Black April: The Defeat of South Vietnam, 1973-1975

by George J. Veith

Paper presented at the 2009 SMH conference

Black April: The Defeat of South Vietnam, 1973-1975

• Despite numerous books on the fall of SVN, events are not clearly understood. While we know the “broad scope” of what happened, most books are from the American perspective, while only a handful in English from the Vietnamese on either side.

• The South Vietnamese refer to the fall of the country as “Black April.” (Thang Tu Den)

• This major historical event has not undergone any in-depth historical analysis. Thus, some myths about the fall, and about the South Vietnamese, have continued unchallenged to this day.

• Due to the rapid collapse, the view of South Vietnam as a weak vassal state, propped up by American money and arms, has become an accepted fact among most historians.

Black April: The Defeat of South Vietnam, 1973-1975

• Moreover, the images of uncontrolled chaos and rioting in Da Nang, the scenes of carnage and terror from the bloody retreat from the Central Highlands, have cemented the analysis of the ARVN as a poorly led military that crumbled without U.S. help when faced with a strong challenge.

• Closer examination reveals different facts that lead one to contest these “facts.” Both the North Vietnamese, and to lesser extent the South Vietnamese, have written extensively about the last years. Further, the US government has released vast amounts of primary source documentation, much of it never examined.

• These sources indicate that what happened on the ground, and in Hanoi, Saigon, Paris, and Washington, was far more complex than a simple collapse as a result of being a weak, vassal state.

How do I know this? Studied fall of SVN for last eight years.

U.S. primary and secondary materials:• Complete review of U.S. primary sources, including never before

seen DAO records, USSAG Daily military reports, State cables, Ambassador back channels, NSC reports, CIA memo’s, and other internal reporting.

• Complied largest collection of secondary sources, including scholarly articles, books, and other writings on the fall.

North Vietnamese materials:• Massive translation project: 94 Communist military books, to include

divisional and corps histories, battle studies, and province histories.• Treasure trove of primary source cables and message traffic

between Politburo and commands in the South.• 19 memoirs from key Communist commanders and diplomats• 55 articles in Vietnamese detailing battles or interviews with key

figures• 45 sources published in English or translated by JPRS into English

How do I know this? Studied fall of SVN for last eight years.

South Vietnamese materials:• Translation of military reporting from Chinh Luan, best paper in

SVN.• Interviewed over 15 South Vietnamese generals, including Gen.

Cao Van Vien.• Interviewed over 45 other ARVN officers, including division,

regiment and battalion cdrs.• Translation of 30 SVN books, 80 articles, and 34 papers written by

ARVN participants to me explaining their roles in various events, plus another 26 in English.

Newly released primary sources from the French and Australian archives

Myths about the fall of South Vietnam:

1. The North Vietnamese did not make the decision to launch a military strike until late 1974 (not true).

2. The South Vietnamese military collapsed because they were weak and ineffective (not true).

3. US aid cuts did not hurt the South Vietnamese military (not true), while Soviets and Chinese poured in aid (not correct).

4. ARVN put up little fight and the Communists easily rolled into Saigon (not true).

First Myth: Hanoi’s decision to return to war was not made until late 1974.

• Most observers believe that Nixon’s resignation and the Congressional aid cuts led to Hanoi’s decision to return to war. Actual decision to resume warfare was made much earlier.

• Initial strategy was to emphasize “political struggle” while also re-arming in the South. “Political struggle” meant an emphasis on building the southern zone economically, while also building socialism in NVN.

• In late Jan 73, Politburo sent this analysis to its southern commands: “The situation could develop along two possible lines: either peace will be maintained, or the war will begin again. We must not have any illusions that the enemy will seriously and strictly implement the agreement, because the enemy is extremely worried about the possibility of total collapse.”

First Myth: Hanoi’s decision to return to war was not made until late 1974.

• Hanoi, believing its own propaganda, expects GVN to quickly collapse once U.S. withdraws. When it does not, and actually grows stronger, the Politburo now faced with a huge problem.

• On 27 Mar 73, Politburo met to review first 60 days of PPA. Le Duan immediately incited the other Politburo members that the US and GVN were “massively violating” the accords. He wants to return to “military struggle” as primary means to win victory, which means large scale attacks. He will not allow “an opportunity it has taken us 20 years to create” to slip through his fingers.

27 March 73 Politburo meeting

• He is supported by Giap, who had NOT backed the Tet 68 or Easter 72 offensives. But now that the U.S. has left, Giap believes that, despite losses from Easter Offensive, his army is stronger than the South Vietnamese.

• Decision at this Politburo meeting to form a top-secret “Central Cell” within the High Command to develop a plan to liberate South Vietnam within a two-year period, 1975-1976.

• At same time, Le Duc Anh, the commander in the lower Delta continues war, blatantly disregarding B-2 Front orders to pull back. Giap soon learns of this, but instead of punishing Anh for failing to obey, Giap uses this to his advantage.

• By showing that by fighting back they did not lose territory but gained it, Giap hopes to convince his own military and Politburo to return to war.

24 May 73 Politburo meeting is key…

• Politburo holds new meeting on 24 May. Giap, after summoning his southern commanders to Hanoi, has them inform Politburo that if they follow present course of not responding to ARVN “nibbling” operations, all their previous gains will be lost.

• While Truong Chinh and Pham Van Dong ask hard questions, the Politburo decides to return to war.

• It reaches the following conclusion: “Actual events are making it increasingly clear that the situation is developing along the second line, because the U.S. has not stopped helping the enemy to conduct territorial encroachment and pacification and to insanely attack the forces of the revolution.”

Thus, PPA dead within four months of signature, but only the Politburo knew it.

• Giap wrote: “Nobody thought any longer in terms of respites… The combat, we realized, would drag on. Because the enemy carried on with its…peace-sabotaging attempts, we had no choice but to defend our revolutionary gains, which we had earned at a great cost of blood.” It was, he felt, “not possible to stop in mid-journey,” and thus, “the situation in South Vietnam would pass through a period of instability, and South Vietnam would have both peace and war.”

• Decision made based upon false data – ARVN forces in Delta had not been on the offensive, as Le Duc Anh had claimed, but exact opposite. PAVN had attacked the river port of Hong Ngu in upper Delta and numerous other places across country.

Thus, PPA dead within four months of signature, but only the Politburo knew it.

• Yet, while Hanoi continued to preach to the world that it was the U.S. and Saigon violating the accords, Le Duan said this about the PPA: “Our intention was to maintain the status quo of our strength and position in the South and later proceed to attack the enemy.”

• The truth of that can be seen in this action: while Le Duc Tho and Kissinger are in Paris negotiating a new ceasefire agreement, at the same time (24 May) the Politburo had made the decision to return to war.

Second Myth: THE RVNAF were weak and ineffective, and that’s why the country fell so quickly

• From Jan 73 until March 75, ARVN units held their own, and generally defeated the PAVN, without U.S. air support. Most losses occurred in small outposts, or when PAVN massed large forces against isolated areas such as Phuoc Long.

• In Jan 1973, PAVN ceasefire attacks uniformly driven back with heavy losses. ARVN recaptured port of Sa Huynh, but lost battle at Cua Viet.

• PAVN attacks in 1974 extremely heavy, but not a country-wide offensive. Attacks in I and III Corps are sequential, not consecutive, enabling ARVN to shift forces to meet problems.

• Heavy fighting in III Corps – Duc Hue siege, smashed by 3rd Armor Brigade in a classic armor strike into PAVN rear. Iron Triangle battle in summer, heavy casualties on both sides. In I Corps, battles in the winter in the hill country south of Hue also result in heavy losses. ARVN takes 15,000 casualties in I Corps in 1974 alone.

Second Myth: THE RVNAF were weak and ineffective, and that’s why the country fell so quickly

• But the shift of the PAVN 304th Division from Quang Tri to Quang Nam results in major battle at Thuong Duc, with profound implications. ARVN airborne units unable to recapture town, but prevent PAVN from further advances. Hanoi interprets this to mean that their forces are now equal to ARVN’s best troops, and hence a major offensive should net them large gains.

• Thuong Duc convinced Hanoi they could defeat ARVN; Phuoc Long convinced them that U.S. would not re-intervene. Both are critical, not just Phuoc Long.

• Thus, plans are now drawn up to attack simultaneously and country-wide. More importantly, the undetected movement of regiments from Quang Tri to a more southern, more weakly defended location, would provide PAVN planners a sound idea that would eventually lead to the battle at Ban Me Thuot in Mar 75.

RVNAF Leaders Are Not Cowards

• ARVN certainly not a strong army, but it was also not the weak and cowardly one portrayed in the media.

• Most commanders did not run; for example, during the 1975 offensive, out of 17 Ranger Groups, and 51 Ranger Battalions (68 senior officers), not one commander deserted his troops. Counting airborne and marines, only two battalion and one brigade commander escaped (out of 32 senior officers). Three officers out of 100. Most stayed with their troops and faced years in prison. Most of those who escaped at the end were no longer troop commander’s. Only VNAF and VNN units left before official surrender, and that was with U.S. help.

• Same problem Allied forces had always faced; PAVN ability to mass. Previously, American intelligence, firepower and mobility had mitigated this advantage, but ARVN no longer had either. RVNAF, given the country’s geographic disadvantages, could not stop a country-wide offensive without U.S. airpower.

When PAVN had to attack dug-in regular ARVN forces, they invariably incurred heavy losses.

Some lesser known examples from 1975:

• At Phuong Duc airfield outside of Ban Me Thuot, 1st Battalion, 53rd Regiment held out for a week against multi-regimental assault supported by armor and artillery. Only 30 men out of 350 escaped back to friendly lines.

• At Chon Thanh in III Corps, 31st Ranger Group defended for several days against 9th Division assault supported by armor and artillery. 9th Division so badly battered it was unable to attack again for another month.

• In hill country south of Hue, elements of ARVN 1st Division held various hill positions against repeated regimental assaults by 324th Division. The 324th so badly hurt it remained behind to garrison I Corps while remainder of PAVN headed toward Saigon.

• In early April, attack by PAVN against Can Tho in IV Corps beaten back by 21st Division (considered ARVN’s worst), causing such heavy losses that MR-9 command had to postpone any further attacks.

Third Myth: US aid cuts did not hurt the RVNAF, while Russia and China poured in aid

• Aid cuts forced DAO and RVNAF to only purchase ammo, fuel, and other essentials.

• Artillery ammo reduced to 105mm HE only. JGS then decreased firing rates to four rounds of 105 per day per gun, two rounds of 155 per day per gun. Two grenades per man per week. 80 rounds of M-16 per man per week.

• Fuel so tight that RVNAF would have been out of gas by July.

• Radio batteries, bandages, tires, medicine, rifle barrels, helmets, boots, ponchos, and other gear, soon became in very short supply. Not because of corruption, but due to heavy fighting and lack of funds.

• VNAF sortie rates cut by 1/2. VNN riverine patrols reduced by 1/3. In mid-March 75, during height of offensive, IV Corps had reached its limit on air sorties for the month. PAVN promptly stepped up attacks. Commander had to allocate sorties from April.

Third Myth: US aid cuts did not hurt the RVNAF, while Russia and China poured in aid

• Economic aid cutbacks just as bad. A survey of enlisted soldiers in the ARVN 3rd Division conducted in 1973 discovered that 90% of the enlisted families had not eaten meat for over a month, and 50% had eaten fish or shrimp just a few times.

• Russia and China did not supply heavy arms after the PPA. Did continue to supply large amounts of economic aid, which enabled NVN to pursue the war. Also supplied small arms, etc.

• Despite claims by US/GVN intel, PAVN forces did not have the number of tanks and artillery they believed. Far less in fact. (Same true for 1972). For example, US claimed PAVN had 600 tanks in SVN. Only had 502 in entire inventory.

• PAVN artillery rounds far less in 1975 than in 1972, and much less than ARVN. For example, ARVN fired 200,000 round in first two weeks in I Corps. PAVN had 40,000 rounds in all of I Corps at start of attacks.

Fourth Myth: ARVN put up little fight, and the PAVN easily rolled into Saigon

• Most U.S. writers have written, mainly from lack of direct knowledge, that PAVN forces easily conquered Saigon.

• In fact, serious battles took place on the outskirts of Saigon. At Ho Nai on Route 1, PAVN 4th Corps unable to advance until Marines retreated.

• At Armor School, 304th Division took 400 dead, only captured it after ARVN attempted to retreat behind Dong Nai River. From the 304th commander, “The fighting was incredibly ferocious. Our troops and the enemy’s troops fought one another for every inch of ground. When we captured a few hundred meters, the enemy would counterattack and push us back.”

Fourth Myth: ARVN put up little fight, and the PAVN easily rolled into Saigon

• At Tan Son Nhut, the 81st Airborne Rangers held off 10th Division armor column for 12 hours, until ordered to surrender. Destroyed six tanks in a matter of minutes.

• Because all the fighting took place outside of Saigon, people commented that the PAVN had taken Saigon “without breaking a light bulb.”

• Major General Hoang Dan, deputy commander of the PAVN 2nd Corps, when asked about this insight, remarked: “Back then, I told people, ‘If anyone says that we attacked and captured Saigon without breaking a single light bulb, I will give him a shovel and have him dig the graves of our dead.’ During our attack on Saigon, our 2nd Corps lost more than 400 men, so I wonder how people can write such things.”

A Few Final Notes

• The 10th Division’s “Deep Penetration” attack against TSN consisted of the largest armor attack in the war, over 65 vehicles. Broken into two columns, supported by a regiment of infantry for each, including engineers, sappers, and a battalion each of anti-aircraft and artillery. One column reached a bridge several miles from TSN on mid-afternoon on 29 April. Bridge collapsed under a tank, forcing column to turn around and join other column.

• If this unit had made it across bridge, a PAVN unit would have attacked TSN as the American withdrawal was still underway.

• On the afternoon of 28 April, a SAM-2 battery finally got operational. When it flipped on its radar, it spotted the planes circling Saigon. The battery requested permission to fire. The senior commander on the ground denied the request. The “History of the Air Defense Service” volume states, “The command levels and especially the most senior commander present in the command trailer at that time, displayed an attitude of hesitancy, a lack of resolve, and a fear of assuming responsibility, and so a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity was lost.”

A Few Final Notes

• One rarely see’s that kind of writing in PAVN books! More importantly, imagine the U.S. reaction if they had fired a SAM into the US airlift, or if the tank column had broken into TSN during the US withdrawal. Imagine how different history would look.

• The number of PAVN troops in South Vietnam at the start of the Ho Chi Minh Campaign was 587,000. That number is higher than the largest number of U.S. forces ever in Vietnam, 534,000. 270,000 men participated in the attack on Saigon alone.

• From 5-30 April, PAVN forces lost over 3500 dead and 8000 wounded in the fighting in III Corps.