alfonsist monarchism and the coming of the spanish civil war

Alfonsist Monarchism and the Coming of the Spanish Civil WarAuthor(s): Paul PrestonSource: Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 7, No. 3/4 (Jul. - Oct., 1972), pp. 89-114Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/259907 .

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Alfonsist Monarchism

and the Coming of the

Spanish Civil War

Paul Preston

The Second Republic in Spain (I931-36) witnessed a process of working class radicalization which the conservative classes were ill-equipped to face. The radicalization was not of recent origin; the lack of a suitable conservative posture was. When the normal political mechanism had been found incapable of dealing with social and economic unrest in I917 recourse was had to the army; the crisis found its resolution in the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera, which anaesthetized the situation for nearly seven years. When Primo fell, conservatives could turn only to the derelict 'historic' parties. Now, deprived of the machinery of caciquismo (electoral rigging) and resentful of the treatment accorded them by the dictator, the old politicans had neither the power nor the will to resume their former function.1

Amidst this disarray of monarchist forces, there appeared several small groups, in themselves of minimal political importance, which were the forerunners of a new and aggressive monarchism, more sensitive to the proletarian threat than the old parties had ever been. Forming at first only an intellectual elite, these groups matched, and indeed anticipated working class extremism, with a body of authoritarian, anti-Marxist and anti-democratic thought. In the later polarization of Republican politics they supplied the extreme Right with an intellectual rationale for resistance to prole-

1 For an account of early attempts to combat revolution in the midst of a breakdown of the old politics, see Juan Antonio Lacomba, La Crisis Espanola de 19I7 (Madrid 1970). For the defeatism of orthodox monarchist groups, see Santiago Galindo Herrero, Los Partidos Mondrquicos Bajo La Segunda Repzublica (2nd ed. Madrid I956), 47-48; Alvaro Alcala Galiano in Accidn Espafola (henceforth AE), I February I932 et seq.; Miguel Maura, Asi Cayo Alfonso XIII (Barcelona I966), 48, 52; Carlos Seco Serrano, Alfonso XIII y la Crisis de la Restauracion (Barcelona I969), I75-8I.

89



CONTEMPORARY HISTORY

tarian agitation. In doing so, they provided both the prior justification for the military rising of 1936 and much of the ideological substance of the national-syndicalist state which grew out of it.2

In I930, however, these groups were fighting a vain rearguard action against the coming of the Republic. In Burgos, an eccentric neurologist, Dr Albifiana, formed the Partido Nacional Espafiol to provide shock-troops against the revolution. In Madrid, a young intellectual, Eugenio Vegas Latapie, founded the Juventud Monarquica. And on a national scale, the ex-ministers of the dictator organized the Uni6n Monarquica Nacional, whose manifesto declared adherence to the work of Primo de Rivera, devotion to his memory and submission to his doctrine. The UMN conducted a large provincial propaganda campaign advocating an authoritarian monarchy to continue the work of the dictatorship. Its foremost exponent was Ramiro de Maeztu, Primo's ambassador to Argentina.

Vegas and Maeztu were the theorists behind the reformulation of monarchist thinking in the next two or three years. Vegas, soaked in the great reactionary Spanish writings of the nineteenth century and deeply impressed by Action Fran,aise, had been anxious in the late twenties to found a journal to give intellectual substance to Spanish monarchism. Simultaneously, but indepen- dently, the Marques de Quintanar, president of the board of directors of La Nacidn, the official organ of the dictatorship, was discussing with Primo the notion of a similar journal. His desire to resuscitate monarchism derived from his admiration for the Portuguese intellectuals of Integralismo Lusitano. In I930, on re- turning from a trip to Portugal, Quintanar received a promise of aid from Primo. Before it could be realized, the regime fell.3

The fall of the dictatorship convinced Vegas, Maeztu, and Quintanar of the need to create an authoritarian intellectual movement to combat the growth of liberalism and republicanism. Vegas

2 Richard Robinson, 'The Parties of the Right and the Republic', in Raymond Carr, ed. The Republic and the Civil War in Spain (London I97I), seeks to prove that the rising was a defensive reaction to the socialist movement which 'was

primarily responsible for undermining the democratic system and leaving the right the stark choice between extinction and violent resistance' (46). It is not

my purpose here to enter into the question of historical responsibility for the out- break of civil war, but rather to re-emphasize that the monarchists had opted for violent extremism before it was necessary to make any choice, and in doing so made the first deliberate attempt to undermine the democratic system.

3 Eugenio Vegas Latapie, Escritos Politicos (Madrid 1940), 8; speech by Quintanar in the Ritz Hotel, Madrid, 24 April I932, AE, I May I932.

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ALFONSIST MONARCHISM AND THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR

hawked his idea around Traditionalist intellectuals like Victor Pradera and the lay theologian, Marcial Solana, but made no head- way until he was introduced in October 1930 to Maeztu, who put him in touch with Quintanar. Agreeing on the need to publish a journal - to be called Contrarrevolucion - they were held up for lack of funds. At this stage, their aims for the galvanization of monarchism coincided with the aims of the leaders of the UMN. The ex- ministers met in Madrid on I4 April I93I. While the King headed for exile and before they themselves fled the wrath of the Republic for their collaboration with Primo, Calvo Sotelo, ex-minister of finance, Yanguas y Messina, ex-minister of state, and other figures of the dictatorship met at the house of the Conde de Guadalhorce, ex-minister of public works. Joined by Quintanar, Vegas, and Maeztu, they held an inquest on the recently collapsed monarchy. At the prompting of Vegas, for whom democracy was tantamount to bolshevism, it was decided to found a 'school of modern counter- revolutionary thought'. Shortly after, the money which made this possible came into the hands of Quintanar. The hostility of some Alfonsist aristocrats to the Republic took the form of supplying cash for subversive activities. A sum of Ioo,ooo pesetas was given by the Marqueses de Pelayo to the Alfonsist General Orgaz. When his embryonic conspiracy was broken up by the police, Orgaz gave Quintanar permission to use the money to found a counter- revolutionary cultural society and theoretical review.4

This was to appear at the end of the year. Meanwhile, the Alfonsist monarchists were forced to take part in organized politics by the foundation of Acci6n Nacional, an electoral organization to protect religious and property interests within Republican legality.5 The notion of Angel Herrera, editor of the Catholic daily El Debate, it was tacitly non-monarchist. The monarchist reaction was one of shocked outrage, particularly at El Debate's notion of the irrelevance of specific forms of government, their 'accidentality'. Prematurely, the Alfonsists were driven into a stark statement of their hostility to the Republic: 'The Republic is the revolution ...

4 Vegas, El Pensamiento Politico de Calvo Sotelo (Madrid I94I), 88-92; Escritos Politicos, 9-12; 'Maeztu y Acci6n Espafiola' ABC, 2 November 1952.

5 For Acci6n Nacional see R.A.H. Robinson, The Origins of Franco's Spain (Newton Abbot I970); Jose Maria Gil Robles, No Fue Posible La Paz (Barcelona 1968); Joaquin Arraras Iribarren, Historia de la Segunda Reptblica Espanola (henceforth HSRE), 4 vols. (Madrid I956-68).

9I




the concept of the accidentality of forms of government is doctrinally immoral and in practical terms an absurdity... Monarchy best defines the contrary of revolutionism and we must all unite under it'.

The practical monarchist response to Acci6n Nacional was to create a rival organization, the Circulo Monarquico Independiente.6 Its inaugural meeting in Madrid provoked a riot; cars were burnt and the ABC offices attacked by a large crowd. ABC was suspended for provocation and nothing more came of the Circle. Monarchist animosity towards the Republic was hardened but the attitude towards Acci6n Nacional changed. Its tactics were still attacked on doctrinal grounds, but the Alfonsists, conscious of its prospects of broad support among Catholics and property owners, and scared of being left behind, joined it. Thus, the Catholic organization's candidates for the June elections included convinced monarchists who could never be indifferent to forms of government: Antonio Goicoechea, ex-president of the Juventud Maurista and once minister of the interior; the Conde de Vallellano, authoritarian monarchist of the UMN, Primo's Alcalde of Madrid, whose hostility to the regime had been demonstrated by his share in plotting its overthrow with Quintanar, Generals Orgaz and Ponte, and other Alfonsists7; Jose Maria Peman, poet and pet intellectual of the dictator, and Pedro Sainz Rodriguez, a brilliant young monarchist historian. This was the Alfonsist dilemma. The ideas of Angel Herrera were anathema but his organization repre- sented the only possibility of power for what was still merely a group of isolated individuals without popular support.

Alfonsist electoral success was limited. Calvo Sotelo, elected for Orense, refused to return without a guarantee of immunity. Sainz Rodriguez was elected as representative for the Agrupaci6n Regional de Derechas of Santander. Yet, despite this numerical weakness, the monarchists managed to keep alive their enmity to the Republic and to gain a disproportionate influence within Accion Nacional. Guadalhorce roundly rejected Herrera's appeal to the ex-ministers to accept the Republic.8 Goicoechea was pro-

6 ABC, 26 April 1931. The CM I was advertised in ABC 5, 6, 7, 8 May I93I, alongside attacks on the confused tactics of Acci6n Nacional.

7 Arraras, Historia de la Cruzada Espafola (Madrid I940), II, 486. This was the abortive plot which supplied the cash for the founding of Accidn Espaiola.

8 Julian Cortes Cavanillas, Gil Robles CMondrquico? (Madrid I935), 70.

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visional president of the organization and was joined on its executive by Vallellano and the Alfonsist Tornos Lafitte.9

Tension could not be long in emerging. The passing of the anti- clerical sections of the constitution in October revealed the monarchists' implacable hatred for the Republic. When Acci6n Nacional's campaign for constitutional revision began, monarchists of both dynastic branches made little effort to restrain the violence of their language. The Traditionalists, of course, with an organization of their own, could take or leave Acci6n Nacional.10 The Alfonsists, however, in their isolation, stayed on in the hope of im- posing a specifically monarchist orientation. Because Gil Robles was anxious to avoid a premature split in his nascent organization, a compromise was reached. The movement's programme, introduced in December, concealed potential divisions. Drawn up by Goicoechea, it was 'circumstantial, minimal, and defensive', and circumspectly avoided the question of forms of government. Its ambiguity suited Alfonsists, who thereby felt in no way bound to cease their anti-Republican offensive.

In the long term, this could only intensify divisions within Acci6n Nacional. This was inevitable since the Alfonsist attitude to the movement was thoroughly ambiguous. In reaction to the burning of the convents in May I931, they had collected one and a half million pesetas to do three things: to create a body to spread the idea of the legitimacy of a rising against the Republic, to inject a spirit of rebellion in the army, and to found a party of ostensible legality as a front for meetings, the collection of funds, and conspiratorial liaison.1 These intentions were obviously inimical to the basic tenets of Acci6n Nacional. The first was already being done by Quintanar and Vegas: the review appeared on 15 Decem- ber I931, under the title Accion Espanola, and on 5 February 1932 a cultural society of the same name was opened. The second was

9 Jose Guti6rrez Rave, Antonio Goicoechea (Madrid I965), I7-I8. In October, Goicoechea was asked to make way for Gil Robles, Herrera's choice for the leadership.

10 On Traditionalism see the article by R.M. Blinkhorn in the present issue and his unpublished dissertation, The Carlist Movement in Spain 1931-37 (Oxford I970). On the Acci6n Nacional see Galindo Herrero, 133-34; HSRE, I, 234; Gutierrez Rave, Goicoechea, I7; Robinson, Origins, 73-74.

11 Felipe Bertran Gilell, Preparacion y Desarrollo del Alzamiento Nacional (Valladolid I938), 82-83; Juan Antionio Ansaldo, iPara Que? De Alfonso XIII a Juan III (Buenos Aires I95I), 23.

93




for the moment left in abeyance, and the third was post- poned until it was seen if it were possible to take over Acci6n Nacional.

Thus, while Goicoechea and Vallellano took part in the legal activities of the accidentalists, Vegas, Quintanar, and Fuentes Pila - another ex-Maurist and director of mines under Primo - co- operated with Orgaz and Ponte in conspiracy.

The Accion Espaiola group made no attempt to mask their dis- agreement with the accidentalists. Quintanar declared bluntly that 'Accion Espanola is not indifferent to political systems. It is anti- parliamentary and anti-democratic'.12 El Debate's tactics of accommodation to the Republic were attacked by Vegas in a series of articles on the ralliement of French Catholics under the Third Re- public. Under the heading 'The History of a Failure', he propounded the futility of accidentalism under an unjust government and defended the right to rise against an illegitimate power.13 And while Acci6n Nacional - whose name was changed to Acci6n Popular in April I932 - maintained a studied vagueness about its attitude to the Republic, the Alfonsists came near to open subversion. In April they announced the founding of the Marques de la Vega de Anz6 prize for the best work on the means of installing an anti-democratic state in Spain.14 Goicoechea took up this line in a speech to the Centro Nacionalista: 'Let the following be our three principles of propaganda: faced with pacifism, the combative spirit; faced with democracy, hierarchy; faced with liberalism, the strong state.'15 An open split with the accidentalists could now hardly be avoided.

The group's strident tone reflected a certain rapprochement with the Traditionalists. Seeking to explain the fall of the monarchy, they placed the blame on its liberalism - virtually the Tradition- alist view.16 Traditionalist intellectuals made resounding attacks on liberalism in the pages of Accidn Espanola. Victor Pradera, in his series 'False Dogmas', sought to oppose 'the revolution and the

12 AE, I May I932, 421. The only specific study of Accion Espaniola, by Luis Maria Ans6n (Zaragoza I960), is inaccurate and inadequate.

13 AE, i March I932 et seq., collected and published as Catolicismo y Re- puiblica (Madrid I932).

14 AE, i6 April I932. 15 AE, I6 July I932, 3I4. 16 See the book by the secretary of the Acci6n Espafiola youth movement,

J. Cortes Cavanillas, La Caida de Alfonso XIII (Madrid 1932).

94




stupid eighteenth century'. But Accion Espafiola was thoroughly eclectic in its elaboration of a new theory of counter-revolution. Its members were drawn to Traditionalism as the fount of indigenous reactionary thought, but they were equally disposed to borrow from Action Frangaise or Integralismo Lusitano. Thus, attacks on universal suffrage and parliamentary democracy came from all three sources.17 Indeed, Quintanar announced a readiness to utilize ideas from all points of the rightist horizon and saw Acci6n Espafola as a 'melting-pot' in which would be fused a new doctrine which was 'more than a return to tradition'. The blending of Traditionalism with more contemporary theories of dynamic monarchism was christened by Quintanar 'national-traditionalism'. The modern national-traditionalist monarchy was to derive its practical content largely from the Primo de Rivera regime.18

Intellectual collaboration between Alfonsists and Traditionalists did not imply union between the two. They shared a bitter hostility to the Republic and a determination to do away with it, but the dynastic question always stood in the way of amalgamation.19 In the first two years of the Republic, they drew together in their adversity, although the Carlists were manifestly the senior partners. Anxious to exploit Carlist popular support, the Alfonsists per- sistently spoke as if union were an accomplished fact. But the limitations of co-operation were shown in August by the abortive coup known as the Sanjurjada, in which the Carlists, having their own subversive arrangements, took little part. Alfonsist participation, however, was enthusiastic. Since the burning of the convents, they had been awaiting an opportunity for a rising. In I932, the previous year's desultory preparations were renewed by a group of monarchist generals exiled in France. Money was collected and Juan Ansaldo, Acci6n Espafiola's most ardent plotter, took General Ponte to Rome to ask Marshal Balbo for arms. These machinations coincided with the attempts of other groups to persuade General Sanjurjo to rise and save Spain from anarchy and separatism.

17 AE, I April 1931, I23; Pradera, ibid., I January 1932 et seq.; see also the articles by Georges Deherme, ibid., i June I932 et seq. and by Jose Pequito Rebelo, ibid., I5 December 1931 et seq. Portuguese and French reactionary books were regularly and invariably favourably reviewed in Accion Espanola.

18 AE, i6 March I932, 83; I May 1932, 421. The dictatorship was seen as the 'selfless effort of one man to save Spain from the chaos of democracy', ibid., i February I932.

19 HSRE, I, 240-43; Robinson, Origins, Appendix I.

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Sanjurjo, Primo's old comrade and collaborator, thus led an extremely confused rising on 10 August; it was an instant failure.20

THE AFTERMATH OF THE RISING was crucial to the development of insurrectionary monarchism. Alfonsists and Carlists were arrested wholesale and virtually all the right-wing press suspended; the Alfonsist militants determined not to make the same mistakes again. A 'conspiratorial committee' was set up at the end of September. Vegas, together with Jorge Vig6n, a staff captain and a collaborator of the review, and the Marques de Eliseda, began at Ansaldo's house in Biarritz to plan the reorganization of the dis- persed elements of the attempted coup for a future national rising. They began collecting funds and within a few days had three million francs, which were entrusted to the Conde de los Andes for foreign arms deals and to the Marques de Arriluce, for operations within Spain. This took place with the knowledge and approval of senior monarchists politicans. Sainz Rodriguez, de los Andes and Vig6n discussed their plans in Paris with Goicoechea and Calvo Sotelo; Alfonso XIII gave his grudging approval.21

This stronger commitment to rebellion finally provoked a split within Acci6n Popular. The Sanjurjada reinforced the accidentalist belief in the futility of conspiracy and violence. Now more self- confident, Gil Robles summoned an assembly to clear the air within his movement. At the assembly, held on 22 and 23 October, the accidentalists stood firmly by the policy of legalism and denied the Alfonsists the possibility of using Acci6n Popular as a 'shield of legality behind which violent attitudes can be developed'.22 The Alfonsists remained within the organization for the moment, but when the accidentalists proceeded to the foundation of a political party to work for power by legal means, they were forced to take counter-action.

This took the form of a call by Goicoechea for the creation of an Alfonsist party which would then be the hub of a federation of the Right. This would enable them to side-step the decisions of the

20 Ansaldo, op. cit., 32-35. The arms obtained were not used. For an account of the rising and its preparations see Arraras, Cruzada I, 485 ff., HSRE, I, 435 ff., Galindo Herrero, op. cit., I56-66.

21 Ansaldo, op. cit., 47-50, Bertrin Giiell, Preparacidn, 84. 22 El Debate, 21, 23, 25 October 1932; Robinson, Origins, 107-09; HSRE, II,

37.

96




October assembly and still use the mass support of Acci6n Popular and the Traditionalists. It was wishful thinking, presupposing that Gil Robles, having gone to some trouble to rid himself of their burdensome anti-Republicanism, would be prepared to associate with them under the same conditions as before. This was unlikely while the monarchists remained committed to subversion. And Accidn Espanola, on its reappearance after suspension, showed that the position had not changed by expressing solidarity with the men of IO August and paying fulsome homage to the chivalry, patriot- ism, and courage of Sanjurjo.23

The idea of union was made public by a series of Traditionalist meetings beginning in December. It was soon clear that union would take place only on Carlist terms. When Goicoechea himself made the second speech in the series, he trod an uneasy line between praise of Traditionalism and a desire to maintain Alfonsist autonomy.24 Even so, the Carlist press assumed that he was about to bring his followers into the ranks of the Traditionalist Com- munion.25 Thus Goicoechea had realized the impossibility of manoeuvring Gil Robles or the Traditionalists into alliance and so went ahead with the creation of his own party.

Its formation had, of course, been presaged in the 1931 plans for a legal front for anti-Republican activities in the event of Acci6n Nacional proving unsatisfactory for that purpose. According to Goicoechea's secretary, the new organization was to be apparently legal.26 In other words, it was to be the practical exponent of the ideas of Accion Espanola. It was conceived in the first instance, said the society's arch-conspirator, 'as a camouflage for the preparation of the military plot'.27 When Goicoechea's withdrawal from Accion Popular was announced in January 1933, a number of monarchists wrote to ABC to express their support. His reply was in effect the manifesto of the new party, to be known as Renovacion Espafiola. An imprecise amalgam of Traditionalism, Maurism, and constitutional monarchism, Goicoechea's letter suggested that he was as confused doctrinally as he was tactically. Thus, unsure whether it

23 See Goicoechea's speech to the Academy of Jurisprudence, La Nacidn, I2 December 1932; AE, I6 November 1932, 449-50. 24 ABC, I3, I4, 20 December I932.

25 Blinkhorn, Carlist Movement, 2II. 26 Gutierrez Rave, Goicoechea, 19-20. 27 Ansaldo, op. cit., 54.

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was merely a facade for conspiracy or was about to take part in politics even without a mass following, Goicoechea's tiny party got under way in February I933.28

Its early history did little to clarify the confusion. At the end of January, speaking in Bilbao, Goicoechea showed that he was still fishing for support from other groups. With an eye on the moderate monarchists within Accion Popular, he implied that his party was Maurist and stated that it was 'constitutionalist and legalist' - a patent untruth. Simultaneously, he made a reference to the Carlists which belied his legalism: 'Of Traditionalism I will say that in the past much has separated us, today hardly anything separates us, and in the future nothing at all will separate us.' ABC took up Goicoechea's line, calling for a right-wing federation, without com- parisons of programmes or close scrutiny of who brought most votes and influence to the union - a feeble attempt to prevent being taken over by Carlism and to hide Alfonsism's complete lack of popular support.29

On i March, Giocoechea elaborated the ideological position of his new party. Sandwiched between the usual overtures to his rivals came the first hint of the authentic voice of Renovaci6n Espafiola. Calling for a profound renovation of the concept of the state and speaking admiringly of Italy, he proposed the eradication of the class struggle by 'fascism, the disciplining of all classes by the state'.30 It might have been more profitable to stick boldly to this line, since little came of confused attempts to align with other groups. But Goicoechea, while committed to conspiracy, could never rid himself of the notion that parties were for politics. Thus, instead of developing an individual position, Alfonsist public activity in 1933 largely took the form of an embittered polemic against Accion Popular, which had by now become the Confedera- ci6n Espafiola de Derechas Autonomas (CEDA). A vain attempt was also made to get Alfonso XIII to declare membership of CEDA incompatible with monarchist ideals.31 Efforts to form a monarchist union with the Carlists were also rebuffed. Friendship

28 ABC II, 13 January, 24 February 1933; AE, i6 January I933, 283-90. The inclusion of four ex-Maurists on the five-man executive committee suggested a taste for orthodox politics.

29 ABC, 31 January, i February I933. 30 ABC, 2 March I933. 31 Gil Robles, No Fue Posible, 86-89; Robinson, Origins, II3-I7.

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never went beyond practical co-operation for limited ends, such as the setting up of a joint electoral office.32

WHILE ALFONSIST LEGAL POLITICAL ACTIVITIES faced such set- backs, the more congenial task of preparing insurrection progressed more smoothly. Conspiracy was the major preoccupation in I933, with the offices of Accion Espanola as the liaison centre. The conspiratorial committee was busy with plans for a rising and with the search for support. A primary objective was the infiltration of the officer corps, which was the province of Valentin Galarza, a colonel of the General Staff. Valuable information regarding the police came from a senior commissioner at the Direccion General de Seguridad, Martin Baguenas. The nominal chief of the projected rising was Sanjurjo. Contact was established in Rome with Marshal Balbo and Mussolini by Calvo Sotelo.33 The growing determination to overthrow the Republic by violence became increasingly explicit throughout the summer of I933. In July Pablo Leon Murciego wrote on the duty of resistance to tyranny, arguing that if the public power was not in accord with divine and natural laws (which, in the eyes of monarchists, the Republic patently was not), then resistance was neither sedition nor rebellion but a duty. A more forthright expression of this came a fortnight later in the first of a long series of articles by the Traditionalist theologian, Marcial Solana, who based his view of resistance on Aquinas and the exegetists of the siglo de oro. Solana quite openly outlined the contemporary relevance of his ideas: the tyrant was any oppressive or unjust government. Since power ultimately rested with God, an anti-clerical constitution clearly rendered the Republic tyrannical.34

At the same time, through both Acci6n Espafiola and Renovaci6n Espafiola, the Alfonsists were developing a notion of the modern monarchy which would replace the Republic. In doing so, they advocated a state which had progressed from Traditionalist models to a much more contemporary authoritarianism. This concept was developed during the spring and summer of 1933 in a series of articles by Eduardo Aun6s.35 It was always apparent that Acci6n

32 ABC, I2, 24 January 1933; Tradicionalistas y Renovacidn Espahola was announced in ABC, 26 March I933.

33 Ansaldo, op. cit., 50-52, 57-58. 34 Pablo Le6n Murciego, in AE, I6 July 1933; Marcial Solana, in ibid.,

i August I933 et seq. 35 'Hacia Una Espafia Corporativa', AE, i March I933 et seq. The articles

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Espaiiola's aggressive monarchism was in part a response to rising working class unrest. Long before it was done by the Falange, Accion Espafola was catering to middle class insecurity by advocating the corporative discipline of economic forces in the name of the nation as the surest guarantee against proletarian rebellion. The most cogent expression of this came from Aun6s. His new state was to be hierarchical and all-embracing in its total mobilization of the masses. Issues for the summer also contained articles by the Italian fascist theorist, Carlo Costamagna, and a translation of Mussolini's La Dottrina del Fascismo.36

The growing sympathy with foreign fascism was not confined to theory, but was closely connected with the contemporary trend to authoritarianism throughout Europe. Acci6n Espaiiola's reaction to the rise of Hitler was extremely favourable. Jorge Vig6n spoke of the 'perfect order' of Hitler's state. He also claimed that the pre- dicament of the Jews was a just response to 'international Jewish press hostility to Germany'.37 There had always been a slight un- dercurrent of anti-semitism in the group. The previous year had seen a review of the reissue of The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, which treated it with complete seriousness and recommended it as fundamental for a study of the Jewish mentality.38 Racism was never a major characteristic of Alfonsism, but it reflected awareness of current developments elsewhere. In September, Goicoechea told the Agrupaci6n Regional Independiente of Santander that Renovaci6n Espaiiola should be what Mussolini called the fascists - 'an anti-party'. Some days later, he spoke of his position as 'That of a Traditionalist ? That of a fascist ? There is something of both - why deny it ?' 39 In October, he visited Germany as a guest of the Nazi party and returned thoroughly infatuated with Hitler - 'a

were later published as La Reforma Corporativa del Estado (Madrid I935). Aun6s was one of Alfonsism's key links with the dictatorship and also the principal exponent of Italian political ideas. As Minister of Labour, he was sent by Primo to Italy to study corporativism, met Mussolini, and returned to work out his own corporative labour code in Spain. See Aun6s, El Estado Corporativo (Madrid I928), and La Politica Social de la Dictadura (Madrid I944), 60 ff. A close read- ing of Accidn Espanola for this period suggests that Aun6s's ideas were considered central by other members of the group.

36 Carlo Costamagna, in AE, I6 May I933; Mussolini's article, ibid., I6 June, I July I933.

37 ibid., I6 March I933, 82; I April I933, 197. 38 Ibid., I May I932, 434-48, I October I933. 39 ABC, I7, 22 September I933.

I00




really superior man, a true political genius' - and optimistic about the possibilities of introducing fascism into Spain.40

It was not therefore surprising that the Alfonsists took an interest in the foundation of small fascist groups by Ledesma Ramos and Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera. Indeed, it was their funds that made possible the appearance of the Falange. The industrialists in Renovacion were the most tempted by the prospect of gaining shock troops for the struggle against socialism, and transmitted money to Ledesma through a member of Renovacion, Jose Felix Lequerica, Goicoechea, and Juan March, the millionaire smuggler. Cash was arranged for Jose Antonio by Ansaldo and the Marques de Eliseda.41

As the November elections approached, Alfonsist contempt for parliamentary politics became more marked. An Accidn Espanola editorial (i6 October) spoke of the counter-revolution's need to give the country a new order, but not by parliamentary means: 'We are not democrats. We don't ask for masses to support our complete political and social programme.' The programme would be imple- mented by a select minority or a caudillo using force. However, until the moment of triumph was at hand, all means, 'including legal ones' would be used. This remarkable statement was qualified for the dedicated subversives by the customary assertion that elections were both absurd and pitiful; taking part in them was designed merely to stave off left-wing victory and was to be undertaken 'without faith, without illusions, and without enthusiasm'.42

Nevertheless, Alfonsists went to some trouble to get elected, by means of alliances with other groups. A central liaison committee was set up in Madrid to determine the bases of union and draw up lists of candidates, but participation was fairly cynical on all sides. While Gil Robles wanted power within the Republic to reform the constitution, the monarchists of both branches sought strategic positions from which to open preliminary hostilities against the Republic while awaiting the opportune moment to unleash the counter-revolution. Indeed, while the committee worked, Accion Espaiola (I6 October) published an article by a priest, Aniceto de

40 La Union, 14 October I933, quoted by Blinkhorn, Carlist Movement, 225. 41 Stanley G. Payne, Falange, A History of Spanish Fascism (Stanford I961),

45 n.; Ansaldo, op. cit., 63-64. 42 AE, i6 October, i November I933; in its issue of I6 September I933 AE

suggested that Sanjurjo would be the caudillo; he himself wrote (ibid. i6 Decem- ber I933) that Acci6n Espafiola was a constant comfort to his spirit.

IOI




Castro Albarran, which reinforced Solana's incitements to rebellion and specifically attacked the legalism of El Debate. Co-operation was not smooth. The Alfonsists vainly insisted that the Madrid list be headed by Sanjurjo - clearly incompatible with CEDA legalism. In a recorded speech Calvo Sotelo proclaimed that 'we are in- terested in going to parliament to prevent others doing so, rather than to enter ourselves', and promised that the next parliament would be the last for many years. Despite friction, a well-financed campaign brought surprising successes.43

The Alfonsists now looked forward to using right-wing strength in the Cortes to make government impossible. Accidn Espanola reminded Gil Robles that he too had called for a new state on 15 October and urged him to make 'manly and heroic' use of his 117 seats. This epitomised the Alfonsist attitude. In October Calvo Sotelo had written to Cortes Cavanillas setting out his anti- parliamentarism and admitting that he wanted a seat merely as a means to discredit the system. Even in exile, he was emerging as an altogether more positive and intransigent leader than Goicoechea. Interviewed in Paris after the elections, he demanded that the electoral coalition should remain united and opposed ministerial collaboration lest it delay the final struggle between Left and Right. Parliament, he said, should be done away with and replaced by a corporative state.44

Alfonsist optimism was short-lived. Gil Robles reaffirmed his liberty of action on 7 December and expressed readiness to colla- borate with non-Marxist Republican groups. The horrified monarchists immediately reopened the old polemic against accidentalism; La Nacion exhorted Catholics not to go over to the side of Jews and Masons; ABC accused Gil Robles of treachery to those monarchist voters who had supported CEDA thinking it to be a non-Republican party. Accidn Espafola carried a stiff attack by a Franciscan theologian on the idea of accommodation to the Re- public.45 At a banquet to celebrate Accidn Espanola's second anni- versary, a provocatively combative tone was taken. Quintanar said

43 For the work of the committee, the campaign, and the results, see HSRE, II, 223-44; Robinson, Origins, I40-51; Galindo Herrero, Partidos, I92-2II.

44 AE, i December 1933; Cortes Cavanillas, Gil Robles, I61; ABC, 21 Novem- ber I933.

45 Gil Robles, No FuePosible, Io6-07; El Debate 15, 17 December I933; ABC, i6 December I933; Galindo Herrero, Partidos, 213; Gumersindo de Escalante, in AE, I February 1933.

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that he and his colleagues were equally ready to write a book, con- duct polemics, or fight at the head of their troops, and Sainz Rodriguez talked of the Carlist Wars as holy wars which had to be repeated. Goicoechea protested at Gil Robles' abuse of the electoral victory and demanded in vain the maintenance of the coalition.46 Accidn Espaiola remained defiant. When the Carlist daily, El Siglo Futuro, writing in praise of Solana's articles, asked who in the modern world was the tyrant to be overthrown, Solana replied that in democratic or constitutional regimes it was anyone who held authority.47

Renovaci6n Espafiola, however, could not emulate the bel- ligerent tone of its doctrinal vanguard, since it had neither the strength to take power and destroy the system from within nor the self-confidence for resolute sabotage of parliamentary proceedings. This was largely the fault of Goicoechea's uncertain leadership. As president of Acci6n Nacional, he had failed to bring it into an Alfonsist orbit and had been equally unsuccessful in attempts to poach support elsewhere. An amnesty bill passed in April 1934 was thus of paramount importance for Alfonsism, for it signified the return to Spain of Calvo Sotelo, who alone was capable of bridging the gap between the inflexible theory of Accion Espafiola and the ineffectual practice of Renovaci6n Espafiola. A significant indica- tion of Goicoechea's lack of success was Alfonso XIII's belief that his best chance of restoration lay with CEDA rather than with the 'salon monarchists' of Renovacion.48

CALVO SOTELO HAD A brilliant reputation as one-time secretary to Antonio Maura and Minister of Finance under Primo.49 And while Goicoechea could never quite shake himself free of an old fashioned clerical conservatism, Calvo Sotelo was already well on the road to a form of fascism. Exiled in April I93 , he went to Portugal, where he appears to have found the atmosphere of General Carmona's

46 AE, i February I933, I005, IOI4; ABC, 6 February I933. 47 Solana, in AE, I6 February 1934. 48 J. Cortes Cavanillas, Vida, Confesiones y Muerte de Alfonso XIII (Madrid

1956), 426. 49 For Calvo Sotelo's life and career see Real Academia de Jurisprudencia y

Legislaci6n, La Vida y Obra de Jose Calvo Sotelo (Madrid I942); Aurelio Joaniquet, Calvo Sotelo (Santander I939); Eduardo Aun6s, Calvo Sotelo y la Politica de su Tiempo (Madrid I94I); Jose Calvo Sotelo, Mis Servicios al Estado (Madrid I93I).

I03




dictatorship congenial. There he was in close touch with the leaders of Integralismo Lusitano and Nacional-Sindicalismo and with Dr Salazar himself. Moving to France in February I932, he was brought into contact with Action Franqaise leaders by exiled Acci6n Espafiola figures like Vegas, Vig6n, and Eliseda. This appears to have been part of a conscious effort on their part to groom him as an unyielding counter-revolutionary leader. Friend- ship with Maurras, Benoist, Daudet and Bainville soon made him a militant anti-parliamentarian. At one stage he considered moving to Rome to complete his political education. Listening to a radio report of Hitler's rise to power, he told Aun6s that it heralded the inevitable triumph of totalitarian systems. Accordingly, he returned to Spain to take the doctrines of Accion Espanola into the Cortes and become the Right's most vigorous apostle of un- bending hostility to the Republic.50

Before Calvo Sotelo made his mark, there were in I934 various Alfonsist attempts to hasten the end of the Republic by illegal means. In March, Goicoechea went with General Barrera and the Carlists, Olazabal and Lizarza, to Rome to secure promises of arms and cash for a rising. Even in this, Goicoechea was little more than junior partner; Barrera decided that the Carlists should have all the money in view of Renovaci6n's meagre popular support.51 Mean- while, attempts to exploit the Falange continued. In April, Ansaldo was named head of Falange terrorist groups, which he tried to turn into a monarchist instrument of street warfare against the Socialists. Goicoechea was also making a deal with Jose Antonio whereby the Falange was to be subsidised provided it did not attack Renovaci6n in its propaganda. This pact, drawn up in the summer by Jose Antonio and Sainz Rodriguez, was never put into effect. Calvo Sotelo, seeing the Falange as the possible party of the future, tried to join and make it his own. Jose Antonio, who had a deep personal antipathy towards him, refused him membership. Ledesma saw this and other monarchist incursions as similar to the attempts of German conservatives to exploit the Nazis. The

50 Vegas, Pensamiento de Calvo Sotelo, 93-1II; Aun6s, Calvo Sotelo, 115-55; Quintanar in AE, i6 September I933; Joaniquet, Calvo Sotelo, I69-73; Jose Maria de Yanguas y Messia, 'Calvo Sotelo en Destierro', in Vida y Obra, passim.

51 Antonio Lizarza Iribarren, Memorias de la Conspiracidn (Pamplona I953), 22-26; William Askew, 'Italian Intervention in Spain', Journal of Modern History, 24, I952.

I04



ALFONSIST MONARCHISM AND TI-IE SPANISH CIVIL WAR

Falange saw Calvo Sotelo as the representative of the big bourgeoisie and the aristocracy. Resentfully, it burnt its bridges to monarchism. Ansaldo was expelled and Eliseda broke his ties. But contact continued through Adolfo Arce, the editor of La Epoca, the conservative daily now closely tied to Acci6n Espafiola. And cash was given later by Renovaci6n sources in Bilbao.52

The Calvo Sotelo episode with the Falange revealed his ambi- tion to be leader of the entire Right. The seed for this was sown by Sainz Rodriguez at a banquet held on 20 May I934 to welcome home Calvo Sotelo and Yanguas. He proposed that Renovaci6n, 'our Traditionalist brothers', the CEDA, and the small fascist groups of Albifiana and Jose Antonio unite in a national block. Calvo Sotelo, taking up the idea, made it clear that such a union would follow a 'straight line' of antagonism to the Republic as opposed to the 'curved line' of tactical accommodation followed by Gil Robles. This heralded the introduction of Acci6n Espafiola's uncompromising position into organized politics.53

Throughout the summer, Calvo Sotelo developed the notion. Gil Robles was attacked for his failure to demand power after the elections, while the Left was still weak. This was clearly aimed at undermining the faith of the more militant Cedistas in their leader. While CEDA collaborated, Calvo Sotelo demanded the conquest of the state, and the erection of a totalitarian system. He was overtly bidding for leadership of the Right and was not going to let punctilious monarchism stand in his way. In March, he said that Spain's problems could be solved by a monarchy or a Dollfuss-style authoritarian Republic. Now he was relegating the monarchy to a secondary position, in which it would be installed - not restored - as the fulfilment of a great evolutionary process.54 A more accurate anticipation of the premises of the Franco regime could hardly be imagined.

There was no noticeable drift of Cedistas to the new block. And the Carlists, in a period of expansion and growing militancy, had little interest in joining the Alfonsists in parliament. Moreover, the ideological line now being propounded by Calvo Sotelo was too

52 Ansaldo, op. cit., 71-89; Payne, Falange, 57-68; Gil Robles, No Fue Posible, 442-43 notes; Ramiro Ledesma Ramos, jFascismo en Espana? (2nd ed. Barcelona 1968), I61-65; Maximiano Garcia Venero, Falange En La Guerra De Espana (Paris I967), 39, II8.

53 AE, I June I934, ABC, 22 May 1934. 54 La Nacidn, 9 March 1934; ABC, 14 June, 24, 31 July I933.

I05




overtly totalitarian for Traditionalist tastes. However, after the Asturian rising of October 1934, the Right was united in outrage and panic. It was the favourable moment for launching the Bloque Nacional. Calvo Sotelo's reaction set the tone. Revolution was the offspring of the constitution which, he claimed, had brought 'sor- row, strikes, separatism, Marxism, destruction, anarchy, the class struggle which is gradually withering the life of Spain'. The situation could be resolved only by the army, the vertebral column of the nation. He reminded it of its political responsibility when he said 'if it cracks, if it bends, if it creaks, then Spain cracks, Spain bends, Spain creaks'. His transparent bid for military support made it clear that for him civil war had already started. It merely remained to unite right-wing forces and animate their morale. This was to be the task of the Block.55

On I November, interviewed by ABC, he pronounced the ruin of the liberal state. Until it could be replaced by the necessary corporative and totalitarian structure, he advocated a patriotic front to co-ordinate existing forces against the revolution. Its objective was the conquest of the state, and with a programme of economic left- ism and political rightism it would impose social justice and authority. The Block's manifesto, drawn up by Sainz Rodriguez, was distributed on the streets in early December. There was never any chance that the CEDA would adhere officially. The Carlists grudgingly aligned themselves with a patriotic initiative. Jose Antonio refused to have anything to do with it. Only Albifiana joined with anything like enthusiasm. Nevertheless, despite this initial lack of success, the Block might be said, in the light of Franco's forced unification of the Right in April 1937, to have been no more than premature. The theory behind the manifesto was culled entirely from Accidn Espanola. There was Traditionalist phraseology as a gesture to the Carlists, but the essential, and basic- ally fascist, content had most in common with Aun6s's articles of the previous year. Monarchism was laid aside before the more urgent need for a 'social, national, nationalist and nationalizing force'. It could well have been the manifesto for the military rising of 1936.56

55 ABC, 7 November I934. 56 ABC, I6, 28 November I934. The manifesto is printed in HSRE, III, 58-

60. For a translation, a list of the signatories and a good analysis, see R.A.H.

I06




Calvo Sotelo devoted 1935 to the unequivocal elaboration of the ideas of the Block. Its appeal was made overtly to the industrial and financial bourgeoisie and the landowning aristocracy. At the beginning of February, he spoke to the Circulo de la Uni6n Mercantil on 'economic and social discipline in the new state'. The current economic problem, he told his listeners, would be solved only by the prior resolution of the political problem, for industrial indis- cipline was bound to thrive in a system which allowed free rein to Marxist propaganda. Only an authoritarian regime, above classes and parties, could deal with a proletariat forever in conflict with the employer and the state. At a Block meeting in Zaragoza in March, he claimed that national wealth would rise with the establishment of the principle of authority. His invariable battle-cry was 'no more strikes, no more lock-outs': 'We can no longer stand an economic civil war. It is necessary to impose a unitary concept of national interest'. It was an unmistakable attempt to play on the fears of the wealthy classes.57

THROUGHOUT THE SPRING and early summer of 1935, a series of Bloque Nacional meetings held each Sunday endeavoured to maintain the bellicose atmosphere of October 1934. The aim was to convince the Right that further dialogue with the Left was impossible and to galvanize it into adopting a warlike posture. This was closely linked with a polemic against Gil Robles' ministerial collaboration with Lerroux's Radicals. Speaking as if Spain were already in a state of civil war, Calvo Sotelo tried to demonstrate Gil Robles' pusillanimity and thereby to discredit him with the CEDA rank and file. Constant complaints were made that the CEDA was abusing an electoral success owed to monarchist cash and votes. And on 2I April, in Seville, he declared that great evils required great remedies, that the need was for drastic surgery not for mor- phine: 'The terms are clear. God or atheism; authority or anarchy and communism. In Spain, there is Right and Left, no centre... The revolution is on a war footing... it is necessary to unite the

Robinson, 'Calvo Sotelo's Bloque Nacional and its Manifesto', University of Birmingham Historical Journal, 2, I966.

57 ABC, 3 February, 19 March I935; La Epoca, i November I935. Sotelo delivered his grand attack on Marxist economics and defence of capitalism within a directed economy in a lecture to the Academy of Jurisprudence, of which he was president. See Jose Calvo Sotelo, El Capitalismo Contempordneo y su Evolucidn (Valladolid I938).

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forces of the Right.' The constant objective was to erode confidence in the possibilities of compromise.58

When Gil Robles gained five ministries in May, however, his tactics seemed to be succeeding. But Calvo Sotelo was not dis- mayed. Since the parliamentary state was doomed, he asserted, accommodation to it was pointless. And when the tactic failed, as it was bound to, the Block would be there, the 'army in reserve'. Incessant attempts were made to denigrate Gil Robles' apparent triumph. At a meeting on 26 May in Gij6n, Calvo Sotelo affirmed that 'Nothing can be expected from the Republic ... it is necessary to have all forces ready in order to achieve a truly national regime'.

When Gil Robles made the Pact of Salamanca with Lerroux on 23 June, Calvo Sotelo's advocacy of belligerence became even more frantic. On 18 August, he said that Spain had to make a choice between revolution and counter-revolution, between socialism and Catholicism. The masses who were national, Catholic, and in favour of order had to unite. Such a union would aim at 'the military integrative state', the recurrent dream of the Accidn Espanola group. Aunos cited Primo as the great figure to be emulated.59

For all its virulence, the Bloque Nacional never really got off the ground. The Carlists made similar attacks on the CEDA but tended to do so separately. And despite Calvo Sotelo's repeated declarations of his affinity with the CEDA masses, there was no appreciable shift of accidentalist support. Gil Robles' appointment as War Minister rather stole the Block's thunder, since it made the officer corps less prone to conspiratorial schemes and, together with a rising stock market, convinced the conservatives who supplied the Block with funds that the danger was receding. Ansaldo could not get financial support for direct action against the Re- public. The Block's militia, 'the guerrillas of Spain', had to be run down and terrorist activities were no more than childish pranks.60

Nevertheless, if Calvo Sotelo's tangible success was minimal, he contributed to a polarization of forces which was to become apparent in the next election campaign, and which could only hasten

58 ABC, IO February, 26 March, 23 April I935. 59 ABC, II, 28 May, 6, 20 August I935; Aun6s, La Reforma Corporativa, xi,

xv, xvi. 60 Ansaldo, op. cit., 95-I03. The main activist achievement consisted in hang-

ing a giant banner across the Alcala bearing the slogan 'Bloque Nacional will save Spain'. It was blown down by wind.

Io8




the moment when his bellicosity would arouse a wide popular response. The rigidity of the Alfonsist line on separatism could only embitter Catalans and Basques alike. In October 1934, Calvo Sotelo was actually involved in a scuffle in the Cortes with the Basque leader, Aguirre. In November I935, he stated that 'The Basque nationalist is anti-European, anti-Spanish, and anti- Basque... Between a red Spain and a broken Spain, I prefer the first'. And in the Cortes on 5 December, he declared that Basque nationalism was 'inspired by a wild, sickening, and repulsive hatred for Spain'. Such language could only accelerate the leftward path of the Basques. But more significant was the effect on the Left. The distinction between the Block and the fascism which had de- stroyed socialism in Italy, Germany, and Austria became decreas- ingly visible to the Left as a result of Calvo Sotelo's stark rejection of the possibilities of parliamentary democracy and his constant use of terms like 'authoritarian' and 'totalitarian'. A Left which tended to lump together Gil Robles and Calvo Sotelo came to feel seriously menaced by the Right in general.61

When the CEDA-Radical coalition fell in December I935, Calvo Sotelo's position seemed to have been vindicated, and the subsequent elections were fought on the terms outlined by him throughout the year. If the Left went to the polls frightened of fascism and the Right terrified of revolution, Calvo Sotelo was largely responsible. Before Gil Robles left the Ministry of War, the Block leader had vainly sent Ansaldo to urge him to make a coup. Three days later, he looked forward joyfully to the coming con- frontation: 'accidentalism is dead on all sides. The Republic is not compatible with authentic rightism'. CEDA was denounced for its misuse of the I933 electoral success. The Block's election manifesto identified the Republic with revolution, and demanded a counter- revolutionary front with precise aims, which amounted to the an- nihilation of the Republic. Gil Robles was reluctant to align himself with the Block and the electoral collaboration agreed upon was slight.62

The great event of the Block's election campaign was the giant 61 ABC, Io October I933; Arraras, Cruzada, II, I53, 393; La Fpoca, 6 Decem-

ber I933. 62 La Nacidn, 14 December; La Epoca, 17, 27 December; ABC, 17 December

I933. The manifesto, dated 25 December, appeared in La Epoca 30 December, and ABC 31 December I933; for negotiations see Gil Robles, No Fue Posible, 409-I9.

I09




'homage' for the Carlist and Alfonsist deputies in the Cortes organized by the Agrupacion Regional Independiente. Meetings in two Madrid cinemas and a theatre were followed by a banquet for 5000 in three hotels. Violent anti-Republican speeches were made by all the big names in Acci6n Espafiola and the Block. Goicoechea demanded the elimination of 'anti-national parties masquerading as workers' organizations'. Socialism should be outlawed, he said, for if Spain did not kill it, then it would kill Spain. He also underlined the urgent need for Spain to follow the examples of Italy, Portugal, Germany, and Austria. Calvo Sotelo's tone was even more aggressive. Against those who would implant the rule of barbarism and anarchy, society must appeal to force: 'to military force placed at the service of the state. Social, economic and separatist discords need to be dealt with by a strong state and there can be no strong state without a powerful army.' The army was the only defence against the 'red hordes of communism'.63

The Block showed little respect for the parliamentary process. It went to the polls to ensure that these elections would be the last. Victory was to be used to dismantle the parliamentary state. When the Left gained the victory, the Block prepared to achieve its objective by a more congenial means. Gil Robles later asserted that it had actually preferred the Right to lose the elections so as to be able to proceed to a violent showdown with the Left. Certainly the Block was less disheartened by defeat than confirmed in its con- viction of the fatuity of the electoral process. Accion Espanola commented that 'to entrust the destiny of the patria to the whims of the multitude is an absurdity', and went on to point out that 'truth can and must be imposed by force'. La Epoca showed contempt for the results while still blaming defeat on CEDA moder- ation. In March, the paper began to publish a series of articles by the Augustine theologian, Father P.M. Velez, on 'the revolution and the counter-revolution' in Spain. He claimed that the definitive struggle had arrived and that to prevent submission to the revolution 'we must all be militant apostles and soldiers and even martyrs if necessary'. Immediately after the election results were known,

63 The fullest report is in La Epoca, 13 January I932; see also ABC, I4 Janu- ary I933. It has been said of Calvo Sotelo's speech that it introduced concepts destined to nourish the political substance of Spain for many years; see Ricardo de la Cierva, Historia de la Guerra Civil Espaiola: I Perspectivas y Antecedentes. 1898-1936 (Madrid 1969), 628.

IIO




Calvo Sotelo urged Portela, the Prime Minister, to exclude the Left from power and call in the army.64 His advice was not accepted, and he now turned definitively to conspiracy. After the elections, Block meetings were few, and plotting replaced propaganda as the central activity. Indeed, the organization as such was virtually dead; the Carlists were making independent plans for an insurrection. The Alfonsists' conspiratorial impetus, relaxed during Gil Robles' tenure of the War Ministry, had revived in October 1935 at the wedding of Alfonso XIII's son, Juan, in Rome, where contact was made between Calvo Sotelo and Sanjurjo. After the elections other military contacts were renewed, especially with the anti-Republican Uni6n Militar Espafiola. Calvo Sotelo himself appears to have played an obscure but crucial role of liaison and en- couragement. Goded's son spoke of him 'fighting at our side'; his brother says he was the linch-pin of preparations for the rising; and most sources see him as constantly in touch with colonels and generals. Where police supervision inhibited him, his faithful friend, the Carlist deputy Joaquin Bau acted as his agent in contacts with army officers and the Falange.65

Yet perhaps Calvo Sotelo's greatest contribution to the July rising was his behaviour in parliament. His speeches were designed to prevent any reconciliation between moderate Cedistas like Manuel Gimenez Fernandez and Luis Lucia, and moderate Re- publicans. Since debates received full press coverage and were not censored, his words were aimed at the Right in general to persuade them of the need for insurrection. The counter-revolutionary doctrines of Acci6n Espafola now received nation-wide publicity, whereas they had previously been confined to the review and to La Epoca, and its complex theological rationalizations of subversion were now translated into practical and immediate terms for the middle classes in general.

64 AE, January I936; letter of Gil Robles in Ya, Io April I968; AE editorial, February I936; La Epoca, I8, 20, 25 February, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, I0 March I936; HSRE, IV, 58.

65 Ansaldo, op. cit., II4; La Cierva, Historia, 739; Manuel Goded: Un 'Faccioso' Cien por Cien (Zaragoza 1938), I4; Joaquin Calvo Sotelo in conversa- tion with the author, 13 May I970; Joaquin Bau in ABC, I3 July I954; Vegas, Pensamiento de Calvo Sotelo, 2II-I2; Galindo Herrero, Partidos, 332. Whether UME's contribution to the rising was more than propagandist remains unclear; see La Cierva, Historia, 76I-63; Stanley G. Payne, Politics and the Military in Modern Spain (Stanford I967), 293 ff. Antonio Cacho Zabalza, La Unidn Militar Espanola (Alicante 1940) is inaccurate.

III




In four major parliamentary speeches, Calvo Sotelo gave the army a theory of political action and the right-wing masses a con- sciousness of their need to confront 'the communist threat'. The first of these, on 15 April I936, dwelt on the disorder into which Spain had fallen since the elections, implying that red revolution was at hand and had to be stopped at all costs. This provoked angry shouts from Socialist and Communist deputies - a provocation which, in its discrediting of parliamentary proceedings, was surely part of his purpose. The speech was followed ten days later by an interview in ABC in which he stated that Spain's only alternatives were communism or a national state. Painting a lurid picture of Russia, he exhorted the middle class to combat the spread of communism. The emphasis was always on the irrelevance of compromise. Goicoechea roundly rejected Gil Robles' scheme for restoring stability under a national government.66

A more decisive step towards parliamentary polarization was taken on I9 May. Eulogising the German and Italian economic systems, Calvo Sotelo urged their adoption in Spain, where, he said, the principle of authority was at the mercy of the country's sworn enemies. This so enraged the Socialist deputy for Santander, Bruno Alonso, that he interjected: 'Now we know what the honourable member is, but he hasn't the courage to declare it publicly.' Calvo Sotelo, with an eye to making the Cortes unworkable, replied: 'I have the courage to say anything I think and the honourable member less than anyone can forbid the legitimate expression of my thoughts. The honourable member is a nonentity, a pigmy.' The irate Socialist offered to fight Calvo Sotelo in the street and cried: 'The honourable member is a pimp'. With such scandal, it was easy to suggest the need for recourse to extra-parliamentary means. Calvo Sotelo followed up his earlier remarks with a reference to the army's patriotic duty to 'deal furiously' with those who acted to the nation's detriment. Meanwhile, Eugenio Vegas spoke in the Accion Espanola lecture room of the Right's need to conquer power to defend its principles.67

In the course of another debate on public order on i6 June, Calvo Sotelo offered in the place of the Republic's instability 'the concept of the integrative state which administers economic justice and which can say with full authority: "no more strikes, no more

66 ABC, 16, 26 April 1936; Gil Robles, No Fue Posible, 693. 67 ABC, 20 May 1936; AE, 'Actividad Intelectual', May I936.

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lock-outs ... no more anarchic liberty, no more criminal destruction of output" ', and then clearly spelt out his position in challeng- ing terms: 'Many call that the fascist state. If it is, then I, who share that idea of the state and believe in it, declare myself fascist.' He went on to talk of the imminent clash between the hordes of revolution and the principle of authority 'whose most august in- carnation is the army'. A blatant overture was then made to the military: 'The soldier who, faced with his destiny, is not ready to rise for Spain and against anarchy, is out of his mind'. The speech was frequently interrupted by the Socialist deputies who accused him of provocation, and a virtual riot broke out in the Cortes. Casares Quiroga, the Prime Minister, accused Calvo Sotelo, with some justification, of intending merely to cause disruption and of seeking to use the army in order to be able once more to enjoy the delights of dictatorship. Calvo Sotelo replied with a repetition of his remarks about the army being the vertebral column of the nation, remarks which were being taken in military circles as a clear invitation to rise. He also stated prophetically that he accepted with pleasure any responsibilities arising from his acts.68

When the last of his major parliamentary interventions took place on I July, positions were already being taken up for the civil war. He announced to the Left: 'You will not be allowed to try out your absurd theories. We will not let you.' Addressing the bourgeoisie, he appealed to them to take part in a fascist reaction against attempts to proletarianize them: 'the remedy will not be found in this or any other parliament, nor in the present government, nor in any government forged by the Popular Front, nor in the political parties which are merely gangs of racketeers. The solution will be found in the corporative state which...' At this point, another riot broke out, and in the tumult a Socialist deputy cried that violence was legitimate against a fascist chief who sought to put an end to parliament and parties.69

Meanwhile, outside parliament, plans for a rising were reaching maturity. The Alfonsist contribution in terms of liaison and finance was crucial. This is not to deny that the July rising was military in substance nor to belittle the Carlist role. Nevertheless, it has to be

68 ABC, I7 June I936. The transcript of this debate from the Diario de las Sesiones de las Cortes is reprinted in full in Ricardo de la Cierva, Los Documentos de la Primavera Trdgica (Madrid I967), 495-567; Jorge Vig6n, El General Mola (Barcelona I957), I07.

69 ABC, 2 July 1936; HSRE, IV, 285-88.

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recognized that the aims of the rising - and the post-I939 economic structure - closely followed the remedies propounded by Accidn Espaiola, to which Franco was himself a subscriber.70 Mola asked Goicoechea to prepare a manifesto for the northern insurrection. Ironically, the spark which set the rebellion in motion was the assassination of Calvo Sotelo. In fact, the point of no return had already been reached, but the murder removed lingering doubts and hastened final preparations. It was Alfonsists who arranged for an aircraft to bring Franco from the Canary Islands and des- patched another to bring Sanjurjo from Lisbon, while Goicoechea, Sainz Rodriguez, and Yanguas waited in Burgos to be part of his government. And it was an Alfonsist deputation which went to Rome to clinch Italian aid.71

Thus the rising and the state which grew from it clearly carried the imprint of Acci6n Espafiola. Yet perhaps of more significance than the intellectual, political, and economic urge for a coup was the Alfonsist role in provoking and accentuating the polarization which made war inevitable. On the one hand consciously preparing the middle classes psychologically, their speeches and articles must have had their influence on the Left. The Alfonsists who called for the forcible implantation of a totalitarian state were prominent in Acci6n Popular and later united with the CEDA at elections. The Left never took a critical interest in the internecine squabbles of the Right and did not distinguish one from the other, which might account for the sincere left-wing belief that the October I934 insurrection was aimed at preventing a fascist seizure of power. Dur- ing the post-October repression, it can hardly have encouraged the Left to hear Calvo Sotelo berate Gil Robles for mildness before the revolutionary threat. And after the February 1936 elections, the virulence of the Block's speeches can only have confirmed the Left in its own extremism. Vegas was not mistaken in writing of those who fought the civil war with the word and the pen.72

70 AE: Antologia (Burgos 1937); I7, I9. 71 Luis Romero, Tres Dias de Julio (Barcelona I967), I48, I89; H.R.

Southworth, Antifalange (Paris I967), IOI; Ansaldo, op. cit., I25. 72 AE: Antologia, I3.

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alfonsist monarchism and the coming of the spanish civil war

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