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Emergency Preparedness Protection civileCanada Canada

HV636

1974S231974

THE ST. JOHN'S / WYATT STUDY

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ECRU Field Report 74/4

THE ST. JOHN'S / WYATT STUDY

by

Joseph Scanlon

Emergency Communications Research UnitSchool of JournalismCarelton University

Ottawa

Working paper: for information only

The St. John's/Wyatt Study

This is the third report by a crisis

research team working from the School of Journalism.

It is a working paper based on a preliminary analysis

of data obtained in St. John's, Newfoundland, after

the mayor of that community declared a state of emer-

gency following a severe blizzard.

T. Joseph Scanlon

School of Journalism

Carleton University

April 25, 1974

I

This is a report of a somewhat peculiar emergency. The in•cident,

in itself, was certainly an emergency and it is easy enough to identify:it was an official declaration by the Mayor of St. John's, Dorothy Wyatt

at 10:30 p.m. on Monday, March 11, 1974 that a state of emergency existed

in the city.

But circumstances surrounding that declaration are somewhatpeculiar:

1. The emergency, a severe winter blizzard, struck with

little warning but,-as it turned out, the lack of

warning didn't really matter,

2. The mayor's declaration was incorrectly reported,but these inaccuracies caused few problems,

3. People in the community were very much confusedabout when they heard about it (the declaration)but despite that confusion they got the messagecorrect anyway.

4. The city appeared to be relatively calm in theface of emergency but that apparent calm was abit deceiving. Things were not as calm as they appeared.

,r The incident on which this report is based is a storm, a severeblizzard which hit the city of St. John's somewhat unexpectedly betweenSunday night March 10 and Monday morning March 11. A storm had beenforecast by the weather office but until around bedtime on Sunday theforecast was for strong winds and 5 to 8 inches of snow. By the timethe storm had finished the 5 to 8 inches had grown to 20.5 inches ofsnow blocking city streets and highways and forcing schools and busi-nesses to close and the strong winds had gusted up to 60 and 70 milesper hour causing a complete white-out. Conditions were so bad that theRCMP stopped their highway patrols.

As city residents woke ùp Monday morning, they discovered thattheir doors were often blocked, their laneways were snowed in and,quite often, they could not see across the street. The city did tryto keep public transportation going on Monday morning but eventuallygave it up. Most businesses and schools were closed that day and remainedclosed until Wednesday. For only the third time in history, the city'slargest newspaper, the Telegram, did not publish for two consecutiveregular publishing days Monday and Tuesday).

By the time the storm had blown over, most people in the communityhad been in their homes for 48 hours or more and some had been trappedat work or elsewhere for at least two days. (Since the storm had hiton a Sunday evening the bulk of the city's population was trapped athome rather than away from home.)

.../2

Given these conditions, it is not surprising that during Mondaycity officials -- particularly the ones responsible for clearing up --began to talk about the need for dramatic action and began to urge themayor to consider declaring a state of emergency. By mid-afternoon,with forecasts of further snow, the mayor began to talk openly on hot-line radio about the possibility of an emergency declaration. At 10:30 p.m.she decided to act and -- in a sworn statement before a justice of thepeace -- she declared the city to be officially in a state of emergency.It was this dramatic action -- the official declaration of a state ofemergency -- which was used as the basis for the study on which thisreport is based.

Actually, the mayor's decision was not nearly as far-reachingas it might have been. Under an amendment to the City of St. John'sAct, passed in 1971, the mayor can, given "snowstorm or flood" conditions,invoke a state of emergency and urder businesses, shops and places ofentertainment closed, suspend shop closing regulations, prohibit orrestrict vehicles from using the streets and order a curfew. On Marchllth, Mayor Wyatt, chose to use only one of these powers -- by restrictingtraffic to emergency vehicles or those with special permission.

But that point -- that the mayor had chosen r, use only part ofher powers -- never really became part- of the public's awareness of theevent; for -- almost immediately -- the media reported the declarationsomewhat differently:

Here is a bulletin from the St. John's CBC newsroom.

A state of emergency has.been declared in St. John's.All businesses and schools have been closed for the

next 24 hours.The state of emergency exists from midnight tonightuntil midnight tomorrow.Only emergency and service vehicles will be allowed

to use city streets.The proclamation was issued by Mayor Dorothy Wyatt

just minutes ago. (10:55 p.m.)

This is a VOCM news special:

St. John's mayor Dorothy Wyatt has just announced

a state of emergency exists in St. John's for the

next 24 hours due to storm conditions. That's

from midnight to midnight.The state of emergency means that all businessesand schools in and around St. John's will beclosed for the next 24 hours.

Small wonder that many people tied the emergency declaration not only

to a ban on all but emergency vehicles but also to a specific decision

to close all stores and businesses. (In fact, of course, weather

conditions made it inevitable chat such establishments be closed but

that was a result from the conditions rather than an order from the

mayor.)

.. /3

3

/

As soon as it became apparent that a state of emergency declaration

appeared likely in St. John's, a trained research team from CarletonUniversity made plans to move into the community. Taking advantage offunds made available by the Defence Research Board and the NationalEmergency Planning Establishment (and taking advantage of special travelarrangements cleared well ahead) the team moved fairly quickly, arrivingin St. John's on the first flights in on Tuesday night. The entire teamwas in St. John's and in action by Thursday morning.

What this team did was draw a small sample (116 in a11) frotn the

population of the city, interview those in the sample to see if they hadheard of the declaration of emergency and, if so, how; and then, whereappropriate, trace the flow of information from person to person in thecase of those who had heard from someone else. In a previous study inNorth Bay, Ontario, tracing interpersonal communications chains had in-volved literally hundreds of hours of work. Not so in St. John's: thebulk of the population heard the mayor's declaration directly from radioor television and heard it immediately. A substantial group said theyrecalled hearing it even before it was officially announced.

The chart below illustrates how people in thE sample said theyfirst heard news of the mayor's actual declaration E a state ofemergency:

Radio 64

Television 35

Someone else 13

Senile 3

Not located 1

Refused 1

Out of a total sample of 116, 84.6 per cent said they heard the newsdirectly from either radio and/or television.

Not only were the proportions who heard from radio and television

very high, the speed of the transmission of the message was very high too.

Of the 116 people in the sample, 90 -- or around 79 per cent -- said they

had heard before bedtime on Monday. This included the bulk of those who

heard from someone else since this included mainly persons who heard

T. Joseph Scanlon, "The North Bay/Slater Study", NEPE Field Report 74/3

The average age of persons in St. John's would appear to be extremely

high. The three cases of senility involved persons who were easily

located and would normally have been co-operative. They were simply

unaware of their surroundings and it was impossible to ascertain ifthey were aware even of the storm.

.../4

- 4 -

seconds after the original announcement was broadcast. Most of the rest

heard right after rising the following morning. And, almost everyone, no

matter when they heard, heard at home: all but four persons in the sample

heard the news first at home: all four heard the news away from someone

else.

Does this mean that virtually the entire population of St. John's

was sitting at home glued to radio or television? No it does not. One

of the questions asked of all respondents was whether they were listeningclosely to the media at the time they heard the news or whether they had

just happened to hear it. In the case of both radio and television a

substantial proportion said they just happened to hear it:

Radio Listening closely 40

Just harpened 30

Television Listening closely 18

Just happened 21

(The above figures include the persons who were the source of those who

heard from someone else.) It would appear that -- t least during this

crisis -- most persons left on their radio and/or television and kept

at least some attention turned to it so they could fasten their attention

very quickly to any important announcement or bulletin. It would appear

also that television was more of a background medium than radio -- perhaps

because radio was being used to handle specific calls and answer specific

complaints and television was carrying on mainly with regular programming.

This data about the high speed of transmission of the news of the

declaration of emergency should not obscure the fact that a significant

proportion of the population did not hear until the morning after the

declaration. Twenty-two persons -- 19 per cent or roughly one out of

five -- heard the following morning. About half of these learned very

early from the radio. This data confirms earlier studies that information

no matter how serious the information -- tends to stop flowing during the

overnight period. (Actually much the same phenomenon occurred overnight

Monday. Although many persons were trapped Monday night away from home,

most persons learned about the seriousness of the storm when they got up

Monday morning.)

What about the atmosphere or the temperature of the community

during a crisis?

Some persons were specially interested in how the relatively now

mayor, a woman, would handle hc!r first serious crisis:

I was wondering what she was going to do, how she'd

handle it. She's our first woman mayor. I wasinterested in her. (student, single, male, 21)

.. /5

- J -

On that reactions differed:

The mayor did a wonderful job for a woman.(Housewife, widow, age 61-70)

My boyfriend is sold on Mayor Wyatt. I wanted herto prove she's good. I didn't think it was as badas it sounded. I thought she'd jumped the gun.(Teacher, female, single, 21-30)

The storm, the consequent isolation and the subsequent declarationof emergency affected other people in different ways. Some saw it as aholiday, an unexpected break. Others recalled past storms and indicatedlittle concern, even implied contempt for the current (as they saw it)over-reaction:

I kind of like it. I wished I was in a log cabin somewhere

in the storm. The news media shouldn't blow these things

out of proportion. All they can do is talk about the

weather. (Businessman, married, 35)

I put on my long underwear and Newfie boots, I usuallywalk so a bit of snow would affect only drivers.(University professor, married 31-40).

The first thing I thought of was the exam I had scheduledfor the next day. Now I wouldn't have to worry about it untilWednesday. It's no big deal. You're in the city, notisolated. (Student, single, male, 20-30)

After I heard the announcement, I just went back to sleep.

I've lived long enough in this climate to know it was

normal. When I was a kid they never closed the schools

until it was up to your waist. Nobody ever got bothered

by storms like they do now. So I was something less than

hysterical about it. (Businessman, widower, male, 60)

Nothing much. It didn't affect us. In the old days we

never missed school. (Retired nurse, female, 71-80)

I couldn't care less. Got a holiday, They should havebetter movies on TV to keep people entertained if they

have to stay home. (Male, married, salesman, 21-30)

But some residents, the aged, the alone, the pregnant saw itdifferently.

I was here alone. I got a lamp ready in case of a black out.

My elderly mother was here visiting. I was afraid it might get

her upset. (Housewife, female, widow, 51-60)

.../6

b

I was frightened about being isolated in the house. Iwas alone in the house and worried about the storm,(widow, female, 61-70)

I didn't like the storm. I was afraid the lightswould go or the phone would go. (Housekeeper, female,single, 68)

I was nervous, home alone, afraid of fire from furnace,living alone. I felt panicky. (Widower, retired, male,

71-78)

I felt fear. What if anyone got sick and had to go to

hospital. (Housewife, female, married, 27)

I felt kind of frightened. (Student, female, 16)

I was afraid the power would go ... and I was here alonefor two days ... the children phoned a neighbour because

I was alone and I couldn't get the door open ... (House-wife, female, 20-30, married)

My husband was stuck at the university. Alone and pregnant

I phoned the lady upstairs to keep me company. (Housewife,

female, 21-30)

A couple of other points emerge from an analysis of the data. The

first is that females were far more likely than males to hear from

television rather than radio. The second is that the age of those who

heard from someone else was lower than that for the age of those who

heard from either radio or television.

According to an initial analysis of the data, the number of males

who heard from radio (31) was almost identical to the number of femaleswho heard from radio (32) and that balance did not vary between thosewho heard on Monday and those who heard on Tuesday morning. When it

came to television, however, about three times as many females (25)heard from television as did males (9). Roughly twice as many males

as females heard away from home but since the number who heard away from

home is relatively small this finding may be less significant.

In terms of age -- although once again the number who heard away

from home is low enough that the significance of such data is low --

there are clear age differences. Those who heard from television averaged

39.0 years. Those who heard from someone else were 27.1 years of age

suggesting that they were a yol:ager (and therefore probably more mobile

proportion of the population.)

This report is brief and it was put together very quickly following

the Carleton study in St. John s; but it does indicate that any emergency

situation, no matter how little it worries some, can be a very frightening

experience for others. It also shows the enormous power, influence and

.. /7

- 7 -

importance of the media of mass communication, particularly radio and

television. (Things would have been quite different if these media had

not been operational). And it provides evidence that even the seemingly

most simple messages can get distorted by the media and that these distortions

can become very widespread very quickly.

In some ways the St. John's experience was a disappointing one to

the Carleton team. The low level of interpersonal communication did not

give us a chance to duplicate much of the material obtained in North Bay.

The rather relaxed attitudes of most of the people interviewed -- and the

warm, sunny weather for several days after the storm -- made it hard to

believe there had been real problems.

However there were some significant and positive results as far as

the team itself was concerned:

1. A completely re0amped operational style -- involving colorcoding of questionnaires -- made our administrative efficiency abouttwo or three times as effective as it had been in North Bay. Most of the

problems in operational style which had been encountered in North Bay

were overcome.

2. More careful preparation of the field assignments by advance

mapping of locations reduced the wasted time in the field. (It also

substantially improved our ability to operate successfully in a community

where communications facilities might be out of action.)

3. Personnel changes in the team -- there were four newcomers in

St. John's -- proved effective. We have now decided to have a turnover

each time in order to guarantee that we always have an experienced reserve.

We now have 15 students with field experience who should be available atCarleton this fall, six of these were in both North Bay and St. John's,nine in one place. (Four of the original team members are now graduating.)

4. We had developed a set of strategies for dealing with refusals

and these worked fairly effectively. They will allow us in time to assess

the effectiveness of and the impact of various ways of introducing our-

selves, e.g. should we mention the support received from NEPE, DRB?

Should the fact the local police have helped us be mentioned?

Finally we can put forward some tentative comments based on our

observations rather than firm research findings:

1. The importance of radio emerged once again yet it appeared that

there were no specific arrangements for tieing in local radio to formalauthority spots such as the mayor's office or location. (The mayor did

not work from home.)

2. In St. John's, anyway, co-ordination between municipal auth-

orities and the police leaves something to be desired. As far as we could

ascertain.the police were not consulted as to the specifics of the

.. /8

emergency declaration and their role in it.

3. The importance of the phone system was again made clear but

the emergency number for St. John's is unsatisfactory. For one thing

it's in the fire hall and whén an alarm goes off you can't hear. For

another it's been plagued by wrong calls and faulty calls. Even during

the crisis -- or so we understand -- about 10 per cent of the calls were

actual emergency-related calls.

4. It seems quite clear that some methods have to be devised to

deal with a population when there is need for an overnight (or during

the night) warning mechanism. The failure of the system to operate

during the night-time hours showed up twice in St. John's.

5. Finally -- despite the simplicity of the message -- the

declaration was distorted. Clearly there is real cause for concern about

the nature of crisis communications. (I, as a journalist, am very much

convinced that expertise in communications must be available during a

crisis. This is a side issue here but it is becoming a matter of

concern.)

.0

"bib̂ Ji^l^ïji^ii iHV 636 1974 S23 1974

The St. Johns/Wyatt study

DATE DUE SLIP

F255o