BONN INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR CONVERSION

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BONN INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR CONVERSION • INTERNATIONALES KONVERSIONSZENTRUM BONN

brief 29Exchanging Gunsfor ToolsThe TAE Approach to PracticalDisarmament–—An Assessment of theTAE Project in Mozambique

The authorsSami Faltas is a programdirector in charge of the Trainingand Education on Small Arms(TRESA) project at BICC.

Wolf-Christian Paes is a projectleader at BICC. His fields ofresearch include small armscontrol and in particular weaponscollection, as well as the role ofeconomic actors in armedconflict.

Cover photo:WORLD VISION Germany

Translation:Jamil Chade

Contents

Acknowledgements 4

Preface 5

Introduction 7

History 8

Assessing the Scope of the Problem 10

Aims and Objectives of the TAE Project 14

Output and Impact 16

Weapons Collection and destruction 16Provision of Tools and Other Incentives 17Figure: Collection Results of TAE Project from20 October 1995 until 14 October 2003 18Civic Education 19Guns into Art 21

Resources Available to the Project 22

Mode of Operation 25

Information Retrieval 25Provision of Incentives 26Storage and Destruction 28

Government and Civil Society 30

Costs and Benefits 31

Lessons Learned and Replication 33

Motivation of Gun-Holders 33Program Goals 34Government Relations 34Provision of Incentives 35

Bibliography 37

brief 29Exchanging Gunsfor ToolsThe TAE Approach to PracticalDisarmament–—An Assessment of theTAE Project in Mozambique

Sami Faltas and Wolf-Christian Paes

BONN INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR CONVERSION

B I CC

BONN INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR CONVERSION • INTERNATIONALES KONVERSIONSZENTRUM BONN

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This study was commissionedby WORLD VISION Germany

and carried out by the BonnInternational Center forConversion (BICC) in closecooperation with the TAE projectin Maputo, Mozambique. Theauthors would like to thank allcurrent and former staff of TAE fortheir willingness to provideinsights into their work,particularly TAE project managerAlbino Forquilha, as well as CUSOvolunteers Kayo Takenoshita andChristian Brun, who have by nowleft the project. Kayo wasinstrumental in organizing the fieldresearch undertaken by the

authors. Noel Stott at the Institutefor Security Studies (ISS) inPretoria provided valuable insightsinto Operation Rachel andauthored the box on that subjectin this report, while Christian Bruncontributed the box on “Arts inthe Crossfire”. Frank Tester of theUniversity of British Columbiashared some of the results of hissimultaneous evaluation on behalfof CUSO. Scott Lewis, researchassociate at BICC, assisted with theediting of this report. The authorsare grateful to WORLD VISIONGermany and feel particularlyindebted to Ekkehard Forberg formaking this research possible. The

main findings of this report werediscussed during a stakeholders’workshop in June 2003 in Maputo,Mozambique and the authorswould like to thank all participantsfor their time and input. Whilemany people have contributed tothis report, the responsibility forthe content lies entirely with theauthors.

Bonn, April 2004Bonn International Center for

Conversion

Sami Faltas and Wolf-Christian Paes

Acknowledgements

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preface

Weapons are hazardous. Notjust in the hands of robbers

and rebels, but in and ofthemselves: The more of themexist and the easier they can beaccessed, the more probable theirlethal use. Hence, thedisarmament of post-conflictsocieties constitutes one of thevital challenges that need to beaddressed, once combat hasended.

In post-war societies, weapons canfulfil a multiplicity of functions:

■ Although kept for defense,weapons promise only a falsekind of security. All too often,accidents occur at homebecause weapons orammunition are not properlystored.

■ As long as a country’sinfrastructure and economy liein ruins, a weapon can offerthe basis for a family’s survival.The owner of a gun can securean income if recruited by aprivate security service or anew army or if hired to protecta drove of cattle.

■ A weapon constitutes an objectof value and a nest egg fortimes of want. Besides theirmaterial value, weapons alsohave their ideological appealand their ‘aura of power’.Former combatants are knownto only reluctantly relinquishtheir ‘companion’ of manyyears.

For people who have losteverything during a war and whohave been uprooted from their kinand native villages, a weaponsometimes offers the only prospectfor securing a modest income, beit legal or illegal. At the same time,people’s hopes and expectationsfor a rapid reconstruction andeconomic renewal of their countryare often thwarted, for theseprocesses take time and are

usually cumbersome andprotracted. That leads todisappointments and to anincrease of crime and armed self-protection: a vicious circle ofviolence threatens to plunge sucha post-war society into chaos onceagain. That’s why there is noreasonable alternative to asystematic disarmament ofcombatants and armed civilians.

The ‘Tools for Arms’ approach inMozambique is a case in pointand a spearheading example: For

the very first time, civil society istaking responsibility for thepopulation’s disarmament at anational level, thereby making anessential contribution towardspeace and reconciliation. DuringMozambique’s civil war, millionsof automatic weapons weredistributed all over the countryand amongst the people. Now theChristian Council of Mozambiqueis collecting at least part of thoseweapons and destroying them onthe spot. Some weapons parts arethen modeled into works of art,

Preface

Pieces of art made from destroyed weapons

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demonstrating to the people thatsuch killing devices are no longerneeded.It cannot be overlooked that thiscivil disarmament must beattributed to the courageouscommitment of individual civilleaders. One of them is BishopSengulane, who has been a majorplayer in Mozambique’s peaceprocess and also initiated thisproject. Mr. Sengulane could buildon the excellent reputation andtrust which the Christian Councilof Mozambique had earnedthrough its role in a successfulconflict resolution.

His involvement demonstrates whycivil actors must play their role inthe peace process: They areneutral with respect to theconflicting parties and thegovernment structures; and theyhave a proximity and easy accessto the people. Civil actors can alsofind innovative interim solutionswithout losing their credibility. Forinstance, although it is now strictlyprohibited to own a weapon in

Mozambique, people who hand intheir guns during the projectperiod need not fear prosecution.No doubt, the project has beenable to learn from the experiencesof previous—often failed—disarmament projects. So-called‘buy back’ programs in whichweapons were bought back attheir actual market value have inthe past actually boosted the armstrade of a whole region. InMozambique, useful householdtools are offered instead asincentives for people to hand intheir weapons, thereby offeringthem new civil incomeopportunities. Those consumergoods given in exchange for arms—mostly sewing machines andbicycles—are symbols of a newbeginning. The Mozambiquedisarmament process isaccompanied by training andawareness programs to preparesociety for a period of peace andto teach people how to resolvefuture conflicts in a non-violentway.

In post-war societies, civil actorsand non-governmentalorganizations (NGO) can indeedfulfil a vital role in conflictresolution and peace building. InMozambique, Church leaders andNGOs are living up to thechallenge. However, there is yetanother area in which NGOs canmake a contribution: security. Inthis area, though, they still have togather and document theirexperiences.

This present Report investigatesthe ‘Tools for Arms’ approach inMozambique and looks into thegeneral preconditions that lead tothe project’s success. It also triesto identify weak areas so otheractors can learn from thisexperience and apply it to othercontexts. WORLD VISION andBICC jointly hope that thisdocumentation will helpencourage other post-war societiesto commit themselves more fullyto the disarmament of theirpopulation and to raise awarenessabout the immense risks of smallarms.

Ekkehard ForbergCoordinator for Conflict Resolution

WORLD VISION Germany

Weapons being destroyed in a public ceremony in Sofala Province

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introduction

The Republic of Mozambique’scoat of arms has at its center

an AK-471 Kalashnikov assault rifleas a symbol of the people’sstruggle against colonial rule,which ultimately led to thecountry’s independence in 1975.The 1970s and 1980s saw manyviolent conflicts in which theKalashnikov, designed in the USSRin the 1940s, helped to bringdown colonial rulers and regimessupported by the West in Angola,Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau,Namibia, South Africa, Zimbabwe,Nicaragua, Cambodia andVietnam. A popular culture ofrevolution evolved around sloganslike “a luta continua”, the image ofErnesto ‘Che’ Guevara and the gunwith the distinctively curvedammunition magazine. A SouthAfrican anti-apartheid music groupeven called itself AK-47.

Today, the Kalashnikov is stillwidely used for a variety ofpurposes, but it is not glorified asbefore. In fact, to many itsymbolizes the disastrousproliferation of small arms thatfuels political conflicts andpromotes the rise of violent crimein many parts of the world.Bishop Dinis Sengulane of theAnglican diocese of Lebombo(Mozambique) finds it painful tosee the gun on the Mozambicanflag. He tells his compatriots that“to sleep with a gun in yourbedroom is like sleeping with asnake” (Sengulane Interview). Inthe 1980s and early 1990s, Mr.Sengulane helped to launch thepeace process that ended the civilwar. In 1995, he founded a projectcalled ‘Transformation of Armsinto Ploughshares’, abbreviatedTAE.2 TAE is a project of theProtestant-dominated ChristianCouncil of Mozambique (CCM),and particularly important toBishop Sengulane, who has beenthe president of CCM since 1975.It aims to tackle one of the

dangerous legacies of theliberation struggle and the civilwar, namely millions of weaponsand huge amounts of ammunitionand explosives in the hands of thepopulation. This unusual church-based effort, which will this reportwill discuss, does not actuallyconvert arms into agriculturalimplements, though that was theoriginal idea, and Dom Dinis stillhopes to achieve that one day(Sengulane Interview). Rather, itcollects weapons, ammunition andexplosives from the population,destroys the ordnance, and offerstools and other useful implementsin exchange.

TAE is unusual for being adisarmament project entirely runby civil society, for turning themetal of scrapped guns into worksof art, and for its longevity. In thisreport, we will discuss how TAEworks, what it has achieved, thedifficulties it faces, how it mightbe made more effective, and towhat extent its approach could beusefully applied elsewhere. Ouraim is not so much to evaluate theproject, but rather to describe andassess its approach. When weprovide details, we do this toillustrate a general point ratherthan to explore the nuts and boltsof the project.

This study is based on two fieldtrips to Mozambique, oneundertaken by Sami Faltas tosouthern Mozambique in March2003 and one made by Wolf-Christian Paes to the centralprovinces of Mozambique in May2003, as well as on an extensive

literature review and interviewswith experts on SALW proliferationboth inside Mozambique andabroad. The main findings of thisreport were discussed during astakeholders’ workshop incooperation with TAE in June2003.

Introduction

1 AK-47 is the original version of thefamously durable gun, admitted for use inthe Red Army in 1947. Many typesfollowed, with different names. InMozambique, the Kalashnikov is referredto as the AKM, a later version.

2 Its Portuguese name actually means‘Transformation of Arms into Hoes.’ Theacronym TAE rhymes with ‘fly’.

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Perhaps the most remarkablething about Mozambique is

how well it has overcome the anti-colonial war (1964-1974) followedby an even bloodier civil war(1976-1992). By 1992, Jim Wurstreports, at least one million peoplehad been killed, while anadditional 1.7 million had fled thecountry (Wurst, 1994). The WorldBank estimates that when the warwas over, nearly a third of thepopulation, 5.7 million people, hadbeen uprooted. Railway tracks,roads and bridges throughout thecountry were in destroyed. Half theschools and a third of all healthclinics were destroyed or severely

damaged. Agricultural fields andcountry roads had been hardenedby drought and were strewn withlandmines. Mozambique hadbecome the poorest country in theworld (The World Bank, 1997).Today, the country still faces severeproblems. However, it is at peace,the wounds torn by the war areslowly healing, the infrastructure isbeing gradually repaired, andlandmines and other ordnance arebeing removed. What is more, theeconomy is growing at one of thefasted rates in Sub-Saharan Africa,largely fueled by South Africaninvestment, and democracy ismaturing. Much of this is made

possible by foreign aid, but noneof it would have happened if theMozambicans had not established asustainable peace.

Around 1990, the FRELIMO(‘Mozambican Liberation Front’)government and the RENA-MO(‘Mozambican National Resistance’)rebels came to the conclusion thatthey had nothing to gain fromcontinuing the war. Probably mostof their followers had grown sickof the conflict much earlier, not tomention the rest of the population.It is generally assumed that astrong and general desire amongMozambicans for peace is the mainreason why despite many problemsthe peace accords signed in 1992have held.

Probably a lack of resourcescontributed to the end of the war.Many observers have noted thecontrast between the success of theMozambican peace process and thequest for peace in Angola, whichtook 10 years longer and sufferedmany setbacks. Like Mozambique,Angola is a Lusophone SouthernAfrican country that underwentPortuguese colonialism, a war ofindependence, and a civil warstoked by foreign powers. Mostanalysts believe that peace wasmore difficult to achieve in Angolabecause of the country’sexploitable resources. MPLA andUNITA fought amongst other thingsabout access to rich sources of oiland diamonds, while inMozambique the assets available toFRELIMO (prawns) and RENAMO(hardwoods) were less lucrative(Collier, 2001).

While Kenyans, Tanzanians,Italians, the United Nations andother outsiders played a big part inbringing the warring Mozambicanfactions together in the early 1990s,the earliest initiatives came fromthe Mozambican clergy. TheChristian Council of Mozambique,the Anglican Church and the

History

Pieces of art made from destroyed weapons

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history

Roman Catholic Church provinceconvinced FRELIMO and RENA-MOthat dialogue was the only way toend the war and save the country.Then, when the fighting stopped,the churches played a key role inthe struggle to build a peacefulsociety. They continue to do so,using their influence both behindthe scenes and in public. TAE isprobably their best-known projectin this regard.

The UN peacekeeping operation inMozambique (ONUMOZ), launchedin 1992, counts as one of the mostsuccessful of its kind. Itdemobilized nearly 100,000combatants and led the country toits first elections. All in all, at theend of the peace process, about214,000 weapons had beencollected, very few of which weredestroyed. Mostly, they werehanded over to the government(Berman, 1996, pp. 74 and 88;Chachiua, 1999a, p. 26). ManyMozambicans regarded theordnance they held as a necessaryprecaution in case the fightingresumed. As a result, whenONUMOZ left in 1995, one expertestimated the number of weaponsremaining in the country at one tosix million (Chachiua, 1999a, p.27).

That estimate was probably toohigh, as we will argue. Howeverthere can be no doubt that thelegacy of weapons stands in theway of Mozambique’s developmenttoward peace, prosperity anddemocracy. Economically, itdrained the country’s resources.According to TAE, 70 percent ofthe Mozambican debt was due tothe import of weapons (Trans-forming Arms Into Ploughshares,2001a, section 2). Besides, theprevalence of weapons,ammunition, mines andunexploded ordnance of otherkinds is an obstacle to commerce,agriculture, health care, educationand the improvement of thecountry’s physical infrastructure.Furthermore, the insecurity

stemming from uncontrolledordnance also affects social andpolitical life. While illegally heldguns sometimes allow people toprotect their family and property,they also give rise to suspicionsand fears that are not helpful whenit comes to peaceful anddemocratic development. Finally,they fuel the rise of violent crimeand cause many serious accidents.

In the early stage of the peaceprocess, these problems, and thedesirability of disarming thepopulation, were clear andundisputed. But who was to tacklethem? ONUMOZ tried and failed.The government, according tomany accounts, was unable to dothe job. One reason was a lack ofresources, but a more fundamentalone was a lack of trust. Thedivisions caused by the civil warmade people reluctant to give uptheir weapons, and perceptions ofgovern-ment corruption andineptitude further undermined theirconfidence in the State and itsofficials. That, at least, is what theobservers we consulted believe.

Enter the Council of ChristianChurches (CCM). In its NationalProgramme of Action for 2002-2004, CCM’s TAE project says that

“Mozambique is the first Country inthe world with a government whoaccepted in 1995 to give the civilsociety, (Christian Council ofMozambique) completely theresponsibility for collection, massivedestruction of small arms and lightweapons as well as all securityprocess of these complex andpolitical very sensible issue.”

It goes on to stress how unusualthis step was, explaining that whilenon-governmental organizationsoften play a prominent role insmall arms action in othercountries,“…the civil society by maingovernments is never allowed tomanage (collection anddestruction) completely of firearms

without the interventions of theirgovernments.”

We can confirm this. Furthermore,TAE claims in its Programme ofAction that Mozambique’s decisionto leave the disarmament of thepopulation to civil society was thereason why a Mozambicandiplomat, Carlos dos Santos, waschosen to chair the preparatorycommittee for the UN Conferenceon the Illicit Trade in Small Arms of2001 (Transforming Arms IntoPloughshares, 2001a).

So the minority churches ofMozambique, united in CCM, tookon the task of removing anddestroying a million guns or moreand immense quantities ofexplosives held illegally. Later inthis report, we will discuss theconsequences and implications(good and bad) of delegating sucha task to non-governmentalorganizations. However, civilsociety is not alone in dealing withillegally held ordnance inMozambique. The governmentauthorities and the South Africanpolice have a co-operative venturecalled Operation Rachel (see box,p. 20) that seeks out and destroyscaches of illegal ordnance, and TAEoccasionally enlists the help of theRachel experts.

CCM launched TAE on 20 October1995 in the presence of religious,governmental and diplomaticrepresentatives, as well as variousnational and international NGOs. Abroad publicity campaign informedthe population about the goals ofthe project and the means itplanned to use to achieve them(Transforming Arms IntoPloughshares, 2001).

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While Mozambique has beensuccessful at keeping the

peace between FRELIMO andRENAMO, it has been much lesssuccessful in achieving sustainableeconomic development andeffective governance. Whilenominally the economic gains havebeen impressive since the end ofthe civil war, much of thedevelopment is focused on thecoastal areas and the ‘developmentcorridor’ linking Maputo’shinterland to the South Africanborder. Despite a noticeable‘trickle-down’ effect, economicopportunities remain scarce formany people in the provinces,leading to substantial migrationboth to the capital and abroad.Agriculture, the predominant meansof economic reproduction in ruralareas, has also suffered greatlyfrom the floods in 2000 and 2001,followed by a severe drought in2002.

The combination of poverty, deepdivisions in the population andweak governance has proved afertile ground for the rise of crime,though Mozambique is still morepeaceful than many of itsneighbors. Due also to itsgeography, Mozambique hasallegedly also become a majortransit point for the trafficking ofdrugs and other contraband. Gunsare also trafficked, for instance tothe cities of South Africa. It isextremely difficult to assess thescope of the problem of SALWproliferation in Mozambique, asreliable statistics on illegal armspossession as well as on arms-related crimes are scarce.

It is widely assumed that duringmost of the colonial period,firearms were rare in Mozambique,

a function both ofunderdevelopment and of thecomparatively superficial control ofthe Portuguese colonial mastersover the neglected hinterland. Thisis supported by interviewsundertaken during our researchwhich confirm that weapons werenot part of the traditional lifestyle.Some respondents even claimedthat Mozambican society wasinherently more peaceful, partiallyas the result of the ‘benign’ colonialrule, than the more violent societiesin neighboring South Africa andZimbabwe. While it seemsquestionable that the colonialregime was indeed more benign inMozambique, there is little doubtthat the country “was not towitness a massive influx of armsbefore the national liberationstruggle of the early 1960s”(Chachiua, 1999a, p. 16).

Observers have estimated that therehad been about 45,000 militaryfirearms in Mozambique in 1971,based on the existence of 35,000Portuguese soldiers and 10,000armed FRELIMO insurgents (ibid.,p. 16). This number seems to beextremely conservative and makesno allowance for the fact thatregular armed forces usuallymaintain more than one weaponper soldier. Furthermore thisnumber excludes police weaponsas well as privately ownedfirearms. Despite these limitations itseems clear that the number ofguns was comparatively low by theearly 1970s, despite the fact that bythe beginning of the decade theliberation struggle had beenunderway for six years. FRELIMOreceived arms from China, theSoviet Union and other EasternEuropean nations, while Portugalpoured arms into the country to

equip both its colonial army andthe white settler population.3

FRELIMO, in line with its doctrineof a popular revolution, followed asimilar strategy of arming civiliansin the areas under their controlboth for self-defense and to assistin an armed uprising of thepopulation. This deliberate strategyassisted the spread of weaponsthroughout the country (Chabal,1996, p. 8).

No organized attempt was made tocollect these weapons during thebrief spell of peace following theLusaka Peace Accord in September1974 and the outbreak of civil warbetween the newly establishedFRELIMO government andRENAMO insurgents in 1976. Thereis very little reliable information onthe number of weapons whichpoured into the country between1976 and the end of the conflict in1994, however most experts agreethat the number must have beenvery substantial. The Maputogovernment during the 1980s spent40 to 50 percent of the state budgeton defense (Berman, 1996, p. 43)and this figure did not includeweapons delivered by the SovietUnion on credit (Chachiua, 1999a,p. 19). Quickly developing into a‘Cold War’ proxy, FRELIMOreceived substantial militaryassistance from socialist ‘brother’countries, much of it in the form ofsmall arms and light weapons.According to Western intelligencereports, some 6,000 tons of militaryequipment were shipped to NacalaPort in February 1977 alone (Africa

Assessing the Scopeof the Problem

3 AK-47 is the original version of thefamously durable gun, admitted for use inthe Red Army in 1947. Many typesfollowed, with different names. InMozambique, the Kalashnikov is referredto as the AKM, a later version.

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the scope of the problem

Contemporary Record, 1978-1979,p. C331). While these numbers arealmost certainly inflated, there islittle doubt that imports of militaryequipment during this period weresubstantial.

Meanwhile RENAMO initiallyreceived arms from Ian Smith’sminority regime in Rhodesia(present-day Zimbabwe) and lateron from the Apartheid governmentin South Africa. In line withRENAMO’s guerilla strategy, muchof this took the form of small armsand light weapons, includingsignificant quantities of Soviet-madeAK-47s seized by South Africanforces during operations in Angolaand Namibia. Further assistancewas provided by other westernstates and private groups espousinganti-Communist and pro-Christianagendas (Chachiua, 1999a, p. 20),while some weapons wereacquired commercially on the blackmarket, in exchange for ivory andtimber. Another important sourceof military equipment for RENAMOwas the capture of weapons fromgovernment troops.

The situation was furthercomplicated by the fact that bothFRELIMO and RENAMO had a badrecord for stock-keeping andstorage procedures. It is widelybelieved that many weapons ‘lost’during the almost two decades of

civil war ended up in the hands ofcivilians, or were hidden bycombatants as a ‘life insurancepolicy’ for the post-conflict period.Meanwhile, FRELIMO continued itspractice of handing out weapons,including automatic rifles both toparamilitary groups (such as partyformations and factory brigades)and to the general population.According to one former FRELIMOofficer, the motivation for thisdistribution was purely political:

“The military was not evenconsulted and, of course, it did nothave in mind the need for armscontrol. From a military point ofview the distribution of weapons to[the] civilian population wasnonsense. Even to militia groups itshould have been more cautious.Because, those weapons could—and most of the time did—end upreinforcing the enemy. But thepolitical leadership deemed itcorrect” (ibid., p. 21).

There is no reliable information onthe total number of weapons incirculation at the end of civil war.According to a much-quotedestimate (Smith, 1996, p. 6) in 1995six million AK-47s were believed tohave been circulating inMozambique in 1995. It is not quiteclear whether this number issupposed to include the 1.5 millionassault rifles that were handed out

by the government to civiliansaccording to the same source. In acountry of some 16 million peopleand with only about 150,000regular combatants at the time ofthe peace agreement, thesenumbers seem to be extremelyexaggerated. However, while thisinflated number still forms the basisfor much of the needs analysis forsmall arms action, there can be nodoubt that the problem ofuncontrolled SALW proliferation bythe mid-1990s was very substantial.

Matters were not helped by thefact that despite the impressiveresults of the ONUMOZdemobilization program, many ex-combatants preferred to retainsome of their weapons by hidingthem before reporting to theONUMOZ assembly areas. Withregard to RENAMO units, anumber of former fightersinterviewed in the context of thisproject confirmed the existence ofa deliberate strategy to hidesubstantial amounts of arms andammunition as a precaution incase the peace process failed.These caches are believed to bemost numerous in formerRENAMO strongholds. This leavesus with three different categoriesof uncollected illegal weapons atthe end of the peace process(Chachiua, 1999a, p. 27):

Assault rifles cut into pieces during public ceremony in Sofala Province

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■ Caches retained by the warringparties, in particular byRENAMO, mostly located ininaccessible areas near theirformer areas of operation;

■ Caches retained by individualsoldiers and militia members,usually located in or nearprivate residences.

■ Individual weapons retained bycivilians, either stemming fromgovernment distribution orpurchased individually, alsousually located in or nearprivate homes.

While the Lusaka peace agreementmarked the end ofpoliticallymotivated violence inMozambique, the strong demandfor automatic firearms by criminalgroups in neighboring South Africaduring the second part of the 1990smeant that cross-border gun-running became an importantproblem. Former combatants fromboth parties, justifiably worriedabout their peacetime prospects,utilized the market opportunitiescreated by the high demand inSouth Africa and sold both theirpersonal weapons and the contentof caches across the porous border.Alex Vines (1996, p. 7) quotes aformer FRELIMO soldier saying “weknew that guns make goodbusiness. So we kept the best forourselves. I have sold some todealers from Joni [Johannesburg]and I kept others for the future.[…] FRELIMO was never going topay us for the years we were madeto fight. We have to look afterourselves.” This view was sharedby the head of the RENAMOParliamentary Group whoremarked that “the soldiers havenot got any money and there is lotsof military equipment in the bush”(Oosthuysen, 1996, p. 49).

In the absence of reliable statisticsit is impossible to quantify thesecross-border transfers, but theSouth African government wassufficiently worried to dispatchspecialized police teams from 1995

onwards to conduct joint weaponscollection and destructionoperations with their Mozambicancounterparts. Dubbed ‘OperationRachel’ (see box, p. 20), this rareexample of cross-border policecooperation is still on-going at thetime of research and has succeededin destroying more than 30,000firearms plus several tons ofammunition, explosives and othermilitary equipment (see detailedstatistics for Operations Rachel 1-9in the box, p. 20).

In the decade following the almostsimultaneous end of white minorityrule in South Africa and the end ofthe civil war in Mozambique,initiatives such as ‘OperationRachel’ have contributed to areduction in cross-border armssmuggling. Improved bordermanagement procedures andintelligence-sharing, as well as areduction in demand for illegalweapons in South Africa (whichprobably peaked in 1996/97) hadan impact on the illegal trade aswell. Another factor could be thatwhile South Africa’s black marketreached the saturation point,leading to a reduction in marketprices, the number of arms cacheswithin easy reach of the SouthAfrican border is shrinking.Interviews with former RENAMOsoldiers in the context of thisresearch confirm that potentialbeneficiaries need to go deeperand deeper into the bush to accessremaining caches of weapons,which must lead to higher costs onthe black market, making the cross-border trade less lucrative. Thereare even some indications thatautomatic weapons are nowsmuggled into Mozambique (UN,2002, p. 8), indicating that weaponsfrom local caches can not longersatisfy the demand of theindigenous criminal groups, eventhough this demand is fairly low byinternational standards.

Given an impoverished andtraumatized population, scores offormer fighters with dim prospects

and growing income disparities asthe result of the governmentmarket-oriented economic policies,one would assume that thewidespread availability ofweapons in Mozambique wouldlead to a sharp increase in armedviolence. Indeed, reports from thelate 1990s cite anecdotal evidencefor a rise in crime, particularly inthe greater Maputo area(Chachiua, 1999a, pp. 34-35;Oosthuysen, 1996, p. 47). The fewavailable statistics record a jump inreported crime of about a thirdbetween 1994 and 1996, eventhough the share of arms-relatedcrimes remained constant at about4.2 percent. Unfortunately nomore recent statistics wereavailable until the time of writing.

Therefore the authors haveattempted to investigate thenumber of arms-related crimes byconducting interviews with localpolice chiefs in Maputo, Beira,Quelimane and Mopeia. Theresults of this informal surveypainted a very different picturecompared with the earlier reports.4

All police officers interviewed forthis report confirmed that thenumber of arms-related crimeswas actually very low and that thisnumber has been stable in theperiod from 1998-2003, and muchlower than in 1992-1995 (InterviewMinistry of the Interior, May 2003).Unsurprisingly, the majority ofcases were reported in the Maputoarea and usually involved the useof guns in armed assaults and car-theft. The latter has also been acause of concern along theNational Highway Number One,where truckers and individualmotorists had been targeted by

4 The authors are aware of the limitation ofthis information-gathering approach.Unfortunately, limited resources preventedus from undertaking a morecomprehensive survey, which would beneeded to assess the real impact of smallarms on the security situation inMozambique. We should add howeverthat the general view on arms-relatedcrime expressed by the police wascorroborated by members of civil society.

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the scope of the problem

armed bandits (Interview Ministryof the Interior and Police ChiefBeira, May 2003).

This view was confirmed duringinterviews with police officials(May 2003) in Mozambique’ssecond largest city, Beira. It is thecapital of Sofala province and animportant port city at the end ofthe Tete corridor between the coastand landlocked Malawi andZimbabwe. Beira saw some heavyfighting during the civil war.Nevertheless, the police confirmedthat there were very few incidentsof arms-related crime, on averageone case per month. While the citysees substantially more crime thanthe hinterland, much of it ispeaceful. The police representativesmentioned the continual presenceof armed bandits along NationalHigh-way Number One, but theyclaim that the number of assaults,which peaked at 7–8 cases perweek in the mid-1990s, is nowmuch lower, partially because aspecial unit of the rapid reactionpolice has been deployed in theprovince. While the police officerwe spoke to acknowledged theexistence of a black market forguns in the city, he claimed thatmost of them were coming from‘leaks’ at the large military base intown, where underpaid soldiers arewilling to sell or rent out (at aprice of about US $20) theirfirearms to criminals.

Police officers in Quelimane (May2003), the capital of Zambeziaprovince, paint an even morepeaceful picture. According to thepolice chief, no black market forfirearms exists in the province,even though the area witnessedvery heavy fighting during the civilwar and, like neighboring Sofalaprovince, contained severalimportant RENAMO bases. Whilesome isolated incidents of armedrobberies were reported, the policeclaimed that there had been onlytwo cases in the period fromJanuary to May 2003. The policeacknowledges that substantial

caches of weapons still exist in theprovince, mostly deep in theinaccessible bush, and while majorstocks of arms are recovered bythe police, usually as the result ofaccidental finds by farmers, thechief was mostly concerned abouttheir potential for accidents ratherthan their use in crime.

All in all, we believe that theproblem of small arms proliferationand misuse in Mozambique hasbeen exaggerated by manyobservers. Whereas Maputo andthe comparatively prosperouscapital region suffer fromsubstantial (mostly property-related) criminal activity, they havebeen spared the soaring crimelevels common in many other largecities in Africa, includingneighboring South Africa.Provincial capitals and secondarycities in Mozambique are muchmore peaceful than the Maputoregion, while rural areas seevirtually no violent crimescommitted with firearms. Thissuggests that either the actualnumber of weapons in circulationis much lower than the publishedestimates we cited above, or thatthe majority of the weaponsretained after the civil war wereexported or well hidden. This issupported by an analysis of theweapons recovered by TAE duringour visits to Mozambique. Most ofthe operational weapons (the onesmost likely to be attractive tocriminals) were recovered fromcaches in remote locations,whereas the weapons submitted inor near urban areas were lessnumerous, and often not inworking order.

Even provinces with reportedlyhigh numbers of remainingRENAMO caches, such as Sofalaand Zambezia, show extremely lowcrime rates. In contrast,comparatively few caches arebelieved to exist near Maputo, yetthe capital shows the highestincidence of arms-related crimes,indicating that the weapons are

coming from elsewhere.Furthermore, while many observers(Oosthuysen, 1996, p. 47) hadpredicted that former fighterswould turn to crime in order tosurvive, the police confirmed thatin 2003 the vast majority of crimeswere com-mitted by disgruntledyoung people between 20 and 35,often coming from an urban setting(Ministry of the Interior, May 2003).

The problems posed by theproliferation of small arms and lightweapons continue to besubstantial. However, the authorsof this report believe that the sizeand the impact of the problemhave been grossly overstated. Armscaches continue to be found in thecountryside and pose a very realrisk of accidental firing orexplosion. The persons uncoveringthe weapons are the first to facethese hazards. Similarly, individualweapons retained from the warcould be a source of accidents or—less likely—end up in the hands ofcriminals. Given the inaccessibilityof many caches and the low blackmarket demand, their recovery bycriminal groups currently makeslittle economic sense. These factorsprovide a benign environment forvoluntary collection programs likethe one operated by the TAEproject.

When it comes to gun control, thegovernment in Maputo is said to bevery strict, but its possibilities arelimited not only by a lack ofmoney, equipment and qualifiedpersonnel. Its laws and institutionsare also less than adequate. It hasdeveloped a National Action Planto implement the UN Programmeof Action on Small Arms of 2001,but needs resources to properlyimplement it. It is also drafting anew law on firearms to replace theoutdated 1973 law introduced bythe colonial power, Portugal. Thislaw does not include certain typesof weapons, nor does it imposeadequate penalties on offenders(United Nations, 2002, p. 9).

brief 29

B·I·C·C14

In very broad terms, it seems fairlyclear what TAE does and what it

hopes to achieve. However, it ishard to discuss the objectives andaspirations of the projectsystematically because TAEdescribes them differently in variousproject documents. This evenhappens within a single documentlike the basic TAE text BackgroundInformation, which is updated fromtime to time, but does not bear adate.5

According to this text, thefundamental aim of TAE is to“establish a culture of peace” in acountry ravaged by war and naturaldisasters (Transforming Arms IntoPloughshares, 2000). To do so, itseeks to “strengthen democracy andcivil society by encouraging thepopulation to participate in activepeacekeeping activities, bypromoting reconciliation and byfacilitating the initiation ofproductive activities for thepopulation. The project alsoencourages the social integration ofthe target group” (TransformingArms Into Ploughshares, 2000), thatis to say, ex-combatantas andothers illegally holding weaponsand explosives.

According to the basic TAE projectdocument, BackgroundInformation, the five majorcomponents of the project are:

1. Collection of weapons6

2. Exchange of weapons for tools

3. Destruction of weapons

4. Civic education of thebeneficiaries7 and surroundingcommunity

5. Transformation of the destroyedweapons into pieces of art andpresenting them to the generalpublic (Transforming Arms IntoPloughshares, 2000).

A TAE report issued in 2001 addstwo further components:

6. “To share the TAE experienceby…promoting Peace andReconciliation during variousnational and internationalevents/activities” and

7. “To improve the TAE projectthrough the constant proposal ofnew practical ideas(Transforming Arms IntoPloughshares, 2001).

TAE’s Background Informationdocument goes on to distinguish ingreater detail

i) General Objectives

■ to help build a culture of peace

■ to support and maintain apeaceful post-war transition inMozambique

■ to offer an alternative lifestyle toarms holders

ii) Specific Objectives

■ to collect and destroy allavailable weapons

■ to transform arms into“plowshares”, i.e. offering usefultools for delivering weapons

■ to reduce violence and educatecivil society about its results

■ to transform destroyed arms intosculptures and other forms of art(Transforming Arms IntoPloughshares, 2000).

Background Information alsospecifies that TAE’s target groupcomprises “illegal arms holders,former combatants, and all otherswilling to share informationconcerning existing arms caches orindividually kept weapons of anytype” (Transforming Arms IntoPloughshares, 2000).

It goes to list as “expected resultsand tangible past benefits”

■ Reducing the number of armscirculating in the country

■ Diminishing accidents due toarms caches

■ Diminishing acts of criminalityand violence

■ Social reintegration of the targetgroup members by involvingthem into productive activities

■ Better acceptance of theprinciples of a culture of peaceamongst the population throughparticipatory acts ofreconciliation (TransformingArms Into Ploughshares, 2000).

Furthermore, the document goes onto describe the wide press coveragethat TAE enjoys, especially inMozambique, but also in foreignmedia (Transforming Arms IntoPloughshares, 2000). It providesexamples of the impact of tools andother useful items provided by TAEto people reporting or surrenderingordnance:

■ A local woman has been able tostart a business by using herincentive received in exchangefor weapons (a sewingmachine). She is now looking toexpand her business.

■ A young man whose home wasdestroyed by the latest floods wasable to begin the process of homereconstruction with the help of

Aims and Objectives ofthe TAE Project

5 The project also gives varying renditionsof its English name, sometimes calling itthe ‘Tools for Arms Project’ and in otherinstances the ‘Transforming Arms intoPloughshares Project’. Occasionally, ‘ACulture of Peace’ is added to the name

6 When TAE speaks of ‘weapons’, it oftenmeans to include ammunition andexplosives.

7 TAE uses this term to denote therecipients of goods offered in exchangefor ordnance.

B·I·C·C 15

aims and objectives

cement bags exchanged withTAE.

■ A former Child-soldier, capturedby one of the fighting factionsduring the civil war inMozambique, received variousmaterials in exchange forinformation leading to thediscovery of two arm cachetsburies by himself after the war.

■ A young university student wasable to receive an Oxford EnglishDictionary in exchange for hisweapon.

■ The many bicycles that havebeen exchanged are now beingused to alleviate the stress ofbringing family essentials dailysuch as water, firewood orbringing produce to the marketfor its sale (Transforming ArmsInto Ploughshares, 2000).

■ A civic education programmeinitiated by the Anglican churchin Maputo has succeeded inhaving some children bring intheir toy plastic guns to the TAEproject office for destruction, inreturn for another new toy.

■ Through the donation of a smallland tractor by a Japanesepartner, two groups of people inthe Manhiça region and theChibuto region competed for thetractor. The second groupsuccessfully raised 500 weaponsand thus the tractor wasdelivered to them (TransformingArms Into Ploughshares, 2000).

Turning to the creation ofsculptures from destroyed guns, thedocument reports:

■ The creation of hundreds ofworks of art made from armsfragments by the Nucleo de ArteAssociation of artists in Maputo,has provided the symbols forpeace: for example, artists havecreated with the destroyedweapons: motorcycle, varioustypes of birds and animals,traditional African statues, ajazz-player, a table and chair etc(Transforming Arms IntoPloughshares, 2000).

We will now attempt to provide ourown interpretation of TAE’s goals.By doing this simply and clearly,we will be better able to estimateTAE’s success. Naturally, we will tryto avoid misrepresenting theproject’s intentions.

The impression we obtained duringour visits in 2003, and readingdocuments written throughout theseven years of the project, is that itin practice, TAE particularly wantsto remove as much weaponry andammunition from Mozambicansociety as possible. That is by far itsmost important objective. Nearly allits other activities serve to supportthis main function. In our view, thehanding out of useful products inexchange for guns, the staging ofcivil education campaigns, theproduction and exhibition of gunsturned into art, and drawingattention to the TAE project athome and abroad in practice allserve to reinforce TAE’s principalfunction, the removal and disposalof ordnance, even if TAE suggeststhat they are equally important.

But beyond weapons reduction liesa bigger goal. By targeting illegallyheld arms and explosives, TAEwants to contribute to peace in

Mozambique. That is its ultimateaim. How, in TAE’s opinion, willweapons reduction lead to greatersecurity and a more durable peace?After all, removing weapons doesnot automatically produce peace.With some justification, TAE be-lieves that disarmament willcontribute to peace in three ways.

First, by making it more difficult forpolitical activists and criminals toobtain guns and bullets. This willbe the case if the tools of violenceare in smaller supply or if peoplehide them more carefully. Second,by demonstrating that it is bothpossible and advantageous forcivilians to get rid of arms andexplosives that they hold illegally.Here civil education and theoffering of incentives are useful.Third, by widening the movementto remove illegal guns fromMozambican society, both byexpanding the TAE project and bypromoting efforts by others. Herefund-raising and public relations areessential.

Now let us see what TAE hasachieved, and how its achievementsmeasure up to its aims andobjectives.

Collected pistols in storage at TAE Headquarter in Quelimane, Zambézia

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B·I·C·C16

In its reports to the CanadianInternational Development

Agency (CIDA), TAE relates its‘objectives’ to ‘outputs’, ‘outcome’and ‘actual result’, (TransformingArms Into Ploughshares, 2001).This provides a useful frameworkfor our discussion.

Weapons Collection andDestruction

The most recent data available(October 1995–October 2003)indicate that TAE collected 7,850weapons, 5,964 pieces ofunexploded ordnance (like minesand grenades of various types),256,537 rounds of ammunition,and various other pieces ofmilitary equipment, adding up to a

total of 270,351 items ranging frombullets to machine guns (Trans-forming Arms Into Ploughshares,2003).

We have no way to judge theaccuracy of these numbers, butwe have no evidence to suggestthey are incorrect. By contrast,we find some of the texts thatTAE puts out about its results inweapons collection confusing andmisleading. In its sixth-monthreport to CIDA, TAE claims that itpassed the milestone of “200,000pieces of weaponry collected” inSeptember 2001 (TransformingArms Into Ploughshares, 2001),and in its BackgroundInformation and other documents,TAE claims to have collected“over 221,000 different pieces of

weaponry and accessories”(Transforming Arms IntoPloughshares, 2000).

These statements sound as if TAEcollected over 221,000 arms,instead of several thousand armsand over 200,000 bullets and otherpieces of military equipment.Unfortunately, this confusionseems to be deliberate. On otheroccasions, TAE has literallyclaimed to have collected 200,000weapons.In April 2002, TAE’s nationalcoordinator Albino Forquilha tolda Portuguese news agency “thatever since the creation of TAE, thisCCM project has resulted in thecollection and destruction of about200,000 weapons…” He also notedthat “the CCM needs about 19million dollars…to make viable itsprogram of Exchanging Weaponsfor Hoes (TAE) for the next threeyears. It plans to collect a total of100,000 weapons per annum”(Lusa News Agency, 10 April2002). A few months later, Mr.Forquilha made a similar statementto South African reporters (SouthAfrican Press Association, 2002).

Clearly, TAE has on severaloccasions exaggerated the resultsof weapons collection by usingword like ‘arms’ and ‘weapons’ fora wide variety of military items, 90percent of which are bullets.

TAE’s tables of collection statisticsseem more consistent and precisethan its texts. These tables indicatethat since 1995, TAE has collectedabout 1,000 weapons a year, plusrespectable quantities ofunexploded ordnance, ammunitionand other military gear. In terms ofdisarming the Mozambicanpopulation, this crop is very small.Nor have we seen any statisticalevidence that supports TAE’s claimthat the removal of weapons andammunition has led to a decline inweapons-related crime andaccidents. At any rate, it is almost

Output and Impact

Improvised storage site for collected arms and ammunition in Mopeia, Sofala

B·I·C·C 17

output and impact

impossible to obtain reliablestatistics on these matters inMozambique.

The 7,850 arms collected by TAEsince 1995 are less than theapproximately 30,000 weaponsrecovered and destroyed by thenine Operations Rachel that tookplace in about the same period(see box on Operation Rachel, p.20).

To be sure, Operation Rachel is aproject of the South African andMozambican governments, whileTAE is entirely run by civil society.Besides some of the weaponscollected by TAE are included inthe figures for Operation Racheldue to the fact that thegovernment program destroysweapons collected by TAE. Allthings considered, for a church-run project to run a weaponscollection program for seven yearsand collect thousands of guns andlarge quantities of ammunition andexplosives is no meanachievement. For them to do thiswith very limited governmentsupport is remarkable.

How has the collection anddestruction of the guns andexplosives recovered by TAEaffected Mozambique? We do notbelieve it has made it moredifficult for political activists,criminals or anyone else to armthemselves. However, it hasproven and demonstrated thatweapons reduction is possible inMozambique. Without OperationRachel and TAE, there would beno one seriously challenging thenormality of weapons beingwidely available in the country.Thanks to these two programs, thepopulation are finding out thatthere are benefits to getting rid ofillegally-held armaments.

This message is reinforced andamplified by TAE’s civic educationactivities, and its success inreaching the Mozambican media.We do not believe that TAE’s art

program has had a big impactwithin the country. The art sceneof Maputo is very far removedfrom the life of mostMozambicans. However, stories,photos and exhibits of art madefrom scrapped guns have hugelycontributed to TAE’s publicrelations outside the country,probably making it much easier toraise funds for the program. Soindirectly, the art project may havehad a strong impact on TAE’sactivities throughout Mozambique. This effect may now be wearingoff, as many potential donorsknow the story of turning gunsinto art, and the artists show agreater interest in furthering theirartistic and commercial careersrather than promoting the TAEproject.

As we will see in the section oncivic education, TAE is planning agender activity. So far, it hasshown little inclination to considerthe various ways in which menand women experience the spreadand the recovery of weapons. Theway it rewards influential ex-combatants may not beencouraging to women sufferingfrom insecurity and gun violence.On the other hand, we couldimagine that women are in ageneral sense sympathetic to TAE’sattempt to get guns out of society.Unfortunately, we can onlyspeculate about these importantquestions.

Provision of Tools andOther Incentives

In the six years between thelaunching of the program in 1995until September 2001, TAE handedout nearly 7,000 kilograms ofcommodities and a negligibleamount of cash. The itemsincluded bicycles, sewingmachines, sheets of zinc for roofconstruction, agricultural tools,building materials and a widerange of other items (TransformingArms Into Ploughshares, 2002).

The exchange of ordnance forproductive goods has been theobject of much thought at TAE.The project has carried out needsassessments in order to select themost appropriate rewards, thoughChristian Brun, previouslyassigned to TAE as a CUSOvolunteer, believes they now needto be re-examined (BrunInterview, March 2003). Thecriteria that TAE uses to determinehow large a reward a ‘source’should receive are not crystalclear, but most current and formerstaff members agree that some ofthe most important are:

1. The volume of the ordnanceoffered, which can vary greatly.

2. Its condition, which staffmembers claim is usually verygood.

3. The type of ordnance offered.Dangerous items rate higher.

4. The characteristics of thesource. According to the staff,deserving recipients get more.

5. ‘Social value’, that is to say thelikely impact of the reward.

5 The project also gives varying renditionsof its English name, sometimes calling itthe ‘Tools for Arms Project’ and in otherinstances the ‘Transforming Arms intoPloughshares Project’. Occasionally, ‘ACulture of Peace’ is added to the name

6 When TAE speaks of ‘weapons’, it oftenmeans to include ammunition andexplosives

7 TAE uses this term to denote therecipients of goods offered in exchangefor ordnance

brief 29

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B·I·C·C 19

output and impact

Whom does TAE reward? It isimportant to note that it offersincentives to the people whoprovide information leading to therecovery of ordnance, or whohand over such ordnance. Theseare called ‘sources’ or‘beneficiaries’. They may not bethe same people who actuallyheld the ordnance. The sourcesmay take TAE’s operational staff tocaches of arms belonging tothemselves, their families, theirneighbors, their rivals, or anyoneelse. Alternatively, they may haveobtained the ordnance from otherpeople by purchase, barter, theftor extortion. Of course, they mayalso have had the items in theirown possession.

During our mission, we spoke to abeneficiary in Boane, nearMaputo, who had paid friends andacquaintances to give him armsand explosives to surrender toTAE in exchange for sewingmachines. These machinesenabled him to expand andmodernize his tailor’s shop in thecentral market. He seemed pleasedwith the arrangement and eager tocontinue it. In this case, it was thetailor, his workers and family, aswell as the people who hadsupplied the ordnance, whobenefited from the swap.Probably, there were indirectbenefits for other people as well.We did not detect any adverseeffects, but when we come todiscuss TAE’s method of operation,we will discuss unintended effects.

It is difficult to assess the impactof providing bicycles, tools andbuilding materials to people whohelp TAE recover illegalweaponry. Definitely, therecipients benefit. Who are they?Generally speaking, they are notwomen hoping to start a business,or struggling young students, asthe examples put forward by TAEsuggest. Male ex-combatants intheir forties who are men ofinfluence and accustomed todoing business benefit much

more, and much more frequently.The incentives provided by TAErarely benefit the poorest membersof local communities directly.However, the poor may profitindirectly. The women workingthe sewing machines in the tailor’sshop in Boane may be a case inpoint.

TAE refers to the beneficiaries as‘sources’, and for good reason.These people are suppliers ofinformation, not necessarily ofguns and bullets. TAE offersrewards to people who provideinformation leading to the removalof illegal weaponry. The guns andbullets may be in the possessionof the source himself, but it is alsocommon for the source to offerTAE guns and explosives that heobtained from others in order totrade them in. In this case, he willgive the actual supplierssomething in exchange for theweaponry. In other cases, thesource will not provide weaponryat all, but lead the project staff tothe place where it can be found,for example in a cache.

How this mode of operationaffects local communities is notclear to us. Unfortunately, theimpressions we gained in ourfieldwork are haphazard andsuperficial. We suspect that theprovision of benefits to ‘sources’makes people think that giving upguns and ammunition can makegood business sense. We alsobelieve that to most potentialbeneficiaries, this financialincentive is a more powerfulmotive than the desire to promotepeace and security. However, TAEsteadfastly denies the commercialnature of exchanging guns fortools.

We are uncertain about the effectsof the goods handed out onincome generation amongst theweaker members of localcommunities. If by adding asewing machine to his shop, atailor can employ another

seamstress, then perhaps a job willbe created. The same applies if afarmer receives a set of tools,enabling him to gainfully employanother person on his land.However, we suspect that in mostcases, the impact of the smallrewards provided by TAE isinsufficient to create sustainablejobs.

Civic Education

This TAE activity was launched in2000. By 2001, about 500 peoplehad participated in what TAEdescribes as civic education events(Transforming Arms IntoPloughshares, 2001). From reportsand interviews with the staff, weconclude that this work mainlyconsists of encouraging thepopulation to hand in weapons. Itis in this context that the dangersof living with arms and explosivesare described, as well as theadvantages of trading them forbicycles, sewing machines and thelike. So civic education isinstrumental to enhancing thesuccess of disarmament(collection, destruction andexchange of ordnance).

TAE encourages people to hand inordnance, gives them somethinguseful in return, and destroys theordnance, turning some of thescrap into art. It is more successfulthan most similar campaignsaround the world in drawingpublic attention to these activities,and this publicity serves tohighlight the possibility anddesirability of getting rid ofweapons and explosives.

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B·I·C·C20

Operation Rachel

Operation Rachel started in 1995and it has become a leadingexample of a weapons collectionand destruction program that hassought to stem the movement ofillegal firearms and other smallarms and light weapons acrossnational boundaries, in particularacross the borders of Mozambiqueand South Africa.

Both the democratically electedgovernments of Mozambique andSouth Africa have since theirtransitions, been faced withincreasing levels of violent crimeexacerbated by the widespreadproliferation of small arms andlight weapons. In 1995, SouthAfrica and Mozambique signed anagreement to jointly combat crime.The aim of Operation Rachel is todestroy arms caches still buried inMozambique following thatcountry's civil war and transitionto democratic rule and relates todisarmament, arms control andcrime prevention.

Its objectives are twofold. First, toprevent weaponry in theseuncontrolled caches from fallinginto the hands ofsmugglers/traffickers who directthem to lucrative undergroundmarkets, mainly South African,

where they are used to perpetratecrimes and acts of violence.Second, to remove and destroyunstable explosive devices andmaterial from these caches therebypreventing injury to innocentcivilians who reside in the vicinityof these caches.

From a South African Governmentperspective then, the collectionand destruction of small arms andlight weapons in Mozambique isnot [only] an issue related todisarmament and arms control, butan issue of crime prevention. “Thedestruction of arms caches inMozambique is viewed as anatural extension of fighting crimein the cities and towns of SouthAfrica.” As the NationalCommissioner of the South AfricanPolice Service, Mr. J.S. Selebi hasstated, “the destruction of thesearms caches in Mozambique withthe assistance of the South AfricanPolice Service is part of ourmandate in maintaining law andorder within [our emphasis] SouthAfrica.”

For Mozambique, OperationRachel is an important means ofdemilitarizing its society. When theUnited Nations PeacekeepingMission in Mozambique(UNOMOZ) was phased out ofMozambique, it was soon realized

that there was an increasingavailability of firearms whichposed a threat to security, peaceand social stability. Afteridentifying hidden arms caches asthe main source of these weapons,and in order to reduce thepotential of violence, thegovernment of Mozambiquedefined as a priority the locationand ultimate destruction of theweapons.

South Africa and Mozambiquehave thus been acutely aware ofthe “cross-border” nature of crimeand therefore the need to combatit at both a national and regionallevel. As such Operation Rachelprevents the weapons fromcausing further destruction in theregion generally and, in particular,from being used in violent crimein both South Africa andMozambique.

Between 1995 and 2002, eightoperations consisting of some 19missions have been undertaken(the data below include figures onthe ninth as well). In total 611weapon caches have been locatedand destroyed. All of theoperations are carried outcollaboratively with members ofthe South African Police Service(SAPS) teaming up with policeofficials nominated by the NationalDepartment of Operations of thepolice of the Republic ofMozambique (PRM). In a uniquedevelopment with respect todisarmament matters OperationRachel has received support fromboth the international donorcommunity and from the privatesector in South Africa.

Operation Rachel’s success isattributable, in part, to consistentlywell-planned and executedoperations as well as a highdegree of cooperation betweenthe relevant states.

Most areas or provinces ofMozambique have been coveredby one or more of the various

Type 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999Handguns 8 13 79 353 453Submachine Guns 91 68 980 735 1874Rifles 981 355 4345 3183 8864Light/Heavy MG 47 52 279 467 845Mortars 15 44 35 21 115Ammunition 23,153 136,639 3,000,000 155,314 3,315,106

Type 2000 2001 2002 2003 TotalHandguns 18 372 101 45 1442Submachine Guns 126 467 346 235 4922Rifles 2205 2943 2072 1302 26250Light/Heavy MG 66 148 47 1 1952Mortars 70 32 5 0 337Ammunition 83,276 486,000 2,004,018 2,200,000 11,403,506

Operation Rachel Weapons Collection Results,1995-2003

B·I·C·C 21

output and impact

operations, including: CaboDelgado, Gaza, Inhambane,Massingir, Maputo, Manica,Nampula, Niassa, Sofala, Pontod’Ouro and Zambezia.

The types of weapons andweapon parts and accessoriescollected and destroyed haveincluded: Anti-personnel mines,anti-vehicle mines, boosters,cannons, demolitionmines/charges, detonators, riflegrenades, hand grenades,handguns, heavy machine guns,initiators, fuses, launchers, lightmachine guns, magazines, mortarbombs, mortars, projectiles, rifles,rocket motors, rockets, small armsammunition and submachine guns.

Commonly found items include:AK47 series assault rifles, Uzisubmachine guns, Browning,Makarov and Tokarev pistols, PG-7rockets and RPG-7 launchers,82mm mortars, 75mm recoillesscannon ammunition and 122mmrockets.

Noel Stott, Institute of SecurityStudies, Pretoria

In other words, what TAE does inthe way of civic education ismostly marketing. Successfulmarketing, in our opinion. Publicawareness campaigns are anauxiliary, not a principal activity atTAE. The gender project that TAEplans to launch may be its firstmajor step toward pursuing publiceducation as a main focus, ratherthan as a means of maximizingweapons collection. However, onecould imagine other publicawareness efforts. Assuming thatonly a very small part of thepopulation will be prepared totrade ordnance for bicycles andsewing machines, and therefore alot of guns and explosives willescape recovery, TAE could havechosen to teach people tominimize the risks of holding andhandling weapons and explosivesin order to minimize accidents andmisuse. However, it has not. Ofcourse, TAE cannot do everything.As its resources are limited, itschoice may have been a wise one.What is not wise is the unsafe andinsecure way in which TAEhandles weapons and explosivesitself.

Guns into Art

TAE did not intend turning gunmetal into sculptures to be acommercial venture, nor was itprimarily motivated by the desirefor artistic innovation. Here again,the motive was publicity andmarketing, and in this sense, theart project has been successfulwithin Mozambique and perhapseven more so abroad (see box on“Arts in the Crossfire”). Amid a lotof international media coverage,the sculptures have gone on tourin the United States, Britain, Italyand France, and other shows areto follow (Transforming Arms IntoPloughshares, 2001).

TAE says this “may lead to the saleof some art pieces to support theproject’s activities” (TransformingArms Into Ploughshares, 2001),and indeed it has. In fact,

commercial success has been thedownfall of TAE’s art project, withmany artists breaking away fromthe project in order to profit fromthe moneymaking potential oftheir work. The Maputo art centerNucleo d’arte that used to workwith TAE now presents its ‘artfrom arms’ on an Internet site(www.africaserver.nl/nucleo) thatonly mentions TAE in passing.Now TAE plans to stop supplyinggun scrap to these artists, andintends to employ others toproduce art from guns for thebenefit of the project, as wasoriginally intended (Interviewswith staff and former staff).

We have already pointed out thatin our opinion the art project hasbeen very important tointernational public relations andfund-raising for the TAE project,but not so important within thecountry. In fact, the pieces of artproduced by the Nucleo artists arerarely, if ever, used during civiceducation campaigns in thecountryside. During a visit to thetown of Mopeia (Zambeziaprovince) the authors were able towitness the destruction of somepreviously collected weapons by aTAE field team. This was doneduring a brief ceremony, includingspeeches by the local dignitariesin front of the assembledpopulation. Although the TAE fieldteam actually had some pieces ofart with them, these were not ondisplay, nor was any referencemade to the idea of turning gunsinto art. When questioned, themembers of the field teamexplained that the people wouldnot understand the ideas of theartist, and that displaying thepieces could even have a negativeimpact, as superstitious villagersmight mistake them for magiccharms (Interviews with teammembers, May 2003).

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The national project office ofTAE is currently located in one

of the rougher quarters of Maputo,plagued by violent crime. HereTAE plans to build a depot forcollected ordnance and a studiofor hired artists turning gun scrapinto art objects. Currently, itsstorage space consists of an IFAtruck that was donated to TAE bya German charity three years agoas a mobile collection anddestruction platform, but whichbroke down in January 2000, soonafter its arrival in Mozambique,and has not been repaired yet.10

This vehicle is parked under a treeon the compound of the ChristianCouncil of Mozambique (CCM) inthe center of town.

The project team consists of aNational Coordinator, Mr. AlbinoForquilha, who is also thecoordinator for the southern partof the country, where the capitalMaputo is located. There are sevenproject officers, a driver, at leastone security guard and aconsultant (formerly two) from theCanadian volunteer organizationCUSO.

The project office in Maputo isresponsible for the developmentof national strategies, the main-tenance of international contacts,the training of TAE staff membersand also for the weaponscollection in the provinces ofMaputo and Sofala. As of June2003, satellite ‘teams’ existed in

the provinces of Gaza, Zambezia,Inhambane and Niassa, usuallyconsisting of an official TAErepresentative working out of theprovincial CCM office.11 In Sofala,Cabo Delgado, Manica, Tete andNampula the project maintains nopermanent staff of their own, butuses CCM offices and staffmembers as their informal

‘representatives’ (Interview withKayo Takenoshita, May 2003).

Despite our best efforts, we havenot been able to fully grasp therelationship between the TAEheadquarters in Maputo and its‘satellites’ in the provinces.Weapons collected in theprovinces are included in thecollection statistics published byTAE in separate columns and inmost cases the head office isproviding funds for salaries andfor the purchase of incentives, aswell as expertise in collection anddestruction. However, the TAE

team in Zambezia province visitedby one of the authors in May 2003maintained that it wasindependently funded and run bythe local CCM office. The sameallegedly applies to the smallerTAE operation in Niassa province.

All current members of staff aremen. A female CUSO volunteer

who, amongst other things,designed a gender activity for TAEleft the project in June 2003.

Two of the operational officers, alieutenant trained as a militaryengineer and a private, areseconded by the Mozambicanmilitary, and one is seconded bythe police. In addition to their lowgovernment wages, they receive asalary from TAE. A third staffmember used to work incounterintelligence and was asoldier for many years before that.He was trained by the SouthAfrican-Mozambican Operation

Resources Available tothe Project

10 We are told that the spare parts havearrived, and the truck will soon beoperational again

11 The exception is the TAE representativefor Inhambane, who works out of theTAE office in Maputo and de facto fulfillsthe role of a second weapons collectionofficer.

Villagers assembled to observe the public destruction of weapons in Sofala

B·I·C·C 23

resources

Rachel and supplied to TAE in1998 by the Ministry of the Interior(Interview Guerra, March 2003).Yet another worked for thegovernment’s ‘political security’agency SINASP during the lastyears of the civil war and joinedTAE in 2000.

TAE is at pains to conceal thisinvolvement of serving and formersecurity service officials, because itbelieves, probably correctly, that alarge part of the population doesnot trust the government and willbe reluctant to hand over illegalordnance if they suspect that stateofficials are involved. This appliesmost particularly in areas wherethere is strong support for theRENAMO. When we spoke to theseconded officers, we got theimpression that their contact withtheir commanders consists mainlyof sending them short reports withstatistics of ordnance collected anddestroyed. They seem to considerthemselves TAE staff rather thansoldiers and policemen.

Other forms of governmentsupport include giving the projectofficial approval, allowing it tohandle illegal ordnance withoutrisk of prosecution, and sometimesproviding explosives for thedestruction of collected ordnance.All in all, the government is notdeeply or intimately involved inTAE’s work and its organization.TAE currently has two vehicles inMaputo, one of which used by thenational coordinator, and thebroken down IFA truck.Additionally, two Land Rovers areon their way from the UK.

The Mozambican organizationsthat support TAE are the CCM,chaired by Bishop DinisSengulane, and Ms. GraçaMachel’s Foundation forCommunity Development (FDC),which are both involved in therunning of the project. BishopSengulane and Ms. Machel areTAE’s patrons. Their organizationsprovide personnel as well as

materials and money, besideshelping to raise funds abroad. TAEalso receives help from theAssociation of DemobilizedSoldiers (AMODEG) and the peacegroup PROPAZ, which haveprovided personnel and expertiseon weapons safety. Leaders ofboth the government partyFRELIMO and the opposition partyRENAMO have endorsed andcommended the work of TAE,providing political backing. Thegovernment ministries of HomeAffairs and National Defenseprovide practical support, whilethe ministry of Finance andPlanning has exempted cargodestined for TAE from customsduties. Finally, TAE receivesassistance from the Mozambican-South Africa weapons recoveryand destruction project calledOperation Rachel (TransformingArms Into Ploughshares, 2000).

Overseas donors have been PressAlternative and the MozambiqueDevelopment Corporation JapanCommittee, both from Japan,‘Arche Nova’ from Germany,CUSO and the CanadianInternational Development Agency(CIDA) from Canada, plusorganizations from theNetherlands, South Africa, Swedenand the USA (Transforming ArmsInto Ploughshares, 2000).

TAE has been quite successful inattracting a significant level offunding and support, both locallyand overseas. In these efforts, theart project has been veryimportant, as we have seen. TAEhas especially benefited fromCanadian support over severalyears. However, it has sufferedand continues to suffer from gapsand shortfalls in funding whichlimit its ability to carry out itscurrent plans, let alone launch theextremely ambitious expansiondevised in its National Plan ofAction (Transforming Arms IntoPloughshares, 2001a).

According to the 2001 figures, thelatest available to us, the operatingbudget of TAE is about US$304,000 (Transforming Arms IntoPloughshares, 2001). Of this, about10 percent is spent on preparation,34 percent on implementation, 26percent on administration, 10percent on the CUSO consultant, 5percent on the CCM managementfee, and the rest on monitoring,evaluation, equipment andunforeseen items (TransformingArms Into Ploughshares, 2001).This budget does not includedonations made by otherorganizations in cash or in kind.

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Arts in the Crossfire

“During the four (4) years I waswith the TAE project(Transformação de Armas emEnxadas or Tools for Arms)working as a DevelopmentAdviser, hardly a week passedwithout spending a few hours atthe Nucleo de Arte, the workshopwhere weapons are transformedinto works of art. I also spent theoccasional Saturday sipping on abeer and exchanging views withartists that rapidly became friends.To say the least, the environmentwas relaxing… and inviting. Justto set the mood, the Nucleoconsists of a couple of picnictables, some banged up chairs (afew made of cut up weapons bythe way), a small bar, a workshopand an exhibition room. But, that’snot really important.

What is important is that everysingle set of foreign or local eyesvisiting the Nucleo workshop forthe first time, without anyexception I can recall, wasimmediately captivated by theseweird, something scary but mostlyjust beautiful rusted weaponpieces of artistic creativity, andeven more so, by their creators.Curiosity was the result of lookingat these odd shapes.

If not during discussions on anindividual basis with the artists, itwas by providing translations forthe international media that I wasmostly able to understand thedepth and thoughts behind themetal shaped into a chair, thebazooka canon into a saxophone,the butt of an AK-47 into a lady’sbody, bullet shells for a crocodile’sback or a G3 mechanism for arose. I often smiled at theinterviews—the artists continuallysurprised me—all sharing thesame guiding principle, butseparately having created theirown artistic methodology andphilosophy for creation. As I thinkback, my memory stumbles likealways, but I clearly remember

Humberto, a huge fellow with thebulging eyes of Savimbi, tellingme how his creations arefundamentally based on thepeaceful flowering of ideas andhow Gonçalo’s first weaponsartwork, The traveler, wasconstructed with separate pieceseach of which represented thesoul of those that were killed inwar-torn years. Those commentscaught my attention and fromthere on I was to discover theminds of not just a group of artistsjammed together working withsimilar materials, but of adistinguishable artistic movementchallenging each other andlearning together in a very isolatedenvironment.

But apart from the art, what canthese pieces of metal really meanand what do they truly symbolize?I was not aware of their awesomepower until I joined a filmingcrew and Gonçalo on a trip toMarracuene, a small town forty(40) km from Maputo. At the time,the whole neighborhood wascelebrating a national holidaylinked to the lengthy war thatoccurred in Mozambique. It waswhen Gonçalo took his saxophoneout of the car that one elderlyman pointed at him and mutteredwords in the local language. Helooked at me and said, “He seesblood and snakes (mambas)”. Isaw a saxophone. As a volunteerin a weapons destruction program,I also saw chopped up AK-47pieces and the canon of abazooka launcher. This man sawblood and snakes (mambas). Themore I traveled and met people inthe presence of the artwork, themore I was astonished by theirreactions. Following Gonçalo’sexplanation of the transformationof weapons into art, one ladydanced a while and fell to herknees, a joyful dance, andscreamed in harmony with othersthat joined in to seemingly close adifficult chapter.

These powerful reactions were not

only observed in Mozambique, butalso in my own country, inCanada. The previously mentionedartist, Gonçalo and myself were ona seven (7) City Tour of Canadawith the TAE artwork. Manyremarkable comments appeared aswe visited the twenty-two (22)schools and over two thousand(2000) students of all ages. A ten-year girl in Winnipeg asked mewhy people would bother to starta war and use guns if nobodyliked them. I tried, but I couldn’tanswer. I recall the teenager inSaskatoon that reminded us all, agroup of 100 fellow students andmyself, of the fact that weaponsmust be readily available inCanada if a teenager in a nearbycity was able to use one the weekbefore to take her own life. AsGonçalo did, I learned a lot aboutmy own country during our trip.

The anecdotes concerning mywork at TAE, both positive andnegative, abound. But too manyanecdotes tarnish the message onewants to submit. And that messageis rather simple: what is moresymbolically beautiful and realthan turning a killing machine intoan instrument of language andcreativity.

On a personal note, I say withrelative certainty that my workwith TAE was equally the mostsatisfying I will ever experienceand the most frustrating I will everendure. That is why I loved it. Thebetter part of it, and this is whatkept me wanting more, is the factthat I could on any given day,observe a young Mozambicanfriend pick up a piece of a cut upPPX and watch it slowly become aleg or a face. This symbolictransformation of contrast andextreme made it all fall into place,made it all worth while. It was myown proof that a change ofattitude can beat a powerful path.It was my own proof that art doesindeed wear a bulletproof vest.”

Christian Brun

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mode of operation

For most of its history, TAE’sactivities have been centralized

in Maputo and have been focusedon the southern and central partsof Mozambique, even thoughactivities in other parts of thecountry are growing. The nationalcoordinator personally approvesall decisions involving policy,public relations and expenses,down to the payment of per diemallowances for each member ofthe operational staff embarking onany trip outside his base. Weobserved on various occasions theparalysis that sets in when adecision needs to be made thatrequires the national coordinator’sapproval, but he cannot bereached. This problem willbecome much more serious as theproject extends to other parts ofthe country.12

Let us look at how the weaponsactivities at TAE are organized.

Information Retrieval

The first stage is informationretrieval. TAE’s operations officershave an extensive network offriends, former colleagues,informers, beneficiaries who areinterested in new exchanges andothers potentially capable ofproviding information that leads toa collection and exchange mission.However, the chief informationofficer told us that all his contactswent through serving ordemobilized soldiers, either fromthe government forces or fromRENAMO, especially high-rankingofficers whom he called ‘generals’(Guerra Interview, March 2003).This was confirmed by the secondoperations officer in Maputo (LuísInterview, March 2003).

Considering that in the TAEapproach it is the source that isrewarded, it seems likely thatsenior serving and demobilizedofficers are the main beneficiariesof the bicycles, sewing machinesand other rewards distributed byTAE. Outside of Maputo, the TAE‘satellites’ play a similar role ininformation gathering, whichcombines serving as a contactpoint for potential ‘beneficiaries’with pro-actively pursuing leads inareas where substantial weaponsholdings are suspected. Outside ofthe capital region, the local CCMoffices usually serve as a contactpoint for people interested inexchanging weapons (orinformation leading to weapons)for goods. When questioned howpotential ‘beneficiaries’ find outabout TAE, CCM officials pointedto media coverage and theinformation dissemination throughexisting CCM structures. In thedrought-stricken areas, thesestructures often extend to thevillage level (Interviews with CCMofficials in Beira and Quelimane,May 2003).

During the visit to Sofala provincein May 2003, one of the authorswas able to observe the modusoperandi of TAE outside of thecapital area and to talk to twobeneficiaries. Sofala province inthe center of Mozambique sawheavy fighting during the civil warand continues to be a RENAMOstronghold. All people interviewedfor this study agreed thatsubstantial caches, mostly hiddenby RENAMO prior todemobilization, continue to existin the province, particularly in theinaccessible hinterland.Furthermore, Sofala is home toMozambique’s second largest city,Beira, and hosts the transportationcorridor to Malawi and Zimbabwe,as well as the notorious NationalHighway No. One, which used tobe infamous for armed highwayrobberies. While these factors

would seem to make Sofala thenatural choice for a TAE satelliteoffice, the project maintains nopermanent presence in theprovince but relies on the goodoffices of the local CCMrepresentative in Beira to act as anintermediary. When the CCMoffice receives credibleexpressions of interest frompotential beneficiaries, it calls theheadquarter in Maputo which thendispatches one of the collectionofficers, usually Mr. Guerra, whohails from the province. Due tothe cost of traveling from Maputoto Beira, these trips only takeplace every couple of months, andonly when the amount ofweapons offered is substantial.

Two beneficiaries agreed to beinterviewed for this study in Beira,here are their stories:

Mr. Z. (name withhold on hisrequest), seems to be in his 40s or50s, served with RENA-MO for nineyears during the civil war, mostlyfighting in Zambezia province.During his military time he was incharge of the arms andammunition storage in his unit.Prior to demobilization, acting onorders from RENAMOheadquarters, his unit buriedabout half of its weapons beforereporting to the assembly areas.Now a self-employed car mechanic,Mr. Z. lives upcountry and finds itvery difficult to feed his fourchildren, a fate he says he shareswith many of his former comrades-in-arms. He heard about TAEthrough someone in the police,who told him that people handingin weapons to TAE would berewarded. In 2002, he first madecontact with Mr. Guerra andarranged for the exchange of 200weapons for 200 zinc sheets. Whilehe used some of the sheets to repairhis roof, he sold most of them forUS $6 per piece. This money heshared with six other people whohad known about the cache. Ever

Mode of Operation

12 This seems to be less of a problem withthe largely autonomous andindependently financed TAE operation inZambezia province, but certainly appliesto the other ‘satellite’ operations acrossthe country which operate withoutbudgets of their own

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since this first contact, Mr. Z. hastalked to former comrades and hastried to locate further weapons.When he is successful, he calls Mr.Guerra and arranges forexchanges to take place. This timehe has assembled some 80 weaponsfrom various caches and hasalready transported them from thecountryside to the vicinity of Beira,hiding them under agriculturalproduce to avoid seizure at policeroad-blocks. He expects ‘payment’again in the form of zinc sheets,which he has to share with fiveother men.

The second beneficiary told asimilar story:

Mr. B. was born in Sofala provincein 1956. He joined RENAMO in1985 and was posted to RENAMO’soperational zone in the northernpart of the province. He was incharge of arms and ammunitionfor his battalion of 500 soldiers.Most of their weapons weredelivered by ship from SouthAfrica. Prior to cantonment, hisunit hid a substantial part of itsweapons in the countryside. Thelocation of these caches was onlyknown to him and a fewcomrades. After demobilization hehas received payment from thegovernment for 18 months, but hehas received nothing since. Forsurvival he farms and keepsanimals. He heard about TAE onthe radio and went with twocomrades to the CCM office inBeira to find out more about theproject. In 2001, he led TAE to acache consisting of 300 weapons,as well as ammunition. Hereceived many zinc sheets inreturn, but declined to acceptsewing machines, as he does notknow how to operate them andfinds that the re-sale value of zincsheets is higher. He shared theprofit from this trade with threeother men. In 2002, he led TAE toanother cache, consisting of 100guns, after receiving a tip from aformer comrade, this time he didnot want a share of the profit as he

felt that the cache did not belong tohim. Mr. B. thinks that he couldlead TAE to many more caches, ifMr. Guerra could come up with thenecessary incentives more quickly.He believes that many moreweapons are out there, but thework has become more difficultrecently, as informers expect to bepaid in advance.

Interviews with Mr. Guerra (May2003) confirm that the projectrelies on a network of informersand middlemen in Sofala province,who search for information oncaches on their own and poolweapons from various sources forone exchange with TAE. Veryoften these informers wereRENAMO fighters during theconflict, and many of them haveparticipated in more than oneexchange, indicating that they actas de-facto agents of the project.This practice, which stands inmarked contrast to the way TAEportrays its operations in public, isthe result of specific conditions inSofala. As TAE has no permanentpresence in the province and Mr.Guerra’s visits to more remotedestinations are limited by thedifficulty of obtaining transport,the project relies on individuals todo much of the actual weaponscollection and also to move thearms to the vicinity of Beira forpick-up by TAE. These individualsare rewarded for their work andshare the goods received with theoriginal ‘owners’ of the weapons.Sources also claim that Mr. Guerra,who plays a key role in thesetransactions and is the only personto know the true identity of theinformers, receives ‘kick-backs’from the beneficiaries.13

The modus operandi observed inBeira is different from theapproach witnessed by the authorsin the Maputo area and inZambezia province. In Zambezia,one of us was able to join amobile TAE team on a field trip tothe town of Mopeia. Mobile teamsusually consist of two or three

TAE staff members, whichrepeatedly visit remote locationswhere weapon caches aresuspected. During their initial visit,the team members contact thelocal authorities, asking forpermission to conduct weaponscollection and explaining the TAEapproach. Local authorities,particularly the localadministrators, and in some casesalso the local churches, inform thepopulation about the project. Theyalso act as intermediaries betweenthe weapons holders and TAE,informing the project about leads.During subsequent visits, weaponsare then collected by the mobileteams. These field visits usuallylast about a week and can onlytake place if TAE has sufficientresources to pay for vehicle rental,fuel and per diems of the teammembers, which means that veryoften there is a time gap betweenthe initial contact, the collection ofthe weapons and the provision ofthe incentives. These are usuallydelivered during a third visit.

Provision of Incentives

Once TAE’s information officershave what they consider a goodlead, they discuss the terms of theexchange. For instance, an AK-47Kalashnikov assault rifle in goodcondition is often exchanged for asecond hand bicycle worth aroundUS $50. We tried to find out whatthe black market price for such anAK-47 is, but received conflictinginformation. While the juniorinformation officer cited 50 millionMeticais (about US $2,100) for the

13 We have no way of verifying thatcorruption of this sort exists in the TAEproject. However, a number of sourcesclose to CCM in Maputo and Beira havemade this claim, some even arguing thatMr. Guerra had already beenreprimanded by TAE headquarters, butcontinues this practice nevertheless. Wewere surprised to note that Mr. Guerracollected an ‘information fee’ of US $25per interview with beneficiaries, arguingthat “information is not cheap”(Interview Guerra, May 2003). Suchpayments had not been previouslyagreed.

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mode of operation

rural areas (Interview Luís), hissenior colleague gave us anestimate of about 3 millionMeticais (some US $128)(Interview Guerra). The SmallArms Survey (2002, p. 66) cites amarket price of US $15 for a usedAK-47 in Mozambique in 1999.

If weapons are as widely availablein Mozambique as most reportsindicate, then the lowest figure isprobably closest to the truth. Atany rate, it seems unlikely thatanyone would consider trading a2,000-dollar gun for a 50-dollarbicycle a good deal. However, ifselling a weapon illegally is risky,as the project staff told us, thenpeople might want to trade a rifleworth between 15 and 150 dollarsfor a used bicycle, especially ifthey possess several guns.

As we noted in the previoussection, the exchange of individualweapons for bicycles, sewingmachines, tool kits and othergoods donated by Westerncharities14 and shipped atconsiderable expense from theircountry of origin to Mozambique,is a small-scale activity. For theretrieval of smaller quantities ofweapons, TAE maintains containerdepots with such goods at itsheadquarters in Maputo and at theQuelimane (Sofala province)satellite office. Problems arise ifthe quantity of weapons traded iseither very high, or the recipientlives far away from the closestCCM office. Where largerquantities of arms are involved,the beneficiaries usually need toshare the reward with severalothers. The same is true in thecase of recipients from remotelocations bringing weapons toCCM offices. They face theproblem of transporting sewingmachines or similar rewards backto their homes. During several

interviews, recipients have statedthat they would prefer to receiveincentives in cash. However TAEhas committed itself to exchangeweapons only for tools.

To find a way around thisproblem imposed by its own rules,TAE has introduced quasi-monetary rewards in the form ofzinc sheets. Zinc sheets are usedin Mozambique in construction,adhere to standard specificationsand carry a fixed retail price (inBeira) of about US $6. As TAE hasbeen handing out building

materials, including sacks ofcement and zinc roofingpreviously, zinc sheets areconsidered an acceptable rewardby the project. Numerousinterviews have confirmed thatthere seems to be a detailedformula by which the price of aweapon is estimated in zincsheets:

■ One operational weaponequals

■ 12 non-operational weapons,equals

■ 520 units of ammunition,equals

14 The main source of these goods areDutch charities, however shipments havealso been received from German andJapanese groups. Weapons stored in IFA truck at TAE Headquarter in Maputo

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■ 10 zinc sheets, equals

■ 1 used bicycle, equals

■ about US $60.

According to interviews with Mr.Guerra (May 2003), this formula isusually adhered to, even though inthe case of very large caches, thenumber of zinc sheets per gun isreduced. Unlike the bicycles andsewing machines, the zinc sheetsare locally procured in Beira andtherefore do not need to betransported from Maputo. Theprocedure seems to be that Mr.Guerra, after inspecting theweapons, agrees on the number ofsheets a beneficiary is to receiveand then asks the TAE office inMaputo to wire the necessaryfunds to procure the sheets. Intheory, the beneficiary then takesreceipt of the zinc sheets,concluding the transfer. However,some sources have indicated thatthe recipients often do not takepossession of the sheets, butrather sell them back to retailer, ineffect exchanging them for cash.For the beneficiaries this is easierthan having to transport the sheetsupcountry, either for their ownuse or for resale. This introducesmonetary rewards through theback door, including numerousopportunities for corruption, andmost people at TAE must beaware of this. Nevertheless, thisaspect of the TAE operation has toour knowledge never beenreported to the internationaldonors. To them TAE prefers toportray individual gun ownershanding in their personal weaponsin exchange for donated bicyclesand sewing machines. Our pointhere is not that commercialexchanges are inherently bad, butthat TAE’s mode of operation isless than transparent andsusceptible to corruption.

Another matter of concern is thelack of vehicles to transportweapons and incentives betweenthe CCM offices and thebeneficiaries. Even in the greater

Maputo area, the TAE staff have inthe last few years been severelylimited in their means of transport,with their only truck (equipedwith weapons destruction tools)stranded in the center of thecapital, while the other projectvehicle is reserved for the nationalcoordinator. Once a vehicle isavailable, a typical mission in theSouth would comprise the chief ofoperations, one of the militarymen, and the police officer, who isin charge of security. These threewill go to the location, taking withthem the goods to be exchangedfor guns.

They travel with a letter from theTAE National Coordinatoraddressed to the militarycommander of the regionconcerned, announcing theintention of the project to collectordnance in a period of a fewmonths. However, they have nolegal authorization to be inpossession of illegal guns andammunition. Their only protectionagainst prosecution is theconfidence that the Mozambicangovernment will not consider itappropriate to prosecute them, asthey are doing good work. Thishas so far proved correct, but it isa weak legal footing on which towork.

At the location, they inspect theitems to be handed in, which arenot necessarily what they havebeen led to expect. Weparticipated in a mission that hadbeen told to expect a few pistols,but was instead handed a bagcontaining two highly explosivegrenades designed to be launchedby a mortar, bazooka or somesuch weapon. Several staffmembers told us that the qualityof the ordnance received is usuallyexcellent (Luís, Guerra Interviews).

Storage and Destruction

The next step in TAE’s preferredmethod would be to destroydangerous items on site, or as

near by as possible. However,this requires explosives, whichare often not available. Therefore,the team often resorts totransporting such items, like thegrenades just mentioned, back toMaputo. There they are placed inthe IFA truck on the CCMcompound, along with all theother weapons and explosivescurrently in storage. And as theteam rarely has more than onevehicle at its disposal, any itemsdestined for storage are taken toMaputo in the same car used bythe team. In the case ofunexploded ordnance, this isextremely dangerous.

The junior information officer toldus he considered field missions a“risky job”. The first risk hediscussed was corruption. If theywanted to deal in weaponsillegally for personal profit, itwould not be very difficult forTAE’s field officers to do so. Thisis all the more tempting becausethey are not highly paid, even byMozambican standards, and theyreceive no bonuses for goodresults. However nothing we haveseen or heard suggests that theyengage in arms-trafficking.Another problem they face is theslow and complicated paperworkimposed by CCM. “We neverleave on time, thanks to thebureaucracy”, the informationofficer said. Besides, there is alack of vehicles and means ofcommunication, and moneyneeded to bribe officials andmiddlemen (Luís Interview). “Toget results, I have to give two orthree million Meticais to thegenerals I deal with,” his seniorcolleague explained. “If I go to aRENAMO area, I also have tobribe the people guarding theweapons. All this comes out ofmy own pocket. CCM is aware ofthis, but won’t acknowledge it.They like to pretend that I amgiven information because Irepresent the churches. But inreality I am doing secretintelligence work. Except that I

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mode of operation

don’t have any funds. CCMdemands results, but they are notprepared to pay for them”(Guerra Interview, March 2003).

Then the junior informationofficer started talking about thesafety risks. “When we go toinvestigate an arms cache, we askthe source to draw us a map andlead the way. Still, we sometimesstray into mined areas. Besides,the caches are sometimesprotected by booby trapsunknown to any of us. At least ifwe had metal detectors, we mighthave some protection, but wedon’t. At least, now we havesome protective equipment foruse when destroying ordnance,like aprons, helmets and goggles.Kayo bought these for us” (LuísInterview, March 2003).15

The TAE team received two daysof informal and basic training inweapons safety in 2000, afterCUSO had complained aboutunexploded ordnance stored inthe TAE office (Brun Interview,March 2003). However, thelieutenant responsible forweapons safety told us that sincehe joined TAE in 2001, there hadbeen no such training either forthe team or for civilians dealingwith weapons in the towns andvillages. He also said that hesometimes lacked the materialsrequired for the safe and reliabledestruction of ordnance, becausethe government was unable toprovide them (Mussa Interview,March 2003).

With regard to storage anddestruction of the collectedweapons, the situation is similarlyhazardous in the other provinces,where TAE is active. In Sofalaprovince, where TAE maintainsno permanent staff, weaponshave been stored in the localCCM office, awaiting the arrival ofTAE staff from Maputo. In onecase documented by one of theauthors, 80 assault rifles in goodworking condition were stored

overnight in the office of theCCM coordinator. While the officebuilding had a private securityguard, it seems questionablewhether he could have preventedan organized ambush. A similarsituation exists in Quelimane,where weapons are stored in thefreight container in the CCMcompound. Again a private guardprovides a minimum level ofsecurity, but could beoverpowered easily by anorganized group. During longerfield missions, such as the onewitnessed by one of the authorsin Mopeia, weapons are kept withthe team, often being stored in atent. It seems remarkable thatsince 1995 there have been noreported incidents of attemptedtheft given these storageconditions, but this never-thelessleaves a lot to be desired,particularly as (non-TAE) CCMemployees in Beira expressedtheir uneasiness about having towork in the same building that isused as temporary storage facilityfor weapons, ammunition andexplosives.

The collected weapons areusually handed to the police fordestruction, particularly whenTAE has retrieved large caches.Smaller quantities of weapons areoften stored at the TAE officesuntil the police can make thenecessary specialists andexplosives available. In the pastyears, weapons collected by TAEwhere also destroyed duringOperation Rachel (see box, p. 20)sorties in Mozambique. Accordingto project staff, TAE would preferto exploit the destruction ofweapons for educationalpurposes, therefore the mediaoften is invited to these eventsand TAE representatives are usedto giving interviews on thoseoccasions. During field trips inZambezia, guns are oftenmechanically destroyed using agenerator-powered saw duringpublic ceremonies, whichcombine the display and the

destruction of the collectedweapons with public speeches byTAE representatives and localdignitaries. The Maputo officeprobably had planned to use theequipment installed in the IFAtruck for similar field activities,however as the vehicle wasstationary for almost three yearsthis has hardly happened so far.Furthermore, SALW ammunition issometimes destroyed usingburning kerosene, a highlydangerous practice in the view ofthe authors.

15 This is a reference to the previous CUSOvolunteer, Kayo Takenoshita. CUSOacted to improve safety pro-cedures afteran incident in 2000, when it came totheir attention that unexploded ordnancewas being kept in the TAE office.

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As we have seen, the TAEproject is run entirely by the

churches, with some governmentsupport behind the scenes. This isnot only unusual, it runs againstwhat is considered good practice.Nearly all experts and instructiontexts on weapons collectionmaintain that only fully trainedexperts, acting under governmentauthority, should handle, moveand destroy the ordnance(Wilkinson and Hughes; Laurance,Godwin and Faltas, etc.).

In the Mozambican case, thegovernment was unable orunwilling, or both, to fully assumethis task, and to a significantextent relegated it to thechurches.16 This, we submit, hashad various effects.First, TAE has not had full accessto the expertise, facilities andresources of the military andpolice. Of course, these are notwell developed in Mozambique. Inlate 2002, at the request of thegovernment in Maputo, the UNDepartment of Disarmament sent amission to assess problems relatedto the storage and management ofmilitary equipment and explosives.This was triggered by anexplosion caused by a stroke oflighting at a military depot in Beirain November of that year. Themission concluded that the armedforces and police of Mozambiqueare unable to ensure properstockpile management, safe

storage and control over theirfirearms (United Nations, 2002, pp.7-8). Nevertheless, full governmentassistance would certainly havemade TAE’s job easier, and maybealso safer and more secure.

Second, TAE has been able toavoid being seen as an accompliceof the FRELIMO government,which politically made its jobeasier in the areas sympathetic toRENAMO, and maybe in otherregions as well.

Third, by avoiding any visiblecollaboration with the government,TAE has not helped to increasepublic confidence in thewillingness and ability of thegovernment to maintain publicsecurity. In the long term, this islikely to be seen as a problem.

We believe that TAE could bemore effective in contributing topublic security in the country if itdeveloped a more visibly co-operative relationship with thegovernment. This kind ofrelationship could operate on twotracks. On the first, it wouldmobilize support for attempts bythe police to enforce weaponslaws and maintain law and order.In doing so, it would also seek thehelp of the police in moving,destroying and storing weaponssafely and securely. However, onthe second track, the churcheswould critically monitor theactions of the police and themilitary to make sure that theyabide by the law and protect therights and liberties of thepopulation.

Government and CivilSociety

16 At a workshop organized by BICC andTAE in Maputo on 24 June 2003, arepresentative of the Ministry of theInterior said that his country’s twocontributions to the implementation ofthe UN Programme of Action to Combatand Prevent the Illicit Trade in SmallArms and Light Weapons were the TAEproject and Operation Rachel.

B·I·C·C 31

costs and benefits

According to our incompleteinformation, the TAE project

costs something in the range of US$350,000 a year, not counting someof the work and material providedwithout payment by the peopleand organizations involved. Itcollects something like 1,000weapons, 700 pieces ofunexploded ordnance and 40,000rounds of ammunition a year. Soin terms of collecting anddestroying weapons, this isobviously not a cheap project, asseveral members of staff confirmedto us.

If the churches were simply to buyillegal ordnance for cash, theywould probably be able to get alarger crop for US $350,000 dollars.Would that be a better alternative?Would it produce more benefits interms of the money spent?Probably not.

First, collecting and destroyingillegal weapons is not verymeaningful unless it is part of awider effort to improve securityand maintain peace. In the case ofTAE, it is an attempt to promote aculture of peace, advocate a lifewithout guns, help ex-combatantsto gain a peaceful livelihood andreduce the suspicion betweenformer enemies. Much of this costsmoney, which is why a programlike TAE cannot be as cheap as astraightforward gun buy-backprogram.

Second, giving people cash forillegal ordnance is risky. Themoney can easily be used forpurposes that are hostile to peace,security and public order. It caneven be used to finance thepurchase of other guns, criminaloperations or political violence.Besides, more than the provisionof tools, it emphasizes the financialvalue of illegal ordnance. Largesums of money can have aninflationary effect. Finally, cash for

guns and ammunition does notdirectly and visibly contribute tothe development of peacefullivelihoods like farming.

In other words, the basic reasoningbehind TAE’s choice to ask peopleto hand in illegal ordnance and, ina separate activity, provide themwith materials and tools that willhelp them build a peacefulexistence, seems sound. When therewards mostly consisted offarming implements, some criticssaid that this was not veryattractive to city-dwellers (Meek,1998) but now that TAE uses awider range of rewards, includingbicycles, this no longer applies.

Does this mean that the US$350,000 allocated to TAE ismoney well spent? Maybe.Compared with many other peaceand development projects, thisseems a worthy and successfuleffort. However, some questionsand doubts remain.

A few paragraphs back, wesubmitted that collecting anddestroying illegal ordnance is notvery meaningful on its own. TAEdoes more than that. It engages incivic education, though that ismostly geared to encouragingpeople to hand in guns andexplosives. It also does a lot ofmedia work, highlighting theproject and the idea ifpeacebuilding in Mozambique.And it says that the number ofguns and explosives collected isless important than the impact onpeople’s mentality and the effecton public security. But what do weknow about such impacts? Verylittle. When it comes to assessingthe success of the program, thereis a general tendency to take thenumber of items collected anddestroyed as the most importantindicator of TAE’s performance. Wefind this regrettable.

Perhaps the TAE project wouldhave a greater impact if it focused

Costs and Benefits

TAE team member demonstrating that a pistol is in working condition

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B·I·C·C32

more on educating people aboutthe dangers of firearms andexplosives, not only to persuadethem to hand over these items,but also to convince them to bemore careful in storing, handlingand moving the ordnance. Afterall, no one believes that TAE willever be able to collect all illegalordnance. Much would be gainedif the people who are not ready todisarm become more careful inthe way they handle the ordnance,and less inclined to use it.Naturally, TAE should lead theway by providing a good examplefor the safe and secure handlingof ordnance. So far, it has failed todo so.

In the same vein, TAE urgentlyneeds to look at the different waysin which its efforts affect, and areperceived by, men and women.Nearly all the policy-makers andstaff members, and most of the

‘sources’ and ‘beneficiaries’ aremen. However, women are alsoaffected by the violence,insecurity, degradation andpoverty associated with theproliferation and misuse of gunsand explosives. They may beaffected more or less drasticallythan men, but the main point hereis that they are affected differently.They have different concerns,perceptions, interests and hopes.TAE needs to get them on board.

If additionally, TAE couldencourage and help thegovernment to do a more effectivejob of controlling the possession,movement and use of firearms andexplosives, that would also besignificant. At present, it goes togreat lengths to avoid beingassociated with the governmentand its agencies, for reasons thatmake sense in the short term.However, in the long term,

Mozambique needs to movetoward strict and effectiveweapons control by thegovernment.

In response to these comments,TAE will tell us they can hardly beexpected to make additionalefforts, as they already find itdifficult to fund their currentactivities. Perhaps the solution tothis dilemma is to shift theprogram’s priorities from weaponscollection and destruction topublic education and cooperationwith the government. WhetherTAE collects 1,000, 2,000 or 3,000weapons a year does not make abig difference in a country likeMozambique. There will always beplenty of arms left over. But if theproject could help change publicopinion and government policywith respect to illegal weaponry,the impact might be significantand lasting. And after all, churchesare better prepared for a job likechanging people’s minds than forrecovering and destroying militaryequipment.

Container used to store weapons at TAE Headquarter in Quelimane, Zambézia

B·I·C·C 33

lessons learned

When it comes to thequestion whether the TAE

approach can and should beapplied in other countries, thereare two opposite positions onecan adopt. Both are legitimate,but neither is entirely convincingand satisfactory in our opinion.

If one accentuates the positive,one can applaud thefarsightedness, courage andtenacity of the CCM in setting upand pursuing this project despiteconsiderable difficulties. One cango on to admire the way TAE hasput the issue of illegal guns onthe map in Mozambique, widelypromoted the idea of replacingthem by something peaceful anduseful, and actually carried outthousands of such exchanges.Besides, one can point out thatthis is a unique example of civilsociety taking the job of weaponsreduction into its own hands,even if in reality the governmentprovides more support to TAEthan meets the eye. Surely, onemight argue, this is a shiningexample for other poor countrieswith weak governments tofollow. Any deficiencies in theproject must, according to thisline of thinking, pale incomparison with its strengths.

However, with equal justification,one can focus on the weaknessesof the TAE approach. TAE’shandling of weapons andammunition is often extremelyunsafe and insecure, it frequentlyoperates without explicit legalauthorization, it publishesmisleading data, and the publicpicture it presents of itsoperations is quite different fromreality. While it claims to bespreading peace and

reconciliation, and may indeedbe doing so, it is also deeplyinvolved in the commercialbusiness of buying guns andexplosives. In this business, itsuse of funds and other resourcesis not transparent. Therefore,despite its remarkableachievements, it is not a goodexample to follow. Looking at theshadowy side of TAE, one canhardly avoid arriving at thisconclusion.

The authors believe there is meritin both views. In our opinion,civil society in other countrieswill find the TAE story inspiringin many ways and can learnmuch from the strengths as wellas the weaknesses of thisapproach. However, we do notthink it would be a good idea toemulate the TAE approach

without modifying it. Modificationwill in any case necessarybecause conditions vary fromplace to place.

Points to consider whenconsidering the replication of theTAE approach to disarmamentinclude the following:

Motivation of Gun-Holders

The success of voluntaryweapons collection programsdepends on various factors. Thesingle most important is howwell the program understandswhy people want to be armed. Inany country that has experienceda civil war in recent history,people who are in possession ofillegal ordnance essentially fall

Lessons Learned andReplication

Weapons being destroyed in a public ceremony in Sofala Province

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B·I·C·C34

into three distinct groups. In thisregard, it makes no differencewhether they are ex-combatantsor not.

The first category consists ofpeople who feel uneasy aboutthe political process and fear areturn to war. Especially duringthe initial stages of a peaceprocess, this group is likely to besizeable. As we have seen, inMozambique military units oftenundertake deliberate measures toprevent their weaponry frombeing seized during the peaceprocess. Retaining someweaponry is considered a ‘lifeinsurance policy’ in case politicalreconciliation fails. This group ofgun-holders can only be reachedby a voluntary disarmamentprogram if political conditions arefavorable. As we have witnessedin Mozambique, the loyalty totheir former military formationserodes over time, and concernabout political repercussions arereplaced by socio-economicworries. In this context, a well-targeted voluntary collectionprogram offering some form ofmaterial incentive can beextremely effective in ‘mopping-up’ military weapons that werenot collected duringpeacekeeping operations.

The second group of gun-holdersconsists of individual civilianswho retain personal weaponsacquired during the conflict inorder to defend themselves, theirfamilies and property againstcriminals (and/or in a more ruralsetting against wild animals).Here the key to success isconvincing them that theirweapons pose a greater risk tolife and limb than attacks bycriminals or wild animals. Thecapacity of the police and othersecurity providers to providereliable services is anotherimportant yardstick. Voluntaryweapons collection programsneed to highlight the risks ofhaving military weapons and

particularly explosives around thefamily home in order to besuccessful. Offering materialincentives of the kind providedby TAE can also help to convincepeople to surrender at least someof their personal stocks. In ruralareas, where policing is spottyand a real risk of animal attacksexists, collection programs couldspecifically target heavierweapons and explosives, or evenoffer to assist in the replacementof military firearms with riflesmore suitable for hunting.

The third distinct group of gun-holders consists of people, whoheld onto their weapons becausethey plan to use them forcriminal acts or in order to trafficthem to other areas. Obviously,this group can not be reached byvoluntary collection efforts andprogram planners need to beconscious that there will alwaysbe people unwilling to surrendertheir arms.

Program Goals

During the description of the TAEprogram we noted that it aims toimprove security in Mozambiqueand ultimately contribute to a‘culture of peace.’ This iscommon to most post-conflictvoluntary weapons collectionprograms. The mere act ofsurrendering and destroyingweapons can, if well publicized,contribute enormously to a peaceprocess by increasing trustamong the population. This isparticularly true when programsmake a deliberate effort not totarget a specific group orgeographical area, but encompassparticipants from all sides andtherefore take a non-partisanstand. In the context of asuccessful peace process and inthe absence of widespreadordinary crime, voluntarydisarmament can be an extremelyeffective tool in stabilizing a post-conflict society.

This seems to be the case inMozambique where virtuallyeverybody interviewed in thecourse of this research agreedthat TAE’s activities had made animportant contribution in termsof improving public security,although the number of weaponscollected is comparatively smallin relation to the size of theremaining stocks. Programplanners need to be consciousthat few voluntary programs willsucceed in making a substantialdent in those stocks.Unfortunately, because changesin public security (and theperception thereof) are difficultto measure, program officersoften use the number of gunscollected as the yardstick bywhich to measure the success orfailure of a program. As we haveseen in the case of TAE, thismeans that instead of focusing onthe creation of trust andpromoting non-violent methodsof conflict resolution, theprogram concentrates oncollecting as many weapons aspossible, maybe even inflatingthe numbers of arms recovered intheir desire to advertise theirsuccess.

Government Relations

The relationship between theauthorities and any voluntarycollection program is of crucialimportance. While there can bevery good reasons for thegovernment to leave theseprograms to representatives ofcivil society, particularly in post-conflict societies where manypeople may view the governmentand its agents as representativesof the former enemy, the supportof state authorities is stillnecessary. There are threecomponents to this.

First, the government needs tocreate the legal conditions toallow any civilian program tooperate, i.e. program staff needto be allowed to collect,

B·I·C·C 35

lessons learned

transport, store and destroyillegal firearms without riskingprosecution. This also needs toinclude people coming forwardto surrender their weapons. Aswe have seen, this is a challengein Mozambique—although TAEoperates with the support of thegovernment, gun-holders feardetection by the police andessentially rely on covert tacticsto get their weapons to TAE. Thisissue could be addressedeffectively by local amnestiesduring the collection periods. Second, the authorities couldprovide crucial assistance inproviding safety and securityduring collection operations, i.e.policemen could securetemporary storage sites andmilitary engineers could assist inthe destruction of firearms andexplosives, while civilians wouldsupervise the process andundertake the sensitiveexchanges. This cooperation hasalready partially implemented byTAE and seems to be verysuccessful.

Third, the government couldassist collection efforts byoutlining clear anduncompromising penalties againstholders of illicit weapons afterthe end of the amnesty period.International experience suggeststhat the ‘carrot-and-stick’approach, which combines theprovision of incentives for thesurrender of illegally heldordnance during the amnestywith the credible threat ofpunishment for the illegalpossession of ordnance after theend of the amnesty period, canbe very successful.

Provision of Incentives

As mentioned before, theprovision of material incentives isa key component to convincepeople to surrender theirweapons. This is particularly thecase in impoverished post-conflict societies where firearms

might well be the only valuablepossession of demobilizedsoldiers. The effectiveness ofoffering non-cash incentives forfirearms depends to a largeextent on the existence anddynamic of a local black marketfor military weapons. Where sucha market is in existence andaccessible, gun-holders are muchless likely to exchange theirweapons for a used bicycle, aslong a strong demand forfirearms keeps the market pricecomparatively high. InMozambique the success of TAE’sapproach can to a large extent beexplained by the absence of afunctioning black market outsideof the Maputo area, and aseemingly low local demand forfirearms. In addition, easily

accessible and large caches hadalready been trafficked across theSouth African border in the1990s, leaving behind stockswhose location deep in the bushmade their recoveryuneconomical, especially in viewof diminishing foreign demandand improved border controls.

Whereas individual gun holderscan sometimes be convinced toexchange their weapons for itemssuch as sewing machines,bicycles and tool kits, thisapproach is less effective whenone is dealing with larger caches.As TAE found out in Sofalaprovince, the people controllingcaches of military ordnance, oftenformer officers of high rank,demand payment in cash rather

Used typewriter donated to TAE as an exchange good

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B·I·C·C36

than in kind. This is partiallybecause they may be more awareof the black-market value of theirstocks, but also because theyusually need to pay off severalpeople, which is easier if thereward is in cash. TAE hasaddressed this problem byintroducing zinc roof sheets as anartificial currency, therebycircumventing the issue of cashrewards. Nevertheless, programplanners need to take thisexperience into account whenplanning exchanges.

On a more technical note, thesourcing-in of incentives needs todiscussed. Here, the approachused by TAE seems unpractical.While the idea of collectingdonated second-hand sewingmachines and bicycles in Europeand Japan and shipping them toMozambique may hold appeal insolidarity circles, in practicalterms it is hardly the mosteconomic way of utilizing scarceresources. The high cost ofshipping plus the considerablecustoms and handling fees17 are a

major burden. Besides, theproject staff rarely knows inadvance what kinds of good willarrive and when to expect them,which makes operationalplanning difficult. This suggestthat it would make more sensefor a program like TAE toprocure tools and other exchangegoods locally, or in neigboring.

Used sewing machine donated to TAE as an exchange good

17 We are told that these days theGovernment often waives customs dutieson these imports

B·I·C·C 37

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B·I·C·C 39

WORLD VISION is aninternational network of

Christian humanitarian agenciesworking in nearly 100 countriesspanning five continents. Our18.000 staff, predominantly fromthe southern part of the world,work in emergency relief and long-term development projects to helpachieve self-reliance for thepopulations we work with. All ourprograms are focused especially onthe needs of children. Health care,agricultural production, waterprojects, education, micro-enterprise development, advocacyand other programs are carried outby the community with the supportof WORLD VISION.

WORLD VISION Germany,founded in 1979, is a recognisednon-profit organisation, and thefunds intrusted to us are utilizeddirectly and exclusively for

charitable purposes. In 2003, wecarried out 173 projects in 45countries. Whereas ourdevelopment projects are fundedby contributions from sponsors anddonors through child sponsorship,our emergency relief programs arefinanced mostly throughgovernment funding such as theGerman Foreign Office in Berlinand the European CommunityHumanitarian Office in Brussels.Apart from project-implementation,conflict resolution and advocacyhave also become importantaspects of our work. The issues wecall attention to include childsoldiers and small arms, preventionof child prostitution, legal rights ofgirls and women as well aschildren affected by HIV/AIDS.

WORLD VISION Internationalmaintains official working relationswith the World Health Organisation

(WHO) and with the UnitedNations International Children'sEmergency Fund (UNICEF).Furthermore, we cooperate withthe World Food Program (WFP),the United Nations DevelopmentProgram (UNDP), and with theUnited Nations High Commissionerfor Refugees (UNHCR). WORLDVISION Germany is a member of"Aktion Deutschland Hilft", analliance of several Germanhumanitarian agencies seeking tocombine efforts in emergencyrelief.

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BICC is an independent,nonprofit organization

dedicated to promoting peace anddevelopment through the efficientand effective transformation ofmilitary-related structures, assets,functions and processes. Havingexpanded its span of activitiesbeyond the classical areas ofconversion that focus on the reuseof military resources (such as thereallocation of militaryexpenditures, restructuring of thedefense industry, closure of militarybases, and demobilization), BICC isnow organizing ist work aroundthree main topics: arms,peacebuilding and conflict. Indoing this, BICC recognizes that thenarrow concept of national security,embodied above all in the armedforces, has been surpassed by thatof global security and, moreover,that global security cannot beachieved without seriously reducingpoverty, improving health care andextending good governancethroughout the world, in short:without human security in thebroader sense.

Arms: To this end, BICC isintensifying ist previous efforts inthe fields of weaponry anddisarmament, not only through itsvery special work on small armsbut also by increasing its expertisein further topics of current concernsuch as the non-proliferation ofweapons of mass destruction, armsembargoes and new militarytechnologies.

Peacebuilding: BICC is extendingits work in the area ofpeacebuilding. In addition toexamining post-conflictdemobilization and reintegration ofcombatants and weapon-collectionprograms, the Center aims tocontribute, among other things, tothe development of concepts ofsecurity sector reform with anemphasis on civilmilitarycooperation, increased civiliancontrol of the military, and theanalysis of failed states.

Conflict: BICC is broadening itsscope in the field of conflictmanagement and conflictprevention, including tensionscaused by disputes over marketableresources and transboundary issuessuch as water.

These three main areas of analysisare complemented by additionalcrosscutting aspects, for example,gender, pandemics, orenvironmental protection.

Along with conducting research,running conferences and publishingtheir findings, BICC’s internationalstaff are also involved inconsultancy, providing policyrecommendations, training, andpractical project work. By makinginformation and advice available togovernments, NGOs, and otherpublic or private sectororganizations, and especiallythrough exhibitions aimed at thegeneral public, they are workingtowards raising awareness forBICC’s key issues.

While disarmament frees up re-sources that can be employed inthe fight against poverty,conversion maximizes outcomesthrough the careful management ofsuch transformation of resources. Itis in this sense that they togethercontribute to increasing humansecurity.

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