army professionalism,the military ethic,and officer ship in the 21st century pub282

8/7/2019 Army Professionalism,The Military Ethic,And Officer Ship in the 21st Century Pub282

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FOREWORD

In the following monograph, Dr. Don M. Snider, a retiredArmy colonel and Professor of Political Science at West Point,Major J ohn Nagl of the Department of Social Sciences, and Major

Tony Pfaff of the Department of English and Philosophy, addresswhat theyand many othersperceive to be a decline in militaryprofessionalism in the Army officer corps. The authors first

describe the ethical, technical, and political components of military professionalism and then address the causes for thedecline. They conclude by proposing a set of principles which, if adhered to, will reinvigorate the vision of the officer corps andmotivate the corps to selfless service.

Dr. Snider, and others who served in the Army in the laterstages of the Vietnam War, saw firsthand the deleterious effects

that result when an institution loses or discards its moral andethical compass. One of the hallmarks of a great institution,however, is its ability to recognize and deal with its defects. TheArmy did that during the decades that followed the Vietnam War.

The officers and soldiers of Americas Army rebuilt theirinstitution into the worlds finest army; the force of decision inOperation DESERT STORM. In the last few years, rapiddownsizing and vastly increased operational tempo have had a

negative impact on the Army and the officer corps. BecauseGeneral Eric Shinseki understands what is at stake, our Chief has challenged each of us to help him reinvigorate AmericasArmy. Accordingly, we commend this thought-provoking essay asa step in that direction.

DOUGLAS C. LOVEL ACE, J R.Interim DirectorStrategic Studies Institute

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CENTER FOR THE PROFESSIONAL MILITARY ETHIC

The United States Military Academy activated the Center for theProfessional Military Ethic (CPME) in August 1998 to bring a newcohesiveness to the United States Military Academys moral-ethicaltraining of cadets. While the cadet honor code (which states that Acadet shall not lie, cheat or steal or tolerate those who do) and the motto(Duty-Honor-Country) provide the underpinnings of cadets moralethos, Academy leadership established the Center to deepen cadetsunderstanding of the Professional Military Ethic and to develop withineach cadet a self concept of officership. The Center will also coordinateand integrate the Academys officership development programs acrossthe curriculum. In turn, as the Center matures, it will provide enhancedassessment methods and resources to Academy leadership, as well asassistance to the field Army, other training centers and civilianeducation institutions with ethical development issues, training forvolunteer instructors and ethical development opportunities for cadets.

Specifically the center will perform five functions: (1) Develop andmaintain instructional materials in support of a program of instructionto the Corps of Cadets on the Professional Mi li tary E thic; (2) Assess theeffectiveness of the West Point Experience in developing within cadetsa professional self-concept and an understanding of the Professional

Mi li tary E thic ; (3) Conduct research on the Professional Mili tary E thic to determine its current content, the potential requirements for change,and its application to the education of cadets and ultimately to theArmy; (4) Develop outreach initiatives to assist and interface with theArmy, particularly schools of professional military education, and otherappropriate F ederal and civilian institutions on the subject of professional ethics and ethical education relating to the Profession of Arms and scholastic integrity; (5) Supervise the Cadet Honor and

Respect Committees. This paper, jointly sponsored by SSI and CPME, is intended to be

the first of many whose purpose is to promote scholarship on Officershipand the Professional Military Ethic as well as enhance the discussion of military professionalism within the Army and sister services.

Michael E . HaithColonel, InfantryDirector, CPME

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF THE AUTHORS

DR. DON M. SNIDER is Professor of Political Science,teaching seminars in military innovation/adaptation andcivil-military relations in the Department of Social Sciencesat West Point. He has been a member of the civilian facultyof the U.S. Military Academy since 1998, having previouslyheld the Olin Chair in National Security Studies,1995-1998. Earlier, he completed a military career whichincluded three combat tours in the Republic of Vietnam and,much later, service on the staff of the National SecurityCouncil, The White House. He retired from the Office of theChairman, J oint Chiefs of Staff, in 1990. Dr. Sniderscurrent research and publications focus on military cultureand ethics, the gap between the military and Americansociety, officership, and U.S. security policy towardsEurope.MAJ OR J OHN A. NAGL teaches international relationsand national security studies in the Department of SocialSciences at West Point. A West Point graduate, he holdsMasters and Doctoral degrees in I nternational Relationsfrom Oxford University, where he studied as a RhodesScholar. His doctoral dissertation, Learning to Eat Soup

with a Knife, examined how military organizations adaptto unfamiliar situations. An armor officer, he led a tankplatoon of the First Cavalry Division during OperationDESERT STORM and commanded an armored cavalrytroop in the First Armored Division in Germany. MajorNagls recent publications include works on arms controlpolicy and military innovation.

MAJ OR TONY PFAF F teaches in the Department of English and Philosophy at West Point. He received a BA inEconomics and Philosophy from Washington and LeeUniversity and an MA in Philosophy from StanfordUniversity, where he was also a graduate fellow at the

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Stanford Center for Conflict and Negotiation. An Infantryofficer, he served in the 1/505 PIR, 82d Airborne from 1987to 1991 with which he deployed to the Persian Gulf. He has

also served in the First Armored Division from 1992-1995,holding several brigade and battalion level positionsincluding Company Commander and Battalion S3. Duringthat time he also deployed to Macedonia for OperationABLE SENTRY. Major Pfaff has written and presentedseveral papers on a variety of topics including militaryethics, ethics of development and conflict resolution.

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ARMY PROFESSIONALISM,THE MILITARY ETHIC, AND

OFFICERSHIP IN THE 21st CENTURY

Introduction: Army Professionalism and Conflictwithin the Professional Military Ethos.

On J anuary 25, 1999, a tall, ramrod-straight youngcombat-arms officer serving in Bosnia with the 1st Armored

Division told the about-to-graduate cadets at West Point, Itell my men every day there is nothing there worth one of them dying for. I t was a startling admission to the cadetswho were in the midst of a series of classes on theprofessional military ethic; the lieutenants admission wasutterly contradictory to what they had been studying. Theirstudies had led them to believe that minimizing casualtieswas an inherent part of every combat mission but not a

mission in and of itself, particularly one which mightimpede or even preclude success in the units mission 1inthis case, peace operations within the American sector of Bosnia. Queried by a cadet in the audience as to why hecommunicated this to his men, the lieutenant responded,Because minimizing, really prohibiting, casualties is thetop-priority mission I have been given by my battalioncommander.

Some time later in the presentation the battalioncommander gave his perspective. I ts simple, he said.When I received my written mission from Division,absolutely minimizing casualties was the missionprioritized as first, so I in turn passed it on in my writtenoperations order to my company commanders. This is themission we have, this is the environment in which we

work.2

Some months later an article in Army magazine by anArmy major made the same point. Arriving for duty inBosnia, his brigade commander gave the major the

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following guidance, I f mission and force protection are inconflict, then we dont do the mission. 3

To us, these two examples from the many communicatedeach week within the media and among the e-mail of theArmy officer corps demonstrate that the Armys norms of professional behavior are being corroded by politicalguidance on force protection. Doubtless the ethics of otherservices are being corroded by the same guidancewitnessAir Force pilots flying combat missions from fifteenthousand feet in K osovo and Bosnia to avoid the risk of pilotloss from ground fire and missiles. Yet one does not hearsenior military leaders defending the military ethic,informing the profession and the American public it servesof its utter necessity for military effectiveness. Neither doesone read in military journals significant dialogues on thepersonal conflicts this is causing for individual officers.

Placed in the larger context and stated simply, changesin the international system since the end of the Cold War,the new nature of conflict (which we will refer to simply asmilitary operations other than war, MOOTW) and secularchanges within American society are strongly influencingthe American military ethic in directions unknown. This isan issue of military professionalism, rightly understood;and as such in an era of already declining Armyprofessionalism is of vital concern to both professionals andthe society they serve.

Thus this manuscript will proceed to place this issue intothe context of military professionalism, a topic little studiedin the military now and even less understood outside theprofession. Subsequently, we will use that framework toanalyze two issues within the profession now impedinghealthy adaptationsthe officer corps intellectual muddleover the purpose of the Army and their ethical muddle over

the role of self-sacrifice in the professions ethos. We believethese two unresolved contradictions have contributed invery significant ways to the Armys inability thus far to dealeffectively with vexing issues such as force protection.

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Lastly, we will present a principled approach for arenewed self-concept and motivation of the Army officercorps, a self-concept that, if it existed now, would lend a very

different perspective to such issues as force protection. A Framework for Analysis:Military Professionalism .

Our understanding of military professionalism isadapted from Professor Sam. C. Sarkesian. 4 As he noted in1981, the examination of professionalism, its boundaries,

and substantive elements lack a generally accepted andcoherent perspective. 5 Fortunately, Professor Sarkesianoutlined such a framework in his book, but to our knowledgeit has not been seen in the literature since. I t is a frameworkthat in the more quantitative analytical environment todaywould be considered a 3x3 matrix of political, social andfunctional interactions inherent in the relationshipsbetween a democratic society and its Armyits military

servants. I n matrix form it appears as:

ComponentsLevel

of AnalysisMilitary

Technical Ethical Political

SocietyLand mine ban,MOOTWmissions

Post-modern oregoist ethic

Casualtyaverse,interventionists

MilitaryInstitution

RMA,resources,recruiting, anddecliningprofessionalism

TheProfessionalMilitary Ethicand forceprotection

Powell Doctrineand forceprotection

IndividualSoldier

Individualskills, retention

Individualvalues

Individualpolitics,civil-military

gap

Figure 1. American Military Professionalism.

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Further, each of these components can be analyzed fromat least three different levels. They can be viewed at thelevel of, or from the perspective of, the American society

sanctioning the military institution, the military institutionitself (the Army), or from the perspective of the individualsoldier within the institution. In contrast to the verticallines above, the horizontal lines in the diagram representreal boundaries across which deep and abidingrelationships have been created, both official (formal) andunofficial (informal). These relationships and some of thecontemporary issues creating tensions, both healthy and

dysfunctional, will be delineated briefly in the sections thatfollow in order to show their contextual reality among themany interactions and relationships involved. Takentogether they provide a brief overview of the state of themilitary institution, its professionalism or effectiveness,and its relationship with the society it serves.

The Functional or Military-Technical Component . This

component includes those aspects of the profession that giveit unique purpose and legitimacy, what Huntington calledthe expertise of the profession. 6 He defined this function inthe post-World War I I era as the management of violence.Others have at different times given it different titles, butthe essence remains clear regardless of specific purposestatement: Armies have been created by societies throughthe ages for the purpose of protecting themselves, their

territory and their way of life, and for advancing theirnational interests in the regions around them. During thealmost four centuries since the Treaty of Westphalia andthe appearance of the nation-state, the formativerelationships between societies and their armies havevaried dramatically depending on the society, its ideologyand its form of government, i.e., the state. 7 Now in thepost-Cold War era, it may be the case that once again the

formative relationships have changed, at least among theadvanced democratic nations, reserving armies forprimarily defensive purposes. 8 Such formativerelationships include the purpose for which society seeks to

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prepare and use its army and the resources provided forsuch uses, particularly human resourcesby conscriptionof a mass citizen army, by soliciting/enticing volunteers

from among the citizenry as the United States does today, orby some combination of these methods.

At the societal level , one currently contentious issue (asnoted in F igure 1) is the desire of some American politicalleaders and a considerable portion of the public to outlaw byinternational treaty the use of land mines as a form of warfare. Such intrusions into the traditional sphere of military professionalshow best to fight warsis oneindicator of societys dissatisfaction with currentprofessionalism. Thus the darker horizontal line separatingthe societal level of analysis from the institutional levelconnotes an American civil-military relationship currentlywith significant tensions on many issues across all threecomponents of professionalism, land mines being only one. 9

A t the i nsti tu ti onal level , the military-technicalcomponent focuses on the overall effectiveness of the Army.Is it capable of doing what society expects of it and in themanner it is expected? Such military effectiveness is theresult of many things, some under the control of the leadersof the military institution and others that must be providedby a supporting society. 10 I nternally, the U.S. Army todayconsiders these essential inputs to combat effectiveness tobe the six imperatives: force mix, doctrine, training,modern equipment, leader development, and qualitypeople. 11

At this level of analysis, there are myriad issuescurrently demanding the urgent attention of the officercorps, those who are responsible for creating the intellectualconsensus and direction that sets the professionalstandards which produce military effectiveness, and

subsequently for policing and adapting these standards asnecessary. Such issues include the institutions inability toobtain a level of resources sufficient to the institutionsneeds, the demonstrable decline in military effectiveness of

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front-line operational units, 12 and the urgent, but unmet,need to modernize fighting forces for the information-dominant forms of warfare potentially available in the

revolution in military affairs (RMA).13

These issues, all of major significance for the decline in Army professionalism,have existed roughly in current form since shortly after theend of the Gulf War in 1992.

At the thi rd level of analysi s, that of the indi vidual soldi er , professionalism in the functional componentbecomes the issue of individual competence in soldier skillsand the motivation by which those skills are to be used andintegrated with those of other soldiers, whether they beofficer, noncommissioned officer or enlisted soldier. Giventhe virtual revolution that occurred in Army trainingprograms in the 1980s, resulting in the remarkableproficiency of our forces in the Gulf War, it might besupposed that at this level few problems exist. But that isclearly not the case. Since the Gulf War, the serious

mismatch between a military structure too large andresources too small, when combined with an unusually highoperational tempo for MOOTW, has severely eroded thetrust and commitment of individual officers and soldierstoward both the Army and the society it serves. This hasbeen particularly so when the soldiers quality of life iscontrasted to a roaring American economy with an excess of good job opportunities. Thus at the individual level

declining professionalism is reflected in the systemicinstitutional failure to attract and retain sufficient recruitsfrom the citizenry to man the current Army force structure,along with the continuing exodus of company grade officers,particularly from the combat arms. 14

The E thi cal Component . The ethical component seeks ateach level of analysis to answer questions like what should officers and soldiers do? and what kind of leaders should the Army have? The answers to these questions establishnorms of individual and collective behavior, what courses of action, and what outcomes the officer is obligated to seek; insum, they constitute a professional military ethic. We

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accept the definition of ethic as the body of moralprinciples or values governing a particular culture orgroup. 15 J ust as with the military-technical component,

this component can be analyzed from the perspectives of American society, the military institution, or the individualsoldier.

At the societal level , it is difficult to categorize succinctlythe ethics to which Americans adhere. Americans are aneclectic people who embrace a variety of ethical beliefs;however, recently some have accumulated more weight asthose in influence have embraced them. These trends, oftenlabeled inaccurately as post-modernism, reflect arejection by many Americans of traditional moralstandards. While some skepticism regarding tradition andauthority is healthy, completely rejecting traditionalstandards undermines the possibility of a common nationalor societal ethic on which professional organizations canrely to inform their own ethics. What many call post

modernism is best thought of as a complex collection of beliefs and theories that, in essence, reject the idea thatthere is any such thing as objective truth, ethical orotherwise. Without an objective standard, truth is thenleft to the individual or group to decide and thus becomesrelative to their desires and beliefs. This has underminedthe earlier consensus among Americans that any particularbelief can actually be wrong.

Of course, not all Americans embrace such relativism,but often what arises in its place is an unreflective egoism,which is best characterized as the belief that what ismorally good is what is best for me. Rather than therelative standard that post modernism offers, egoism is anobjective standard against which to measure conduct. I tsbasic premise is everyone should do those things, and onlythose things, that they perceive are good for them. Such anethic does not necessitate untrustworthiness, cowardice, orselfishness, and, in fact, many Americans have found that itis in their interests to be trustworthy, brave, and giving, andoften so behave. Nonetheless, such an ethic does not

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preclude behavior such as untrustworthiness, cowardice, orselfishness by describing it as morally reprehensibleandwhen it does not, this ethic comes into direct conflict with

the professional military ethic.Many Americans have combined this egoist ethic with

the post-modern insight that all truth is relative, and relyon the contradictory ethical system that results from thisviewpoint to make ethical decisions. We cannot recount thenumber of students we have had who profess a belief inChristianity, J udaism, or I slam but reject the possibility of objective moral truth. This experience on campuses hasbeen noted and written about by other philosophers. 16 Thefact that the acceptability of such contradictory beliefs hasseeped so profusely through modern religious institutions isalarming evidence that reason is slowly being disregardedas important in the larger society. And to a militaryinstitution that values, and indeed prizes, rational thoughtand decisionmaking processes, the potential conflict is

immense. J ust as our students see no problem embracingthe contradictory beliefs of an objective religion along withrelative post-modernism, so too many officers today seenothing wrong with embracing a personal ethic of unreflective self-interest or relativism, along with theobjective ethical demands of the profession.

At the level of the mili tary insti tution , this contradictionis most evident as officers attempt to reconcile theirpersonal ethic with that of the institution. While the beliefsof egoism and post-modern relativism can be heldconsistently by many in America, they cannot be held byArmy officers who simultaneously hold an objectiveprofessional ethic. 17 One reason is that while theprofessional military ethic requires that at least sometruths be held as objective, the social ethic does not. Anotheris that while the professional military ethic requires thatthe officer put self-interest secondary to at least some otherconsiderations, the prevailing social ethic does not. This isnot a new dilemma for the Army: Since the founding of theRepublic with its unique social contract making the

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citizenry sovereign over the state, the Army has understoodand accepted that it, ironically, can never reflect internallythe essence of this contract. 18

Furthermore, the ethical obligations of the officer areobjective and are not contingent on any desire held by anyindividual. The professional military ethic is not a relativeethic. The obligation to uphold it or any of its tenets does notarise because those in the profession said so, but ratherbecause it is necessary if the profession is to be effective inits purpose of warfighting. In a relativist ethic what is goodor bad is justified based on the desires of the individual orgroup; what is good is what makes one (or the group) feelgood, while what is bad is what does not. For a professionalethic, good and bad are determined, in part functionally, byhow the profession contributes to society. As noted earlier,the military performs a socially useful, indeed vitalfunctionthe protection of society and its territory and wayof life. This creates a moral obligation for the soldier, and

particularly for the commissioned officer, to respondeffectively when called on to defend a defenseless society,even to the point of death. 19

Thus, where it would be improper for a manager at IBMto invade the privacy of her employees, the officer is morallyobligated to do so. I n order for the military to function well,leaders must know and have influence over many aspects of soldiers private lives, including their health and physicalcondition, how they spend their money, and where and withwhom they spend their free time. 20 This does not mean,however, that rightness or wrongness of exercising suchinfluence is relative to the situation, or even relative to thedesires of the officer corps or business professionals. I tmeans that given how the officer and the businessmancontribute to the well-being of society, in every case it wouldbe wrong for the IBM manager to exercise such influenceand right for the military officer to do so.

The objectivity of the professional military ethic is alsonot contingent on any personal desire a member of the

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profession might have. These obligations are not merelyinstrumentalthey do not take the form If I want to be asoldier, then I must be willing to sacrifice. Rather they take

the form Since I am a soldier, I must be willing to sacrifice. The source of these truths arise out of the moral obligationan officer incurs when he or she accepts a public trust, i.e.,when an officer accepts freely, without reservation, his orher Commission from society. The obligations may beprofession specificthat is they only hold for those whoaccept the Commissionbut they are nonetheless objectivein nature. They hold regardless of the desires or beliefs of

those who accept such charges.Given this understanding of the nature of the

professional military ethic, at the individual level theproblem is not just that the contradictions discussed earliermay cause soldiers to mistakenly choose one ethic over theother. Nor is the problem that soldiers may sometimes giveweight to the social ethic when they should have given

weight to the professional ethic though on occasion this toocan be a problem, witness the Aberdeen scandal or theegregious behavior of BG Hale. 21

The fundamental problem is the existence of thecontradiction itself. L ogically, anything can follow from acontradiction. And if literally anything follows from acontradiction, then any system of beliefs that iscontradictory can produce any other belief. Ethical belief systems are supposed to guide our behavior. But if anythingfollows from a contradiction then anything could be anethical truth and thus any belief can pass as ethicalguidance. And if any belief can pass as ethical guidance,then ethics would not be able to guide decisions eitherindividually or organizationallyany decision would be

just as good as another! This renders such an ethical systemnonsensical and self-defeating.

Some officers claim that their unwillingness to adoptfully the norm of self-sacrifice is motivated more byunwillingness to sacrifice in vain, rather than relativism or

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egoism. They are not, so the argument goes, interested inmaximizing self-interest, but rather the national interest.

They see many MOOTW missions as never-ending, quixotic

quests that are only marginally in the national interest. Inthis view, putting soldiers lives at risk when it benefitsAmerica so little is not just imprudent, but immoral. Suchofficers then see radical force protection 22 as inherentlymoral since it limits the chances that soldiers might have topay the ultimate sacrifice in vain.

Certainly, it is wrong for the civilian leadership to putsoldiers lives in jeopardy for immoral reasons. I t is just ascertain that the militarys senior leadership is required topoint that out to civilian leaders when they feel the civilianleadership is doing so. What is not clear, though, is thatmissions that do not serve individual perceptions of national interests are in fact immoral. I t would be hard toargue that intervening to prevent humanitariancatastrophes such as the genocide in Bosnia and Rwanda is

immoral just because the national interest, howeverdefined, is not well-served. But more to the point, servingofficers must remember that under American norms of civil-military relations, determining the national interest isthe responsibility of the elected leaders and the public theyserve, and not the responsibility, nor the prerogative, of themilitary.

This is not to say that acting in the national interest isnot an important consideration. However, it cannot be theonly, or even always the best, criteria by which to justifymilitary intervention and by extension, the risking of soldiers lives. I f by immoral one means, anything not in thenational interest, one is articulating a simple version of nationalism, which privileges one group over another in thesame way that egoism privileges one individual overanother. Thus, it is subject to similar criticisms as egoism.

Therefore, while the national interest is certainly animportant consideration, it cannot be the whole story to theprofessional mil i tary ethi c. I f i t were, then acti ng

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dishonorably could be morally obligatory as long as it servedthe national interest.

Therefore, the argument that it is immoral to intervenewith soldiers to stop or prevent humanitarian disastersbecause such activities are only marginally in the nationalinterest loses its force. I f it is not immoral to send soldiers onsuch missions, military leaders cannot have a moralobjection to them and thus remain morally obligated, aslong as the military remains subordinate to civilianauthority, to accept such missions.

Thus, we conclude that the post-modern ethos(relativism) or an unreflective egoism (or nationalism) isincompatible with being a professional military officer. Themajor ethical tension is the failure of individual officers togive up such ethics, adopting instead the necessary virtuesof a professional military ethice.g., self-sacrifice andself-abnegating service. That leaders at multiple levels donot understand and act on this understanding signals amajor breakdown in the acceptance and application of the

professi onal mi li tary ethi c wi thin the Uni ted S tates Army.F ailure to recogni ze thi s can have ter r ible consequences,

such as foster ing uncr i tical acceptance of r adical force protection as the r ight thi ng to do, even at the expense of missi on accompli shment!

The Political Component . This component of military

professionalism is the least understood today, probablybecause of the Huntingtonian tradition within theAmerican profession of arms that the military should avoidpolitics and politicization in order to retain itsprofessionalismHuntingtons objective control. 23 Suchtradition is rich with examples. Eisenhower did not registerwith a political party until drafted for the presidency by theRepublicans in 1951; General Marshall did not vote until

after his decades of public service, lest he be undulyinfluenced. 24 But regardless of the traditions, the militaryinstitutions in America are, as Sarkesian points out,inherently political institutions in their interactions with

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the larger political and social systems of Americangovernance. 25 For example, their financial resources areallocated annually by a political process in which they must

participate involving both the executive and legislativebranches of government. Further, when executing theirunique function of warfighting, their use is determined byan equally political process involving the same branches of government, as well as by the opinion makers and masspublic of American society i tself. I n fact, mil i taryinstitutions retain their legitimacy and standing as aprofession only by their successful interaction in these

political processes and with the society they serve. Thus,their professionalism inherently has a political component.

A t the soci etal level , as noted in Figure 1, it isincreasingly clear that the use of U.S. armed forces forintervention abroad in humanitarian and peace-enforcingpurposes is well-supported by the American people, evenmore so than perceived by elected representatives of both

political parties.26

I t is also the case that the Clintonadministrations have been well-appointed by liberalinterventionists, who, with much merit to their causes, havebeen willing and able to pursue a more militarized U.S.foreign policy. The sentiment seems to be Whats the pointof having this superb military that you are always talkingabout if we cant use it? 27

At the societal level, there is also evident tension overthe uniqueness of military culture, a uniqueness which hasbeen under steady attack since the end of the Cold War fromthose of a progressive agenda. While it is not unusual forsuch political activism to be focused on the armed forcesduring periods of peace and prosperity, it is quite unusualfor elected political leaders not to offer informed assistanceto a profession in need of selective adaptation, defending thefunctional necessities of the professions culture. 28

Unfortunately, it is the case that after three decadeswithout conscription, too few Americans today, andparticularly those in positions of public influence, haveexperiential knowledge of the instrumental value of

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military culture. 29 This has left the public articulation of theneed for such culture to senior military officers, a task theyhave been either unable or unwilling to complete

effectively.30

At the next level of analysi s , both of these issuesdecisionmaking about the use of force and defense of themilitary cultureretain high salience within theintellectual dialogue of the Army. So do the other issuesmentioned under the military-technical componentresourcing and readinessand they are not unrelated. TheWeinberger-Powell doctrine is still held by many seniormilitary leaders across the armed forces, 31 causing thewell-publicized tensions of 1992-1994 betweenthen-Chairman of the J CS, General Colin Powell, and theClinton administration. 32 But at a deeper level all of thesemajor issues, from gaining the resources necessary formodernization to the use of force and to radical forceprotection, reflect a renewed institutional ambivalence over

how far senior military leaders should go in opposingpolitical guidance. When does their candid, professionaldisagreement and dissent become disloyalty to theadministration under which they serve? On the other hand,when does its absence become disloyalty to the institution ofwhich they are the chief stewards? 33 When, if ever, may suchmilitary leaders go beyond the three traditional functions of representing the profession and its needs, rendering candid

professional advice, and executing legal orders from above?As shown in Figure 2, the roles of senior military leaderstoday often overlap with those of civilian leaders, who,because they are elected and appointed leaders of thepeople, have the last say, even if wrong. In such situations,the plight of senior military leaders is not to be envied;nonetheless, their duty should be clear.

At the institutional level, there is also currently a thirdpolitical issue. This is the conventional wisdom thatAmerican society is casualty averseunwilling to acceptcasualties in military operations supporting less-than-vitalnational interests. Such wisdom is, in fact, myth (our

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refutation of this position is in the following section), but auseful myth for political decisionmakers. And, if casualtyadversity is becoming accepted by senior military leaders,it helps explain at the institutional level why the preventionof military casualties has such current salience.

Finally, at the individual level of analysis currentconcern, particularly within academia, is focused on thepotential of a civil-military gap, a disjuncture between theculture and values of American society and those of theindividuals composing the military, particularly the officercorps. 34 While many are concerned with the recentRepublicanization of the officer corps, the larger issue ishow different and how separate the military should befrom the society it serves. Whether this tension is sui gener i sowing to the policies of the Clinton administration remainsto be seen. 35

In sum, in this section we have presented a frameworkwith nine perspectives across the components of professionalism, and a brief overview of the U.S. Army andits tensions with political leaders and the society it serves.We have also noted its declining professionalism andeffectiveness. There is, as we will discuss subsequently,much behind each of these perspectives and manyinter-relationships that need to be examined if one is tounderstand well the reasons behind such declines. Suffice to

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Figure 2. The Civilian-Military Interface.


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say that such a decline has been the case historically inAmerica after every major war. Thus the Army is nowdeeply involved in a necessary and vital transition from a

Cold War Army focused on the big war in Europe to anArmy of a different character to be used for a different set of missions under different priorities.

We now turn to a more in-depth analysis of two issueswhich we believe are significantly retarding the Armysability to get on with this vital transition of adaptation to21st century missions and environments while preservingthe vital aspects of an effective land force. They are: theofficer corps intellectual muddle over the fundamentalpurpose of the Army, and their ethical muddle over the roleof self-sacrifice within the professions ethic.

Resolving the Intellectual Muddle.

After roughly five decades of almost continuous focus onland warfare in Europe, and now almost one decade of peace, the Armys officer corps is, candidly speaking, in themidst of an intellectual muddle. That is, institutionally it isthinking and acting in a confused manner, one which beliesits fundamental purpose and foundational relationshipswith the American society it serves. 36 Given the enormousrevolutions through which American society has passed inthe last decade, it should not surprise us to find that the

Army is showing signs of strain; armies are such intimatereflections of their parent societies that a revolution in theone [is] bound to cause a revolution in the other. 37 Not all of the causes of this muddle are of the Armys own making orwithin its control. There are, however, several importantcauses of the confusion that are within the institutionscontrol, and, as we shall explain, it is there that the Armymust start to redefine its purpose and organizational

essence.Prepar ing to F ight the Wrong War ? While there is much

debate over whether true military innovation springs frominside organizations, from external sources, or from a

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combination of the two, 38 there is a growing recognition thatcultural factors to a great extent determine whetherchanges accord with the organizational essence of an

Army.39

Clearly, during periods of significant externalchange, it is axiomatic that public organizations simplycannot proceed with the learning and adaptation that isnecessary for effectiveness in their task without a very clearvision of organizational essence and purpose. This is thefunction of senior leadership, to determine and articulatepersuasively a coherent vision for the organizations future.

T hi s axi om i s even more appl i cabl e to mi l i tar y

organizations where the histories of successful innovationdisclose the absolute necessity of an engaged, well-informedofficer corps conceptualizing, leading, and otherwisefacilitating the innovations and adaptations necessary forchange. Such innovation in periods of transition is, after all,cultural in its essence rather than technological. Suchclarity of vision, particularly at the strategic level, is citedby prominent theorists and historians as the essential firststep of successful military innovation and adaptationwhat is the new strategic task of the military institution,what is the new theory of victory for future war? 40 AdmiralWilliam A. Moffett had a clear vision when naval aviationwas born in the 1930s, and there was no doubt in the mindsof Generals Gavin and Howze after the Korean War aboutthe new need for airmobility of Army forces. B ut such clar i ty of visionrealistic in its premises, coherent in itscomponents of forces, mission and r esour ces, and thusbeli evable to the officer corpswe believe, has not been

provided si nce the end of the Gulf War and the ini tiation of the post-Cold War bui lddown of mi li tary capabi li ties.

The two most prominent causes of the officer corpsmuddle are not hard to identify. Political guidance to theArmy still requires conventional capabilities to execute

nearly simultaneously two major regional conflicts, hencethe retention by many within the officer corps of the bigArmy, big war vision and essence, and also the retention of the bulk of the Armys Cold War force structure and

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i nfr astr uctur e. I n stark contr ast, the C l i ntonadministration has since 1993 repeatedly received theapproval of the American people for the conduct of MOOTW.

Given the reality of a desirable can do attitude among themiddle and lower ranks of the officer corps, it is notsurprising a significant majority of those officers now acceptMOOTW missions as the purpose and essence of the Army,indeed, as the vision for the future. 41 They have experiencednothing else and have been presented with no other vision ofthe future that is credible to them. 42

The major positions contributing to the muddle areshown in Figure 3.

Fighting and Winning the Nations Warsor Military Operations Other Than War?

Big Army, Big War MOOTW

Political leaders Yes Yes

Military leaders Yes No . . . Perhaps Yes43

(1997)

Mid-, lower-officercorps

No, not credible Yes

Figure 3.

As the diagram shows, Americas political leaders aretelling the Army its essence is to do both big wars and

MOOTW; and senior Army leaders are in turn telling theinstitution the same thing. But at the lower level, where thebulk of the officer corps accepts MOOTW as the way of thepresent and the future, it is a quite different story due to atleast four other causal factors:

The resources, both financial and human, requisite toplacing both missions within the core purpose of the Army

have not been forthcoming. Whether that is a failure of responsibility of political leadership or of senior militaryleaders is now largely irrelevant. To the majority of theserving officer corps it is simply inconceivable, given a

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modernization holiday of almost a decade and steadilydeclining funds for collective training over the same periodthat senior leaders, whether uniformed or not, can expect

more with less. In fact this issue is one of the mostfrequently mentioned as cause of the unprecedented, andgrowing, gap in trust and confidence between the lowerechelons of the Army officer corps and its seniorleadership. 44

The Armys operational tempo, caused by a 37 percentreduction in force structure since the Gulf War coupled withrepeated MOOTW, is up roughly 300 percent over Cold Warlevels. Army-wide, soldiers are deployed an average of over140 days per year away from families and home post; theaverage is well over 200 days per year for those soldiers andfamilies assigned within Europe. Understandably, thisunsustainable rate has increasingly demoralized soldiersand their families, contributing heavily to the exodus of

junior officers and likely, to the current recruiting crisis for

the volunteer force. The Army officer corps, until the onslaught of MOOTW

in the mid-1990s, generally held the self-concept, and thusthe motivation, of leader-trainers. This was the successfulresult of the TRADOC-led training revolution in the 1970sand 1980s. 45 To be an officer was to be a leader and trainer ofsoldiers, practically regardless of the officers branch. Thisself-concept correctly placed great emphasis on achievingpositive results from rigorous training in individual and,particularly, collective skills. Unfortunately, given themultiplicity of missions and paucity of training resourcescurrently confronting the Army, those same officers, severalnow in or selected for battalion and brigade command, areleaving the service in almost unprecedented numbers. 46

They echo the refrain, I t isnt fun any more. 47 Moreregrettably yet, their junior officers are also leaving, statingthat I ve seen what my commander has had to deal with thepast two years, and I dont want to do that. 48 I t is a sure signof a mi li tary professi on in trouble that juni or offi cers do not aspire to serve in thei r commanders posi tion .

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All soldiers, regardless of rank, have watched for thepast seven years the amazing success of the Americaneconomy, but have not participated in its benefits at a

commensurable rate. More importantly, sociologically thisis not the Army of the 1970s or even the 1980s; roughly 60percent of the soldiers are now married with 85 percent of spouses working outside of the home. Thus, the impact of the excessive operation tempo on the current married withworking spouse force has no precedent in Army history.Although some redress is on the way in FY 2000 in the formof across-the-board and focused pay increases, the failure of

the Army to provide adequately for quality of life issues iscited by enlisted soldiers as the main reasonfar above anyotherfor the lowest state of soldier morale in the 1990s. 49

These facts about the current organizational climatewithin the Army, particularly wi thin the operational force

structur e, document the consequences of an amazingly largemismatch between resour ces and mi ssions. To be sure, there

have been quantitative analyses aplenty describing thedegree to which the Army lacks funding for modernizationalone, and offering comparable explanations of why the AirForce is now flying the oldest fleet of aircraft in theirservices young history. 50 Yet until 1999, with theappearance of a systemic failure of recruiting for thevolunteer force and the unremitting exodus from the Armyofficer corps, the magnitude of the overall danger to military

professionalism was not so clear. I t is now evident, however ,that the option of continuing to muddle through thistransition i s no longer an option.

One Solution: Fight the Wars American Society Approves . Since this monograph is focused on problemidentification and analysis rather than solutions, which arethe purview of current uniformed leaders, we offer here onlybrief insights as to how this intellectual muddle overorganizational purpose and essence might be resolvedoneway among many, we are sure.

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In a democracy, an Army does not get to choose themissions it acceptsat least, no professional army does.

The hesitancy of the U.S. Army to accept wholeheartedly

the missions it is currently being given strikes the authorsof this paper as cause for concern in the context of militaryprofessionalism. We beli eve that means defi ni ng the Armysorganizational purpose, its essence, simply as serving the

Amer ican society, and fi ghti ng the confli cts they approve,when they approve them . Any other essence or purposestatement places the institution in the illegitimate andunprofessional position of declaring its intellectual

independence from the society it was formed to serve. Andas we have deduced from the evidence presented, if theArmy continues to resist organizing, training, andequipping itself to fight and win the wars it is currentlybeing asked to fight, it may no longer have a sufficientlyprofessional officer corps when the next big war occurs.

The Army can create a vision and an organizational

climate that accepts the importance of MOOTW whilemaintaining much of its desired focus on training/adaptingfor future regional wars. But for that to occur, Army leadersmust resolve the resources-missions gap in ways that arecredible. This must be done very quickly. There are manyoptions, from gaining relief/change in the two-MRCguidance, to obtaining increased resources, to reducingunneeded structure and infrastructure, to specializing roles

within the total Army. None are easy nor without costs. Butit is equally clear that radical action to close the gap is wellpast due; the cost in declining professionalism is already toogreat.

In light of these facts, it is encouraging that Army Chief of Staff General Eric K. Shinseki recently addressed manyof the problems with which we have expressed concern inthis monograph, and explicitly articulated a vision toadjust the condition of the Army to better meet therequirements of the next century. 51 That vision is clearabout the need to dramatically change the Army; a vision of Soldiers on point for the Nation transforming this, the most

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respected Army in the world, into a str ategically r esponsive for ce that is dominant across the full spectrum of operations .52

To accomplish this transformation, General Shinsekihas promised that by the end of FY 2000, the Armysdivisions and armored cavalry regiments will be manned at100 percent of authorization, removing some of the strain onunits as soldiers no longer have to do the job of two or three.Even more importantly, General Shinseki established avision of a lighter, more strategically deployable Armywhich will allow us to put a combat capable brigadeanywhere in the world in 96 hours once we have receivedexecute liftoff, a division on the ground in 120 hours, andfive divisions in 30 days.

The missions to which these lighter-weight units willrespondand which their presence and capability shouldhelp to deterare the very peacekeeping and stabilityoperations which have confounded the Armys forcestructure and manning system since the end of the ColdWar. General Shinseki intends to begin procuring weaponssystems to man two new middle-weight brigadesimmediately. Changing the institutional culture, which stilllooks askance at peacekeeping missions, however, will takelongerbut the need for change has been recognized, andthe process has begun. I t will take time to see whether thisvision will prove credible and motivating to the bulk of theofficer corps. As we have noted earlier in this monograph,such a credible vision has been missing, contributing to lowmorale and diminishing trust between officers serving inthe field and their leaders in Washington. I n our view,

solvi ng the gap between missi ons and resour ces remains theunsecured, cr i tical link to turning this new vision into morethan simply another declaratory policy.

The Comfor table Myth of a Casualty A verse Amer icanPublic. Despite the promise of substantial change in thestructure and organization of the Army to meet the needs of the new world order in which we find ourselves, there is a

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second, equally disturbing trend of incipient decline withinanother component of military professionalism, the ethicalcomponent. That is the trend for senior military leaders to

accept, as political leaders have accepted since the early1990s, the myth that the American society is casualtyaverse.

As we noted earlier, the issue of force protection drawssome of its salience from the accepted conventional wisdomthat the modern American public is very averse to acceptingU.S. casualties in operations abroad. This wisdom is mostoften cited in reference to the participation of U.S. armedforces in humanitarian and peace operations. On otheroccasions it is presented as a broadly accepted wisdomapplicable to all military operations abroad, regardless of purpose. I t is a wisdom held by, and almost always voicedby, influential elites in the nations foreign policycommunity, opinion makers such as elected politicians,members of the press, columnists, and the ubiquitous

chattering classes of Washington talk shows. As we shallsee, not all scholars agree with this myth, particularlyserious academics and serious polltakers.

The origins of such wisdom are varied, but one mostoften cited is the incident in Mogadishu in October of 1993.Eighteen U.S. Army Rangers were killed in that action. Livetelevision coverage in the United States subsequentlyshowed the body of an American soldier being draggedthrough the streets surrounded by jubilant Somalis. 53 Fourdays later President Clinton announced the end of U.S.involvement in the operation, ostensibly because of thepublics adverse reaction to the casualties. He alsoannounced a rapid timetable for withdrawal of all U.S.forces. The incident ultimately led to the sacking of Clintons Secretary of Defense, L es Aspin, furtherheightening the understanding within the policycommunity that because of the publics sensitivities,casualties could not be tolerated. 54 At about the same time asociological explanation for the American publics aversionto military casualties was offered by an American scholar on

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the pages of one of the most prestigious journals, Foreign Affai r s.55 Thus the myth grewthe publics intolerance of casualties results in quick reversals of public support for

military operations abroad. Political leaders therefore needto factor into their foreign policy decisions the risk of suchreversal, and the political costs potentially to be incurred.Subsequent political guidance to U.S. military leaders hasnot ceased to emphasize the urgency and importance of absolutely minimizing U.S. casualties, and by extensionany collateral damage to civilian populations.

The most recent exampleKosovo, a war without aground campaign and with U.S. pilots flying at fifteenthousand feetis a clear manifestation of such politicalguidance. The point here is that the conventional wisdom isa myth. In fact, the American public is quite willing toaccept casualties, and doubtless, political leaders are awareof this. Recent scholarly research demonstrates, once againconvincingly, that there are two conditions that must be

apparent in order for the U.S. public to accept casualties:56

they must be convinced there is a consensus among politicalleaders that the operation is in the nations interests; andthat this same consensus among political leaders issufficient to see the venture through to a successfulconclusion (L incolns, that these dead here shall not havedied in vain . . .). 57 The elite consensus was obviouslymissing, and thus in the publics mind so also the

willingness to see it through successfully, both in the case of Somalia in 1993 and in K osovo in 1999. 58 I t has been theunwillingness, or inability, of the Clinton administration tocreate an elite consensus that leaves their policy hostageto the publics recoiling from the loss of American soldierslives. But this is not the doing of the public. Research hasrepeatedly demonstrated that there is room for politicalleaders to shape public opinion and create a forum for

deliberation and debate of intervention decisions. To besure, in that debate the public will consider in a rationalcalculus the risks to American lives as well as other costs

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and benefits of the intervention, but it is not a debate that isforeclosed because they are casualty averse.

Therefore, if it is understood that such behavior bypolitical leaders who as a class, and forthrightly so, are moreconcerned with reelection than with accomplishment of anymilitary mission, 59 it becomes even more imperative to askwhy senior military officers are signing operational orderswith the identical guidance. As we discussed in theintroduction, such is the case today with Army divisioncommanders in Bosnia, and by implication of more seniorcommanders, also. I s it possible that senior Army officershave adopted the policy attitudes of political leaders or,more of concern, their behavioral norms? Clearly that is theimpression the junior officers have, and as well one held bythose of the public interested in the issue. Even moreperplexing than occasionally bowing to political pressure issenior officers intellectual acceptance of such a myth. I t istrue that political leaders are going to behave as though the

myth was real; it is often in their individual self-interest todo so. Thus for practical purposes senior military leadersmust accept the myth as a real influence. I t is influentialirrespective of its validity. But precisely because it is amyth, senior military leaders must be articulate andpersuasive in advice to civilian leaders that the public is, infact, not so casualty averse. Only then can they fulfill theirprofessions responsibility for candid and forthright advice

to political leaders as well as their responsibility forpreservation of the professions ethic.

The gap between top military leaders and juniorofficersand the public at largeis instructive here. Mostmid-career officers and the American public believe that,while casualties should obviously be minimized, theyremain an inevitable part of any deployment. They alsobelieve that the accomplishment of MOOTW missions are,under certain circumstances as noted above, worth the riskof loss of American lives. This perspective is demonstratedin Figure 4.

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An Analysis of Casualty AversionIs the U.S. PublicCasualty Averse? Why?

Political Leaders Yes Intervention is highrisk

Military Leaders Echo High risk; lesspreferred form of war

J unior MilitaryOfficers

No Willing to sacrifice

American Public No Will accept, under

two conditionsFigure 4.

Again, the solution appears straightforward. SeniorArmy leaders should replace all service guidance anddoctrine that treats the prevention of U.S. casualties asanything other than an inherent component of anyoperational mission. 60 The trust in operational commanders

ability to accomplish missions prudently and competently,i r r espective of the number of A mer ican casualti es, must berestored, and immediately so. 61 Without that, few officersaware of the professions need to maintain its own uniqueethic will seek command. Ultimately there will be no

professi on, only an obedient mili tary bureaucracy wi th noautonomy, one which responds in an unthinking and uncritical manner to the requests and directives of civilian

leader s. We doubt the mi li tary effectiveness of such abureaucracy.

Resolving the Ethical Muddle.

B oth hi story and present r esearch confi rm that i t i sduring times of uncertainty and change in missionrequirements that a f i rm foundat ion of shared

understanding of professi onali sm i s most needed to sustainthe mili tary organization. 62 We therefore offer several ideason how to refocus individual officers, and thus the officercorps itself, on the ethical foundations of professionalism.

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We turn first to the concept of self-sacrifice, specificallyaddressing the issue of risk as an inherent part of anofficers concept of duty. I n other words, if an officer is

morally obligated to lead her unit to successful missionaccomplishment (the moral claim of the mission) is theobligation of, and thus the risk of, self-sacrifice inherentwithin that duty? And if so, what happens to the officersmoral obligation, and thus to the professions ethic, if political leaders proscribe such risk as part of a policy of radical force protection? In the paragraphs that follow weaddress the first question by a review of the origins of the

American military ethic, and subsequently answer thesecond by using examples of the recent NATO operation inKosovo and Serbia.

The I nherence of S elf-sacr i ficial R isk: S acr i fice I s N ot A l ways Above and B eyond the C all of D uty . Whilesacrificing may sometimes be above and beyond the call of duty, it is not always the case. We often apply words like

saint and hero in a variety of situations, all of whichinvolve sacrifice, but not all of which involve circumstancesthat are above and beyond the call of duty. We do call heroespeople who do their duty even when considerations of self-interest or self-preservation would cause most others tofail. For example, consider the terrified doctor who remainswith his patient in a plague stricken city. Clearly he isheroic, but it is still his duty to tend to his patient. The

presence or absence of the plague does not alter the fact thata doctors duty is to remain with his patient. 63 I t only affectshow we judge the character of the doctor who does so.

Nevertheless, it is not sufficient to simply assert thatthere are conditions when sacrifice can be obligatory; wemust spell out what those conditions are. J ust as withactions in war, we must not think our concept of sacrificemust either permit everything, or allow nothing. I t is hardto argue, for example, that the soldier who falls on a grenadeto save his fellow soldiers was merely doing his duty. Suchan action seems to be beyond the call of duty. I f it is not, thenit is not clear that any action ever could be. Nevertheless, it

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seems equally clear that soldiers, and especially the officerswho lead them, are obligated to risk their lives to accomplishlegitimate missions. What remains is to give a principled

account of this distinction.In giving such an account, it is important to resist the

temptation to justify such obligations by virtue of the factthat one agreed to take the job. A trucker, for example, maycontract to deliver specified goods to a certain destination bya certain time. 64 However, he cannot be morally obligated todrive at high speeds over a dangerous shortcut, even if thatmeans he may not be able to fulfill the provisions of thecontract. The trucker, while he may have certaincontractual obligations, cannot be morally obligated to puthis and others lives at risk to fulfill them. He will simplyhave to live with the penalty, and the customer will simplyhave to live without the goods. The officer, however, cannotsimply live without the victory that he or she may haveotherwise achieved. For this reason, especially given the

kinds of sacrifices that the officer is required to make, it isimportant that the obligation run much deeper than a merecontract.

In fact, the obligation does run more deeply. I t is rootedultimately in the fact that the service the officer corpsprovides is essential if human beings are to thrive andflourish. When officers play their roles well by effectivelydefending a defenseless society, they are contributing to thewell-being of fellow citizens. I f it were otherwise, we wouldnot be able to justify their obligation to make the sizablesacrifices officers are often called upon to make.

But these sacrifices are justified. Human beings are,among other things, social creatures. If they are to thrivethey must form the kind of societies and structures of governance that permit, if not promote, the good life for all of

its members. In any socio-political setting, a tension arisesbetween the needs of the community and the needs of theindividual. That tension is resolved in the Americanconstitutional system by recognizing that individuals have

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certain rights, namely the right to life and the right toliberty. A socio-political setting that recognizes such rights,even if it sometimes resolves specific issues imperfectly,

would be one worth defending as is the American Republic.But rights entail obligations. If someone has a right to

something, someone else has an obligation to provide for it.I f a person has a right to life, the obligation falls ontosomeone to safeguard that life. If someone has a right toliberty, then it falls onto someone to safeguard that liberty.

This is why states have an obligation to raise and maintainarmies. 65 Armies then perform a morally necessaryfunction: safeguarding the rights to which the members of that society are entitled vis`a vis external threats to theirsecurity, individually and collectively.

Since it is a tragic, but no less true, fact that some humansocieties feel a need to destroy other human societies, itmust then be a necessary feature (at least as long as this factis true) of a good society that it be able to defend itself. Thisalso means that it will be a good thing, though perhapsunder some conditions not morally obligated, to use force tostop or prevent violent conflict, since the cessation of violentconflict is a necessary condition for a good society.

Since the authority to decide when the use of force isappropriately in the hands of the civilian authorities,professional soldiers have a pr ima facie obligation to

accomplish the missions civilian authorities assign them.Since it can be morally permissible, if not obligatory, to useforce outside national boundaries to stop or prevent violentconflict, professional soldiers are then obligated to performsuch missions, as long as they are not blatantly immoral. Aswe have argued earlier, humanitarian interventions are notblatantly immoral.

Furthermore, this issue goes to the deeper issue of theongoing redefinition in America of what it means to be agood citizen. While some may reject the idea that citizensowe any service to their country, our argument suggestsotherwise. I f America is a good society in the relevant sense,

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then some citizens all of the time, or all citizens some of thetime must either support the defense through the paymentof taxes or offer themselves for service in the case of a

national emergency.And those who answer the call for service incur special

moral obligations. As we have shown, what justifies theseobligations is that they are necessary if the state is to beproperly defended. Since a successful defense depends onsuccessful accomplishment of certain missions, theaccomplishment of those missions has moral force. Thismeans those who undertake such missions, unlike the tardytruck driver cited earlier, are morally obligated to see themthrough to successeven if that means putting themselvesand their soldiers at risk to do so. The only thing that couldnegate this is some weightier moral claim.

This obligation to sacrifice is not limited to times of conflict. Many, if not most, missions undertaken in thedefense of a state engender some risk. Even in peacetime,training missions often have the potential to result in injuryor death of those who participate. Thus by extension,self-sacrifice on the part of the officer corps to make possiblerealistic training which ultimately contributes to missionaccomplishment is also morally obligated.

All of this is not to say that officers can ever beindifferent to friendly casualties. Rather, it is an officers

duty to consider the risk of casualties, as well as severalother factors when planning how best to accomplishassigned missions. The point is that the considerations of casualties, as well as other relevant factors, are inherent tothe moral duty to defend a defenseless society.

Hence, a coherent view of the officers duty is presentedin Figure 5.

As stated before, the moral claim of the mission can onlybe superseded by a weightier moral claim. Self-interest, andeven sometimes self-preservation, cannot serve asweightier moral claims. If they could, the possibility of

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defending society would be undermined. And, as indicatedearlier, that is not morally permissible. But, that there canbe such claims must be understood before we have acomplete conception of sacrifice for the militaryprofessional. The J ust War Tradition (J WT), upon whichthe Laws of L and Warfare are founded, embody one such setof obligations. J WT recognizes that everyone has the rightto life and liberty, regardless of the nation to which theybelong. This right can be mitigated, even negated, but onlyunder a certain set of conditions .

One of the fundamental principles that underlies the J WT is that soldiers are obligated to take risks to preservethe lives of noncombatants . By gaining the right to kill(which is necessary if they are to properly serve and defendthe state), soldiers have given up the right not to be killed.

Noncombatants have not gained the right to kill, and assuch, still retain their right not to be killed. While this canbe mitigated somewhat by the application of the doctrine of double effect, 66 that doctrine requires, among other things,that soldiers take extra risks to preserve civilian lives. 67

This may seem counterintuitive to many militaryleaders. We often hear officers claim that their soldiers livesare more valuable, and thus more worthy of protection, thanthe lives of noncombatants. 68 But those who make suchclaims clearly misunderstand the extent of a soldiers moralobligations. A soldier exists to defend on behalf of the statethe individual rights of its citizens. I t makes no sense to say

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Figure 5. A Coherent View of the Officers Duty.


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that soldiers, who have given up their right not to beharmed, may enjoy additional protection at the expense of the lives of civilians, who do have a right not to be harmed.

Still, it is not the case that to preserve civilians livessoldiers are obligated to take any and all risks. Their risk islimited by the following conditions: by taking this risk, (1)one cannot accomplish the mission, or (2) one will not be ableto carry on future missions.

To illustrate this point, consider the following example.In World War I I , French pilots flying for the Allies (overFrance) had the problem that if they bombed high, theycould destroy their target with little risk to themselves, butat a high cost in civilian casualties. If they bombed low, theycould destroy their target and their bombing would beaccurate enough to minimize civilian casualties, but theircasualty rate would be very high. The casualty rate would beso high, in fact, that they might be able to carry out one ortwo suicide missions, but would not long be able to sustain

the effort and the Germans would have emerged victorious. To resolve this tension, the French pilots bombed lowenough to reduce civilian casualties but high enough thattheir casualty rates would allow for not only missionaccomplishment, but also for sustained operations againstthe Nazis. Since all noncombatantsregardless of theirnationalityretain their right to life, soldiers (or airmen inthis case) are obligated to accept these extra risks as

inherent within their duty.69

This illustrates well the problem a policy of radical force

protection poses for the professional military ethic.Consider the recent bombing of K osovo and Serbia, whereAllied air forces bombed high enough to be out of range of Serbian anti-aircraft weapons and Allied ground forceswould not even mount a ground campaign for fear of casualties.

To our understanding these tactics, driven by Allianceand domestic political considerations, were more designedto preserve soldiers and aviators lives than to rapidly and

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effectively accomplish the mission, thus allowing morecivilian casualties than would have otherwise been thecase. 70

By not using Apache helicopters, A-10s, or NATO groundtroops to destroy Serbian military capacity, NATO forcesfailed to take risks they should have taken. Certainly theseforces were more vulnerable than high altitude bombers,but by keeping them out of harms way, soldiers andaviators placed risks they could have taken onto civilians.But soldiers and aviators, as we have discussed before, areobligated to take risks, at least up to the point of certainfailure, that civilians are not. I f it was the case that NATOcould have accepted the additional risk without dooming themission, then NATO was obligated to do so.

By not taking the risks necessary to destroy Serb tanksand other military and paramilitary forces, NATO forces didnot diminish the Serb capability to carry out their brutalpolicies. By aiming at Serbian infrastructure and militarybases (resorting to the World War I I strategy of attrition),NATO forces failed to stop the continued slaughter of innocent civilians, and, as some have argued, might haveaccelerated it. I f this is the case, that by adopting tacticswith more risk for allied soldiers they could have degradedmore rapidly Serb military capacity and thereby savedinnocent lives, then NATO air forces were obligated to takethose extra risks. This last point is important. Under therules of land warfare, NATO forces had at least a prima facieobligation to take risks to preserve innocents lives, and theydid not do so.

These tactics may have been justified if the politicalconsequences of increased NATO military casualties wouldhave precluded intervening on behalf of the Albanians atall. I f political pressure in Germany or I taly, for example,

would render NATO incapable of conducting operationsagainst Serbian efforts to ethnically cleanse Kosovo A N D if failing to intervene would still result in a K osovo cleansed of ethnic Albanians (though the cleansing would undoubtedly

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have proceeded at a much slower pace) then NATOs courseof action, at least with respect to preserving soldiers andairmens lives at the expense of rapid accomplishment of the

mission, would be morally permissible. We suggest,however, that was not the case. I t is quite clear that theoperation could have continued as a coalition of the willingfrom within NATO, much as did the initial phases of theBosnian campaign.

The problem for the professional military ethic should now be obvious. S ervi cemen and women ar e not only morally required to take those risks necessary to accomplish themission, they are morally required to take some additionalr i sks to preserve the li ves of noncombatants. E ven i f onewants to argue that the pr ior i ty mission was, i n fact, force

protection, the claims to the r ights of li fe and liber ty on the par t of the noncombatants supersede in this case the moralclaims of force protection as a mission. Thus, under theimposition of a policy of radical force protection we have a

si tuation where whi le serving the interests of the state, whi chofficers ar e obligated to do, the state places the officer corps i na position from which it cannot fulfill its other moralobligations. This creates a contradiction that renders the

professi onal ethi c incoherent and ineffective at i ts most basic purpose: to provide moral gui dance for behavior to both theinsti tution and individual members.

This incoherent view of duty as currently implementedis shown in F igure 6; note the cracks in the duty conceptcaused by the extraction of casualty minimization and theplacing of it as a supererogatory mission.

Reconceiving the Officer as Self-sacrificing Servantof Society .

I t should now be clear that what is needed is a principledapproach to officership. We recommend principles as afoundation from which consensus can be built, educationcan proceed and officers can apply moral reasoning to theissues and problems they face in the course of their dailyduties. We do not presume that the set of principles below is

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the very best one. We have given it considerable thought,but doubtless this set can be improved. Our point, however,is that there is insufficient intellectual consensus within theArmy today as to what it means to be an officer. Creatingthat consensus is the responsibility of the officer corps. Wetherefore encourage readers to develop a better set of principles and to enter a dialogue in the professionalliterature with a view toward creating consensus within theofficer corps.

Adopting a principled approach to officership will, webelieve, assist in the necessary recasting of the institutional

role and the self-concept of the officer, and thus of the officercorps itself. We believe this is needed at every level, from thepre-commissioning cadet to the Chief of Staff and hiscolleagues as they guide the institution through thistransition. Our basic reasons for believing that this is anecessary corrective, regardless of where the Armyeventually exits the transition, are drawn from our studyand understanding of the Army as a fighting organization

with a very unique culture.As such, we understand that the process of resolving the

issues outlined in this monograph is essentially politicaland organizational. I t is political in that the institution is

35

Figure 6. An Incoherent View of the Officers Duty(as currently implemented in MOOTW).


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reacting at its borders with external environments of intense and rapid change imposed through politicalprocesses. I t is organizational, and thus cultural and

ethical, because the organization retains in its internalenvironment extensive autonomy to remake itself, to adaptto the necessities of its new missions and priorities . Leadingthe institution and effecting change within it via politicaland organi zational processes ar e the raison dtre of theofficer corps! By their public trust, they are responsible atall times for both the current state of the Army and itsprofessionalism; they lead every single soldier in the Army,

every day, in every installation around the globe,maintaining the most effective organizational climatespossible. They are also responsible for those plans andpolicies that adapt the institution to changing realities. 71 Tobe sure they are assisted and supported by legions of veryprofessional Army civilians and by the most professionalnoncommissioned officer corps in the world, without whichthey could not fulfill their responsibilities. B ut the fact remains that commissioned officers, motivated by a cor rect

self-concept of who they are and what they are to do on behalf of American society, are the dominant force in military organizational change, i ntellectually and ethi cally.

A Principled Approach to Officership .72

Thus we offer the following set of principles from which

all officers, and particularly those at pre-commissioninglevels, should draw both their vision and their motivation :

1. The officers duty is to serve society as a whole, toprovide that which they cannot provide forthemselvessecurity. Thus a moral obligation existsbetween the officer and the society he or she serves, a moralobligation embodied in the officers commission.

Officers act as agents of society , both individuallyaccountable to them and, as well, serving to strengthen theclaim of the service on the affections of the American people.

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2. Professional officers always do their duty,subordinating their personal interests to therequirements of the professional function. They serve with

unlimited liability, including life itself. When assigned amission or task and particularly in combat, its successfulexecution is first priority, above all else, with officersaccepting full responsibility for their actions andorders in accomplishing it.

3. Officers, based on their military expertise,determine the standards of the profession , e.g., for

tactical competence, for equipment specifications, forstandards of conduct for all soldiers. Within aprofessional self-policing role , officers set/change theprofessions standards, personally adhere to the standards,make the standards known to all soldiers, and enforce thestandards.

4. The officers motivations are noble andintrinsic, a love for his or her craftthe technicaland human aspects of providing the nationssecurityand the sense of moral obligation to usethis craft for the benefit of society . These motivationslead to the officers attainment and maintenance of thehighest possible level of professional skill andknowledge.

5. Called to their profession and motivated by theirpursuit of its expertise, officers are committed to acareer of continuous study and learning .

6. Because of both the moral obligation accepted and themortal means employed to carry out his or her duty, theofficer emphasizes the importance of the group overthat of the individual . Success in war requires thesubordination of the will of the individual to the task of the

groupthe military ethic is cooperative and cohesive inspirit, meritocratic, and fundamentally anti-individualisticand anti-careerist.

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7. Officers strictly observe the principle that the militaryis subject to civilian authority and do not involve themselvesor their subordinates in domestic politics or policy beyond

the exercise of the basic rights of citizenship. Senior militaryofficers render candid and forthright professional judgments when representing the profession and advisingcivilian authorities (there is no public or political advocacy role).

8. The officers honor is of paramount importance,derived through history from demonstrated courage

in combat the professional soldier always fights whencalled onand it includes the virtues of honesty andintegrity. I n peace, the officers honor is reflected inconsistent acts of moral courage.

9. The officers loyalty is legally and professionallyto an office, rather than individual incumbents, and inevery case is subordinate to their allegiance to theideals codified in the Constitution.

10. The officers loyalty also extends downward tothose soldiers entrusted to their command and to theirwelfare, as persons as well as soldiers, and that of theirfamilies during both peace and war.

11. Officers are gentle-men and -women persons ofcharacter, courtesy and cultivation, possessing the qualitiesrequisite for military leadership.

12. Officers lead by example , always maintaining thepersonal attributes of spiritual, physical and mental fitnessrequisite to the demands of their chosen profession.

T hrough l eadershi p, officers invest in theirsubordinates, both as soldiers and as persons andparticularly in the vital noncommissioned officer corpstothe end that they grow in character, maturity and skill.

Further, we believe that the vocation of officershipshould be understood and executed, indeed lived, in aconsistent and principled manner. Given the importance of

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the ethical component of American militaryprofessionalism, the connection between the Armysprofessional military ethic and the principles of officership

is very relevant. I f a principle cannot logically be derivedfrom elements of the professional military ethic, then itshould not be part of the self-concept as an officer!Conversely, however, if the principles of officership arecorrectly consistent with the professional military ethic andsupportive of it, then all officers regardless of rank shouldreflect seriously on how many of these principles they haveinculcatedare these principles imbedded in their own

self-concept? Those commissioned by society mustremember that only to the extent that an officer corps is,each one, loyal to its professional military ethic, can it beconsidered professional.

I f it is the case, as we believe, that true character is moreaccurately seen in adversity than in success, then theapplication of these principles can, perhaps, be most readily

understood in the context of recent issues within or close tothe profession of armsIran-Contra, Tailhook, Khobar Towers, Aberdeen, and the Commander-i n-Chi efsimpeachment. In these particular cases, three applicationsof the principles come immediately to mind: the professionsconcept of selfless service, the relevance to the profession of the difference between morality and legality, and last, andmost important, the officers valuation of truth.

The concept of service is central to a principledunderstanding of officership. I t holds that the professionserves the American people by providing a socially usefuland necessary function: defending Americans and theirinterests by being schooled in war and hence able to applyeffectively protective violence at their request. As noted inthis monograph, this meeting of a societal need creates themoral dimension of the Armys professionalism as well asthe noble character of the individual officers service to h

army professionalism,the military ethic,and officer ship in the 21st century pub282

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