allied in combat: coalition organization and battlefield ... · allied in combat: coalition...

Allied in Combat: Coalition Organization and Battlefield Performance

Rosella Cappella ZielinskiBoston University

Ryan GrauerUniversity of Pittsburgh

Prepared for Peace Science Society Conference, South Bend, IN, 20-22 October 2016

Why Do Coalitions Vary In Their Military Power?

Theoretically and Politically Important

Surprisingly LittleExisting Literature

Insights from Organization Theory

Coordinative Structure

Resource Asymmetry


U-forms and M-forms

Intervening Effects of Resource Asymmetry

Executive

1

1A

1B

2

2A

2B

3

3A

3B

4

4A

4B

Executive

A

A1

A2

A3

A4

B

B1

B2

B3

B4


U-Form M-FormRe

sour

ce E

ndow

men

t

Asymmetric High Levels of Military Power

Low Levels of Military Power

Symmetric Low Levels of Military Power

High Levels of Military Power


Descriptive Statistics For World War I and II

Major Battles (Clodfelter and Dupey & Dupey) Western, Eastern and Italian Fronts; North Africa; Pacific Theatre

Frequency of Co-Belligerency on the Battlefield 55/129 – 43% Battles involved more than two belligerent forces 68% Allied; 32% Axis/Central Powers

Number of Co-Belligerents on the Battlefield Allies –18 Battles involved 2 co-belligerents; 12 Battles with 3;

6 Battles with 4; 2 Battles with 5 Axis/Central Powers – 17 Battles with 2 co-belligerents;

1 Battle with 3

Member Contribution and Parity

Research Design

Four Case Studies

Structural Variables Held Constant: Technology Offense Defense Balance

Battle Variables Held Constant Parity Ad-Hoc Alliances Offensive and Defensive

Operations


U-Form M-Form

Res

ourc

e E

ndow

men

t Asym-metric


Axis in North Africa1941-42


Axis in North Africa

1941-42

Sym-metric



First Battle of Ypres 1914

Axis in North Africa

• Axis in North Africa 1941-42 119,000 (Axis) vs. 118,000 (Allies) Wide open terrain permitting fluid transition

from offense to defense Axis battlefield victories

• Asymmetric Coalition Bastico: “the infantry man and the mule” Rommel: “It made one’s hair stand on end to

see the sort of equipment with which the Duce had sent his troops into battle.”

North Africa Command (Bastico)

Italian Mobile (20th) Corps (Gamberra)

ArieteAmoured Trieste

Motorized

21st Italian Corps

Trento Bologna Brescia Pavia

Italian Savona

Armored Group Africa (Rommel)

German Africa Corps (D.A.K.)

15th

Armoured21st

Armoured

Africa (later 90th

Light)

Hitler

Mussolini

M-Form

M-Form + Asymmetry = Low Military Power

• In response to Allied offensive German General Crüwell insisted that the Ariete was unable to stand the pressure alone

• General Gambarra refused aid of Panzer divisions

• Rommel asks Mussolini to put Gambarra under his command.

• Mussolini agrees to remove Gambarra from official command yet Ariete and Trieste remain formally under Bastico.

• 15th Panzer Division joins Ariete at Sidi Rezegh and Allies withdraw

North Africa Command (Bastico)

Italian Mobile (20th) Corps (Gamberra)

ArieteAmoured

Trieste Motorized

Armored Group Africa (Rommel)

German Africa Corps (D.A.K.)

15th

Armoured21st

Armoured Africa (later 90th

Light)

ItalianSavona

21st Italian Corps

Trento Bologna Brescia Pavia

Hitler

Towards U-Form

Increased Hierarchy and Increased Combat Power

• Exploiting Comparative Advantage

• Rommel and retaking El Agheila March 1941: Italian infantry in defense positions, freeing up German motorized divisions for offensive engagements.

• Rommel and retaking Benghazi April 1941: Brescia Division brought up to Benghazi so that German 3 Reconnaissance Battalion was ready to continue its eastward advance.

• Improved training, morale, tactics of Italian troops

• Ariete & Trieste Motorized Divisions remain separate

• December 1941 attack at Gobi to be made with Italian Motorized Corps

• Italians fail to arrive and the Africa Korps strike alone

• Rommel: “The enemy fell slowly back on Bir el Gobi, but it was no longer possible to destroy, or even outflank and envelop any material part of their force. There was in fact a serious danger of our own force being outflanked round both sides by the superior enemy. Crüwell, who realized that the destruction of the enemy could only be achieved with the co-operation of the Italians, repeatedly wired: ‘Where is Gambara?’”

The Limits of Incomplete Hierarchy


Preliminary Conclusions

A Small Literature, Ripe for Investigation

Organizational Structures Should Matter

Asymmetric – M-form Coalitions Clearly Underperform

Further Work is Necessary to Assess Other Hypotheses

allied in combat: coalition organization and battlefield ... · allied in combat: coalition...

Documents