1

Succeeding in 21st Century Battle Network Competitions

John Stillion and Bryan ClarkCenter for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments

• Battle Network (BN) definition:

– A combination of distributed target acquisition sensors (finders and damage assessors), command and control (deciders), weapons (shooters), and the electronic communications linking them together.

• Essential BN attributes:

– Enable shooters to engage targets they cannot “see” far more effectively than would otherwise be possible

– Enable finders to achieve much higher levels of effectiveness as a group than they possess organically

– Enable deciders to coordinate and prioritize tactical engagements at a much higher level of efficiency to achieve the desired operational effects

– Enable those assessing the results of these operations (damage assessors) to determine their relative success with far greater accuracy than would otherwise be possible

• BNs first emerged about 100 years ago but were relatively rare until recently due in part to the high cost of transmitting and processing information

– This limited the number of BNs and the instances of BN competition

• Declining cost and increasing power of information transmission and processing systems will likely spur BN proliferation, and with it BN competition

2

• Network attributes depend heavily on operational metrics

• Tempo of operations influences decision to exploit or disrupt opposing network

• “Virtual Attrition” is often more cost-effective than platform destruction

• Competitions accelerate and culminate, then jump to new mode

• In some cases one side or the other is “saved by the bell” when a conflict ends just before a competition jumps to a new mode

3

• Submarines vs. ASW

– Examine competition with focus on BMC2, multi-domain elements, success of networked vs. autonomous attackers

• IADS vs. Air Attack

– Explore how “cutting-edge” technologies advantage first one side, then the other in Battle Network Competitions

4

• Submarines and commercial/escort ships are relatively slow– Dependent on cueing to get in position

– Difficult to evade attack

– Results in “slow-motion” operations (better to exploit comms)

• Submarines have limited situational awareness– EM sensor range <10 nm; sonar ranges <30 nm normally

– Difficult to determine if incoming weapon will be successful

• Submarines lack self defense– Some decoys, but little else to defeat torpedoes and depth charges

5

Fundamentals of ASW-sub competition remain largely unchanged.

6

Subs maintain speed disadvantage & larger ships less vulnerable.

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Sub speed disadvantage (u/v)

Mean Transoceanic Merchant Ship Size

Jul ’40–Dec ’41

Jul ’43–Jun ’44

Apr ’41–May ’43

Jan ’42–Sep ’42

Apr ’41–Jun ’44

U-boat patrol areas

Sep ’39–Mar ’40

Jan ’42–Jan ’44

Sep ’39–Mar ’41

Jun ’44–Apr ’45

Coastal convoys mid-1942–1945

Transatlantic convoys 1939–1945

U-boat bases Sep ’39 & after Jun ’44

U-boat bases Jul ’40–Jun ’44

Long range & slow speed of adversaries shaped competition.

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Sep-39 Jan-40 May-40 Sep-40 Jan-41 May-41 Sep-41 Jan-42 May-42 Sep-42 Jan-43 May-43 Sep-43 Jan-44 May-44 Sep-44 Jan-45 May-45

Shipping losses (tons) U-boats at sea in Atlantic U-boats sunk per month

Key metric for allies: overall shipping losses.

Invasion of Norway &

low countries

Evasive convoy routing based on shore HFDF

begins

U-boats begin using French bases

Convoy escorts proficient with

radar

Subs shift to U.S. coast

Enigma code upgraded

U.S. coast convoysL-band GSR

deployedAllies crack new Enigma code

S-band radar

Continuous air escort New convoy codes

S-band GSR deployed

X-band radar deployed

Snorkel deployed

X-band GSR deployed

U-boats deploy to coast of France

U-boats evacuate French bases

H-K carrier groups

H-K groups sink supply submarines

Start max submergence through Bay of Biscay

Bombing of French U-boat bases

U-boats to European coast and southern Atlantic

U-boats shift to surfaced night attack

due to sonar threat

German decryption of convoy orders

Supply submarines start ops off Azores

“Wolf Pack” tactics start

Hedgehog

Hedgehog fully fielded

U b

oats p

resen

t or lo

st per m

on

thSh

ipp

ing

loss

es (t

on

s)

U-boats begin using Norwegian bases

Naval Enigma code broken

More escorts for convoys

Leigh Light & L-band radar a/c

HF/DF, radar on escort

Escort CV

“Saved by the Bell”

Overall shipping losses=shipping construction

1942 spike around U.S.; stopped by convoys w/out sinking subs.

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Jan-40 Apr-40 Jul-40 Oct-40 Jan-41 Apr-41 Jul-41 Oct-41 Jan-42 Apr-42 Jul-42 Oct-42 Jan-43 Apr-43 Jul-43 Oct-43 Jan-44

Overall shipping losses (X 1000 tons)

Losses on U.S. East Coast and Carribean (X1000 tons)Losses per month per U-boat (X 100 tons)

U-boats at sea in Atlantic

U-boats sunk off East Coast and inCaribbean

U-boats shift back to central and eastern Atlantic

Coastal convoys start on East coast

Coastal convoys start in Caribbean

Enigma code upgraded

Enigma code broken

U b

oats p

resen

t or lo

st per m

on

thSh

ipp

ing

loss

es

Radar equipped aircraft and escorts start deploying

Effective weapons (hedgehog/mousetrap) deployed

On U.S. entry into war, 6 aircraft and ~12

escort ships available (but not equipped) on

East Coast

By 1 April, 170 planes and 94 escorts of various types

Coastal vessels stay in inland waterways, protected by minefields

During May radar-equipped aircraft begin deploying to East Coast

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Sep-39 Feb-40 Jul-40 Dec-40 May-41 Oct-41 Mar-42 Aug-42 Jan-43 Jun-43 Nov-43 Apr-44 Sep-44 Feb-45

Shipping losses per U-boat per month U-boats at sea U-boats sunk per month

Invasion of Norway & low

countries

Evasive convoy routing based on

shore HFDF begins

U-boats begin using French bases

Convoy escorts proficient with radar

Subs shift to U.S. coast

Enigma code upgraded

U.S. coast convoysL-band GSR

deployed

Allies crack new Enigma code

S-band radar

Continuous air escort New convoy codes

S-band GSR deployed

X-band radar deployed

Snorkel deployed

X-band GSR deployed

U-boats deploy to coast of France

U-boats evacuate French bases

H-K carrier groups

H-K groups sink supply submarines

Start max submergence through Bay of Biscay

Bombing of French U-boat bases

U-boats to European coast and southern Atlantic

U-boats shift to surfaced night attack

due to sonar threat

German decryption of convoy orders

Supply submarines start ops off Azores

“Wolf Pack” tactics start

Hedgehog

Hedgehog fully fielded

U b

oats p

resen

t or lo

st per m

on

thSh

ipp

ing

loss

es p

er U

-bo

at p

er m

on

th

U-boats begin using Norwegian bases

Naval Enigma code broken

More escorts for convoys

Leigh Light & L-band radar a/c

HF/DF, radar on escort

Escort CV

Key metric for Axis: U-boat productivity.

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Convoy size

Japanese convoy results

Number of convoys

Percentage of M/V sunk

North Atlantic convoy results

Convoys ShipsConvoys Sighted

Ships Sunk% Convoys

Sighted% Ships Sunk

HX (9 kts) 23 923 8 12 35 1.3

SC (7 kts) 24 991 14 45 58 4.6

ON (9.5 kts) 24 897 11 29 36 3.2

ONS (7 kts) 23 836 11 31 48 3.7

But convoys alone reduced submarine effectiveness.

Location of attacks Independent Coordinated

U.S. attacks, Atlantic and Mediterranean;Jan 1943–Feb 1944

Number of incidents 176 18

Number assessed as sunk or probably sunk 9 3

Percent successful 5 17

U.S. attacks, Atlantic and Mediterranean;March 1944–May 1945

Number of incidents 41 38

Number assessed as sunk or probably sunk 5 21

Percent successful 12 55

Probability of regaining contact

Single Ship Coordinated

Jan 1943–July 1943 0.54 0.8

Aug 1943–Feb 1944 0.68 0.9

Engagement platform sensors not able to gain & maintain contact.

13

Squid (1943)Hedgehog (1941) Mousetrap (1942)

Smaller, aimed contact weapons more effective.

WeaponLethal

radius (ft)# of charges

/ barrageWeapons effectiveness per barrage

1st half ’43 2nd half ’43 1st half ’44 2nd half ’44 1st qtr ’45

Depth Charge 21 9 5.4 4 6.4 5.1 7

Mousetrap 0 24 7.5 15.4 28.1 23

Squid 0 16 33.3 62

Depth Charge (1939)

Lorient

Brest

St. Nazaire

Bordeaux

La Pallice

Sep ’39–Mar ’41Jun ’44–Apr ’45

Jul ’40–Dec ’41

Apr ’41–May ’43

“Virtual attrition” in Bay of Biscay much more important than kills.

Metric was kills; should be “virtual attrition” of U-boat presence.

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u-boat losses per month Transit Duration (hours) U-boats at sea in Atlantic Percentage of deployed subs in Bay

U-b

oat lo

sses / Perce

ntage o

f dep

loyed

U-b

oats in

Bay

U-b

oat

pre

sen

ce /

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L-band GSR deployedLeigh Light

deployed in Bay

L-band radar deployed in Bay

H-K groups start

S-band radar deployment starts

Naxos S-band GSR deployed, not effectively X-band radar

deployed

U-boats fight back with FLAK

Naxos S-band GSR more effective

S-band radar deployed

U-boats return to max submergence

U-boats start max submergence

U-boats ordered to surface in day, submerge at night

Bombing of French U-boat bases

Hedgehog deployed

Enigma code broken

Enigma code upgraded

U

Radar detector protects U-boats but reduces

productivity

Covert detection increases kills, but only modestly

increase presence in Bay

New detector slows boats, increases presence in Bay

and reduces Atlantic presence

Time to introduce RWR takes half as long as

previous time

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Metox L-band GSR

Tunis X-band GSR

H2S S-band radar

Naxos S-band GSR

Counters take less time until competition “jumps” to a new band.

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Sep-39 Mar-40 Oct-40 May-41 Nov-41 Jun-42 Dec-42 Jul-43 Jan-44 Aug-44 Mar-45

Mo

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Lifetime of Advancements in World War II ASW

L-band ASW radar

Original Enigma code

Upgraded Enigma code

L-band RWR

S-band ASW radar

X-band ASW radar

Convoy order decryption

S-band RWR

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SensorVisual

Radar

Broadband Sonar

Narrowbandsonar

Other

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54 214 15 36

Surface ship Aircraft Submarine Intelligence

Diesel submarine detections by U.S. during 1967 Arab-Israeli War

Diesel subs in 1967 Arab-Israeli War tracked as in WWII.

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Sensor

Visual

Radar

Broadband Sonar

Narrowband sonar

Other

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Surface ship Aircraft Submarine Intelligence

Nuclear submarine detections by U.S. during 1967 Arab-Israeli War

Nuclear subs tracked during 1967 war by passive sonar.

1958

19701978

1970

1970

1978

1978

1978

SOSUS array coverage

SOSUS and submarine arrays enabled near-continuous track.

19581978

19701978

1978

SOSUS arraycoverage

Passive sonar competition nears “culmination” in 1980s.

SOSUS array coverage decreasing with quieter

threat subs

21

1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

German,U-boat

SnorkelingDiesel subs

(including Soviet)Soviet, noisyNuclear subs

Soviet quiet nuclear subs

Rest-of-World (ROW), non-nuclear submarines (some AIP)

Nuclear and non-nuclear

subs

1944U.S./UK forces win Battle of

Atlantic

1942Disastrous U-

boat campaign off U.S. East

Coast

~1955Large Soviet SSK

force; U.S. reliant on snorkel for

detection

1958Task Force Alfa raises U.S. ASW

performance

1960–70sMore Soviet nuclear subs

deployed

1962SSKs detected in

Cuban Missile Crisis, but only with

enormous effort

~1975Major U.S. acoustic

advantage over Soviet SS/G/BN

1980sSignificant USSR quieting effort

following Walker spy revelations

~1995Limited ASW

capability against quieter Soviet sub force

2003Fielding of VDS, LFA,

multi-statics

“Saved by the Bell”

“Saved by the Bell”

U.S. was lucky in last two shifts; how to prepare for next one?

1980sAs Soviet SSNs

became harder to track, primary effort became

holding SSBN at risk in bastions

e

EM competition

e

Passive sonar competition

eActive sonar competition?

ROW subs noisy, continuing

passive regime

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• Competition will shift away from detection of noise from sub– Culminated in 1990s, but U.S. got a reprieve

– Quieting techniques known and achievable by key competitors

• Competition will shift toward:– Active sonar: Low-frequency (100–300 hz) ranges in 10s–100s of miles

– Non-acoustic phenomena: Wakes, chemicals, radiation, etc.

– Background noise

• Shift enabled by improved processing and modeling– Increasingly can fit onto mobile platforms, co-locating sensor and shooter

• Effective competitors will exploit fundamentals, “virtual attrition”– Active sonar impacts sub operation and behavior, even if inaccurate

– Smaller, “mission-kill” weapons can be longer range, effective vs. subs

• Submarines vs. ASW

– Examine competition with focus on BMC2, multi-domain elements, success of networked vs. autonomous attackers

• IADS vs. Air Attack

– Explore how “cutting-edge” technologies advantage first one side, then the other in Battle Network Competitions

23

• Speed

• Access

• Fragility

• Relatively low payload

• Relatively low combat persistence

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Combat Sorties per Month

US AAF vs. Germany March 1944 26,411

Rolling Thunder (1965–86) 9,468

IAF 1973 18,131

Desert Storm 51,840

Allied Force 10,231

• Combination makes air forces extremely sensitive to attrition

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Analog computing bombsights

Early losses drove both the Luftwaffe and RAF to adopt night bombing.

1000 ft radius USAAF “Target Area”

1200 ft CEP still sufficient to attack major plants

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Electronic Competition PhaseBomber Stream

GEE Program Start GEE Testing GEE Jammed

H2S Program Start H2S TestingH2S: 3 GHz ground

mapping radar Naxos-Z detector fieldedOboe Program Start Oboe Test Oboe Mk I 200 MHz Karl Jammer

Oboe Mk II 3 GHz

SerateMandrel Counter Freya, etc.

Tinsel Counter VHF Communication Jammer100 Group Jammers and Offensive Night Fighters

Airborne Cigar, Corona

Test Policy DelayWindo

w Conops Degrade

Wilde Sau/Zame Sau

Freya: 120–130 MHZ pulsed system. ~ 75 mile range "Mandrel" jamming EW radars modified to operate 107–158 MHZ to reduce jamming effectiveness

Kleine Heidelberg: Bi-Static radar leveraging Chain Home Signal. Range ~180 miles

Wurzburg Test WurzburgWindo

w Dopler and Resonance anti-Window Mods

Lichtenstein: 490 MHz pulsed system. ~3 mile range "Jammed" by WindowSN-2 85 MHZ Jammed

Naxos-Z H2S detector

Kammhuber Line Running Commentary Jammed

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1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945

BC Probability of Completing Tour Fraction of Bombs w/I 1,000 ft BC Cum. Sorties

Initial Day Operations

vs. Germany

Khammhuber Line IOC

Khammhuber Line FOC

“Bomber Stream”

Introduced

Bomber Command 100 Group Dedicated Comm. Jamming Aircraft

Battle of Hamburg

Average Chance of Surviving 30 Missions 51%

27

Typical RAF Bomber Command Bombing Accuracy Pre-1942

Typical RAF Bomber Command Bombing Accuracy Pre-1942

RAF bombing pre-1942 largely ineffective.

Bomber Command operations through early 1942 relied on crews independently finding targets with aircraft widely separated in space and time

• Navigation and bombing highly inaccurate• German defenses develop slowly but grow

increasingly effective

28

Maximum GEE Range

March 1942 British field GEE navigation aid after 21-month development period• Accurate to about 5 nm at maximum range of 250 sm• Enabled concentration of attackers in time and space to overwhelm linear

Himmlebett defenses• Germans identified its use and purpose on May 29 (82 days)• “Henrich” jammers developed and fielded by August 4, 1942 (67 days)• By December 1, 1942 GEE useless over Germany (267 day operational life)

Maximum GEE Range

29H2S S-Band Navigation Radar H2S Scope Presentation of Zuider Zee

H2S required 15 months from program start to first combat use on January 30, 1943• Provided navigation and bombing accuracy independent of range from UK• About twice as accurate as GEE• Germans reconstructed set from aircraft downed on February 2, 1943

(second combat use—3 days!)• Countermeasures team formed February 22, 1943 (24 days)• Naxos airborne homing device fitted to German night fighters from

September 11, 1943 (222 Days)

Maximum GEE Range

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July 24, 1943 Raid on Hamburg “Zahme Sau” (Tame Boar) night fighter tactics:Ground controllers provided general running commentary on the course, speed, height, and location of the bomber stream rather than single bombers.

“Wilde Sau” tactics: Single seat day fighters converged on target city and engaged bombers visually in the target area under a ‘freelance” system

German Low-Tech Response Restores Defense Effectiveness Rapidly

Window defeats Himmelbett system, but Germans rapidly adopt new tactics.

July 1943 RAF introduces “Window” in “Battle of Hamburg”• 746 attacking bombers dispensed one 2-pound packet of Window

every minute • Average time of fall was 15 minutes• Produced about 11,000 “bomber-like” returns

• German radars “clustered” near 500 MHz • Foiled GCI, gunlaying and AI radars (all used similar frequencies)

• Reduced effectiveness of defenses by about 75 percent

31

One of four 2.5 kW/650lb. Jostle VHF communications jammers in bomb bay of 100 Group B-17 100 Group B-17 Fortress III ECM Aircraft

?

Fielding 250+ dedicated ECM aircraft defeats new German tactics by denying communications.

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1965 Sep Nov 1966 Mar May Jul Sep Nov 1967 Mar May Jul Sep Nov 1968 Mar May Jul Sep Nov

SA-2 Bat.

5

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SA-2 Battalions in North Vietnam

Intense attacks on Hanoi Bombing halted above 20o North

SAM Hunter - Killer

ECM Pod Formation

AGM-45 Shrike ARM

AGM-78 Standard ARM

Dev.

Dev. F-105F Wild Weasel

EB-66B Standoff Jamming vs. Fire Can and Fan Song EB-66B Shift to Jamming EW/GCI

QRC-160-1 Development

QRC-160-8 Jams SA-2 Missile Beacon

Flak Trap

SA-2 Manual Track Tactics

SA-2 Track on Jam Tactics

MiG-21 Introduced

Fan Song EMCON "Dummy Load" Modification

Flat Face L/L Acq. Radar Added to SA-2 Regiment

EW/GCI and SAM radars integrated

F-100F Wild Weasel (APR-25/26 RHWR)

SA-2 Command Uplink First Detected by Firebee Drone - QRC-160-8 Dev. Starts

QRC-160-8 Recovered - New SA-2 Missile Beacon Dev. Starts

QRC-160-1 ECM Pod In-Theater Testing

Use MiGs to Break-Up Pod Formations

QRC-160-1 Repeater Jammer - Denied Range to Fan Song and Fire Can

5

Brief bombing halt

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Probability of Completing Tour Strike Sortie Fraction Total Strike Sorties Flown vs. N. Vietnam "Virtual Attrition"

33

Early 1968Mid-1965

SA-2 drives U.S. to introduce extensive dedicated ECM support.

34

“Iron Hand”SEAD

“MiG CAP”Fighter Escorts

Strike Force

Target SA-2 SiteSA-2 Site

EB-66Standoff Jammer

EC-121 AEW“MiG CAP”Fighter Escorts

“Iron Hand”SEAD

By 1968 support aircraft often outnumber strike aircraft resulting in “virtual attrition.”

35

• Time from introduction of an innovative system to fielding of a countermeasure generally shorter than development time of the innovation

• Cycle time decreases as conflict duration increases

• Systems working in new ways (H2S, SA-2) take longer to counter

• Anticipated measures (EB-66 Jamming) take less time

WWII Night Bombing Competition

Rolling Thunder Competition

• U.S. experience in Vietnam and IAF experience in October War showed:– Even with massive support packages and advanced ECM attrition is still a concern– Introduction of new systems (e.g. SA-2) can dramatically change combat outcomes in

short period of time– Big ‘last mover’ advantage in ECM/ECCM competition

• U.S. begins serious search for a “new approach” to aircraft survivability– Eventually invests in stealth to change the nature of the competition from active vs.

active to active vs. passive in the EM realm

• What is next?– Increasing reliance on active ECM as counter-LO EM sensors proliferate– Increasing centrality of IR sensors and weapon seekers as LO aircraft proliferate on both

sides• Calls into question utility of supercruise and afterburners

36

?

Have Blue (DARPA Initiative 1974)

Combat Aircraft Design Transformed

• Aircraft get shot down over enemy territory providing adversary physical access to innovative systems—this often aids in fielding countermeasures– Corollary: It is better to wait until innovative systems can be fielded “en

mass” to achieve significant results than to introduce them piecemeal and risk early compromise

• IADS goal is to minimize damage to important assets, not (necessarily) to shoot down aircraft

• Great sensitivity to “actual attrition” makes air attackers very susceptible to “virtual attrition”– Rising support : strike sortie ratios likely indication that a “jump” is

required

37

• Network attributes depend heavily on operational metrics – Avoiding subs or night fighters is “good enough”—don’t have to kill them all

• Tempo of operations influences decision to exploit or disrupt opposing network– Short duration of air operations makes disruption more attractive– Slower pace of submarine warfare makes exploitation more attractive

• “Virtual Attrition” is often more important and cost-effective than platform destruction– Forcing opponent to operate less effectively or efficiently

• Competitions accelerate and culminate, then jump to new mode– Competitions “jump” when one side fields systems that defeat the opposing network

(usually wide area and/or localization sensors) at the physics level– Signs a competition may be nearing culmination include:

• Increasing support requirements to enable operations (Rolling Thunder)• Useful life of innovations measured in weeks• In peacetime, inability to significantly improve KPPs at affordable cost and/or in a reasonable time

• In some cases one side or the other is “saved by the bell” when a conflict ends just before a competition jumps to a new mode– Identifying and preparing for new basis of competition important for future success

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