about 20 or 30 feet be-yond us where it detonated .Later thjat same day, he hadanother close call

We had, as we had ad-vanced, uncovered vario'isJapanese supply caches. Oneof these was an ammunitiondump . . . . About 1505 theJaps blew the large dump nearwhere I was standing andcaused numerous concussioncasualties including myself

. . I don't remember a thingabout it. The boys tell me that ,when the blast went off, I wa sthrown right up in the air, andI turned a complete flip an dthen landed on my face .On the night of D + 1, th

Japanese again launched a majoattack on the 6th Marines, thitime with 44 tanks . Major Donovan later described the wild clash"The battle evolved itself intomadhouse of noise, tracers, anflashing lights . As tanks were hiand set afire, they silhouetteother tanks coming out of thflickering shadows to the front oalready on top of the squads ." ThMarines poured in their fire, nowwith 2.36-inch rocket launchersgrenade launchers, self-propelle75mm guns, and their own artillery and tanks adding to thdin. When dawn broke, it waover and the shattered hulks of 2Japanese tanks lay there smoking

In the 4th Division zone of action, the left regiment, the 23dalso had a difficult time in thSusupe swamp. The 24th and 25t

MGeneral Harry Schmid t

was the leader of the 4th Ma-rine Division in the assaults atRoi-Namur in the Marshall Islands andthen at Saipan in the Marianas .

Born in 1886, he entered the Corps asa second lieutenant in 1909 . By extraor-dinary coincidence, his first foreignduty was at Guam in the Marianas Is -lands, an area he would return to 33years later under vastly different cir-cumstances !

The Philippines, Mexico, Cuba, an dNicaragua (where he was awarded aNavy Crosssecond only to the Medal

of Honor), interspersed with repeate dstays in China, were the marks of adiverse overseas career. At home therewere staff schools, paymaster duties ,and a tour as Assistant Commandant .

By the end of World War II, he ha dbeen decorated with three Distin-guished Service Medals. Retiring in1948 after 39 years of service, he wa sadvanced to the four-star rank of gen-eral. His death came in 1968 .

A contemporary described him as "aBuddha, a typical old-time Marine : he'dbeen in China; he was regulation, OldEstablishment, a regular Marine . "

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Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 8355 1T his Japanese soldier and tank are both perm anently finished af ter an attack on M arine lines .

towards.

looming of overex-lolland Smith pulled the 165th

try out of his reserve (thermy's 27th Infantry Division )

-. This

Smith came ashore to take com-mand of the additional Army unit sof his 27th Division as they landed .

With the 165th Infantry on itsright flank and the 24th Marinesto its left, the 25th Marines waspoised on the north edge of Aslitoairfield late on D+2. Its patrolsfound the strip was abandoned,but the 165th, assigned to cap-

ture it, decided to wait until thenext day.

The division had finally ap-proached the 0-1 line, except onthe left flank where contact wit hthe 2d Division was again broken ,this time near Mount Fina Susu .

This same day, 17 June, saw acrucial command decision byAdmiral Spruance. With the power-

ajor General Thomas E . Wat-son, as a brigadier genera land commander of Tactica l

p-1, built on the 22d Marines, le dk-. For this he was awarded a

et

.

He took command of the 2d Marine. In June hef-

Retirement came in 1950, and he died.

With a birth date of 1892, and an en -listment date of 1912, he fully qualifiedas a member of "the Old Corps ." Afte rbeing commissioned in 1916, he servedin a variety of Marine assignments in theCaribbean, China, and the United States .

Given the nickname "TerribleTommy," Watson's proverbial impa-tience later was characterized by Gen-eral Wallace M. Greene, Jr., as follows :"He would not tolerate for one minut estupidity, laziness, professional incom-petence, or failure in leadership . . . . Histemper in correcting these failings couldbe fiery and monumental," as both Ma -rine and Army officers found out at Eni -wetok and later Saipan! Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 303240

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D i v i s i o n a l R e o r g a n i z a t i o nT h e t r a i n i n g b e f o r e S a i p a n w a s b a s e d o n a n e w T a b l e o f O r g a n i z a t i o nf o r t h e M a r i n e d i v i s i o n s . T h e i r s i z e w a s r e d u c e d b y 2 , 5 t h ) m e n l o1 7 , 4 6 5 . T h e a r t i t l e t y r e g i m e n t s e a c h l o s t o n e o f i t s 7 5 m m p a c k h o w i t z e rb a t t a l i o n s , b u t t h e i n f a n t r r t i m e d i t s p r e v i o u s u n i t s R i f l e s q u a d s , h o w e e rw e r e r e o r g a n i z e d t o t o t a l 1 3 , u s i n g t h r e e t i r e f t a m s o f t o u r m e n w i t h t a ht e a m b u i l t a r o u n d a B r o w n i n g a u t o m a t i c r i f l e ( B A R ) , a 5 0 p e r c e n t i n c r e a s e i nt h e d i v i s i o n o f t h i s v a l u a b l e w e a p o n . T h e n u m b e r o f 6 0 m m m o r t a r s i n t h e d i -v i s i o n t a b l e o f e q u i p m e n t w a s s i m i l a r l y e x p a n d e d , w h i t e t h e n u m b e r o ft l a m e t h r o w e r s g r e w t e n - f o l d . I n a d d i t i o n , t h e t a n k b a t t a l i o n s w e r e a b l e t o r e -p l a c e t h e i r a n t i q u a t e d l i g h t t a n k s w i t h m e d i u m s .

f u l m a i n J a p a n e s e f l e e t n o wa p p r o a c h i n g S a i p a n , h e o r d e r e dh i s f a s t c a r r i e r s t o m e e t t h e e n e m ys h i p s , a n d t h a t n i g h t w i t h d r e wh i s t r a n s p o r t s a n d s u p p l ys h i p s f r o m t h e i r o f f s h o r e s u p p o r t p o -s i t i o n s t o a s a f e d i s t a n c e f r o m t h eJ a p a n e s e t h r e a t .D + 3 , 1 8 J u n e

W h e n t h e i n f a n t r y m e n a s h o r ew o k e t h e n e x t m o r n i n g , t h e yl o o k e d o u t i n a m a z e m e n t a t t h ee m p t y o c e a n a n d a w a v e o f u n e a s yq u e s t i o n s r a c e d t h r o u g h t h e i rm i n d s : " W h e r e i n h e l l a r e o u rs h i p s ? W h a t a b o u t f o o d a n d a m m u -n i t i o n w e ' v e g o t t o h a v e ? W i l l w eg e t b a c k t h e d a y t i m e n a v a l s u p p o r t -i n g g u n f i r e a n d a l s o t h e s t a r s h e l l i l -l u m i n a t i o n ? " T h e m e n i n f r o n t l i n ec o m b a t h a d n o w a y o f k n o w i n gt h a t o v e r 3 3 , 0 0 0 t o n s o f c a r g o h a d

a l r e a d y b e e n u n l o a d e d w h e n t h es h i p s w i t h d r e w .B o t h M a r i n e d i v i s i o n s w e n t o nt h e a t t a c k , w h i l e t h e 1 0 5 t h I n f a n t r yj o i n e d t h e 1 6 5 t h o n t h e f a r r i g h tf l a n k , e n a b l i n g R a l p h S m i t h t o p u th i s 2 7 t h D i v i s i o n i n t o m o t i o n t o o c -c u p y A s l i t o a i r f i e l d a n d a t t a c ka l o n g t h e s o u t h e r n c o a s t .T h a t s a m e m o r n i n g , 1 8 J u n e , t h e4 t h M a r i n e D i v i s i o n a t t a c k o b j e c -t i v e w a s t h e s e i z u r e o f t h e 0 - 3 l i n e .T h i s w o u l d m e a n r e a c h i n g t h e e a s tc o a s t o f S a i p a n a n d s p l i t t i n g i n t w ot h e J a p a n e s e f o r c e s . F i r s t , h o w e v e r ,t h e 2 3 d M a r i n e s , r e i n f o r c e d b y ab a t t a l i o n o f t h e 2 4 t h M a r i n e s , h a dt o s e i z e t h e p o r t i o n o f t h e 0 - 2 l i n ei n i t s z o n e . T h i s w a s t o b e t h e d i v i -s i o n ' s l i n e o f d e p a r t u r e . T h e e n t i r ed i v i s i o n , w i t h t h r e e i n f a n t r y r e g i -m e n t s a b r e a s t , j u m p e d o f f a t 1 0 4 0 .A t 1 3 4 0 t h e 2 5 t h M a r i n e s h a dr e a c h e d 0 - 3 . T h e 2 4 t h M a r i n e s h a d

1 0

t a n k - l e d J a p a n e s e c o u n t e r a t t a c ko n b o t h f l a n k s b u t w a s a b l e tr e a c h 0 - 3 b e f o r e d a r k .T h e 2 3 d M a r i n e s , h o w e v e r , w as t o p p e d b y i n t e n s e e n e m y m o r t aa n d m a c h i n e g u n f i r e c o m i n g f r o ms o u t h e a s t o f L a k e S u s u p e r i g h t ot h e b o u n d a r y l i n e b e t w e e n t h e t wM a r i n e d i v i s i o n s , m a k i n g i t u nc l e a r w h i c h d i v i s i o n h a d r e s p o n sb i l i t y f o r w i p i n g o u t t h e s e e n e mp o s i t i o n s . A t t h e s a m e t i m e , i t w ai m p o s s i b l e t o f i r e a r t i l l e r y o n t h e mf o r f e a r o f h i t t i n g f r i e n d l y t r o o p sA s a r e s u l t , t h e 2 3 d M a r i n e s s u ff e r e d h e a v y c a s u a l t i e s . S o , b y t he n d o f t h e d a y , a l t h o u g h a l l o f t h4 t h M a r i n e D i v i s i o n ' s r e g i m e n tw e r e i n c o n t a c t , a g a p s t i l l e x i s t eb e t w e e n t h e t w o M a r i n e d i v i s i o n s

T h e b i z a r r e b e c o m e s c o m m o np l a c e i n c o m b a t . F o r i n s t a n c e , o no f t h e 2 3 d M a r i n e s ' 7 5 m m h a l ft r a c k s f i r e d i n t o a J a p a n e s e c a vt h a t d a y , a n d a d e n s e c l o u d o f n o xi o u s f u m e s c a m e p o u r i n g o u t . Ag a s a l a r m w a s s o u n d e d . T h i s m e a ns e r i o u s t r o u b l e , f o r a l l t h e r i f l e m eh a d l o n g s i n c e j e t t i s o n e d t h e i r b u rd e n s o m e g a s m a s k s . R e l i e f f l o o d et h r o u g h t h e m e n a s i t w a s e s t a bl i s h e d t h a t t h e f u m e s w e r e n o t p os o n o u s a n d c a m e f r o m p i c r i c a c it h e J a p a n e s e h a d s t o r e d i n t h e c a v eO v e r i n t h e 2 d D i v i s i o n ' s z o n et h e 8 t h M a r i n e s s a w s o m e b i t t ef i g h t i n g o v e r H i l l 2 4 0 . A h e a v i l y d ef e n d e d c o c o n u t g r o v e r e q u i r e d s a t ur a t i o n f i r e f r o m t h e a r t i l l e r y o f t h

G r o u n d C o m m a n d L i s tT h e M a r i n e a n d A r m y u n i L a s s i g n e d f t c a i p a no p e r a t i o n . . v e r e u n d e r t h e s e s e n i o r c o m m a n d e r s :\ A m p h i b i o u s C o r p s - L t G e n H o l l a n d M , S m i t h

2 d M a r i n e D i v i s i o n - M a j G e n T h o m a s F . W a t s o n2 d M a r i n e s - C o l W a l t e r 1 . S t u a r t6 t h M a r i n e s - C o l J a m e s P . R i s e l e y8 t h M a r i n e s - 0 , 1 C l a r e n c e R . W a l l a c e1 0 t h M a r i n e s - C o t R a p h a e l G r i f f i n1 8 t h M a r i n e s - L t C o l R u s s e l l L l o y d4 t h M a r i n e D i v i s i o n - M a j G e n I - l a r r y S c h m i d t1 4 t h M a r i n e s - C o l L o u i s G . D e H a v e n

2 0 t h M a r i n e s - L t C o l N e l s o n K . B r o w n2 d M a r i n e s - C o t L o u i s R . J o n e s2 4 t h M a r i n e s - C o t F r a n k l i n A . 1 - l a r t2 5 t h M a r i n e s - C o t M e r t o n J . B a t , h e l d e r2 7 t h I n f a n t r y ) i v I ' - l o n - M a j G e n R a l p h C . S m i t h , U S A1 0 5 t h I n f a n t r y - C o l L e o n a r d A . B i s h o p , U S A1 0 6 t h I n f a n t r y - C o t R u s s e l l G , A y r e s , L J ' - kI t h I n f a n t r y - C o t G e r a r d W . K e l k v . , U S AD i v i s i o n A r t i l l e r y - B G e n R e d m o n d F K e m a n , J r . , U S AX X I V C o r p s A r t i l l e r y - B G e n A r t h u r N I . H a r p e r , U S AS a i p a n G a r r i s o n F o r c e s - M a j G e n G e o r g e W . G r i n e r . U S A


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n.

The price for the two Marine divi-. By the nigh t

e.

D+4-D+7, 19-22 JuneThe most critical event of 19 June

fke

en ashore . The opposingttle . When it was over

df

. Exul-.S . Navy fliers labelled it "Th e

." With

and additional carrier plane attack sthe next day, the Japanese attemptto relieve Saipan by a decisive nava lvictory was smashed . As an officia laccount summarized the impactashore, "the eventual doom of th eenemy garrison was assured ." Andthe American supply ships wereable to return offshore to unloa dtheir vital cargoes .

During the four-day span of D+4to D+7, the 105th Infantry movedslowly along the south coast andthen joined the 165th Infantry insealing off the die-hard Japanes esurvivors in Nafutan Point, in thesoutheastern corner of the island .Once the enemy was penned in, the105th was assigned to eliminate him .The rest of the 27th Division, nowincluding the 106th Infantry, was or -dered north to be the Corps reserve .

This period, 19-22 June, marked atotal shift in direction for the Ameri -

can troops. Pivoting on the 2 dMarines on the far left flank alongthe western shore, the other Marineregiments swung around from thei rdrive which had reached the eas tcoast to face north, with their righ tflank on Magicienne Bay

On 20 June, the 4th Division con -fronted a key objective. LieutenantChapin had a ringside seat :

We had a perfect chance t owatch a battalion of the 25thmaking an attack . . . . It wasin action about a quarter of amile from us, and the whol epanorama was spread out be -fore us. They were assaultin gHill 500, the dominant terrainfeature of the whole area, andit was apparent that they wererunning into a solid wall o fJap fire . But, using [artillery ]timed fire, smoke, and tanks ,they finally stormed the top

Marine Artillery RegimentsThe 10th Marines and the 14th Marines supporte dthe 2d and 4th M arine Divisions respectively. Theyhad each had a significant reorganization befor eSaipan . In early spring, the 5th Battalion in each change dits designation. They were redesignated the 2d and 4th155 m m A rti llery Battalions, Corps Arti l lery, but adminis -Friendly artillery fire was a major asset for the America ntroops, both in supporting their attacks and smothering

tratively attached to the 10th and 14th Marines . Thus the10th and 14th Marines each contained two 75mm pac khowitzer battalions (1st and 2d), two 105mm howitze rbattalions (3d and 4th), and a 155mm artillery battalion ,armed with the new Ml 155mm howitzers, the first to b ereceived by the Marine Corps in the Pacific .Japanese sorties . This camouflaged emplacement holds a Ma-rine 105mm howitzer .

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 8255 0

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tions. Did they ever taste good toour hungry palates, surfeited athey were with K rations! "

Simultaneously, intensive preparations were made for a coordi-nated attack by both Marine divisions the next morning. A total o18 artillery battalions were massedfor supporting fire . Combat efficiency was officially rated as "versatisfactory," in spite of a soberintotal of 6,165 casualties .

The following day saw thMarines attack all along the lineThe 6th Marines overran parts oMount Tipo Pali, while the 8thMarines worked its painful wayinto the maze of ridges and gulliethat formed the foothills of MounTapotchau . On the right, the 24thMarines was forced into the messbusiness of blasting caves honeycombed along Magicienne BayIn one of the mortar platoons,weird encounter took place, as described at the time to this authoby the participant, First LieutenanJoseph J. Cushing :

[I] was bending over one o f[my] mortars, checking the layof it, when [I] felt a tap on myshoulder, and a guy asked[me], "Hey, Mac, are you a Ma-rine?" [I] turned around an d

and took it. The use of those The Marine divisions were now there was a Jap officer stand -supporting arms provided a facing two major problems . First, ing about a foot from [me] . [I]magnificent spectacle . From their drive north was confronted by dropped to the ground,our vantage point, we could General Saito's main line of de speechless with amazement ,see the timed fire bursting in fense, running west to east across and [my] men riddled the Japcave entrances, and moving the island . Secondly, the terrain into from head to toe .down the face of the hill as which the attack had to go was a On the left of the 4th Divisionthe 25th Marines made a major adprecisely as if . . . . it were nightmare of ravines, caves, hills, vance of 2,400 yards . The forwardgoing down a stepladder. On valleys, and cliffs all fortified lines were now reaching an arethe lower levels, the flame- and defended to the death by where the Kagman Peninsula juttedthrower tanks were spouting the Japanese . out to the east. This resulted intheir napalm jets upward June 21 brought a respite for the substantially increased frontaginto other caves. It was quite front line troops: "D+6 was enjoyed that the two Marine divisions coulda sight! by all for a change! We rested on not properly cover . To deal wit hOver in the area of the 2d Divi- our positions; caught up on sorely this, Holland Smith decided to com-sion, the 8th Marines wheeled from needed sleep ; got some water mit his reserve, the 27th Infantr y

facing east to attack northward into (which had been conspicuous by its Division, to the center of the linethe foot hills leading to Mount absence); and even had a good hot leaving just one battalion of thTapotchau . meal . For we got our first 10-in-1 ra- 105th Infantry way back in the rear


15/40

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 8391 8S till another cane field, w ith its hidden Japanese defenders lying in w ait, confronts these M arine rifl em en .-

t to eliminate the Japaneseby-passed Nafutan Point.

This day (D+7) was also marke ds

.S .t

. They had beenavy escort carriers .

hing racks for rockets by. Later that day, eight planes

. (Onlysquadrons ,

dfor Saipan, but they

. )While these developments were

,n in the rock-bottom basic life

plified by their impact on the:

I made a final inspection o fthe platoon position and the nsacked inexhausted . When itcame my turn to stand watch ,it took every last reserve o fwillpower and strength to get

up and go on duty. Then fo rhours I alternated betwee nfighting off my sleepiness andsweating out the noises andmovements that were al laround us .

After a while, I spotted ashape, darker than the rest ofthe surrounding shadows. Itwas the size of a man's head . Iwatched it for a long time,nerves on edge, finger on mycarbine trigger. Finally itseemed to move. I fired a shot .Nothing happened. Iwould've been suicide to goover and investigate . In thatdarkness and jungle my ownmen would've shot me in asecond. So when it came tim efor my relief, I pointed out th esuspicious object to the nextman, told him to watch i tclosely, and collapsed into adead-tired sleep .

When dawn came on D+8, Iwas awakened, and the firs tthing I did was to look overwhere I'd shot on the night be-fore. There, lying on top of arock, was the gas mask of on eof my men! The owner hadbeen sleeping right beside it. Itwas a miracle he hadn't been

hit . The tremendous strain o fthe previous night did funnythings to your mind . . . .

D+8-D+15, 23-30 JuneComplications of a serious nature

arose in the execution of the battleplan for 23 June. The battalion o fthe 105th Infantry still had notcleaned out Nafutan Point ; therewere semantic and communication sdifferences between the two Smithgenerals as to orders about wh owould do what and when; the 106thand 165th Infantry got all tangledup in themselves during a march totake over the center portion of th eAmerican lines and were too late tojump off in the attack, thus delayingthe attacks of the Marines . Whenthe Army regiments did move out ,they found that the rugged terrainin their sector and the determine denemy in camouflaged weaponspositions in caves of the steep slopeleading up to Mount Tapotchaumade forward progress slow an ddifficult. The 27th Infantry Divisionwas stalled .

The corps commander, HollandSmith, was very displeased withthis situation. It had started withthe difficulties experienced in get -

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ting that division ashore; it was ex-acerbated by the time it was takin gto secure Nafutan Point and themix-up in orders there; now the ad-vancing Marine divisions were get-ting infiltration and enfilading fireon their flanks because of the 27th' slack of progress .

Accordingly, Lieutenant Genera lHolland Smith met that afternoo nwith Major General SanderfordJarman, USA, who was slated to bethe island garrison commander,and asked him to press MajorGeneral Ralph Smith for muchmore aggressive action by the 27th .Jarman later stated :

I talked to General (Ralph )Smith and explained the situa -tion as I saw it and that I fel tfrom reports from the corpscommander that his divisionwas not carrying its full share .He immediately replied tha tsuch was true; that he was in noway satisfied with what his regi -mental commanders had doneduring the day and that he hadbeen with them and hadpointed out to them the situa-

tion. He further indicated to methat he was going to be presen ttomorrow, 24 June, with his di-vision when it made its jump-offand he would personally see toit that the division went forward. . . . He appreciated the situa-tion and thanked me for comingto see him and stated that if hedidn't take his division forwardtomorrow he should be relieved .This blunt meeting was followe d

the next morning (D+9) by an evenblunter message from Hollan dSmith to Ralph Smith :

Commanding General i shighly displeased with th efailure of the 27th Division onJune twenty-third to launch itsattack as ordered at King hourand the lack of offensive ac-tion displayed by the divisio nin its failure to advance an dseize objective 0-5 when op -posed by only small arms andmortar fire .

The failure of the 27th to ad -vance in its zone of action re-sulted in the halting of attack sby the 4th and 2d Marine Divi-

sions on the flanks of the 27t hin order to prevent dangerou sexposure of their interio rflanks . It is directed that im-mediate steps be taken tocause the 27th Division to ad-vance and seize the objectivesas ordered .These objectives were given dra

matic names by the Army regiments: Hell's Pocket, Death Valleyand Purple Heart Ridge. It was certainly true that the terrain was perfect for the dug-in Japanese defenders : visibility from the slopeof Mount Tapotchau and from thridge gave them fields of fire trake any attack up the valley. Holand Smith didn't fully recognizthe severity of the opposition, andby the end of the day, the 106tInfantry had gained little, whilthe 165th Infantry had bee"thrown back onto the original linof departure . "

Meanwhile, the 2d Marine Division on the left was painfully slugging its way forward in the tortuous environs around MounTapotchau. The 4th Marine Divi

From left, BGen Merritt A . Edson, Assistant Division Comman- utive off icer, respectively, during a pause in the action . LtCoder of the 2d Marine Division, confers with Col James P . Riseley McLeod was killed several days after this photograph .and LtCol Kenneth F. McLeod, 6th Marines commander and exec -Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 8248

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oted east ,n

. There the ground wa splus, but covered with can e

e:

The terrain here consisted ofcountless cane fieldsoneafter another. And it was th esame old story: in every fieldthe company would lose aman or two. It was wonder -fully quieting to the nerves tostart into a growth of head-high cane, and wonder whowould not be coming out onthe other side! The Jap sniperswho were doing the damagewere dug in so deeply, andcamouflaged so well, that i twas impossible to locate thembefore they fired. And then i twas too late; you were right ontop of them, and they hadnailed another one of yourmen - or maybe you! Thenthere was always that nex tcane field up ahead . . . .

Some of the fields had beenburnt out by the napalm -bombing of our planes. Thisgave us greatly increased ob-servation as we went throughthem, but clouds of chokingdust arose from the ashes t oplague us and dirty ourweapons. With water s oscarce, one of our chief source sof liquid sustenance was sugarcane juice . We'd whack off asegment of the cane with ourcombat knives, then chew andsuck on it till only the dr yfibers were left. In these burnt -out fields we weren't evenable to do this, as the cane wa sspoiled and tasted lousyAlong with the death toll in th e

cane fields came the physical de-mands placed on the troops by thehot tropical climate . Lieutenan tChapin noted small, human issuesthat loomed large in the minds ofthe assault troops :

All this time the sun wa sbroiling down on top of us .Our canteens had been empty

for hours . Everyone was ab-solutely parched . . . . Finallywe did stop, as the effects o fheat exhaustion and lack ofwater started to become ap-parent . [Our company com-mander] arranged for somewater to be brought up to ourposition. When the cansarrived, everyone crowdedthirstily around, and wehad to order the men to dis-perse . . . . Then each platoo nleader rationed out a can of theprecious liquid amongst hismen. As was the age-old Marin etradition, we waited till all ou rmen had their share before w etook ours. The water was luke-warm, rusty, and oily as it cameout of the cans, but it still tastedlike nectar !While these local events tran-

spired on the front lines, a majo rupheaval was taking place in therear. Seeing that the corps linewould be bent back some 1,50 0yards in the zone of the 27th In-fantry Division, Holland Smith ha d

.

Denartment of Defense Photo (USMC) 85336

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Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 8184A s the fig hting reached the interior of S aipan, the troops encoun- N ote the tops of the helm ets of M arines peering f rom their foxholestered difficult f oliage and terrain w hich impeded their mov em ent .had enough. He went to see Admi-rals Spruance and Turner to obtai npermission to relieve Ralph Smit hof command of his division .

After reviewing the Marin egeneral's deeply felt criticism ofthe 27th Infantry Division's "de-fective performance," the admi-rals agreed to the requeste dchange, and Ralph Smith was su-perseded by Major General Jar-man on 24 June .

A furor arose, with bitter inter-service recriminations, and theflames were fanned by lurid pres sreports. Holland Smith summa-rized his feelings three days afterthe relief. According to a unit his-tory, The 27th Infantry Division inWorld War II, he stated, "The 27thDivision won't fight, and RalphSm ith will not make them fight . "Army generals were furious, and inHawaii, Lieutenant General RobertRichardson, commander of the U . S .Army in the Pacific (USARPAC )convened an Army board of in-quiry over the matter. The issuereached to the highest military lev-els in W ashington .

While the Army's Deputy Chie fof Staff, Lieutenant General JosephT. McNarney, reviewed the matter,he found some faults with HollandSmith, but then went on to say tha tRalph Smith failed to exact the per-formance expected from a well -trained division, as evidenced b ypoor leadership on the part of som eregimental and battalion comman-ders, undue hesitancy to bypasssnipers "with a tendency to alibi be -cause of lack of reserves to mopup," poor march discipline, andlack of reconnaissance .

The Army's official summaryUnited States Army in World War II,The War in the Pacific, Campaign i nthe Marianas (published 15 yearsafter the operations) attributedsome errors to Holland Smith' shandling of a real problem, and i talso gave full recognition to the dif -ficult terrain and bitter resistanc ethat the Army regiments faced . Thehistory stated that :

. . . there is no doubt tha tthe 106th Infantry Regiment ofthe 27th Division was late injumping off in the attack on

the morning of 23 Juneeventhough not so late as HollandSmith charged. On the 23d andagain on the 24th, the Armytroops attacking Death Valleywere slow and faltering in .their advance. According tothe testimony of General Jar -man, who took over the divi-sion from Ralph Smith, the uni tleaders of the 106th Infantr ywere hesitant and apparentlyconfused. Although the Armytroops in Death Valley sus-tained fairly heavy casualties ,the two Marine divisions onthe flanks suffered greaterones. Yet the Marines madeconsiderable advances whil ethe 165th Infantry registeredonly small gainsthe 106th In-fantry almost none at all .

No matter what the extenu-ating circumstances wereandthere were severalthe con-clusion seems inescapable thatHolland Smith had good rea-son to be disappointed withthe performance of the 27th In-fantry Division on the twodays in question . . . .

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Back where the conflict was with-

insula by the night of. The shoreline cliffs provoke d

:We were close to the north-

ern shoreline of the peninsula .And right there the Japs haddug a big emplacement . Theyhadn't had time to finish it,but we could see that it wassituated so as to fire righ tdown the beach-line . Anytroops landing on that beac hwould have received a terribleenfilading fire from this gunposition. Not far from the em -placement were the guns tha thad been destined to go int oit: huge, 5-inch, dual-purposenaval guns . They were deadlythings, and I was glad th eenemy had never gotten theminto action. Now they lay

there on their wooden skids ,thickly coated with grease ,wrapped in burlapimpotent .This unfinished state of the Japan-

ese defenses was, in fact, a criticalfactor in the final American victoryon Saipan. The blockading success offar-ranging submarines of the U .S .Navy had drastically reduced , thesupplies of cement and other con-struction materials destined for elab-orate Saipan defenses, as well as th enumber of troop ships carryingJapanese reinforcements to the is -land . Then the quick success of th eMarshalls campaign had speeded upthe Marianas thrust by thre emonths. This was decisive, for "oneprisoner of war later said that, hadthe American assault come thre emonths later, the island would havebeen impregnable . "

The 4th Marine Division en -countered more than cane fields inthe Kagman Peninsulathe cliff snear the ocean were studded with

caves. A 20-year-old private firs tclass in Company E, 2d Battalion ,23d Marines, Robert F . Graf, de -scribed the Marine system fordealing with these and the othersthat were found all through th ebitter campaign :

The firepower was in -tense, and we were workin gour way up to where th eshots originated. Quit eoften there would be mult icave openings, each protect-ing another. Laying downheavy cover fire, our spe-cialist would advance tonear the mouth of the cave .A satchel charge woul dthen be heaved into th emouth of the cave, followe dby a loud blast as the dyna-mite exploded. Other timesit might be grenades throwninside the cave, both frag-ment type which explodedsending bits of metal al l

hen a Japanese survivor did emerge from a cave, Marines were dynamite in his hands, but was shot before he could throw it .. This enemy soldier had a stick of

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 87137

17


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throughout the cave, andother times [white] phos-phorous grenades that burnedthe enemy

Also the flame thrower wasused, sending a sheet of flameinto the cave, burning anyon ethat was in its path. Screamscould be heard and on occa-sions the enemy would emergefrom the caves, near the en -trance, we would call upon the .tanks, and these monsterswould get in real close andpump shells into the opening .

Graf went on to picture the useof flame-throwing tanks, the ulti-mate weapon for dealing with th eenemy deep in his hideouts . Hecontinued :

Some of the caves had ar-tillery mounted on track sthat could be wheeled to th eentrance, fired and pulledback, unobserved. Therewere caves with reinforcedmetal doors that protectedthem from our artillery .Perhaps a direct hit from a16-inch naval gun could

have blasted it open, bu tnothing else .A fellow rifleman from Graf'

company told him this story :You should go up and see thehuge cave that I was just in .It was large and contained acompletely equipped operat-ing room, all the medica lequipment, surgical tools ,etc. The tools were madefrom German surgical steel .When the battalion andregimental doctors were toldabout it, they almost wen t

Displaying the bazooka which knocked out four Japanese light grabbed some grenades, approached one tank from the side, an dtanks are bazook a men PFC L auren N . Kahn, left, and PFC Lewis tossed the grenade into its open turret . T heir action saved a 37m mM. Nalder. T he tw o M arines fired all their amm unition at Japanese gun crew , the objective of the tank . The gun crew, with its mentanks advancing in a counterattack on the night of D+1 . K ahn then w ounded, was also out of amm unition .Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 8516

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Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 8356 6Some of the Japanese caves, such as this one, had been carefully reinforced . Marine riflemen move warily to inspect it .

crazy over finding such excel-lent equipment . Each doctorwanted some tools for his use .These attacks on caves were as

eg

. Graf recounted:

Throughout the campaignwe were taking prisoners .

Seldom were they Japanes esoldiers, instead Korean andChamorro laborers, both me nand women, who mostlyworked in the sugar cane fieldsand processing plants . Chamor-ros were natives of the islands ,while the Koreans, of course ,were brought over as force dlabor. Approaching us, handsup, and smiling and bowing theKoreans would say in under-standable broken English, "MeKorean, not Japanese ." Some

Japanese civilians were alsocaptured . The Japanese tradi -tion was that the male membersof the family were the dominantmembers . Several times whenwe tried to feed newly capturedwomen and children first, themale would shove them asid eand demand to be first for ra-tions . A few raps to the ches twith a rifle butt soon curedthem of that habit .As the sick, scared, and often

starving civilians would emergefrom their hideouts, there weremany pitiful scenes :

One sad incident I recall wa swhen a captured civilian Japan-ese woman came up to me . Shewas crying and when she go tclose to me she started hittingme on the arm and pointing tomy pack. I did not know wha tshe wanted until an interpretercame over and explained tha tshe wanted some food and

water for her dead child. Shepointed to a wicker baske tthat contained her dead in-fant. I gave her what she re-quested, and she placed thefood and water in the baske tso that the child could hav enourishment on the way tomeet the baby's ancestors .

Physical conditions ofmany were pitiful . Every ill-ness that we had bee nbriefed on was observed :leprosy, dengue fever, yaw sand many cases of elephanti -asis . Most of them wereskeleton thin, as they had nonourishment for many days .Many were suffering fro mshock caused by the shellingand bombing, and fright be-cause they did not have th evaguest idea as to what wewould do to them. Civilianscaught in a war that was no tof their making . . . .

19


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Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 8326Marine talks a terrified Chamorro woman and her children into leaving her refuge .

Civilians are escorted back to safety , food, and medical care .Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 8301

20


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Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 83989The 37mm gun was a workhorse for the Marines in a wide variety of firing missions . Thos eare Japanese bullet holes in its "shield . "

One of the captured persons im-e

.ns

. She was dressed in tradi-: a brilliant

ed

. Although," as Gra fre,

. To. "

Over on the west side of Saipan ,-et-tde

. Now, how-l

earines clawing up the eastern

s)tfk

.Meanwhile, back at Nafutan

oint, the battalion of the 105th In--

d. The officia l

-s

; units re-ds

; they repeatedly yielded. "

The stalemate came to a climax o n+11 . Approximately

ebodied men who remained ,

dhe Army later re-

-

Aslito airfield and there was chaosinitially there . One P-47 plane wasdestroyed and two others damaged .The Japanese quickly continued onto Hill 500, hoping to reunite therewith their main forces. What theyfound instead was the 25th Marinesresting in reserve with an artillerybattalion of the 14th Marines . The es-caping Japanese were finished off thefollowing morning .

On the front lines in the center ofthe island, General Jarman, now intemporary command of the 27th In-fantry Division, took direct actionthat same day (D+11) . An inspectionby two of his senior officers of thenear edge of Death Valley revealedthat battalions of the 105th Infantry"were standing still when there wa sno reason why they should notmove forward." That did it. Jarmanrelieved the colonel commandingthe 106th and replaced him with hisdivision chief of staff . (Nineteenother officers of the 27th Infantry Di -vision were also relieved after theSaipan battle was over, althoug honly one of them had commanded aunit in battle . )

While these developments weretaking place in the upper echelons,

the junior officers in the front lineshad their own, more immediate,daily concerns . As the authorrecalled :

I had worked out a pre-sleep routine which I fol-lowed every night withoutfail. Before I lay down, Iwould make careful menta lnotes of where the companyCommand Post [CP] was andwhere my squad leaders' fox-holes were. Then I wouldwork out the rotation of thewatches with my CP group .Next came a check of my car-bine to make sure it was inperfect operating condition.When all this had been done ,I'd lie down, adjusting myhelmet to serve as a pillowLast, and most important ,was the placing of myweapons: my carbine layacross my body so my handwould fall naturally on thetrigger; my combat knife wasstuck in the ground where myright hand lay; and mygrenades were carefully ar-rayed at my left hand. ThenI'd drift off to sleep .

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I . ! ' _

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o b UF o r t h e n e x t s e v e r a l d a y s , t h e A M a r i n e 8 1 m m m o r t a r c r e w k e e p s l o b b i n g s h e l l s i n t o e n e m y p o s i t i o n s a h e a d o f t h e u n i t i2 7 t h I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n p r o b e d a n d i s s u p p o r t i n g b y f i r e . D e p a r t m e n t o f D e f e n s e P h o t o ( U S M C ) 8 2 2 6m a n e u v e r e d a n d a t t a c k e d a t H e l l sP o c k e t , D e a t h V a l l e y , a n d P u r p l eH e a r t R i d g e . O n 2 8 J u n e , A r m yM a j o r G e n e r a l G e o r g e W . G r i n e r ,w h o h a d b e e n q u i c k l y s e n t f r o mH a w a i i u p o n t h e r e l i e f o f R a l p hS m i t h , t o o k o v e r c o m m a n d o f t h ed i v i s i o n , s o J a r m a n c o u l d r e v e r t t oh i s p r e v i o u s a s s i g n m e n t a s g a r r i s o nf o r c e c o m m a n d e r . T h e 1 0 6 t hm a r k e d t h e d a y b y e r a d i c a t i n g t h el a s t e n e m y r e s i s t a n c e i n t h e s p o tt h a t h a d c a u s e d s o m u c h g r i e f :H e l l ' s P o c k e t .T h e 2 d M a r i n e D i v i s i o n m e a n -w h i l e i n c h e d n o r t h w a r d t o w a r d t h et o w n o f G a r a p a n , m e e t i n g f e r o c i o u se n e m y r e s i s t a n c e . T i p o P a l i w a sn o w i n 6 t h M a r i n e s ' h a n d s . T h e 8 t hM a r i n e s e n c o u n t e r e d f o u r s m a l l

2 2


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Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 8328 1ith the Japanese well dug in, hidden in their well camouflaged positions, a satche l

. If any of them bolt out, the Marine rifle -.

To the right, the 6th Marinesmopped up its area and now heldthe most commanding ground, withall three of its battalions in favor-able positions. In fact, since replace-ment drafts had not yet arrived, the2d Marine Division had all three ofits infantry regiments deployed online . Thus it was necessary for it scommander, Major General Watson ,to organize a division reserve fromsupport units .

The pressure on manpower wa sfurther illustrated by the fact that ,in this difficult terrain, "eightstretcher bearers were needed toevacuate one wounded Marine ." Inaddition, there was, of course, thedeep-seated psychological andphysical pressure from the constant ,day after day, close combat. "Every-one on the island felt the weight o ffatigue settling down . "

During a break in the fighting, Marines of a flamethrower and demolitions team pose wit hthe Japanese flag captured during action after the American landing .

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 82608rongly defended by th e

. Because of their size in com-son with Mount Tapotchau,

." Each. Painfully, one by one, they

e.

Near Garapan, about 500 yards,

oon on what wasld

. Theorning of 29 June, a heavy ar-

ed mortar fire raked the. Then friendly

. This. As hoped, the enemy raced

ir caves to repel the ex-. Suddenly the mortars

.ith time

e.

s.

23


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On the 4th Division front, thedrive forward was easier, but its leftflank had to be bent sharply back -ward toward the 27th Infantry Divi -sion. By nightfall on 28 June, th eMarine division's lines formed a ninverted L with the 23d Marinesand part of the 165th Infantry facingnorth, while the rest of the Arm yregiment and two battalions of the24th Marines faced west . Thisstrange alignment was a focus of at -tention when each battalion was is -sued its nightly overlay from corpsheadquarters showing the lines o fthe corps at that time, so tha tfriendly fire from artillery and sup-porting Navy destroyers would nothit friendly troops . Once again ,enemy planes raided, hitting boththe airfield and anchorage. As usual,enemy night patrols were active .

The end of the saga of Nafuta nPoint, way to the rear, had come theday before (27 June) . The Japanesebreakout had left almost no fightingmen behind there . Accordingly, the Amidst the horrors of war, someone retained a sense of humor, and put up this pre-Worlbattalion of the 105th Infantry at War II Marine recruiting poster in Garapan .last overran the area after enduring Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 871a final banzai charge . The soldiersfound over 500 enemy bodies in th earea, some killed in the charge andsome by their own hand .

D+15 (30 June) marked a goo dday for the Army. After fierce fight-ing, the 27th Infantry Division fi-nally burst through Death Valley ,captured Purple Heart Ridge, an ddrew alongside the 8th Marines .Holland Smith gave due recogni-tion: "No one had any tougher jobto do." The gaps on the flanks withthe 2d and 4th Marine Divisionswere now closed. In doing so, theArmy had sustained most of the1,836 casualties inflicted upon i tsince D-Day. The 4th Marine Divi-sion, however, had suffered 4,45 4casualties to date, while the 2d Ma -rine Division had lost 4,488 men .

The corps front now ran fromGarapan, past the four pimples, tothe 4th Marine Division's lef tboundary. Here, it ran sharply

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 852Moving on the double, Marines go yard by yard through skeletal Garapan, flushing out thJapanese defenders .

24


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r t h w a r d t o H i l l 7 0 0 . F r o m t h e r e i ta n t o t h e e a s t c o a s t . C e n t r a l S a i p a na s i n A m e r i c a n h a n d s . M o s t o f t h ee p l e n i s h m e n t s u p p l i e s h a d b e e no a d e d . T h e e n e m y h a d b e g u ni t h d r a w i n g t o h i s p r e p l a n n e d f i n a le f e n s i v e l i n e s . T h e A r m y ' s o f f i c i a ls t o r y s u m m e d u p t h e s e d a y s 's t l y v i c t o r i e s t h i s w a y , " T h e b a t t l eo r c e n t r a l S a i p a n c a n b e s a i d t oe c o m e t o a s u c c e s s f u l e n d . "

D + 1 6 - D + 1 9 , 1 - 4 J u l yN o w H o l l a n d S m i t h t u r n e d h i st e n t i o n t o o p e r a t i o n p l a n s t o d r i v eh r o u g h t h e n o r t h e r n t h i r d o fa i p a n a n d b r i n g t h e c a m p a i g n t o ac c e s s f u l , a l b e i t a b l o o d y , c o n c l u -o n . H i s n e x t o b j e c t i v e l i n e r a nr o m G a r a p a n u p t h e w e s t c o a s t t oa n a p a g a n d t h e n e a s t w a r d a c r o s sh e i s l a n d . P a s t T a n a p a g , n e a r F l o -

r e s P o i n t , t h e 2 d M a r i n e D i v i s i o nw o u l d b e p i n c h e d o u t a n d b e c o m et h e c o r p s r e s e r v e . T h a t w o u l d l e a v et h e 2 7 t h I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n a n d t h e4 t h M a r i n e D i v i s i o n t o a s s a u l t G e n -e r a l S a i t o ' s f i n a l d e f e n s e s .T h e e a s i e s t a s s i g n m e n t d u r i n gt h i s p e r i o d f e l l t o t h e 4 t h M a r i n eD i v i s i o n o n t h e e a s t c o a s t . I t a d -v a n c e d 3 , 5 0 0 y a r d s a g a i n s t l i g h t o p -p o s i t i o n , v e e r i n g t o i t s l e f t , e n d i n go n 4 J u l y w i t h i t s l e f t f l a n k s o m e2 , 0 0 0 y a r d s n o r t h o f T a n a p a g , r i g h to n t h e w e s t c o a s t .A s u s u a l , w h a t l o o k e d l i k e " l i g h to p p o s i t i o n " t o G e n e r a l S c h m i d t i nh i s d i v i s i o n a l C P l o o k e d v e r y d i f -f e r e n t t o t h a t t i r e d , t e n s e l i e u t e n a n tw h o d e s c r i b e d a p a i n f u l l y t y p i c a lr i f l e p l a t o o n s i t u a t i o n o n D + 1 6 :I t o o k t h e r e s t o f m y m e na n d w e p r o c e e d e d v e r y c a u -t i o u s l y t o c o m b t h e a r e a . I t

2 5

w a s a t e r r i b l e p l a c e : t h e r o c k sa n d c r e e p e r s w e r e s o i n t e r w o -v e n t h a t t h e y f o r m e d a n a l -m o s t i m p e n e t r a b l e b a r r i e r ;v i s i b i l i t y w a s l i m i t e d t o a f e wf e e t . A f t e r w h a t h a d h a p p e n e dt o [ m y w o u n d e d s e r g e a n t ] ,t h e a t m o s p h e r e o f t h e p l a c ew a s v e r y t e n s e . W e l o c a t e ds o m e r o c k c r e v i c e s w et h o u g h t t h e J a p s m i g h t b e i n ,a n d I t r i e d c a l l i n g t o t h e m i no u r J a p a n e s e c o m b a t p h r a s e st o c o m e o u t a n d s u r r e n d e r .T h i s p r o v e d f r u i t l e s s , a n d i t l e tt h e J a p s k n o w e x a c t l y w h e r ew e w e r e , w h i l e w e h a d n oi d e a o f t h e i r l o c a t i o n . T h e n It r i e d t o m a n e u v e r o u r f l a m e -t h r o w e r m a n i n t o a p o s i t i o nw h e r e h e c o u l d g i v e t h ec r e v i c e a b l a s t w i t h o u t b e c o m -i n g a s i t t i n g - d u c k t a r g e t h i m -


28/40

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 848The only way to deal with some Japanese in their well-protected defenses was to blast them with a flame-thrower .

self. Because of the configura -tion of the ground, thisproved impossible .

Right about now, there wa sa shot off to our left . Westarted over to investigate andall hell broke loose! A Jap au-tomatic weapon opened upright beside us . We all hit thedeck automatically . No onewas hit (for a change), but wecouldn't spot the exact loca-tion of the weapon (as usual) . Icalled to the man who'd beenover on the left flank . No an-swer. What had happenedto him?At this point more enemy fire spat -

tered around the small group ofMarines. The source seemed to beright on top of them, so the lieutenanttold two of his men to throw som egrenades over into the area he thoughtthe fire was coming fromabout 20

feet away. Under cover of that, theMarines worked a rifleman forward acouple of yards to try to get a bead onthe Japanese, but he was unable t ospot them and the enemy fire seeme dto grow heavier .

Now the lieutenant began to getvery worried :

Here we werecompletelyisolated from the rest of thecompanyonly half a dozenof us leftour flank man haddisappeared and now wewere getting heavy fire froman uncertain number of Jap swho were right in our middleand whom we couldn't locate !Some of the men were gettin ga little jittery I could see, so Itried to appear as calm andcool as I could (although Ididn't feel that way inside!) . Idecided to move back to theother end of the hilltop and

report to [our company com-mander] on the phone . If Icould get his OK, I woul dthen contact [another one o four platoons] for reinforce-ments, and we could moveback into this area and clea nout the Jap pocket.Pressing hard against th

Japanese defenses constantly resulted in these kinds of face-toface encounters . Three days late(D+19), Lieutenant ColoneChambers observed a memorablact of bravery :

Three of our tanks camealong the road . . . . The ymade the turn to the southand then took the wron gturn, which took them offthe high ground and into acave area where ther ewere literally hundreds ofJaps, who swarmed all ove r

26


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30/40

peated in another battalion which The official Marine history pic- filthy uniforms, stiff withhad had 22 out of 29 officers and 490 tures the scene : sweat and dirt after over twoenlisted men either killed or Twisted metal roof tops now weeks of fierce fighting, th ewounded in action . littered the area, shielding Marines joyfully dipped thei r

Next to the 4th Marine Division Japanese snipers . A number of heads and hands into the coo lwas the 27th Infantry Division in deftly hidden pillboxes were ocean waters .the center of the line of attack . It, scattered among the ruins . As- With the other two divisions altoo, had a far easier time than in the sault engineers, covered by ready having veered their attack tgrinding experiences it had just riflemen, slipped behind such the left and reached the northwescome through. Its advance also obstacles to set explosives while coast, the 2d Marine Division waveered left, and was "against negli- flamethrowers seared the front. now able to go into corps reservegible resistance" with "the enemy Assisted by the engineers, and as planned, on 4 July. (Hollandin full flight." Thus it reached the supported by tanks and 75mm Smith, seeing the end in sight onwest coast, pinching off the 2d Ma- self-propelled guns of the regi- Saipan, wanted this division restedrine Division and allowing it to go mental weapons company, the for the forthcoming assault ointo reserve . 2d Marines beat down the scat- neighboring Tinian Island . )

There was a different story in the tered resistance before nightfall . The Japanese, meanwhile, wer2d Marine Division zone of action at On the beaches, suppressing falling back to a final defensive linthe beginning of this period . On 2 fire from the LVT(A)s of the 2d north of Garapan. The American atJuly Flametree Hill was seized and Armored Amphibian Battalion tack of the preceding weeks had nothe 2d Marines stormed into Gara- silenced the Japanese weapons only shattered their manpowerpan, the second largest city in the located near the water. their artillery, and their tanks, buMariana Islands. What the regiment Moving past the town, the the enemy also was desperate fofound was a shambles ; the town had 2d Marine Division drove to- food . "Many of them had been sbeen completely leveled by naval wards Flores Point, halfway to pressed for provisions that they wergunfire and Marine artillery Tanapag. Along the way, with eating field grass and tree bark ."


31/40

D +20-D+23, 5-8 Jul yAny Japanese "withdrawal"

heir men weree

. This tactic produced againsf-de who should be saved .e

ime for First Lieutenant. Stott, in the 1st Battal-

:On this twenty-first day o f

the battle we trudged along acircuitous route to relieve th e23d Marines for an attac kscheduled for 1300. A norma lartillery preparation precededit, followed by the morale-lift-ing rockets, but neither theynor mortar fire could eliminatemany cave-dwelling Japs. Andagain the cost was heavy .Using civilian men, women,and children as decoys, the Ja psoldiers managed to entice avolunteer patrol forward int othe open to collect additionalcivilian prisoners. A dozen

men from A Company wer eriddled as the ruse succeeded .This kind of treacherous actio n

by the Japanese was demonstrate din a different form on the follow-ing day (D+21) . LieutenantColonel Chambers described ho whe dealt summarily with it and ,by contrast how his men treatedgenuine civilians who had beenhiding :

. . . .a few of the Japs hadplayed possum by smearingblood of other Japs on them-selves and lying still as theMarines came up . However,within the battalion my in-structions were "if it didn' tstink, stick it." [My officer ]just laughed and said theMarines had bayoneted allthe bodies . You had to do it !

We also picked up severa lcivilian prisoners, includin gsome women and children. Thething that really got to me waswatching these boys of mine ;they'd take all kinds of risks ;they'd go into a cave neve rknowing whether there wouldbe soldiers in there, to bring

out these civilians . The minutethey got them out, they beganto feed them, give them part o ftheir rations, and offer theircigarettes to the men. It mad eyou feel proud of the boys fordoing this .Once the 2d Marine Division be -

came corps reserve, it was obviou sto General Smith that the time wa sripe for a banzai attack. He dulywarned all units to be alert, andpaid a personal visit on 6 July toGeneral Griner, of the 27th InfantryDivision, to stress the likelihood o fan attack coming down the coast-line on the flat ground of the Tana -pag Plain.

General Saito was now cor-nered in his sixth (and last) com-mand post, a miserable cave inParadise Valley north of Tanapag .The valley was constantly rakedby American artillery and navalgunfire; he had left only fragmen-tary remnants of his troops; hewas himself sick, hungry, an dwounded . After giving orders forone last fanatical banzai charge ,he decided to commit hara-kiri inhis cave . At 10a.m. on 6 July, fac -

A salvo from the truck-mounted rockets was a welcome prelude to any Marine attack .Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 88403

29


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Navy ChaplainsTwo types of non-combatants are at tached to Ma rineunits: members of the Navy Medical Corps an dNavy Chaplain Corps. Whenever the Marines arein combat, they are well tended to in body and soul onthe front l ines . Navy Lieutena nt John H . Craven, Chap -lain Corps, ea rned the Bronze Star for his ac t ions unde rfire on Saipan . Later he summarized activities :"In combat our main action was to go from place toplace , unit to unit , and start out early in the morning an dgo till dark, just visiting one unit after the other andmany t imes just have a ve ry br ief service . We ha d somevery sma ll hymn books . and some Testaments I couldca r ry in my map case, and we would just gather a fewmen together in a bomb crater or defilade . ; . and I woul dhave one service after the other . Sometimes we ha dtwelve, thirteen, or fourteen of those in one day, espe-cially on Sunday . . . ."Then we had to take our turn at the cemetery Eac hchaplain from different units would go down and take hi sturn for burial . We ha d a brief committal service for eac hone as they brought the bodies in . And I set myself up t otry to keep up with all of the men of our units : where the ywere , whether they were in the hospital . I worked closelywith a sergeant major and it was amazing how we wereable to keep up with men, a nd when they were killed an dwhen and where they were buried . "Cra ven kept a notebook l ist ing all the c asua lt ies, an dhe would keep that current from day to day. Eac hevening he would compare notes with the regimenta lsergeant major. It was a help to any chaplain to knowwho were casualties and where, and to report and workwith their friends, and it was also a help to the sergean tmajor because it verified reports he got .

When Chaplain Craven and the other chaplains re-turned to the rear ar eas w ith their units , they started writ -ing let ters to the fam ilies of eve ryone who w as kil led inthe regiment, and added their letters to those the com-manding officers were re quired to write .

One other regimental chapla in used a spec ia l type o fministration. He had a canvas gas-mask carrier slun gover eac h shoulder . In one carrier he ha d Scotch whiskey,in the other fried chicken. As he knelt by each young ,frightened, wounded Marine, he was invariably asked ,"Am I going to be O .K .?" "Sure you are!" was the c heerfu lanswer. "W hi le you are wai t ing to be evac uated , woul dyo u ra ther have a drumst ick or a wing?" The young Ma -r ine would be so surprised he would forget about him-self . Then, when the cha plain asked if he wanted to was hi t down with a swig of Sc otch, he c ouldn't believe he wa shearing correctly amidst all the confusion, noise, anddeath all around him .A young doctor, hearing about this chaplain, said ,"That man probably saved more young l ives from dyin gof shock than will ever be known ."

0

a0

T he S aipan cemetery w as dedicated after the battle .

crying "Tennoeestn-f.m ., 7 July! "d

he commencement of the.

The ultimate outcome was clea r: "Whether we attack, o r

,."

The threat of a mad, all-ou tenemy charge was nothing new t othe troops on Saipan. A rifleman re -counted one such experience :

Whenever we cornered theenemy and there was no wa yout, we faced the dreaded ban-zai attack . The 23d Marineshad a few of these during ourSaipan adventure, as did all theother outfits. I dreaded theseattacks and yet welcomedthem, which is quite a paradox .They generated a great deal offear but, when it was over, tha tparticular sector was Jap-free.

For hours, we could hearthem preparing for their ban-zai attack, as it was the end forthem and they knew it . Be-cause it was against their her-itage, their training, and thei rbelief, they would not surren-der. All that was left was afinal charge, a pouring in of al ltheir troops in one concen-trated place with their pledgeto take as many of us wit hthem as possible .His account continued with a

dramatic description of the tensewaiting he endured, while he lis-

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Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 8184Navy corpsmen risked their lives daily to treat wounded Marines .

tened to the enemy "yells andscreams going on for hours." Thenoise increased as Marine artilleryand mortars, pounding in the direc -tion of the Japanese sounds, addedto the deafening din . The Marineswere waiting in their foxholes withclips of ammo placed close at handso that they could reload fast, fi

breaching the marianas - the battle for saipan

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