brady gillerlain toward a new relationship of souls
TRANSCRIPT
Toward a New Relationship of Souls?:The Russo-Germanic Partnership and the Dynamics of Power in the 21 st Century
Francis Brady GillerlainDiplomacy and World Affairs, Group Languages - Russian & German
Supervised by Professor Horacio R. Trujillo,
Department of Diplomacy and World Affairs
D.W.A. 490 Senior Seminar
Occidental College, April 2012
Table of Contents
A – Introduction p. 1B – Thesis p. 2C – Background p. 2
D – Methodology/Case Study p. 61. Russian and German Relations in the Historical View
i. Estrangement: Atlanticism and the Hallstein Doctrine p. 7
ii. Détente Rapprochement and Sovereignty:
Treaties of Rapallo and Berlin, Ostpolitik and Russlandpolitik p. 8
2. The Modern Relationship since 2000 i. Neo-Atlanticists and the Emerging Russlandpolitik p. 10
ii. Hints of Hallstein or a new Relationship of Souls? p. 11
E – Literature Review p. 121. Political Viewpoints
i. State and IGO-level Diplomacy p. 13
ii. Individual Diplomacy p. 17
iii. Military Performance and Comparison p. 21
iv. Cultural Bonds p. 24
2. Economic Viewpointsi. “Energy Diplomacy” p. 26
ii. Trade, Corporate Linkages, and Modernization p. 29
iii. Labor Connections and Demographics p. 33
F – Analysis 1. Contemporary Germany
i. Current Political and Economic Status p. 36
2. Contemporary Russia i. Current Political and Economic Status p. 37
3. Alternative Vectorsi. Europe p. 39
ii. China p. 41
iii. United States p. 43
iv. The Current Bilateral Relationship p. 44
G – Prognostications for Relations:
Further Effects on the Unipolar Order p. 48
H – Conclusions: The Curtain Sets on Unipolarity? p. 50
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A. Introduction
The Russian-Germanic relationship is the main axis through which the European dynamics of
power are founded. The various combinations of alliances and hostilities between Germany and Russia
and any number of other partnering European states have each had a titanic effect upon the European
order, and therefore also upon the rest of global order. From the first formations of these two nations to
the present day, their cooperation has built long periods of relative peace, and their mutual distrust and
scorn has shaken not just Europe, but the entire world. This is as true today as it was two centuries ago,
when the two powers underwrote a period of relative stability in Europe, as well as a century later when
their mutual hostility began 30 years of global World War. The complete restructuring of the global order
after those wars into bipolar halves was again integrally tied to the relationship of Russia with Germany.
Throughout these eras, foreign policy was split in Germany between an “Eastern” outlook of
rapprochement with Russia, and a “Western”-oriented hostility toward the East: mostly an allying with
other states such as the U.S. to expand into an Eastern Europe dominated by Russia. Similarly, Russia
was stuck between a “Western” orientation of a peaceful coexistence with Western Europe or America, or
an “Eastern” orientation, focusing on retaining its Eastern European holdings, or later strengthening its
the Warsaw Pact allies and warming relations with China to combat the strength and influence of the
“West.” These developments of political thought within the two nations during these eras naturally still
have tremendous impact in modern relations, and continue to play out in much the same way, albeit with
a few major contextual differences.
The collapse of this formerly bipolar world has led to a new ossification of power led by a single
hegemon, the U.S., creating a new unipolar world order. Recent developments suggest this state of affairs
appears to be rapidly deteriorating, and powers old and new are growing into vacuums left by an
increasingly retreating hegemon. These ascending nations are increasingly cooperating politically,
economically, and culturally, as each new non-U.S. tie further fractures the unipolar order into a new,
multipolar world.
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Russia and Germany both exhibit these tendencies, through the testing of new alliances, building
of new relationships, and maneuvering of blocs to create new poles of power. For Russia and Germany,
this specifically manifests in a strong bilateral relationship, built from historical inertia, fast-growing
economic ties and broad political cooperation on mutual goals. This growing relationship – perhaps aided
with further partnership from other interested nations – will either fundamentally challenge the status quo
that has maintained itself since the collapse of the bipolar order, or its potential faltering and failure may
further reinforce reigning unipolarity, maintaining the status quo. These two nations’ interactions
continue to strongly influence European power dynamics, and the formation of a European pole of power
may not be far off. A new European partnership may end the status quo, but continued feuding may once
again create tension and conflict in Central Europe, as well as around the world.
B. Thesis
Are these two powers forming global alliances to yet again balance against the other in the post-
Cold War world, or are they instead cooperating?
If they are indeed cooperating, are they cooperating solely with one another, and in what ways is
this growing partnership modifying the structure of the existing unipolar world order, if at all?
C. Background
As noted above, this is not a new question. For centuries, the Russo-Germanic relationship has
underwritten the European order, as well as spawned its most climactic discord. These effects on the
European balance have, in turn, had significant influence on global events.
When the two powers are bonded together in alliance, the European system takes pause at the
collected strength of the two nations. The defeat of Napoleon and the relative peace of the Holy Alliance
in the Post-Napoleonic era, as well as the relative stability of the Three Emperor’s League in the pre-
World War One world order, were all possible only through Austro-Prussian-Russian cooperation.
Previously, when the Prussian-Russian connection was severed, as in the Seven Year’s War, the War for
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Austrian Succession and at the French zenith during the Napoleonic Wars, the European balance, and the
global order, was thrown into chaos.
The 13th century invasions of Orthodox Novgorod by Teutonic Knights, so skillfully used by
Sergei Eisenstein to evoke Russian nationalism for 20th century propaganda purposes,1 was arguably the
first major cataclysmic war between Germanic and proto-Russian powers – the effects of which were felt
around the European continent and beyond – and it was hardly the last. Whenever the Russians and
Germans found themselves in direct conflict, European peace was thoroughly shattered, with
reverberations felt elsewhere in the world.
“What of the relationship of Russia and the Germans?” was the question that launched the
Franco-Prussian war, which created the unified German state, and led to the fatal re-structuring of fin de
siècle Europe. This rise of central European power led to decades of war for supremacy. The faltering and
failure of this Three Emperor’s League, fed by tensions created in that Franco-Prussian war, led to the
consolidation of the now-famous entangling alliances. The fore-most of these was the Russian alliance
with Serbia and France against Germany and Austria, which directly led to the mass slaughter of World
War One. After this cataclysm, Lenin, architect of the socialist upsurge in the 20th century following the
war, also understood the importance of this relationship. He remarked in 1918 that “we [Russian
socialists] are doomed if the revolution does not break out in Germany.”2 Without the strengths of
Germany and Russia bound together into one union, Lenin firmly believed that 20th century socialism
could not truly succeed in its internationalist mission. The Second World War further reinforced this
claim. In classic historical repetition, the war was launched first against France as a result of positive
Russian relations with Germany (as in the Franco-Prussian War), and then expanded drastically in scale
with the subsequent German invasion of Russia. The war in Europe was fought and decided primarily on
the Eastern Front between these two powers, and the effects of that front had dramatic repercussions in
the other theatres.
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After both of the World Wars, and with the creation of the atomic bomb, this same question of the
relationship between Germany and Russia created the major fault line of the Cold War, made manifest in
the Berlin Wall and the military build-up in the Fulda Gap. The splitting of Germany into capitalist and
socialist sectors again echoed Lenin’s prediction, as the world, too, was then also split between capitalist
and socialist camps, creating the primarily bi-polar world order of the Cold War.
The end of the Cold War was sparked by the reunification of Germany under the capitalist camp,
the tinder that lit the fire leading to the collapse of the socialist bloc, and of bipolarity. The world then
largely came under the control of a single power, ideology and economic system. America, center of
modern capitalist development and the one nation that had avoided centuries of devastating land warfare,
took on the role of sole global hegemon.
For a time, this development seemed to signal that Europe was no longer of political significance.
The conflicts of the next two decades would be determined and decided by a new Entente of America,
and its junior partners of Britain and Israel. The Europeans took a back-seat, focusing more on regional
unity, post-Soviet integration and what some have deemed a new “decadent, materialistic outlook,” rather
than on the “petty politics” that had led to the deaths of millions in the last century. These focuses
culminated with the creation of the political and economic solidification of Europe into the European
Union in its modern iteration in 1992,3 with Germany playing a central role. The Russian nation, defeated,
humbled and broken from its Cold War experience, turned inward. Europe stood still, as the rest of the
world marched onward into the 21st century.
Russia and Germany, recovered from the internal and external reconfigurations the end of the
Cold War brought, are now entering it as well. The consequences for Europe may be every bit as
immense as the long eras of peace in the 19th century, or the terrible turmoil of the 20th.
All of these alliances, wars and shifts between the two powers had and continue to have
spectacular ramifications – not only for European society, but for the entire globe. The consequences of
such actions, from the Baltic Crusades through the Seven Year’s War to the present day, reverberate
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elsewhere. These reverberations across the globe, in turn, influenced and continue to influence events in
Europe. As noted, the German-Russian relationship is at the core of the European balance of power, and
recent political developments have shown Europe fundamentally retains an important role in influencing
global political movement, but the fate of the world is not decided by European scheming. The world is
not Euro-centric, and never has been. Simultaneously, the shifting landscape of global politics does not
exist independently of European affairs.
The new Entente and its leading hegemon did not hesitate to move quickly to consolidate power
and react to new, 21st century threats while Europe slumbered. America, Britain and Israel directed their
own march forward directly into military and budgetary overreach in the Middle East and Eastern Europe.
NATO expansion and anti-ballistic missile development, pushed forward by a United States eager to
consolidate power over a newly democratic and capitalist Eastern Europe, ran quickly into financial and
political roadblocks. The same outcomes came to their attempts to simultaneously react to terrorist
attacks, combat two separate insurgencies and democratize nations on the other side of the globe at the
point of a bayonet. This overreach, combined with tremendous financial crises in America reinforcing a
similar sort of crisis in Europe, has thrown the status quo of unipolarity into question. The New American
Century4 that was constantly written about only few short years ago has shifted into a constant worry of
American Decline,5 American Weakness,6 and American Downfall.7 Regardless, United States and the
unipolar order are not nearly over with, but the strain of overreach, failed military ventures, and financial
crisis are beginning to have dramatic impacts in the realm of foreign affairs.
Arriving only a short two decades from its solidification, the cracks in the unipolar world order
have re-ignited global competition. The ascendancy of the BRIC nations, and their waging of new
economic and intelligence battles across the world, are the top headlines of the 21st century. This would
suggest that human society is once again on the threshold of, or has perhaps already crossed into, a new
and wide-spanning “Great Game” on a scale far larger than the imperial “Tournament of Shadows” of the
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19th century. These rising nations, the former great powers, and the global hegemon are now jockeying
either for an increasing share of strength and influence, or to hold on what has already been achieved.
Russia, a state once popularly thought consigned to the dust heap of history, is now “resurgent”
and once again looking to its frontiers. This “other half” of the previously bi-polar global world-order is
yet again seeking to project its power and authority. With America and Britain committed in the Middle
East and Europe reeling from financial crisis, Russia is attempting to rebuild its military might and
reassert itself in its traditional sphere of influence.
The 2008 invasion of Georgia, though fraught with blunder, was the first signal of this re-
emergence of Russian strength, as well as a Russian delineation of the farthest reaches of NATO. Russia
is also perhaps one of the clearest examples of a participant in this new “Tournament,” and its actions
serve as spotlight on similar maneuverings in other nations. This manifests in Russia's oft-written about
overt “multi-vector” foreign policy.8 The “multi-vector” strategy plays multiple nations and interests off
one another in pursuit of finding the most tangible and beneficial longer-term alliance, and is considered
somewhat unique. For the moment, Russia has no pre-existing alliance, owes allegiance to none, and no
one power is Russia’s primary partner as of yet. Political and economic upheavals within Russia lead the
nation to seek relationships with strong partners willing to cooperate with Russian intentions in their near
abroad, allowing its government to focus on domestic issues and the immediate Russian sphere of
influence, which furthermore aides in hedging against the far-flung threats to Russian goals.
Germany, another former titan of global geopolitics, is currently not only feeling the pain of
operating within the framework of a European Union project bereft with financial crisis, but is also
experiencing rising anti-German sentiment. This is due to stringent German-backed austerity measures to
combat Eurozone fiscal imbalances. These actions alienate the nation from its neighbors, who see
themselves as forced by the Germans to slash welfare to maintain membership in a Union largely already
dominated by Germany. The crisis may thus lead or force Germany to either reject its place of leadership
within the European Union in favor of a more restrained, back-seat role, or face exit of junior partners and
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possible outright collapse of the Union. It may also see Germany reinforce its position as the dominant
authority within the European sphere even further if the Union maintains cohesion.
In any of the aforementioned cases, Germany is not only capable of, but somewhat forced into
taking a more sovereign and independent position. This is equally true of Germany’s role in NATO. The
German government tires of its commitments to a NATO expanding ever-eastward and increasingly
involved in military adventurism across the world. Germany is ready to rid itself of its previously
submissive relationship with a United States that leads the security pact to such places. This is evidenced
by timid German public and government reactions to UNSC resolutions on and direct NATO
interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria. Germany, too, is searching for alternatives.
D. Methodology/Case Study
In order to examine this question in a comprehensive manner, a clear conception of the specific
forms that the relationship has taken in the past must be clearly determined. Those forms must then be
utilized to pinpoint the course of the relationship over the past few decades, as well as plainly identify the
current status of the relationship, built from comprehensive analysis of current news and economic data
built through use of (Thaddeus Jackson’s conception of) a “constructivist-realist” IR framework.9
As is the case with many states, there have been four primary strains of interaction between
Russia and Germany: open warfare, estrangement, détente/ rapprochement, and alliance. These strains do
not necessarily exist in a continuum, and the relationship has jumped suddenly from one state to another
without step-by-step progression.
1. Russian and German Relations in the Historical View
The historical record of the 20th century clearly and concisely illustrates this phenomenon of
“jumping” and these general strains within the Russo-Germanic context. Since the states of war and
alliance are self-explanatory and not likely to exist in the immediate future, the focus will be on reviewing
the two historical states that the contemporary relationship may take.
i. Estrangement: Atlanticism and the Hallstein Doctrine
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The first form is borne out of the divided Germany after the end of the Second World War and at
the opening of the Cold War. With each half of the nation in open alliance with one of the major opposing
and hostile poles, the relationships within the two Germanys were naturally a warm relation toward the
patron, and cooled relations with the “enemy patron” and its client. The major alignment of the West
German nation that eventually took control of “the two Germanys” was towards the United States and
Western European democratic capitalist societies, and against the “Eastern” Russian-dominated bloc of
the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. The Hallstein Doctrine,10 although perhaps a better example of
“exclusive mandate” policies, is a decent manifestation of the more estranged status between (the later
dominant of the two halves of) Germany and Russia. The Hallstein Doctrine was a policy of minor
recognition of the East German government and USSR by the Federal Republic of Germany itself, with
strict foreign policy repercussions for recognition by other states of the “Other Germany” and its patron.
This doctrine cooled relations with the East in favor of stronger ties with the United States and Western
Europe. This became known as the orthodox “Atlanticist” outlook, which operated in tandem with an
“Easterly” orientation of Moscow. The name has since stuck11 with the expansion of the EU and NATO,
although the meaning of the term has changed slightly with the end of the Cold War.
The Atlanticists of today have a similar approach to the Atlanticists of the Cold War. Since there
is no longer a Warsaw Pact to be hostile to, today orthodox Atlanticists are concerned with maintaining
very close ties with the United States, as well as strengthening participation within Euro-American
institutions such as NATO. To do this, Atlanticists often encourage spurning other pragmatic agreements
with less democratic capitalist societies to the East, such as with Russia and the post-Soviet Confederacy
of Independent States (CIS). Atlanticists often also promote a “harder line” against the assertion of the
Russian Federation in the old Soviet sphere of influence, at times almost applying a “Cold War” mindset
to the modern European political landscape. This, in turn, leads the Russians to take a more
confrontational stance with Europe, and seek partnerships with parties other than Europe and the United
States, a counterbalancing within the European power dynamic – possibly leading to further global “East-
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West” instability – and mirroring Cold War polarizations.
ii. Détente, Rapprochement and Sovereignty:
Treaties of Rapallo and Berlin, Ostpolitik and Russlandpolitik
The second strain can be traced back to the last time Germany was an independent, united
Republic, in the Weimar Republic formation. Much like the reunited post-1990 German Republic and the
newly federated Russia of the 1990s, Weimar Germany was formed from disparate segments of an
ideologically divided German people, and the new Russian Soviet Republic was a broken, humiliated, and
yet transforming and growing nation. Much like today, both parties were searching for a new and
independent foreign policy orientation that could challenge a ruling Entente that had subjugated, defeated,
or humiliated these nations.
The beginnings of modern Russo-Germanic rapprochement can then be traced first to the treaties
of Rapallo (1922) and Berlin (1926). Rapallo was a dramatic reversal from World War One hostility to a
most-favored status, as well as a return to status quo ante bellum between the two powers. This created a
split in German foreign policy thinking between the “Ostlers” and “Westlers,” essentially the very same
split later created between the modern fully Russian-oriented Russlandpolitikers and U.S.-oriented
Atlanticists. This split was especially pronounced due to these treaties exemplifying a sovereign foreign
policy, making firm strides outside of the deferential and subordinate role mandated by the victorious
Allies in the Versailles treaty. The “Ostler” victory of the Rapallo Treaty12 was quickly followed with a
counter-attempt at a series of agreements with the Allied powers in the Locarno treaties, internally
combatting this potential Russo-Germanic anti-Versailles alliance. The failure of Locarno to actually bear
the fruit of a truly improved Atlantic relationship13 led to a re-affirmation of Rapallo in the Neutrality Pact
and Treaty of Berlin,14 the inertia of which led directly to Russian attempts at securing peace and
solidifying an anti-Versailles alliance in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.
These attempts at an early Russlandpolitik were shattered with the outbreak of the Second World
War and the Nazi German invasion of the Soviet Union, and the pieces of it were shelved until German
reunification. The very contemplation of Russlandpolitik was nearly impossible until German Chancellor
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Willy Brandt had his Kniefall in the Warsaw of 1970,15 and the signing of the Treaties of Moscow and
Warsaw, which began a process of reconciliation with Germany’s Nazi past and furthered engagement
with the Warsaw Pact. This was done despite integration into NATO and an active maintenance of a
Western orientation. Ostpolitik was no Rapallo in scope, but it again created economic, diplomatic and
cultural linkages with Russia and estranged German brethren in the east. It also started a new debate
between the neo-“Ostlers” for Ostpolitik and neo-“Westlers” for further belligerence and a harder line
with the Soviets, so as to keep in foreign policy lock-step with the United States and their Western
European allies. Again, the “Ostlers” agitated for a sovereign move toward normalization of relations
with the East, significantly before the United States and Western America undertook similar measures in
the SALT accords. German cooperation with Russia again foretold a global peaceful coexistence.
This quasi-independent Ostpolitik orientation was continued by Chancellor Kohl after
reunification in 1991, as a return for support of the Soviet leadership for unification. Kohl maintained
primarily friendly relations with the incoming Russian president, Boris Yeltsin, in order to maintain peace
in Europe. The Chancellor also invested $40.25 billion in Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union,xvi
the largest of any power in the immediate aftermath of the end of the Cold War, during some of the worst
years of financial misery in Russia. This partnership was tempered due to mutual disagreements over the
course of the First Chechnyan War, as well as German-backed NATO intervention in the former Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
2. The Modern Relationship since 2000
The election of Gerhard Schröder in Germany and ascension of Vladimir Putin to power in
Russia marked the beginning of the modern, 21st century Russo-Germanic relationship. Both leaders saw
dramatic changes in their respective nations during their tenure, as well as a drawing together of their
nations, primarily as a result of the shifting post-Cold War political landscape.
i. Neo-Atlantacists and the emerging Russlandpolitik
Chancellor Gerhard Schröder represented the maturation of the kernel of Ostpolitik into a new
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paradigm of Russlandpolitik in Germany. Similar to Kohl in positioning to Russia, Schröder’s facilitated
continuing close ties with Russia. This included the creation of numerous partnership agreements, such as
joint pipeline construction, rail infrastructure development and a “Soviet-era debt for German investment”
deal, among numerous others.16 The German chancellor also refused to criticize Russia openly on human
rights violations in interventions such as subsequent Chechnya interventions, electoral fraud and other
conflicts in “core values.” The two nations also drew closer on disagreement with the United States, as a
result of the 2003 Iraq War. This appearance of these much closer ties was enhanced in the media by a
focus on Schröder’s close personal friendship with Putin, perhaps fuelled by their mutual commitment to
unpopular engagements in counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency in Afghanistan and Chechnya,
respectively. This friendship may have even created personal benefit for former Chancellor Schröder, who
was hand-picked after his Chancellorship by the Kremlin-backed Russian energy company Gazprom to
chair future joint pipeline development projects.
This growing mutual dependence and friendship between Russia and Germany did not please
other global actors. Perhaps unsurprisingly, these new high levels of Russo-Germanic cooperation, and
the emergence of this German Russlandpolitik, led Eastern European states to try and form a new “cordon
sanitaire” between the two powers. These Eastern European states have drawn themselves close to the
United States and one another, becoming staunch orthodox Atlanticists. The Polish Prime Minister has
even made allusions to the consequences of Rapallo, calling these pipeline projects both a possible
“Schröder-Putin Pact,”17 and a “Molotov-Ribbentropp pipeline,”18 the implications of which are clear.
The German dependence on Russian energy is a direct result of energy mixes and networks
created in the late 1970s during the Soviet era, to fuel the Warsaw Pact.19 With the disbanding of
COMECON, Russia has sought to utilize and expand these transport networks, flooding them with its
energy reserves, as well as taking advantage of the momentum of the pre-existing energy mixes in post-
Soviet economies as yet another tool to secure Russian interests.
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The election of noted Atlanticist Angela Merkel to the Chancellorship in Germany was supposed
to change this growing mutual dependence. Outwardly, this seemed to be the case. German companies
went through a sudden period of trouble in Russia, such as the oft publicized Lufthansa Overflight Ban
and Cargo Hub dispute of 2007.20 This cooling was further reinforced by Germany’s initial support for
anti-Russian politicians in the “Color Revolutions” in Ukraine and Georgia,21 as well as recognition of
Kosovo in 2008 against Russia’s ally Serbia. Three subsequent Ukranian Gas Transit crises in the early to
mid-2000s had drastic repercussions in Western economies – such as Germany’s winter heating fuel crises
as a result of these shutoffs – which further reinforced the perception of German dependency on Russian
energy. This seemed to force Merkel to re-think her hardline positioning.
ii. Hints of Hallstein or a new Relationship of Souls?
This was not the case. Despite this outward appearance of a return to cool relations with Russia,
Germany never returned to an Atlanticist footing. Merkel’s support for the “Color Revolutions” quickly
dried up when EU and NATO expansion was actually considered for these nations. Support for the tiny
Balkan nation of Kosovo was, overall, a mild, rhetorical move rather than a grand political statement.
Angela Merkel, the anti-Communist “Russian-skeptic” has, for all intents and purposes, essentially
continued to build a strong, bi-lateral relationship with Russia from day one. Merkel, like Schröder, was
even invited to and attended the Russian [World War Two] Victory Day celebrations.22 Like Schröder, she
has agreed to continue Russian-German pipeline projects Nord Stream and South Stream, in an effort to
secure German energy needs, despite continuing protest from EU member states.23 Like Schröder, she
failed to harshly criticize Russia for the 2008 Georgian War, and has overall further encouraged economic
and political integration and development with the Federation, despite her Atlanticist credentials. This
suggests that Russlandpolitik is here to stay, possibly meaning that the old cultural bonds that drew
Russians and Germans together in a “Seelenverwandschaft” (“Relationship of Souls”) could combine
with increasing economic and political partnership. This new partnership could, indeed, represent an
attempt to balance against the hegemon and its unipolar order, much like Rapallo.
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E. Literature Review
Many prominent European-oriented organizations and prominent European scholars have made
initial attempts to explore the course of the German-Russian partnership over the last two decades, and
discern why it is that the relationship has recently gotten so much stronger.
Each individual work that has been produced on the subject has a certain piece of the overall
picture, but very rarely has the European scholarship undertaken a comprehensive approach to the broad
relationship. The few that actually do exist are not fully up to date.
The vast majority of scholarship regarding the relationship only utilizes certain select frameworks
to analyze it. As a result of much of the scholarship being quite old, many of these pieces focus only on
the relationship of Russia with the European Union, rather than on the growing bilateral partnership.
When the bilateral partnership is discussed, works are usually also focused on only one of the two
nations, with only smaller sections of each piece dedicated to an analysis of the German-Russian bilateral
relationship. More generally organized, the current scholarship falls into three groups: political analyses,
economic works, and predictive stabs at the future course of the relationship, with some crossover with
the latter, based off of analysis from the former two. This work will attempt to create a comprehensive
and up-to-date picture of the bilateral relationship, merging contemporary analysis, current statistics and
the various predictions in an attempt to discern the path and effect of the bilateral relationship on the
European and global orders over the past decades, and into the future.
1. Political Viewpoints
i. State and IGO-level Diplomacy
The Russo-Germanic relationship is most often viewed through the lens of state-level diplomacy:
bilateral interaction of state diplomats either on official visits, or actions within international
organizations geared toward a particular bilateral diplomatic goal.
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Iris Kempe's 2006 From a European Neighborhood Policy toward a New Ostpolitik – The
Potential Impact of German Policy24 clearly defines the German foreign policy orientation of that time.
Kempe writes that Germany after unification sees itself as the bridge between Eastern and Western
Europe, and attempts to orient its foreign policy to placate that region. She clarifies the reason for German
efforts at old-style Ostpolitik in Eastern Europe is in the German drive for EU expansion into these
former Warsaw Pact states, and identifies the economic benefit Germany receives from this (discussed in
Economic Viewpoints). Kempe also believed that the Color Revolutions around 2005 also signified the
limit to Russian authority in the post-Soviet space, and a possible stronger direction for German focus.
With the reversal in Ukraine’s elections and 2008 Georgian War, it seems that time and Putin have not
been kind to this prediction. Germany also is moving away from EU expansion due to the increasing
fiscal crisis within the zone, possibly shedding members rather than gaining them.
This behavior in the EU is very similar to Germany’s recent behavior in NATO. Dirk
Schuchardt’s 2009 work Germany’s Interest in Future NATO Enlargement25 illustrates Germany’s
participation (or lack thereof) within NATO, specifically in terms of its foreign policy goals, one of which
being continued strong relations with Russia. Schuchardt calls attention to Germany’s reluctance to push
for further eastern expansion of the collective defense organization. In the author’s view, this is a result of
Russia’s zero-tolerance position on Ukraine (or is it rather only “the Ukraine?”) and Georgia’s accession
to the collective security organization. The author claims that Germany seeks primarily to utilize NATO
to stabilize the European landmass, and that if NATO expansion threatens Russian interest, leading to
destabilization, then NATO expansion is no longer in the German interest. Schuchardt suggests that
Germany will instead focus on expansion in the Western Balkans, but to what degree this is possible after
NATO intervention in the 1990s is not elaborated, and Germany has made no recent signs it is interested
in expanding NATO in this direction.
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Both Mara Morini’s 2007 Russia and the European Union after the Partnership and Cooperation
Agreement (PCA): a period of uncertainty or a new political strategy?26 and Anastasia Chebakova's 2011
Cooperation and Isolation: Understanding EU-Russia Dialogue27 detail the contemporary relationship
between the EU and Russia, especially exemplified by performance and renewal on the PCA Treaty.
Morini suggests that the EU collectively sees itself more cautiously than Germany does on an
individual basis, due to Russian actions
“which are perceived to be increasingly divergent from the EU’s conception of European values. This
1 "Alexander Nevsky (1938)" Movie Database. IMDB, n.d. Web. <http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0029850/>.
2 Lenin, Speech To The Seventh Congress Of The Russian Communist Party On The Brest-Litovsk Peace 7 March 1918, Works, third edition, vol 22, p. 322
3 "Europe without frontiers." EUROPA - The History. European Union, n.d. Web. <http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/1990-1999/index_en.htm>
4 Sutphen, Mona, and Mona Hachigian. The Next American Century: How the U.S. Can Thrive as Other Powers Rise. Simon & Schuster, 2008.
5 Rachman, Gideon. "American Decline." Think Again. Foreign Policy, January 2011. Web. <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/01/02/think_again_american_decline?page=full>
6 Innocent, Malou. "Pakistan's Boldness Reveals America's Weakness." The National Interest. 29 Apr. 2011. Web. <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/pakistan%E2%80%99s-boldness-reveals-america%E2%80%99s-weakness-5244>
7 London, Herbert. "Big Govt Steers America's Downfall." Newsmax. 22 Aug. 2011. Web. 17 Apr. 2012. <http://www.newsmax.com/HerbertLondon/Big-Government-taxes-debt/2011/08/22/id/408219>
8 "The 2008 Foreign Policy Concept." Russian Foreign Policy . Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the European Union, n.d. Web. <http://www.russianmission.eu/en/russian-foreign-policy>
9 Jackson, Thaddeus. Constructivist Realism or Realist-Constructivism? International Studies Review 6. 2, 2004. 337-341. Web. <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1521-9488.2004.419_2.x/abstract>
10 "Interview des Ministerialdirektors, Professor Dr. Wilhelm G. Grewe mit dem Chefredakteur des Nordwestdeutschen Rundfunk, Hans Wendt ["Hallstein-Doktrin"], 11. Dezember 1955." 100(0) Schluessel Dokumente zur Deutsche Geschichte im 20. Jahrhundert. Joint Effort of German, Russian and Austrian Government Archives, n.d. Web. <http://www.1000dokumente.de/index.html?c=dokument_de&dokument=0019_hal&object=context>
11 "Bulgaria and Romania: The new kids on the block." . The Economist, January 4th, 2007. Web. <http://www.economist.com/node/8492549?story_id=8492549>
12 "German-Russian Agreement; April 16, 1922 (Treaty of Rapallo)." The Avalon Project. Yale University Lillian Goldman Law Library, April 16th, 1922. Web. <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/rapallo_001.asp>
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‘values gap’ is deemed to have widened, especially during President Putin's second term in office,”
especially with Putin’s rejection of the CFE Arms Limitation Treaty. This cooling of EU-Russia relations
due to Russian failure to fully “democratize” and “liberalize” has likely only increased with Putin’s third
term. Morini asserts that “the stronger Russia has become, the worse the EU-Russia relations” are, and
Russia has certainly become stronger relative to an EU weakened by internal turmoil. This makes
Germany’s consistent bilateral appeasement to Russian foreign policy goals all the more conspicuous in
the face of a cooling EU policy. It is also possible that the German government attempts to fulfill foreign
13 "The Locarno Treaties 1925." World History Chronology. WebChron, September 16th, 2003. Web. <http://www.thenagain.info/WebChron/World/Locarno.CP.htm>
14 Stalin in Power: the Revolution From Above, 1928-1941, Robert C. Tucker, Norton, 1990, pp. 226-228
15 "Kniefall in Warschau ." Willy Brandt Biografie. Bundeskanzler Willy Brandt Stiftung, 2005. Web. <http://www.willy-brandt.org/bwbs_biografie/Kniefall_in_Warschau_B172.html>
16 "Deutsch-russisches Verhältnis - Putin und Schröder zelebrieren Milliarden-Geschäfte." Spiegel Wirtschaft. Der Spiegel, 04/11/2005. Web. <http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/0,1518,350815,00.html>
17 Glabus, Wolfgang. "Putin Pumps Up The Volume. Natural gas to run along a controversial German-Russian axis. By Wolfgang Glabus." The Atlantic Times, October 2005. Web. <http://www.atlantic-times.com/archive_detail.php?recordID=312>
18 Hundley, Tom. "Poles wary of Nord Stream pact." Europe - Poland -Energy. Global Post, 5/30/2010. Web. <http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/poland/091221/poland-russia-nord-stream>
19 2009 Gas Conflict and its Consequences for European Energy Security
20 Angelica Gruber and Michael Shields. "Lufthansa resists Russian request to move cargo hub." Reuters, 11/02/2007. Web. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/11/02/idUSL0256229020071102>
21 Daly, John. "Color Revolutions Turn Black." Current Affairs. International Relations and Security Network, 07/23/2010. Web. <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch-Archive/Detail/?lng=en&id=119208>
22 "NATO troops take part in Moscow Victory Day parade." World News - Russia. Deutsche Welle, 05/09/2010. Web. <http://www.dw.de/dw/article/0,,5557247,00.html>
23 Crooks, Ed. "Gazprom’s Nord Stream and South Stream gas pipelines are go, but are they needed?." FT Blogs. Financial Times, 2/9/2010. Web. <http://blogs.ft.com/energy-source/2010/02/09/gazproms-nord-stream-and-south-stream-gas-pipelines-are-go-but-are-they-needed/>
24 Kempe, Iris. From a European Neighborhood Policy toward a New Ostpolitik: The Potential Impact of German Policy. Munich, Germany: Center for Applied Policy Research (CAP), 2006. Web. <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=44156>
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policy obligations from fellow EU and NATO members of taking a “harder line” with Russia via the EU
itself, while reserving a more amicable style for the ‘individual’ bilateral relationship.
Chebakova’s analysis supports this idea. She utilizes a constructivist-linguistic approach to
analyze EU-Russia treaty language, suggesting that the fundamental EU-Russia relationship reveals itself
within the construction and use of language of international agreements between the two parties. The
author notes a tone of superiority in EU “suggestions” for Russia to uphold certain EU-held values, with
the European end goal being full political, economic and cultural integration of Russia into European
frameworks. Russia, on the other hand, merely
“perceives the EU as a group of European nation-states (e.g., “common histories of nations,”
“responsibility of European States” (Russian Strategy 1999, Preamble)) rather than a “non-traditional,”
“post-modern,” or “post-national entity”” and “that it is not only Russia, but also the EU who needs to
transform or change in order for successful cooperation to occur.”
In Chebakova’s view, this creates a more independent and sovereign self-conception of the
Russian state. This belies that Russia does not view the EU as a theoretical partner, instead picking and
choosing to form relationships with the powerful nation-states of the EU (Germany), merely using the EU
as a middle-man of communication and formality. “Russia treats the EU as a source of modernization” by
selecting partnerships within the EU to create modernization links. One wonders if Russia really sees
much of a distinction between bilateral partners with European states and EU cooperation, as it is likely
that the Union, on a whole, does not share this view.
25 Schuchardt, Dirk. Germany’s Interest in Future NATO Enlargement. 2009. Web. <http://www.atlantic-community.org/app/webroot/files/articlepdf/Schuchardt - Germany Interests in Future NATO Enlargement.pdf>
26 Morini, Mara. Russia and the European Union after the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA): a period of uncertainty or a new political strategy?. University of Bologna, 2007. Web. <foreignpolicy.it/file_adon/morini.doc>
27 Chebakova, Anastasia. Cooperation and Isolation: Understanding EU-Russia Dialogue. 6. 1. Review of European and Russian Affairs, 2011. Web. <http://www1.carleton.ca/rera/ccms/wp-content/ccms-files/2011-issue-v1-chebakova-2.pdf>
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Roland Goetz 2007 paper Germany and Russia - strategic partners?28 largely agrees with this
analysis. Goetz suggests Russia works willingly within global organizations that do not compromise its
own sovereignty, but does not participate within intranational groups that would theoretically abridge it.
Goetz notes that this full European integration path is as a possibility only held by "a small number of
Russian analysts." This Russian view of the EU as individual states is likely even further reinforced by
current European economic weakness and political discord. The commonly held "Paris-Berlin-Moscow
Axis” theory is also touched on, as a result of Russia's treatment of the EU as a sum of its parts, rather
than a whole entity, as well as the close tri-lateral relationship between the two largest “parts” and Russia.
Goetz still insists that "simple and grand sounding concepts like 'the Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis' or
'Germany as the leading power in Europe' are useless because they do not match the complexity of
Germany's tasks." Germany is not simply a power-seeking machine, but a state attempting to balance
relationships that may be rather mutually exclusive due to other competing interests.
Alexander Rahr’s 2007 Germany and Russia: A Special Relationship29 sums up much of the
debate. Rahr again underlines the very strong relationship between Russia and Germany in 2007,
contrasting with growing rifts between Russia and the EU, America, and China. Germany’s frustration
with the failure of the EU and NATO to properly include Russia within its initial frameworks and
planning is also touched upon. The author also again identifies one trend in German politics in the
“rapprochement” camp, from Brandt’s Kniefall to Kohl’s assistance to the new Federation, “ending” with
Schröder’s “friendship of peoples,” as what he terms an “Ostpolitik Redux,” contrasted with a “Western
Emphasis” championed by Merkel. He views Merkel’s government as definitely finding foreign policy
priority in the EU space and US partnership, while finding some reprieve from a ratcheting up of tensions
28 Goetz, Roland. Germany and Russia - strategic partners?. Geopolitical Affairs, 2007. Web. <http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/fachpublikationen/Strategic_Partners_ks.pdf>
29 Rahr, Alexander. Germany and Russia: A Special Relationship. The Washington Quarterly 30. 2 - CSIS, MIT, 2007. 137-145. Web. <https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:bQuBYR5_v9wJ:www.twq.com/07spring/docs/07spring_rahr.pdf &hl=en&gl=us&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESiUVt4NslEj1Vrkb3u3TWgoCT04nondxlhkXGrA5BCGJOLIFM4bhUCrzsfxgaJASQZXSgIuFWJQEwzV1_5k8fCTS2TDnacHPt7gCx7rELQz3aH2Yx0DK5wRs7bmnaA0gclliiri&sig=AHIEtbQW_Jm_BwL_O3Ii6o_4IJM4e99EAw>
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with Russia as a result of the paused EU and NATO expansion. He notes that Merkel’s favoring of a
possible Transatlantic Free Trade Area between the EU and US, which he believes could lead yet again to
an East-West divide between that entity and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
Christopher S. Chivvis and Thomas Rid of the RAND Corporation and John Hopkins University
respectively have the most comprehensive modern work on the bilateral relationship, and will be
referenced throughout this review. Their 2009 work The Roots of Germany’s Russia Policy30 gives some
interesting perspective on the above debate. The authors suggest an “emerging Russlandpolitik” that has
been slowly gestating within the German state since reunification, and with its roots in past German
foreign policy as well as current political configurations. They suggest that the bilateral relationship is one
that is not often fully understood within US policy circles, and – as is the end goal with this paper – insist
that
“one must go beyond the tired clichés about Germany’s dependence on Russian energy to the deeper
historical, political, economic and cultural forces that have shaped Berlin’s evolving relationship with
Moscow.”
Chivvis and Rid believe that as a result of reunification of Germany and the fall of the Soviet
Union, in the European view, Russia and Germany are merely two great powers. Rather than representing
the front lines of East and West, Germany now represents a Central European pole of power, and one that
has strong attraction to the geographically, politically and economically contiguous Russian pole. This is
not only a result of NATO/EU-Russia relations, energy trading, or a historical factors alone, but of strong
ties throughout every aspect of the entire relationship.
Chivvis and Rid insist that Germany is, “for better or for worse,” at the center of a new pan-
30 Christopher S. Chivvis and Thomas Rid. The Roots of German'ys Russia Policy. Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 51. 2 - 2009. 105-122. Web. <http://www.iiss.org/publications/survival/survival-2009/year-2009-issue-2/the-roots-of-germanys-russia-policy/>
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European space spanning from Lisbon to the Urals. Consolidation and cooperation within this sphere is
the primary goal of the German state, as has continue to be under the EU project, which fundamentally
requires a close relationship with Russia. The authors also suggest that perhaps even a controversial new
“Equidistance” with both Russia and the United States is emerging, although with the accelerating of
financial crisis, it may be that a “tipping point” has already been achieved.
ii. Individual Diplomacy
The bilateral ties are not only analyzed through the interactions of states, but the interaction of
individual politicians and their parties, and the influence they collectively have on the operation of the
relationship.
Lieutenant Colonel William Morris USAWC’s 2003 work United States Foreign Policy Options
Toward Germany: What is the impact of Vladimir Putin’s Recent Engagement of Germany31 does exactly
that. The Lt. Col. aptly investigates the personal relationship between the two nations’ top executives of
the time – Vladimir Putin and Gerhardt Schröder – in order to delineate a possible course of action for the
United States to re-engage the Germans in the run-up to the Iraq War. The Lt. Col. Morris notes that, right
before the outbreak of the Iraq War,
“Over 80 percent of the Russian public thinks highly of Germany versus 48 percent for the United States.
Additionally, the Russians show great confidence in Germany’s ability to act responsibly in the world forum
when compared to the United States.”
In the author’s mind, this represented a fundamental shift away from the immediate post-9/11
relations, in which Germany and Russia both experienced a briefly strong tie with the United States, with
over 10 years of relative support from America for German reunification, and solidarity on Islamic
fundamentalist terrorism, respectively.
The Lt. Col. also locates rising tensions with Germany in the United States’ exclusion of Russia
31 Lieutenant Colonel Morris, William. United States Foreign Policy Options Toward Germany: What is the impact of Vladimir Putin’s Recent Engagement of Germany. USAWC, 2003. Web. <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA415765>
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in its Global Missile Defense Plan, ratcheting up hostilities on Germany’s eastern border, combined with
disagreement on the proper action to take on the Iraq crisis. These were both views that Germany
naturally strongly shared with a Russia looking out for its own interests and upholding state sovereignty.
Therefore, the author concludes that the personal relationship and shared “early ties to Marxist thought”
between Putin and Schröder is “one factor among many” leading to cooling relations. Thus, “it can not
[sic] be conclusively shown that Putin [alone] is contributing to the rift between the United States and
Germany.” This is further evidenced when the record of Chancellor Angela Merkel’s ruling coalition is
contrasted with Chancellor Schröder’s.
Florian Justwan’s 2006 paper A More Traditional Foreign Policy?: Germany’s Foreign Policy
Under the Grand Coalition,32 argues that the Red/Green Coalition in Germany represented a
fundamentally different foreign policy from Merkel’s Black/Red Grand Coalition. Justwan believes that
this is due to the new Chancellor’s “curriculum vitae and character,” which
“facilitate a good bilateral relationship. The chancellor’s view of the United States is influenced by her
perception of the US during her time in Communist East Germany. Thus it is clearly more positive than
Schröder’s and Fischer’s, who both were spawned from the German “68-generation” that – inter alia due
to the Vietnam War – generally has a more critical picture of the United States, including its foreign
policy.”
This echoes the analysis of Lt. Col. Morris’ work, that personal relations indeed played a large
role, and that policy was influenced by the personal and historical backgrounds of the executive
leadership. Justwan does admit that, from the viewpoint in 2006, “the future direction of German-Russian
relations remains unclear.” The author still asserts, primarily due to campaign rhetoric and initial actions
taken immediately after the election, that “it seems safe to say that Germany’s foreign policy did get a
new direction under the Grand Coalition,” despite steadily increasing ties with Russia from Kohl’s time.
Justwan attributes such ties to inertia created primarily by Schröder. The author does leave open the
32 Justwan, Florian. More Traditional Foreign Policy?: Germany’s Foreign Policy Under the Grand Coalition. Osgood Center, 2006. Web. <http://www.osgoodcenter.org/justwan_paper.pdf>
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possibility that an Iraq-level foreign policy crisis “could well put the countries’ new foreign policies to the
test again,” which would theoretically illuminate a lack of substance beneath this new rhetoric.
Karl-Heinz Kamp and Carlo Masala’s work The New German Foreign and Security Policy: More
than a Change in Style33, published later that year in 2006, seems to agree with this analysis. They cite
Merkel’s quick visiting of NATO headquarters, re-affirmation of a “NATO-first” policy, and the
refreshing of the EU-US and German-US relationships, as well as a strengthening of the German-French
bond. The author also notes a reversal of Schröder rhetoric, in that Schröder criticized the US publically
and Russia privately, whereas Merkel now criticizes the US privately and Russia publically. Nonetheless,
Kamp believes that Merkel will remain pragmatic on Russia, but with far more distance than her
predecessor.
Roland Goetz 2007 paper Germany and Russia - strategic partners?21 is seemingly more
prescient. It sharply contrasts with claims of Lt. Col. Morris, Justwan and Kamp. Goetz disagrees that
Merkel’s first Black-Red coalition represented a fundamentally new German foreign policy, and that in
fact Merkel has been continuing many of the same policies as the Red-Green coalition under Schröder.
Goetz introduces the idea that the basic concepts of relations, recently
“expressed by the German Foreign Office with the expression "rapprochement through integration,"
[recalling] the Leitmotiv of Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik, "change through rapprochement,"
has not fundamentally changed from the Schröder days, but instead has only changed to a cooler,
diplomatic style. Iris Kemp’s 2006 work12 mentioned earlier also agrees with this in that the change in
leadership did in fact “affect the style, and not the substance of relations,” directly in conflict with the
confrontational title of Kamp’s work. Both Kemp and Goetz believe that the only major contrast is an
insistence on partnership being predicated on a move toward shared values as well as shared interests, as
33 Kamp, Karl-Heinz. The New German Foreign and Security Policy: More than a Change in Style. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V., 2006. Web. <http://www.kas.de/db_files/dokumente/arbeitspapiere/7_dokument_dok_pdf_9739_2.pdf>
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opposed to the previous Red-Green willingness to immediately accept Russian foreign and domestic
policy “imperfections.”
In Angela Stent’s 2008 Restoration and Revolution in Putin’s Foreign Policy,34 Putin, too is
identified as having a major role in the modern relationship. Stent again identifies Germany as “the most
successful relationship” for Russia in Europe, and credits this partially to Putin’s background. Both
Putin’s command of German (having served with the KGB in the GDR) and Merkel’s command of
Russian (having grown up in the GDR) play a minor role in influencing the personal relationship between
the two leaders. Putin, as the “‘German in the Kremlin’ (Rahr 2000),” has ensured that the importance of
Russia’s markets and Russia’s cooperation stays foremost in the minds of Germany’s top leaders,
sympathetic or not. Once again, the personality of the two leaders is “one role among many” that leads to
the relationship. Almost paradoxically, and yet still somewhat sensical in this particular light, Stent writes
that “History and geography, as well as commerce, will ensure that close Russian–German ties will
remain one of Putin’s enduring legacies.”
The Roots of Germany’s Russia Policy notes that the German reaction to the 2008 Russian
invasion of Georgia threw the previous debate into some chaos. Chivvis and Rid note that Germany did
not strongly denounce Russia, nor did they seek to cool relations, as an orthodox Atlanticist ostensibly
should have. “Within Germany itself,” they show that
“there is an uncanny degree of consensus when it comes to Russia policy. It can be difficult to find major
differences between not only the main political parties, but also the major social and economic interest
groups. Social Democrats, Greens, post-communists and conservatives might differ in their rhetoric on
Russia, but in substance they share many of the same views.”
This strongly asserts that the 2008 invasion gave total credence to those on the “style, not
substance” side of the aforementioned debate. This also backs up the assertions of Goetz and Kemp of a
direct line from Brandt to Merkel, but challenges the claims that Merkel would insist on a relationship of
34 Stent, Angela. Restoration and Revolution in Putin’s Foreign Policy. Europe-Asia Studies 60. 6: Routeledge, 2008. 1089-1106. Web. < http://www.on-luebeck.de/~flamer/uni/Die%20Aussenpolitik%20Russlands/Stent_2008_Restoration_Revolution_Putins_Foreign_Policy.pdf>
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values. Chivvis and Rid issue a direct and provocative challenge to this traditional split of “Ostpolitik” of
Brandt and Schröder and “Atlanticism” of Kohl and Merkel. Instead, they suggest that every West
German policy in the Cold War up to Kohl was “Atlanticist” in outlook, as even Brandt’s “Ostpolitik”
was firmly rooted within “Western integration.” This “Atlanticism” up to and including Kohl, they argue,
is instead more of a factor of Cold War power dynamics, rather than truly representing any “traditional”
foreign policy. Schröder and Merkel acting in relative lock-step is, despite the rhetoric and predictions,
merely the modern manifestation of a singular German policy. This “Russlandpolitik” then represents the
evolution and emergence of a single line of foreign policy thought among Germans that has existed for
over 40 years. It is also one that Russia gladly accepts as it seeks new and strong partners, which has seen
no change as a result of the 2008 elections, which brought in President Dimitri Medvedev, with Putin as
Prime Minister in a “strong advisory role.”
The relationship is not only carried out through words and agreements. The current status of
forces of both Russia and Germany also provides significant insight into the bilateral relationship.
iii. Military Performance and Comparisons
The military performance of the two nations in recent conflicts, as well as the level of cooperation
and coordination between the two militaries, demonstrates the policy-formation processes and longer-run
views of the two nations.
In Roger McDermott’s 2008 work Russia’s Armed Forces: The Power of Illusion,35 the author
confronts the realities of the current state of the Russian military, mainly through an analysis of its
performance in the 2008 Georgian conflict. McDermott identifies the role of the Russian military as
guarantor of Russian interest in their near-abroad and symbol of national unity, but disputes that Russia
has the capability for further power projection. He argues this mainly through a discussion of the
shortfalls and needs determined by the Russian government after the blunders of the “Five Day War” in
Georgia, and outlines the strategies that the Russian government and military have adopted to adapt to
35, Roger. Russia’s Armed Forces: The Power of Illusion. Russie.Nei.Visions. 37: IFRI, 2009. Web. <http://www.ifri.org/?page=contribution-detail&id=5294&id_provenance=97>
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and combat against these failures. The author focuses primarily on the military modernization program, as
well as a new “marketing campaign” of the utilizing of Soviet-era imagery to promote morale and send a
message of strength and defiance to “Western” powers. The author firmly believes that the modernization
campaign is more PR than practicality, and that the bulk of the program is fluff to cover an increasingly
stagnant and problematic military apparatus. While McDermott does not compare the Russianmilitary
directly to Germany’s, or speak of a German role to play within Russia’s military reform, the author does
conclude that as a result of "Russia's current economic difficulties it will be difficult to realize the
ambitious reform agenda laid out after the Georgian war," (p. 6). This may not be the case if Russia is
solely relying on Russian capability alone, but with foreign assistance the modernization program may
indeed bear fruit.
Rod Thornton lays out the contemporary case against some of McDermott’s arguments. In his
2011 paper Military Modernization and the Russian Ground Forces36, Thornton makes the argument that,
while modernization may be slow, the Russian government is firmly committed to truly spending on and
reinvigorating its military systems. This is partially due to a recovery of Russia’s economy from the
depths of economic crisis in 2008. Thornton suggests that, as a result of the failures to capture total
supremacy in the Georgian conflict, and with time to recover from the initial stumbles and economic
disorder, that the Russian military is indeed “now undergoing quite significant reform in terms of
structure, deployability, and overall philosophy,” and that they may very well correct past mistakes and
represent a new force. The author also claims that the Russian military is streamlining its command and
control structures significantly, trimming old command positions and creating a dual
conscript/professional force, and gearing forces for conflicts with smaller nations. It is the Russian
defense industry, he claims, that needs the real overhaul. This need dovetails quite neatly with the
increased funding for technical modernization programs in the economy. Despite possible stumbling
blocks, two years into the process the military overhaul appears to be much more than a simply PR
36 Thornton, Rod. Military Modernization and the Russian Ground Forces. Strategic Studies Institute, 2011. Web. <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1071>
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maneuver. Russia fully intends to make their military a first rate fighting force.
The history of National Socialism and reunification in Germany would suggest a different role for
the German military. For years, this was indeed the case, and the German military was a subordinated
force of “national defense,” an apt comparison being that Germany’s forces were a slightly more powerful
version of Japan’s Self Defense Forces. In 2006, with German troops fighting abroad for the first time
since the Second World War and Germany’s global position rising, the German government produced a
document suggesting a shift in this thinking. This White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy and the
Future of the Bundeswehr37 was the first such document produced in 12 years. With the shift into Merkel’s
Chancellorship and a more Atlanticist orientation, the government emphasized that the Bundeswehr “has
consistently followed the path of transitioning to an expeditionary force.” This document suggested that
the German military would perhaps transform into a truly capable national military able to carry out force
projection, rather than being oriented solely around simple tasks of “national defense.” This White Paper
also suggested that Germany would take a larger role in NATO missions in the future, as requested by
NATO allies unimpressed with Germany’s small role in the Afghanistan mission.
The November 2011 report Current Status of the Bundeswehr Reorientation38, put out by the
German armed forces, portrays yet another paradigm shift. The document clearly lays out the perspective
and intentions of Germany’s armed forces and civilian government for the 21st century, a nearly complete
reversal of the above document. The German Armed Forces are facing a cutback to 185,000 military
personnel, with a similar "streamlin[ing] to a considerable extent" of command structures as the Russians.
In a stark contrast with Russia, much of the Reorientation document focuses mainly on the Bundeswehr's
role in infrastructure development, employment of German citizens, and further armament procurement,
37 White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr. German Federal Ministry of Defense, 2006. Web. <merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/Germany_White_Paper_2006summary.pdf>
38 Current Status of the Bundeswehr Reorientation Safeguarding National Interests – Assuming International Responsibility – Shaping Security Together. Bundeswehr, 2011. Web. <http://www.bmvg.de/resource/resource/MzEzNTM4MmUzMzMyMmUzMTM1MzMyZTM2MzEzMDMwMzAzMDMwMzAzMDY3NzY2ZDM4NjgzMjc4MzUyMDIwMjAyMDIw/Current%20Status%20of%20the%20Bundeswehr%20Reorientation.pdf>
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with only a blurb given to actual combat priorities. Participation in further NATO peacekeeping missions
farther than the regional level is also clearly stated as not being a goal of Bundeswehr reorientation. This
suggests that, as a result of the European financial crisis, Germany is now utilizing its military more as an
economic tool rather than in an overtly traditional martial role. This is again conspicuous in the face of a
“resurgent Russia” undergoing massive overhauls of its military after attacking potential recruits to the
same NATO Germany is a member of. Germany either feels secure enough to do so due to solidly strong
relations with Russia, or – however unlikely – may simply not view the Russian military as any sort of
active threat and does not identify any other immediate conventional military challenges.
iv. Cultural Bonds
The bilateral relationship is not only furnished through purely political maneuverings and
political economy, but through the interactivity of long standing cultural mores, as well as public opinion
and media viewpoints.
Again, Chivis and Rid’s 2009 work is one of the few to touch upon this aspect. They argue that
Germany’s relationship with Russia is deeply influenced by the German “historical responsibility” to
make amends for the crimes of its National Socialist past. This collective cultural guilt for the deaths of
over 20 million Soviet citizens during the Second World War indeed plays a significant role in tampering
German aggressiveness.
The authors claim Germany’s “Russlandpolitik” also grew from the kernel of the successful
rapprochement of “Ostpolitik,” and through collective memories of the cooperative Soviet leadership
during negotiations on reunification. Fundamentally, Germany believes that Russia “does not act out of a
position of strength, it acts out of a position of weakness,” and that Germans have a role to play, in the
legacy of Kohl, in helping make Russia a strong place, mainly to avert a back-slide into early 20th century
imperialist conflicts.
Chivis and Rid also write of a deeper cultural and historical connection, going back centuries to
the inter-relations of Prussian, Austrian and Russian aristocracies, as well as some of the partnerships
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described in the introduction of this work. The authors argue that Germans are culturally fascinated with
the “mythical’ Russian soul (die russische Seele): deep, sensual, melancholic and patriotic,” and argue, as
in the title and background of this work, that there existed a,
“widespread idea that Germans and Russians shared a Seelenverwandschaft (relationship of souls)
[which] captured a specific self-image of German intellectuals and artists, who longed for a more authentic
and genuine life in contrast to the industrialization and orderly, disciplined processes of capitalist
Germany.”
Chivis and Rid also see through an analysis of German opinion polling, that Germans
increasingly want closer ties to Russia, and that the reverse is also the case.
In Valeria Kasamara and Anton Sobolev’s 2012 The Image of Germany in the Russian Press and
in the Eyes of the Russian Political Elite39 details this reverse more closely by analyzing the contemporary
Russian perspective on Germany. Their analysis of media trends and recent opinion polling suggest a
realistic, well-informed view of the relationship, as well as an emphasis. Russian media and elites also
view Germany as a “culturally close neighbor, chief political ally and economic partner in Europe,” and
“a political heavyweight on the European scene with the greatest impact on decision-making.”
The socio-political relationship is only one side of the bilateral Russo-Germanic relationship. No
matter the rhetoric and treaties, it is the economic fundamentals of the two states that play a primary role
in determining the capabilities and realities of partnership.
2. Economic Viewpoints
i. “Energy Diplomacy”
When Russia and Germany’s economic ties are analyzed, it is typically done via analysis of the
strong trade in energy-related natural resources, focusing on Russia as primary hydrocarbon exporter to
Europe and Germany, and the effect that has on Germany both as a large importer and as political partner.
39 Valeria Kasamara and Anton Sobolev, . The Image of Germany in the Russian Press and in the Eyes of the Russian Political Elite. Higher School of Economics Research, 2012. Web. <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2032076>
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Michael Friedholm’s 2005 The Russian Energy Strategy & Energy Policy: Pipeline Diplomacy or
Mutual Dependence?40 is a stellar example of such a work. Friedholm argues that, post-2003, swathes of
Russia’s energy sector was centralized under the state, rather than fragmented among petty corporate
fiefdoms. This allowed the Russian state to use energy as a foreign policy tool against states in the near-
abroad, while being wary not to let the use of such a tool significantly damage the economies of larger
nations like Germany, for fear of reprisal. This ability came as a result of Russia’s status as one of the
leading energy producers and exporters in the 21st century world. Importantly, Fredholm asserts that an
increasing reliance on Russian energy moves from a solely economic sphere to a simultaneously political
one, as “energy is not decoupled from international politics and geostrategy.” According to the author,
however, the charges levied against Russia for using energy as a weapon has also been greatly
exaggerated by states in Russia’s periphery to drum up NATO and EU sympathy. Friedholm also argues
that the Russian economy in 2005 is dependent upon increasing export of hydrocarbons, which seems to
require an unlikely privatization of critical nationalized energy industries. This refusal of privatization is a
result of the Russian government outlining energy security as one of the key strategic concerns for the
nation in the coming decades. The author also makes the claim that Russia will need more support from
CIS states to supply Europe, as it does not have the domestic supply to meet increasing demands.
Vladimir Milov’s 2008 Russia and the West: The Energy Factor41 agrees with some of
Friedholm’s analysis, but paints a slightly more drastic picture. Utilizing an in-depth analysis of policy
decisions and energy statistics collected over the past two decades, Milov believes that Russia’s resource
endowments and strong economic growth stemming from export have given the Russian state and
Russian companies a sense of nationalist confidence and “energy egoism,” creating a sort of “energy
superpower.” This confidence has led them to pursue policies of confrontation with states in Eastern
Europe and force Western European powers such as Germany into political concessions to secure their
40 Friedholm, Michael. The Russian Energy Strategy & Energy Policy: Pipeline Diplomacy or Mutual Dependence?. Conflict Studies Research Center, 2005. Web. <www.da.mod.uk/CSRC/documents/Russian/05(41)-MF.pdf>
41 Milov, Vladimir. Russia and the West: The Energy Factor. CSIS, 2008. Web. <http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/080731_milov_russia&west_web.pdf>
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energy supplies.
The author argues that, due to such power coming from energy exports, that “high scale
geographic diversification of Russian exports is highly unlikely.” Russia may be willing to partner on
some things, but “unpredictable and controversial moves from the Russian side cannot be ruled out,
whereas finding fundamental solutions in the form of long-term binding mutual agreements may be
difficult.” Milov believes that this adversarial strategy can only be overcome through the rise of a more
liberal government in Russia, which he claims to be highly unlikely during the next decade at the very
least. Milov also reinforces a viewpoint advanced by internal EU foreign policy reports, that the EU is
currently split into five camps on Russia policy: “Trojan Horses,” “Strategic Partners,” “Friendly
Pragmatists,” “Frosty Pragmatists” and “New Cold Warriors,” although to what extent the first and latter
three diverge upon – outside of differing extremes in the framework of “Estrangement-” and
“Rapprochement-” politics – is not elaborated. Using this framework, Germany’s current orientation
would range from “Trojan Horses” to “Friendly Pragmatists,” as discussed earlier.
Peter Rutland’s 2008 works Russia as an Energy Superpower42 and Is the Oil Boom
Sustainable?43 both tackle this tendency of scholars like Milov to exaggerate Russia’s superpower status
merely on natural resource endowments alone, and challenges the assumption that, with an inevitable fall
in energy prices or continued focus on energy expansion, so too will Russia’s economy collapse – either
due to under-diversification or ‘Dutch disease.’ The author analyzes Russia’s development as a result of
energy export profits, as well as its attempts at diversification, “energy diplomacy,” and utilization of
energy dispute as a foreign policy weapon. He argues that "it seems contradictory to argue both that
Russia is dying from the 'resource curse' and that it is also a dangerous energy superpower," and skillfully
uses a John Maynard Keynes quote from 1925 to demonstrate a similar analysis existed in history, in that:
“The economic system of Russia has undergone such rapid changes that it is impossible to obtain a precise
42 Rutland, Peter. Russia as Energy Superpower. New Political Economy 13, 2008. 2. Web. <http://prutland.web.wesleyan.edu/Documents/Energy superpower.pdf>
43 Rutland, Peter. Putin's economic record: Is the oil boom sustainable?, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 60: 6 (2008): 1051-1072. Web: <http://prutland.web.wesleyan.edu/Documents/Putin's%20record.pdf>
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and accurate account of it. (…) Almost everything one can say about the country is true and false at the
same time.”
He therefore also advocates that Russia is not the "typical Third World petro-state," nor is it the
Netherlands, and that indeed Russia already has a relatively diversified economy – one which the
Russians are now making every effort at expanding further. Rutland concludes that the ability of Russia to
use natural resource endowments as political weapons is an exaggerated claim "held together simply by
suspicion and fear of Russia," and that "at best, energy can be used as a hard power resource only when it
is combined with the other tools (...) including military capacity and diplomatic bargaining." In Rutland's
eyes, Russia's strength is not built solely on sand, but indeed only slightly augmented from the export of
it, reinforcing the government of Germany’s decisions to back the development of further energy relations
with Russia, in exchange for cooperation on modernization efforts, even “at expense” of Eastern Europe.
Chivvis and Rid’s 2009 The Roots of Germany’s Russia Policy reinforces this view. At that point
in time, they argue that Russia’s role as a solid exporter of energy is no longer in question. They note that
Germany will not be able to fulfill its energy needs in the coming years without Russian supply. The only
risks are in Russia’s own increasing demand for energy, and either German attempts to circumvent Russia
and go directly to Central Asia (which has not manifested in the past or present), or Central Asian
production and export shortfalls in augmenting Russian and German supply. They identify the danger
primarily in the longer-term capability of Russia to actually supply increasing demands. The authors insist
that “this concern diminishes the relevance of potentially malevolent Russian intentions,” instead
explaining that Germany wants a partnership not only to influence Russian “energy politics” but also to
direct Russian energy development. This suggests a mutual dependence, rather than a one-sided relation.
As Chivis and Rid argue earlier, the bilateral tie is not all about energy. Other linkages also come
into play, such as rising trade ties and business relations.
ii. Trade, Corporate Linkages, and Modernization
Non-state entities indeed play a significant role in the bilateral relationship. Without corporate
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linkages between the two states, unprecedented levels of energy trade and commodity trade would be
impossible. The study of respective business climates and cooperation of Russian and German firms is
therefore extremely important to fully understand the bilateral partnership.
Adrienne Shannon’s 1998 German Investment in Russia44 details the beginnings of the corporate
relationship between a reunified Germany and changing Russia. She notes that, as of 1998, Germany was
Russia’s largest donor and creditor. Shannon shows that “Five years ago [in 1993], the number of German
companies in Russia was only 30, but as of 1997 this number has grown to approximately 410.
Companies with established offices in Russia include Pfaff, Krups, Lufthansa, Bau Klotz, Mercedes Benz,
and Spiegel (…) [and] Germany's trade with Russia is expected to triple last year's results.” The author
also notes linkages in the banking and pharmaceutical sectors, which continue to grow today, who push
for cooperation from staunch Atlanticists like Helmut Kohl. Although these statistics are over a decade
old, these general patterns of growth have largely continued in the same way.
Another example of EU-sponsored growth in Russia’s economy is connected to BP. Although BP
is a British company, the Corporate Europe Observatory's 2009 work BP and the Russian Bear45 gives
insight into EU-Russia business accords and IGO-corporate linkages that influence the relationship. The
BP project in Russia also has a German connection in that former German Chancellor Schröder is on the
executive board. The paper details the BP-Sidanco deal amid the background of the negotiations on the
EU-Russia Partnership and Co-operation Agreement. The author notes that despite economic downturn, a
harsh and competitive business climate, and a foreign-business-unfriendly government, that European
firms feel that Russia is well worth the investment. The author evidences this with statements from the
"British Minister for Trade, Brian Wilson, [who] continued to insist that businesses saw Russia as an
important growth market despite the crisis," and John Browne, then Chief Executive of BP," who believed
'that Russia “rivals any other potential opportunity available anywhere in the world.'" As a result, despite
44 Shannon, Adrienne. German Investment in Russia. Lehigh University, 1998. Web. <http://www.lehigh.edu/~incntr/publications/perspectives/v16/shannon.pdf>
45 BP and the Russian Bear A Case Study. Corporate Europe Observatory and PLATFORM, 2009. Web. <http://archive.corporateeurope.org/docs/extracting_influence_russia.pdf>
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tumultuous beginnings, BP continued its investment and brought it to unprecedented levels, making the
"largest foreign investment in Russia since 1917." The CEO stresses that the EU's support of BP ventures
"…are not one-off gestures of support: EU underpinning for BP's business in Russia has been broad-based
and systemic. The EU has assisted BP not out of benevolence towards the company but through a perceived
shared interest, yet it is far from certain that what benefits BP also benefits the EU as a whole."
This suggests that EU-Russia business partnerships are heavily underwritten and influenced by
the states and state interest. The CEO further reinforces in that,
"The EU assists BP because, while it may not be in the long term interests of the EU to depend upon
Russian gas, EU energy policy currently relies on it. Without BP, it would have to rely on Russian state
companies, most notably Gazprom. As TNK-BP is currently the only major oil and gas company in Russia
with no state involvement, and the only major energy company in the country not majority-controlled by
Russians, it is a key partner for the EU."
Without further Russian privatization or strong European progress on renewable energy
development (which may lead to EU/German-Russian cooperation as a result of modernization
cooperation anyway), that the EU and Russia will both continue to negotiate and underwrite business
relationships in multiple sectors, that span both states’ economies.
Iris Kemp’s 2006 work12 agrees with both of these analyses. She notes that the trading relationship
between Germany and Russia is “asymmetric,” albeit “Germany remains Russia’s closest trading partner”
in 2006 as in 1998. Kemp notes that this may be changing. Germany’s strong interest in EU expansion,
due to the huge new export markets for German products, led to an initial shift. The figures on German
exports to Central and Eastern Europe had at least tripled from the 1980s to 2006. With many of these
trading agreements and developments being fuelled on faulty accounting and what are essentially yet
another case of “sub-prime loan” fraud – one of the many causes of the financial crisis in Europe as well
as in America – it may be that Germany will instead look to other, more secure export markets, rather than
its smaller traditional European partners.
The author also identifies the same business-government linkages in Germany as the BP-EU
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relationship, in that some of the more powerful industries in the German economy are directly associated
with lobbying organizations,
“such as the Committee on Eastern European Economic Relations (Ostausschuss der deutschen Wirtschaft)
with representatives in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Kaliningrad and Novosibirsk, the German-Russian Forum,
and the German-Ukrainian Forum (…) committed to promoting German Ostpolitik, but their priorities are
focused much more on promoting trade relations and a favorable investment climate rather than on
strategy development.”
The question then becomes: to what degree have favorable investment climates and trade
relations now become strategic developments under Merkel in the crisis economy?
The Russian government certainly seems to think they are – at the very least – closely
intertwined. Andrew Kuchins, Amy Beavin and Anna Bryndza’s 2008 Russia's 2020 Strategic Economic
Goals and the Role of International Integration46 takes the regime’s own stated strategic economic
objectives and analyzes the possible successful strategies that the Russian state suggests to achieve them.
They assess that Putin fundamentally wishes to take Russia from being the weakest perceived BRIC state
back to the status of a world power, returning to the list of the world’s top economies. United Russia’s
fundamental goal is to diversify Russia’s economy, and become a global innovator, financial hub, and top
energy producer. Russia fundamentally sees itself as needing to integrate into the global economy, no
matter the isolationist foreign policy rhetoric or abrasive actions that the government may take.
The authors argue that Russia is currently fueled by domestic consumer demand, and that a shift
of this magnitude would fundamentally alter the very basis of the Russian economy. Despite more
diversification than a typical petro-state, the economy remains hooked on the sale of hydrocarbons. The
authors see Russia’s goals as succeeding as long as the government does not rely solely on inertia of
previous economic policies. They see this effort as being coupled with a continuation of Russia’s growth
as a larger importer and exporter, albeit one with a growing trade deficit. This would most likely manifest
46 Andrew C. Kuchins, Amy Beavin, and Anna Bryndza. .Russia's 2020 Strategic Economic Goals and the Role of International Integration. CSIS, 2008. Web. <http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/080731_kuchins_russia2020strat_web.pdf>
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as an inflow of capital, paid for by a vast short-term export of energy. Ideally, such energy would
increasingly by mined with higher-efficiency, technologically innovative extraction techniques.
Chivis and Rid provide further insight into the modern development of these goals, and
Germany’s role to play in The Roots of Germany’s Russia Policy. They also see Russia’s recovering and
expanding market as an increasingly important area for the German government to encourage increasing
investments and exports. Germany remains the world’s largest exporter to Russia, and German direct
investment in Russia at this point was larger than the United States’. New private investors, such as
“E.ON, Volkswagen, Bosch and Siemens” were also continuing to access and operate within Russian
markets in 2009.
Within Russia’s military industry, diversification efforts, and overall modernization programs, the
authors identify many areas of “infrastructure in dire need of new investment and machines.” As Russia
recovers from the financial crisis on the back of high energy prices, German corporations see themselves
in a place to meet this rising demand. This growing relationship fosters a mutual economic reliance
between the nations, and the authors again note businesses lobbying government for an even stronger
commercial bilateral relationship.
Cooperation on modernization is further evidenced in Katinka Barysch’s 2010 The EU-Russia
Partnership for Modernisation,47 which analyzes the 2010 EU-Russia Modernization Partnership 48 in
light of the pre-existing 2008 Russo-Germanic partnership. The author notes that the EU project is far
broader, with “a shopping list of value targets” mandated and carried out by the sates. It is also linked to a
promotion of common values, which threaten the current configuration of the Russian state and may
easily undermine the effort. In contrast, Barysch details that Russo-Germanic modernization cooperation
exists solely within a few concrete areas, which the two regimes pass over to corporate entities and NGOs
47 Barysch, Katinka. The EU-Russia Partnership for Modernisation. EU-Russia Centre Review 15, 2010. p.28. Web. <http://www.eu-russiacentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/EURC_review_XV_ENG.pdf>
48 Joint Statement on the Partnership for Modernisation EU-Russia Summit. Rostov-on-Don: Council of the European Union, 2010. Web. <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/er/114747.pdf>.
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to fund and carry out. Nonetheless, the Russian government is reportedly not pleased that Russian
business investment in the German market has not been to the same level as the reverse.
There is yet another pressing factor to the economic relationship which sets a timetable for the
pace and scope of reforms in each society, and illuminates further possibility for beneficial cooperation.
iii. Labor Connections and Demographics
On the whole, European societies are facing tough demographic challenges in the coming
decades. This is most felt in the realm of the labor force, whose status has a direct correlation to economic
growth and sustainability, as well as political positioning in the longer run.
Most frequently, the mainstream news has discussed for some time Russia’s demographic
“crisis,” in that, due to falling birthrates and high mortality rates, “Russia” may cease to exist as we know
it. The 1997 RAND study by Julie DaVanzo and David Adamson Russia's Demographic "Crisis": How
Real Is It?49 challenged assumptions behind this continuing theme in the media. In tandem with work
done by Russian scholars, the RAND researchers found the situation to be more complex than mere
“depopulation,” and that much of it could be attributed to recent political developments, combined with
longer-run trends. They conclude that, while further research was needed, they could determine that the
variety of factors in Russian demographics does not add up to a “crisis,” but that they posed a challenge
to future Russian regimes.
Nicholas Eberstadt’s 2010 Russia’s Peacetime Demographic Crisis: Dimensions, Causes,
Implications50 states plainly that a crisis indeed exists within Russia’s demographic data. In the interim
between 1997 and 2010, the population continued to contract due to a particularly low life expectancy
among developed European economies, and Russians simultaneously “greyed” at a rate unseen in other
European nations. They argue, as a result of longer-term statistical analysis, that Russia is not only facing
49 Julie DaVanzo and David Adamson. "Russia's Demographic "Crisis": How Real Is It?." Reports & Bookstore. RAND Corporation, 1997. Web. <http://www.rand.org/pubs/issue_papers/IP162/index2.html>
50 Eberstadt, Nicholas. Russia’s Peacetime Demographic Crisis: Dimensions, Causes, Implications. Russia’s Peacetime Demographic Crisis: Dimensions, Causes, Implications, 2010. Web. <http://www.nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=446>
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a stagnating, aging population with a sustained high mortality rate, but that they also face decreasing
labor productivity due to low levels of “social capital.” Despite this, they do admit that the economic
growth from 1998-2008 did “mask” the severity of the situation, but that the financial crisis and a
“slumping international demand for natural resources” [sic] has brought the “crisis” back into full view. A
preponderance of Russia’s population is getting significantly older, dying younger, with fewer workers to
help sustain the system and maintain a balanced demographic.
This view is tempered, and perhaps a bit contradicted by Vladimir Gimpelson and Rostislav
Kapeliushnikov’s 2011 Labor Market Adjustment: Is Russia Different?51 In it, the authors argue that
Russia’s labor market has been quite resilient during times of crisis, and indeed is maintaining relatively
low levels of unemployment and stable levels of employment for decades. The major restructuring of
economy, while having a significant demographic hit, has not had as major an effect as in other post-
Soviet economies. There are still noticeable declines in employment, wages, and in productivity, but not
as major as in other nations, given the severity of the crises that have befallen them collectively. The
authors argue that Russia’s labor force and economy has a certain amount of unique flexibility that allows
it to buck these general trends, and there is more productivity in the labor force than assumed.
Grigory Ioffe and Zhanna Zayonchkovskaya's 2010 Immigration to Russia: Why it is Inevitable
and How Large it May Have to be to Provide the Workforce Russia Needs52 further contradicts Eberstadt,
detailing Russian attempts to combat labor challenges and the demographic crisis, both through
immigration and other means. The authors note that Russia already has the second largest immigrant
population in the world, mainly as a legacy of the Soviet Union. This number continues to grow, and
augments Russia’s capability to maintain a steady labor force with a declining population. They also
comment that Russia has encouraged and put into place a gamut of “pro-birth” policies simultaneously
51 Vladimir Gimpelson and Rostislav Kapeliushnikov, Labor Market Adjustment: Is Russia Different?. Institute for the Study of Labor, 2011. Web. <ftp://ftp.iza.org/SSRN/pdf/dp5588.pdf>
52 Grigory Ioffe and Zhanna Zayonchkovskaya, . "Immigration to Russia: Why it is Inevitable and How Large it May Have to be to Provide the Workforce Russia Needs." National Council for Eurasian and East European Research. 21 Jan 2010: n. page. Web. 17 Apr. 2012. <http://www.ucis.pitt.edu/nceeer/2010_824-05g_Ioffe.pdf>
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with these levels of immigration. The authors argue that Russia cannot cope with its demographic crisis
without unprecedented levels of immigration, and that indeed Russia’s future depends on immigration.
They also insist that Russia’s leaders understand this to be the case, but that a large amount of xenophobia
and lack of societal acceptance of immigrants, as in many other places, are holding this change back.
Germany’s demographic challenges, on the other hand, are somewhat less pronounced. James
Vaupel's 2004 paper Germany's Demographic Challenges53 clearly outline the state of the German
population. While the mortality rate is relatively low and the life expectancy quite high, Germany’s
population is indeed greying, and the population growth rate is below sustainable rates. The social welfare
nets in Germany are also becoming harder to maintain with this demographic imbalance. In the face of
this, as well as the predictions made for Russia, the author rightfully insists that a recent
“Neglect of demography has been replaced by exaggeration, scare-mongering, uninformed speculation,
and pessimistic fatalism. The sky is not falling. It takes 100 years for a baby to become a centenarian.
Demographic change is like an incoming tide on a North Sea beach: the tide comes in inexorably but
gradually.”
Regardless of the challenges and “crises” in demography, and despite the cries that “no policy can
change it,” there is indeed much time and capability to respond to demographic challenges. Labor
challenges, however, are a different beast.
Germany’s labor force, on the whole, has also been faring relatively well, in a way somewhat
similar to the Russian case. Michael Burda and Jennifer Hunt's 2010 What Explains the German Labor
Market Miracle in the Great Recession?54 explains that Germany, too, had a significant GDP slump.
Regardless, it was able to maintain stable employment and low unemployment relative to other European
economies due to certain labor market “flexibilities,” as well as a lack of employer confidence during the
53 Vaupel, James. " Germany's Demographic Challenges." F.A.Z.. (2004): Web. 17 Apr. 2012. <http://user.demogr.mpg.de/jwv/pdf/faz_20040408_41_en.pdf>
54 Burda, M.C., and J. Hunt. What explains the German labor market miracle in the Great Recession? National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER Working Paper (2011) 17187. Cambridge MA. <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Programs/ES/BPEA/2011_spring_bpea_papers/2011_spring_bpea_conference_burda.pdf>
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boom period. They explain that much of this “miracle” was a lack of hiring predating the crash, as well as
similar reductions in working hours and wages. Once again, immigration and business climate plays a
significant role.
A 2005 report published by the German government The Impact of Immigration on Germany’s
Society55 details these roles. Germany has a long history of guest workers and immigration to deal with
labor shortages, especially after World War Two. Naturally, this hasn’t meant a lack of xenophobia or
lack of integrative processes within German society. The German economy and society have clearly
benefitted from migrant workers, but the country is increasingly dealing with the social ramifications of
these levels of immigration, in the form of increasing discomfort from ethnic majority Germans, as well
as continuing attacks from the German far-right.
F. Analysis
Much has changed in the past two years, with a deepening of the financial crisis and further
shifting of the European geopolitical situation. What does that change look like, what does it mean for
further development of the bilateral relationship, and what effect is that (only bilateral?) relationship
having on the unipolar world order?
1. Contemporary Germany
i. Current Political and Economic Status
Germany remains the second most populous nation in Europe after Russia, with 81 million
people. GDP real growth rates are still contracting, from 3.7% in 2010 to ~3% in late 2011.56
Unemployment is at an all-time low, down to ~5.8% as of last count.57 Inflation recently fell to 2.3% in
April 2012,58 down from rates of 2.9% as of October 2011,59 though the European Central Bank (ECB)
and German banking leaders believe inflationary pressure to be rising in Germany.60 Population growth
rates are up .04% in 2010, holding relatively stable. Germany remains the world’s 3rd largest importer and
exporter (excluding the EU), with the 3rd highest positive Current Account Balance (CAB) in the world.61
55 lvisa Torlak, Veronika Vitt, Edda Currle, Kathrin Prümm, Axel Kreienbrink, Susanne Worbs and Peter Schimany. The Impact of Immigration on German'ys Society. Federal Office for Migration and Refugees Migration and Integration Research Department, 2005. Web. <http://www.emn.at/immigration/docs/b03.pdf>
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As a result of the 2011 Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant disaster in Japan, Germany has banned the
development of nuclear energy and has begun a phasing out and shutting down its nuclear power plants,
to be completed by 2022.62 They have launched on a $263 billion shift to “Green” energy projects, to
attempt and offset the loss of energy from the loss of nuclear power,63 though German market analysts
have signaled that investment and focus on development and use of Russian natural gas is more likely.64
The former “Black/Red” Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union – Social
Democratic Party “Grand Coalition” ceased to exist as a result of the 2009 Federal elections. Instead, the
CDU/CSU formed a new center-right governing coalition with the Free Democratic Party.65 Germany also
faces new Federal elections in 2013, with recent State-level electoral results66 and current polling
numbers67 suggesting a possible Red/Green coalition victory (possibly with additional support from The
Left, with the Pirate Party possibly playing a tie-breaker role). Germany remains committed abroad in
Afghanistan, possibly for some time to come,68 despite continuing domestic unpopularity. This
unpopularity, along with the Bundeswehr re-orientation and a slow economic recovery suggests that –
even with a new Atlanticist-conservative government – Germany is unwilling to become involved in
further military conflicts. This is evidenced by the slow response and abstention on UNSC action on
NATO intervention in Libya,69 as well as rejection of multilateral military responses in Syria and Iran.70
This is in-line with foreign policy under Schröder, and remains in lock-step with Russian foreign policy.
2. Contemporary Russia
i. Current Political and Economic Status
Russia, the largest country in Europe by landmass and population at about 138 million people,
remains in a position of precarious strength. GDP real growth rates have been sideways, holding at 4.3%
from the past year, but up from negative growth in 2009. Inflation fell from 11.7% in 2009 to an estimated
6.7% in 2010, although it is not still fully agreed if this was due to successful government anti-inflation
measures, or simply a reflection of the decrease in personal income, increase in consumer prices, and
stagnant consumer activity.71 Population growth rates remain detrimentally stagnant, currently at -.47% as
of 2011.72 Unemployment rates are down from 7.5% in 2011 to around 6.8% in early 2012.73 Russia is
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currently the world’s 10th largest exporter, and 17th largest importer, with the 5th largest positive CAB in
the world. Arms exports are up yet again after reaching record highs of $10 billion in 2011,74 now at $11
billion or 17% of global trade in 2012,75 leaving Russia the world’s number two arms exporter after the
United States. Russia remains the world’s top natural gas exporter76 and oil producer,77 and is the world’s
number two natural gas producer78 and oil exporter.79
Russia is currently undergoing a “leadership transition” in which outgoing President Medvedev
will switch positions with current Prime Minister Putin, maintaining the same dominance and much of the
56 Williams, Dede. "Exports lead German recovery."ICIS.com. ICB, 03/19/2012. Web. <http://www.icis.com/Articles/2012/03/19/9542463/exports-lead-german-recovery.html>
57 "German Unemployment rate - Seasonally adjusted data."Google Public Data. World Bank, February 2012. Web. <http://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=z8o7pt6rd5uqa6_&met_y=unemployment_rate&idim=country:de&fdim_y=seasonality:sa&dl=en&hl=en&q=unemployment in germany>
58 Randow, Jana. "German Inflation Slowed in March as Energy Rose at Weaker." Bloomberg Businessweek. Bloomberg, 04/13/2012. Web. <http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-04-13/german-inflation-slowed-in-march-as-energy-rose-at-weaker-pace>
59 Vits, Christian. "German Inflation Accelerated More Than Inititally Estimated, Led by Energy." Personal Finance. Bloomberg, October 12th, 2011 . Web. <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-13/german-inflation-rose-more-than-estimated.html>
60 Sakari Suoninen and Jessica Mortimer. "German inflation pressures to rise: ECB's Weidmann." Finance & Stock Market News. London South East, March 28th, 2012. Web. <http://www.lse.co.uk/FinanceNews.asp?ArticleCode=nnb312kjypdgjhp&ArticleHeadline=german_inflation_pressures_to_rise:_ecbs_weidmann>
61 "Germany." World Factbook. CIA, April 11th, 2012. Web. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gm.html>
62 Paulsson, Lars. "German Nuclear Ban Spurs French Atomic Imports: Chart of the Day." Bloomberg News. Bloomberg, June 9th, 2011. Web. <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-09/german-nuclear-ban-spurs-french-atomic-imports-chart-of-the-day.html>
63 Nicola, Stefan. "Germany’s $263 Billion Renewables Shift Biggest Since War." Bloomberg Businessweek. Bloomberg, March 19th, 2012. Web. <http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-03-18/germany-s-270-billion-renewables-shift-biggest-since-war>
64 REGNUM.ru, 3/18/2011, “Немецкий эксперт: Россия вместо Японии, газ вместо атомной энергии. ИА REGNUM <http://www.regnum.ru/news/1385036.html>
65 Merkel's rival concedes defeat in German election."World News - Europe - Germany. The Telegraph, September 27, 2009. Web. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/6237210/Merkels-rival-concedes-defeat-in-German-election.html>
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same leadership of the United Russia Party that has ruled since 2001.80 The Communist Party did win an
unprecedented 20% of the vote, but was not enough to form an opposition coalition.81 This suggests a near
total retention of foreign and domestic policy strategies and goals for Russia over the next decade.
As mentioned above, Russia – in tandem with Germany and China – continues to oppose UNSC
and NATO intervention in Libya, Syria and Iran. As a result of the leadership transition and slow
recovery, Russia has been shoring up partnerships and re-affirming its modernization efforts. One
manifestation of this is a recently signed economic agreement with other BRICS nations to develop
Russian mineral resources, which may lead to more efficient mineral resource extraction for export.82
Putin has also re-affirmed military restructuring, calling for an increased $770 billion over the next ten
years, though there have been some setbacks in the transition to a mixed volunteer-conscript force.83
Regardless, military modernization continues apace, with a multitude84 of military85
modernization86 projects87 either nearing completion88 or entering service.89 Russia’s technological
modernization is also progressing at a decent pace, with a new pledge of $14 billion into financing the
Skolkovo “Tech City” project. Part of that funding is going toward construction, with other parts
financing bringing over consultants from Silicon Valley, promoting new Russian tech start-ups, and
generally stimulating high tech industry development in Russia.90 These Russian government subsidies,
along with generous tax cuts, have attracted the attention of a respectable amount of foreign investors,
primarily from European and American tech companies.91
66 Lepisto, Christine. "Historic Election Results - What Does Green Party Win Mean for Germany?."Treehugger. Discovery, March 30th, 2011. Web. <http://www.treehugger.com/corporate-responsibility/historic-election-results-what-does-green-party-win-mean-for-germany.html>
67 Wilko Zicht und Matthias Cantow." Sonntagsfrage Bundestagswahl." Wahlrecht.de. N.p., 04/13/2012. Web. <http://www.wahlrecht.de/umfragen/index.htm>
68 "German army units not to pull out of Afghanistan before 2014." radio The Voice of Russia Politics. RIAN, TASS, March 12th, 2012. Web. <http://english.ruvr.ru/2012_03_12/68217941/>
69 Dr. Miskimmon, Alister. "German'ys stumbling foreign policy on Libya." Centre for European Politics, August 26th, 2011. Web. <http://cep.rhul.ac.uk/cep-blog/2011/8/26/germanys-stumbling-foreign-policy-on-libya.html>
70 "Guido Westerwelle: Germany opposes military intervention in Syria." Interviews. Interfax, March 20th, 2011. Web. <http://www.interfax.com/interview.asp?id=317948>
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It is likely, then, that Russia’s grand modernization project, while not perfect, will achieve some
strategic economic goals. Russian economic recovery and addional funding for modernization efforts may
be further aided by high oil prices,92 though this may be offset with slipping prices for natural gas.93
Russia also recently completed an 18-year bid to join the WTO, acceding to the organization on Dec. 17th,
2011, which may drive further commodity trade growth and give continuing and increasing aid to Russian
modernization efforts.94
3. Alternative Vectors
Much has been written here about the German and Russian state of affairs, bilateral relationship,
and growing power as a new pole, but the two powers have, for some time, been involved in their own
71 “СМИ: по итогам 2009 года инфляция в России показала рекордно малый рост” Polit.ru, 1/13/2010, <http://www.polit.ru/economy/2010/01/13/record.html>
72 "Russia." World Factbook. CIA, April 11th, 2012. Web. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html>
73 "Russia Unemployment Rate." Trading Economics. Russian Federal State Statistics Service, February 2012. Web. <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/russia/unemployment-rate>
74 "Russian 2010 arms exports top $10 billion." Security Industry. UPI, March 2nd, 2011. Web. <http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2011/03/02/Russian-2010-arms-exports-top-10-billion/UPI-79141299073519/>
75 "Russia ranked 2nd biggest global arms exporter – arms think tank." Defense. RIANovosti, 12/23/2011. Web. <http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20111223/170443514.html>
76 "COUNTRY COMPARISON - NATURAL GAS - EXPORTS." World Factbook. CIA, 2011. Web. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2183rank.html>
77 Gleb Gorodyankin and Melissa Akin, . "Russia Baltic oil exports to soar in Q2 -traders." Reuters, March 16th, 2012. Web. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/16/russia-oil-idUSL5E8EG2YZ20120316>
78 "COUNTRY COMPARISON - NATURAL GAS - PRODUCTION." World Factbook. CIA, 2011. Web. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2180rank.html>
79 "COUNTRY COMPARISON – OIL - EXPORTS." World Factbook. CIA, 2011. Web. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2176rank.html>
80 "Election fraud in Russia: Medvedev and Putin to exchange positions." Rustavi 2, March 2nd, 2012. Web. <http://ireport.cnn.com/docs/DOC-756544>
81 "Сводная таблица результатов выборов 2011 г." Выборы и референдумы. Центральной избирательной комиссии Российской Федерации n.d. Web<http://www.vybory.izbirkom.ru/region/region/izbirkom?action=show&root=1&tvd=100100028713304&vrn=100100028713299®ion=0&global=1&sub_region=0&prver=0&pronetvd=null&vibid=100100028713304&type=233>
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political projects. Russia has traditionally been focused on the CIS and the post-Soviet sphere, and has
been involved in another possible pole in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization with “number two”
world power China. Germany seems to remain well integrated into the European Union, if not NATO and
other Atlantic cooperation organizations, and has also been cooperating a great deal with China
economically. This is also not mentioning that both of these states surely have other very important
bilateral relationships. While not an exhaustive list, an exploration of the top three alternative vectors for
Russia and Germany – centering on the top poles of power in Europe, China and the United States – will
provide clarity on what exactly makes a Russo-Germanic pole the primary mutual vector, and how such
cooperation may stymie the unipolar world order.
i. Europe
For the past decades, Germany’s main focus has been on the European Union: an expansion to
new Eastern reaches, the integration of these new Eastern members, and Germany’s own version of
China’s “peaceful rise” to the top spot in the Eurozone economic sphere. The financial crisis threatening
the Eurozone has put this dream of a German-EU project into mortal danger. Germany’s position of
respect and power is disintegrating as a result of the growing fiscal crisis. German-backed austerity
measures, forced upon the so-called “PIIGS” (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain) and their
faltering economies, are beginning to elicit backlash. European unemployment is at a zenith, while
German unemployment is at its nadir.95 Growing German inflationary pressure in a Eurozone caught in a
deflationary spiral is causing a growing tension between the ECB and German banks.96 These disparities
and contradictions have led to wide-spread anti-German and anti-EU rhetoric in Europe,97 which is rising
at an alarming pace,98 fuelling popular and political dissent among European nations.99 The goodwill and
82 "BRICS states may jointly develop Russian mineral resources and modernize economy." Russia and India Report. ITAR-TASS, March 7th, 2012. Web. <http://indrus.in/articles/2012/03/07/brics_states_may_jointly_develop_russian_mineral_resources_and_moder_15074.html>
83 Flintoff, Corey. "Remaking Russia's Military: Big Plans, Few Results." News - World - Europe. National Public Radio, March 7th, 2012. Web. <http://www.npr.org/2012/03/07/147595521/remaking-russias-military-big-plans-few-results>
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partnership that Germany has experienced with fellow EU nations may disappear as many German-
friendly regimes are voted out of office, partially due a perception to Germany’s “self-serving role” – as
well as Germany’s partners in the EU aiding that role – leading to the crisis.100 This is further evidenced
by the Euro-critical Communist Party of Greece and Coalition of the Radical Left of Greece each winning
10% of the vote in in recent Greek electoral polls,101 as well as huge gains for other anti-Euro parties, such
as the 5% for the openly neo-Nazi anti-EU Greek “Golden Dawn” Party.” This is seen elsewhere, with the
leftist Front de Gauche, which calls for the invalidation of the Lisbon Treaty, winning 17% of a recent
84 "Russian Army Began to Modernize its Fleet of Main Battle Tanks T-72B." Defense Industry News - Uralvagonzavod. Army Recognition, March 9th, 2012. Web. <http://www.armyrecognition.com/march_2012_new_army_military_defence_industry/russian_army_began_to_modernize_its_fleet_of_main_battle_tanks_t-72b_0903123.html>
85 "Russian Air Force to Receive Six Su-35 Fighters by Yearend." Defense. RIANovosti, 3/12/2012. Web. <http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20120312/172116202.html>
86 "Russia to Complete and Modernize Antei-class Subs."RusNavy. World Arms Trade Analytic Center , 03/23/2012. Web. <http://rusnavy.com/news/navy/index.php?ELEMENT_ID=14659>
87 "Russian Air Force Adopts New Cruise Missile."Defense. RIANovosti, 03/20/2012. Web. <http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20120320/172284223.html>
88 "Russia Announces 'Massive' Tank Scrappage Scheme."Defense. RIANovosti, 03/23/2012. Web. <http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20120323/172346264.html>
89 "International Debut for the Russian T-90MS Tank Upgrade at DefExpo 2012." NewsMilitary. Defense Update, March 29th, 2012. Web. <http://newsmilitary.com/pages/3392101-international-debut-russian-t-ms-tank-upgrade-defexpo>
90 O'Brien, Chris. "Russian tech revolution plants a flag in Silicon Valley." MN.com. Mercury News, 04/02/2012. Web. <http://www.mercurynews.com/chris-obrien/ci_20286326/obrien-russian-tech-revolution-plants-flag-silicon-valley>
91 "Russia's technology boom attracts foreign investors."Telegraph.co.uk. Rossiyskaya Gazeta, April 3rd, 2012. Web. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sponsored/russianow/technology/9183881/Russia-technology-foreign-investors.html>
92 "Crude Oil Price History." NYMEX, 2012. Web. <http://www.nyse.tv/crude-oil-price-history.htm>
93 "Natural Gas Price History." Trading Economics. NYMEX, 2012. Web. <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/commodity/natural-gas>
94 Bratersky, Maxim. "Russia Has Joined the WTO: Now it is Time to Think Whether this Was Necessary."Economics -Analysis. Russian International Affairs Council, March 30th, 2012. Web. <http://russiancouncil.ru/en/?id_4=277&active_id_11=37#top>
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electoral poll, up from 10% only a short time ago.102 There is also a similar 27% for likely senior coalition
partner the center-left Socialist Party, whose presidential candidate Hollande has openly called for a
cooling of French-German relations.103 Similar electoral shifts are taking place across the Eurozone.
Germany is also being criticized for its renewables shift causing economic and energy supply
shockwaves in the European economy. This may slow down development of renewables in Germany, due
to a lack of cooperation from EU partners.104 The EU itself is also undergoing critical structural crises,
facing a momentary breakdown of the Schengen free-movement zone,105 as well as continuing threats at
Schengen exit from France,106 expulsion of Greece,107 and movements from others. The financial
unsustainability of the Eurozone, the turmoil of the Schengen Zone, and poor political climate is further
exacerbated by the mere possibility of full-scale default and exit of economies in the Eurozone if the
status quo is maintained. The alternative seems to be center-left and far-leftist coalition electoral victory,
but such parties gaining control of several key European Union member nations would surely bring the
same outcome. Should the “PIIGS” fully default (opposed to partial defaults we have seen in “debt
restructuring”) or even exit the zone, the possibility of further Credit-Default Swap (CDS) events108 could
send the Continent into a financial panic, and theoretically dissolve the Union.109 In any case, the
European Union’s deepening crisis110 will certainly lead to a major restructuring of some sort or another,
and the Union will therefore cease to exist, at least in its current formation. Germany, then, is certainly
looking elsewhere for partnership.
Ever-skeptical Russia has seen new opportunity resulting from the instability in the Eurozone.
Regardless of the risk, Russia knows of its dependence on European economic stability, and has therefore
launched an unprecedented campaign of cooperation with the EU in this moment of need. Russia is
attempting to “re-set” previously sour relations, and step in not only to help stave off a potential crisis that
could hit the Russian economy, but also to generate goodwill toward Russia among skeptical states.
Russia also agreed to work with the IMF to potentially send monetary aid to crisis-stricken economies,
and has also begun an attempt at a visa-free regime,111 thus far not leading to anything concrete.
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Despite “traditional” Euro-skepticism and the increasingly dangerous European economy, Russia
sees more opportunity in engaging at this time than disengaging. This is likely to remain unchanged in the
event of a Eurozone collapse or far-leftist electoral victory, and it is very likely that the Putin regime will
welcome more Euro-critical and leftist parties within the European Union. Such victories may lead to
increasingly ‘dangerous’ support for the Communist Party of the Russian Federation or newly registered
Leftist coalitions at home, but relations would largely remain unchanged even in the event of a
theoretically spectacular political event in Russia. This rapprochement with a changing Europe may also
lead to even closer relations with Germany, as both countries are now committed to combatting the
European crisis. Russia may find itself increasingly split between support for insurgent Euro-critical
parties and support for Germany’s EU project, although a Red/Green coalition victory in the 2013
95 O'Brien, Matthew. "Austerity Is a Disaster: The Lesson of Europe's Record Unemployment." Atlantic Business. The Atlantic, April 2nd, 2012. Web. <http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/04/austerity-is-a-disaster-the-lesson-of-europes-record-unemployment/255334/>
96 Cignarella, Vincent. "Inflation May Drive Germany Out of the Eurozone." MarketBeat. Wall Street Journal, April 13th, 2012. Web. <http://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/2012/04/13/inflation-may-drive-germany-out-of-the-eurozone/>
97 Johannes Korge and Ferry Batzoglou, . "Railing against the 'Fourth Reich' - Anti-German Mood Heats Up in Greece." Spiegel International. Der Spiegel, 02/09/2012. Web. <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,814344,00.html>
98 Severgnini, Beppe. "A word of advice for my emotional German friends." FT Opinion. Financial Times, December 13th, 2011. Web. <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/79d2cafe-25aa-11e1-856e-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1sIAexpTx>
99 "Plan Prompts German Bashing From France." WSJ Europe News. Wall Street Journal, December 3rd, 2011. Web. <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204012004577074433052312076.html>
100 Grodsky, David. "Germany and the crisis of the periphery."The European Strategist. N.p., 03/13/2012. Web. <http://www.europeanstrategist.eu/2012/03/germany-and-the-crisis-of-the-periphery/>
101 "Greek Mainstream Parties Languish As Elections Near -Polls." WSJ Business. Wall Street Journal, April 14th, 2012. Web. <http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20120414-700807.html>
102 Zocolan, Thierry. "Mélenchon culmine à 17% selon un sondage CSA." Elections présidentielles 2012 RSS. L'Express, 4/12/2012. Web. <http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/politique/melenchon-culmine-a-17-selon-un-sondage-csa_1104012.html>
103 Crumley, Bruce. "TIME Interviews French Presidential Front-Runner François Hollande." Time World Global Spin. Time, 04/13/2013. Web. <http://globalspin.blogs.time.com/2012/04/13/time-interviews-french-presidential-front-runner-francois-hollande/>
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German elections may also rectify this contradiction. Regardless of electoral outcomes and the fate of the
European Union, WTO accession will surely be a boon for European exporters, with modifications in
Russian tariff quotas and lower tariff rates leading to ever more trade with Germany and other strong
European trading partners.112
ii. China
German ties with China are following a very similar path to the Russo-German bilateral
relationship. Trade between the two nations has skyrocketed, and Germany is now China’s 4th largest
import partner and 5th largest export partner.113 Conversely, China is Germany’s 1st largest import partner
and 6th largest export partner.114 Trade grew 40% in 2010, and the Germans have increasingly backed
Chinese strategic economic and foreign policy goals. Together, the two nations blocked an American
attempt to create a CAB imbalance ceiling.115 Germany also killed two foreign policy birds with one stone
by abstaining on Libya and denouncing military intervention in Syria and Iran, as it not only lines up with
Russian foreign policy, but the Chinese orientation as well. The two countries recently signed 14 new
104 "Germany 'Must Not Go It Alone' EU Commissioner Attacks Berlin's Energy Plans." Spiegel International. Der Spiegel, 03/12/2012. Web. <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,820767,00.html>
105 Collett, Elizabeth. "Faltering Movement: Explaining Europe." Migration Information Source. Migration Policy Institute, November 2011. Web. 17 Apr 2012. <http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?ID=859>
106 Parussini, Gabriele. "Sarkozy Threatens to Exit Schengen Area." World - Europe. Wall Street Journal, March 11th, 2012. Web. <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304450004577275313803633368.html>
107 "Facing Schengen expulsion, Greece locks up immigrants."EurActiv.com. N.p., March 29th, 2012. Web. <http://www.euractiv.com/justice/facing-schengen-expulsion-greece-locks-immigrants-news-511834>
108 Fontevecchia, Agustino. "ISDA Says Greece In Default, CDS Will Trigger." Forbes Markets. Forbes, 03/09/2012. Web. <http://www.forbes.com/sites/afontevecchia/2012/03/09/on-greece-defaults-and-the-future-of-derivatives/>
109 "International Contracts and the Euro-zone Crisis." Securities and derivatives briefing. Ashurst, (2012) Web. 17 Apr. 2012. <www.ashurst.com/page.aspx?id_content=6505>
110 Monami Yui and Mariko Ishikawa. "Euro Set for Biggest Weekly Drop in 7 Months on Debt Woes."Bloomberg News. Bloomberg, April 6th, 2012. Web. <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-04-05/euro-set-for-biggest-weekly-drop-in-7-months-on-debt-woes.html>
111 Andreev, Ivan. "Russia and the EU: When Will Visas Be Abolished?." Society - Analysis. Russian International Affairs Council, March 6th, 2012. Web. <Russia and the EU: When Will Visas Be Abolished?>
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economic deals and 22 new cooperation agreements, creating even further economic interdependence as
Germany and China both follow export-driven growth models. With political and economic tensions
ratcheting up, both nations are increasingly looking to utilize the markets of the other to sustain their
export-driven growth.116 In return for cooperation, China – like Russia – also realizes economic
interdependence and is also considering an EU bailout pledge in an attempt to aid Germany.117
This, yet again, is a German search for a strategic partnership118 to the East, comprised of interests
over values, coming from a staunch Atlanticist. This suggests Germany’s foreign policy direction is firmly
pointed eastward, pursuing a double Russlandpolitik and Chinapolitik: not merely a redux of Willy
Brandt’s West-integrated Ostpolitik, but a serious, sovereign attempt at a new direction for German
foreign policy.
Russia, too, has seen strengthening ties with China in recent years. Both countries are leading
members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, hold regular joint military exercises, and share
similar strategic and economic goals, as well as boast a strong economic relationship.119 While Russia is
not among China’s top importers or exporters, China is Russia’s 2st largest import partner and 4th largest
112 "The Future for Russia’s Energy and Commodities Industries after WTO Accession ." Bulletins - Energy, Resources and Environment. Global Intelligence Alliance, March 22nd, 2012. Web. <http://www.globalintelligence.com/insights-analysis/bulletins/the-future-for-russia-s-energy-and-commodities-ind>
113 "China." World Factbook. CIA, April 11th, 2012. Web. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html>
114 "Germany." World Factbook. CIA, April 11th, 2012. Web. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gm.html>
115 "Germany and China - Mr Wen goes to Berlin."Newsbook. The Economist, 06/28/2011. Web. <http://www.economist.com/blogs/newsbook/2011/06/germany-and-china>
116 Wolverson, Roya. "Will Germany-China Ties Hurt the U.S.?." Time Business - Economy and Policy. Time, 06/29/2011. Web. 17 Apr 2012. <http://business.time.com/2011/06/29/will-germany-china-ties-hurt-the-u-s/>
117 "China 'considering' eurozone rescue pledge, Wen says."Asia Business News. BBC, 02/02/2012. Web. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-16848634>
118 "Deutsch-Chinesisches Gemeinsames Kommuniqué zur umfassenden Förderung der Strategischen Partnerschaft." Auswärtiges Amt, August 2010. Web. <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/599088/publicationFile/50187/100718-DeutschChinesisches_Kommunique.pdf;jsessionid=39E11953463EC11E205DDC0D3F10D94F>
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export partner.120 The countries share common concerns with Islamic separatism and terrorism, as well as
common values in upholding territorial unity and state sovereignty and a desire to displace the United
States as global hegemon. As mentioned, this manifests in regular joint protest against U.S. maneuverings
at the UNSC, as well as continuing rejection of subsequent NATO interventions.
Russia also finds a lucrative market for oil and gas exports in China’s growing economy.
Whether or not this will eclipse the German-Russian relationship is unknown, but unlikely due to the
amount of pre-existing development, as well as Russia’s struggle to meet rising European demand alone.
The relationship is not perfect, and tensions over theoretical Chinese designs on the vast, resource rich,
and largely empty Russian Far East, occasional border, pollution and trade imbalance disputes, combined
with an overall mutual suspicion stemming from the historical Sino-Soviet split, prevent the relationship
from becoming a fully-blown alliance.121 Regardless, Putin’s return to the presidency marks a new,
positive chapter in relations, and Putin has already made signs that he wishes to further strengthen ties
with China in his third term.122 The two countries have indeed strengthened ties during the economic
downturn, signing a several lucrative economic agreements, including a trillion dollar gas deal. As a
result, trade between the two states is also expected to double in the coming years.123 Like the Russo-
German and Sino-German relationships, Russia and China also share a growing strategic partnership.
iii. United States
German-U.S. relations remain strong, but have been battered by a number of German foreign
119 Harding, Luke. "Russia fears embrace of giant eastern neighbour." The Observer - World News - Russia. The Guardian, August 1st, 2009. Web. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/aug/02/china-russia-relationship>
120 "Russia." World Factbook. CIA, April 11th, 2012. Web. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html>
121 Dr. Weitz, Richard. "China-Russia relations and the United States: At a turning point?." RIA Opinions. RIANovosti, April 14, 2011. Web. <http://en.rian.ru/valdai_op/20110414/163523421.html>
122 Tiegang, Zhang. "Putin's return to Kremlin boosts Russia-China relations." China News. Xinhua, 03/05/2012. Web. <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-03/05/c_131447923.htm>
123 Druzhinin, Aleksey. "As global economy cools, Russian-Chinese relations heat up." RT Politics. Russia Today, October 11th,2011. Web. <http://rt.com/politics/china-russia-putin-jiabo-economy-573/>
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policy “defections” and turmoil within NATO and the UNSC. U.S.-German trade ties remain strong, and
Germany remains the 5th largest import partner for the U.S.,124 and the U.S. is still Germany’s 2nd largest
export market, after France. German government officials continue to view the United States as the
world’s dominant power, but the “quagmires” in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as a lack of leadership in
the Arab Spring and Libya intervention, have led Germany to begin reconsideration and reorientation.125
Germany’s abstention on Libya action in the UNSC is the clearest evidence for this reorientation, but
murmurs of disagreement on the role of NATO between France, the U.S. and Germany also illuminate
discontentment and divergence.126
Despite growing unrest among the Atlantic Alliance members, the U.S. recently agreed with
Germany and Russia to scrap missile defense systems (ABM) planned for deployment in Eastern
Europe,127 in favor of a system proposed by Germany in which the ABM HQ would be located at
Ramstein AFB in Germany. This effort is combined with increased German attempts to negotiate with
Russia on behalf of the U.S. to come to a mutually acceptable agreement on ABM deployment.128 The
recent Wikileaks scandal in 2008 also revealed that the United States largely sees Germany the
“parroting” Russian line to enhance their bilateral relationship, against U.S. interests, suggesting that the
U.S. is also feeling a new distance.129 Germany remains within the Atlantic framework of treaties and
IGOs, but “cracks” and divergences in the relationship are becoming more noticeable with time.
The U.S.-Russian relationship is far cooler, and Putin’s re-election bodes poorly for a serious
turn-around. The only significant trade relationship between the two nations is that the U.S. remains
Russia’s 3rd largest export market,130 and that a few U.S. companies have stepped forward to invest in
124 "United States." World Factbook. CIA, April 11th, 2012. Web. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html>
125 Crary, David. "Consensus abroad: U.S. still top world power." Air Force Times. Gannett Corporation, 03/25/2012. Web. <http://www.airforcetimes.com/mobile/index.php?storyUrl=http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2012/03/ap-consensus-abroad-united-states-still-top-world-power-032512/>
126 Farnsworth, Tim. "Germany pushes for changes in NATO’s nuclear posture." Arms Control Now. Arms Control Association, 03/14/2012. Web. <http://armscontrolnow.org/2012/03/14/germany-pushes-for-changes-in-natos-nuclear-posture/>
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Russian modernization. Wikileaks also highlighted U.S. pressure on Germany and GM’s European brand
Opel to not sell off that brand, primarily due to the buyers considering sales to Russian carmakers, which
illuminated a state of mistrust in U.S.-Russian economic relations.131 The political “re-set” in relations
also proved mostly ineffective, with continuing mutual belligerence characterizing the relationship. Putin
has blasted U.S.-backed NATO expansion, ABM system deployment,132 involvement in Libya,
machinations concerning Russia’s regional partners in Syria and Iran,133 and countless other U.S. actions
and policies. Russia continues to view the United States as a belligerent hegemon following a
confrontational foreign policy, even despite the change in presidency from Bush to Obama.134
Despite frosty relations around election time – which is not a new phenomenon – there have been
some successes, and some of the ‘frost’ may simply be for show. The New START nuclear weapons
reduction treaty appears to be on track,135 and the Russian government also recently agreed to allow
NATO use of transit routes for their mission in Afghanistan. Obama was also recently ‘caught’ telling
127 Amies, Nick. "Missile shield plans cause rift between US, Europe and Russia." DW Top Stories - World. Deutsche Welle, 0912/2010. Web. <http://www.dw-world.com/dw/article/0,,6309087,00.html>
128 Gotkowska, Justyna. "Germany in NATO’s missile defence system ." Center for Eastern Studies. OSW, 02/08/2012. Web. <http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/ceweekly/2012-02-08/germany-nato-s-missile-defence-system>
129 Reitman, Andrew. "US cables shed light on EU 'Friends of Russia' in Georgia war." EUO Headline News. EU Observer, 01/12/2010. Web. <http://euobserver.com/9/31400>
130 "Russia." World Factbook. CIA, April 11th, 2012. Web. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html>
131 Goh, Brenda. "GM clashed with Russia over Opel unit-paper." . Reuters, July 25th, 2011. Web. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/25/gm-wikileaks-idUSL3E7IP14420110725>
132 "Russlands Außenpolitik "Putin ist egal, wer in Washington regiert"." Präsidentenwahl in Russland 2012. Der Spiegel, 03/05/2012. Web. <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,819344,00.html>
133 "Zeitungsbeitrag - Putin wettert gegen USA und Nato."Präsidentenwahl in Russland 2012. Der Spiegel, 02/27/2012. Web. <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,817832,00.html>
134 Bridge, Robert. "US deals Russia the 'anti-American' card."Politics - Columns. Russia Today, April 5th, 2012. Web. <http://rt.com/politics/columns/bridge-too/us-russia-missile-bridge/>
135 Slungaard, David. "A Sophomore Slump?: Troubleshooting Russian Modernizations and New START Reductions." CSIS Analysis. Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 9th, 2012. Web. <A Sophomore Slump?: Troubleshooting Russian Modernizations and New START Reductions>
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Russian President Medvedev that he simply “needs time” around elections to trump up ABM, which may
reduce after an Obama re-election.136 This suggests that strained relations could warm in the coming years
of Putin’s presidency, possibly with German help, as Russia shores up its position in the international
community. It is far likelier that the U.S.-Russian relationship will remain cool in the decades to come,
especially as Russia, China and Germany cooperate further to stem U.S. global influence.
Aside from political and economic concerns, there is another important factor: there is an ocean
separating Russia, Germany and the United States, and around 4,000 miles separating Moscow and Berlin
from Beijing.137 There is also a 6-8 hour time difference between Moscow and Berlin, and Washington138
D.C. and Beijing.139 In comparison, Moscow and Berlin are a mere 1,000 miles140 and 2 hours apart.141
iv. The Current Bilateral Relationship
Aside from other, faltering relations within Europe, both Moscow and Berlin represent the
closest, most geographically beneficial vector for increasing collaboration and partnership. In addition to
this geographic proximity, Germany and Russia also represent the strongest political and economic
vectors for one another. 2012/2013 has become the German Year in Russia, as well as the Russian Year in
Germany.142 Germany continues to be Russia’s top import and export partner,143 and although Russia does
not enter into Germany’s top commodity trading partners, Germany currently imports 60% of all imported
natural gas (40% total usage) from Russia, 40% of all imported oil, and 25% of all German coal, up from
136 Weir, Fred. "Obama asks Russia to cut him slack until reelection." Europe News. Christian Science Monitor, 03/26/2012. Web. <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2012/0326/Obama-asks-Russia-to-cut-him-slack-until-reelection>
137 "Distance Calculator.” N.p., n.d. Web. <http://www.distance.to/>
138 "The World Clock - Time Zone difference from U.S.A. – District of Columbia – Washington DC." . Time and Date, n.d. Web. <http://www.timeanddate.com/worldclock/difference.html?p1=263>
139 "The World Clock - Time Zone difference from China – Beijing." . Time and Date, n.d. Web. <http://www.timeanddate.com/worldclock/difference.html?p1=33>
140 "Distance from Moscow to Berlin." Time and Date, n.d. Web. <http://www.timeanddate.com/worldclock/distanceresult.html?p1=166&p2=37>
141 "The World Clock - Time Zone difference from Russia – Moscow." . Time and Date, n.d. Web. <http://www.timeanddate.com/worldclock/difference.html?p1=166>
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previous years.144
These levels of import may very well increase yet again, as turmoil over Germany’s ambitious
renewables program will likely delay its completion, therefore not covering the deficit left from the
elimination of nuclear energy by 2022.145 Chancellor Merkel has attempted to downplay this increasing
dependence,146 but the energy gap is becoming too large to ignore in light of these inter-EU
disagreements, and such renewable production delays are certain due to work stoppages as cooperation
agreements are hammered out. German companies are therefore reaching out to Gazprom to fulfill this
growing “23% hole” in the German energy mixture.147 Russian natural gas has a huge role to play in the
immediate future German energy mix,148 with the new North Stream pipeline and scheduled South Stream
pipeline set to double energy exports in the coming years.149 With the nuclear phase-out and a growing
economy, it is likely that German demand could increase close to 30%. This fundamentally means a
tremendous growing mutual economic dependence, with Russia increasingly fueling its economic
142 "A good time for German-Russian cooperation." . Office of the Federal Chancellor, 07/19/2011. Web. <http://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/Content/EN/Artikel/_2011/07/2011-07-19-dt-rus-regierungskonsultationen_en.html>
143 "Russia." World Factbook. CIA, April 11th, 2012. Web. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html>
144 McKillop, Andrew. "Germany Marches East - Russia Moves West, Putins Energy Diplomacy." Politics - Natural Gas. The Market Oracle, March 5th, 2012. Web. <http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article33449.html>
145 "Does German 'Ausstieg' mean more Russian gas?."Newsflash. Eurasia Energy Observer, Jun 29th, 2011. Web. <http://www.eurasia-energy-observer.com/news/new/german-ausstieg-does-not-necessarily-mean-more-russian-gas>
146 "Merkel plays down future Russian gas dependence." TL Politics. The Local, July 19th, 2011. Web. <http://www.thelocal.de/politics/20110719-36387.html>
147 Mazur, Konrad. "German companies strengthen their cooperation with Russian gas suppliers." OSW Commentary. OSW Center for Eastern Studies, 10/24/2011. Web. <http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2011-10-24/german-companies-strengthen-their-cooperation-russian-gas-suppl>
148 LeVine, Steve. "German'ys denuclearization shot in Russia's arm." The Oil and the Glory. Foreign Policy, May 31st, 2011. Web. <http://oilandglory.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/05/31/germanys_nuclear_shot_in_russias_arm>
149 Steininger, Michael. "Nord Stream pipeline opens, Russia-Europe interdependence grows." CSM World News. Christian Science Monitor, November 8th, 2011. Web. <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2011/1108/Nord-Stream-pipeline-opens-Russia-Europe-interdependence-grows>
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revitalization, through Germany’s increasing use of Russian energy in fuelling its industries and homes.
Germany and Russia have also significantly strengthened trade ties, increasing trade 38% from
2010 to 2011. The two nations recently signed five new economic agreements, supporting energy
initiatives, technology investment, and support for even further business linkages, among others. 116
German companies were also recently granted access by the Russian government to develop rare earth
deposits after China (with the world’s top rare earth reserves) imposed limits on their domestic metal
exports.150 This in of itself suggests Russian and German bilateral primacy over individual linkages with a
protectionist and insular China, albeit trilateral policy overlap is still quite strong.
Corporate linkages are also continually robust in the technology field as a result of continuing
effective modernization partnerships, but there have been some setbacks in other industries. The German
generic pharmaceutical firm Stada is a perfect example, as it has faced continual difficulty with
negotiations for purchase of Russian firm Pharmstandard, despite with Russian government support. Even
though individual deals take some time and can often go sour, the Russian markets represent too large an
opportunity to ignore for German investors. Stada has even continued attempts to enter the Russian
market.151 Part of the problem may be Russian government interference, in an attempt to keep German
firms from overwhelming the Russian markets without significant Russian presence in German ones.
Given Germany and Russia’s demographic situation, it is likely that this imbalance will continue, with
German investment and capital taking advantage of a resilient and overabundant skilled Russian labor
market, along with the Russian government’s push for new technological and industrial development.
Russian military modernization has also received a surprising amount of support from Germany
and France. Both NATO members have been involved in extensive and shocking arms deals with the
150 Judy Dempsey. "Russia and Germany Bolster Trade Ties." World - Europe. New York Times, July 19th, 2011. Web. <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/20/world/europe/20iht-germany20.html?_r=1>
151 Ludwig Burger and Maria Kiselyova. "Exclusive: German drug firm Stada's failed Russian forays." . Reuters, 3/14/2012. Web. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/14/us-stada-russia-idUSBRE82D17R20120314>
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Russian government. German firm “Rheinmetall” is building a land combat training center for Russian
troops in the Russian town of Mulino, with further centers planned for the future. France has also planned
to send up to four Mistral class amphibious warships to Russia,152 especially intriguing considering
Russia’s poor amphibious assault capability, which was demonstrated during the 2008 Georgian War.
France also plans to send Russia advanced infantry combat systems, and Russia has expressed interest in
further contracts with “Rheinmetall” outside of training facilities,153 further evidenced by Russian
generals recently contemplating purchase of German Leopard 2 tanks over further modernization efforts
of domestic tanks. This demonstrates that the Germans are now seen as mutually beneficial military
partners, even though no concrete military cooperation has taken place with continuing German
membership in NATO.154
Given the history of the Second World War, this growing military cooperation suggests that huge
strides have been made in Russian-German cultural rectification. Other cultural linkages manifest outside
of state and corporate level cooperation has also been steadily growing. Germany and Russia recently
agreed to cooperate in tracking down Russian cultural property stolen by the Nazi regime,155 further
addressing the crimes of the National Socialist past. The two nations have strengthened the St. Petersburg
Dialogue and Russian-German Youth Parliament cultural exchange associations,156 in an attempt to begin
building strong bilateral educational exchange bonds. Merkel’s visit to the 65th anniversary Victory Day
152 "Mistral Warships for Russia to Get Russian Weaponry."Defense News. RIANovosti, 02/16/2012. Web. <http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20120216/171350710.html>
153 Socor, Vladimir. "Arms Transfers To Russia—An Internal Challenge to NATO." Analysis: Foreign Affairs. Georgian Daily, JUNE 30th, 2011 . Web. <http://georgiandaily.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=21634&Itemid=132>
154 Bidder, Benjamin. "Wehrtechnik made in Germany Moskau liebäugelt mit dem Leo." Thema: Russland. Der Spiegel, 04/13/2011. Web. <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,756334,00.html>
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parades at the same time NATO troops appeared for the first time in the military parade157 also suggests
growing cultural understanding. Due to this willingness to attend despite a past in the GDR, as well as
Merkel’s continuing willingness to cooperate with Russia, has led to a widespread appreciation of Angela
Merkel among Russians. Merkel is the only western leader to earn that particular respect. Merkel herself
is also known to have portrait of Russian Empress Catherine the Great on her desk,158 in this context a
reminder that strong women leaders existed throughout history, albeit Merkel’s inspiration also being a
Prussian-born Russian Empress who facilitated strong ties with Prussia is certainly not insignificant.
Politically, despite a recent spy row in which two Russian spies were arrested in Germany,159
relations and cooperation on a number of foreign policy issues remains tight. Along with German
abstentions, Russian objections and Russian vetoes on NATO interventions and UNSC resolutions
mentioned earlier, the Russian government recently reversed position on the conflict in Syria and
criticized Syria’s leadership160 after German requests to do just that.161 This shows that Berlin remains
staunchly committed to cooperation with Moscow with Putin back in office, even with the retrenchment
155 "Germany and Russia seek cultural property stolen by the Nazis." Acercando Naciones. La Vanguardia, n.d. Web. <http://www.acercandonaciones.com/en/cultura/alemania-y-rusia-buscan-bienes-culturales-robados-por-los-nazis.html>
156 "A good time for German-Russian cooperation." . Office of the Federal Chancellor, 07/19/2011. Web. <http://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/Content/EN/Artikel/_2011/07/2011-07-19-dt-rus-regierungskonsultationen_en.html>
157 "Marching through Red Square A pragmatic new foreign policy may be a plus, but it does not mean that Russia is ready to make any changes at home."Russia, NATO and Europe. The Economist, May 20th 2010. Web. <http://www.economist.com/node/16163464>
158 Offenburg, Anastasia. "Russen würden Merkel wählen."Thema: Präsidentenwahl in Russland 2012. Der Spiegel, 03/09/2012. Web. <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,819931,00.html>
159 Helen Pidd and Tom Parfitt. "Suspected Russian spies arrested in Germany." World News - Germany. The Guardian, October 24th 2011. Web. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/oct/24/suspected-russian-spies-arrested-germany>
160 "Russia’s criticism of Syrian leader suggests it’s preparing for a future without him." Middle East News. Washington Post, April 6th, 2012. Web. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/russias-criticism-of-syrian-leader-suggests-its-preparing-for-a-future-without-him/2012/04/06/gIQAT6TrzS_story.html>
161 Moulson, Geir. "Germany hopes for Russian rethink on Syria." Nation & WOrld. The Seattle Times, March 5th, 2012. Web. <http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2017668434_apsyriadiplomacy.html>
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in “autocratic” values that suggests. Putin is similarly showing his increasing willingness to work within
the bounds of German foreign policy realities, so that the two powers reach a mutually beneficial
agreement. German Foreign Minister Westerwelle – member of the even more staunchly Atlanticist
junior coalition party of the Free Democratic Party (FDP) – was recently quoted as saying,
"Russia is and remains a centrally important partner for Germany and Europe. We therefore want to
continue and deepen the strategic partnership with Russia," which “is more necessary than ever.”
It is likely that Merkel will continue relations in the future much in the same way that they have
been carried out in the past, with increasing mutual dependence and cooperation. If Merkel is not re-
elected, Sigmar Gabriel, the SPD Chief and likely President in that case has stated on record that he too
strongly believes in the German-Russian partnership.162 This would likely be checked by the Green
Party’s pro-renewable and anti-Gas agenda, affecting bilateral ties in much the same way as Merkel’s
Atlanticist credentials. Russia’s leadership and political situation is relatively secure under Putin’s
guidance, but as mentioned earlier, recent protests and electoral turmoil163 suggests that this may or may
not be the case forever. While green, center-left and radical left regimes in Europe are likely to cooperate
with Putin and United Russia (or liberal or leftist alternatives), the outcome of both Germany’s and
Russia’s elections and the behavior of the victorious parties in either case are total unknowns.
This underlines that, despite temporary setbacks, Germany and Russia continue to cooperate at a
progressively increasing rate, and will very likely continue to do so well into the future.
G. Prognostications for Relations: Further Effects on the Unipolar Order
Predicting the future is mostly a fool’s game, but certain truths can be pulled from the analysis.
These two nations are of tremendous value to one another, and there is a great deal of inertia behind their
bilateral ties. A true “Relationship of Souls” is still some ways off, but one can begin to see the outlines of
162 "Federal Environment Minister Sigmar Gabriel sees Germany and Russia as partners in a "modernisation partnership"." Press Releases - Archive - 16th Legislative Period. German Federal Environment Ministry, 06/12/2008. Web. <http://www.bmu.de/english/press_releases/archive/16th_legislative_period/pm/41775.php>
163 "Moscow protest against Putin win sees drop in support."BBC News Europe. BBC, March 10th 2012. Web. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-17323565>
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an increasingly strong Russo-Germanic partnership, built from German distancing to “traditional”
Atlantic-oriented tendencies via the new Russlandpolitik. Russia remains on the same anti-U.S. and pro-
[East] German/Chinese inertia from 70 years of the Cold War and continuingly sour Atlantic relations.
Despite continued cooperation with the hegemon, both Russia and Germany have made many mutually
supporting moves toward ending unipolarity, evidenced by action in IGOs as well as growing mutually
dependent economic links outside of Washington’s economic systems.
This is further enhanced with the number two “rising” power of China having a growing
relationship with the two partners, forming a strong trilateral tie between the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization members and their German strategic partner. For now, China’s stellar “peaceful rise” may
remain too intimidating for both Russia and Germany to consider even closer ties, leaving the two
partners to focus primarily on their mutual goal of creating a new Moscow-Berlin pole from the chaos and
possible wreckage of the pan-European project. Rumblings in the Chinese economy164 may very well
cause this mutual distrust and intimidation to disappear, with instability and fears of interconnected
economic collapse increasing cooperation between the three partners. Regardless if a Chinese economic
stall or meltdown actually occurs, the three powers will certainly continue to build mutual dependence.
Recent events in the Middle East show the influence of this political arrangement in the
international arena. Action in Libya was significantly stalled if not somewhat curtailed due to
simultaneous U.S. overreach in and fatigue from Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as disagreement and
dissention from Germany, Russia and China. This cooperation has also led to stalling actions on U.S.-
backed calls for intervention in Syria and Iran. Russia165 and China166 have both sold millions of dollars’
worth of advanced weapons to Iran, openly defying U.S. pressure and sanctions. As noted earlier,
Germany is increasingly annoyed with the aggressive moves of its former patron the hegemon in ABM
development and world-wide interventions, evidenced through non-cooperation with the United States
and overlap with Russia and China.167 The performance of all three nations in Iran embargoes clearly
164 von Hoffman, Constantine. "Even China's own data say its economy is troubled ." MoneyWatch Commentary. CBS, March 16, 2012. Web. <http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505123_162-57398514/even-chinas-own-data-say-its-economy-is-troubled/>
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demonstrates this phenomena, with Russia publically warning the United States, calling its embargoes an
attempt at “regime change” that would not be tolerated,168 and China criticizing the move as “casting a
shadow over the global economy,” interestingly during a visit by German Chancellor Merkel.169 Russian170
and Chinese firms171 are also both capitalizing on their non-participation in the embargo, and German
firms have also found a way to circumvent U.S. and E.U. policy by trading using companies outside of
embargo black-lists.172
The three nations have also been cooperating economically in an attempt to replace the dollar as
the world’s reserve currency. Both China173 and Russia174 have called for the end of the U.S. dollar as the
165 Weinberger, Sharon. "Russian Firm Got No-Bid Pentagon Contract After Selling Arms to Iran." Danger Room. Wired, August 31, 2011. Web. <http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/08/pentagon-gave-no-bid-contract-to-russias-biggest-arms-dealer/>
166 David Lerman and Tony Capaccio. "Some Chinese Missile Sales to Iran May Escape U.S. Sanctions Law." Bloomberg Businessweek. Bloomberg, 11/1/2011. Web. <http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-11-01/some-chinese-missile-sales-to-iran-may-escape-u-s-sanctions-law.html>
167 Kristen Allen and Charles Hawley. "The World from Berlin Iran Embargo ." Theme: Iran Sanctions. Der Spiegel, 01/24/2012. Web. <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,811124,00.html>
168 "Russia warns US over Iran oil sanctions." Europe News. Al-Jazeera, n.d. Web. <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2012/01/201211382815875531.html>
169 McDonald, Joe. "China criticizes Iran sanctions as Merkel visits." Bostom.com. NYTimes, 2/3/2012. Web. <http://articles.boston.com/2012-02-03/news/31022132_1_iran-sanctions-iran-last-week-iran-specialist>
170 Kramer, Andrew. "An Embargo and a Boon." NYT Business. New York Times, 2/16/2012. Web. <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/17/business/global/russian-oil-industry-set-to-capitalize-if-embargo-hits-iran.html?pagewanted=all>
171 Vafeiadis, Michail. "On eve of Iran nuclear talks, sanctions bite." CSM Business. The Christian Science Monitor, April 13th, 2012. Web. <http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/2012/0413/On-eve-of-Iran-nuclear-talks-sanctions-bite>
172 "Sanctions Hit—and Miss—in German Trade With Iran ."WSJ Europe Business News. Wall Street Journal, 12/17/2011. Web. <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204323904577040172793024832.html>
173 Mcdonald, Joe. "China calls for new global currency." ABC Money. ABC News, n.d. Web. <http://abcnews.go.com/Business/story?id=7168919&page=1#.T4okqbYlud4>
174 Wenzel, Robert. "Russia Calls for a Role for Gold in a New International Reserve Currency." . Economic Policy Journal, n.d. Web. MARCH 30, 2009. <http://www.economicpolicyjournal.com/2009/03/russia-calls-for-partial-gold-standard.html>
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single reserve currency system, to be replaced by a currency basket including the Euro, other
commodities, and ostensibly the Ruble and Renminbi. Germany has cautiously signed on to the idea after
“further examination.”175 This suggests that the German government is again with the Russians and
Chinese, this time on criticism of the instability of the global reserve currency issuer being a single nation
with its own economic concerns, with national monetary policy having global repercussions. This is not
new, with Germany and China cooperating to oppose U.S. policy as far back as the 2010 stimulus,176 as
well as continuing diversification of Chinese and Russian assets away from U.S. treasury bonds.177
H. Conclusion: The Curtain Sets on Unipolarity?
While it does not yet represent a fundamental “threat” to the unipolar order of the United States,
the Russian-German bilateral partnership is creating an increasingly strong European pole of power. The
two nations are certainly not balancing against one another, but indeed are cooperating more with each
passing year. Currently, the European pole — like the Chinese pole — is not strong enough on an
individual basis to directly challenge the continuing hegemony of the United States. When this newly
forming European pole interacts with the rising Chinese pole, it certainly has shown that such a political
formation presents a growing counter-balance to the status quo. International, interconnected economic
crises threaten to speed the creation of new linkages of political power and new global power dynamics,
as well as strengthen these growing pre-existing relationships. The United States, and the rest of the
world, would do well to pay attention to these changing dynamics, lest a new partnership take the world
by surprise.
175 Charbonneau, Louis. "New reserve currency idea needs work-German minister." . Reuters, 3/27/2012. Web. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/03/27/financial-sdr-germany-idUSN2754209520090327>
176 "China and Germany Oppose Fed Dollar Dump." Midas Letter. BBC News, n.d. Web. November 5, 2010. <http://www.midasletter.com/index.php/china-and-germany-oppose-fed-dollar-dump/>
177 "Russia Halves U.S. Treasury Holdings over 14-Month Period." RIANovosti, 2/16/2012. Web. <http://en.rian.ru/world/20120216/171344327-print.html>
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