bantay elekyson 2013 pre-election report
DESCRIPTION
Bantay Eleksyon 2013 is a domestic election observation mission of the Consortium on Electoral Reforms (CER) that aims to monitor the entire process of the 2013 elections. This Report covers the preparations for the May 13, 2013 national and local elections, including the elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), and the conduct of campaign for national candidates and the campaign for local candidates.This report seeks to assess the state of preparedness for the holding of the 2013 national and local elections and the conduct of the national and local campaigns. In doing so, it seeks to determine if the conduct of the elections thus far—at the eve of the May 13 elections—achieves the international standards for free and fair elections.TRANSCRIPT
Bantay Eleksyon 2013
Report on the Preparationsand Conduct of Campaigns in the 2013 Elections
May 10, 2013
Introduction
This is the first report of Bantay Eleksyon 2013, a domestic election observation
mission of the Consortium on Electoral Reforms (CER) that aims to monitor the entire
process of the 2013 elections. This Report covers the preparations for the May 13,
2013 national and local elections, including the elections in the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), and the conduct of campaign for national candidates
and the campaign for local candidates.
This report seeks to assess the state of preparedness for the holding of the 2013
national and local elections and the conduct of the national and local campaigns. In
doing so, it seeks to determine if the conduct of the elections thus far—at the eve of
the May 13 elections—achieves the international standards for free and fair elections.
Included are data from the field, media reports, and official documents related to the
2013 elections. The report contains the following areas:
A. AES Implementation and Other Preparations
B. Conduct of National and Local Election Campaign
C. Election Violence
A. AES Implementation and Other Preparations
The preparations for the holding of the midterm national and local elections on the
Second Monday of May 2013 are largely over. The election paraphernalia, including
the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) vote-counting machines, are all in place.
1
The reliability of the PCOS machines themselves have been proven in the 2010
elections, with only 450 machines failing, out of 80,000 originally assigned to
clustered precincts. This translates into a 0.6% failure rate and is well below the
2.75% expected failure rate set by the Comelec.
The Final Testing and Sealing of the PCOS machines in the 2013 elections was
successfully conducted with a very low machine failure rate of less than one percent.
This may indicate the same level of reliability as the 2010 performance.
The Project of Precincts is already finished, with 77,829 clustered precincts
organized, and with corresponding Board of Inspectors (BEIs). The clustered
precincts have a varying number of voters not exceeding 700 voters. The printing of
ballots was also completed ahead of schedule. 52,333,801 ballots were already
printed by the National Printing Office by April 3, 2013, way ahead of its April 25,
2013 deadline.
However, there are still issues that provide the anxiety over the performance of the
automated election system and the credibility of AES election results:
Voters list bloating. The voters’ list remains a constant source of public apprehension,
for valid reasons. Only the ARMM voters’ list has been purged of around 500,000
spurious and underaged voters, consequently bringing down the total for the region
from 1.7 million voters to only 1.2 million voters. The rest of the country still has the
old registry dating back to the 1997 general registration.
The ARMM, due to the general registration has 100% biometrics coverage. The rest
of the country, however, only reached 84%. This affected the reliability of biometrics
in cleansing the national voter list. It also prevented the possible use of biometrics in
identifying voters during election day. The enactment of R.A. 10367 or Mandatory
Biometrics Voter Registration Law may provide the impetus in completing the
biometrics coverage. However, this is not implemented in the 2013 elections.
Lack of source code review. The source code of the AES system software, including
the one for the PCOS operations was only made available several days before the
2
elections. This is already too late to assure—for the political parties and other
stakeholders—the accuracy of the count and the security of the system.
The review was unduly delayed by the ongoing legal battle between the Dominion
Voting Systems, the owner of the software, and Smartmatic, the licensee. Although
the software was sold along with the hardware when Comelec bought the 2010 leased
machines, Dominion remained in control of the source code.
To be sure, the source code review itself is not critical to the implementation of the
AES. The more critical element is the certification by a competent authority—in this
case the SysTest Lab, Inc. This was first issued in 2010, covering the AES then.
When enhancements were done to correct the errors and problems of the software in
time for the postponed ARMM elections in 2011, this required a new certification
which was issued only in time for the 2013 elections.
Conduct of the Random Manual Audit. The Random Manual Audit (RMA) was
improved to enable the immediate manual counting of ballots of one randomly-
selected precinct in each of the 232 congressional districts. This is an improvement
over the arrangement in the 2010 which was criticized for the two-month delay in
execution. However, there is concern over the early selection of the precinct for RMA
audit, which may lead to possible manipulation.
B. Conduct of National and Local Election Campaign
The national campaign involved the campaign for senatorial and party-list posts and
started 90 days before election day. The local campaign involved the campaign for
congressional, provincial, and municipal posts and started 45 days before election
day.
In 2013, the elections for ARMM posts of governor, vice-governor, and members of
the Regional Legislative Assembly were synchronized for the first time. Its campaign
period also started 45 days before election day.
3
The Commission on Elections initiated several measures that strictly enforced the
laws governing the conduct of campaigns. It is widely perceived to have the political
will to do so. A number of resolutions were issued by COMELEC to ensure free and
fair elections.
However, these were not all implemented due to the various unfavorable decisions
issued by the Supreme Court. Many of these Supreme Court decisions are in the form
of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or an order to return to Status Quo Ante. As
such, these do not rule on the constitutionality or illegality of the Comelec actions and
can be interpreted as encroaching on the constitutional authority of COMELEC to
administer elections. Among these are following instances:
(1) Party-list groups. COMELEC tried its best to regulate the number or organizations
wanting to contest in the party-list system by implementing the criteria of having only
marginalized sectors to join the race. However, the Supreme Court overruled this
decision and ordered that a group does not have to represent any marginalized and
underrepresented sector to qualify as a party-list organization.
(2) Campaign Finance. COMELEC also attempted to strictly enforce campaign
finance rules by issuing Resolution 9476, consistent with the Fair Elections Act of
2001. It carried out a high-level campaign against use of unlawful election
propaganda. It succeeded in its anti-Epal campaign, the crackdown on illegal posters,
and the creation of a campaign finance unit.
COMELEC also spelled out the airtime limit of political ads by allowing national
candidates a total of 120 minutes on ALL TV networks and 180 minutes on radio
stations, with local candidates allotted 60 minutes on TV and 90 minutes on radio.
This is in accord with the original intent and interpretation of the corresponding
provisions in the Fair Elections Act.
However, again, the Supreme Court ordered a status quo ante and ordered COMELEC
to revert to its 2010 rule in allowing national candidates to have 120 minutes airtime
in each TV station and 180 minutes in each radio station. This, in turn, effectively
negates any rule at all since COMELEC resolutions are only implementable for a
4
particular election. The Supreme Court decisions effectively scuttled efforts to level
the playing field among candidates as far as media expenditures are concerned.
(3) Liquor Ban. To prevent or minimize election violence, the COMELEC approved
the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) recommendation to extend
the liquor ban from the traditional 2 days to 5 days starting May 9. However, the
Supreme Court again issued a TRO on this resolution based on a petition contending
that the extension of the ban would cause damage to business.
(4) Money Ban. In anticipation that vote-buying will remain as the major form of
cheating in the election process throughout the country, COMELEC introduced an
initiative to curtail this illegal practice by imposing Money Ban. It is, however, a
disappointment that such initiative is meeting stiff resistance and may also be stricken
down. COMELEC was already forced to amend the relevant resolution.
The Comelec is to be commended for its efforts to institute reforms in the conduct of
campaigns in order to ensure fairness and create a level playing field. However, much
still needs to be done in order to achieve this, particularly in the field of cooperation
by the co-equal branches of government.
C. Election Violence
Election violence is still a matter of concern in the 2013 elections. However, the
number of incidents so far is tending to show a decrease of around 50% compared to
the levels of 2010 elections. For the election period in 2010 (from January 10, 2010
to June 30, 2010), there were 150 election-related violent incidents (ERVIs) that
CER-VotePeace recorded.
So far, the PNP recorded only 58 ERVIs in the period from start of campaign on
January 13, 2013 up to April 30, 2013. It recorded a total of 35 fatalities and 34
wounded. The most prevalent type of incident is shooting.
Election violence so far has remained localized to specific cities and towns, and has
not yet necessitated the placement of any area under Comelec control. There is a
5
growing number of incidents attributed to the rebel New People’s Army (NPA) while
those attributed to private armed groups are still in the majority.
The PNP has designated as areas of concern in relation to election violence the
following provinces: Abra in Cordillera Administrative Region; Pangasinan, Ilocos
Sur and La Union in Ilocos Region; Cagayan in Cagayan Valley; Pampanga and
Nueca Ecija in Central Luzon; Batangas and Cavite in Calabarzon; Masbate in Bicol
Region; Samar in Eastern Visayas; Misamis Occidental in Northern Mindanao; and
Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur and Basilan in the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao.
A decrease of Private Armed Groups (PAGs) was also noted by the Philippine
National Police, from 112 in 2010 to 48 in 2013. These developments can be
attributed to the effective intervention of the security sector such as Task Force Safe;
the active involvement of Civil Society Organizations, and the political will of the
Aquino government to put an end to political and electoral violence.
Various initiatives, government and civil society, were launched to forge peace
covenants among candidates and multisectoral stakeholders. They have greatly helped
in forming public opinion against election violence and warlordism.
The Payapang Bayan, Payapang Halalan (PAYAPA) campaign led by the CER and
local civil society organizations, particularly targeted the most notorious provinces in
the list of areas of concern: Masbate and ARMM, particularly Maguindanao, Lanao
del Sur, and Basilan. In these provinces, both peace covenants and multisectoral
stakeholders agreements were forge for the peaceful conduct of elections. So far, the
record showed the unprecedented lowering of the level of electoral violence in these
provinces.
CER-PAYAPA worked with the Commission on Elections, the PNP Task Force SAFE,
and other relevant government agencies on the issue of electoral violence.
6
Consortium on Electoral Reforms (CER) is a coalition of 47 national organizations
and of individuals committed to strengthening Philippine democracy through electoral
reforms.
Bantay Eleksyon 2013, the CER domestic election monitoring mission, monitoring
the entire election process. It aims to monitor the various components of the electoral
process and it adheres to the principles of transparency and impartiality.
Payapang Bayan, Payapang Halalan (PAYAPA), the project addressing peace in the
major areas of election violence of Masbate, and ARMM, particularly the provinces
of Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur and Basilan.
7