assessment of missile defence global capabilities

Assessment of BMD Global capabilities

Missile Defence as a Factor in Establishing a New Security Environment

International Conference Moscow, 3-4 May 2012

Colonel-General V.V. Gerasimov

Briefing Objectives

• Presenting the findings from the assessment of global BMD capabilities

• Highlighting the available tech opportunities to respond to missile threats in a joint manner

BMD Information Capabilities

BMD Global Information Capabilities

• modernizing the deployed missile warning radars

• fielding mobile BMD radars

• increasing the capabilities of low orbit satellite grouping

• tapping into the information resources held by allies and partners

Deployment of BMD Information Assets

Conclusions

• The deployed information subsystem covers the entire territory of the Russian Federation

• Impediments are about to emerge and block the employment of Deterrence Forces

• Subsystem’s capacities can be further enhanced • Comprehensine applications of the deployed

information assets solidly beef up the BMD efficiency

BMD Weapons

Conditions

• Missile launch lines feature research purposes• Targets’ positions are hypothetical, though close

to reality• BMD assets performances get estimated

through processing the available data and running comparative analyses

• No use of BMD penetration aids• Calculations are built on computer models

developed by the Ministry of Defense experts

Threats to the Russian Strategic Nuclear Force From: the West

Threats to the Russian Strategic Nuclear Force From: the Center

Threats to the Russian Strategic Nuclear Force From: the East

Threats to the Russian Strategic Nuclear Force From: the East

Conclusions

• Concept for a BMD posture is global in character

• BMD assets in Europe and in Asia Pacific Region are elements of the global BMD system primarily intended for protection of selected sites in the US territory

• BMD assets pose a threat to the Russian Strategic Nuclear Force based across Russia

• Deployed BMD assets already have the capability to intercept Russian ballistic missiles

BMD Assets in Poland

Capabilities Assessment

Baseline Data

• Hypothetical nature of developed scenarios

• Launch area – south

• Missile range – up to 11000 km

• Targeting – east coast of the USA

• BMD interceptor positions:– Poland (shooters featuring Phase 3 and 4 capabilities)

– Russia (south)

Conclusion. US-bound BM trajectories appear to be outside of the killing zone for third-phase BMD shooters. Interception is impossible.

Conclusion. US-bound BM trajectories would be crossing the killing zone for fourth-phase BMD shooters. Interception in possible.

Capabilities That Can Threaten Russia

Conclusion. Russian BM trajectories would be crossing the killing zone for fourth-phase BMD shooters. Interception is possible.

BMD Assets in Romania

Capabilities Assessment

Baseline Data

• Hypothetical nature of developed scenarios

• Launch area – south

• Missile range – up to 3000 km

• Targeting – South and Central Europe

• BMD positions:– Romania (shooters featuring third-phase capabilities)

– Russia (south)

Conclusion. South Europe-bound trajectories fall within the killing zone for third-phase BMD interceptors. Interception is possible.

Conclusion. Part of the Western Europe-bound trajectories happen to be outside of the killing zone for third-phase BMD shooters. Interception is partial.

Conclusion. Russian BM trajectories would be crossing fourth-phase BMD killing zone. Interception is possible

Conclusions• Romania-based BMD shooters featuring first and

second-phase performances will have limited capabilities to assure protection of South Europe against missiles launched from the south

• Poland-based BMD shooters featuring third-phase performances would pose a threat to the Russian Strategic Nuclear Force, while failing to assure protection of the entire Western Europe against the threat of missile strikes from the south

• Close-to-Russia sea-launched BMD shooters would be posing a threat to the Russian Strategic Nuclear Force

• There is room for cooperation aimed at developing an effective European-wide BMD system (development of the joint defense area)