Allied in Combat: Coalition Organization and Battlefield Performance
Rosella Cappella ZielinskiBoston University
Ryan GrauerUniversity of Pittsburgh
Prepared for Peace Science Society Conference, South Bend, IN, 20-22 October 2016
Why Do Coalitions Vary In Their Military Power?
Theoretically and Politically Important
Surprisingly LittleExisting Literature
Insights from Organization Theory
Coordinative Structure
Resource Asymmetry
Why Do Coalitions Vary In Their Military Power?
U-forms and M-forms
Intervening Effects of Resource Asymmetry
Executive
1
1A
1B
2
2A
2B
3
3A
3B
4
4A
4B
Executive
A
A1
A2
A3
A4
B
B1
B2
B3
B4
Coordinative Structure
U-Form M-FormRe
sour
ce E
ndow
men
t
Asymmetric High Levels of Military Power
Low Levels of Military Power
Symmetric Low Levels of Military Power
High Levels of Military Power
Why Do Coalitions Vary In Their Military Power?
Descriptive Statistics For World War I and II
Major Battles (Clodfelter and Dupey & Dupey) Western, Eastern and Italian Fronts; North Africa; Pacific Theatre
Frequency of Co-Belligerency on the Battlefield 55/129 – 43% Battles involved more than two belligerent forces 68% Allied; 32% Axis/Central Powers
Number of Co-Belligerents on the Battlefield Allies –18 Battles involved 2 co-belligerents; 12 Battles with 3;
6 Battles with 4; 2 Battles with 5 Axis/Central Powers – 17 Battles with 2 co-belligerents;
1 Battle with 3
Member Contribution and Parity
Research Design
Four Case Studies
Structural Variables Held Constant: Technology Offense Defense Balance
Battle Variables Held Constant Parity Ad-Hoc Alliances Offensive and Defensive
Operations
Coordinative Structure
U-Form M-Form
Res
ourc
e E
ndow
men
t Asym-metric
High Levels of Military Power
Axis in North Africa1941-42
Low Levels of Military Power
Axis in North Africa
1941-42
Sym-metric
Low Levels of Military Power
High Levels of Military Power
First Battle of Ypres 1914
Axis in North Africa
• Axis in North Africa 1941-42 119,000 (Axis) vs. 118,000 (Allies) Wide open terrain permitting fluid transition
from offense to defense Axis battlefield victories
• Asymmetric Coalition Bastico: “the infantry man and the mule” Rommel: “It made one’s hair stand on end to
see the sort of equipment with which the Duce had sent his troops into battle.”
North Africa Command (Bastico)
Italian Mobile (20th) Corps (Gamberra)
ArieteAmoured Trieste
Motorized
21st Italian Corps
Trento Bologna Brescia Pavia
Italian Savona
Armored Group Africa (Rommel)
German Africa Corps (D.A.K.)
15th
Armoured21st
Armoured
Africa (later 90th
Light)
Hitler
Mussolini
M-Form
M-Form + Asymmetry = Low Military Power
• In response to Allied offensive German General Crüwell insisted that the Ariete was unable to stand the pressure alone
• General Gambarra refused aid of Panzer divisions
• Rommel asks Mussolini to put Gambarra under his command.
• Mussolini agrees to remove Gambarra from official command yet Ariete and Trieste remain formally under Bastico.
• 15th Panzer Division joins Ariete at Sidi Rezegh and Allies withdraw
North Africa Command (Bastico)
Italian Mobile (20th) Corps (Gamberra)
ArieteAmoured
Trieste Motorized
Armored Group Africa (Rommel)
German Africa Corps (D.A.K.)
15th
Armoured21st
Armoured Africa (later 90th
Light)
ItalianSavona
21st Italian Corps
Trento Bologna Brescia Pavia
Hitler
Towards U-Form
Increased Hierarchy and Increased Combat Power
• Exploiting Comparative Advantage
• Rommel and retaking El Agheila March 1941: Italian infantry in defense positions, freeing up German motorized divisions for offensive engagements.
• Rommel and retaking Benghazi April 1941: Brescia Division brought up to Benghazi so that German 3 Reconnaissance Battalion was ready to continue its eastward advance.
• Improved training, morale, tactics of Italian troops
• Ariete & Trieste Motorized Divisions remain separate
• December 1941 attack at Gobi to be made with Italian Motorized Corps
• Italians fail to arrive and the Africa Korps strike alone
• Rommel: “The enemy fell slowly back on Bir el Gobi, but it was no longer possible to destroy, or even outflank and envelop any material part of their force. There was in fact a serious danger of our own force being outflanked round both sides by the superior enemy. Crüwell, who realized that the destruction of the enemy could only be achieved with the co-operation of the Italians, repeatedly wired: ‘Where is Gambara?’”
The Limits of Incomplete Hierarchy