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Central and East European

International Studies Association (CEEISA)

4th Convention

“Reflecting on a wider Europe and beyond: norms, rights

and interests”

University of Tartu, Estonia, 25–27 June 2006

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CONTENTS

Elizabeth Fausett and Thomas J. Volgy IGOs and the Strategic Choice to Join: Europe’s Post-Cold War Architecture

Elena Fofanova Russia and Estonia: The Emergence of Conflicting Belief Systems?

Evgeny Golovinov The Prospects of the European Constitution

Konstantin Golubev The Issue of Counteracting the Challenges of Globalization in Europe

Igor Gretskiy Russian Foreign Policy and the Ukraine’s 2004 presidential elections

Hiski Haukkata The Northern Dimension and the European Neighbourhood Policy

Alexander Izotov The Evolution of the EU – Russian Relations Model of and the Concept of the EU – Russia Four Common Spaces

Thomas Lane

The European Union's Russia Policy after the latest enlargement: Continuity or Change?

Zuzana Lehmannová European Culture and Integration

Paulina Pospieszna Neighbor Effect on Russia’s Economic Development after the EU Eastern Enlargement

Tatiana Romanova EU-Russian Relations Through the Prism of International Relations’ and Integration Theories

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Glen M. Segell Reflecting NATO Enlargement (2004) and Subsequent Relations with the European Union

Elżbieta Stadtmuller Towards regional governance of the EU through “Eastern policy”

Natalia Zaslavskaya European Union’s Policy towards Russia: Projecting Democracy?

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Elizabeth Fausett and Thomas J. Volgy

IGOs and the Strategic Choice to Join: Europe's Post-Cold War Architecture

We report here on part of an ongoing project to identify the scope and nature

of the formal, institutionalized dimension of post-Cold War international poli-tics. In response to the dramatic transformations resulting from the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, then-president George H.W. Bush called for the creation of a US-led new world order.1 It is now a decade and a half since those declarations, yet the contours of the new world order re-main much in doubt. Apart from the obvious few examples (e.g., NAFTA, WTO), American policy makers have initiated some incremental changes to existing institutions (e.g., NATO expansion, experimentation with UN peace-making), while fighting attempts by other states to create institutional arrange-ments (e.g., the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court, etc.).

Our research programme focuses on one dimension of world order; inter-state cooperation and coordination as reflected through the formation of and participation in intergovernmental organizations (IGOs).2 We are interested in the architecture of such formal organizations in international politics. Akin to the frame of a building, international organizations are a sprawling, intercon-nected network of elements and, while not every node or component makes direct contact with every other, they each contribute to an overarching structure. The international organizational structure appears to be both durable and dynam-ic (see Pevehouse, 2003; Shanks et al, 1996; Volgy et al, 2006); while some organizations are born and die quickly, many others represent a strong and en-during core. The term architecture also implies a construction or creation re-quirement as well as permanent maintenance issues. World order does not oc-cur automatically and neither do its observable underpinnings (i.e. international architecture).

In a previous effort (Volgy, Fausett, Grant, Detamore and Rogers, 2006) we mapped out the web of traditional IGOs, comparing the post-Cold War pattern with its predecessor, and found some vital but only incremental changes be-

1 Addresses to the joint session of Congress, September 11, 1990; March 6, 1991. 2 We recognize that the concept of world order is multidimensional, and formal organizations

constitute only one dimension. The institutional contour of the world order does not represent its totality, as it excludes regimes, norms, and rules that may be articulated outside of formal struc-tures. However formal structures are a crucial part of the world order and we limit our inquiry to focus systematically on a highly salient dimension of institutionalized cooperation.

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tween the two groupings of IGOs. We were able to demonstrate that since 1989 a) a US-led new world order has not emerged; b) major and minor dissatisfied states in the post-Cold War era have challenged US global leadership by engag-ing in separate architectural creation; and c) albeit not often successfully.

Our findings also continued to underscore the regional nature of the global web. Despite claims regarding the advent of globalization, most IGOs were and continue to be regional and sub-regional in nature. Here, we focus on the Euro-pean web and seek to understand better the dynamics unfolding in the region by 1) describing how the European architecture changed since 1989; 2) asking how much variability there is in membership across and within regional and sub-regional organizations; and 3) exploring how those areas that were sepa-rated from Western Europe during the Cold war have sought to accommodate themselves within the regional architecture.

We caution that this is an exploratory effort; we are probing general empiri-cal patterns that are likely to raise more questions and guide us further as we expand the inquiry in the future across time and states outside of Europe. We are particularly interested in the strategic calculations made by states among alter-native webs of formal organizations. We assume that states make choices among a number of non-mutually exclusive alternatives to cooperation and collaboration in the pursuit of their policy preferences. Apart from unilateral and bilateral options, they face options regarding long-term commitments to structural choices, including membership and participation in global internation-al organizations (GIGOs), interregional organizations (IRGOs), regional organ-izations (RGOs), and sub-regional organizations (SRGOs). The last two of these clusters dominate the web of global architecture and are found most ex-tensively in Europe and Africa.

The European region creates unique challenges for researchers. Undeniably, the European Union (EU) represents the most successful effort at integration in recent international politics yet, less is known about state involvement in other regional and subregional organizations not specifically linked to the EU. This is especially so for SRGOs (e.g., Sabic and Bojinovic, 2006), though they contin-ue to be highly salient in European security and identity issues (e.g., Buzan and Waever, 2003:372-3). Furthermore, the return "back into Europe" of states that were either separated from it or have newly emerged raises the issue of strateg-ic choices made by policy makers in these countries concerning the types of

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organizations in which they wish to pursue their policy preferences,3 above and beyond joining the EU. Below we suggest a rudimentary model to assess such choices and to predict variation in joining IGOs; discuss the evidence we de-velop; provide our mapping of European IGOs; explore the evidence about stra-tegic choices; and develop some preliminary regarding the participation pat-terns of "newer" European states.

Grappling with Participation Most studies of international cooperation and organizations - with some not-

able exceptions4 – have focused on the IGO as the unit of analysis, and sought to extract from the nature of the IGO the likely reasons why states may choose to participate in them. Historically, liberal institutionalists (see Hoffman, 1956; Keohane, 1988; Russett, 1971) have noted that by ensuring collective goods and tools to punish cheating, IGOs allow states substantial opportunities for cooperation and collaboration, and after some level of institutional participa-tion, it is likely that state will continue to join further collaborative efforts. Structural realists, on the other hand, understand state behavior largely as a function of the structure of the international system, and through power rela-tions tend to view IGOs as manifestations of that power structure (Mearshei-mer, 1994/95; Waltz, 1979).

Other scholars have focused on the interplay between power and long-term foreign policy preferences in the construction of IGOs and presumably the rea-sons why states would join them. Ikenberry (2001) argues that the U.S. has created a constitutional order that, while embedding its policy preferences into the system, surrendered some autonomy for a buy off on those preferences. In turn, states reasonably satisfied with the status quo could, through participation in the web, better influence outcomes. Vofgy and Bailin (2003) compliment this perspective by arguing that declining American structural strength makes it prohibitively costly for the US to create a new world order after the Cold War, suggesting also that policy preferences of states regarding their regional coun-terparts and the US may substantially impact their involvement with alternative webs of IGOs.

Clearly, policy preferences play a major role for decision-makers at both the national and international level (Bueno de Mesquita, 2000; Lemke 2002)

3 Assuming that they are willing to "qualify" to join; the issue of qualifications can become ex-

tremely problematic for membership in the EU although less so in most other European IGOs unaffiliated with the EU.

4 See for example, Jacobson, et. al., 1986; Shanks et. al, 1996; Russett, Oneai, and Davis, 1998.

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yet, despite their preferences, decision-makers are constrained by practical con-cerns. Membership in IGOs entails substantial costs that may limit states' abili-ties to indiscriminately actualize those preferences. Democratic theory litera-ture provides added insight regarding both commonality of preferences and similarities in domestic political processes that may facilitate cooperation (e.g. Fearon, 1998; Gutmann and Thompson, 1996; Macedo, 1999). This may be especially so in organizations where similar policy preferences and political structures make commitments more justifiable to national constituents.

Figure 1 summarizes the relationships we expect between various attributes of states, the types of formal organizational clusters in which they may choose to participate, and their choices to enmesh themselves in these organizations. We suggest that capabilities will directly and strongly impact on density of par-ticipation (regardless of the type of web) since the stronger the capabilities of states, the more resources they have available to join these organizations. In addition, economically more powerful states are also likely to have an invest-ment in the status quo and, to the extent that these webs represent efforts to maintain the status quo, the more endowed states should be more inclined to participate in multilateral mechanisms.

Figure 1. Dynamics of Participation in Alternative Webs of IGOs

Density of Participation

CICOs Trade Dependence IRGOs

Capabilities RGOs EU Membership SRGOs Policy Similarity with Region We expect trade dependence to be related to membership in IGOs such that

IGOs provide additional assistance to states in their pursuit of trade relation-ships, either for regulatory purposes or for purposes of potential conflict media-tion (e.g. Bierce and Omori, 2005). However in the European context, the over-arching role of the EU in trade relationships suggests that the more trade depen-dent the state, the more it is likely to enmesh itself in RGOs. We don't expect that relationship to hold for SRGOs, since economic relationships are primarily driven by the entire region, and even functional organizations are primarily region-wide (see below for a description of RGOs versus SRGOs).

For European states, the collective dominance of the EU for economic and (increasingly) social policies, should impact heavily on virtually all aspects of relationships. Therefore, we anticipate that EU membership will drive over-

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whelmingly choices about joining the regional web. Whether or not EU mem-bership predicts as well for joining other webs remains a theoretical and empir-ical question but we suspect that participation in SRGOs are driven more by issues of sub-regional identity and problems unique to the sub-region, suggest-ing that EU membership would be either unrelated or negatively related to the density of participation in these webs.

Finally, similarity in foreign policy preferences between states should effect decisions to join and participate in alternative webs. There is considerable var-iation in foreign policy preferences across European states, not only between the "older" and "newer" states, but within the "older" and "newer" states as well. Here, we assume that the decision to join IGOs is not automatic, or based solely on calculations about benefits conferred by the organization on members (public goods). We expect that the closer a state is to the aggregate policy prefe-rences in the region, the more it is likely to participate in regional and sub-regional organizations.

Given the very preliminary nature of our analysis, we start with a focus on "variability" with respect to a few key issues addressed above. We suggest that European states vary in terms of their capabilities, their dependence on interna-tional trade, their policy preferences, and membership in the EU. Taken togeth-er, these factors constitute a basic model for variation in RGO membership across European states, and are expressed in the following equation: RGO density = ß1[EU membership] + ß2[trade] + ß3[capabilities] + ß4 [policy preference distance]

At the same time, we suggest that if strategic choices are at play, they are

likely to be influenced by factors that vary with the context in which webs of IGOs are embedded. We assume that SRGOs work in a political environment substantially different from that of RGOs. This is likely since sub-regional polit-ical and economic dynamics are different than regional ones, as global dynam-ics differ from regional and sub-regional ones. In fact, as suggested earlier, sub-regional organizations may provide important additional structural mechanisms for policy makers. This suggests to us that the application of the regional equa-tion to GIGOs, IRGOs, and SRGOs should yield different results, and provide useful information for further analysis.

The Dependent Variable: Mapping Participation in IGOs The research results discussed below are based on an ongoing data collec-

tion project on traditional intergovernmental organizations (called the TIGO

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database). The TIGO database contains information on all traditional IGOs5 extant in 1975, 1989, and 2004, and reports state membership information for each state in each IGO. The database further subdivides the population of IGOs into GIGOs, IRGOs, RGOs6, and SRGOs.

Unlike in other studies, our measure of membership in IGOs is a density, ra-ther than a frequency of the number of organizations joined. The density meas-ure is a ratio, calculated by dividing the number of organizations a state joins by the number it has the opportunity to join. Opportunity is measured solely with regard to the constraints on membership put forth by the organization's charter, and our database identifies whether or not any country meets the criteria.

Describing the Web in Europe: 1989 and 2004 Previous studies (Shanks, Jacobson, and Kaplan, 1996; Volgy, Fausett,

Grant, Detamore and Rogers, 2006) have noted that a) regional membership organizations dominate the web of IGOs and b) the size of these regionally-based webs varies dramatically across regions. Along with Africa, Europe (as we would have expected given the emergence of the EU) has the largest web of international institutions (see Figure 2). Also notable is that the European web has shrunk since the end of the Cold War, consistent with overall shrinkage in the web of IGOs (Volgy et al, 2006). The database identifies 42 "live" European regional organizations in 2004, down from 53 in 1989. Only 4 new traditional regional organizations came into being following the collapse of the Soviet Union and none of those occurred in the 21st century. Incremental ism - rather than a full revamping of the regional structure - appears to be the primary playbook for Europe.

5 The database includes only "traditional" IGOs, excluding all emanations. For operational de-

finitions of IGOs included in the database, see Volgy, Fausett, Grant, Detamore, and Rogers, 2006.

6 There is an enormous amount of controversy over how to identify "regions" (e.g., see Lemke, 2002; Buzan and Waever, 2004). We make no claim to resolving this controversy. For analytic purposes, we have created here a classification scheme that is based on a combination of geogra-phy, and broad political affiliation. Accordingly, our regions consist of: Europe, Asia, Middle East (including states with dominant Arab or Islamic populations directly adjoining the Middle East, such as Saharan Africa, Afghanistan, and Turkey); Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America (including Central America), and the Caribbean. Organizations exclusive to North America (two) and Oceana (two) are for accounting purposes coded as "other" region. Israel is excluded from the Middle East; Turkey is included in the Middle East, but not in Europe.

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Figure 2. Numbers of RGOs and SRGOs (Combined) for Six Regions, for 1989 and 2004. (Source Volgy, Fausett, Grant, Detamore and Rogers, 2006)

Given EU enlargement, both in size and purpose, we should see a diminu-

tion in broad, regional organizations outside of the EU context. We classify or-ganizations as "functional" if they primarily engage in narrow, technical, or regulatory tasks related to a single issue. Those with a broader scope are grouped as non-functional. More than a decade after the Cold War, the number of non-functional organizations has decreased dramatically (by almost 35%, as noted in Figure 3). The resulting proportional increase in functionally driven regional organizations has been almost equally as dramatic, showing an increase of 50%. As is evident in Figure 3, SRGOs represent the most dynamic element of this difference. While the number of functional RGOs remains relatively constant, non-functional SRGOs have shrunk by 35% and functional SRGOs have more than doubled (although SRGOs hold the larger proportion of non-functional organizations).

Figure 3

Looking at the various purposes of SRGOs versus RGOs (see Figures 4 and

5) provides some clues to the alternatives available to European states, even in the context of the EU. Given the general wealth of most European states, a ma-jority of both types of organizations are devoted to economic issues. However, SRGOs appear to provide structural alternatives to the EU regarding social, political/military, and "general" organizations.

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Figure 4. Organizational Purpose Divided by RGOs and SRGOs, 1989

Figure 5. Organizational Purpose Divided by RGOs and SRGOs, 2004

SRGOs also provide a mechanism for European states' ongoing cooperative

efforts without the involvement of major European states. As Figure 6 notes, SRGOs are the overwhelming type of structure where none of the major Euro-pean states are represented. Alternatively, the major EU states dominate the re-gional organizations such that all RGOs include them in their membership.

Figure 6. Major Power Membership in Regional IGOs, for 1989 and 2004

Finally, we should take note of the very limited extent of Russian penetra-

tion into European regional organizations. At the end of the Cold War, the So-viet Union was a member of 7 European RGOs, sharing membership with the UK, France or (West) Germany in only one. In 2004, Russia is a member of only

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8 RGOs, but in 7 shares membership with major EU states. Clearly Russia has integrated into some of the existing architecture of Europe though not aggres-sively so. Concurrent with Buzan and Wsever's conclusions, Russian policy makers have not demonstrated a strong multilateral involvement in Europe, a posture likely reflecting both Russian priorities toward a more global and inter-regional role as well as an effort to re-direct institutionalized cooperation toward bilateral means (Buzan and Wasver, 2003; Willerton and Beznosov, 2005).7

Despite its shrinkage, the regional architecture of Europe is fairly stable and appears to function through an incrementalism. As membership panties and the lack of creation seem to indicate however, Europe is not "re-making" itself. Rather, a "greater" Europe is gradually being drawn into the existing regional architecture, partially driven by the success of the European Union.8

Assessing the Dependent Variable: How Variable is it? We suggested earlier that there may be substantial variability in the propen-

sity of European states to join different types of IGOs, a variability that should be evident not only across IGO types but across and within groupings of "older" and "newer" European states.9 Even among the more established states of the EU (see Table 1) there have been non-automatic choices; variation is evident across states on the western side of the old Cold War divisions. Portugal joins roughly half the SRGOs it is eligible to join, compared to Spain's 100%; Irel-and joins nearly 40% fewer RGOs than does the UK and Austria joins roughly 25% fewer IRGOs than does Ireland. The variation between "older" and the "newer" states of Europe is even stronger, as is the variation within the "newer" group. While the older states average between 73% and 85% involvement across the board, the newer states join at a much lower rate, ranging from 30% to 57%. The joining patterns are also more diverse among the newer states that

7 Powers and Goertz (2006) also note sharp increases in bilateral as opposed to multilateral ap-

proaches since 1989. 8 "Greater" in this context is used to indicate breadth. 9 Omitted from Table 1 are Cyprus, Iceland, Lichtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco and

San Marino. Due to their size and other special circumstances (e.g. the division of Cyprus on the part of the Greeks and Turks) that place unique constraints on their maneuverability in the inter-national (and regional) arena, in addition to the difficulty in obtaining reliable data, we felt justi-fied in their exclusion in this analysis. The inclusion of more eastern states (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) might also strike some as contentious. While these states are indeed on the fringe of Europe, the definition of Europe has expanded dramatically in the past decade, as the most recent additions to the EU and NATO apply demonstrate. Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia have the opportunity to join several regional organizations.

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have, except in the case of GIGOs, a standard deviation of .20 or higher com-pared to the older states' average of .13.

Table 1. IGO Joining per European State

"Old" Europe “New” Europe GIGOs IRGOs RGOs SRGOs GIGOs IRGOs RGOs SRGOs

Austria 0.733 0.571 0.824 0.600 Albania 0.458 0.462 0.188 0.333

Belgium 0.855 0.700 1000 0.667 Armenia 0.404 0.333 0.067 0.000

Denmark 0.783 0.857 0.824 0.714 Azerbaijan 0.414 0.500 0.133 0.000

Finland 0.833 0.750 0.882 0.818 Belarus 0.421 0.545 0.000 0.000

France 0.919 0.857 0.941 0.625 Bosnia 0.379 0.182 0.188 0.333

Germany 0.917 0.667 1.000 1.000 Bulgaria 0.600 0.846 0.375 0.750

Greece 0.820 0.636 0.765 1.000 Croatia 0.576 0.300 0.375 0.333

Ireland 0.667 0.714 0.588 0.333 Czech Rep 0.650 0.727 0.588 0.500

Italy 0.867 0.727 1.000 1.000 Estonia 0.500 0.778 0.294 0.667

Netherlands 0.850 0.667 0.941 0.667 Georgia 0.421 0.400 0.067 0.333

Norway 0.754 0.857 0.625 1.000 Hungary 0.700 0.700 0.706 1.000

Portugal 0.800 0.923 0.824 0.500 Latvia 0.483 0.778 0.294 0.500

Spain 0.850 0.857 0.778 1.000 Lithuania 0.483 0.556 0.353 0.500

Sweden 0.833 0.600 0.882 0.769 Macedonia 0.424 0.200 0.188 0.333

Switzerland 0.790 0.625 0.813 1.000 Moldova 0.356 0.545 0.188 0.333

UK 0.803 0.769 0.941 0.400 Poland 0.729 0.909 0.706 0.667

Romania 0.683 0.667 0.375 0.750

Russia 0.783 0.850 0.200 0.667

Serbia 0.552 0.273 0.188 0.500

Slovakia 0.633 0.636 0.471 0.500

Slovenia 0.610 0.545 0.471 0.000

Ukraine 0.509 0.714 0.200 0.500

mean 0.817 0.736 0.852 0.756 mean 0.535 0.566 0.301 0.432

standard 0.0648 0.1078 0.1237 0.2297 standard 0.1241 0.2165 0.1952 0.2693

deviation deviation

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Table 2 reports correlation coefficients by type of organization. They reflect

substantial differences between older and newer states, with IRGOs housing the biggest difference. Negative correlations between regional (both RGOs and SRGOs) and interregional (IRGOs) present an indication of a preferred local rather than intercontinental focus on the part of older states. Important to note, however, is how closely related GIGO and RGO joining patterns are to each other, perhaps reflecting the extent to which Ikenberry's (2001) "constitutional" order reflects the interests of wealthy states that are satisfied with the status quo at the global level.

Table 2. Correlations Between Joining Investments for All Types of IGOs

GIGOs IRGOs RGOs SRGOs ALL GIGO -

IRGO 0.635 -

RGO 0.918 0.550 -

SRGO 0.722 0.532 0.659 -

Older States1

GIGO -

IRGO 0.075 -

RGO 0.796 -0.174 -

SRGO 0.413 -0.131 0.07 -

Newer States GIGO -

IRGO 0.622 -

RGO 0.731 0.510 - SRGO 0.639 0.563 0.595 -

Altogether, these patterns appear to indicate that joining each of the webs of

IGOs is not automatic for European states: choices apparently are being made

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even by wealthy European states about joining IGOs, above and beyond joining the EC.

The Independent Variables Capabilities and Trade Both of the above variables are from the World Bank's World Development

Indicators database for 2003 (Bank, 2005). Capabilities were measured by GDP10 and were log-transformed to account for diminishing returns. Trade dependence is calculated as a percentage of GDP.11 Agreement/disagreement with Regional Policy Preferences

The policy preferences measure utilizes data from a project that makes use of UN General Assembly roll call votes to gauge policy preferences among in-dividual states and regions (Volgy and Fausett, 2005).12 We concur with Lemke (2002) that while there is no fail-safe method for assessing state preferences, the voting data constitute an adequate measure of policy preferences (for a discus-sion of the measure's applicability to Northern states, see Volgy et. al., 2003).

Our measure of policy preferences provides comparisons between each in-dividual state's preferences with those of the European region as a whole.13 UNGA votes from contested resolutions are recoded along a Likert scale where a "no" vote is recorded as the lowest value, a "yes" is the highest and "abstain" or "absent" provide the middle point.14 Individual European states scores are calculated by averaging each state's vote over the number of resolutions for the

10 In millions of US dollars. 11 The measures are meant to duplicate earlier research (Shanks et. al., 1996) using similar con-

cepts and measures. 12 Measuring similarity in foreign policy preferences is plagued by vexing validity issues. Sev-

eral options have been proposed in the literature for measuring dissatisfaction and preferences, among them tau-b and United Nations General Assembly votes (e.g. Signorino and Ritter, 1999; Tomlin, 1985; Voeten, 2000). UNGA measures are criticized both for the limit of data availabili-ty (recorded votes only exist from 1945 on) and lack of variation in minor power voting (see Lemke, 2002). As this analysis focuses on 2004, the time limit does not apply to this study. Second, as seen in Table 3 below, there seems to be a fairly large amount of variation in voting patterns within the region.

13 For a brief weighing of UNGA votes, and other various measures, as expressions of policy preferences, see Lemke (2002). For an expanded justification for the viability of UNGA votes as preferences see Volgy et al (2003).

14 By placing "abstain" and "absent" as the middle ground between yes and no, this scale al-lows for the possibility that some states may not be able to risk outright agreement or disagree-ment with other states. As motivation for "abstain" and "absent" votes is not transparent, we avoid "padding" by consigning these votes to a neutral category.

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session. The European regional policy preference score is calculated by taking the average of the votes of all of the states in the region for each resolution. The per-resolution regional vote scores are then averaged across the number of reso-lutions of the UNGA session to create a regional policy preference score. Disa-greement with regional policy preferences is calculated from the above statis-tics. Individual state policy preference scores are compared to the overall re-gional score, creating a "distance" measure between policy preferences. Lower numbers represent smaller distances between policy preferences and thus higher policy agreement between states.15

EU membership A dichotomous variable, this indicates state membership of the EU, as of

2003. The following table provides descriptive statistics for all the variables utilized.

Table 3. Variable Descriptive Statistics1

MIN MAX MEAN STD DEV

GIGO Investment 0.356 0.919 0.654 0.1743 IRGO Investment 0.182 0.923 0.638 0.1964

RGO Investment2 0 1 0.530 0.3201

SRGO Investment 0 1 0.568 0.2980

EU Member State 0 1 0.368 0.4889

Trade 0.485 2.028 0.967 0.3890

Capabilities 7.583 14.69 2

11.169 1.9644

Distance From Regional Policy Preferences 0.002 0.156 0.037 0.0415

1 Data represented above hail from three complementary datasets (Bank, 2005; Volgy, 2005; Volgy, 2005b) for the year 2003; N = 38

2 When controlling for EU membership in the model, the EU is removed from the investment score so as not to artificially inflate the significance of EU membership. This adjusted RGO variable spans 0-1, with a mean of 0.502 and a standard deviation of 0.3090.

15 Note that a negative relationship for this variable denotes lesser distance, or, greater agree-

ment in policy preferences.

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Correlates of RGO and SRGO Membership Compared to GIGO and IRGO Membership

We apply a standard OLS regression operation to each of the four models predicting to membership in alternative webs of IGOs for European states. The results are noted in Table 4. Although our models contain only four variables for only 38 observations, they yield a strong cumulative effect on the dependent variables. The amount of variance explained particularly for GIGOs and RGOs is very strong (92% and 86% respectively).16

Table 4. Standard OLS Regression of European State Joining Densities1

GIGO IRGO RGO SRGO

Distance from Regional Policy

Preferences Economic Capabilities (logged GDP in mil)

Trade (as a % of GDP)

EU Member (dummy)

Intercept

-0.647*** (.194) .077*** (.006) -.001 (.021) .034 (.024) -.198** (.071)

0.130 (.638) 0.078*** (.020) 0.090 (.070) -0.061 (.079) -0.304 (.234)

-1.978*** (.476) 0.116*** (.015) 0.089* (.052) 0.153* (.059) -0.823*** (.174)

-3.343*** (.755) 0.121*** (.024) -0.0623 (.083) -0.161* (.094) -0.543* (.277)

N R2

Adjusted R2

38 0.9321 0.9239

38 0.4198 0.3495

38 0.8769 0.8620

38 0.6466 0.6037

***- at .001,** - at .05, * - at .10 1 Note: coefficients are unstandardized. For membership in GIGOs, two predictor variables are worthy of note. First,

and clearly, the global arena appears to be the province of the strongest of eco-

16 Common knowledge (i.e. EU membership is overwhelmingly dominated by relatively rich states) would lead one to expect particularly high correlations between two or more of the va-riables. While we do not deny the dangers of multicollinearity, marginally high correlations can be tolerated in OLS within reason. In this case only the correlation between EU membership and economic capabilities, with a Pearson's r approaching .73, represent a possible hazard. This correlation, however, is still below the conventional cutoff of .8. As high correlations only inflate standard errors while leaving actual point estimates alone, and both of these variables maintain significance (in at least two of the models), in spite of a fairly strong correlation between the two, there is evidence that both of these variables are important to understanding regional joining for European states. On the problem of col linearity, see Fox (1997).

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nomic states: the relationship between density in the web and economic capabil-ities is significant at the .001 level. While our data do not allow us to determine whether this relationship is due to the limited resources of smaller states or greater investment in global economic issues on the part of stronger states, we do know that the global web consists of a far broader variety of IGOs than eco-nomic ones directly affecting the economic fortunes of states.

Second is the relationship between membership and a state's congruence with regional policy preferences (negative and significant at the .05 level), sug-gesting that along with the ability to play in the global arena, it is also some higher level of agreement with regional policies that may help create incentives to do so. Many of the organizations in the web of GIGOs were created by the US with its western allies, consistent with objectives to preserve the global sta-tus quo they favored (Ikenberry, 2001). Most "older" European states are heavi-ly imbedded in that status quo, of which the EU is now a large part. It is no wonder then, that commonality in regional policy preferences is linked to higher rates of participation for those European states that are also powerful (compared to their non-European counterparts) economic actors.

The model for the regional web (RGOs) is equally powerful, but demon-strates a pattern substantially different from the GIGO model. Now, as expected, whether or not a state is a member of the EU, along with economic capability, predicts powerfully to joining other, region-wide IGOs. However, so does trade dependence and policy similarity with the region as a whole. All four variables are statistically significant, suggesting the cumulative effects of these variables for state enmeshment in the regional web, above and beyond EU17 membership.

The model for sub-regional web (SRGOs) membership demonstrates the most unique outcome. Here—along with economic capacity—we find agree-ment with regional policy preferences to be equally significant, and unlike in the previous models, the relationship with EU membership is negative and signifi-cant EU members have approximately 16% lower levels of SRGO membership than do non-EU members. Membership in SRGOs appears to provide an alter-native arena for European states that have the capacity to join them, are less

17 Policy disagreements within the European region represent a factor both more and less than

it appears. We attempted to control for the influence of "new" states by introducing a dummy variable in the equation (not shown), and these preference variables continued to hold their signi-ficance, indicating that these are effects across both the "older' and the "newer" states that are part of the EU and of Europe. However, since the more established states offer the greatest membership concentrations within the constellation of RGOs, we assume that these preference effects emanate primarily from the older, Western European states.

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likely to be included in the European Community, and share substantially simi-lar policy preferences.

As expected, participation in SRGOs appears to follow a process different from RGOs, although these results seem to indicate that engaging the sub-regional webs is not a reaction against region-wide policy orientations. In fact, those states that are most consistent with region-wide policy preferences are more likely to join SRGOs, and more so when they are not members of the EU. This pattern suggests that either because they are excluded or have not been able (or willing) to meet EU standards, they are finding collaborative arrangements sub-regionally. Note in this regard that SRGOs, unlike RGOs, hold a dispropor-tionate share of non-functional organizations in the region along with most of the political/military and social organizations in Europe.

Across the four models, sheer economic capacity consistently shows very significant and strong relationships to state participation, regardless of the type of web analyzed. This finding is consistent with both functionalist (e.g., Mitra-ny, 1975; Jacobson et.al., 1986; Shanks et. al., 1996) and liberal institutionalist perspectives regarding the benefits gained from routinized participation in IGOs. Likewise, the extent to which states hold common regional policy preferences appears to be correlated with joining GIGOs, RGOs and SRGOs. The most in-teresting and strongest variant of this pattern appears to reside in SRGOs where states collaborate with more homogeneous counterparts.

Also of interest is the linkage between the relative importance of trade de-pendence and RGO membership. As we had noted earlier (Figure 6), an over-whelming majority of current regional organizations are devoted to the eco-nomic sector. While trade dependence doesn't appear to be significant for other webs, it does so for RGO participation in the case of European states.

Finally, we should note that our base model is least useful in predicting par-ticipation in IRGOs. The total amount of variance explained for this group is the lowest at 35 percent, and only economic capability demonstrates any statistically significant relationship to membership density. Evidently the dynamics involved with IRGO membership are substantially different for European states than with the other types of organizational webs.

Fitting In Central and Eastern Europe Enormous changes have occurred in Central and Eastern Europe following

the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. In addition to a major renovation of the political landscape, a period of fractional ization struck several Eastern European states. As the established states behind the old Iron Curtain changed regimes and others (re)created their new state identities as

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the Soviet Union's borders crumbled, the old COMECON and Warsaw Pact cooperative structures became obsolete. For some, including the Czech Repub-lic, Hungary, and Poland, entry into the western web of structures, and especial-ly into NATO and the EU, appeared to be a foregone conclusion.18 We can now observe a bit more clearly the extent of theirs and their neighbors' integration into the western-dominated web of structures (see Figure 7).

Once the two groups are compared, the distinction between membership densities for older and newer states is fairly straightforward. In general—and as expected—the older European states dominate the higher levels of membership in both GIGOs and RGOs, those organizational webs which continue to encap-sulate major elements of old Cold War architecture. As Figure 7 also illustrates, some of the newer states reach density parity with older states across both groupings of GIGO and IRGO networks of organizations, and the gap between the two groups is somewhat narrow. RGO and SRGO membership densities indicate joining patterns, however, that display more variation throughout the Central and Eastern states. Furthermore, the wealthier and more centralized of the “newer” states have fairly well imbedded themselves within each web across the board, maintaining high involvement throughout all of the webs, as compared to the majority of the newer states. These states demonstrate the rush to reintegrate into Europe (and globally).

At the same time, very substantial differences are evident within the group of "newer" states. Not only does there appear to be substantial differences in participation rates between states newly entering the EU versus those that have not entered, but within each of those sub-groupings as well. Figure 8 notes a substantially higher rate of RGO participation by Hungary and Poland than Slo-venia or Estonia. Hungarians outpace the Czechs and Slovenians in SRGO membership. Poland demonstrates even higher rates of participation in IRGOs than Russia, and substantially more so than the Czechs or Hungarians. There appears to be significant variation here, and our models are clearly inadequate to explain the options being pursued by these "newer" states.

18 A Hungarian colleague noted to one of us in 1994: "We have no choice but to join the EU

and NATO. These are the only steps that allow us to reintegrate back into Europe. I wish we had a choice...Hungary will lose its own identity, swallowed up by Germans, the French and the English.. .but we can't become Europeans again without this change."

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Figure 7. Participation Densities fer European States per IGO Type, 2004

As discussed earlier, the Russian push toward a more global role1 ap-pears to be at the exclusion of a major regional presence in Europe. Consis-tent with a global, as opposed to a regional positioning, it maintains the highest involvement in GIGOs and 2nd

highest involvement in IRGOs, sur-passing almost all the entirety of Eu-ropean states, older and newer.

The "far-Eastern European" states - Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia - not only exhibit low levels of in-volvement in organizations at the regional level, but also in GIGOs and IRGOs. Belarus, despite its geograph-ical location, exhibits density patterns consistent with this sub-grouping of "newer" states. These four states not only remain outside of mainstream Europe, but are engaged in very little institutional networking. Their over-all separation from the web of IGOs emphasizes Willerton and Beznosov's (2005) claims: Russia's renewed pre-ference for bilateral agreements allow (and in some cases force) poorer (and conflict prone) states to bypass a large portion of regional and international architecture while generating some benefit from bilateral cooperative arrangements.

1 For example, see "Putin Touts Russia as

World Leader," Moscow Times, June 14, 2006.

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Conclusions Our preliminary analysis of the correlates of membership density in alterna-

tive webs of organizations by European states has been useful in highlighting a number of patterns. First, economic differences within post Cold War Europe further underscore the importance of capabilities in the choices made by states to enmesh themselves in all four types of organizational networks. We suspect that this relationship exists on the basis of the sheer capacity of states and that it may reflect the reality that many of these organizations exist to support a status quo that favors the wealthier states and has more policy relevance for them. Yet, even when controlling for policy preferences, the capability measure re-mains the strongest predictor across every type of organization.

Second, congruence in policy preferences matters and appears to constitute an important correlate of states working together in regional and sub-regional architecture, even controlling for newer versus older states. However, policy preferences of the newer states on a range of issues—from support of US initia-tives through the appropriate economic models for growth—suggest substantial and long-term policy divisions for the region (Schuster and Maier, 2006). To the extent that a larger and more diverse Europe is emerging, our findings sug-gest that divergence in policy preferences will make state integration into re-gional and sub-regional arrangements more problematic in the future.

Ours is a preliminary analysis and much still remains to be done. We need, for instance to expand our probe of correlates of IRGO membership. In previous work (Volgy et. al., 2006) we found that it was in the creation and joining of new IRGOs where the new, post-Cold War web looks substantially different from its predecessor. Interestingly, in this effort we were least able to predict variation in European states' membership in IRGOs. In the future, we will pur-sue a comparative analysis of state membership in both more established and newly created webs of inter-regional governmental organizations.

Additionally, we are fascinated with the patterns uncovered for sub-regional organizations. This is the web of structures that provide perhaps the greatest commonalities for sub-groupings of European states that may be dissatisfied with region-wide policy preferences, and provides outlets for collaboration among like-minded neighbors. Yet, the non-functional component of this web has shrunk substantially since the end of the Cold War, and while membership is negatively correlated with EU membership (indicating an alternative outlet to the dominance of the EU for collaboration across sub-regional interests), it ap-pears that it is those states that are least distant from the region's foreign policy norms that are the most active in SRGOs. Why this is so needs to be explored further.

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We have of course been most remiss by failing to probe longitudinal and cause-and-effect relationships. We have only created correlations at one point in time (2004), making it impossible to draw valid inferences about cause and ef-fect. We are presently remedying this problem by finishing our data gathering to provide a second snapshot of membership patterns at the end of the Cold War, allowing us to observe how well our base models held across the two different time periods.

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