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Succeeding in 21st Century Battle Network Competitions
John Stillion and Bryan ClarkCenter for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments
• Battle Network (BN) definition:
– A combination of distributed target acquisition sensors (finders and damage assessors), command and control (deciders), weapons (shooters), and the electronic communications linking them together.
• Essential BN attributes:
– Enable shooters to engage targets they cannot “see” far more effectively than would otherwise be possible
– Enable finders to achieve much higher levels of effectiveness as a group than they possess organically
– Enable deciders to coordinate and prioritize tactical engagements at a much higher level of efficiency to achieve the desired operational effects
– Enable those assessing the results of these operations (damage assessors) to determine their relative success with far greater accuracy than would otherwise be possible
• BNs first emerged about 100 years ago but were relatively rare until recently due in part to the high cost of transmitting and processing information
– This limited the number of BNs and the instances of BN competition
• Declining cost and increasing power of information transmission and processing systems will likely spur BN proliferation, and with it BN competition
2
• Network attributes depend heavily on operational metrics
• Tempo of operations influences decision to exploit or disrupt opposing network
• “Virtual Attrition” is often more cost-effective than platform destruction
• Competitions accelerate and culminate, then jump to new mode
• In some cases one side or the other is “saved by the bell” when a conflict ends just before a competition jumps to a new mode
3
• Submarines vs. ASW
– Examine competition with focus on BMC2, multi-domain elements, success of networked vs. autonomous attackers
• IADS vs. Air Attack
– Explore how “cutting-edge” technologies advantage first one side, then the other in Battle Network Competitions
4
• Submarines and commercial/escort ships are relatively slow– Dependent on cueing to get in position
– Difficult to evade attack
– Results in “slow-motion” operations (better to exploit comms)
• Submarines have limited situational awareness– EM sensor range <10 nm; sonar ranges <30 nm normally
– Difficult to determine if incoming weapon will be successful
• Submarines lack self defense– Some decoys, but little else to defeat torpedoes and depth charges
5
Fundamentals of ASW-sub competition remain largely unchanged.
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Subs maintain speed disadvantage & larger ships less vulnerable.
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Me
an M
erc
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t Sh
ip S
ize
(to
ns)
Max
imu
m s
teal
thy
sub
sp
ee
d /
Me
rch
ant
ship
sp
ee
d
Sub speed disadvantage (u/v)
Mean Transoceanic Merchant Ship Size
Jul ’40–Dec ’41
Jul ’43–Jun ’44
Apr ’41–May ’43
Jan ’42–Sep ’42
Apr ’41–Jun ’44
U-boat patrol areas
Sep ’39–Mar ’40
Jan ’42–Jan ’44
Sep ’39–Mar ’41
Jun ’44–Apr ’45
Coastal convoys mid-1942–1945
Transatlantic convoys 1939–1945
U-boat bases Sep ’39 & after Jun ’44
U-boat bases Jul ’40–Jun ’44
Long range & slow speed of adversaries shaped competition.
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Sep-39 Jan-40 May-40 Sep-40 Jan-41 May-41 Sep-41 Jan-42 May-42 Sep-42 Jan-43 May-43 Sep-43 Jan-44 May-44 Sep-44 Jan-45 May-45
Shipping losses (tons) U-boats at sea in Atlantic U-boats sunk per month
Key metric for allies: overall shipping losses.
Invasion of Norway &
low countries
Evasive convoy routing based on shore HFDF
begins
U-boats begin using French bases
Convoy escorts proficient with
radar
Subs shift to U.S. coast
Enigma code upgraded
U.S. coast convoysL-band GSR
deployedAllies crack new Enigma code
S-band radar
Continuous air escort New convoy codes
S-band GSR deployed
X-band radar deployed
Snorkel deployed
X-band GSR deployed
U-boats deploy to coast of France
U-boats evacuate French bases
H-K carrier groups
H-K groups sink supply submarines
Start max submergence through Bay of Biscay
Bombing of French U-boat bases
U-boats to European coast and southern Atlantic
U-boats shift to surfaced night attack
due to sonar threat
German decryption of convoy orders
Supply submarines start ops off Azores
“Wolf Pack” tactics start
Hedgehog
Hedgehog fully fielded
U b
oats p
resen
t or lo
st per m
on
thSh
ipp
ing
loss
es (t
on
s)
U-boats begin using Norwegian bases
Naval Enigma code broken
More escorts for convoys
Leigh Light & L-band radar a/c
HF/DF, radar on escort
Escort CV
“Saved by the Bell”
Overall shipping losses=shipping construction
1942 spike around U.S.; stopped by convoys w/out sinking subs.
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Jan-40 Apr-40 Jul-40 Oct-40 Jan-41 Apr-41 Jul-41 Oct-41 Jan-42 Apr-42 Jul-42 Oct-42 Jan-43 Apr-43 Jul-43 Oct-43 Jan-44
Overall shipping losses (X 1000 tons)
Losses on U.S. East Coast and Carribean (X1000 tons)Losses per month per U-boat (X 100 tons)
U-boats at sea in Atlantic
U-boats sunk off East Coast and inCaribbean
U-boats shift back to central and eastern Atlantic
Coastal convoys start on East coast
Coastal convoys start in Caribbean
Enigma code upgraded
Enigma code broken
U b
oats p
resen
t or lo
st per m
on
thSh
ipp
ing
loss
es
Radar equipped aircraft and escorts start deploying
Effective weapons (hedgehog/mousetrap) deployed
On U.S. entry into war, 6 aircraft and ~12
escort ships available (but not equipped) on
East Coast
By 1 April, 170 planes and 94 escorts of various types
Coastal vessels stay in inland waterways, protected by minefields
During May radar-equipped aircraft begin deploying to East Coast
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Sep-39 Feb-40 Jul-40 Dec-40 May-41 Oct-41 Mar-42 Aug-42 Jan-43 Jun-43 Nov-43 Apr-44 Sep-44 Feb-45
Shipping losses per U-boat per month U-boats at sea U-boats sunk per month
Invasion of Norway & low
countries
Evasive convoy routing based on
shore HFDF begins
U-boats begin using French bases
Convoy escorts proficient with radar
Subs shift to U.S. coast
Enigma code upgraded
U.S. coast convoysL-band GSR
deployed
Allies crack new Enigma code
S-band radar
Continuous air escort New convoy codes
S-band GSR deployed
X-band radar deployed
Snorkel deployed
X-band GSR deployed
U-boats deploy to coast of France
U-boats evacuate French bases
H-K carrier groups
H-K groups sink supply submarines
Start max submergence through Bay of Biscay
Bombing of French U-boat bases
U-boats to European coast and southern Atlantic
U-boats shift to surfaced night attack
due to sonar threat
German decryption of convoy orders
Supply submarines start ops off Azores
“Wolf Pack” tactics start
Hedgehog
Hedgehog fully fielded
U b
oats p
resen
t or lo
st per m
on
thSh
ipp
ing
loss
es p
er U
-bo
at p
er m
on
th
U-boats begin using Norwegian bases
Naval Enigma code broken
More escorts for convoys
Leigh Light & L-band radar a/c
HF/DF, radar on escort
Escort CV
Key metric for Axis: U-boat productivity.
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Pe
rce
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ge o
f sh
ips
lost
Nu
mb
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voys
Convoy size
Japanese convoy results
Number of convoys
Percentage of M/V sunk
North Atlantic convoy results
Convoys ShipsConvoys Sighted
Ships Sunk% Convoys
Sighted% Ships Sunk
HX (9 kts) 23 923 8 12 35 1.3
SC (7 kts) 24 991 14 45 58 4.6
ON (9.5 kts) 24 897 11 29 36 3.2
ONS (7 kts) 23 836 11 31 48 3.7
But convoys alone reduced submarine effectiveness.
Location of attacks Independent Coordinated
U.S. attacks, Atlantic and Mediterranean;Jan 1943–Feb 1944
Number of incidents 176 18
Number assessed as sunk or probably sunk 9 3
Percent successful 5 17
U.S. attacks, Atlantic and Mediterranean;March 1944–May 1945
Number of incidents 41 38
Number assessed as sunk or probably sunk 5 21
Percent successful 12 55
Probability of regaining contact
Single Ship Coordinated
Jan 1943–July 1943 0.54 0.8
Aug 1943–Feb 1944 0.68 0.9
Engagement platform sensors not able to gain & maintain contact.
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Squid (1943)Hedgehog (1941) Mousetrap (1942)
Smaller, aimed contact weapons more effective.
WeaponLethal
radius (ft)# of charges
/ barrageWeapons effectiveness per barrage
1st half ’43 2nd half ’43 1st half ’44 2nd half ’44 1st qtr ’45
Depth Charge 21 9 5.4 4 6.4 5.1 7
Mousetrap 0 24 7.5 15.4 28.1 23
Squid 0 16 33.3 62
Depth Charge (1939)
Lorient
Brest
St. Nazaire
Bordeaux
La Pallice
Sep ’39–Mar ’41Jun ’44–Apr ’45
Jul ’40–Dec ’41
Apr ’41–May ’43
“Virtual attrition” in Bay of Biscay much more important than kills.
Metric was kills; should be “virtual attrition” of U-boat presence.
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u-boat losses per month Transit Duration (hours) U-boats at sea in Atlantic Percentage of deployed subs in Bay
U-b
oat lo
sses / Perce
ntage o
f dep
loyed
U-b
oats in
Bay
U-b
oat
pre
sen
ce /
tra
nsi
td
ura
tio
n (
ho
urs
)
L-band GSR deployedLeigh Light
deployed in Bay
L-band radar deployed in Bay
H-K groups start
S-band radar deployment starts
Naxos S-band GSR deployed, not effectively X-band radar
deployed
U-boats fight back with FLAK
Naxos S-band GSR more effective
S-band radar deployed
U-boats return to max submergence
U-boats start max submergence
U-boats ordered to surface in day, submerge at night
Bombing of French U-boat bases
Hedgehog deployed
Enigma code broken
Enigma code upgraded
U
Radar detector protects U-boats but reduces
productivity
Covert detection increases kills, but only modestly
increase presence in Bay
New detector slows boats, increases presence in Bay
and reduces Atlantic presence
Time to introduce RWR takes half as long as
previous time
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Metox L-band GSR
Tunis X-band GSR
H2S S-band radar
Naxos S-band GSR
Counters take less time until competition “jumps” to a new band.
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Sep-39 Mar-40 Oct-40 May-41 Nov-41 Jun-42 Dec-42 Jul-43 Jan-44 Aug-44 Mar-45
Mo
nth
s
Lifetime of Advancements in World War II ASW
L-band ASW radar
Original Enigma code
Upgraded Enigma code
L-band RWR
S-band ASW radar
X-band ASW radar
Convoy order decryption
S-band RWR
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161
74
35
40
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SensorVisual
Radar
Broadband Sonar
Narrowbandsonar
Other
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54 214 15 36
Surface ship Aircraft Submarine Intelligence
Diesel submarine detections by U.S. during 1967 Arab-Israeli War
Diesel subs in 1967 Arab-Israeli War tracked as in WWII.
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1311
6
Sensor
Visual
Radar
Broadband Sonar
Narrowband sonar
Other
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8 11 11 6
Surface ship Aircraft Submarine Intelligence
Nuclear submarine detections by U.S. during 1967 Arab-Israeli War
Nuclear subs tracked during 1967 war by passive sonar.
1958
19701978
1970
1970
1978
1978
1978
SOSUS array coverage
SOSUS and submarine arrays enabled near-continuous track.
19581978
19701978
1978
SOSUS arraycoverage
Passive sonar competition nears “culmination” in 1980s.
SOSUS array coverage decreasing with quieter
threat subs
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1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
German,U-boat
SnorkelingDiesel subs
(including Soviet)Soviet, noisyNuclear subs
Soviet quiet nuclear subs
Rest-of-World (ROW), non-nuclear submarines (some AIP)
Nuclear and non-nuclear
subs
1944U.S./UK forces win Battle of
Atlantic
1942Disastrous U-
boat campaign off U.S. East
Coast
~1955Large Soviet SSK
force; U.S. reliant on snorkel for
detection
1958Task Force Alfa raises U.S. ASW
performance
1960–70sMore Soviet nuclear subs
deployed
1962SSKs detected in
Cuban Missile Crisis, but only with
enormous effort
~1975Major U.S. acoustic
advantage over Soviet SS/G/BN
1980sSignificant USSR quieting effort
following Walker spy revelations
~1995Limited ASW
capability against quieter Soviet sub force
2003Fielding of VDS, LFA,
multi-statics
“Saved by the Bell”
“Saved by the Bell”
U.S. was lucky in last two shifts; how to prepare for next one?
1980sAs Soviet SSNs
became harder to track, primary effort became
holding SSBN at risk in bastions
e
EM competition
e
Passive sonar competition
eActive sonar competition?
ROW subs noisy, continuing
passive regime
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• Competition will shift away from detection of noise from sub– Culminated in 1990s, but U.S. got a reprieve
– Quieting techniques known and achievable by key competitors
• Competition will shift toward:– Active sonar: Low-frequency (100–300 hz) ranges in 10s–100s of miles
– Non-acoustic phenomena: Wakes, chemicals, radiation, etc.
– Background noise
• Shift enabled by improved processing and modeling– Increasingly can fit onto mobile platforms, co-locating sensor and shooter
• Effective competitors will exploit fundamentals, “virtual attrition”– Active sonar impacts sub operation and behavior, even if inaccurate
– Smaller, “mission-kill” weapons can be longer range, effective vs. subs
• Submarines vs. ASW
– Examine competition with focus on BMC2, multi-domain elements, success of networked vs. autonomous attackers
• IADS vs. Air Attack
– Explore how “cutting-edge” technologies advantage first one side, then the other in Battle Network Competitions
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• Speed
• Access
• Fragility
• Relatively low payload
• Relatively low combat persistence
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Combat Sorties per Month
US AAF vs. Germany March 1944 26,411
Rolling Thunder (1965–86) 9,468
IAF 1973 18,131
Desert Storm 51,840
Allied Force 10,231
• Combination makes air forces extremely sensitive to attrition
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Analog computing bombsights
Early losses drove both the Luftwaffe and RAF to adopt night bombing.
1000 ft radius USAAF “Target Area”
1200 ft CEP still sufficient to attack major plants
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Electronic Competition PhaseBomber Stream
GEE Program Start GEE Testing GEE Jammed
H2S Program Start H2S TestingH2S: 3 GHz ground
mapping radar Naxos-Z detector fieldedOboe Program Start Oboe Test Oboe Mk I 200 MHz Karl Jammer
Oboe Mk II 3 GHz
SerateMandrel Counter Freya, etc.
Tinsel Counter VHF Communication Jammer100 Group Jammers and Offensive Night Fighters
Airborne Cigar, Corona
Test Policy DelayWindo
w Conops Degrade
Wilde Sau/Zame Sau
Freya: 120–130 MHZ pulsed system. ~ 75 mile range "Mandrel" jamming EW radars modified to operate 107–158 MHZ to reduce jamming effectiveness
Kleine Heidelberg: Bi-Static radar leveraging Chain Home Signal. Range ~180 miles
Wurzburg Test WurzburgWindo
w Dopler and Resonance anti-Window Mods
Lichtenstein: 490 MHz pulsed system. ~3 mile range "Jammed" by WindowSN-2 85 MHZ Jammed
Naxos-Z H2S detector
Kammhuber Line Running Commentary Jammed
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30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945
BC Probability of Completing Tour Fraction of Bombs w/I 1,000 ft BC Cum. Sorties
Initial Day Operations
vs. Germany
Khammhuber Line IOC
Khammhuber Line FOC
“Bomber Stream”
Introduced
Bomber Command 100 Group Dedicated Comm. Jamming Aircraft
Battle of Hamburg
Average Chance of Surviving 30 Missions 51%
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Typical RAF Bomber Command Bombing Accuracy Pre-1942
Typical RAF Bomber Command Bombing Accuracy Pre-1942
RAF bombing pre-1942 largely ineffective.
Bomber Command operations through early 1942 relied on crews independently finding targets with aircraft widely separated in space and time
• Navigation and bombing highly inaccurate• German defenses develop slowly but grow
increasingly effective
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Maximum GEE Range
March 1942 British field GEE navigation aid after 21-month development period• Accurate to about 5 nm at maximum range of 250 sm• Enabled concentration of attackers in time and space to overwhelm linear
Himmlebett defenses• Germans identified its use and purpose on May 29 (82 days)• “Henrich” jammers developed and fielded by August 4, 1942 (67 days)• By December 1, 1942 GEE useless over Germany (267 day operational life)
Maximum GEE Range
29H2S S-Band Navigation Radar H2S Scope Presentation of Zuider Zee
H2S required 15 months from program start to first combat use on January 30, 1943• Provided navigation and bombing accuracy independent of range from UK• About twice as accurate as GEE• Germans reconstructed set from aircraft downed on February 2, 1943
(second combat use—3 days!)• Countermeasures team formed February 22, 1943 (24 days)• Naxos airborne homing device fitted to German night fighters from
September 11, 1943 (222 Days)
Maximum GEE Range
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July 24, 1943 Raid on Hamburg “Zahme Sau” (Tame Boar) night fighter tactics:Ground controllers provided general running commentary on the course, speed, height, and location of the bomber stream rather than single bombers.
“Wilde Sau” tactics: Single seat day fighters converged on target city and engaged bombers visually in the target area under a ‘freelance” system
German Low-Tech Response Restores Defense Effectiveness Rapidly
Window defeats Himmelbett system, but Germans rapidly adopt new tactics.
July 1943 RAF introduces “Window” in “Battle of Hamburg”• 746 attacking bombers dispensed one 2-pound packet of Window
every minute • Average time of fall was 15 minutes• Produced about 11,000 “bomber-like” returns
• German radars “clustered” near 500 MHz • Foiled GCI, gunlaying and AI radars (all used similar frequencies)
• Reduced effectiveness of defenses by about 75 percent
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One of four 2.5 kW/650lb. Jostle VHF communications jammers in bomb bay of 100 Group B-17 100 Group B-17 Fortress III ECM Aircraft
?
Fielding 250+ dedicated ECM aircraft defeats new German tactics by denying communications.
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1965 Sep Nov 1966 Mar May Jul Sep Nov 1967 Mar May Jul Sep Nov 1968 Mar May Jul Sep Nov
SA-2 Bat.
5
15
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SA-2 Battalions in North Vietnam
Intense attacks on Hanoi Bombing halted above 20o North
SAM Hunter - Killer
ECM Pod Formation
AGM-45 Shrike ARM
AGM-78 Standard ARM
Dev.
Dev. F-105F Wild Weasel
EB-66B Standoff Jamming vs. Fire Can and Fan Song EB-66B Shift to Jamming EW/GCI
QRC-160-1 Development
QRC-160-8 Jams SA-2 Missile Beacon
Flak Trap
SA-2 Manual Track Tactics
SA-2 Track on Jam Tactics
MiG-21 Introduced
Fan Song EMCON "Dummy Load" Modification
Flat Face L/L Acq. Radar Added to SA-2 Regiment
EW/GCI and SAM radars integrated
F-100F Wild Weasel (APR-25/26 RHWR)
SA-2 Command Uplink First Detected by Firebee Drone - QRC-160-8 Dev. Starts
QRC-160-8 Recovered - New SA-2 Missile Beacon Dev. Starts
QRC-160-1 ECM Pod In-Theater Testing
Use MiGs to Break-Up Pod Formations
QRC-160-1 Repeater Jammer - Denied Range to Fan Song and Fire Can
5
Brief bombing halt
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1965 Sep Nov 1966 Mar May Jul Sep Nov 1967 Mar May Jul Sep Nov 1968 Mar May Jul Sep
Probability of Completing Tour Strike Sortie Fraction Total Strike Sorties Flown vs. N. Vietnam "Virtual Attrition"
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Early 1968Mid-1965
SA-2 drives U.S. to introduce extensive dedicated ECM support.
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“Iron Hand”SEAD
“MiG CAP”Fighter Escorts
Strike Force
Target SA-2 SiteSA-2 Site
EB-66Standoff Jammer
EC-121 AEW“MiG CAP”Fighter Escorts
“Iron Hand”SEAD
By 1968 support aircraft often outnumber strike aircraft resulting in “virtual attrition.”
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• Time from introduction of an innovative system to fielding of a countermeasure generally shorter than development time of the innovation
• Cycle time decreases as conflict duration increases
• Systems working in new ways (H2S, SA-2) take longer to counter
• Anticipated measures (EB-66 Jamming) take less time
WWII Night Bombing Competition
Rolling Thunder Competition
• U.S. experience in Vietnam and IAF experience in October War showed:– Even with massive support packages and advanced ECM attrition is still a concern– Introduction of new systems (e.g. SA-2) can dramatically change combat outcomes in
short period of time– Big ‘last mover’ advantage in ECM/ECCM competition
• U.S. begins serious search for a “new approach” to aircraft survivability– Eventually invests in stealth to change the nature of the competition from active vs.
active to active vs. passive in the EM realm
• What is next?– Increasing reliance on active ECM as counter-LO EM sensors proliferate– Increasing centrality of IR sensors and weapon seekers as LO aircraft proliferate on both
sides• Calls into question utility of supercruise and afterburners
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?
Have Blue (DARPA Initiative 1974)
Combat Aircraft Design Transformed
• Aircraft get shot down over enemy territory providing adversary physical access to innovative systems—this often aids in fielding countermeasures– Corollary: It is better to wait until innovative systems can be fielded “en
mass” to achieve significant results than to introduce them piecemeal and risk early compromise
• IADS goal is to minimize damage to important assets, not (necessarily) to shoot down aircraft
• Great sensitivity to “actual attrition” makes air attackers very susceptible to “virtual attrition”– Rising support : strike sortie ratios likely indication that a “jump” is
required
37
• Network attributes depend heavily on operational metrics – Avoiding subs or night fighters is “good enough”—don’t have to kill them all
• Tempo of operations influences decision to exploit or disrupt opposing network– Short duration of air operations makes disruption more attractive– Slower pace of submarine warfare makes exploitation more attractive
• “Virtual Attrition” is often more important and cost-effective than platform destruction– Forcing opponent to operate less effectively or efficiently
• Competitions accelerate and culminate, then jump to new mode– Competitions “jump” when one side fields systems that defeat the opposing network
(usually wide area and/or localization sensors) at the physics level– Signs a competition may be nearing culmination include:
• Increasing support requirements to enable operations (Rolling Thunder)• Useful life of innovations measured in weeks• In peacetime, inability to significantly improve KPPs at affordable cost and/or in a reasonable time
• In some cases one side or the other is “saved by the bell” when a conflict ends just before a competition jumps to a new mode– Identifying and preparing for new basis of competition important for future success
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