“3s” concept implementation - sparex nuclear...
TRANSCRIPT
“3S” Concept Implementation
Strategy
Dr. Lucian Biro
General Manager
SPAREX Nuclear 3S Ltd.
Nuclear Safety, Security & Safeguards Consulting
Romania
BIT's 4th Annual New Energy Forum – 2014
Forum 6: Nuclear Energy
Qingdao International Convention Center,
Qingdao, China
September 21-23, 2014
2
IAEA Nuclear Security Related Definitions
Lessons learned from the past
“3S” Concept
NPP Nuclear Security Vulnerabilities
NPP Safety & Security Characteristics
Design Basis Threat
Final remarks
References
Content
3
IAEA Nuclear Security Related
Definitions
4
IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 20
5
Definitions (1)
Defense in depth.
The combination of successive layers of nuclear
security systems and nuclear security measures for the
protection of targets from nuclear security threats.
Nuclear facility.
A facility (including associated buildings and
equipment) in which nuclear material is produced,
processed, used, handled, stored or disposed of and
for which an authorization or license is required.
IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 20
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Definitions (2)
nuclear security culture.
The assembly of characteristics, attitudes and
behaviours of individuals, organizations and
institutions which serve as a means to support,
enhance, and sustain nuclear security.
nuclear security system.
An integrated set of nuclear security measures.
IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 20
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Definitions (3)
nuclear security regime.
A regime comprising:
The legislative and regulatory framework and administrative
systems and measures governing the nuclear security of
nuclear material, other radioactive material, associated
facilities and associated activities;
The institutions and organizations within the State responsible
for ensuring the implementation of the legislative and
regulatory framework and administrative systems of nuclear
security;
Nuclear security systems and nuclear security measures
IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 20
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Lessons learned from the
past
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NPP Nuclear Accidents
NPP Sites from Satellite
9/11 Terrorist Attack in New-York
Lessons learned from the past
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NPPs Nuclear Accidents
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Windscale (Anglia) 1957
Three Miles Island (USA) 1979
Chernobyl (Ukraine) 1986
Fukushima (Japan) 2011
NPPs Nuclear Accidents
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NPP Sites from Satellite
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Germany: Biblis NPP
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France: Flamanville NPP Site
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Ukraine: Chernobyl NPP Site
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Romania: Cernavoda NPP Site
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9/11 Terrorist Attack
in New-York
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Targets Size Comparison
- US NEI Presentation-
WTC
208’ x 1,353’
Pentagon
1,489’ x 71’
Spent Fuel Bay
80’ x 40’
Reactor Building
130’ x 160’
Fuel
Storage
Containers
10’ x 20’
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Rethinking the Nuclear
Threat
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Changing of terrorists’ motivation
Interest for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
Using the technology to exploit the vulnerabilities of a
particular society
Development of black markets may offer access to
weapons
The rapid spread of technological knowledge can boost
terrorists weapon attem
Rethinking the Nuclear Threat
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“3S” Concept
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Nuclear safety:
to operate a nuclear facility in such manner that protects the
public and environment;
Nuclear security:
to protect nuclear facility against the intruders who whish to
damage or destroy it in order to harm people and the
environment;
Nuclear safeguard:
to verify the compliance with NPT requirements.
“3S” Concept (1)
23
The “3S” concept takes into consideration the links,
influences, synergies, feed-beaks between nuclear
safety, nuclear security and nuclear safeguards;
The objectives are to eliminate the gaps and
vulnerabilities on a nuclear facility operation in normal,
abnormal and accident conditions;
“3S” Concept (2)
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Nuclear Safety & Security Synergy
Nuclear
Safety
Nuclear
Security
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Nuclear Security
Vulnerabilities
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Lack of procedures
Inefficient procedures
Inefficient Physical Protection Systems
Lack of Facilities Personnel Training
Radioactive Sources Lost or Theft
Inefficient Transportation Physical Protection
Nuclear Security Vulnerabilities (1)
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Lack of coherent strategy
Gaps in Legal Framework
Inadequate Equipment
No specialized response units
Permissive Border Control
No background history of radioactive sources
No security culture
Nuclear Security Vulnerabilities (2)
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NPP Safety & Security
Characteristics
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Comprehensive measures for safety and security;
Comprehensive emergency and security plans;
Robust containment, spent fuel pools, and spent fuel
storage containers;
Redundant and diverse plant safety systems;
Trained plant staff, skilled in accident and event
response;
Well-trained, well-armed security forces.
Requirements for NPPs
30
CANDU-6 Multiple Layers Protection
Reactor Building
Bio Shield
Calandria Vessel
Reactor Fuel
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Design Basis Threat
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Physical Protection Regulations in Nuclear Field
Design Basis Threat
Regulations on using DBT
Regulations on requirements for guards and security
personnel qualification
Nuclear Security Related Regulations
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Principle of “defense in depth”
Categorization of nuclear material
Vital areas protection
Detection, delay, response
People trustworthiness
Design Basis Threat Concept
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NPP Physical Protection Arrangements
- US NEI Presentation -
Area Controlled
by the Owner
Protected
Area
Vital Area
Access Control
Area protected
by Double
Fences
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An assessment of physical, cyber, biochemical, and
other terrorist threats;
The potential for attack on facilities by multiple
coordinated teams of a large number of individuals and
several insiders;
Th�e potential for suicide attacks;
The potential for water-based and air-based threats;
US NRC: factors considered in new DBT (1)
36
The potential use of explosive devices of considerable
size and other modern weaponry;
The potential for attacks by persons with a
sophisticated knowledge of facility operations;
The potential for possibly long-lived �fires.
US NRC: factors considered in new DBT (2)
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DBT for Spent Fuel
Transportation by Airplane
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Security Measures for SNF Transportation (1)
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Security Measures for SNF Transportation (2)
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Spent Fuel Loaded in Airplane
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“3S” Concept is designed for an integrated approach to
be used in the area of nuclear safety, nuclear security
and nuclear safeguards;
Final Remarks
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1) US NRC Security Spotlight, May 2007
2) IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 20:
Objective and Essential Elements of a State’s
Nuclear Security Regime (2013)
References
43
Thank you for your attention !
Dr. Lucian BIRO
General Manager
Sparex Nuclear 3S Ltd.
Nuclear Safety, Security & Safeguards
Consulting
Romania
Mobile: + 40-753-090-897
E-mail: [email protected]