a content analysis of the obituary notices on mao tse-tung(pp. 475-487)

American Association for Public Opinion Research

A Content Analysis of the Obituary Notices on Mao Tse-TungAuthor(s): Trong R. ChaiSource: The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 4 (Winter, 1977-1978), pp. 475-487Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Association for Public OpinionResearchStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2748526 .

Accessed: 25/01/2014 04:21

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

American Association for Public Opinion Research and Oxford University Press are collaborating with JSTORto digitize, preserve and extend access to The Public Opinion Quarterly.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 129.78.139.28 on Sat, 25 Jan 2014 04:21:44 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=oup

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=aapor

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=aapor

http://www.jstor.org/stable/2748526?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


A Content Analysis of the Obituary Notices

on Mao Tse-Tung

TRONG R. CHAI

0 N SEPTEMBER 10, 1976, the day after the passing of Mao Tse-tung, an editorial in The New York Times, entitled "Mao Tse-tung," reflected the widespread concern over the political future of China: "Now that Mao is gone the world will watch to see whether China remains unified, achieves political stability and continues its economic development." This concern seems to stem mainly from a long power struggle between the "moderates" and the "radicals."

The conflict began in the Cultural Revolution of 1966-1969 and culmi- nated in the current anti-rightist campaign; and the two factions appear incompatible in many aspects. The moderates, represented by Teng Hsiao-ping, were often victims of the Cultural Revolution who, in recent years, have been returned to high posts in the Party and the Government. But Teng, rehabilitated in early 1973, was stripped of his powers again in April 1976 and became a major target of the anti-rightist movement. On the other hand, the radicals-headed by Chiang Ching, Mao's widow, Wang Hung-wen, a vice chairman of the Party, Chang Chun-chiao, a vice premier, and Yao Wen-yuan, a politiburo member-gained power at the expense of the moderates and were widely considered as the real instiga- tors of the anti-rightist campaign until their arrests in October 1976. In addition to personal animosities, there are some ideological differences between the two camps. The radicals, stressing ideological purity, empha-

Abstract In this content analysis of the obituary notices on Mao Tse-tung by 11 military and 29 administrative regions the basic findings are that the military as a whole did not strongly prefer the moderates over the radicals, that the municipalities were much more radical than the provinces, and that the purges during the Cultural Revolution have no significant bearing on the political lineup today. The analysis also shows that the community, group, and personal ties with the factional heads appeared to be important variables in ex- plaining attitudes toward the current anti-rightist campaign.

Trong R. Chai teaches political science at Kean College of New Jersey. POQ 41(1977-78) 475-487



476 TRONG R. CHAI

size strong political and ideological control over economic, educational, and scientific work, while the moderates, generally, want time-consuming political education reduced and more attention paid to economic development.'

Of course, these definitions of moderates and radicals are over- simplified because most political leaders locate themselves somewhere between the two extremes and keep their positions fluid.2 Nevertheless, a great number of experts have used these terms to analyze power relations in China, and nearly all of them believed that factional fights between the moderates and the radicals would be intensified as a result of Mao's death. Taking one typical example (Time, 1976:3 1), we were told that "Mao's death set the stage for what may turn out to be a prolonged and destructive struggle for power between moderates and leftists." Thus, China watchers have focused their attention and interests on the factional lineup in the national and provincial political scenes, as well as in the civilian and military establishments.

Some analysts argued that the moderates were weak in Shanghai and Liaoning but strong in the South (Terrill, 1976:28). Others indicated that not only Shanghai but all major cities in China were leftist strongholds (Bonaria, 1976:36). Still others contended that some provinces in the Southwest such as Szechwan3 and Yunan4 were also sympathetic to Teng. Furthermore, The Washington Post reported that "about a third of China's 29 administrative regions were led by veteran cadres purged by Maoists during the Cultural Revolution. Many appear to have won their new positions through the influence of Teng" (Mathews, 1976). This group of party leaders were, of course, his political supporters, according to The Washington Post.

With regard to the military, everyone agreed that it could play a key role in the current struggle,5 but there was no consensus among students

1 For excellent summaries of the current factional fights see Chang (1976) and Starr (1976).

2 For instance, Time (Feb. 3, 1975) reported that "even Chang Chun-chiao, an erstwhile member of the radicals' Shangai bastion, seemed converted to the moderate side, an apostasy that many China watchers have suspected for months." Hong Yung Lee (1975:36) suspected that Wu Te, a moderate member of the Politburo of the Party's Central Com- mittee "may have close political ties with the radicals." As a result, there are always con- flicting reports about political inclinations of party leaders. For example, Newsweek (Feb. 3, 1975) stated that "nine of the twelve Vice Premiers are old-line moderate cadres." But Lee said: "In the Government apparatus, the moderate group has a better position: seven moderates vs. five radicals among the twelve Vice Premiers (1975)."

3 Mainichi Daily News (English edition, Tokyo) of September 27, 1976, reported that Szechwan has been put under military control because of unrest caused by Teng's supporters.

4According to the Washington Post, Yunan provincical party showed lack of interest in any radical policies. See Mathews (1976:1).

6 For example, Michael Y. M. Kao (1976) said: "The role of the military as a key political player is now indisputable. Party leaders cannot afford to ignore its voice nor can they survive politically without its approval and support." See also Far Eastern Economic Review (Oct. 1, 1976).



MAO TSE-TUNG 477

of Chinese politics on exactly what this role would be. A majority of experts maintained that most army commanders were behind the moderates. Newsweek (Sept. 20, 1976:31), for example, asserted: "They enjoy the backing of two of China's most powerful soldiers, Defense Minister Yeh Chien-ying and the Peking military commander, Chen Hsi-lien-as well as most other regional military commanders and the bulk of the People's Liberation Army." However, a few analysts held that the military was divided in the factional quarrels and that individual relations with factional leaders seemed to be an important factor for the support for the moderates.

The army commanders who were formerly affiliated with the Fourth Field Army, headed by Lin Piao, were said to be hostile to the rightists, while those previously affiliated with the Second Field Army supported their former political commissar, Teng (Lien-ho pao, 1976). And three regional commanders-Chen Hsi-lien of Peking, Li Teh-sheng of Shen- yang, and Hsu Shih-yu of Canton-who all happened to be from the same birthplace (Hwangan County in Hupei) as that of Li Hsien-nien, another moderate leader, and who all worked together with Li for years in the Communist base of the border area of Hupei, Anhwei, and Honan in the early Chinese Communist movement, were also reportedly in favor of the moderates (Butterfield, 1976b).

The purpose of this study is to attempt to test the validity of these, and other, statements regarding the identity of friends and foes of the moderates as well as of the radicals.

Methodology

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the Stand- ing Committee of the National People's Congress, the State Council and the Military Commission of the Central Committee solemnly issued a joint obituary notice on Mao on September 9, 1976 (Jen-min jih-pao, 1976a). Within a day, 11 military regions,6 3 cities and 26 provinces sent separate obituary notices to these national bodies,7 expressing deep sor- row over the death of their beloved chairman, praising his great contribu- tion to the establishment of a Communist government in China and to the international Communist movement, and pledging their firm, contin- uous support of his policies-and particularly his antirightist campaign (Jen-min jih-pao, 1976b, c, d). These notices appeared to be similar in their criticism of Teng, but a careful analysis reveals that they were quite different. A content analysis of these notices was therefore employed to determine the degree of support for the campaign by these military and civilian leaders.

6 The term "military" or "military leaders" is used below to refer to the commanders of the 11 military regions.

7The term "notices" is used below to refer to these 40 obituary notices.



478 TRONG R. CHAI

It should be noted in passing that the term "civilian leaders" is employed to refer to the first secretaries of 29 municipal and provincial par- ties. With the exception of the Peking municipal party, all the obituary notices were sent out in the name of the provincial or municipal party and the revolutionary committee in its administrative region. And 11 notices by provinces were written under the names of not only the provincial party and the revolutionary committee but the military district as well. In view of the fact that almost every first secretary of the provincial or municipal party concurrently held the position of the chairman of the revolutionary committee in his administrative region and that a great number of the first secretaries also served as political commissars of the military districts in their provinces, these 29 notices, whether bearing the names of one, two, or three organs, were considered as the creatures of the first secretaries.

Content analyses of publications have generally used four types of analytical units: item, theme, space, and symbol (Berelson, 1954:508-509). The theme-and especially the item-is too gross for the purpose of this research. For example, one sentence in the notice by the Central Com- mittee et al. reads: "Chairman Mao led our party in waging a protracted, acute and complex struggle against the right and left opportunist lines in the Party, defeating the opportunist lines pursued by Chen Tu-hsiu, Chu Chiu-pai, Li li-san, Lo Chang-lung, Wang Ming, Chang Kuo-tao, Kao Kang, Jao Shu-shih and Peng Teh-huai and again, during the great prole- tarian Cultural Revolution, triumphing over the counter-revolutionary revisionist line of Liu Shao-chi, Lin Piao and Teng Hsiao-ping, thus, en- abling our party to develop and grow in strength steadily in class struggle and the struggle between the two lines." This sentence praised Mao's leadership, which seems to be too broad to be a concept for an effective analysis of these notices. A subdivision of this concept is necessary, and the above sentence would be analyzed as follows: under Mao's leadership: (1) the Party had defeated the opportunist lines; (2) the Party had defeated the revisionist lines; and (3) the Party had grown stronger as a result of defeating these two lines. The sentence contained at least these three themes, and, accordingly, it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine what theme underlay each sentence.

Similarly, to measure the amount of space devoted to the attack on the moderates does not seem to be a viable approach. Using a few words for a stern, personal charge against Teng is probably a more violent attack on the rightists than devoting a long statement for an indirect, imper- sonal criticism of their causes. For instance, the criticism of Teng (pi Teng) took only two spaces, and an appeal for the prevention of the restoration of capitalism (fang chih tzu pen chu i fu pi) occupied eight. By measuring space, the notice including the second phrase, other things being equal, will be considered as having criticized the rightists four times



MAO TSE-TUNG 479

as much as the one containing the first phrase. This is apparently untrue, so space count as an approach was also ruled out.

Thus, the word used as a symbol was employed in this study as the basic unit for analysis.8 The notices were full of political symbols which showed the distribution of attention of the military and civilian leaders, which, in turn, showed the degree of support of each leader for the anti- rightist movement.9 These anti-rightist symbols were selected on the basis of the following assumptions:

(1) Political leaders sympathetic to the moderates did not like to often mention or praise the Cultural Revolution, during which many rightists were purged; (2) political leaders sympathetic to the moderates were apathetic to the concept of permanent revolution, which was typically justi- fied as inciting the Chinese people to continue fighting against Teng's group; (3) these sympathizers for the moderate causes did not want to make personal or indirect attack on the rightists and their stands; and (4) these supporters of the moderates also opposed the dictatorship of the Party over the rightist group.

In light of these assumptions, which are believed to be valid, the following four groups of symbols were selected:

(1) The symbols for the Cultural Revolution and its products: the Pro- letarian Cultural Revolution, the Cultural Revolution, Red Guards, the socialist newborn things, and the three-in-one combination of the old, middle-aged and young; (2) the symbols for permanent revolution: the struggle between the lines, the struggle between the two lines, class struggle, and to combat and prevent revisionism;10 (3) the symbols for the moderates and their causes: (a) the symbols for the moderates: Liu Shao- chi, Teng Hsiao-ping, Teng, the capitalist roaders, the bourgeoisie, and class enemies; and (b) the symbols for the moderate causes: right devia- tionist attempt at reversing correct verdicts, revisionism," the revisionist

8 The symbol analysis was used on a large scale for the first time by Harold D. Lasswell (1941). Nathan Leites and his associates (1951) later analyzed symbols used in the seven- tieth birthday greetings to Stalin by politburo members. They found that two different images of Stalin were emphasized by politburo members, the Bolshevik image and the popular image, and that "those who stress the Bolshevik image [Malenkov, Molotov and Beria] could be assumed to be politically closer to Stalin than those who do not." This analysis provides another small confirmation of the validity of the analytical technique and thus serves as a model of the present study. For the most exhaustive treatment of the use of content analysis to make political inferences see George (1959).

9 Karl W. Deutsch (1955:23), while stressing the importance of words used as symbols, has this to say: "Viewed as indicators, political symbols and their statistical distribution can tell us something about the flow of messages between political groups and organizations.... Such flows of messages can tell us something, in return, about the distribution of attention of the individuals, groups, and organizations concerned."

10 The symbol "to combat and prevent revisionism" was meant to denote the combating and prevention of domestic revisionism, while the phrase "to combat revisionism" referred to the struggle against the Soviet, or "modern," revisionism.

11 The word "revisionism" was not meant to include "modern revisionism," which sym- bolized the revisionist policies adopted by the Soviet Union.



480 TRONG R. CHAI

line,12 capitalism,13 the capitalist road, the restoration of capitalism, and the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie; and (4) the symbols for the dictatorship over the moderates: the restriction of bourgeois rights, and the dictatorship of the proletariat.

A careful study of these 24 symbols reveals that it is impossible to rank them according to the intensity, of the attack on the moderates as most symbols could not reflect this degree of intensity. Nor is it necessary to indicate whether the attitude toward the campaign expressed by each symbol was positive, neutral, or negative, because each symbol contained in the 40 non-national notices generally reflected those attitudes in the national notice. A simple frequency count of these symbols in the notice was thus used in this study.

The total number of anti-rightist symbols in each notice was computed, with the proviso that a symbol could be counted more than once in a notice if it so appeared. Since the number of words varied from notice to notice, the percentage of symbols against the total number of words in a notice was used as an indicator of the attitude toward the moderates. Such a percentage was called the Verbal Attack Index (VAI). For instance, the notice by the Central Committee et al. had 2,624 words and contained 32 anti-rightist symbols, so the VAI value for this notice was 1.22, which was computed as follows:

32 . 2,624 x 100 = 1.22

In the absence of a measure of the statistical significance for this index value, we can only compare one VAI value of a notice or a category of notices with another. The higher the VAI value a notice had, the more it favored the campaign, and vice versa. And in order to compare these no tices effectively, some statistical techniques were employed to test the significance of the difference in the VAI value between two or more groups of notices.

The question of reliability and validity should be noted here as a final methodological discussion. There is no coding reliability problem in this research. The researcher simply made a frequency count of the selected symbols and was not involved in any judgment as to their direction and intensity. The study, however, may have the problem of content validity-the representatives or sampling adequacy of the content.

Since each military and civilian leader issued only one notice, no re- liable way is available to test whether each notice adequately represented the attitude of each leader. Fortunately, two methods are available to in- directly test the content validity. First, a x2 test was used to test the signif-

12 A careful study of these notices shows that "the revisionist lines" signified the lines taken by Mao's foes since the Cultural Revolution and that "the opportunist lines" represented the causes pursued by his adversaries prior to that political turmoil.

13 The term "capitalism" did not cover the concept "bureaucratic capitalism" as the latter stood for the capitalism before the liberation.



MAO TSE-TUNG 481

icance of the difference in the VAI between the notice by the Central Committee et al.-presumably reflecting the position of Hua Kuo-feng, who was then the Premier and the first vice chairman of the party-and his eulogy delivered on September 18, 1976, at Mao's funeral. The result shows that his attitude toward the campaign, as demonstrated in these two documents, did not change.14 Therefore, the notice could be assumed to accurately represent his attitude, and an increase in the sampling size-the addition of the eulogy-would not reinforce the analysis of his position. Second, Peking and Tsinghua Universities, two leftist strongholds,15 issued their notices on Mao separately.16 The average VAI of these universities was much higher than that of the notices under study: 2.04 compared with 1.16. And a t test shows that the probability that this difference resulted by chance was less than .1 percent.17 This is another in- dication that an analysis of these notices by the use of the VAI can reveal the degree of opposition to the moderates.

It should also be noted, in closing, that the validity problem may also be caused by the inaccuracy of translation. To cope with this problem, the original Chinese notices were analyzed throughout this study.

Findings

We shall now try to answer the questions raised earlier.18 Table 1 shows the VAI values of Hua's eulogy, the notice by tfe Central Committee et al., and the 40 notices under this study. While the VAI values in the table speak for themselves, several interesting points should be emphasized:

First, among 11 military regions, the highest VAI value was 1.49 for the Nanking Military Region, which included Shanghai, the home city of Wang Hung-wen, Chang Chun-chiao, and Yao Wen-yuan, and the lowest was .69 for Foochow. Foochow had a surprisingly low VAI value, but

14x2 = .077, df = 1, p < .75. 16 The leftist inclination of these two universities was discussed in many sources, including

The New York Times, which stated: "According to foreigners in Peking, soldiers have now [after the arrest of Chiang Ching] been posted around Tsinghua and Peking Universities, two centers of leftist strength whose administrations have been controlled by supporters of Miss Chiang. Wall posters had reportedly appeared at the two campuses accusing Mr. Hua of failing to use the controversial Mao saying and opposing his selection as chairman" (But- terfield, 1976a).

16 These two notices were published in Jen-minjih-pao of September 14 and 15, 1976, re- spectively.

17 t = 3.810, df = 40, p < .001. 18 To answer these questions we need personal information on the military and civilian

leaders. This information was obtained from the following sources: Union Research Insti- tute (1969-70, 1975); Yearbook on Chinese Communism Editorial Committee, every year since 1967; U. S. Central Intelligence Agency; Clark and Klein (1971) Institute of Inter- national Relations (1970-71); Kasumigaseki-kai (1972); Huang Chen-hsia (1968); and the biographical files of the American Consulate-General in Hong Kong.



482 TRONG R. CHAI

Table 1. The Verbal Attack Index (VAI), by Institution

Institution VA I Institution VA I

Szechwan .61 Chengtu MR 1.25 Foochow MR .69 Kirin 1.25 Sinkiang .75 Sinkiang MR 1.25 Kansu .83 Kiangsu 1.26 Shenyang MR .85 Shansi 1.26 Fukien .87 Inner Mongolia 1.29 Yunan .87 Wuhan MR 1.32 Tsinghai .89 Shantung 1.33 Peking MR .89 Kunming MR 1.34 Shensi .94 Honan 1.38 Tibet .94 Tsinan MR 1.44 Heilungkiang .96 Liaoning 1.49 Kwangsi .96 Nanking MR 1.49 Hunan .98 Peking 1.49 Canton MR .99 Kiangsi 1.56 Anhwei 1.02 Tientsin 1.59 Hupei 1.04 Chekiang 1.71 Kwangtung 1.05 Shanghai 2.21 Lanchow MR 1.08 n = 40 z VAI = 46.49 Kweichow 1.12 a = .31 X= 1.16 Ningsia 1.12 The CC et al.a 1.22 Hopei 1.13 Hua Kuo-fengb 1.14

NOTE: MR: Military Region. a The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the Standing Committee

of the National People's Congress, the State Council and the Military Commission of the Central Committee.

b The eulogy delivered on September 18, 1976, at Mao's funeral.

there were some clues for this inclination.19 The next lowest VAI values were from Shenyang, Peking, and Canton-.85, .89, and .99, respec- tively-and the difference in the mean VAI value between these three and the other eight regions was strong enough (.91 to 1.23) to be statistically significant at the .05 level.20 Incidentally, the commanders of the three regions were Li Te-sheng, Chen Hsi-lien, and Hsu Shih-yu, who, as pointed out earlier, were born in the same county and worked in the same Com- munist base with Li Hsien-nien. The data, therefore, support the argu- ment that the community and group ties with Li could affect attitudes of army commanders toward the moderates.

Second, the military had a higher consensus on the attack on the mod- 19 The regional commander Pi Ting-chun died on July 7, 1976, but his death was an-

nounced one week later. The reason for the delay in the announcement, according to the Daily Telegraph (London) of August 30, 1976, was that he was killed in the factional conflict in Fukien. This report was later confirmed by a revelation in the New York Times of November 26, 1976: he "was killed in a helicopter crash during military maneuvers along the coast. Some wall posters in Fukien have charged that the helicopter was sabotaged by Miss Chiang." Probably for this reason, this military region sent to the Central Committee a telegram (released by Hsinhua on October 29, 1976) that "strenuously demanded that the 'gang of four' be expelled from the Party for life and be given the severest punishment."

20 t = 2.285, df = 9, p < .05.



MAO TSE-TUNG 483

Table 2. The Verbal Attack Index (VAI), by Section

Sectiona Mean VAI N SS df MSS F

Northwest .98 7 South 1.02 7 Southwest 1.03 6 North and Northeast 1.22 10 East and Central Interior 1.42 10

Between 1.19 4 .30 3.75b Within 2.63 35 .08

a Significant at the .05 level. b Northwest: Lanchow (Kansu, Ningsia, Shensi and Tsinghai) and Sinkiang Military Re-

gions (Sinkiang); South: Canton (Hunan, Kwangsi and Kwangtung) and Foochow Military Regions (Fukien and Kiangsi); Southwest: Chengtu (Szechwan and Tibet) and Kunming Military Regions (Kweichow and Yunan); North and Northeast: Peking (Hopei, Inner Mongolia, Peking City, Shansi and Tientsin) and Shenyang Military Regions (Heilung- kiang, Kirin and Liaoning); East and Central Interior: Nanking (Anhwei, Chekiang, Kiangsu and Shanghai); Tsinan (Shantung) and Wuhan Military Regions (Honan and Hupei).

erates than the civilian. The difference between the lowest and the highest VAI values for the military was only half as much as that for the administrative regions: .80 compared to 1.60. This suggests that the military tended to stay away from party politics by refraining from taking extreme political positions.

Third, Shanghai was a city with the highest VAI value, 2.21, much higher than any other institution; and Szechwan, Teng's home province, had the lowest, .61. Interesting enough, eight neighboring provinces of Szechwan (Kansu, Tsinghai, Tibet, Yunan, Kweichow, Hunan, Hupei and Shensi) also had an unusually lower mean value than that of Kiangsu (Shanghai is in this province) and its three neighboring provinces (Shan- tung, Anhwei and Chekiang): .95 compared with 1.33. The statistical possibility that this difference could occur by chance was less than one percent.2" Thus, the findings indicate that the Szechwan area was the cen- ter of moderate forces and the Shanghai area was the leftist stronghold.

From this it follows that the East would be more favorable to the criticism of Teng than the South and the West. Table 2 shows the VAI values of the five sections of the country. There were no basic differences between the Northwest, the South, and the Southwest in the VAI value. But strong differences appeared between these three sections and the other two sections. The average VAI value for the three sections was 1.01, compared with 1.22 for the North and Northeast and 1.42 for the East and Central Interior. The probability that the relationship between the VAI and section was due to chance was less than 5 percent. Hence, section can satisfactorily explain differences in attitudes toward the moderates; and the vast regions of the South and the West were apathetic to the anti-

21 t= 3.610, df = lo, p < .Ol.



484 TRONG R. CHAI

rightist campaign, while the East and Central Interior favored it most, with the North and Northeast in between.

The differences in the VAI value among sections were perhaps merely a reflection of their socioeconomic environments, as the East was much more developed than the West, and urbanization might be a real cause for variations in attitude. If so, we should be able to find that the cities were much more radical than the provinces. In comparing 3 major cities and 26 provinces on the VAI, we found that the mean VAI values of the cities was 1.76, which was .66 higher than that of the provinces. This difference was statistically extremely significant (p < .001). Hence, the sug- gestion that cities are leftist centers seems to be substantiated.

Personal political experience would probably be found to be another powerful influence in verbal attack. The data on the political status of 28 civilian leaders22 during the Cultural Revolution, excluding the first secretary of Heilungkiang provincial party, who has not been identified,23 seem to demonstrate that those who were purged24 in that political turmoil were less enthusiastic about the anti-rightist movement than nonpurged leaders. The mean VAI value was 1.07 for the purged group and 1.22 for the nonpurged group, a difference too small to have statistical significance. Perhaps, since the purge took place a decade ago, it has only a miniscule bearing upon current Chinese politics.

But the impacts of some important personnel decisions made one or two years ago are still felt today, according to the finding. Thus, of 29 civilian leaders, 16 were appointed in the 1974-1975 period,25 when Teng as the first vice premier virtually exercised the powers of the late premier Chou En-lai, who was then mortally ill and hospitalized. This group of

22 This number included Chang Ping-hua, the acting first secretary of Hunan provincial party. Since Hua Kuo-feng assumed heavy duties in the central government, Chang has be- come the acting first secretary. See Li Ming-hua (1976).

23 According to the Central Intelligence Agency, two first secretaries of the provincial par- ties had not been identified by the end of 1975: one in Tsinghai and the other in Heilung- kiang. See Central Intelligence Agency (1975:3). The Union Research and the Taiwan sources, however, reported that the position in Tsinghai was filled by Sung Chang-keng in March 1974. See Union Research Institute (1975:11) and the Yearbook on Chinese Com- munism Editorial Committee (1974).

24 The term "purged" refers to those who were severely criticized, demoted, or removed from their posts. The following are the first secretaries of the provincial party committees purged during the Cultural Revolution: Chang Ping-hua (acting, Hunan), Chao Hsin-chu (Hupei), Chao Tzu-yang (Szechwan), Chia Chi-yun (Yunan), Chiang Wei-ching (Kiangsi), Liao Chih-kao (Fukien), Pai Ju-ping (Shantung) and Wang Chien (Shansi).

25 The 1974-1975 appointees are An Ping-sheng (Kwangsi), Chang Ping-hua (acting, Hunan), Chao Hsin-chu (Hupei), Chao Tzu-yang (Szechwan), Chia Chi-yun (Yunan), Chiang Wei-ching (Kiangsi), Liao Chih-kao (Fukien), Lu Jui-lin (Kweichow), Pai Ju-ping (Shantung), Peng Chung (Kiangsu), Sung Chang-keng (Tsinghai), Sung Pei-chang (An- hwei), Tseng Shao-shan (Liaoning), Wang Chien (Shansi), Wei Kuo-ching (Kwangtung) and the first secretary of the Heilungkiang Provincial Party Committee. Wang Chia-tao was still identified as the first secretary in March 1974. Three months later he transferred to Liaoning. Hence, his successor, while not identified, took over his position in 1974 and should be considered as a 1974-1975 appointee.



MAO TSE-TUNG 485

the newly appointed leaders tended to support Teng. The mean VAI value of the 1974-1975 appointees was much lower than that of the old appointees: 1.08 to 1.28. The difference was so great that the relationship between appointment date and verbal attack was statistically significant at the .05 level, in the predicted direction.

The military, in tending to take the middle of the road, did not neces- sarily oppose the radicals. The mean VAI value for the military leaders was slightly lower than that of the civilian, 1.14 compared with 1.17, but statistically very insignificant. The finding confirms a strong majority view that the military was more supportive to the moderates. The extent of its support, however, seemed far less than most analysts believed.

Unlike the military as a whole, some military leaders threw strong support to either faction, and their field army ties appeared to be a critical cause. There were five field armies before this system was replaced by military regions in 1954, and of the 11 military regions, 10 commanders have been identified. Among them, three were from the Second Field Army, two from the Third Field Army, and the remaining five from the Fourth Field Army. Table 3 demonstrates that the commanders who had ties with the Second Field Army had the lowest mean VAI value, while the military leaders formerly affiliated with the Fourth Field Army had the highest. The mean differences between the Second and the Third Field Armies and between the Third and the Fourth Field Armies were both too small to have any significance. However, the difference between the Second and the Fourth Field Armies was statistically significant. Thus, it is safe to say that with the exception of the two commanders from the Third Field Army, the group tie with the field armies was a vital cause for variations in the VAI value.

Table 3. Comparison of Field Armies on the Verbal Attack Index (VAI)

Difference of Field A rmya Mean VA I Mean Difference Mean Test (t)

(1)Second 1.00 (1)-(2) = -.17 .817 (2) Third 1.17 (2)-(3) = -.15 .979 (3) Fourth 1.32 (3)-(1) = .32 2.463b

a The Second Field Army: Chen Hsi-lien (Peking), Li Te-sheng (Shenyang) and Yang Yung (Sinkiang); the Third Field Army: Hsu Shih-yu (Canton) and Wang Pi-cheng (Kunming); and the Fourth Field Army: Han Hsien-chu (Lanchow), Liu Hsing-yuan (Chengtu), Ting Sheng (Nanking), Tseng Ssu-yu (Tsinan) and Yang Te-chih (Wuhan). The successor to Pi Ting-chun (deceased) as the commander of the Foochow Military Region has not been identified.

b Significant at the .05 level.



486 TRONG R. CHAI

References

Berelson, B. 1954 "Content analysis," in G. Lindzey (ed.), Handbook of Social Psychol-

ogy, vol. 1. Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley. Bonavia, David

1976 "1976-year of upheaval," Far Eastern Economic Review 94 (no. 40):36. Butterfield, Fox

1976a "The Chinese shake-up," New York Times, Oct. 14, p. 2. 1976b "Li Hsien-nien, Economic chief, in prime minister's role in Peking,"

New York Times, Oct. 29, p. A8. Chang, Parris H.

1976 "Mao's last stand?" Problems of Communism 25 (no. 4):1-17. Clark, Anne B., and Donald W, Klein (eds.)

1971 Biographical Directory of Communist China, 192 1-1965, 2 vols. Cam- bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Deutsch, Karl W. 1955 "Symbols of political community," in Lyman Bryson et al. (eds.), Sym-

bols and Society: Fourteenth Symposium of the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion. New York: Harper.

Far Eastern Economic Review 1976 "Who is guarding the guards themselves." Oct. 1, pp. 39-41.

George, Alexander L. 1959 Propaganda Analysis: A Study of Inferences Made from Nazi Propa-

ganda in World War II. Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson. Huang Chen-hsia (ed.)

1968 Mao's Generals. Hong Kong: Research Institute of Contemporary His- tory.

Institute of International Relations 1970-71 Chinese Communist Who's Who, 2 vols. Taipei: Institute of Inter-

national Relations. Jen-min jih-pao

1976a Sept. 10. 1976b Sept. 11. 1976c Sept. 12. 1976d Sept. 13. 1976e Sept. 14. 1976f Sept. 15.

Kao, Michael Y. M. 1976 "The role of the military in transition: the politics of Mao's army-

building." Issues and Studies 12 (no. 9):63. Kasumigaseki-kai (ed.)

1972 Biographical Directory of Contemporary China. Tokyo: Kasu-migaseki- kai, under the supervision of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Asian Division.

Lasswell, Harold D. 1941 "The world attention survey." Public Opinion Quarterly 5:456-462.

Lee, Hong Yung 1975 "Peking: the moderate-radical balance." New York Times, Feb. 14, p.

36. Leites, Nathan, Elsa Bernaut, and Raymond L. Garthoff

1951 "Politburo images of Stalin." World Politics 3 (no. 3):317-339.



MAO TSE-TUNG 487

Li Ming-hua 1976 "The CCP leadership and party works in 1975." Issues and Studies 12

(no. 2):72. Lien-ho pao

1976 "An unresolved dispute with the military created by the clique of the cultural revolution led by Mao's wife, Chiang Ching." Taipei: overseas edition, Sept. 24 and 25.

Mathews, Jay 1976 "Peking, province rivalry hinted in Chinese officials' eulogy." Washing-

ton Post, Sept. 22, p. 1. Newsweek

1976 "China after Mao." Sept. 20, p. 31. Starr, John Bryan

1976 "From the 10th party congress to the premiership of Hua Kuo-feng: the significance of the color of the cat." The China Quarterly (no. 69):457- 487.

Terrill, Ross 1976 "China without Mao." The New Republic 175 (no. 13):28.

Time 1975 "A victory for Chou-and Moderates." Feb. 3, p. 23. 1976 "The helmsman passes." Sept. 20, p. 31.

Union Research Institute (ed.) 1969-70 Who's Who in Communist China, 2nd ed., 2 vols. 1975 Hierarchies of the People's Republic of China. Hong Kong: Union

Research Institute. U. S. Central Intelligence Agency

1974, 1975 Directory of Officials of the People's Republic of China. Yearly Appearances and Activities of Leading Personalities of the People's Republic of China.

Yearbook on Chinese Communism Editorial Committee (ed.) 1967ff. Yearbook on Chinese Communism. Taipei: Institute for the Study of

Chinese Communist Problems.



a content analysis of the obituary notices on mao tse-tung(pp. 475-487)

Documents

mao tsetung trong

mao tsetungauthors

passing of mao tsetung

obituary notices

conditionsa content

jstor terms

jstor archive

cultural revolution