air force cruise missile history

8/8/2019 Air Force Cruise Missile History

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TheEvol ut i on

of

t he

Cr ui se M s s i l e

by

KENNETH

P

WERRELL

Ai r Uni versi t y

(AU)

Ai r

Uni vers i t y Press

Maxwel l Ai r

ForceBase,

Al abama

September 1985


3/304

Li braryof Congress Catalogi ng

i n

Publ i cati onData

Wer r el l , Kenneth

P

The

Evol uti on

of

the Crui seMs s i l e

September 1985

I ncl udes bi bl i ogr aphi es and i ndex

1 Crui seMssi l es-H story I i r Uni versi ty US T i t l e

UG 3 2

C7W47

1985

358

.174 0973

85-8131

Fi rs t Pr i nt i ng 1985

SecondPri nti ng

1998

D sclai mer

Opi n ons, concl usi ons, andrecommendat i ons

expressedor i mpl i edw t hi n aresol el y

those

of the

edi t ors and

do

not necessari l yrepresent

thevi ews of

Ai r

Uni ver si t y,

the

Uni ted

States

i r

Force

the

Department of

Defense,

or

any

other

US

government

agency Ceared

f or

publ i c

rel ease

di str i buti on

unl i mted

For

sal e

by the

Superi ntendent of Documents

USGovernment

Pr i nt i ng

Of f i ce

Wshi ngtonDC20402


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t z

c nezi eani

a l i o ka TE

j zzvzJ

j zvi ny at wdl i zzvE wi t f i t f i E

ez ui s z

mi l l i z


5/304

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK


6/304

CONTENTS

Chapt er

Page

DSCL IMER

FOREWORD

i x

THE

UTHOR

xi

CKNOWEDGMENTS

x i i i

I

I NTRODUCTION

1

Not es

6

THE

E RLY

YE RS

7

For ei gn

Ef forts 8

The

Navy- Sper r y Fl yi ng

omb 8

The

Army- Ket t er i ng

ug

12

For ei gn Devel opment s

17

The

Army- Sper r y

Exper i ment s 21

USNavyEf forts

23

TheKet t er i ng- General Mot or s A 1

26

X QAi rcraf t

s Aer i al Torpedoes

3

PHRODTE

The

Aer i al

Torpedo

I n

Act i on

32

Not es

36

WORLD

W R

41

TheGermn

V l

41

The

Ameri can V- 1 J B- 2

62

The

Nor t hr op

J B- I / J B-10

68

Not es

71

I V

POSTW R

DEVELOPMENTS

79

Post war Adj ust ment

81

Ai r

Mat er i el

Commnd

NSHEE

81

Nort hr opSnar k 82

North Ameri can

Navaho

97

TheMar t i n Matador

108

Navy Pr ogr ams

113

Regul us

I

Ri gel , Regul us

I I

Tri ton

113

TheCrossbow

120


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Chapter

Page

The

Hound

Dog

121

TheBuckDuck 123

The Bul l Goose

124

The

Quai l

125

Not es

129

V

USCRUSEMSSI LES

REVI TALIZED

135

Advanci ng

Technol ogy

135

Remot el y Pi l oted Vehi cl es

RPVs

142

SCAD

SCAM

S UD

144

1970s

146

Harpoon 150

ST WSand

S M

oSL M

151

The

Navy Ef fort Gener al

Dynamcs Wns

t heSL Mont r act 154

L M 156

Not es

165

VI

1977TOTHE

PRESENT

171

Cr ui se

M ssi l es

and

SALT

172

TheB 1

176

L Mel ect i on

178

Cr ui se M ssi l e Car r i er

187

Rati onal e

f or

Mul t i pl e

Cr ui se

M ssi l e Var i ants

189

SL M

192

GL M

201

MR SM

205

L M

C ASALM

T M

208

Fi nal Words

211

Not es

214

VI I

CONCLUSION

223

APPENDX

Speci f i cat i ons

of Vari ous Cr ui se

M ssi l es

235

APPENDX

B Di scussi on of Ai r War Col l ege

Cr ui se M s s i l e Sur vey

237

APPENDXC Cr ui se M s s i l e Sur vey Ai r power Resear ch

n s t i t u t e Ai r

War

Col l ege

241

APPENDX

D

Cr ui se M s s i l e Sur vey Cr oss

Tabul at i on

249

V


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Page

APPENDX

E

Snark

Fl i ght

Record

253

APPENDX

F X 1

Launchi ngs

6

APPENDX

Navaho

Launchi ngs

63

APPENDX

Tomahawk

Launchi ngs

65

APPENDX

Boei ngAGM8 Aand

AGM8 B

Fl i ght Test s

7

INDEX

273


9/304



10/304

FOR WOR

The penchant of t he Amer i can ml i t ar y t o be on t he l eadi ng edge of

t echnol ogy

coul d destroy our

perspect i ve

of newweapon system and

d i s t o r t

our percept i ons of

t h e i r most e f f e c t i v e

use

i n mdemwar f ar e

o

s

wi t h crui se m s s i l e s

one

of

t echnol ogy s newes t and mos t sophi st i cat ed devel opment s r Werr el l s

book

pr ovi des t he perspect i ve and i n s i gh t

we woul d ot her wi se

l ack

Al t hough

c r u i s e m ss i l es

a r e amng

t he newest and mos t sophi st i cat ed weapons

f i e l d e d by t he Uni t ed t a t e s t hey possess a r i c h concept ual and t echnol ogi cal

he r i t a ge t s

i mpor t ant

t h a t

we

under st and t h i s heri t age as

we

consi der

depl oyment

and empl oy ment

opt i ons

t s al so i mpor t ant t h a t we understand t he

devel opment al

process i l l u s t r a t e d by t he hi s t or y of t he c r u i s e mss i l e

W t hout

t he perspect i ve

pr ovi ded by t h i s h i s t o r y

our percept i ons

of

t h e i r purpose and use

l ack

dept h and

i n s i g h t

Many

s i g n i f i c a n t event s have

i nt er vened bet ween

t he

compl et i on of r Werr el l s

manuscr i pt

i n

1982

and

t s

publ i cat i on

The

manuscr i pt

has not

been

updat ed

because rapi d devel opment s

mke

such updat i ng an endl ess task I n f a c t

t he

rapi d

pace of

cont i nued devel opment

serves t o r ei nf or ce t he need t o r e f l e c t on t he

devel opment

of these

system and

t o

pl ace t h e i r purpose

i n

perspect i ve

ON L

STEVENS

Col onel US F

Commnder

Cent er

f o r

Aerospace

Doct r i ne

Research and

Educat i on


11/304



12/304

TH

UTHOR

r

Kennet h

P Wer r el l

conduct ed t h i s

study whi l e

ser vi ng

as a

v i s i t i n g prof essor

a t the

Ai r Uni ver si t y

Cent er f or

Aer ospace

Doctr i ne

Research and Educat i on

CADRE ,

Maxwel l Ai r Force Base

Al abama

A 1960 graduate

of the Uni t ed

t a t es Ai r Force Academy,

r Wer r el l hol ds the

M

and

PhDdegr ees f r om

Duke

Uni ver si ty

r

Wer r el l

s

Prof essor

of

Hi stor y

a t

Radf or d

Uni versi t y

Hi s

backgr ound

i ncl udes a Vi si t i ng

Associ ate

Prof essor as s i gnment a t Command and

Gener al

Staff

Col l ege

and Hi stori an assi gnment s

f or both

Oper at i ons Research

I nc and the

Wr

Depar tment

i s t o r i c al

Fund

A f r equent

parti ci pant

i n m l i t a r y h i s t o r y

wor kshops and conf er ences r Wer r el l

has

authored s e v e r a l a r t i c l e s and

papers

onml i t a r y h i s t o r y Amongthese s Ei ghth

i rForce

Bi bl i ogr aphy

MA/AH

Publ i shi ng

1981

r

Wer r el l was comm ss i oned

upon

graduati on

f r omthe Uni t ed t a t es Ai r Force

Academy

i n

1960

and r ecei ved hi s p i l o t wi ngs

i n 1961 Ass i gned t o

t he

56t h

Weat her

Reconnai ssance Squadron i n

Yokot a J apan f r om 1962

u n t i l

1965 Dr

Wer r el l served

r s t as

p i l o t

and

l a t e r

as

a i r c r a f t commander f or t he WB-50

He

r esi gned h i s

commssi on

wi th the r ank of

capt ai n i n 1965


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14/304

ACKNOWEDGMENTS

Many i ndi vi dual s and

or gani zat i ons

hel ped

make

t h i s book possi bl e

F i r s t

w sh

t o t hank those

a t my

home

i n s t i t u t i o n

Radf or d

Uni ver si t y,

who

encour aged

and

made poss i bl e

my

workw t h t he Ai r Uni ver s i t y t he oard of V i s i t o r s

D Donal d

~Dedmon, Presi dent ;

D

Davi d

Moor e,

Vi ce

Presi dent

f or

cademc Af f ai r s D

j

D St ump,

Dean

of

t he

School

of

Arts

and

Sci ences

and

D

K

Rober t s,

Chai r man of t he Depar t ment of Hi s t ory Speci al t hanks ar e due Prof B Hol l ey

t DukeU

and

CongressmanRi ckBoucher 9t h D st

Va

f or ass i s tance

and

suppor t

dur i ng t he cl ear ance pr ocess The Uni t ed St at es Ai r For ce, Li eut enant General

Char l es Cl evel and, f or mer Commander of t he Ai r

Uni ver si t y,

Maj or General

USAF Ret i r ed Davi d Gr ay,

f or mer Commandant

of

t he Ai r War

Col l ege,

and

Maj or General Paul Hodges, Commandant of t he Ai r War Col l ege, wer e unspari ng

i n t h e i r suppor t t hr oughout t h i s pr oj ect Col onel

Thomas

Fabyani c USAF

Ret i r ed

t he

f ounder

and

fas t di r ect or

of t he Ai r power Resear ch

I n s t i t u t e

ARI ,

and Col onel

Kennet h

Al nw ck,

h i s

successor,

deserve

much

of

t he

c r e di t

f or

hel pi ng

concei ve t he concept , encour age t he p r o j e c t and removemany of t he b a r r i e r s

encount er ed

Col onel

Donal d St evens ,

current

d i r e c t o r pr ovi ded

v i t a l

publ i cat i on

assi st ance Ot her s a t t he Ai r Uni ver s i t y who hel ped i n many i mpor t ant ways were

Li eut enant

Col onel s

Donal d Baucomand

J ohn Gui l mart i n USAF Ret i r ed

and

Dr

Davi d MacI saac Pr est on Br yant , J ohn

F

H

Schenk,

and Dorot hy

McCl uski e

l en t

very val uabl e

e d i t o r i a l

assi st ance Many

i ndi vi dual s

hel ped i n document

pr ocessi ng

J o Ann

Per due,

Edna Davi s,

Conni e

Smt h,

Mar ci a W l l i a m , and

J enni f er Warner For

l o g i s t i c a l

suppor t am

thankful

t o Capt Harbert J ones, Bet t y

Br own,

Mar i l yn Tyus,

and

Toni Whi t e

Gr aphi c

support,

of

excel l ent

q u a l i t y

came

f r omt he pen of Peggy

Gr eenl ee,

whi l e

J ohn West cot t

and

St ephen

Garst

of

Ai r

Uni ver s i t y Revi ewcreated t he softback cover

The

US F

Hi s t ory Programhel ped

i n a number of ways, f r om archi val

and p i c t o r i a l suppor t t o

much

appr eci at ed

advi ce and c r i t i c i sm

These

i ndi vi dual s i ncl ude Dr

Ri char d

Mor se, R

Car gi l l

H a l l

LynnGamma J udy

Endi cot t , Pres sl ey

B ckerst af f ,

and Mar gar et

CWorn

of t he

Al ber t F Simpson Hi st or i cal Resear ch

Cent er

D

Ri char d Hal l i on of Edwar ds

Ai r

Force Base

and J ohn

Bohn

of Of f ut t Ai r Force Base

The abl e assi st ance of

J u l i e

McAul ey

fromEgl i n Ai r

Force

ase l M senko,

Dr Cl ar ence G ger , and Mke

Levy f rom

Aer onaut i cal

Syst em

D v i s i o n

;

Rober t

Smth f r om

Ai r

Force Logi st i cs

Command

and Kl ar a

Foel l er f r om

Medi a

Resear ch

a t Nor t on Ai r

Force

Base

pr oved

i nval uabl e

The Ai r Uni vers i t y

Li br a r y pl ayed a key r o l e i n maki ng t h i s

book poss i bl e w t h speci al t hanks due Tomma

P a s t o r e t t

Rut h Gr i f f i n andKat hl een

Gol son

Col onel

Benj amn Ti l l man

and Maj or J ohn Gannon of t he 416t h

Bombardment Wng

Col onel

J oseph Rut t er , theL Mrogram

D r ect or, and t he

RDQsect i on

a t

t he Pent agon were as unspar i ng of t h e i r

t i me as

t hey

wer e hel pf ul


15/304

and hospi t abl e Rear

Adm ral

Wal t er Locke

Col onel

Carey Dani el s and Mabl e

Lawry

of t he J oi nt

Crui se

M s s i l e s Proj ect

Of f i ce

l e nt

i nval uabl e

assi st ance E

Conrowand others a t R ND

Dean Sampson

and J

R

Utterstrom

of t he Boei ng

Aerospace Company

D

I r a

Chart of t he Nor t hrop Corporat i on Rose Mar i e

P h i l l i p s of t he

Sperry

Corporat i on J ohn

Bi ckers and

E J Rei l l y of t he

McDonnel l

Dougl as Ast ronaut i cs Company Davi d J o l i v e t t e r of

t he Wl l i ams I nt ernat i onal

Corporat i on

Ri chard Shear i n of t he

Vought

Corporat i on

D

Derek

Brui ns

of

Occi dent al Col l ege W l l i amKai ser of t he Cradl e of Avi at i on Museum

Ri char d

Schar chburg of

t he

Gener al

Mot or s

I n s t i t u t e Foundat i on Bob

Fi nl ey

and

Bruce

Greenberg

of t he Nat i onal Ar chi ves Phi l Edwards and Pet e Sut hard of t he

Nat i onal

Ai r

and

Space

Museum

Char l es

Wrman

of

t he

Ai r

Force

Museum

and

D

W l l i am

Armst r ong of

t he

Naval Ai r Syst ems Command

a l l pl ayed

v i t a l

rol es

i n

maki ng t h i s book

poss i bl e

The many i ndi vi dual s a t t he

Def ense

udi oVi sual

gencyhel ped obt ai n most of t he

i l l u s t r a t i o n s

whi l e

t he

Maxwel l

Ai r Force Base

Photo Lab

processed

them

Overseas

B. C. Kervel l of t he Royal

Aeronaut i cal

Est abl i shment Ai r Commodore A

Probert

Humphrey Wnn

and J

P.

McDonal d

at the Ai r Hi st ori cal Branch andE Hi nes of t he I mper i al War Museum

made t he r i t i s h

and

German s i d e of t he s tory poss i bl e

F i n a l l y must t hankmy

e n t i r e

f aml y especi al l y

mywi f e J eanne

who

endured

much

t o

make

t h i s

proj ect

possi bl e

K NN T PW RR LL

Seni or Research

Fel l ow

Ai r power

Research I n s t i t u t e


16/304

CHAPTER

INTRODUCTION

The out come of war

i s determned by a compl ex combi nat i on of f a c t o r s t h a t

i ncl ude number s, p o l i t i c s ,

s t r a t e g y , t a c t i c s , t r a i n i n g ,

moral e,

l eadershi p,

organi zat i on, l o g i s t i c s , weapons,

and

l uck . As l i g h t super i or i ty i n most of these

c at e go r i e s , or a

great superi or i t y i n one,

can

account f or vi ct or y . Wthout

at t empt i ng

t o rank

order these

f a c t o r s , i t i s obvi ous t h a t

t he

country

possessi ng

b e t t e r weapons i ncreases

i t s chances of vi ctory .

Consequent l y,

t he

Uni t ed

S t a t e s must come t o gri ps w t h changi ng

t echnol ogy

i f

t he

country

i s t o r emai n

m l i t a r i l y strong A l eadi ng student of m l i t a r y

t echnol ogy

has put i t

t h i s

way

. . . newandmore

ef fect i ve

weapons

have general l y beenadoptedonl y

s l ow y i n

spi te of

thei r

obvi ous advantages

Si nce t he character of

contemorary

weapons i s such

that thei r pr oducti on

as

wel l

as thei r

use candi sl ocate

whole

economes, i t i s probabl y not toomuch t o suggest

that

t he

sur vi val of

enti re

cul t ur es mayhi ngeuponan ab i l i t y

t o

perf ect

super i or weapons

andexpl oi t them

f u l l y Sur vi val i t s e l f ,

then, appears

t o

depend

on speedi n both t he

devel opment and

t he

opti mum

ut i l i zat ion

of

weapons I

Gi ven

t h i s

premse,

t he

US

m l i t a r y

must

not

become

p a r t

of the

pr obl em

but

r a t h e r

must

make

the best use of t he count r y' s economc, s c i e n t i f i c ,

and

manufact ur i ng

resources

. The

s e r v i c es

must l ook t o

the f uture

.

I n 1945,

t he

t op

Amer i can

ai r man

wr ote t h a t :

Nati onal safety woul d

beendangered

by

anAi r Forcewhosedoctr i nes and t echni ques are

t i e d

sol el y on t he equ pment and

process

of

t he

moment

Present

equ pment

i s but astep i n progress,

andany Ai r Force

which

does

not

keep i t s doct r i nes

ahead

of i t s equi pment, andi t s vi s i on far i nto

t he future, canonl y del ude t he nat i on i nto a

f a l se

senseof

securi ty

2

Whi l e weapons

come

and

go

i n the

m l i t a r y ,

h i s t o r y

provi des

exampl es

of

c l a s s es

of

weapons

havi ng both

a

dramat i c

and a l a s t i n g

i mpact upon t he conduct of

war f ar e .

These

exampl es i nvol ve weapons

whi ch

wer e, a t t h e i r i ncept i on,

r evol ut i onary s i nc e they wer e not mer el y new but c l e a r l y super i or t o equi pment

al r eady

i n

use

on

t he

b a t t l e f i e l d

.

Because

they

domnated

war f ar e

they

wer e

c r uc i a l

t o b a t t l e f i e l d success ;

and

nat i ons possessi ng

and

usi ng such weapons

e f f e c t i v e l y

wer e,

more of ten t han n o t , vi ct or i ous . Exampl es

i ncl ude

t he

l ong bow gunpowder ,


17/304

EVOLUTIONOF

THECRUSEMSSILE

i r o n - c l a d

st eamhi ps, tanks,

and

ai rpl anes

. These weapons not

onl y di spl aced

e x i s t i n g ar mament s, they a l s o

forced w descal e changes i n ml i ta ry t r a i ni ng,

organi zati on,

t a ct i c s,

s t r a t e g y ,

and

t hought

.

For

exampl e,

the ai rpl ane

has

come

to

domnate l and

and

sea war f ar e i n addi t i on to

i nt r oduci ng anewformof

war f ar e,

d i r e ct bombardment

of t he enemy' s

homel and

. A

number of t echnol ogi cal

devel opment s have

f undament al l y

changed t he course of

ai r power

dur i ng i t s short

h i s t o r y

.

Some of t he

more

s a l i e n t exampl es

are j e t engi nes, nucl ear warheads,

r ad i o , r adar , and

mssi les ( b a l l i s t i c

and c r u i s e

:

sur f ace- t o- sur f ace,

a i r - t o - a i r ,

a i r - t o -

gr ound, ands u r f a c e - t o - a i r ) .

A

c l as s

of

mss i l e

of par t i cul ar i n t e r e s t , now

ent eri ng

t he

US

i nventory, i s t he

c r ui s e

mss i l e . The purpose of t h i s

study

i s t o eval uat e t he crui se

m s s i l e agai nst

the

c r i t e r i a

suggested above, seeki ng

answer s

t o

two

basi c

quest i ons

:

I s

the curr ent

c r ui s e

mss i l e si mpl y anot her weapon i n t he nowf aml i ar

c l as s

of ae r i a l

muni t i ons?

Or does i t represent a potent i al l y r evol ut i onar y

c l as s

of weapons i n

i t s

own

r i g h t ?

These quest i ons, and t he. answer s t o them maywel l

have f ar - r eachi ng

i mpl i cat i ons,

f or i f the curr ent

ver si on

of t he cr ui se mssi l e r epr esent s not an

evol ut i onar y

devel opment but a quantum

eap

f or war d i n

weaponr y,

then US devel opment

and

empl oyment s t r a t e gi e s

r equi r e

s i g n i f i c a n t

adj ust ment .

I n a c t u a l i t y ,

t he

crui se m s s i l e , as

an

operat i onal

concept

and system

has been

around f or some t i me ;

and

very

earl y

on

i nspi r ed

r a t h e r

f ar - r eachi ng cla im . A

newspaper

account

i n

1915

c a l l e d

i t

:

A

devi ce

. .

.

l i k e l y

t o revol ut i oni ze

modern

war f ar e

.

'

Bef or e Worl dWar I was over , the

c r u i s e

m s s i l e ,

or

t he

ae r i a l

torpedo,

as

i t

was then c al l ed , was touted as t he gun

of t he futur e - 4

and

compar ed i n

i mpor t ance w th t he i nvent i on of gunpowder . ' Bi l l y M tchel l sawi t as :

A

weapon

of

t r emendous

val ue

and

t e r r i f i c force to

ai r power .

6

The

passi ng of years

has

not

dimmed ent husi asm f or t he devi ce, a newspaperman i n 1977 wr i t i ng t h a t : Except

f or

gunpowder and atomc bomb, no weapon

has

threatened agreater

e f f e c t

onwar

and

peace than t he

c r ui s e m s s i l e

. ' More t emper at e

comments

al so

emphasi ze

i t s

i mpor t ance .

The

advent of t he l ong- r ange hi ghl y accurat e crui se mssi les ,

one

hi gh

o f f i c i a l

t o l d

Congress,

i s

per haps

t he

most

s i gni f i c ant

weapon

devel opment

of t he decade .

8

Accor di ng

t o Lesl i e Gel b, a noted def ense a na l y s t : Thecrui se

m s s i l e coul d be an i nval uabl e addi t i on t o

our

s ec ur i t y or a

danger ous

compl i cat i on

.

9

I ndeed, there i s l i t t l e doubt t h a t

t he crui se

m s s i l e

t oday i s

i mpor t ant

t o the overal l

US def ense e f f o r t

.

At t h i s wr i t i ng ( J une

1983),

USdef ense pl anner s

are c a l l i n g f or a

l a r g e

buy of

c r ui s e m s s i l e s

i n

a var i ety

of f or ms :

3,000ALCMs ( Ai r - Launched

Crui se Mssi les ) , 3,994

SLCMs

( Sea- Launched

Crui se Mssi les ) , 560 GLCMs

( Gr ound- Launched Crui se Mssi les ) ,

and

per haps 3,000 t o 5, 000

MRASMs

( Medi um Range Ai r - t o- Sur f ace Mss i les )

w th

a

t o t a l

est i mat ed

pri ce tag of al most

$30 b i l l i o n . Thi s w l l i ngness byDODof f i c i a l s t o spend

l a r g e

sums

on var i ous

v er s i o ns of t he c r u i s e mss i l e i nd i c at e s t h a t DODbel i eves

t he

weapon i s

c r u ci a l

t o a

successf ul f u t u r e def ense

posture

. Such an i nvest ment of

conf i dence

and

d o l l a r s

mer i t s s er i ous at t ent i on byml i tary prof essi onal s

and

l ay persons al i ke

.

Cer tai nl y, t he

publ i c

needs

t o know

more about

t h i s weaponi n order t o

f o l l owi t s


18/304

The

Boei ng

AGM86B,

ALCMAi r

Launched

Cr ui se

Mss i l e )

. (USN)

I NTRODUCTION

TheGeneral DynamcsBGM109, SLCM(SeaLaunchedCr ui se

Mss i l e ) (USN)


19/304

EVOLUTION

OF

THE

CRUISE

MSSILE

The General

Dynamcs

BGM109, GLCM (Ground

Launched Cr ui se Mss i l e )

.

( General

Dynamcs)

progress, to understand i t s

i mpor t ance,

and

to bear

i t s c o s t s

. Thi s poi nt i s

f undament al

because

publ i c

knowl edge

represents

t he onl y

vi abl e

mechani smi n a

democr acy f or

generat i ng

suppor t f or def ense proj ect s .

For

i t s p a r t , t he

ml i ta ry

est abl i shment at a l l l evel s* needs t o

know

more about t he c r ui s e mssi l e f or even

more

f undament al

reasons . Those

operat i ng

i t w i l l

be

e f f e c t i v e onl y t o t he ext ent

t h a t

they

compr ehend

t he

weapon' s

c a p a b i l i t i e s

and

l i mtati ons

.

But

even

those

m l i t a r y members not d i r e c t l y

i nvol ved

w th the crui se m s s i l e

need

t o be wel l

i nf ormed t o

appr eci at e

i t s i mpor t ance

and

t o

know

why i t

r ecei ves

so

much

f undi ng

and

at t ent i on . At t he hi gher l e v e l s , pl anner s

and

deci si onmaker s need t o underst and

c r u i s e mssi les as much as possi bl e i n order t o

make

t he bes t deci si ons and pl ans .

Students of t he

c r ui s e

mss i l e shoul d

f ocus

on t he

bas i c

c har a ct e r i s t i c s of t he

weapon

Consequent l y,

t h i s study addresses these c har a c t e r i s t i c s as wel l

as

quest i ons deri ved

f r om

and i nher ent i n

t hem Such an appr oach can

put

t he

s t o r y

i n t o a moremeani ngf ul cont ext and suggest f ol l ow on

quest i ons and

hypotheses

f or

f u r t h e r

eval uat i on

.

A

revi ew of

t he

c r ui s e m s s i l e ' s

l ong

hi s t o r i c al

record

can

i l l umnate not

onl y

wher e

i t has been, but

suggest wher e

i t may be

goi ng

. Thi s

i s

admt t edl y

an ambi t i ous goal .

But

t o be more than j ust an

i nt er esti ng s t u d y ,

more than j ust h i s t o r y f or h i s t o r y ' s

sake,

t h i s study must r a i s e

and s a t i s f a c t o r i l y

answer a

number of

s p e c i f i c quest i ons

.

' See

AppendixH

or a survey of the

Ai rWar

Coll ege

class of 1982, i ncludi nga rough

test of

t he

knowedge l evel of

Ai r

Force

of f i ce rson

the crui se mssil e


20/304

I NTRODUCTION

For i ns t a nc e,

what has changed and what has r emai ned const ant between t he

e a r l i e r

and current vers i ons

of

t he cr ui se mssi l e? What advantages and

di sadvantages

are

i nher ent

t o cr ui se mssi l es as a cl ass

of

weapons?

Why

wer e

c r ui s e m s s i l e s not

successf ul l y

i nt r oduced ona l arge

s c al e

i nto ml i tary i nventor i es

bef or e?

What

obst acl es

has

t he weapon

encount er ed?

Overal l ,

what

l essons can

be

gl eaned f r om t he hi s t o r i c al record of t he cr ui se mssi l e?

What

are the useful

par al l e l s ? F i na l l y ,

howi mpor t ant

i s the crui se mssi le? I s t he c r u i s e mss i l e j u s t

another weapon l i k e so

many o t h e r s ,

or does i t represent a r evol ut i onary

c l as s

of

weapon?


21/304

EVOLUTIONOF

THECRUISE

MSSILE

NOTES

CHAPTER

1 .

I . B Hol l ey, J r . , I deas andWeapons (New

Haven,

Conn

:

Yal e Uni versi ty,

1953) ,

175 .

2

.

Henry H

Ar nol d

quoted i n

Ai r

Force Manual I - 1 , Funct i ons andBasi c Doctr i ne of t he Uni t ed

S t a t e s

Ai r

For ce, Febr uar y

1979,

4- 11

.

3

.

Aeri al Tor pedo i s

Gui ded

100

mles by

Gyr oscope,

NewYork Tr i bune ( 21 Oct ober 1915) , 1

4

.

El mer Sperry t o

Admr al

E ar l e , 25

Oct ober

1918,

quoted i n

Delmar S Fal uney,

The

Hi stor y of

P i l o t l e s s Ai rcraf t and

Gui ded Ms s i l e s ,

manuscr i pt ,

Naval H i s t o r i c a l Center,

c

.

1958,

112,

113

.

5

.

Geor ge

OSqui er t o Chi ef of

S t a f f ,

5 Oct ober 1918, Subj ect : An

Automat i c

Carr i er f or t he Si gnal

Corps (Liberty Eagl e) ,

; Bi on

J .

Ar nol d

t o t he

Secretary

of War, Secret Report onAutomat i c Car r i e r s ,

Fl yi ng

Bombs ( FB) , Aeri al Tor pedoes (AT) 31 J anuar y 1919, Exhi bi t F,

Ai r

Uni vers i ty Li brary F i l m

623

. 451 W253B

6 . W l l i amMtchel l ,

Lawr ence

Sperry and

the Aeri al Torpedo,

US .

Ai r

Servi ces ( J anuary

1926) ,

16

.

7

.

HowardS i l b e r , Omaha Wor l d- Heral d ( 17

Apr i l

1977) ,

11 .

8

.

Mal col m

R Curr i e

quoted i n J ohn

H

Dougl as,

A Technol ogy

Revol ut i on i n Weaponry,

Sci ence News

( 23

J u l y

1977) ,

60

9 . L e s l i e

HGel b, Nucl ear Bar gai ni ng

:

The Presi dent' s

Opt i ons, New

Yor k Ti mes Magaz i ne ( 27

J une

1982) ,

61

.

10 . Thepr i ce t ag

on

t he

GLCMs

i s

$3 . 7

b i l l i o n ,

on t he MRASM$3 t o $6

b i l l i o n , and

on t he SLCMs

$11

. 8 b i l l i o n

.

TheALCMbuy

of

4, 348

mssi les at $8. 5 b i l l i o n was cut t o

3, 000

mssi les and unspeci f i ed

cost

i n

February 1983

. Tomahawk

Numbers, Aerospace Dai l y

( 5 Apr i l 1982) ,

201

; Pentagon,

Announci ng

SARs, I ndi cat es

F- 15,

F- 16 Deri vat i ves,

Aer ospace Dai l y ( 23

March

1982) , 129,

130 ;

J CMPOSeeks

P ot e n t i a l

Compet i t i on f or

GLOM

TEL,

LCCs, Aer ospace

Dai l y

( 23

December

1981) ,

275

;

SARPr ogr ams

Summari zed

as

of

Sept ember 30, Aer ospace

Dai l y

( 18 November

1982) ,

101

;

Pent agon

Puts

Cr ui se M s si l e

Thr ough

Ext ensi ve

Revi ew

Aer ospace

Dai l y

( 20 May

1981) , 106

;

Davi d R G r i f f i t h s ,

Pr oposal

Se t onAi r- to- Sur f ace

Ms s i l e ,

Avi at i on Week

( 29

December

1980) , 24,

25 ;

Har r i et

S . Hughes, Competi t i on Opt i ons f o r t he

Medi um

Range Ai r- to- Surf ace M s s i l e Program

unpubl i shed

MA Thesi s, Amer i can Uni versi t y, 1981,

23,

24 Navy

Sees MRASM

as

Money

Probl em Aer ospace

Dai l y

( 24 August 1982) , 297 Ai r

Force Cuts ALCMTotal

;

Navy

Retai ns

Tomahawk

Pl ans,

Aer ospace

Dai l y ( 3 Febr uar y

1983) , 193

.


22/304

CHAPTER

11

THEEARLYYEARS TO1941

Even before Worl d War I , dur i ng t he f i r s t

decade

of power ed f l i g h t , t he i dea of

an unmanned, aut omat i cal l y cont r ol l ed f l yi ng bomb or aer i al torpedo

ci r cul at ed i n

anumber of

count r i es

. ' The t echnol ogy maki ng such

a

devi ce

possi bl e

consi st ed of gyr oscopes mount ed i n

contempor ary ai r f r ames

. The f i r s t p r ac t i c al

e f f o r t s

on record

began

whenPeter

C

Hew tt , i nvent or of t he mer cur y vapor l amp,

appr oached El mer A Sperry

of

Sperry Gyr oscope

Company

i n

Apr i l

1915 w th

t he

i deaof a f l yi ng

bomb

.

z

Together they

devel oped and

testedanaut omat i c control

systemon both a Cur t i s s f l yi ng boat and a

t w n- engi ne

ai r c r af t . ' Thi s p ar t i c ul ar

system showed enough

promse

by

t he

summer of 1916

t o mer i t a t e s t w t h an

o f f i c i a l observer . I n

August,

Elmer

Sperry

wr ote to

Li eut enant

Col onel

Geor ge

O

Squi er

of

t he

Si gnal

Corps,

but the

Army di d

not

answer

. 4

Consequent l y,

t he

two

i nventor s arranged an o f f i c i a l

t r i a l

w t h t he

Navy

On 12 Sept ember 1916,

Li eut enant T

W

W l ki nson,

J r

. ( USN) , w t h

Sperr y' s son

Lawr ence

as p i l o t , took

of f

aboar d a s p e c i a l l y equi pped seapl ane

.

Under aut omati c c ont r o l , t he ai r c r af t

cl i mbed to a predetermned al t i t u de , hel d a s a t i s f a c t o r y compass course, f l ew

a set

d i s t a nc e, dove, andwoul d have

i mpact ed as pl anned had

Sperry

not

i nt ervened . '

El mer

Sperr y' s

developments

w t h gyroscopes

made unpi l ot ed

mss i l e s possi bl e

.

I n

addi t i on,

hewas

di rectl y

i nvol ved

i n

both

of

Ameri ca' s

Worl d

War I

mss i l e s

(Sperry

Corp

. )

7


23/304

EVOLUTIONOF

THE

CRUSEMSSILE

Wl ki nson wr ote what appears, i n

r e t r o s p e c t ,

as a r e a l i s t i c

apprai sal

of

t he

m s s i l e ' s

a s s e t s

and l i a b i l i t i e s

.

He

noted

t h a t comparedw t h guns t he devi ce

had

t he

advant age

of

l onger

range

.

Further,

W l ki nson acknow edged,

The

mor al

e f f e c t

of such devi ces

may

be great .

They

are p r ac t i c a l l y i ndes t r uc t i b l e ,

unl ess a wel l -

ai med

shot di sabl es [ t h e ]

engi ne or contr ol devi ces,

and

they cannot be

dr i ven

of f .

6

But t he devi ce was expensi ve, r equi r ed

compl i cat ed

l aunchi ng

f a c i l i t i e s , and

i t s use i n l ong range

attacks

agai nst f o r t s

and

c i t i e s i s of doubtf ul ml i ta ry

val ue on

account of [ t h e ]

d i f f i c u l t y

of s t r i k i n g at any desi red poi nt rather than

at random

w t h i n t he

l i m t s

of t he c i t y or f o r t r e s s . '

For ei gn Efforts

I n the same general t i me

f r ame,

Eur opeans al so workedon f l yi ng bombs. The

p r i nc i pa l e f f o r t s abr oad wer e made by

t he B r i t i s h

. '

Shor t l y

a f t e r

Worl d

War

I

began, t he B r i t i s h

War

Of f i ce asked Prof essor

A

M

Low

to work on a r angef i nder

f or

coast

a r t i l l e r y ,

appar ent l y because he demonst r ated i n London i n

1914

t he

p r i n c i p l e s

now

used

i n

tel evi si on

.

But

t he

p r oj ec t

soon changed

to a radi o- contr ol l ed

f ly ing bomb to i n t e r c e pt zeppel i ns

and

attack

gr ound

t a r g e t s . On 21 March

1917,

Low demonst r ated

t he

devi ce

to B r i t a i n ' s top brass

. The f i r s t

vehi cl e

i mmedi at el y crashed . One

observer,

Maj or Gordon

B e l l ,

f i t t i n g l y cal l ed t he

Mad

Maj or because he t e r r i f i e d

passengers

w th l oops i nches of f t he gr ound, f l i g h t s

under

br i dges, and i n

one

case a f l i g h t

through

a hangar , excl ai med I coul d

throw

my

bl oody umbr el l a t ha t f a r

9

The second b i r d got of f t he

gr ound

and f l ew

sati sfactori l y- f or

a

whi l e .

But

i t then dove t oward

t he assembl ed

spectators,

s cat t er i ng

them before cr ashi ng

about

three

yards

f r om

Low and

t he radi o

c ont r o l s

. '

H

P

Fol l and,

desi gner

of t he f amous SE- 5

pursui t pl ane, desi gned anot her

mss i l e

f or

t he p r o j ec t . Bui l t by t he Royal

Ai rcraf t Factory, i t measur ed

20

t o 22 f e e t

i n span, wei ghed

500

pounds,

and

used t he same 35 hp engi ne as i t s

predecessor

.

But

t he Fol l and mss i l e

pr oved

equal l y unsuccessf ul , f a i l i n g t o get ai r bor ne on three

at t empt ed l aunchi ngs

i n J u l y

1917 . L i t t l e wonder

the Br i t i sh ended the proj ect .

The

Navy-Sperry

Fl yi ng

Bom

Meanwhi l e,

Amer i ca' s

decl arat i on

of war on

6 Apr i l 1917

changed

everyt hi ng

i n

t he

Uni t ed

S t a t e s

.

Ei ght

days

l a t e r , t he

Naval Consul t i ng

Board

recommended

t h a t

$50, 000

be a l l o t t e d t o

Sperr y' s

f l yi ng

bomb proj ect

.

Subsequent l y,

Secretary


24/304

EARLYYEARS

The

B r i t i s h

Royal

Ai rcraf t

Est abl i shment

(RAE)

Aeri al

Tar get

under

const r ucti on,

1917

The

devi ce

was unsuccessf ul l y

tested

i n

J u l y

1917

( RAE, Farnborough)

of t he Navy J osephus Dani el s

f or med

a

f i ve- man comm t t ee

t o i nves t i gat e

t he

i dea

;

i t recommended support f or t he

p r o j ec t ,

and

Dani el s appr oved $200, 000 f or t he

f ly ing

bomb

i n l a t e May

.

' 3

Exper i ment s began i n J une at Amtyvi l l e,

Long

I s l a n d

. The Navy

suppl i ed f i v e

Cur t i ss N-9 seapl anes and pur chased s i x s e t s of

Sperry

cont r ol s . Dur i ng over 100

f l i g h t t e s t s , whi ch began i n September , p i l o t s got

the Cur t i ss

N- 9s

of f

t he wat er ,

moni t ored

t he

aut omati c

f unct i on

and,

a f t e r

t he

mechani sm

i ndi cated

i t s

descent

t o

the t a r g e t , f l ew

home

.

14

The next step came i n md- October when t he

Navy

ordered f i v e

s p ec i a l

a i r c r a f t

( f l y ing

bombs )

f r om

Gl enn

Cur t i ss b cause Sperry

wanted

a f a s t er a i r c r af t than

t he

N-9 Remarkedl y, Cur t i ss del i ver ed I t h e devi ce*

s i x

days

ahead

of t he 30 day ,

schedul e

But a f t e r t he success of t he manned N- 9, f a i l u r e domnated t he new

phase w i t t y

t he

unmanned vehi cl e

. Maj or

pr obl ems emer ged, t he

f i r s t of whi ch

was

l i t e r a l l i

ge t t i ng

t he machi ne of f t he

gr ound

. Because takeoffs

upset

t he

azi muth c ont r o l , t he

exper i ment er s

used

catapul t

l aunchi ngs

.

The

f i r s t

at t empt ed

l aunchi ng

on 24

November 1917 ended i n di s as t e r , as

di d

a second on 7

December

.

t

o

The

t h i r d

att empt ed l aunchi ng on 21 December, w t h a d i f f e r e nt catapul t system

f a i l e d

because

of

engi ne pr obl ems . Cr ashes on

14

and

17

J anuar y,

when

f ly ing bombs

got b r i e f l y ai rborne, c a s t doubt on both

t he catapul t

system

and t he devi ce' s

f l y i n g

a b i l i t y .

' see AppendixA

ormssi l e

character i sti cs .


25/304

EVOLUTIONOF

THE

CRUSEMSSI LE

Ther ef or e

t o i mpr ove and

hence t o pr ove t he ai rwor t hi ness of t he f ly ing

bomb, man

agai n

took t he

cont rol s

.

On

6

February,

Lawr ence

Sperry successful l y

f l ew

t he

machi ne,

f i t t e d

w th

s k i s ,

of f t he

i c e

of

Gr eat Sout h

Bay, Long

I sl and

.

The

next day,

t he mssi l e

crashed a t l i f t - o f f ,

l eavi ng

Sperry unhurt

but the machi ne

demol i shed . Further manned t e s t s di scl osed

a t h i r d

pr obl em

a m smat ch of

c o n t r o l system

and mss i l e

.

Cont r ol s adequat e f or

t he

N-9pr oved i nadequat e

f or the

mor e

esponsi ve f ly ing

bomb

. Fi ndi ng t ha t t he machi ne l acked l ongi t udi nal

s t a h i ~ i , , ,

t he t e s t e r s l engt hened t he f usel age

t wo f e e t and

made

other s u i t a b l e

modi f i ;: at i ons

. 1 1

The

Na v y ' s

Worl d

War I

f ly ing

bomb, ' '

associ at ed

w t h Elmer

Sperry

and

Genn

Curt i ss

.

A

devi ce

of t hi s type performed

successful l y

f or

t he f i r s t

t i me on 6

March

1918 ( General

Motors

I n s t i t u t e )

The

f i r s t successf ul f l i g h t occurred on 6 March

1918,

when t he

f ly ing

bomb

f l ew

1, 000 yar ds

as

pl anned

. One

month

l a t e r , however , a s i m l a r att empt f a i l e d . 2 0

Al t hough t he c at a pul t

f uncti oned w e l l ,

Sperry

wanted a newl aunchi ng

devi ce .

Consequent l y,

Sperry hi r ed a consul t i ng engi neer , Car l L . Nor den ( l a t e r

knownf or

hi s

Worl d

War

I t

bombsi ght ) ,

t o

desi gn

a

t h i r d

type

of

c at a pul t

.

2

1

The

Chi ef

of

Naval Or dnance,

Rear

Admr al

Ral ph

Ear l e,

reported t h a t

t he c at a pul t

was wort h al l

t he t i me

and

e f f o r t

spent

on t he f l yi ng

bomb

.

122

I n

r e t r o s p e c t , we

can

onl y

specul at e as t o whet her

Ear l e' s apprai sal was real i smor r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n .

For whi l e

c at ap ul t s wer e t o pr ove

i mpor t ant t o

t he

Navy

i n

subsequent

y e a r s ,

l a t e r

model s

r e l i e d upon a

muchd i f f e r e n t

t echnol ogy

.

Meanwhi l e, Sperry

f ur t he r t e st e d

t he f ly ing

bomb

. The t e s t

bedconsi st ed of a

1 0


26/304

EARLY

YEARS

Lawence Sperry, t he

i nvent or ' s

son,

was

very acti ve i n t he devel opment of

t he

f ly ing bomb.

Sperry

( l e f t ) w th Li eut enant

Bel l i nger

i n

a

Curt i ss

f ly ing boat i n

1913

( Nati onal

Ar chi ves)

Marmon

car f i t t e d w t h an OX-5 ai r c r af t engi ne

and

an overhead f r ame f or t he

f ly ing bomb. The

auto- mssi l e combi nat i on reached speeds of 75

t o

80 mphon

t he Long I sl and Par kway, becomng i n essence a movi ng, open- ai r wnd t unnel .

Sperry consi dered usi ng t he combi nat i on as a

l auncher

but coul d not f i nd a s t r ai ght

road of adequat e l ength . The

exper i ment er s

di d

t r y a

s t r a i ght

sect i on of the

Long

I sl and

Rai l r oad,

but

f l anged

wheel s

coul d

not

keep

t he

Marmon

on

the t racks

. z '

I n any event, whi l e t he Norden catapul t pr oved s at i s f a c t o r y , t he f l yi ng bomb

di d not .

On

13

August ,

a

f ly ing bomb movi ngdown

t he Nor den devi ce l i f t e d

t he

f r o n t

wheel of t he dol l y of f t he t r ack

and

wr ecked t he mssi l e . I n ear l y

Sept ember ,

another crash

occurred because

of an el ec t r i c al power

f a i l u r e

i n the f ly ing

bomb

.

On

t he 23d, t he devi ce f l e wabout 300 f e e t before i t went out of cont rol

and

crashed .

Anot her di d l i t t l e

b e t t e r

three days l at e r , f ly ing onl y

500

f e e t

bef or e

cr ashi ng . z

4

Meant i me, t e s t s cont i nued

w th t he N-9

On

17 Oct ober, t he

exper i ment er s

l aunched

one

w th t he di st ance

devi ce

s et at 14, 000 yar ds . But because

of

a

shortage

of

gr ound

crew

member s,

t he

p i l o t

of

t he

N-9

chase pl ane

had

t o as s i s t i n

t he l aunchi ng

of

t he

f l yi ng

bomb

and

when he got a l o f t , he was unabl e t o

cl ose

on t he l i g h t e r , p i l o t l e s s N-9 . The di st ance mechan smon t he p i l o t l e s s N-9

mal f unct i oned

and

t he

devi ce was l a s t seen

f l y i n g

s t r ai ght

and l ev el

east war d over

t he ocean . Thi s was

t he

l ongest

f l i ght i n t he Navy- Sper r y t e s t s . 1 5

On

29

October,

t he Navy l aunched

a modi f i ed f l yi ng bomb

w t h a

l a r ger

t a i l

and

a i l e r o n .

The

Navy

o f f i c e r i n charge,

r e c a l l i n g

t he

m s s i l e ' s

l as t

per f ormance,


27/304

EVOLUTIONOF

THECRUSEMSSILE

ordered

t ha t

onl y

two

gal l ons of f ue l

be

put i n

t he

f u e l tank

( t o

ensure t he

machi ne' s

recovery) . Thi s pr oved catast r ophi c . As t he c at a pul t accel erat ed t he a i r c r a f t , t he

gas

s h i f t e d

t o

t he

r e a r

of

t he

f ue l

t a n k ,

s t a l l i n g

t he

engi ne

and

destr oyi ng

t he

l a s t

Cur t i ss

f ly ing

bomb.

116

These

f a i l u r e s

di scour aged

nei ther the

Navy nor Sperr y ; both

p a r t i e s

i ns i s t ed t hat

t he exper i ment s shoul d

cont i nue

because

t he

devi ce s t i l l

had

a

pr oms i ng

f u t u r e . I

bel i eve,

Sperry wr ote Admral Ear l e, that t he t i me has

p r a c t i c a l l y

arr i ved when

we

have on hand the gun of

the

future

[ or i gi nal emphasi s]

. z ' Hence,

on 1

November 1918, Admral

Ear l e reported t o t he Chi ef of Naval Operat i ons (CNO

t h a t , bef or e spri ng 1919, t he

f l yi ng

bomb

coul d pr obabl y be devel oped

to carry

a

1, 000- pound bombl oadup t o 75 ml es w t h an

accur acy

of about 1 . 5 mles . Ear l e

wr ote

t h a t

such a devi ce coul d be mass

pr oduced f or $2, 500

. The

f ly ing bomb,

he cont i nued : Shoul d have a strong mor al

e f f e c t , and

shoul d pr ove very val uabl e

i n

bombardi ng c i t i e s

. . . . [ But i t ] w i l l pr ove of l i t t l e val ue agai nst i s o l a t e d f o r t s or

agai nst s hi p s

.

I '

Once t he Navy f ound

a s at i s f a ct o r y ai r f r ame, a

pr oduct i on

deci si on coul d then

occur . 1 9

Al t hough t he war ended,

t he Navy

cont i nued t he programw th

t he

hel p

of

t wo

f ormer Sperry

empl oyees, Carl Norden

and

Hanni bal

Ford, a f t e r

El mer Sperry

bowed out

of

t he p r o j ec t . I n Sept ember 1918, t he

Navy

supervi sor of t he p r o j ec t ,

Commander

B

.

B

.

McCormck,

pushed

f or a new

f l yi ng

bomb

desi gn

and

i mpr oved aut op i l o t . McCormck

asked

Nor den

to

study

t he Sperry c ont r o l s

and

r e p o r t

back,

whi ch

he

di d

on

30

Oct ober

.

A

day l a t e r , McCormck

recommended

t h a t t he

Navy

pur chase

s i x

a i r c r a f t f r om

W t t enman- Lewi s ;

on

2

November,

t he

Bureau

of

Or dnance ordered

f i v e

f l y i ng

bombs f r omt h a t

company

The

Navy

f i t t e d twoof

these a i r c r a f t w th

Sperry

cont rol s

f r omt he Amtyvi l l e p r o j ec t ,

and t he

r emai ni ng three w th cont r ol s r edesi gned by Norden The Navy successf ul l y f l ew

t he

W t t enman- Lewi s

ai r c r af t i n March 1919 .

The

program

cont i nued

as McCormck requested a s h i f t

of

t he t e s t i n g

s i t e f r om

Amtyvi l l e,

New

York,

t o

Dahl gr en,

Vi r gi ni a, a

move

compl et ed

by

May

1919

.

I n

addi t i on

t o

t he N-9 and W t t enman- Lewi s

a i r c r a f t ,

t he Naval A i r c r a f t

Factory

at

Phi l adel phi a

b u i l t

t en

f ly ing

bombs. The l a t t e r wer e very t ai l - heavy,

and

appar ent l y f l ew onl y w t h

s a f e t y

p i l o t s aboar d ; a w se

move

i n vi ew

of t h ei r

unmanned f l i g h t per f ormance . On t he

f i r s t att empt ed

unmanned

f l y i ng

bomb

l aunchi ng on 18

August 1920,

t he machi ne crashed

a f t e r

150

yar ds . TheNavy di d

not att empt t he next l aunch u n t i l

November

.

Thi s f l i g h t

l a s t e d

t wenty

mnutes,

and

t he

machi ne f l ew i n c i r c l e s

. The

t h i r d f ly ing

bomb,

l aunched

on 25

Apr i l 1921,

f l ew l e s s than

t wo

mnutes . Them s s i l e ' s

l ack of progress, coupl ed w th decl i ni ng

f unds,

l ed

t he

Navy

t o

cancel

t he

e f f o r t

i n

1922

.

Meanwhi l e,

t he

Army

had

devel oped

a somewhat more successf ul f l y i ng bomb

3

The

Army-Ketteri ng

Bug

There i s a di r e c t

connect i on between t he Army

and

Navy

f ly ing

bomb

progr ams . Whi l e Sperry f a i l e d t o

i nt er es t t he

Army

i n t he i dea bef or e

t he

war ,

a

1 2


28/304

EARLYYEARS

f l y i n g

demonst r at i on i n l a t e 1917 di d t he

t r i c k

.

On

21

November, Gl enn

Cur t i ss,

El mer

Sperry, Rear Admral

Ral ph

A Ear l e, and Maj or Gener al

Geor ge

O

Squi er ,

now

Chi ef Si gnal

O f f i c e r , watched as

an N-9 f l ewover seven mles under aut omati c

control . The f l i g h t i mpr essed Squi er who, f i v e days l a t e r , wr ote t he Chai r man

of

t he

Ai rcraf t

Boar d

t h a t i mmedi at e and energet i c e f f o r t s

shoul d be made w t h t he

f l yi ng bomb proj ect .

Heconcl uded

:

The t i me

has come,

i n

t he

opi ni on of t he wr i t e r , when t h i s f undament al quest i on

shoul d

be

pressed w t h a l l possi bl e vi gor , w t h a vi ew t o t aki ng t o Europe

somet hi ng

new n war rather than

contenti ng our sel ves

as i n t he pas t w t h

f ol l ow ng

t he i nnovat i ons t h a t have been

offered

from

t i me t o t i me

si nce

t he

begi nni ng

of

t he

war by

t he

enemy

Wars

are

won l argel y by new

i ns t r u me nt a l i t i e s,

and

t h i s

Boar d

shoul d be

a

l eader

and

not

f ol l ower

i n

t he

devel opment

of

a i r c r a f t f or war

.

32

The Boar d appr oved Squi er' s

r ecommendat i ons

and, w t h

t he Secretary of War' s

verbal i ns t r uc t i ons ,

exper i mental workbegan .

I n

December ,

Squi er

appoi nt ed

a f our - man boar d t o i nvesti gate t he p o s s i b i l i t i e s

of

the weapon Whi l e three members reported negat i vel y, Char l es F . Ket t eri ng,

i nvent or

of t he aut omobi l e s e l f - s t a r t e r and l a t e r vi ce

presi dent

of General Mot or s,

f i l e d

a f avorabl e mnori ty report .

Not s u r p r i s i n g l y ,

he r ecei ved a cost pl us cont ract

t o

devel op

t he

devi ce

.

3 4

Paral l el

t o

t he

Navy-Sperry programwas an

Army

program

associ at ed

w th Charl es Kett er i ng

Kett er i ng

( r i g h t ) examnes

a

model

of hi s

Worl dWar

I

mss i l e

i n 1946 ( General Motors I n s t i t u t e )

1

3


29/304


30/304


31/304

EVOLUTION

OFTHECRUSE

MSSILE

t he r e s u l t s of t he f l yi ng

bomb

t e s t s t o

t he Al l i es

. 4

The

Armst i ce, of course,

over t ook everythi ng

.

When

t he

Dayton

proj ect

cl osed

down

on27

November

1918,

20

Bugs wer e

compl et ed

al ong w t h 5

ai r f r ames,

and 11 p a r t i a l l y

b u i l t

Bugs . But

t e s t s cont i nued

a f t e r t he war . '

I n

December

1918, t he

Army

sent

s i x

Bugs t o

Amtyvi l l e

f or

t e s t s

. But

onl y one

of f our

l aunches

of t he

Long

I s l and t e s t s pr oved successf ul .

A

t h r ee- of f i c er

board,

i n

J anuar y

1919,

recommended

further devel opment

of

t he

f ly ing

bomb

by

t he Ai r Servi ce,

pr ompt i ng

t he l a s t phase of t he p r o j ec t , t e s t s i n

t he f a l l of 1919 .

B

J . Ar nol d sel ect ed Car l st r omF i e l d , near Ar cadi a, F l o r i d a , as a

good

pl ace

f or

f u r t h e r t e s t s

i n

hi s

1918 search .

I n md- 1919,

Li eut enant

Col onel

Guy

L

Gearhart,

a

40- year

ol d

f ormer

coast

a r t i l l e r y

o f f i c e r ,

t ook over

t he

proj ect

and

r ecei ved

author i zat i on

on29

August

t o shi p 12 Bugs to Car l st r om 2

Bet ween 26Sept ember

and

28Oct ober 1919,

t he Armyatt empt ed 14 t e s t

f l i g h t s

.

Al t hough f i v e Bugs

crashed

on or

i mmedi at el y

a f t e r

l aunchi ng,

t he

s i x t h

at t empt

( on 13

October )

was

successf ul

; t he f l yi ng

bomb covered

1 3/ a mles . Ot her

successf ul f l i g h t s of 1 3/ a mles and 2 mles occurred before t he f i n a l shot, on 28

Oct ober . On t h i s par t i cul ar

t e s t ,

t he

Bug f l ew16

mles

bef or e

cr ashi ng because

of

engi ne pr obl ems . But t he 16- ml e f l i g h t coul d not conceal t he f a c t t hat 10 of 14

att empt s

had

ended

i n f a i l u r e . Gear har t ' s report avoi ded t h a t poi nt and

recommended

onl y

mat t er s

of a

t echni cal

nature

:

devel opment

of a

c at ap ul t ,

i mpr oved engi nes,

and

exper i ments w th

l a r ger

gyros .

So

ended t he

Ket t er i ng

Bug

p r o j ec t , at a cost to the Ameri can

t axpayer

of

about

$275, 000 f or t he peri od Apr i l

1917

to

March 1920 .

4 3

Besi des an

i nt e r es t i ng

andoften over l ooked epi sode, what di d these Worl d

War

I

f l y i n g bomb p r o j ec t s r eveal ? F i r s t , t he

exper i ment er s

exper i enced

d i f f i c u l t i e s

j u s t

ge t t i ng unmanned a i r c r a f t

i n t o t he ai r . Launch pr obl ems caused a number of

c r a s h e s , compl i cat i ng devel opment of

the

f l yi ng

bombs.

Second, t he

manufact urer s

f ound t h a t

bui l di ng

a

s t a b l e

a i r c r a f t t ha t f l e wwel l w thout p i l o t s was

not

easy . L imted knowl edge of aer odynamcs, l ack of t e s t i ng, and haste i n bui l di ng

t he machi nes guaranteed pr obl ems .

L i t t l e

wonder ,

then, t h a t t he f l yi ng bombs

had

basi c aer odynamc

f a u l t s . The devel opment al method of t he day, t r i a l

and

e r r o r , di d not work wel l w t h

unmanned

a i r c r a f t

. Mannedt e s t s p a r t i a l l y

sol ved

these

aer odynamc pr obl ems ;

modi f i cat i ons

and f l i g h t exper i ence

l ed t o

l a t e r , al t hough

somewhat

l i m t e d , successes

.

Thi r d,

other

t echni cal pr obl ems

hi ndered

t he

progr ams . I n p a r t i c u l a r ,

nei t her gui dance syst ems nor

engi nes

per f ormed as

desi gned

. Fourth,

destr uct i on

of

t he

f l yi ng bombs onmost of

t he

t e s t s r e s t r i c t e d

t he

progr ams . Thi s

f r agi l eness

was

due,

i n

l arge

measure,

t o t he

f a c t

that these

machi nes wer e

desi gned t o be cheap and

f l y

short one-way

mssi ons

. The Army

was

unabl e to recover

many

f or subsequent t e s t i ng,

thereby r api dl y exhaust i ng t he

number of avai l abl e vehi cl es . Further exacerbat i ng t h i s pr obl em

was

t h a t these

wr ecks

yi el ded

l i t t l e

posi t i ve data

onwhy

t he crashes

occurred

. Fi nal l y,

despi t e

al l

t he f a n f a r e ,

expense,

and

e f f o r t , t he

exper i ment ers achi eved

mni mal success . Onl y

1 of t he 12 Spenr y- Navy t e s t s

f unct i oned

pr operl y ; andon t h i s par t i cul ar t e s t , t he

f ly ing

bomb

f l e wamer e 1, 000 yar ds .

The Ket t er i ng Bug

had2

successes

on6

1 6


32/304

att empt s

at

Dayt on,

1

of 4

a t

Amtyvi l l e, and 4 of 14 at

Car l st r om

Takentogether

t h e n ,

there wer e onl y 8 successes on 36 at t empt s

.

I n

b r i e f ,

a

f ew

me- hani cal l y- gi f t ed

v i s i o n a r i e s ,

equi pped

w th

l im ted

knowl edge

and

resources, wer e unabl e to transform t he

f ly ing

bomb i dea i n t o

r e a l i t y

.

Despi t e

t h e i r

best e f f o r t s and a f ewsuccesses, t he theory r emai ned more advanced

than the

t echnol ogy of t he day .

Nevert hel ess, t he i dea

per si sted i n t he

years

t ha t

f ol l owed

.

For ei gn Devel opments

EARLYYEARS

Work

on t he p i l o t l e s s

bomber

cont i nued not onl y i n

t he

Uni t ed

S t a t e s

but i n Gr eat

B r i t a i n . '

As

earl y as

May

1919, t he Royal Naval

Ant i ai rcraf t Gunnery Comm t t ee

requested a

radi o- cont r ol l ed

t a r g e t ai r c r af t . I n response, t he Ai r

Mn i s t r y att empt ed

t o devel op such a vehi cl e i n Engl and and, at t he

same t i me,

buy one

f r omt he Uni t ed

S t a t e s ; but B r i t i s h Secretary of

S t a t e , Wnston

Churchi l l ,

vetoed

t he

l a t t e r

i n i t i a t i v e

.

By 1920,

t he RAF percei ved t h a t

t h r e e

l i n e s of p ot e nt i a l devel opment exi sted a

gyro- gui ded f l yi ng bomb, a t a r g e t m s s i l e ,

and

a radi o- contr ol l ed, ai r- l aunched

m s s i l e

.

I n

s hor t or de r ,

t he

RAF

dr opped

t he

t h i r d

and mer ged

t he

f i r s t

t wo

cat egor i es . The B r i t i s h f l ew a number of radi o- cont r ol l ed

a i r c r a f t ( w t h p i l o t

moni tors) i n t he ear l y and md- 1920s, i ncl udi ng a B r i s t o l f i ght e r ,

a Sperry Avi o,

a

DH . 9A,

and a

Wol f .

After

t he war ,

RAE b u i l t t h i s

r adi o- contr ol l ed

mssi le ,

shown

i n

1920-22 ( RAE, Farnborough)

1

7


33/304

EVOLUTIONOF

THE

CRUSE

MSSILE

But

per haps

equal l y per t i nent to t h i s par t i c ul a r s t o r y i s t he Royal Ai r craf t

Est abl i shment

(RAE) 1921 Target a i r c r a f t . *

Begi nni ng

i n J u l y

1922,

t he B r i t i s h

conduct ed

t e s t s

over

water

f or

both

s a f e t y

and

secur i t y

reasons

.

The

seventh

t e s t ,

on

3 Sept ember

1924,

was a

p a r t i a l

success ; t he devi ce, a f t e r i t s catapul t l aunch, f l e w

f or 12 mnutes before i t s

engi ne

st opped . On the tenth and f i n a l t e s t on 2March

1925,

t he

mss i l e f l ew

39 mnutes

. 45

The

RAF began

work on a t r u e f l yi ng bomb i n Sept ember 1925 .

Compared

w th t he

RAE 1921 Target m s s i l e , t he Lar ynx ( Long RangeGunw th Lynx

Engi ne)

was smal l er , heavi er, and f a s t e r

. *

I n f a c t ,

a200 hp Lynx I Vengi ne gave

t he

devi ce

a t opspeed of about 200mph, maki ng i t

f a s t e r

than

cont empor ary

f i g h t e r s . The fast

Larynx

crashed

i n t o Br i s t o l Channel s h o r t l y a f t e r a catapul t l aunch

f r om

t he HMS

Stronghol d

on20

J u l y

1927

.

The

RAF

bel i eved

t h a t

t he

second

mss i l e

compl et ed

i t s

100

ml e course on 1 Sept ember 1927,

al t hough

i t was l o s t .

On

15 Oct ober

1927,

t he t h i r d Larynx f l e w 112

mles

at

193 mph, i mpact i ng

f i v e

mles of f

t a r g e t

. 4 6 I n

Sept ember and

Oct ober of t he

next

year, HMS

Thanet

l aunched

t wo

mssi l es t h a t

f l ewappr oxi mat el y 50 ml es each,

one

l andi ng w t h i n 1 . 6 mles of i t s t a r g e t whi l e

t he other

i mpacted 4

. 5

mles f r om i t s

t a r g e t .

I n

May 1929,

t he RAF

l and- l aunched

two mssi l es f r omPor t l and

:

t he f i r s t f l ew

beyond

i t s t a r g e t i n t o t he unknown, whi l e

t he

second

per f ormed as

programmed

The RAE

L a r y n x

m s s i l e on c o r d i t e - f i r e d c at a pu l t

of d e s t r o y e r HMSStronghol d, J ul y 1927

The

man

on t he box i s Dr .

Geor ge

G a r d n e r ,

l a t e r

Di r e c t o r of

RAE ( RAE,

Farnborough)

*See Appendi x

A

f or mss i l e s p e c i f i c a t i o n s


34/304

EARLY

YEARS

Anot her vi ew

of

t he

Larynx

.

Note t he 3

on

t he

mss i l e ' s packi ng crates,

w ngs,

and t a i l

.

The

mss i l e ' s

f i r s t

l aunchon

20

J u l y 1927over t he Bri stol Channel

fa i led

.

( RAE,

Farnborough)

Because of safety and secur i t y

consi derat i ons,

t he B r i t i s h s h i f t e d

t he i r t es t s

to

a

200- ml e

course i n the deser t wast es of I raq . The r e sul t s di sappoi nt ed t he

RAF,

however , as t he

t h r e e

Larynxs l aunched i n

August

and

Sept ember 1929 f l e w onl y

27,

60, and 32

mles

r espect i vel y

. I n

Oct ober ,

one crashed

on

t he

l aunchi ng

pl at f orm

whi l e

another was l a s t seen as i t passed t he 22 ml e mark. The

ai r men

bl amed

vapor

l ock

i n t he engi ne, rather than the control system f or t he f a i l u r e s .

They concl uded f r om

these

t e s t s

t h a t

accur acy was equated

w th weat her

i nf ormat i on,

and

t a r g e t s beyond

100

ml e ranges wer e theref ore l i mted

to area

type

t a r g e t s .

47

By 1927, t he B r i t i s h

wer e devel opi ng

three types

of

mssi les

: a

mechani cal l y-

cont rol l ed f ly ing bomb, a radi o- cont rol l ed m s s i l e ,

and

an ai r

def ense mss i l e t o

break

up enemy ai r c r af t

f ormat i ons

. I n Oct ober 1930, t he Chi ef of t he

RAF

Ai r

S t a f f el i mnat ed t he

ai r def ense

m s s i l e ,

shel ved

the radi o- contr ol l ed Lar ynx,

cont i nued t he mechani cal l y- cont r ol l ed

Larynx

at a l owp r i o r i t y ,

and emphasi zed

i ns t e ad

a new

t a r g e t

mss i l e

.

Three

years

l a t e r ,

t he

Chi ef

of

t he

Ai r

S t a f f

establ i shed

new

p r i o r i t i e s

f or t he pr ogram Def ense

agai nst p i l o t l e s s ai r c r af t r ecei ved t op

research p r i o r i t y , shepherd ai r c r af t (manned

mot her

shi ps gui di ng

r adi o- cont r ol l ed

unmanned

m s s i l e s )

ranked

second i n p r i o r i t y ( ahead of a new

Larynx) ,

w th t he

l owest p r i o r i t y assi gned

t o a m s s i l e t h a t woul dhome i n on enemyr adi o s t a t i ons .

I n

1934, t he

ai r

def ense mss i l e

r egai ned

i t s

number one

p r i o r i t y s t a t u s ; but

because

t h i s

ai r

def ense mss i l e

r equi r ed

t wo

mot her

a i r c r a f t f or gui dance, cost

as muchas a

1 9


35/304

EVOLUTIONOF

THECRUSE

MSSILE

s i n g l e

engi ne

f i ght e r , coul d operate onl y i n

dayl i ght , and r equi r ed three t o f our

years t o devel op, t he RAF

dr opped

i t i n 1936 . ' 8

Despi t e these

s t a t e d

p r i o r i t i e s , t he

RAF r e a l l y

di d

not hi ng w t h t he

f ly ing

bomb u n t i l i t s f i n a l cancel l at i on . TheRAF' s

maj or concer ns

wer e hi gh uni t cost

and l ow

accuracy .

The RAF

est i mat ed t h a t a 300 mph,

250- ml e- r ange

mss i l e

woul d cost

500

each i n a 5, 000 uni t run,

whi l e

a 450

mph

m s s i l e

woul d

cost

3, 000 t o f 4, 000 api ece . The B r i t i s h ai r men est i mat ed

accur acy a t

10 mles

on

a

200- ml e f l i ght i n

average

weat her condi t i ons . Dur i ng these

s t u di e s , t he

Ai r S t a f f

l ooked at rockets as a

s ub st i t u t e

f or t he f l y i ng bomb

and consi dered

j et - powered

f ly ing bombs . F i n a l l y , i n Sept ember 1936, t he

Ai r

S t a f f

r evi ewed

both t he

ai r

def ense

and Larynx

m s s i l e s

and

deci ded

t h a t

ne i t he r

mer i t ed

f u r t h e r

devel opment

. 41

The B r i t i s h , however , di d have a successful i nt erwar mss i l e

devel opment

program

t he

t a r g e t

mss i l e

. The RAF began t h i s

program

by

convert i ng

three

F a i r l e y I I I F f l oat bi pl anes t o meet t he 1930

r equi r ement

f or a radi o- cont rol l ed

t a r g e t . Al t hough t he i n i t i a l two,

l aunched

of f t he HMSVal i ant i n J anuar y and

Apr i l

1932, crashed, the

t h i r d , l aunched on 14 Sept ember 1932, f l ew f or

ni ne mnutes . I n

J anuar y 1933, t he converted a i r c r a f t ,

dubbed

t he F a i r l e y

Queen, sur vi ved t wo hours

of Royal

Navy a n t i a i r c r a f t

bombardment . The next mont h, t he

Ai r

Mn i s t r y l e t a

c o n t r a c t

f or

a

cheaper

t a r g e t m s s i l e ,

a

conver si on

of

t he

Ti ger

Moth

t r a i n e r .

Cal l ed

t he Queen

Bee,

i t f i r s t f l ew

under radi o contr ol i n 1934 . I n a l l , t he F a i r l e y

Corporat i on b u i l t 420

such devi ces

bet ween 1934 and 1943 . 5

Fai rl ey I I I F equ pped w th

r adi o- cont rol devi ces

andknown

as

t he Fai r l ey Queen

I t al so

acted

as a

shepherd a i r c r a f t .

( RAE,

Farnborough)

20


36/304

EARLYYEARS

Launch

of

deHavi l l and

Queen

Bee

Th i s

t a r g e t

m s s i l e

was

a

r a di o - c ont r o l l e d

versi on

of

t he

deHavi l l and

Ti ger

Mot h

(RAE

Far nborough)

The

Ar my- Sper r y

Exper i ment s

US

Army i nt erest i n

f l yi ng

bombs cont i nued i n post - war

years . For exampl e,

i n l at e

1919,

one

of f i cer

noted

that

t he f l yi ng

bomb

w l l

be

a

great

asset

t o

t he

ml i t a r y forces

of

t he

country

f i r s t

perf ect i ng

i t

.

5'

Consequentl y,

t he

Army

contracted wth t he

Sperry

Gyroscope

Company i n February 1920 t o

desi gn and

construct f our gyro

uni t s,

and then i n Apr i l 1920 w t h t he Lawrence Sperry Ai r craf t

Company t o

perf ect automati ccontrol by i nstal l i ng equ pment

i n three Standard

E-1

a i r c r a f t

and

f i v e Messenger ai rcraf t . Mechan cal probl em,

especi al l y

w t h

gyr oscopes, hi nder ed several ot her wi se

successf ul

t e s t s fl own

w t h

pi l ot moni t or s

i n

November

and

December

1920 BecauseLawrence Sperry achi eved even

greater

success i n s i m l ar t e s t s betweenMarch

andMay

1921

at M tchel l

Fi el d, he wona

second

cont ract i n J une

t o

upgrade

t he

gudance

equ pment and

t o

construct

si x

Messengers,

three as

aeri al t orpedoes .

Further

f l i g h t s i n

l a t e 1921 achi eved good

accur acy . s z

The contract

i ncl uded

one

unusual feature,

a pr ovi si on pr ovi di ng

$5,000

f or

h i t t ing

a target 1 out of 12 ti mes at 30 ml es ,

and

a $5, 000

bonus

f or 2addi t i onal

h i t s

.

The

same bonus

appl i ed t o

t r i a l s

at

60 and 90 ml es

. 53

Di f f i cul t i es w th

t he

2

1


37/304

EVOLUTIONOF

THE

CRUSEMSSILE

Lawence Sperr y' s Messenger a i r c r a f t

.

Sperry

di ed i n a

crash

of t h i s type ai rcraf t

on

13

December

1923

( Nati onal

Ai r

andSpace

Museum

aut omat i c

cont rol s

encour aged,

i f not f o r c e d , Sperry t o use radi o- cont r ol

gui dance

.

Af t er gai ni ng appr oval

f rom t he Army' s cont racti ng o f f i c e r on 9

May,

Sperry used

radi o- cont rol

equi pment , devel oped a t

t he

Army

Engi neer i ng Di vi si on

by

Li eut enant Redman,

whi ch al l owed an ai r c r af t about 1 1 / 2

mles

away t o

gui de

t he

si mul at ed

f l yi ng bombs .

Sperr y obt ai ned

good r e s u l t s i n

May

and J une 1922-

b e t t e r

than

anythi ng

achi eved

thus

f ar

.

14

I n t he t e s t s at Mtchel l Fie ld

one day

before the expi rati on of t he c o n t r a c t ,

t he

Army j udged Sperr y' s devi ces to have tw ce

hi t

a t a r g e t at 30ml es, t h r e e t i mes

a t

60

ml es, and

once a t 90

mles

. 53

The Chi ef

of Engi neeri ng Di vi si on

i ns i s t ed,

however , t h a t Sperry

had

not ear ned t he bonus si nce the contract di d not speci f y

r a d i o

control . Thi s

par t i cul ar o f f i c i a l noted t h a t a systemrequi r i ng a mot her a i r c r a f t

t o

f l y

a ml e

or

so

f r om

t he f ly ing

bomb a l l

t he

way t o

t he

t a r g e t

offered

l i t t l e

advant age . Regar dl ess

of the meri ts of t he

c a s e ,

t he Army pai d Sperry

a $20, 000

bonus .

5

6

Despi t e

t h i s

negat i ve

r eact i on to

a

r adi o- cont rol

system

t he

Army

pr oceeded

t o

conduct

i t s

own r adi o- cont rol t e s t s . The

Engi neer i ng Di vi si on devel oped a p i l o t -

moni t ored system t h a t gui ded a number

of

Sperr y' s

Messenger

a i r c r a f t between

Oct ober 1923 and

Apr i l

1925 at

McCook and

Langl ey Fi el ds . Agai n, mechani cal

pr obl em hamper ed t he

f l i g h t s

. 5

I n 1927, t he war depar t ment pushed

the radi o- control i dea

. However , t he

two

a i r c r a f t

purchased

i n

1929

f or these

t e s t s ,

a

Cur t i ss

Robi n

( XC- 10)

and

a

St i mson

22


38/304

EARLYYEARS

J u n i o r ,

pr oved unsat i sf actory .

More

i mpor t ant l y, t he

count r y' s economc

depr essi on const r i ct ed

f unds and del ayed t he proj ect .

Bef or e

l eavi ng

Amer i can

Army

devel opment s

t emporar i l y,

one keen

pr oponent

of f ly ing bombs

deserves

ment i on

.

I n J ul y

1923,

Bi l l y Mtchel l

suggested usi ng

f ly ing bombs i n t h e

f amous

bat t l eshi p bombi ng t e s t s . The Chi ef of Engi neer i ng

Di vi si on recommended

agai nst Mtche l l ' s

pr oposal on t he advi ce of

Li eut enant

Redman, who bel i eved

t h a t t he

chances

f or f a i l u r e

wer e hi gh because t he system

wor ked onl y

agai nst l ar g e t a r g e t s and, mor eover ,

because t he Sperry t e s t

r e sul t s

wer e

due

l a r g e l y to good l uck . Ther ef or e, on 18

August

1923, t he Chi ef of t he

Ai r

Servi ce r e j ec t e d

t he use

of a er i a l torpedoes i n t he t e s t s . 5 9

US Navy Ef fo r t s

USNavy

i nt e r e s t i n crui se mssi l es r eemer ged i n t he md- 1930s f r omasomewhat

d i f f e r e n t d i r e c t i o n than mght be

expect ed,

f or t he

mai n i mpet us cameby way of

unmanned

aer i al t a r get

progr ams

.

L i k e t he Army, t he Navy r ecogni zed t he

advant ages

of radi o- cont r ol l ed vehi cl es

.

The

Navy

di scussed r adi o control not

onl y

i n

1916

but al so i n t he

summer

of

1917

i n

connect i on w th

t he

Sper r y devi ce . Radi o

control

work commenced under t he

Bureau

of Or dnance i n J anuar y

1921,

f ol l ow ng an expr essi on of i nt er e s t by t he

Chi ef

of Naval

Oper at i ons

i n a n t i - a i r c r a f t t a r g e t s . Fl i ght t e s t s began i n 1921 w th

f u r t h e r

exper i ments

conduct ed

i n 1923

and

1924 . The f i r s t

successf ul unpi l ot ed

radi o- cont rol l ed f l i g h t

occurred

i n Sept ember 1924 . Al t hough

t h i s naval

wor k

cont i nued, t he

Navymade

l i t t l e

progress a f t e r

1925 because of

i n s u f f i c i e n t

f unds

. A

Navy e f f o r t

t o r eenergi ze

t he program i n 1932 f e l l v ict im to a

budget cut by

Pr esi dent

Roosevel t

t he

f ol l ow ng

year . 6

A

second Navy

e f f o r t begi nni ng

i n

1935

di d b e t t e r

.

I n Apr i l 1935, t he

Commander

of

A i r c r a f t ,

Bat t l e F l ee t ,

requested t h a t t he CNOpr ovi de

a

hi gh speed,

radi o- cont rol l ed a i r c r a f t f or

ant i - a i r c r af t t a r get p r a c t i c e . I n August , t he Pl ans

Di vi si on,

Bur eau

of Aer onaut i cs repeated

t h i s

request

. The

CNO Adm r al W l l i am

H Stanl ey,

who

had

seen

t he

B r i t i s h a i r c r a f t t a r g e t , t he radi o- cont rol l ed Queen

Bee, suppor t ed t he program As t he

Bur eau

of Or dnance had l i t t l e or no

ent husi asm

f or such

an a i r c r a f t , t he CNOdi r ect ed

t he Bureau

of

Engi neer i ng

and

t he Bureau

of

Aeronaut i cs

t o pr oceed w th

t he proj ect

i n

May, 1936 .

The

Navy

began

f l i g h t

t e s t s

i n

February

1937,

and

by

t he

end

of t he

year

had

achi eved good

r e sul t s

. TheNavy f i r s t used t he

devi ce as a

t a r g e t

i n

operat i ons

w th

t he

c a r r i e r

Ranger i n August, 1938 . These

and

subsequent pract i ce sessi ons

r eveal ed shocki ngl y poor

US

Navy

a n t i - a i r c r a f t

gunner y,

consi der i ng t he l ow

per f or mance of

t he

t a r g e t

a i r c r a f t . Meanwhi l e, t he

Navy f ormul at ed more deadl y

pl ans f or t he radi o- cont rol l ed ai r c r af t .

Li eut enant Commander

Del mar Fahmey suggested

combat

uses f or drones 6 2

23


39/304

EVOLUTIONOF

THE

CRUSE

MSSILE

( t ermed assaul t

drones )

as

ear l y

as

August 1936,

a mer e

month

a f t e r

assumng

command Al t hough one aut hor as s er t s t hat i n t he l a t e

1930s naval

av i a t or s

prevented

t h i s concept fromdevel opi ng, t he growt h of t echnol ogy and wor l d events

wer e c e r t a i n l y c at a l ys t s i n accel erati ng t he devel opment of

combat

r o l e s

f or drones .

Two pi eces of el ect roni cs

equi pment

emer ged at t hi s poi nt t o

f o s t e r

t he m s s i l e ' s

progress :

t e l e v i s i o n and

t he r adar a l t i me t e r . By 1937, RCA

demonst r ated

ai rborne

t e l e v i s i o n i n

an ai r

r econnai ssance proj ect

f or

t he Sovi ets

. I n

August 1941,

TV

r ecei ved

i t s

i n i t i a l

t e s t i n g

aboar d

an

Amer i can drone .

I n t u i t i v e l y obvi ous i s

TVs

u t i l i t y i n

ext endi ng

t he vi si on of t he drone' s operator,

thereby i ncreasi ng

operat i onal eff ect i veness

. The

concur r ent use of radar al t i meters

made drone f l i g h t

mor e

p r a c t i c a l ,

s i nc e

they

accurat el y

measur e

a l t i t u d e

above

t he

s u r f a c e ,

an

especi al l y val uabl e capabi l i t y when f l y i n g over

var yi ng t e r r a i n .

( Thi s

i s i n

c o n t r a s t

t o

t he

bar omet r i c a l t i me t e r ,

whi ch measur es a base

pressure . ) I n J anuar y

1941,

t he

Navy successful l y t e s t e d r adar al t i meters i n a

drone . At h i r d f a c t o r ,

wor l d

events,

was

si mpl y

t he gr owi ng t ensi ons

and

c o n f l i c t

i n