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QUARTERLY

BANKING DIsputes

DLA Piper’s Banking & Finance Litigation team welcomes you to our quarterly round-up, designed to keep you informed of the latest news and legal developments, and to let you know about future developments that may affect your practice.

oN the horIzoN reCeNt DeVeLopMeNts & CAses

spotLIGht oN… CoNtACts

Autumn 2013

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■ LIBOR/swaps mis-selling cases to come before Court of Appeal

The appeals in the cases of Graiseley Properties Ltd and others v Barclays Bank plc [2013] EWHC 67 (Comm) and Deutsche Bank AG v Unitech Global Limited [2013] EWHC 471 (Comm) will start being heard by the Court of Appeal on 14 October 2013.

The appeals focus on the question of whether the parties should be allowed to amend their statements of case to include arguments of misrepresentation by the banks in relation to their conduct in fixing the LIBOR rate. In Graiseley, the High Court allowed the claimant to amend its case to include such claims, whilst in Unitech the High Court refused a similar request.

The decision could open the path to similar LIBOR fixing claims by the thousands of businesses currently alleging that they were mis-sold interest rate swaps by the major banks.

■ Can claimants have a second bite at the cherry after accepting a favourable Financial Ombudsman (“FOS”) determination?

Towards the end of October the Court of Appeal will hear an appeal in (1) Clark (2) Clark v In Focus Asset Management & Tax Solutions (“Clark”). The appeal will determine whether a claimant, who has accepted a favourable FOS determination, can then bring a civil claim for damages against a financial services provider for their full losses over and above those received as a result of the FOS determination. At present there are conflicting High Court decisions on this point.

Prior to the first instance decision in Clark the position seemed to be that once a claimant accepted a FOS determination that was the end of the matter. The claimant could not then issue court proceedings to recover additional sums. Clark turned this on its head, opening up the possibility of claimants using monies recovered under the FOS determination to fund additional court proceedings.

Although the courts approach claims differently to FOS and might reach quite different conclusions, if the Clark decision is upheld it will undoubtedly expose financial institutions to additional cost and expense in defending such claims. Rather than a cost effective alternative to court proceedings the FOS procedure may become an unwelcome prelude to them.

■ Cyber Security

Cyber-attacks are now perceived to be the greatest threat to banks, greater even than the Eurozone crisis. What is being done to address the threat?

On the domestic front HM Treasury has been working closely with the Bank of England and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) to ensure that cyber risks are better understood, and to promote cyber security in the financial services sector. The FCA has led a benchmark programme, to identify the cyber and technology practices of 30 major financial institutions. It intends to publish an updated version of its business continuity

oN the horIzoN

In this section we summarise cases, legislation and other developments in prospect in coming months:

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management practice, alongside a discussion paper, so that all firms in the sector can learn from the exercise. In November high street banks will take part in a one-day simulated exercise to rehearse and enhance response arrangements to cyber threats.

At a European level there is a proposal for an EU Cyber Security Directive (“Proposed Directive”) with the aim of ensuring a high common level of network and information security across Europe. The Proposed Directive obliges all European Member States to:

■ produce national cyber security strategies and national co-operation plans;

■ establish competent authorities for network and information security;

■ set up Computer Emergency Response Teams;

■ share information between Member States.

The Proposed Directive envisages the creation of a pan-EU co-operation plan and co-ordinated early warnings for cyber incidents. The aim is to develop a culture of risk management and to encourage information sharing between public and private sectors.

Under the Proposed Directive banks will be required to assess the risks they face and adopt appropriate and proportionate measures to ensure network and

information security. Banks will be required to report to the “national competent authority” any incidents which seriously compromise their networks and information systems and which significantly affect the continuity of critical services. The competent authorities will be given powers to introduce sanctions, initiate audits and make public details of breach reports.

Earlier this summer, the Department for Business Innovation and Skills called for evidence on the impact of the proposed directive. Concerns were expressed about the safety of data when submitting requests, the potential for conflict with data protection regulation, the costs of compliance and the potential for duplicating reporting requirements.

The text of the Proposed Directive is now being debated in the Council of the EU, the European Parliament and the Commission. Negotiations will probably carry on into 2014 and it is estimated that the Proposed Directive will be adopted in 2015. Assuming the text can eventually be agreed, Member States, including the UK, will then need to consider how best to implement the legislation into domestic law.

Interestingly other parts of the world, such as the United States of America, have opted for a more voluntary and flexible approach with regard to cyber

security. It remains to be seen whether the difference in approach will create inconsistencies for financial institutions whose operations span several jurisdictions.

■ Opening up UK Payment Systems

The government considers that the current market for UK payment systems prevents competition, stifles innovation and fails to respond to consumer need. After a period of consultation it has now announced proposed amendments to the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill which will create a new competition-focused utility style regulator for retail payment systems, under the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA).

The main objectives of the new Payment Systems Regulator (“Regulator”) will be to promote competition, innovation and the interests of end users. It will oversee all domestic payment systems which are brought within its scope by being designated by HM Treasury. It is anticipated that initially the main inter-bank schemes and international card schemes will be designated.

In addition to having powers to require access to payment systems for payment services providers and to vary agreements (including those relating to fees and charges), the new Regulator will also have the power to require owners of payment systems to dispose of their interests in them.

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The Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill is currently being considered by the House of Lords. Once it has received Royal Assent, the government intends for the new Regulator’s powers to come into force in late 2014, with the Regulator being fully operational by Spring 2015.

ISDA Arbitration Guide 2013 – model clauses

As reported in our recent Banking Disputes Alert, on 9 September 2013 the ISDA Arbitration Guide was published following a two-year consultation with ISDA members. It provides model clauses for various forms of arbitration for use in derivative transactions. This is welcome news for the banking and investment community which has not always found the standard ISDA submission to court based adjudication of disputes to be ideally suited to complex cross-border structured product disputes.

The publication of the ISDA Arbitration Guide and the model clauses indicates that there is a real appetite for arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism for use in the derivatives market. In particular, parties are clearly drawn to the advantages in respect of enforceability and neutrality which international arbitration can provide. However, the Guide is clear in that these are model clauses which may not be appropriate in all cases, particularly in more complex transactions where more detailed arbitration provisions may be more suitable.

Parties are also advised to consider the Model Clauses carefully (they are not to be viewed as “boilerplate”) in the context of the domicile of the counterparty and the location of the assets in order to determine whether any amendments are necessary to maximise recognition and enforcement in those particular jurisdictions. Except in the case of the simplest transactions, specialist advice should be sought.

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reCeNt DeVeLopMeNts & CAses

In this section, we take a more in-depth look at some the cases and other developments affecting the banking and financial industry in recent weeks.

Court of AppeAL DeLIVers wrItteN juDGMeNt IN swAps MIs-seLLING CLAIM

Earlier this year the Court of Appeal heard an appeal in the case of John Green and Paul Rowley v The Royal Bank of Scotland plc [2013] EWCA Civ 1197, the first English swaps mis-selling case to go all the way to trial.

Back in July the Court of Appeal indicated orally that it would reject Green and Rowley’s appeal but it has only just published its full written judgment. This confirms that unless a bank crosses the line and gives a customer advice there is neither justification nor need to impose a common law duty independent of but co-existent with the remedy provided by statute. Click here to read our more detailed alert on this case and here to access the full judgment.

tidal energy Limited -v- Bank of scotland plc: Good show, ChAps?

By Jamie Curle (Partner) and Oli Felton (Associate), London

The High Court has brought some welcome clarification on the responsibility of banks to check the beneficiary name on CHAPS payment instructions, in the context of a fraudulent diversion.

On 13 September 2013, the Bristol Mercantile Court held that a bank which paid money pursuant to a CHAPS instruction submitted by a customer on the bank’s standard printed CHAPS Transfer Form, specifying the sum to be paid, the customer account to be debited, and the account number, sort code and account name of the beneficiary account, was not obliged to reimburse its customer where the name was that of a different beneficiary to that named in the CHAPS Transfer Form.

On 31 January 2012, Tidal Energy Limited (“Tidal”), a customer of Bank of Scotland Plc (“BoS”) instructed BoS on a CHAPS Transfer Form to pay £217,781.57 owing to one of Tidal’s suppliers, Designcraft. As it happened, the information that Tidal had been given about Designcraft’s receiving account (which was reflected on the CHAPS Transfer Form) was false – the account in fact belonged to an entity named Childfreedom Ltd (“Childfreedom”). The result was that the CHAPS Transfer Form contained account details for a Childfreedom account, but also named ‘Designcraft’ in the ‘beneficiary name’ field.

A week after the monies had been transferred, Tidal informed BoS that it had been induced by fraud to pay the funds to the account number and sort code given on the CHAPS Transfer Form (i.e. Childfreedom), when it had intended to pay Designcraft, and requested that the money be reimbursed. Tidal further requested that Barclays (the receiving bank) stop the withdrawal of any of the funds from the Childfreedom account. Barclays declined to put a

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stop on the funds in the absence of a Court order compelling them to do so, and £217,000 of the funds transferred by Tidal were allowed to be withdrawn.

Tidal sued BoS, seeking summary judgment on its application for the return of £217,781.57 on the basis that there was no authorised acceptance of the CHAPS payment on behalf of Designcraft because that was not the name of the customer who held the account number specified on the CHAPS Transfer Form, and therefore, the payment to Designcraft was never completed.

BoS argued (amongst other things) and adduced expert evidence to the effect that:

■ it did not undertake to ensure that Designcraft received the money;

■ that it was normal banking practice for banks to process payments through CHAPS on the basis of the payee’s account number and sort code, and not the name of the payee;

■ that it was authorised by Tidal to process the transfer through CHAPS in accordance with normal banking practice and did so; and

■ that BoS would be entitled to debit Tidal’s account if it made a CHAPS transfer to the account number and sort code named in the CHAPS Transfer Form regardless of

whether that was an account in the name of the payee specified in the Transfer Form, as it was necessary in order to give the instruction business efficacy.

Central to the case was evidence from a Customer & Domestic Manager within BoS’ Electronic Payments Team, who had worked for BoS for 28 years. He gave evidence to the effect that all the major UK clearing banks processed and routed CHAPS payments on the basis of sort code and account number only – so-called “straight through processing”. The bank would only refer to the beneficiary name on the payment instruction only if it was unable to apply the payment automatically to an account by reference to the account number and sort code only. He also believed that whilst it was open to the receiving CHAPS member to check that the beneficiary name entered by the paying member matched the name of the beneficiary account or account holder, it would be economically impossible to do so if they were also to fulfil their obligations to process CHAPS payments within the maximum inward payment transmission time of 1.5 hours.

The Court agreed that there was no requirement in the CHAPS Rules that the beneficiary’s name had to be included in a transfer instruction and was satisfied that, in practice, CHAPS transfers were processed without reference to the name of the beneficiary. Judge Havelock-Allan QC, who

noted that the question had never arisen before, held that the identity of the beneficiary was irrelevant to the way in which the payment was processed – it was the destination account number and sort code that mattered. The Judge concluded that a receiving bank which was able to match the account number and sort code to one of its accounts would be expected to credit that account with the money and indicate acceptance of the payment.

The Court’s decision is something of a curate’s egg. On the one hand, it provides banks with confidence that they can continue to process CHAPS instructions on a “straight through” basis, without needing to carry out a manual check of the beneficiary’s name, and that CHAPS instructions can therefore continue to be processed on a near to real time basis. On the other hand, this sort of CHAPS fraud is becoming ever more prevalent, precisely because fraudsters have identified that banks do not check the beneficiary name on a CHAPS transfer and, to the extent that the fraudsters keep up to date with the proceedings of the Bristol Mercantile Court, this can only encourage further attempts to defraud companies through abuse of the CHAPS system. Interestingly, the Judge expressed no view on whether Tidal might be able to recover the payment from Barclays, which it will be recalled had declined to put a stop on the funds without a Court order requiring it to do so.

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Malice aforethought: tort of malicious prosecution now arises out of civil proceedings

By Jean-Pierre Douglas-Henry (Partner), Elinor Thomas (Senior Associate) and Ji-Whan Bang (Trainee Solicitor), London. This article first appeared in the September issue of Butterworths’ Journal of International Banking and Financial Law.

In the recent decision of Crawford Adjusters and Others v Sagicor General Insurance (Cayman) Ltd and Another [2013] UKPC 17, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council overturned longstanding restrictions on the availability of malicious prosecution claims in relation to civil proceedings. The decision means that any commercial litigant who knowingly brings claims without reasonable and proper cause may now be exposed to a claim for malicious prosecution and face having to pay significant damages to a successful defendant. In particular, banks should be aware that borrowers, against whom unsuccessful claims are brought, including fraud and conspiracy claims, may now seek to retaliate by claiming against the bank for malicious prosecution.

The tort of malicious prosecution enables a person who is the subject of proceedings brought maliciously and without reasonable and proper cause to claim compensation for loss suffered as a result. Until recently, it was thought that this tort was available only in the case of malicious criminal

prosecutions and did not extend to civil claims. Although this technically remains the case under English law, the recent decision of the Privy Council on appeal from the Cayman Court of Appeal in Crawford Adjusters and Others v Sagicor General Insurance (Cayman) Ltd and Another, which is highly persuasive (although not strictly binding) on the English courts, has provided the strongest indication yet that this division may soon be abolished.

the facts

The respondent insurance company (Sagicor) appointed the appellant, Mr Paterson, to act as its loss adjuster in relation to a claim following hurricane damage to a village in Grand Cayman. Based on his assessment of the cost of reconstruction, Mr Paterson recommended certain advance payments be made to companies appointed to repair the damage. Sagicor (acting under the direction of its vice-president, Mr Delessio) subsequently came to doubt the basis for these payments and brought proceedings against Mr Paterson alleging fraud and conspiracy. These allegations ultimately proved baseless and the action was discontinued.

Mr Paterson lodged a counterclaim for malicious prosecution. At first instance, the judge found that the dominant motive behind the proceedings had been Mr Delessio’s personal dislike of Mr Paterson and the former’s “obsessive determination to destroy [Mr Paterson] professionally”. Although those proceedings

were ultimately determined in Mr Paterson’s favour, the allegations nonetheless proved hugely damaging to his reputation and the willingness of third parties to employ him. Mr Paterson’s claim for compensation for these losses failed, however, on the ground that malicious prosecution was available in respect of criminal proceedings only. Mr Paterson appealed to the Privy Council.

the decision

By a majority of 3-2, the Privy Council held that the tort of malicious prosecution should be extended so as to apply to civil proceedings. The majority emphasised the “pre-eminent principle” that “ for every injustice there should be a remedy at law” and were ultimately unconvinced by the various policy factors cited in favour of restricting the availability of the tort. In particular, Lord Kerr described as “ fanciful” the concept that permitting malicious prosecution in civil claims would give rise to endless satellite litigation, noting that there was “no evidence that this has in fact occurred in those states of America where the tort is recognised”. Further, to the extent that the essence of the tort is the misuse of the coercive power of the state, Lord Wilson noted that this too applied as much to criminal as civil proceedings, and therefore failed to explain the basis for the distinction.

The views of the minority judges, as well as emphasising the strength of the above policy factors, focused on concerns as to the principled development of the law. In Lord Sumption’s

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view, the tort of malicious prosecution was in fact a form of misfeasance in public office, which was designed to constrain the exercise of public power. It was neither principled nor desirable to effectively create a new tort applicable to civil proceedings, whose ambit would in his view be “both uncertain and potentially very wide”.

Conclusion

Privy Council decisions are not binding on English courts (although they are of significant persuasive authority) and therefore the position under English law will remain as it was until the matter reaches the Supreme Court. As a practical matter, however, potential litigants should be ever more cautious of bringing claims which might be viewed as vexatious and have little prospect of success. Even were it to become the position in England, the judgment itself leaves several questions unanswered. For instance, neither the test for what constitutes “malicious” or “reasonable and proper cause” were formally addressed by the Privy Council, since neither of these points was disputed on the facts. In more ambiguous cases, it might be doubted whether the test for these could be directly transposed from how they are applied in relation to criminal proceedings. Further, the question of whether the tort should apply to the malicious defence of proceedings was expressly left open. All of these issues will most likely be resolved on a piecemeal basis as the case law develops.

exclusive jurisdiction clauses and the race for justice

By Jamie Curle (Partner), James Carter (Senior Associate) and Hannah Kennedy (Associate), London

Exclusive jurisdiction clauses may not be as exclusive as parties to contracts which contain such clauses expect. The English Courts have recently confirmed that exclusive jurisdiction clauses are not necessarily exclusive when it comes to litigation in the EU.

Background to the case

In Lehman Brothers Bankhaus AG I.INS v CMA CGM ([2013] EWHC 171 (Comm)), the Claimant was a German former subsidiary of Lehman Brothers which entered a German liquidation process on 15 September 2008. On 10 June 2011 the Claimant issued proceedings in the English Commercial Court in which it sought to recover a debt of $6 million (the “English Proceedings”). The contract with which the English Proceedings were concerned was governed by English law and subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the High Court of England and Wales.

As a matter of mandatory French law the Defendant was entitled to an order deferring the date on which payment fell due, resulting in their not being liable in the English Proceedings. Proceedings seeking such an order from the

French Courts were commenced by the Defendant in February 2010 (the “French Proceedings”).

The Defendant, a French company, filed an acknowledgment of service in the English Proceedings but challenged the jurisdiction of the English Courts on the basis that, as the order sought in the French Proceedings was sought pursuant to mandatory French law (which if found to be correct, the English Courts would be bound to apply in the English Proceedings) the English Proceedings should be stayed pending their outcome.

the Brussels regulation

The framework governing questions of jurisdiction within the EU is to be found in Council Regulation 44/2001, the Brussels Regulation. In particular, Article 23 makes provision for jurisdiction agreements, whilst Articles 27 and Article 28 address the issues raised by the same cause of action being advanced in multiple Member States.

Article 23

Article 23 provides, in broad terms, that where parties have conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the Courts of a particular Member State, and where at least one of the parties is domiciled in a Member State, then the Courts of the specified jurisdiction shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear the dispute.

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In principle, that should be the end of the matter. Where parties, one of whom is domiciled within the EU, agree to confer exclusive jurisdiction on the Courts of a particular Member State that Court has exclusive competency to hear the dispute, and any other Court must stay any proceedings brought to them in favour of the specified Courts.

Article 27

However, Article 23 must be read in conjunction with Article 27, which codifies the principle of lis alibi pendens. Where proceedings involving the same cause of action are on-going in the Courts of a Member State, the Courts second seized of jurisdiction must stay the proceedings brought before them, until the Courts first seized have decided whether or not they have jurisdiction to hear the dispute. Consistent with the overriding objective of the Brussels Regulation the intention is that this will avoid conflicting decisions, and ensure the harmonious administration of justice throughout the EU.

In 2003 the European Court of Justice held in the case of Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl (Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl [2005] QB 1) that proceedings involving the same cause of action must be stayed on the basis of Article 27 even where there is an exclusive jurisdiction agreement in favour of the Court second seized.

This decision ultimately altered the effect of Article 23 – the reference to “exclusive” in Article 23 was not as exclusive as may otherwise have been expected. The Brussels Regulation trumped the exclusive jurisdiction clause and the intentions of the parties as recorded in the contract.

Article 28

Article 28 goes further than Article 27, granting Member State Courts the discretion to stay proceedings where there are already on-going proceedings in another Member State Court, and those proceedings are “related”. An action is “related” to another if it is so closely connected that the two sets of proceedings are so closely connected that they could produce irreconcilable judgments.

the decision in Lehman Brothers

In Lehman Brothers, the French Proceedings had been commenced before the English Proceedings. In broad outline the Court found as follows:

■ These were not the “same” causes of action for the purposes of Article 27 of the Brussels Regulation, as they did not involve the same facts and rule of law.

■ However, in the context of Article 28, the Court found that there was a “substantial degree of connection” between the French and English Proceedings which gave rise to the risk of there being irreconcilable

judgments. It was found to be in the “interests of the harmonious administration of justice” for the French Proceedings to proceed and for the English Proceedings to be stayed pending their outcome.

In relation to the specific issue of the exclusive jurisdiction clause, the Court held, based on reasoning in AWB (Geneva) SA v North America Steamships Ltd ([2007] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 315), that the French Proceedings were outside the scope of the exclusive jurisdiction clause on the basis that it was for the French Courts to determine whether they had jurisdiction to determine an issue relating to a mandatory provision of French law.

Conclusions

It is natural for parties to assume, when entering into a transaction, that an exclusive jurisdiction clause will have absolute effect, and that it will eliminate any risk of challenge to jurisdiction i.e. that exclusive will mean exclusive. That assumption is a reasonable one given the provisions of Article 23 of the Brussels Regulation.

However, Lehman Brothers is further authority in the line of cases stemming from Erich Gasser which demonstrate that this is not the case, at least not where the same or, now, connected proceedings have already been commenced. The Courts have shown themselves willing to allow challenges to jurisdictional elections, thereby overriding the provisions of Article 23.

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In that same line of cases is the infamous West Tankers decision which launched the so called ‘Italian Torpedo’. In West Tankers proceedings which were started in Italy, contrary to an arbitration clause, were held incapable of being restrained by an anti-suit jurisdiction. It was held that the Italian Courts were first seized and thus the case fell within Article 27. This despite the fact that arbitration is not within the scope of the Brussels Regulation.

Parties have also tried to use Article 22(2) of the Brussels Regulation to circumvent exclusive jurisdiction clauses. Article 22(2) provides in essence that where proceedings have “as their object” the validity of the constitution of a company, the courts of the Member State where the Company has its seat shall have jurisdiction. For this

argument to work the validity of the constitution of the company must be the decisive issue and not ancillary

(See Depfa Bank plc & Dexia Crediop S.p.A v Provincia di Pisa [2010] All ER (D) 231/Berliner Verkehrsbetriebe (BVG), Anstalt des offentlichen Rechts v JPMorgan Chase Bank NA, Frankfurt Branch (Case C-144/10)

The practical consequence of all of this is that parties are currently faced with a race for justice – the pressure is on to ensure the ‘right’ Court is the Court first seised in European disputes.

The balance between speed of action and justice may be better struck, at least as regards arbitration clauses, following the amendments to the Brussels Regulation which will take effect from 10 January 2015.

Those amendments will provide, in essence, that even where another Member State Court is first seized in apparent contravention of an arbitration clause, it will be possible for the Courts of the seat of the arbitration to both consider the validity of the clause and, if appropriate, refer the dispute to arbitration. This will be so even where the other Member State Court has ruled that the clause is invalid.

These amendments neuter the effect of the Italian Torpedo as far as arbitrations are concerned. However, as illustrated by Erich Gasser (same cause of action in both cases) and Lehman Brothers (related actions) the present threat of a ‘torpedo’ claim (Italian or otherwise) aimed at circumventing an exclusive jurisdiction clause will remain in the context of EU litigation.

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spotLIGht oN…oUR ITALIAn BAnkIng & DERIvATIvEs PRAcTIcE

DLA Piper’s Italian banking and derivatives team is a perfect example of our ability to combine expert local knowledge with an international reach. The team operates across our Rome, Milan and London offices, and is headed by Domenico Gaudiello, a Partner in the Rome office, supported by Ugo de Vivo, a Legal Director based in London.

The team has significant experience assisting banks and financial institutions in structuring, negotiating and drafting the relevant documentation for derivatives transactions. In particular, the team has been involved in some of the most important derivative transactions executed by Italian local authorities in the period from 2001 to 2008 (including sinking fund structures, amortising swaps, CDS and other complex structures aimed at creating hedging and amortising components in connection debt instruments issued by local authorities). Our team also assist banks and other financial institutions on the regulatory aspects of derivative sales and the feasibility of derivative transactions with “special” Italian entities (such as Italian banking foundations, pension schemes, etc.)

Following the financial crisis, and the ban introduced in 2008 on the conclusion by Italian local authorities of new derivative transactions (Article 62 of Law no. 133/2008), our team has been extensively involved in assisting banks and financial intermediaries on significant litigation and other disputes involving the local authorities regarding the alleged mis-selling of derivatives or other regulatory breaches. The team has assisted major international and Italian banks in connection with litigation pursued by Italian regional and other local authorities, providing a wide range of assistance before the administrative, civil and criminal courts. In this respect, an article by Domenico Gaudiello published earlier this year in the Butterworths’ Journal of International Journal of Banking and Financial Law, reviewing recent Italian derivatives litigation and the interplay between public, commercial and criminal law, can be found on our website here: http://www.dlapiper.com/derivatives-litigation-in-italy-03-01-2013/.

For further information about our Italian banking derivatives practice, please contact Domenico Gaudiello or Ugo de Vivo

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jean-pierre Douglas-henry Partner t +44 20 7153 7373 jp.douglashenry@dlapiper.com

jamie Curle Partner t +44 20 7796 6396 jamie.curle@dlapiper.com

jeremy Andrews partner t +44 20 7796 6280 jeremy.andrews@dlapiper.com

hugh evans Partner t +44 113 369 220 hughevans@dlapiper.com

Adam Ibrahim Partner t +44 113 369 2216 adam.ibrahim@dlapiper.com

stewart plant Partner t +44 161 235 4544 stewart.plant@dlapiper.com

Ben johnson Partner t +44 161 235 4536 ben.johnson@dlapiper.com

Ioannis Alexopoulos Partner t +44 20 7796 6897 ioannis.alexopoulos@dlapiper.com

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