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Buddhist Studies 220. Friday 3-6pm. Professor Evan Thompson: evantimothythompson@gmail.com Buddhist Philosophy, Phenomenology, and Cognitive Science: Assessing the Dialogue. This seminar will be devoted to recent work in cross-cultural philosophy that links Buddhist philosophy with cognitive science, philosophy of mind, and phenomenology. Our guiding question will be whether Buddhist philosophical psychology can be understood as a kind of phenomenology. The conviction that it can be so understood is often used as a way to argue for the relevance of Buddhist accounts of the mind, as well as Buddhist meditative practices, to cognitive science, especially to recent neuroscience attempts to explain consciousness. Yet this approach to the Buddhism-cognitive science dialogue has provoked criticism. Buddhist scholars have argued that Buddhist accounts of the mind are theoretical constructs, not phenomenological descriptions, and they have emphasized that these accounts are embedded in metaphysical and epistemological frameworks that are incompatible with “neurophysicalism,” the view that consciousness is a state of the brain. At the same time, philosophers and cognitive scientists have voiced scepticism about the validity of phenomenology for a scientific understanding of the mind. Examining these criticisms in light of our guiding question will require us to think about what exactly phenomenology is and what it could be in a modern cross-cultural context. At stake is nothing less than the fundamental issue of what it means for the human mind to examine itself and the place that Buddhist philosophy can have in this endeavor for us today. Our readings will include chapters from my forthcoming book, Waking, Dreaming, Being: New Light on the Self and Consciousness from Neuroscience, Meditation, and Philosophy, chapters from Jay Garfield’s forthcoming book, Engaging Buddhism: Why Buddhism Matters to Philosophy, as well as a wide variety sources from Buddhist studies, Buddhist philosophy, cognitive science, philosophy of mind, and phenomenology. Class Format: Given the wide range of readings and the diverse backgrounds of the seminar participants, I will take the first hour or so to introduce and critically present the readings; the rest of our time will be devoted to discussion. Texts: The book manuscripts by Jay Garfield and Evan Thompson will be made available electronically. Other primary readings are available electronically, either through the University library or as indicated on the class schedule below. For the background and supplementary materials, which are not required reading, I have given links to electronic versions, where available.

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Requirements

• Midterm paper (can be a detailed proposal for the final paper): 3000-4000 words.

• Final paper: 7000-8000 words.

Schedule Readings in bold typeface are the required seminar readings and should be completed before each class meeting. Do these readings in the order listed. The other readings are background and supplementary materials; they are not required. I will draw from them in my presentations and you can make use of them in writing your papers. (Note: I do not expect you to have read the required readings prior to the first class meeting on Jan. 24.)

I. Introduction. Jan 24. The Buddhism-Cognitive Science Dialogue: Where Are We Now and Where Might We Go? Thupten Jinpa, “Buddhism and Science: How Far Can the Dialogue

Proceed?” Zygon 45 (2010): 871-882. Donald S. Lopez, Jr., “The Future of the Buddhist Past: A Response to the

Readers,” Zygon 45 (2010): 883-896. Jay Garfield, “Ask Not What Buddhism Can Do for Cognitive Science; Ask

What Cognitive Science Can Do for Buddhism,” Bulletin of Tibetology 47 (2012): 15-30. http://www.smith.edu/philosophy/docs/garfield_ask_not.pdf

Evan Thompson, Waking, Dreaming, Being, Prologue. Dan Arnold, “Reaching Bedrock: Buddhism and Cognitive Science,” Berfois.com

(April 2012). http://www.berfrois.com/2012/04/dan-arnold-buddhism-cognitive-science/

Asaf Federman, “What Buddhism Taught Cognitive Science about Self, Mind, and Brain,” Enrahonar. Quaderns de Filosofia 47 (2011): 39-62. http://ddd.uab.cat/pub/enrahonar/0211402Xn47/0211402Xn47p39.pdf

Peter Harrison, “A Scientific Buddhism?” Zygon 45 (2010): 861-869. Antoine Lutz, John D. Dunne, and Richard J. Davidson, “Meditation and the

Neuroscience of Consciousness: An Introduction,” in Philip David Zelazo, Morris Moscovitch, and Evan Thompson, eds., The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness (New York and Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007). http://www.sheermind.com/uploads/9/3/7/0/9370422/meditation_and_the_neuroscience_of_consciousness.pdf

Antoine Lutz, Heleen A. Slagter, John D. Dunne, and Richard J. Davidson, “Attention Regulation and Monitoring in Meditation,” Trends in Cognitive

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Sciences 12 (2008): 163-169. http://brainimaging.waisman.wisc.edu/~lutz/Lutz_attention_regulation_monitoring_meditation_tics_2008.pdf

Jan 31. No Class I have to be away at the annual “Zen Brain” conference at the Upaya Institute and Zen Center: http://www.upaya.org/programs/event.php?id=1099

II. How Contemporary Buddhist Philosophy of Mind Leads to an Encounter with Phenomenology

Feb 7. Buddhist Philosophy Basics. Jay Garfield, Engaging Buddhism, chapters 1-3. Mark Siderits, Buddhism as Philosophy, chapters 1-2. Feb 14. The Self. Jay Garfield, Engaging Buddhism, chapter 4. Evan Thompson, Waking, Dreaming, Being, Introduction and chapter 10. Amber Carpenter, “Persons Keeping Their Karma Together: The Reasons for the

Pudgalavāda in Early Buddhism,” unpublished. Email me if you want a copy. Jonardon Ganeri, “Buddhist Individuals and Inward Empathy,” World View and

Theory in Indian Philosophy. Warsaw Indological Studies 5 (2012): 247-260. https://www.academia.edu/2146304/Buddhist_Individuals_and_Inward_Empathy_2012_

Jonardon Ganeri, “Emergentisms, Ancient and Modern,” Mind 120 (2011): 671-703.

Mark Siderits, Buddhism as Philosophy, chapters 3 and 6. Feb 21. Varieties of Consciousness. Jay Garfield, Engaging Buddhism, chapter 5. Evan Thompson, Waking, Dreaming, Being, Introduction, chapters 1-2. Jake H. Davis and Evan Thompson, “From the Five Aggregates to Phenomenal

Consciousness: Towards a Cross-Cultural Cognitive Science,” in Steven Emmaneul, ed., A Companion to Buddhist Philosophy (John Wiley & Sons, 2014). http://evanthompsondotme.files.wordpress.com/2012/11/emmanuel_8772_c38_main.pdf

Jonardon Ganeri, The Self: Naturalism, Consciousness, and the First-Person Stance, chapter 7.

Feb 28. Buddhist Dualism, Neurophysicalism, and the Hard Problem of Consciousness. Dan Arnold, “Dharmakīrti’s Dualism: Critical Reflections on a Buddhist

Proof of Rebirth,” Philosophy Compass 3 (2008): 1079-1096.

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https://www.academia.edu/284734/Dharmakirtis_Dualism_Critical_Reflections_on_a_Buddhist_Proof_of_Rebirth

Evan Thompson, Waking, Dreaming, Being, chapters 3 and 9. Dan Arnold, Buddhas, Brains, and Believing: The Problem of Intentionality in

Classical Buddhist and Cognitive-Scientific Philosophy of Mind, chapter 1. Michel Bitbol, “Is Consciousness Primary?” NeuroQuantology 6 (2008): 53-72.

http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4007/1/ConsciousnessPrimaryArt2.pdf The Dalai Lama, The Universe in a Single Atom, chapter 6. Owen Flanagan, The Bodhisattva’s Brain, chapter 3. Piet Hut and Roger Shepard, “Turning the Hard Problem Upside Down and

Sideways,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1996): 313-329. http://www.ids.ias.edu/~piet/publ/turning/tuc2.ps

Galen Strawson, “Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (2006): 3-31.

March 7. Phenomenology. Jay Garfield, Engaging Buddhism, chapter 6, pp. 201-212. Francisco J. Varela, “Neurophenomenology: A Methodological Remedy for

the Hard Problem,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1996): 330-349. https://unstable.nl/andreas/ai/langcog/part3/varela_npmrhp.pdf

Natalie Depraz, Francisco J. Varela, and Pierre Vermersch, “The Gesture of Awareness: An Account of Its Structural Dynamics,” in Max Velmans, ed., Investigating Phenomenal Consciousness: New Methodologies and Maps (Amsterdam and New York: John Benjamins Publishing, 2000). http://www.autopoiesis.com/documents/Depraz%20Varela%202000.pdf

The Dalai Lama, The Universe in a Single Atom, chapters 7-8. Piet Hut, “The Role of Husserl’s Epoché for Science: A View from a Physicist,”

paper presented at the 31st Husserl Circle Conference, 2001. http://www.ids.ias.edu/~piet/publ/other/husserlcircle.html

III. Can Phenomenology Be Buddhist?

Can Buddhist Philosophy Be Phenomenology? The Problematic Status of Phenomenology

in Buddhist Philosophy of Mind March 14. Husserl and Indian Thought. Edmund Husserl, “Pure Phenomenology, Its Method and Its Field of

Investigation.” http://www.lightforcenetwork.com/sites/default/files/Husserl%20-%20Pure%20Phenomenology,%20Its%20Method%20and%20Its%20Field%20of%20Investigation.pdf

Edmund Husserl, “Philosophy and the Crisis of European Man.” http://www.users.cloud9.net/~bradmcc/husserl_philcris.html

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Karl Schuhmann, “Husserl and Indian Thought,” in D.P. Chattopadhyaya, Lester Embree, and Jitendranath Mohanty, eds., Phenomenology and Indian Philosophy (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1992).

Steven Crowell, “Is There a Phenomenological Research Program?”, Synthese 131 (2002): 419-444.

Steven Crowell, “Jan Patočka and the Phenomenological Research Program.” http://www.o-p-o.net/essays/CrowellArticle.pdf

Fred J. Hanna, “Husserl on the Teachings of the Buddha,” The Humanistic Psychologist 23 (1995): 365-372.

Jonardon Ganeri, “Well-Ordered Science and Indian Epistemic Cultures: Toward a Polycentered History of Science,” Isis 104 (2013): 348-359. https://www.academia.edu/4105450/Well-Ordered_Science_and_Indian_Epistemic_Cultures_Towards_a_Polycentred_History_of_Science_2013_

Edmund Husserl, “Sokrates-Buddha: An Unpublished Manuscript from the Archives,” Husserl Studies 26 (2010): 1-17.

Richard King, Indian Philosophy: An Introduction to Hindu and Buddhist Thought, chapters 1 and 2.

Lau Kwok-Ying, “Husserl, Buddhism and the Problematic of the Crisis of European Sciences.” http://www.cuhk.edu.hk/rih/phs/events/200405_PEACE/papers/LAUKwokYing.PDF

J.N. Mohanty, “Phenomenology and Indian Philosophy: The Concept of Rationality,” in D.P. Chattopadhyaya, Lester Embree, and Jitendranath Mohanty, eds., Phenomenology and Indian Philosophy (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1992). http://www.sunypress.edu/pdf/52314.pdf

March 21. Is Yogācāra Philosophy a Kind of Phenomenology? Jay Garfield, “Vasubandhu’s Treatise on the Three Natures: A Translation

and Commentary,” in Jay Garfield, Empty Words: Buddhist Philosophy and Cross-Cultural Interpretation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

Jay Garfield, Engaging Buddhism, chapter 6, pp. 212-241. March 28: Spring break April 4. Is Yogācāra Philosophy a Kind of Phenomenology? Robert Sharf, “Is Yogācāra Phenomenology? Some Evidence from the

Chéng wéishì lùn,” unpublished. Iso Kern, “The Structure of Consciousness According to Xuanzang,”

Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 19 (1988). Iso Kern, “Object, Objective Phenomenon, and Objectivating Act

According to the ‘Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi’ of Xuanzang (600-644),” in D.P. Chattopadhyaya, Lester Embree, and Jitendranath Mohanty, eds., Phenomenology and Indian Philosophy (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1992).

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Dan Lusthaus, Buddhist Phenomenology: A Philosophical Investigation of Yogācāra Buddhism and the Ch’eng Wei-shih lun (London: RoutledgeCurzon Press, 2002. A useful synopsis of this book is William Waldron’s review at http://www.middlebury.edu/media/view/440170/original/review-lusthaus_buddhist_phenomenology_h-buddhism.pdf

April 11. Is the Svasaṃvitti Doctrine Necessarily Internalist? Dan Arnold, Brains, Buddhas, and Believing: The Problem of Intentionality

in Classical Buddhist and Cognitive Scientific-Philosophy of Mind, chapter 5.

Christian Coseru, “Taking the Intentionality of Perception Seriously: Why Phenomenology is Inescapable,” Philosophy East and West, in press. http://www3.nccu.edu.tw/~ckeng/doc/Coseru1_svasamvitti_paper_PEW.pdf

Dan Arnold, “Is Svasaṃvitti Transcendental? A Tentative Reconstruction Following Śāntarakṣita,” Asian Philosophy 15 (2005): 77-111.

Dan Arnold, “Self-Awareness (svasaṃvitti) and Related Doctrines of Buddhists Following Dignāga: Philosophical Characterizations of Some of the Main Issues,” Journal of Indian Philosophy 38 (2010): 323-378.

Georges Dreyfus, “Is Perception Intentional? A Preliminary Exploration of Intentionality in Dharmakīrti,” in B. Kelner, H. Krasser, H. Larsic, M.T. Much, and H. Tauscher (eds.) Pramāṇakirtiḥ: Papers Dedicated to Ernst Steinkellner On the Occasion of His 70th Birthday, Wien: Arbeitskries für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, Universität Wien, 95-113.

Jonardon Ganeri, “Self-Intimation, Memory and Personal Identity.” Journal of Indian Philosophy 27: 469–83.

Jay Garfield, “The Conventional Status of Reflexive Awareness: What’s At Stake in a Tibetan Debate?” Philosophy East and West 56 (2006): 201-228.

Birgit Kellner, “Self-Awareness (svasaṃvedana) in Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya and -vṛtti: A Close Reading,” Journal of Indian Philosophy 38 (2010): 203-231.

Brigit Kellner, “Self-awareness (svasaṃvedana) and Infinite Regresses: a Comparison of Arguments by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti,” Journal of Indian Philosophy 39 (2011): 411-426.

Evan Thompson, “Self-No-Self: Memory and Reflexive Awareness,” in Mark Siderits, Evan Thompson, and Dan Zahavi, eds., Self, No Self? Perspectives from Analytical, Phenomenological, and Indian Traditions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). http://evanthompsondotme.files.wordpress.com/2012/11/self-no-self.pdf

IV. Mindfulness: A Meeting Ground for Cognitive Science,

Phenomenology, and Buddhist Philosophy of Mind? April 18. Can There Be a Cognitive Science of Mindfulness?

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Antoine Lutz, Amishi P. Jha, John D. Dunne, and Clifford D. Saron, “Investigating the Phenomenal and Neurocognitive Matrix of Mindfulness-Related Practices,” American Journal of Psychology, in press.

Thomas Metzinger, “The Myth of Cognitive Agency: Subpersonal Thinking as a Cyclically Recurring Loss of Mental Autonomy,” Frontiers in Psychology 4:931. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00931 http://www.frontiersin.org/Journal/10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00931/abstract

Jake H. Davis and Evan Thompson, “Developing Attention and Decreasing Affective Bias: Toward a Cross-Cultural Cognitive Science of Mindfulness,” in K.W. Brown, J.D. Creswell, and R.M. Ryan, eds., Handbook of Mindfulness (New York: Guilford Press), in press. http://evanthompsondotme.files.wordpress.com/2012/11/davis-thompson-chap-08-final1.pdf

Georges Dreyfus, “Is Mindfulness Present-Centered and Non-Judgmental? A Discussion of the Cognitive Dimensions of Mindfulness,” Contemporary Buddhism 12 (2011): 41-54.

John Dunne, “Toward an Understanding of Non-Dual Mindfulness,” Contemporary Buddhism 12 (2011): 71-88.

Paul Grossman and Nicholas T. Van Dam, “Mindfulness, By Any Other Name… Trials and Tribulations of Sati in Western Psychology and Science,” Contemporary Buddhism 12 (2011): 219-239.

Anne Harrington and John Dunne, “Mindfulness Meditation: Frames and Choices,” American Psychologist, in press. http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/10718406/46521719.pdf?sequence=1

Robert Sharf, “Mindfulness and Mindlessness in Early Chan,” unpublished. April 25. No class The “Buddhism, Mind, and Cognitive Science” Conference at UC Berkeley begins Friday, April 25, with afternoon lectures by me and Clifford Saron. http://buddhiststudies.berkeley.edu/events/ May 2. Phenomenology, Cognitive Science, Meditation, and the Rhetoric of Experience. Georges Dreyfus, “But Aren’t We Conscious? A Phenomenological

Approach to Buddhist Philosophy of Mind,” unpublished draft. Georges Dreyfus, “Taking Meditation Seriously But Not Too Much,”

unpublished draft. Robert Sharf, “Buddhist Modernism and the Rhetoric of Meditative Experience,”

Numen 42 (1995): 228-283. http://buddhiststudies.berkeley.edu/people/faculty/sharf/documents/Sharf1995,%20Buddhist%20Modernism.pdf

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Robert Sharf, “The Rhetoric of Experience and the Study of Religion,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (2000): 267-287. http://buddhiststudies.berkeley.edu/people/faculty/sharf/documents/Sharf1998,%20Religious%20Experience.pdf

Mark Siderits, “Buddhas as Zombies: A Buddhist Reduction of Subjectivity,” in Mark Siderits, Evan Thompson, and Dan Zahavi, eds., Self, No Self? Perspectives from Analytical, Phenomenological, and Indian Traditions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

May 9 Classes end May 2, but I am happy to schedule an extra class to make up for the missed class on Jan 31.