3 11 23 - leb

ISSN 0014-5688 USPS 383-310

Features

Departments

1 Director’s Message

19 Focus on Counterterrorism

Critical Incident Management in the Ultimate Crisis

Fighting Terrorismin the 21st Century

By John F. Lewis, Jr.

Confronting Terrorism onthe State and Local Level

By D. Douglas Bodrero

The JointTerrorism Task Force

By Robert A. Martin

3

State and local law enforcementagencies’ antiterrorism efforts areenhanced greatly by comprehensiveplanning and thorough threatassessments.

11

23

Cooperation between federal, state,and local law enforcement agenciesis the key to combating new terroristtrends in the next millennium.

March 1999Volume 68Number 3

United StatesDepartment of Justice

Federal Bureau ofInvestigation

Washington, DC20535-0001

Louis J. FreehDirector

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The highly successful Joint TerrorismTask Forces are composed of variouslaw enforcement personnel workingtogether to combat terrorism.

28 Police Practice Bomb Threat: A Primer for the First Responder

Members of the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP)Committee on Terrorism prepared articles for this issue. The Committeewas created in 1986 to counter the international terrorist threat throughcooperative police activities. Members of the Committee on Terrorism

represent a variety of local, state, and federal agencies and departments,both civilian and military, from the United States and abroad.

March 1999 / 1

Director’s Message

n many ways, terrorism is unique amongcrime problems. It is as old as organized

United States and in support of extraterritorialinvestigations, domestic terrorism operations,and countermeasures relating to both interna-tional and domestic terrorism. This center alsoreflects the coordinated interagency response thatis critical to a comprehensive counterterrorismstrategy. Representatives from 20 federal agen-cies maintain a regular presence in the center andparticipate in its daily activities. Thismultiagency arrangement provides an unprec-edented opportunity for information sharing,warning, and real-time intelligence analysis.

The bombings of the federal building inOklahoma City and the World Trade Center inNew York, and the simultaneous attacks on theU.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania onAugust 7, 1998, clearly demonstrate that theUnited States remains a target of both domesticand international terrorists. This issue of the FBILaw Enforcement Bulletin focuses on the terror-ist threats that confront the United States and theFBI and law enforcement response to thesethreats.

It is my hope that the articles in this issueof the Bulletin will give readers a clearer under-standing of the challenges posed by terrorism andthe importance of a coordinated response to theterrorist threats we face. Although the FBI hasbeen designated as the lead federal agency inthe U.S. government response to terrorism, thebattle against terrorism demands the coordinatedresponse of the intelligence and criminal justicecommunities. In recent years, this coordinatedresponse has resulted in several notablesuccesses—the arrest and conviction of theOklahoma City bombers; the rendition fromoverseas of Ramzi Yousef—the mastermind ofthe World Trade Center bombing—and the

Responding to Terrorism

Isociety but has evolved continually to reflect thetechnologies and methodologies of the times.Terrorists are among the most ruthless of crim-inals, but their motivation rarely stems frompersonal need or a desire for material gain.Unlike the majority of violent criminals, terror-ists do not know their victims; in fact, one of thehallmarks of terrorism is its indiscriminatevictimization. Also unlike most serious criminalactivity, terrorism invites—and even dependsupon—media attention to ensure a maximumyield of terror.

During the past several years, the UnitedStates has witnessed two convergent terroristtrends: while the overall number of terroristincidents has declined, the attacks that haveoccurred have resulted in increased destructionand casualties. In 1986, for example, there were25 incidents of terrorism perpetrated in theUnited States, resulting in 1 death and 19 inju-ries. In 1995, only one act of terrorism wasrecorded in the United States (the truck bombingof the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building inOklahoma City), but it resulted in 168 deaths andover 800 injuries. Our experiences in the UnitedStates reflect a worldwide trend toward fewer,but more destructive, terrorist attacks, carried outto achieve maximum casualties, terror, and mediaattention.

The U.S. government and FBI response toterrorism has changed during the past severalyears as well. In 1996, the FBI created the FBICounterterrorism Center to expand and integratemany of its analytic and operational capabilities.The center combats terrorism on three fronts:international terrorism operations both within the

Director’s Message

2 / FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

conviction of Yousef and his coconspirators; andthe prevention of an international terrorist plot toattack several New York landmarks, and thearrest and conviction of the plotters.

Cooperation among law enforcement agen-cies at all levels represents an important compo-nent of a comprehensive response to terrorism.This cooperation assumes its most tangibleoperational form in the Joint Terrorism TaskForces that exist in 16 communities across thenation. These task forces combine the resourcesof the FBI and other federal agencies with thestreet-level expertise of local and state lawenforcement officers. This cooperation hasproven highly successful in preventing severalpotential terrorist attacks, including the plot tobomb New York landmarks in 1993.

The increased globalization of crimesincluding terrorism also has led the FBI toexpand the number of Legal Attaché, or LEGAT,offices abroad. Today, 36 LEGATs work withhost governments to prevent crimes against U.S.interests and to investigate those that do occur.These offices provide the FBI with a valuableforward defense against international terroristswho target U.S. interests.

The future holds new challenges.Cyberterrorism and attacks on our nation’scritical infrastructure and terrorist use of weap-ons of mass destruction (WMD) are emerging assignificant counterterrorism concerns. To helpprovide a coordinated platform to countercomputer-based assaults and threats to ournation’s critical infrastructure, the FBI hasestablished the National Infrastructure ProtectionCenter (NIPC). NIPC draws together personnelfrom federal law enforcement and intelligenceagencies and state and local agencies, as well as

experts from critical industries, to safeguard theinterlocking computer, mass transport, and publicutilities systems that power our modern society.Likewise, the FBI has established the NationalDomestic Preparedness Office to coordinate theefforts of a wide range of federal, state, and localagencies to enhance the abilities of communitiesaround the country to respond to WMD threats.

The FBI marked its 90th anniversary in 1998by further enhancing its ability to respond toterrorist incidents of the future. On November20, 1998, the FBI opened a state-of-the artStrategic Information and Operations Center(SIOC) at FBI Headquarters in Washington, DC.This expanded facility serves as a nationalcommand center during large-scale investigationsor at times when risks to U.S. interests may beheightened. Reflecting the combined efforts thatare necessary for an effective response to terror-ism, SIOC is staffed by personnel from severalagencies, depending on the nature of the incidentor threat.

As we succeed in identifying and apprehend-ing today’s terrorists, the terrorists of tomorroware mastering new strategies and techniques ofterror. These and other issues pose dauntingchallenges to the intelligence and law enforce-ment communities. However, by building uponthe strong foundation of cooperation alreadyestablished and by pursuing aggressive, constitu-tionally sound investigative techniques, I believewe can meet these challenges.

Louis J. Freeh

lthough not new to theUnited States, the threat ofterrorism is changing and

United States has declined in thepast decade, the number of thosekilled and injured in distinct actshas increased.1 A single attack in1993 killed 6 people and injurednearly 1,000 when terroristsbombed the World Trade Center inNew York City. Less than 2 yearslater, an attack in Oklahoma Cityresulted in the worst act of domesticterrorism in the United States andthe deaths of 168 people. The num-ber of attempted terrorist acts in the

United States remains equallyalarming to the law enforcementcommunity.

The FBI, working in conjunc-tion with its state and local counter-parts, prevented 5 acts of terrorismin 19962 and 20 acts in 1997.3 Howcan law enforcement agencies bestwork together to fight terrorism to-day and into the 21st century? In-vestigators must consider thesources of today’s international anddomestic terrorism threats.

March 1999 / 3

Abecoming more deadly. Over thelast several years, the FBI has noteda new trend in terrorism within theUnited States that involves a transi-tion from more numerous low-levelincidents to less frequent but moredestructive attacks, with a goal toproduce mass casualties and attractintense media coverage. While thenumber of terrorist attacks in the

Fighting Terrorismin the 21st CenturyBy JOHN F. LEWIS, Jr.

World Trade Centerin New York City


“

”

While the number ofterrorist attacks in the

United States hasdeclined in the pastdecade, the numberof those killed andinjured in distinct

acts has increased.

Mr. Lewis, retired assistant director of the FBI's National Security Division,currently serves as the director of Global Security for Goldman, Sachs, andCompany in New York City. Mr. Lewis is a member of the IACP and servedas chairman of the IACP Committee on Terrorism between 1996 and 1998.

CURRENTTERRORIST THREATS

International Terrorism

International terrorism againstthe United States is foreign-basedor directed by countries or groupsoutside the United States. In pastdecades, international terroristshave attacked the United States pri-marily by targeting U.S. citizensand interests overseas. The mostmemorable attacks include theabduction of hostages in Lebanon inthe mid-1980s; the December 1988bombing of Pan American Flight103 over Lockerbie, Scotland,which killed 189 Americans; theJune 25, 1996, detonation of an ex-plosive device outside Al-KhobarTowers in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia,in which 19 U.S. military personnelwere killed; and the August 7, 1998,bombings of the U.S. embassies inNairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam,Tanzania, which resulted in thedeaths of 12 Americans. Withone exception, no attacks by

international terrorists were re-corded in the United States between1984 and 1992.4 All of this changed,however, on February 26, 1993,when foreign terrorists bombed theWorld Trade Center in New YorkCity. The suspects intended to de-stroy the tower and murder over35,000 people.

The FBI divides the current in-ternational terrorist threat to theUnited States into three categories.The first threat to Americans comesfrom the activities of foreign spon-sors of international terrorism. TheU.S. Department of State has desig-nated seven countries as state spon-sors of terrorism: Iran, Iraq, Syria,Sudan, Libya, Cuba, and North Ko-rea. These sponsors view terrorismas a tool of foreign policy. How-ever, their activities have changedover time. Past activities includeddirect terrorist support and opera-tions by official state agents. Now,state sponsors generally seek toconceal their support of terrorismby relying on surrogates to conduct

operations. State sponsors remaininvolved in terrorist activities byfunding, organizing, networking,and providing other support and in-struction to formal terrorist groupsand loosely affiliated extremists.

Formalized terrorist groups,such as Lebanese Hizballah, Egyp-tian Al-Gama’a Al-Islamiyya, andPalestinian HAMAS, pose the sec-ond threat to the United States.These autonomous organizationshave their own infrastructures, per-sonnel, financial arrangements, andtraining facilities. They can planand mount terrorist campaignsoverseas, as well as support terroristoperations within the United States.Some groups use supporters insidethe United States to plan and coor-dinate acts of terrorism. In the past,these formalized terrorist groupsengaged in criminal activities in theUnited States, such as illegally ac-quiring weapons, violating U.S. im-migration laws, and providing safehavens to fugitives.

The third category of terroristthreats stems from loosely affiliatedinternational radical extremists,such as those who bombed theWorld Trade Center. These extrem-ists do not represent a particular na-tion. Loosely affiliated extremistsmay pose the most urgent threat tothe United States at this time be-cause they remain relatively un-known to law enforcement. Theycan travel freely, obtain a varietyof identities, and recruit like-minded sympathizers from variouscountries.

Domestic Terrorism

The devastating bombing of theAlfred P. Murrah Federal Buildingin Oklahoma City on April 19,

1995, and the pipe bomb explosionin Centennial Olympic Park duringthe 1996 Summer Olympic Games,underscore the ever-present threatthat exists from individuals deter-mined to use violence to advancetheir agendas. From 1982 to1992, atotal of 165 terrorist incidents oc-curred domestically.5 The majorityof these attacks were conducted bydomestic terrorist groups, particu-larly Puerto Rican groups, left-wing extremist groups, and specialinterest groups.

Domestic terrsorism involvesgroups or individuals who operatewithout foreign direction entirelywithin the United States and targetelements of the U.S. government orcitizens. Domestic terrorist groupsrepresent extreme right-wing,

extreme left-wing, and special in-terest beliefs. The major themes es-poused today by extremist right-wing groups include conspiraciesregarding the New World Order,gun control laws, the approach ofthe millennium, and white su-premacy. Many of these extremistgroups also advocate antigovern-ment, antitaxation, or antiabortionsentiments and engage in surviv-alist training to ensure the perpetua-tion of the United States as a white,Christian nation.

One current troubling branchof right-wing extremism is themilitia or patriot movement. Mili-tia members want to remove fed-eral involvement from variousissues. They generally are law-abiding citizens who have become

intolerant of what they perceive asviolations of their constitutionalrights. Membership in a militia or-ganization is not entirely illegal inthe United States, but certain stateshave legislated limits on militias,including limits on the types oftraining (e.g., paramilitary training)that militias can offer legally. TheFBI bases its interest in the militiamovement on the rise of violence orthe potential for violence and crimi-nal activity stemming from themovement.

Experts have traced the growthof the militia movement in part tothe effective use of modern commu-nication mediums. Videotapes andcomputer bulletin boards and net-works, such as the Internet, havebeen used with great effectiveness

March 1999 / 5

arning remains critical to the terrorismprevention effort. In 1989, the FBI

Terrorist Threat Warning System

Wdeveloped its Terrorist Threat Warning Systemto transmit information and intelligence to othermembers of the law enforcement community.Acting as the lead federal law enforcementagency in combating terrorism in the UnitedStates, the FBI manages this system to ensurethat vital information regarding terrorismreaches those in the U.S. law enforcement andcounterterrorism communities. The warningsystem ensures the accurate, timely, and orderlydissemination of new information to thoseresponsible for countering terrorist threatsagainst individuals, property, and facilitieswithin the United States. All federal governmentagencies and departments are reached throughthe warning system. If the threat informationrequires nationwide unclassified dissemination

to all federal, state, and local law enforcementagencies, the FBI can transmit such messagesvia the National Law Enforcement Telecommu-nications System, or NLETS.

The Awareness of National Security Issuesand Response (ANSIR) Program is designed toprovide unclassified national security threat andwarning information to as many as 40,000 U.S.corporate security directors and executives, lawenforcement personnel, and other governmentagencies. ANSIR represents the first initiativeby the U.S. government to provide this type ofinformation to individual U.S. corporations withcritical technologies or sensitive economicinformation that foreign governments or organi-zations may target. Each FBI ANSIR coordina-tor meets regularly with industry leaders andsecurity directors for updates on current nationalsecurity issues.


by militia sympathizers. Exploitingyet another medium, promilitia fac-simile networks disseminate mate-rial from well-known hate groupfigures and conspiracy theorists.Organizers can promote their ide-ologies at militia meetings, patriotrallies, and gatherings of variousother groups espousing antigovern-ment sentiments. Left-wing extrem-ist groups generally profess a revo-lutionary socialist doctrine andview themselves as protectors of theAmerican people against capitalismand imperialism. They aim tochange the United States throughrevolutionary means rather thanparticipating in the established po-litical process.

During the last 3 decades,leftist-oriented extremist groupshad posed the predominant domes-tic terrorist threat in the UnitedStates. Beginning in the 1980s,however, the FBI dismantled manyof these groups by arresting keymembers for their criminal activi-ties. The transformation of theformer Soviet Union also deprivedmany leftist groups of a coherentideology or spiritual patron. As aresult, membership and support forthese groups has declined.

Special-interest terrorist groupsdiffer from extreme left- and right-wing terrorist groups because mem-bers of these groups seek to resolvespecific interests rather than pursuewidespread political changes.Members of such groups includeanimal rights advocates, supportersof environmental issues, and anti-abortion advocates.

While some consider the causesthat special-interest groups rep-resent understandable or even

noteworthy in nature, they remainseparated from traditional law-abiding special-interest groups be-cause of their criminal activity.Through their violent, criminal ac-tions, these terrorist groups attemptto force various segments of soci-ety, including the general public, tochange their attitudes about issuesthey consider important. Therefore,special-interest groups will con-tinue to present a threat.

Unconventional Weapons

Along with the risk posed bygroups and individuals, both for-eign and domestic, a threat stem-ming from the choice of weaponused also exists. Although terroristscontinue to rely on such conven-tional weapons as bombs and smallarms, several cases suggest that ter-rorists and other criminals may con-sider using unconventional chemi-cal or biological weapons in anattack in the United States at somepoint in the future.

The Cyberterrorism Threat

The FBI defines cyberterrorismas terrorism that initiates, or threat-ens to initiate, the exploitation of or

attack on information systems. TheU.S. government, state and localgovernments, and the private sec-tor have become increasingly de-pendent on computer hardware,software, networking, and commu-nications technologies for accom-plishing operational and adminis-trative goals. However, greaterinfrastructure sophistication pre-sents new vulnerabilities and cyber-terrorism threat scenarios. Com-promise or damage to criticalcomputer systems can jeopardizepublic safety and U.S. national se-curity. In February, March, andJune of 1998, the FBI’s TerroristThreat Warning System dissemi-nated four separate warnings relat-ed to threats received against com-puter systems in the United States.

As the 21st century approaches,the FBI has prepared to address thisnew and growing threat in a varietyof ways. The FBI’s National Infra-structure Protection Center (NIPC)has developed the capability toidentify, analyze, and characterizespecific cyber threats and incidents.The NIPC uses the FBI’s criminalinvestigative and counterterrorismresources and expertise in carryingout its mission. The center worksproactively to monitor all physicaland cyber threats, to maintain rela-tions with the greatest number offederal government agency watchcenters, and to disseminate infra-structure threat information to gov-ernment agencies, state and locallaw enforcement, and corporate se-curity directors and executives.

Criminal and national securityissues have converged in thecyberterrorism threat. Law enforce-ment can achieve success against

“...the FBI anticipatesa greater number

of terrorist attacksaimed at U.S.citizens and

interests abroad.

”

this and other terrorism threats byforging strong links among law en-forcement at the federal, state, andlocal levels, and through broad fed-eral government agency and publicsector participation.

FIGHTING TERRORISMTODAY AND TOMORROW

Just as the threat from terrorismhas changed over the last severalyears, so has the FBI response tothis serious national security threat.In preparation for the next century,the FBI continues to bolster its abil-ity to prevent acts of terrorism be-fore they occur and to effectivelyrespond to such acts once they havetaken place.

An example of the FBI’s readi-ness for the next century is the Stra-tegic Information and OperationsCenter (SIOC) at FBI Headquarters.This 24-hour operations center wasrecently enlarged and modernizedwith state-of-the-art technology.SIOC is available for use by FBIemployees and representativesfrom other federal, state, or localagencies during times of nationalcrisis, such as following the com-mission of an act of terrorism.

The linchpin of FBI efforts re-mains promoting its counter-terror-ism capabilities and strengtheningits ties with other agencies on thefederal, state, and local law enforce-ment levels.

FBI Counterterrorism Mission

The FBI counterterrorism mis-sion is to prevent acts of terrorismbefore they occur or to react to themafter they happen by bringing theperpetrators to justice. To enhancethis mission, the FBI established aCounterterrorism Center in 1996 tocombat terrorism on three fronts:international terrorism operations,domestic terrorism operations, andcountermeasures pertaining to bothinternational and domestic terror-ism. The center helps law enforce-ment and intelligence communitiesto more effectively counter threatsof terrorism within the UnitedStates by combining the experi-ence and special skills of each

March 1999 / 7

Al-Khobar Towers inDhahran, Saudi Arabia

Pan American Flight 103in Lockerbie, Scotland

represented agency in a coordinatedeffort directed at the threat of ter-rorism or in response to a terroristact.

Twenty other federal agenciesparticipate in the FBI center, andtheir representatives are fully inte-grated into its operation. These rep-resentatives serve as specific pointsof contact for their agencies,thereby enhancing the flow of intel-ligence and allowing for a collabo-rative exchange of information. TheFBI believes that this interactionhas increased the ability of the U.S.government to counter domesticand international terrorism, both athome and abroad.

Objectives of theFBI Terrorism Program

Major objectives within FBIdomestic and international terror-ism programs include identifyingand preventing the activities of ter-rorists prior to the commission ofterrorist acts and pursuing the arrestand prosecution of responsible indi-viduals. As part of this preventioneffort, the FBI collects foreign in-telligence information relating tothose international terrorist groupsand individuals whose activitiesthreaten the security of the UnitedStates. Pursuant to attorney generalguidelines, the FBI analyzes the in-formation collected and works withother members of U.S. intelligenceagencies and law enforcement andcounterterrorism communities tofully exploit such information.

In the fight against terrorism,the FBI Counterterrorism Centeruses various resources, whichinclude multiagency task forces;ongoing liaison with all federal,


state, and local law enforcementagencies; its Legal Attaché pro-gram; the Terrorist Threat WarningSystem; and the introduction of newfederal legislation.

Joint Terrorism Task Forces

The FBI combats terrorismthrough its participation in 16 for-malized Joint Terrorism TaskForces (JTTFs) around the country.The JTTFs, composed of federal,state, and local law enforcementpersonnel, strive to increase the

landmarks, and the crash of TWAFlight 800.

Legal Attaché Program

The FBI currently counters glo-bal terrorism threats through mean-ingful cooperation with allied gov-ernments around the world. Incoming years, the FBI anticipates agreater number of terrorist attacksaimed at U.S. citizens and interestsabroad. Cooperation with othergovernments remains indispensablein countering this heightened threatof global terrorism. The FBI pres-ently has 36 Legal Attachés over-seas, and the program’s success hasresulted in the recent establishmentof new offices in Israel, SaudiArabia, Pakistan, and Egypt. Thetrust and good faith developedthrough this cooperation are hall-marks of FBI relationships over-seas. Among the many benefits ofestablishing Legal Attachés is theclose working relationships FBIpersonnel form with the local lawenforcement agencies, which havepractical and operational familiaritywith terrorist organizations thatmay pose a threat to Americans.These relationships further enhancethe ability of the FBI to maintain aproactive, rather than reactive, pos-ture in addressing terrorist threats.If a terrorist attack targeting U.S.citizens or interests does occur, Le-gal Attachés can provide the FBIwith an immediate on-scene pres-ence in the first critical hours of apost-incident investigation.

Additionally, the presence ofLegal Attachés abroad has provencrucial in facilitating U.S. criminalextraterritorial jurisdiction. TheU.S. government has successfully

effectiveness and productivity oflimited personnel and logisticalresources. They avoid duplicationof investigative effort and expandcooperation and liaison amongfederal, state, and local lawenforcement.

JTTFs have been highly suc-cessful in several critical operationsaround the country. The FBI-NewYork City Police Department JointTerrorism Task Force, for example,has worked on many critical cases,including the massive World TradeCenter bombing investigation, theplot to bomb major New York City

“The FBI combatsterrorism throughits participation in16 formalized Joint

Terrorism TaskForces around the

country.

”

March 1999 / 9

returned terrorists from other coun-tries to stand trial for acts orplanned acts of terrorism againstU.S. citizens. There have been over350 extraterritorial jurisdictioncases since legislation was enactedin 1984 and 1986.

One recent case involved therendition of a subject from Paki-stan wanted for the shooting deathsof two CIA employees in Langley,Virginia. The Legal Attaché inIslamabad, Pakistan, coordinatedextensive liaison with various for-eign entities and U.S. intelligenceagencies. Ultimately, the LegalAttaché coordinated the delivery ofthe subject to an FBI arrest teamin Pakistan. The Legal Attaché’son-scene role was critical to the

successful rendition of the subjectto the United States, where he stoodtrial.

Domestic Preparedness Program

The Domestic PreparednessProgram represents a major part ofFBI liaison with state and local lawenforcement agencies. The FBI co-ordinates efforts with other U.S.government agencies to train fed-eral, state, and local emergency re-sponse personnel to deal with ter-rorist events involving weapons ofmass destruction. Over the next 5years, this initiative will support thetraining of emergency responders inapproximately 120 cities, selectedaccording to population density, up-coming large-scale security events,

critical infrastructure, and geo-graphic orientation. Workshops andseminars include 1 week of trainingcurriculum that addresses variouslevels of instruction.

To further facilitate this majoroutreach effort, the FBI has estab-lished a National Domestic Pre-paredness Office (NDPO). TheNDPO will serve as a clearinghousefor information on weapons of massdestruction training programs andwill work to spur development ofother national preparedness assis-tance initiatives.

CONCLUSION

Terrorism has become a world-wide problem, and a major threat toU.S. national security. FBI Director

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

ederal law enforcement efforts received asignificant boost in the fight against terror-

fight against terrorism. Additionally, the omni-bus law broadened federal jurisdiction overcrimes linked to terrorism and included newfederal criminal statutes for participating ininternational terrorist activities in America.

A key provision of the law authorizes thesecretary of state, in conjunction with theattorney general and the secretary of the trea-sury, to designate an organization as a foreignterrorist organization (FTO). By designating anFTO under the law, the United States seeks tohinder the fund-raising ability of terroristorganizations. The law allows law enforcementto seize the funds of designated terrorist organi-zations. Because FTO branches within theUnited States function primarily as fund-raisingarms for the overseas parent organization, thelaw could have a significant impact on theirterrorist activities within the United States.

Fism with the passage of The Antiterrorism andEffective Death Penalty Act of 1996.7 This law,enacted and signed by President Clinton onApril 24, 1996, includes several new measuresaimed at countering terrorism. Highlights of thelaw include measures that enhance the powersof the federal government to deny visas toindividuals belonging to groups designated asterrorist and that simplify the process fordeporting aliens convicted of crimes. The newlaw also bans all U.S. aid to countries thatprovide assistance or military equipment toterrorist states, allows U.S. citizens to sueforeign nations in federal court for terrorist actscommitted against U.S. nationals abroad, andauthorizes approximately $1 billion over 4 yearsto strengthen federal law enforcement in the

Louis J. Freeh has stated that lawenforcement agencies must doeverything within their powerto prevent terrorist incidentsfrom occurring.6

The FBI remains committed toits leadership in counterterrorism—a vital part in maintaining the secu-rity of the United States. The stepsfederal, state, and local law enforce-ment take today will strengthenthe fight against terrorism in the21st century. Effective means ofidentifying and preventing terroristacts before they occur, enhanced

communication and liaison withvarious levels of law enforcement,close cooperation with agencies ofthe federal government, timely dis-semination of threat information,and effective analysis of trends anddevelopments have better preparedthe law enforcement community inaddressing terrorist threats. Withthe continued cooperation of lawenforcement at all levels, the FBIwill continue to enhance its abilityto protect the American peoplefrom the threat of international anddomestic terrorism.

Endnotes1 Officially classified acts of terrorism

include four attacks in 1993, no attacks in1994, one attack in 1995, three attacks in 1996,and two attacks in 1997.

2 U.S. Department of Justice, FBI,Terrorism in the United States: 1996 (Washing-ton, DC: FBI, 1998), 5.

3 U.S. Department of Justice, FBI,Terrorism in the United States: 1997 (Washing-ton, DC: FBI, in press).

4 U.S. Department of Justice, FBI,Terrorism in the United States: 1982-1992

(Washington, DC: FBI, 1992), 14.5 Ibid., 8.6 “What Can Be Done About Terrorism?”

USA Today Magazine, January 1996, 24.7 Public Law 104-132.

T he FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin staffinvites you to communicate with us

via e-mail. Our Internet address [email protected].

We would like to know your thoughts oncontemporary law enforcement issues. We

welcome your comments, questions, andsuggestions. Please include your

name, title, and agency on alle-mail messages.

Also, the Bulletin is availablefor viewing or downloading ona number of computer services,as well as the FBI’s homepage. The home page addressis http://www.fbi.gov.

The Bulletin’sE-Mail Address


he bombing of the NewYork City World TradeCenter in 1993 proved once

such as New York, Miami, and Chi-cago remained the most likely tar-gets. However, the reality thatAmericans could perpetrate terror-ist acts on their fellow citizens intheir own country became apparentin Oklahoma City on April 19,1995. Any previous abstract law en-forcement perceptions about ter-rorism dissipated in the aftermathof the Oklahoma City explosion.For state and local law enforce-ment, perspectives concerningdomestic terrorism and the need

for effective antiterrorism effortschanged forever.

A study sponsored by the Na-tional Institute of Justice (NIJ) con-firmed that state and local law en-forcement agencies view the threatof terrorism as real, but their re-sponse to the threat varies widelyaccording to the size and resourcesof the department and the nature ofthe threat in any given community.1

In the past, major cities developedpreventive and preparation pro-grams, often in cooperation with the

March 1999 / 11

Tagain that law enforcement cannotignore the threat of terrorism onAmerican soil. Yet, after that trag-edy, most state and local law en-forcement administrators stillviewed terrorism primarily as an in-ternational threat. While the NewYork bombing proved that foreign-inspired mass terrorism could occuron U.S. soil, many administratorsbelieved that metropolitan centers

Confronting Terrorismon the State and Local LevelBy D. DOUGLAS BODRERO

Alfred P. Murrah FederalBuilding in Oklahoma City


FBI and its joint terrorism taskforces, whereas smaller cities andcounties usually operated on theirown. According to the NIJ report,antiterrorism resources varied ac-cording to the existing threat poten-tial. Some smaller jurisdictions de-veloped regional alliances toaddress specific extremist groupsand organizations operating withinlocales.2 However, the majority ofjurisdictions only recently realizedthe threat presented by extremist in-dividuals and groups and now as-sess the threat that such groups maypose to their respective communi-ties and to related operational plan-ning and readiness issues.

AN INCREASE INEXTREMIST ACTIVITY

Unable to pinpoint an exacttime or incident to account for theresurgence of extremist activitywithin the United States, some re-searchers speculate that the end ofthe Cold War left American patriotswithout an enemy. Emotions and

rhetoric previously directed towardthe fear of a communist takeoverbecame replaced by a fear that theUnited Nations, backed by a covertgroup of industrialists, sought tocreate a new world order marked bya centralization of power andwealth. Some individuals believethat the passage of gun control leg-islation fanned the flames of anti-government sentiment, or they at-tribute this attitude to the growingpower and influence of the federalgovernment, with diminishing con-trol of state and local authorities.Other researchers point to thespread of the Christian IdentityMovement and its religious-basedbeliefs in the superiority of theAryan race. Additionally, docu-mentation exists showing that theright-wing extremist movementgrew out of the farm crises of the1970s.3

Reviewing a list of individualsand groups indicted for recentterrorist-related incidents estab-lishes common characteristics that

comprise the current terrorist move-ment. Adherents often move fromone group or movement to anotherand may hold multiple member-ships. Major movement themes in-clude white supremacy, althoughoften denied, and an advocacy ofthe violent takeover of a govern-ment that a group believes is corruptand conspiring to deprive them oftheir Second Amendment protec-tions. Whatever their philosophyand makeup, such groups appearto encourage and reinforce oneanother.

Holding an extreme view on anissue is not uncommon or illegal.When that belief turns radical andthose individuals holding suchviews violate the law, attempt toforce their will on others, or ad-vocate and engage in violence, alllevels of law enforcement shouldbecome involved.

CHANGING PRIORITIES

While international terrorismreceived the bulk of media attentionduring the 1980s, a concurrentgrowth in the variety of national,right-wing extremist organizationstook place.4 The death of GordonKahl, a staunch member of theSheriff’s Posse Comitatus killed ina firefight with state and federal of-ficers in northwest Arkansas,marked the beginning of a newmove toward violence among right-wing extremist groups.5 The emer-gence of the Sheriff’s Posse Comi-tatus; the Covenant, Sword, andArm of the Lord; the Arizona Patri-ots; the White Patriot Party; andother right-wing extremist groupschallenged assumptions aboutterrorism as the exclusive tool of

“

”

The FBI’s activitiescannot succeed

without cooperationand assistancefrom local lawenforcement

agencies.

Mr. Bodrero currently serves as a senior research associate with theInstitute for Intergovernmental Research, a nonprofit, Florida-basedcriminal justice research organization, and is the former commissioner ofpublic safety for the state of Utah. Mr. Brodero is a member of the IACP.

violent leftists and forced law en-forcement to reevaluate and re-examine previously perceivednotions regarding the motivation ofterrorists.

In the 1980s and early 1990s,with most left-wing extremist orga-nizations in disarray and emergingviolent right-wing extremist groupseffectively neutralized by the FBI,most state and local law enforce-ment remained untouched by thethreat of right-wing violence. Thesame time period also introducedincreasing concerns and responsi-bilities for state and local law en-forcement. The war on drugs andthe increasing violence posed bystreet gangs, as well as the resultingstruggle to meet the demand for lawenforcement services, rapidly filledthe gap left by the diminishingstreet unrest and the reduced threatfrom the extreme left. However, thereprieve from domestic terrorismwas short-lived. By the early 1990s,a new movement of domestic terrorhad started, and by the middle of the1990s, violent right-wing extrem-ists obviously still existed in theUnited States.

TERRORISMOR EXTREMISM

Although experts have at-tempted to explain the phenom-enon, many definitions of terrorismexist. One such definition is “pre-meditated, politically motivatedviolence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnationalgroups or clandestine agents, usu-ally intended to influence an audi-ence.”6 In other terms, terrorists in-tend for their acts to infuriate thepublic and cause outrage. They

sometimes use violence and blood-shed to accomplish these objec-tives. Referring to the pipe bombexplosion at the 1996 SummerOlympic Games, one author statedthat “there is a grim economy to theway a terrorist works, born of a darkarithmetic: fear rises exponen-tially.”7 Portraying a government asineffective and unable to providesecurity for its citizens remains animportant objective of terrorism.

Extremism is even more diffi-cult to define. Many individualsharbor excessive views concerningsubjects they consider important. Ifnot for the violent activities of someindividuals or groups, right-wingextremists merely would be exercis-ing their right to free speech. Ex-tremists become terrorists whenthey act on their beliefs through un-lawful violent acts in order to influ-ence or intimidate others into ac-cepting their viewpoints.

For state and local law enforce-ment administrators, terrorist orga-nizations, right-wing extremists,and hate groups all generate thesame problems and produce thesame amount of pressure for a reso-lution. Law enforcement efforts and

resources should concentrate on thecriminality of actions, not culture orphilosophy. While law enforcementmay need to monitor groups thatadvocate the use of violence toachieve their objectives, agenciesshould apply the labels of terroristand extremist with restraint.8

STATE AND LOCALLAW ENFORCEMENT

Although the FBI assumes thelead federal role in the investigationand prevention of domestic terror-ism, every act of terrorism occur-ring within the United States re-mains local in nature. Such acts, andthe threat thereof, fall within thepurview of state and local law en-forcement and present significantchallenges, far removed from thedaily concerns, priorities, and op-erational considerations of most po-lice administrators.

FBI activities cannot succeedwithout cooperation and assistancefrom local law enforcement agen-cies. Local police officers anddeputy sheriffs, along with troopersand state investigators, sense thediscontent among terrorist move-ments, monitor the advocacy of ex-treme causes, respond to hatecrimes, and serve as the foundationfor an effective assessment ofthreatening activities within theircommunities. In all probability,state or local law enforcement offi-cers will respond first to a terroristthreat or incident. However, stateand local administrators should re-member that the FBI’s unique rolein the nation’s counterterrorismefforts makes it a critical com-ponent in any terrorism-relatedinvestigation.

March 1999 / 13

“The preventionand response

to terrorist actsrequire unified

efforts.

”


cal attacks.10 Disagreement existsconcerning the level of threat, butadministrators agree that the need toprepare and plan for the possibilityof an incident occurring in any ju-risdiction, regardless of location orsize, remains strong.

By creating a domestic terror-ism planning process at the stateand local level, administrators canrespond better to a terrorist incidentand also help to identify and preventan incident from occurring. First,law enforcement officers must rec-ognize a domestic terrorism threat.Next, as with other important lawenforcement challenges, agenciesshould develop a state of readinessto prevent, deter, and interdict ter-rorist attacks. Planning, an essentialstep, should include identifying po-tential threats and those areas thatmay be vulnerable to attack, main-taining an inventory of relevantagency resources, and creating in-teragency agreements. Such agree-ments should include informationexchange, planning oversight, asurvey of available resources,and formal involvement in an

incident command structure. Agen-cies also should engage in contin-gency planning to prepare for “whatif” scenarios by exploring the vari-ous alternatives for attack in a par-ticular jurisdiction. An effectiveplanning effort also includes anenhanced ability for multiagencyresponse.

The success of the planningprocess depends on the establish-ment of a planning team. The teamshould include a variety of per-sonnel, including senior agencyadministrators, investigative com-manders, agency or jurisdictionalprosecutors or legal advisors, sen-ior representatives from local emer-gency services providers (e.g., firedepartments, rescue squads, haz-ardous material teams), ambulanceor hospital representatives, stateemergency workers, and local FBIand Bureau of Alcohol, Tobaccoand Firearms personnel. Other fed-eral agency representatives mayhave interest in a particular juris-diction. For example, Departmentof Energy representatives, if a facil-ity is located in their jurisdiction,or Department of Defense person-nel, where military facilities arepresent, also should have repre-sentation on the team. Agenciescan plan team participation aslimited or as broad as possible,however, as a general rule, teamsshould involve as many agenciesand individuals as feasible. If theplanning team becomes too large,the formation of subcommittees ad-dressing individual specific re-quirements of the plan may proveeffective.

The planning team should ar-ticulate the elements of the plan,

PLANNING

At first glance, the threat of do-mestic terrorism and the scope ofpotential methods and targets mayappear overwhelming. Activity byright-wing extremist groups has re-mained difficult to assess becauseof the cell-type structure and otherclandestine tactics many groupshave adopted and the fact that mostgroups operate in rural areas. Prob-lems have appeared to increasesince the Oklahoma City bombing.Klanwatch—a project of the non-profit Southern Poverty Law Centerthat attempts to curb Klan and racistviolence through litigation, educa-tion, and monitoring—reported that“[t]here were 858 groups operatingin the United States in 1996, a 6percent increase over the 809groups noted in 1994 and 1995.”9

Although others who track ex-tremist activity acknowledge thedifficulty when determining thelevel of threat, a concern for futureactivity remains. The same report,along with numerous others, warnsof increased violence, including thepossibility of biological and chemi-

which should include, at a mini-mum, the following:

• the chain of command;

• command and control (aneffective incident commandsystem also would address thisand other planning needs);

• the overall purpose of the plan,including a definition of whatincidents or elements the planintends to cover;

• individual contingency eventplans;

• notification procedures;

• investigative and intelligenceguidelines;

• media planning;

• emergency public notificationplans;

• personnel and equipmentdatabases;

• volunteer coordination; and

• a process for keeping the planupdated.

Not only will such a planning pro-cess assist in preparing for an event,but the planning steps themselvescan enhance working relationships,establish mutual priorities, and iden-tify and analyze the risk and vulner-abilities. Agencies also should havea process for evaluating the plan’seffectiveness. The FBI, as well asother federal, state, and local partici-pants, should have roles in review-ing, updating, and continually as-sessing the finished product. Tomaximize the effectiveness of thisprocess, the planning team requiresthe support and endorsement of keyadministrative officials and electedgovernment leaders.

THREAT ASSESSMENT

Addressing the threat of do-mestic terrorism should include as-sessing and separating lawful, con-stitutionally protected rhetoricfrom criminal threats. To accom-plish this difficult and sensitivetask, agencies should initiate a for-mal process of threat assessment—“an intelligence-based methodol-ogy whereby situations, circum-stances, or conditions are re-searched and evaluated....”11 Thevast majority of individuals whohold strong extremist beliefs poseno real threat to law enforcement or

one side of the equation, the crimi-nal activity and accompanyingthreats made by such groups andindividuals require that they main-tain a secretive existence. However,for effectiveness and to gain publicsupport while maintaining their fol-lowers, most organizations sponsorpublic meetings and seminars. Lawenforcement personnel can attendsuch public meetings to monitorand assess the threat potential orseriousness of the proposed actions.Still, administrators should exercisecaution to avoid opening investiga-tions based on beliefs alone. If,however, those beliefs encourage orelicit others to commit violence toaccomplish extremist objectives,then a legitimate law enforcementinterest exists. Focus always shouldremain on criminal actions, notmere advocacy or impassionedpleas for legitimate action to correctperceived wrongs.

Target Identification

Another contributing factor inthreat assessment is target identifi-cation. Targets generally followbroad categories based on the mo-tives of the group or on the indi-vidual planning the attack. Domes-tic groups, including right-wing,issue-oriented, radical organiza-tions and separatists, often choosetargets for a specific purpose. Tar-gets normally fall into five broadcategories, some that overlap, de-pending on the motives of thoseplanning the attack.12

Symbolic or public messagetargets represent the first, the mostcommon, and by far the largest, cat-egory. These may include promi-nent landmarks, electrical utilities,

March 1999 / 15

“Law enforcementefforts and

resources shouldconcentrate on

the criminality ofactions, not culture

or philosophy.

”society. Most remain content withespousing inflammatory rhetoricand attending meetings, rallies, andexhibitions to reinforce their ex-tremist beliefs. Distinguishing be-tween the individuals and groupswho advocate extreme views andthose who advocate harm becomesthe challenge that law enforcementagencies must address effectively.

A close examination, however,reveals a dichotomy both in phi-losophy and rhetoric that can aid inthe threat assessment process. On

pipelines, state and local govern-ment buildings, universities, certainfederal government buildings, andbusinesses and industries involvedin such areas as chemical produc-tion, animal research, forest orwood products, and refineries.

The second category includesgovernment-owned or -operated fa-cilities. These consist of tunnels,computer facilities, airports, statecapitols, bridges and overpasses,maritime facilities (e.g., locks andharbors), and law enforcementbuildings and support structures.

The third category involvesmilitary targets (e.g., military bases,museums, and testing facilities).While generally more secure thanother potential targets, these offeran immense opportunity to embar-rass the military and the U.S. gov-ernment.

Cyber targets comprise thefourth category of potential targets.An enormous psychological impactcould result from targeting utilities,hacking into their networks andcontrol systems, and shutting themdown. Other potential cyber targetsinclude air traffic control centers,financial networks, utility distribu-tion networks, emergency 9-1-1centers, and other vital services thatrely on computer-operated controlsystems and networks.13

Individual victims represent thefifth and last major target category.Kidnapping, extortion, assassina-tion, and other human target attacksaccomplish terrorist objectives.While intimidation remains themost common tactic used againstindividuals to gain compliance, do-mestic terrorists continue to employviolence. Individuals most likely

targeted include elected govern-ment officials, law enforcementpersonnel, tax collectors, courtclerks, members of the judiciaryand prosecution systems, and fami-lies in each of these categories.14

Threat assessment in this area re-quires not only evaluation of theindividual or group making thethreat but also an assessment ofthe vulnerability of the potentialvictim.

INTELLIGENCE

Complicated and legally chal-lenging intelligence issues surroundthe deterrence of domestic terror-ism. Each agency should contact itsrespective legal advisor and reviewdepartment policies for guidance.Many terrorist groups rely on theconstitutionally protected rights ofadvocacy and assembly. Therefore,determining the curiosity seekers,followers, and those who may advo-cate violence requires an intelli-gence assessment of known and ob-served activities. For resourceconsiderations, law enforcementshould carefully analyze the ex-tremists’ activities for evidence ofcriminal conduct. Content with theopportunity to publicly expound

their beliefs, some movement lead-ers may not pose a threat. Manymovement followers who may notunderstand the objectives of thegroup, much less their radical solu-tions, also may not pose a threat. Infact, most extremist leaders talkmore about their various complaintsthan about their radical solutionsso that they will not lose theirfollowers.

Dependent upon the nature ofthe advocacy and associated ac-tions, law enforcement should fo-cus only on those groups that indi-cate intent to commit violent action.The Regional Information SharingSystem (RISS), a regionalized in-formational exchange networkimplemented by the Bureau of Jus-tice Assistance, offers relevant ana-lytical information disseminationservices, as do many state informa-tion systems. There are numerousInternet sites dedicated to the ex-tremist movement that individualscan access without violation of lawor policy. The U.S. Department ofJustice presently is developingGuidelines for Online Investiga-tions by Federal Law EnforcementAgents. Additionally, many groupswill discuss openly their objectiveswith anyone willing to listen, in-cluding law enforcement officials.Officers should review their agen-cies’ policies and consult depart-ment legal advisors before imple-menting intelligence coverage.

TRAINING

After the Oklahoma City bomb-ing, agencies began to ask, “Can ithappen in our jurisdiction?” and “Ifit does, what would we do?” Un-fortunately, except in the largest


“...agencies shoulddevelop a state of

readiness to prevent,deter, and interdictterrorist attacks.

”

metropolitan centers, agencies offervery little terrorism training otherthan civil disturbance and specialweapons and tactical training.Training initiated after 1995 con-centrates mainly on preparation andresponse. The Federal EmergencyManagement Agency (FEMA) pro-vides limited funding to state emer-gency management agencies. Thisfunding is used primarily on orien-tation training for first responders,including law enforcement agen-cies. The FEMA training focusesmostly on the roles and duties ofvarious responding agencies, stress-ing the need for emergency agen-cies to work toward a unified re-sponse. As part of this effort, somestates include limited discussionsof threat potential and awarenessissues.

While response to an incident iscritical, prevention of the act re-mains preferable. Antiterrorism(pre-incident) training involvespreparation and response consider-ations in an effort to prevent vio-lence from occurring in the firstplace. To maximize training time,available courses should assist stateand local agencies in understandingthe nature of extremists and theirorganizations to better assess theirpotential for violence. Agenciesshould disseminate useful informa-tion concerning the history and evo-lution of the right-wing extremistmovement. Additionally, law en-forcement should become familiarwith current trends and activities tomake informed interpretations ofpotential extremist activities.

Departments should discuss is-sues concerning the various terror-ism roles and responsibilities of law

enforcement agencies at all levels.Terrorist and extremist organiza-tions and individuals span jurisdic-tional boundaries, and the investi-gation and deterrence of criminalactivities associated with such indi-viduals strongly suggest amultijurisdictional approach. Thetraining and adaptation of other suc-cessful multiagency investigativeefforts apply in the investigation ofterrorist groups and individuals.Additionally, a review of the legalissues surrounding privacy and in-telligence guidelines and the adop-tion of formal intelligence, investi-gative case initiation, andcase-closing policies remain criticalfactors in any training effort. Issuesof surveillance assessment, as wellas an understanding of the psychol-ogy and profile of an extremist indi-vidual or group, also remain impor-tant. As with any complex criminalactivity, training becomes criticalfor developing both an effective ap-proach and a better understanding

of the problem. The Bureau of Jus-tice Assistance, in consultation andcooperation with the FBI, devel-oped an antiterrorism training pro-gram specifically addressing theneeds of state and local law enforce-ment—an effort that has provenbeneficial.

CONCLUSION

Assessing the nationwide do-mestic terrorism threat is difficult.Neither the movements nor the so-lutions are defined easily. However,one fact remains—successful anti-terrorism and counterterrorism ef-forts require the full participationand cooperation of law enforcementat all levels. Critical ingredients tosuccess include coordinated plan-ning, intelligence sharing, and aunified, informed response to ter-rorist threats. The prevention andresponse to terrorist acts requireunified efforts.

While Americans should notlive in fear, they need to recognize

March 1999 / 17


and respond to the threat that terror-ism presents to the United States.“The United States is the target ofthe future,” and “terrorism is agreater threat to democracy thancommunism or socialism everwere”15 represent views articulatedby many individuals. All levels oflaw enforcement must implementeffective antiterrorism efforts incombating this threat to ensure thesafety of all American citizens andtheir communities. After all, thevery foundation of democracy re-lies on freedom from fear, terror-ism, and terrorist activities.

Endnotes1 Kevin Riley and Bruce Hoffman, Domestic

Terrorism, A National Assessment of State and

Local Law Enforcement Preparedness (SantaMonica: Rand Corporation, National Instituteof Justice, 1995).

2 Ibid.3 Mark Pitcavage, Ph.D., Common Law and

Uncommon Courts: An Overview of the

Common Law Movement (Tallahassee: Institutefor Intergovernmental Research, 1997).

4 Brent L. Smith, Terrorism in America:

Pipe Bombs and Pipe Dreams (New York:State University of New York Press, 1994).

5 Ibid.6 United States Code, Title 22.7 Pico Iyer, “Lost Magic, Terror at the

Games,” Time, August 5, 1996, 21.8 Richard Fairburn, “Labeling Terrorism,”

Police Marksman, July/August 1995, 41.9 “Officials Bolster Action vs. Far Right”

USA Today, March 5, 1997, Sec. Nation.10 Ibid.11 Ed Higgins, Threat Assessments and the

Antigovernment Extremist, presentation at theState and Local Antiterrorism TrainingProgram, Colorado Springs, Colorado, April1997.

12 Stephen Bowman, When the Eagle

Screams: America’s Vulnerability to Terrorism

(New York: Birch Lane Press, 1994).13 Ibid.14 Ibid.15 Ibid.

Wanted:Photographs

he Bulletin staff isalways on the lookoutT

for dynamic, law enforce-ment-related photos forpossible publication in themagazine. We are interestedin photos that visually depictthe many aspects of the lawenforcement profession andillustrate the various taskslaw enforcement personnelperform.

We can use either black-and-white glossy or colorprints or slides, although weprefer prints (5x7 or 8x10).Appropriate credit will begiven to contributing photog-raphers when their workappears in the magazine. Wesuggest that you send dupli-cate, not original, prints aswe do not accept responsibil-ity for prints that may bedamaged or lost. Send yourphotographs to:

Brian Parnell, ArtDirector, FBI LawEnforcement Bulletin,FBI Academy, MadisonBuilding 209, Quantico,VA 22135.

hese two observations also could apply to othercatastrophic events, including terrorist attacks,

March 1999 / 19

Critical IncidentManagement in theUltimate CrisisBy Joel Carlson, M.S.

Focus on Counterterrorism

“I’ve learned that emergencies can only bemanaged by people at the site. They can’t bemanaged back in Washington.”1

“Expect the unexpected and be prepared toadjust accordingly. The importance of limitingthose things that any executive should attemptto do in the time allowed, and the importance ofcarefully choosing one’s battles, is implicit in thefact that some of the toughest of those battleswill be chosen for you.”2

—Government officials following the1979 accident at the Three Mile

Island nuclear power facility.

that have plagued the United States for the pastseveral years. The International Association of Chiefsof Police defines a disaster as an incident that threat-ens to or actually takes lives, causes substantial riskto property or the well-being of the community or asegment of that community, or requires a commitmentof resources beyond those normally available.3 Suchincidents may become more frequent and deadly ascriminals and terrorist groups exploit the availabilityof chemical substances, biological agents, and nuclearmaterials to construct weapons of mass destruction.Reasons for accessibility include the increasedvolume and types of substances produced, the failureof security systems to protect the materials, the

T

Photo © Jeanetta Clark


transfer of prohibited weapons to irresponsiblegovernments, or the proliferation of various materialsto countries that previously did not perceive a needfor sophisticated weaponry.

The criminal use of chemical, biological, ornuclear materials could result in a disaster unparal-leled in U.S. history and test the government’s abilityto avoid panic, disorientation, and loss of confidencein ensuring the public’s safety. The specter of terroristacts with catastrophic consequences remains of greatconcern to those individuals charged with combatingsuch attacks. Leaders in the public emergency re-sponse and management sectors may face situationsthat could consume their processes, procedures, andcapabilities. Emergency personnelmay exhaust their experience,devotion, training, and capabilityattempting to protect the publicfrom potentially catastrophic anddevastating consequences. Whatcritical incident managementprocedures are available fordealing with such incidents?

UNDERSTANDINGTHE FEDERAL ROLE

Within the federal government,systems exist that will respond toassist local, county, and stategovernments in mitigating the impact of a threat oractual misuse of weapons of mass destruction(WMD).

• The FBI serves as the lead federal agency forresolving a crisis perpetrated by a malevolentelement in a WMD incident occurring within theUnited States and its territories.

• The Federal Emergency Management Agency(FEMA) supports the FBI by coordinatingconsequence management (e.g., evacuationplanning or search and rescue efforts) of a WMDincident. However, because crisis and conse-quence management may occur at the same timeand require close coordination, the FBI remainsthe lead federal agency until the attorney generaltransfers that role to FEMA.

• The U.S. Department of State is the lead agencyin coordinating U.S. resources in response to aWMD incident in a foreign country should thatgovernment request such assistance.

• The U.S. Department of Defense provides spe-cialized technical resources to assist in themitigation of WMD devices or the consequencesof their misuse, to supply logistical support toother federal responders, and to furnish additionalassistance as defined by the situation and directedby the President.

• The U.S. Department of Energy provides techni-cal and scientific assistance to locate hidden

nuclear material; to diagnose asuspected, improvised nucleardevice; to plan the disablement ofa nuclear yield or radiologicaldispersal device; and to adviselocal authorities on the hazardsand effects.

• The Public Health Service andthe Centers for Disease Controland Prevention respond withtechnical and scientific personneland equipment to assist in themitigation of the health concernsthat could arise from variousaspects of WMD misuse.

• Other federal agencies will respond with person-nel and resources if the threat or attack requirestheir unique resources or jurisdictional authority.

Because criminal misuse or the threat of misuseof chemical, biological, or nuclear materials on adomestic target poses the ultimate managementchallenge for public safety agencies and governmentleaders, these federal responders will complement,and in many cases supplement, the resources of cities,counties, and states. While managing this multiagencyresponse proves difficult, good planning, practice, andpatience make it achievable.

MANAGING THE CRISIS

Generally, two ways exist to manage a crisis. Oneinvolves ignoring the need to define a command

“

”

...a presidentialdirective designates

the FBI as thelead agency of allfederal resources.

structure before a crisis occurs and then being forcedto create such a structure during the incident. Thisroute requires that onsite command or managementpersonnel create a working incident structure whilesimultaneously attempting to manage the crisis. Therisk of creating additional crises in the midst ofmanaging one is almost guaranteed. The secondoption involves defining the incident command,coordination, communication, and operationaldirection.

The unified command and control of the incident,the setting of strategic and tactical goals, and theintegration of resources from all responding agenciesdetermine the effectiveness and efficiency of thegovernment response. Therefore, the most pressingquestion for emergency man-agement professionals is howthey can direct resources frommany agencies of differentdisciplines at all levels ofgovernment in a meaningfuland coordinated way to addressa potential technical disasterand maintain the confidence ofthe citizens who may becomethe victims. At the same time,these professionals face addi-tional crisis managementdifficulties, including changingmanagement objectives,differing value systems, politi-cal harassment, too little data, too much data, poordata-handling methods, little planning, insufficienttime to learn, confusion, and fatigue.4 What shouldthese crisis managers do?

The Incident Command System

The Incident Command System (ICS), whichmany fire, police, and emergency managementagencies have used since its inception in 1970, mayhold some of the answers. The ICS requires planningand practice on the part of the participating agencies.Unfortunately, it is impossible for the various emer-gency response agencies at all levels of government todevelop and practice plans with one another toaddress the uncountable scenarios in the thousands of

different venues across the United States. However,an application of ICS to accommodate different levelsof response represents an alternative to this maze ofpotential pairings of responding agencies. Through awell-developed ICS, state and local governments canalert their state, local, and county response agenciesand deploy them under the predefined ICS, thusensuring that a unified command and response teamimmediately begins to address the crisis and itsconsequences.

The Joint Operations Center

In response to a domestic misuse of weapons ofmass destruction incident, a presidential directivedesignates the FBI as the lead agency of all federal

resources. To facilitate thisresponsibility, the FBI em-ploys a joint operations center(JOC), a concept similar tothat of the state-level ICS.This center coordinatesinteragency operational andsupport needs of the deploy-ment and manages jointagency public information andmedia interaction. The federalagencies that respond to suchincidents have worked withthe FBI in exercises and drillsbased on the JOC concept.Commanders from the various

responding federal and state agencies converge as ajoint operations command coalition to address criticaldecisions regarding incident resolution. The FBIdesignates a special agent in charge (SAC) to conveneand head this command group. The SAC may recom-mend technical and scientific actions with potentialcatastrophic consequences to higher federal authorityas required. The SAC also maintains a direct line ofcommunication to the FBI director and the attorneygeneral. The critical interfacing and coordinating ofstate and local operations with federal operations, andvice versa, occur through the various elements of theJOC. A close working relationship of all levels ofgovernment in this type of crisis management is notan option; it is essential.

March 1999 / 21


The ICS and JOC Interface

How does the JOC interface with the state andlocal ICS? Unification of command and integration ofoperations is critical. Specialized federal technicaland scientific resources can rely on the FBI, includingits personnel with whom they have practiced, for asingle format of decision making that remains thesame no matter which community hosts the incident.The local FBI office where the incident occurs holdsthe key to managing deployed federal personnel andresources and organizing the JOC. Already familiarwith state and local resources, these FBI offices mustbecome acquainted with the ICS response plans forthose states or communities within their regions. Thismelding of command and controlresources builds a bridge betweenthe federal JOC and the state ICS.

Moreover, the responsibilityfor initiating familiarizationbriefings and training programs atall government levels in this typeof crisis management rests equallywith state and FBI officials in thevarious regions. The designatedincident commanders of the stateor local ICS and the SAC of theJOC should work together throughexercises and drills prior to a realtest of their capabilities. Thesuccess of melding federal techni-cal and scientific resources, which are unknown tolocal and state responders, with state and localpersonnel and resources will occur only through themanagement skills of the state ICS incident com-manders and the SAC. For example, the managementof the Oklahoma City bombing incident illustrateshow the meaningful use of multiagency resourcessucceeded because of planning, preparation, and jointalliances. The former Oklahoma City chief of policenoted the importance of establishing relationshipswith federal authorities and the local fire chief beforea crisis because of the difficulty in doing so once thecrisis begins. The federal and local response willbecome a unified incident command at the time of acrisis only with cooperation and preplanning on alocal level between state ICS and FBI commanders.

Mr. Carlson, a certified protection professional of theAmerican Society for Industrial Security and retired FBIspecial agent, currently serves as a member of the techni-cal staff working on counterterrorism and criminal use ofnuclear materials issues at Sandia National Laboratoriesin Albuquerque, New Mexico. Mr. Carlson is a member ofthe IACP.

Predetermination of roles and responsibilities, crisistraining and exercising of personnel, and a desire toprepare for the unfathomable will permit this meldingof FBI and local crisis management resources. Afederal report emphasizes this point in two state-ments: “Unified command...is essential...to avoidchaos and coordinate tactical activities” and “[t]heissue of who is the primary agency in charge is not tobe determined on the emergency scene.”5

CONCLUSION

Preparation for managing a weapons of massdestruction incident first requires an appreciation ofthe magnitude of the potential consequences. Whenall involved responding agencies have that awesome

outcome in full focus, they willunderstand the truly essentialelements of planning, training,cooperation, liaison, resourcedefinition, and coherent publicpolicy implementation. Therefore,crisis managers cannot wait forsuch an incident to occur to perfecta process for handling the nextone. They must manage the firstevent intelligently and with ameaningful application of re-sources and leadership at all levelsof government.

Endnotes1 “Crisis Management: 10 Key Lessons from the Three Mile Island

Experience,” Public Affairs Review (1985): 26.2 Ibid.3 Critical Incident Management course, International Association of

Chiefs of Police, Alexandria, VA, 1991.4 Robert Kupperman, Facing Tomorrow’s Terrorist Incident Today

(Washington, DC: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1977).5 Report of the Joint Fire/Police Task Force on Civil Unrest

(Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency and the U.S.Fire Administration, 1994).

“

”

Crisis managerscannot wait for...

an incident to occurto perfect a process

for handling thenext one.

March 1999 / 23

n February 23, 1997, a 70-year-old Palestinian vis-ited the observation deck

FBI-New York City Police Depart-ment Joint Terrorism Task Force(JTTF) responded. Task force in-vestigators rushed to the scene toassist the local investigators. Thetask force command center opened,and the numerous agencies thatcomprise the task force immedi-ately began working to ascertain theshooter’s identity, his origin, andwhether he had any ties to orga-nized terrorist groups.

Within hours, the commandcenter had answers to these ques-tions. The FBI dispatched its LegalAttaché in Israel to the Gaza Strip tointerview the subject’s family. TheFBI and local police in Florida

interviewed several people whocould help track the subject’s move-ments while he lived in that state,fulfilling the residency require-ments he needed to purchase theweapon. This information, togetherwith the information supplied bythe task force command center, al-lowed investigators to quickly iden-tify the shooter and, more impor-tant, determine if the incident wasan act of international terrorism.

The task force concluded thatthe individual seemed mentally un-stable, expressed hatred of Israeland the United States, had no con-nection to any organized inter-national terrorist group, and had

Oof the Empire State Building.Shortly after arriving, he openedfire with a handgun that he had le-gally purchased just 1 month afterarriving in this country. He killed 1person and wounded 7 others beforekilling himself. A search of hisclothing revealed a long ramblingletter that expressed anti-U.S. andanti-Israel sentiments, along with aFlorida nondriver’s license identifi-cation card and a receipt for theweapon.

Immediately upon receivingnotification of this crime, the

The Joint TerrorismTask ForceA Concept That WorksBy ROBERT A. MARTIN



committed the attack alone. Thespeed with which the JTTF arrivedat this conclusion remains a testa-ment to the effectiveness of a jointtask force concept. Had the JTTFnot been in place, the investigationmay have taken days or weeks,rather than hours, to conclude.

History of the JTTF

In 1979, the New York City Po-lice Department (NYPD) first usedthe concept of combining federaland local law enforcement capabili-ties due to an overwhelming num-ber of bank robberies. Because theconcept proved valuable, adminis-trators eventually applied it to thecounterterrorism program. Prior tothe establishment of the JTTF, an adhoc task force of local and federalauthorities would form to investi-gate each new terrorist case.

The idea behind the establish-ment of the JTTF was a simple one.Once established, the task forcewould remain in place, becoming aclose-knit, cohesive unit capable of

addressing the complex problemsinherent in terrorism investigations.

Originally the JTTF began with11 members from the NYPD and 11FBI investigators. Today’s taskforce, 1 of 16 nationwide, includesmore than 140 members represent-ing numerous federal and localagencies, such as the U.S. MarshalsService, the U.S. Department ofState’s Diplomatic Security Ser-vice, the Bureau of Alcohol, To-bacco and Firearms, the Immigra-tion and Naturalization Service, theNew York State Police, the NewYork/New Jersey Port AuthorityPolice Department, and the U.S.Secret Service.

All agencies participating in theJTTF sign a formal memorandumof understanding that clearly statesthe task force’s two objectives:

• reactive: to respond to andinvestigate terrorist incidentsor terrorist-related criminalactivity; and

• proactive: to investigatedomestic and foreign terrorist

groups and individuals target-ing or operating within theNew York metropolitan areafor the purpose of detecting,preventing, and prosecutingtheir criminal activity.

Integration of Agencies

The key to the success of theJTTF concept remains the meldingof personnel from the various lawenforcement agencies into a singlefocused unit. All members of theJTTF must think and perform as ateam.

This concept best uses the indi-vidual skills and expertise of eachJTTF member. The benefits of thisintegration are innumerable. NYPDmembers bring the insight thatcomes from years of living andworking with the people in the city.These members typically have ad-vanced through careers from uni-formed precinct patrol to variousdetective duties before being as-signed to the JTTF.

The FBI special agents bringvast investigative experience fromassignments all over the world. TheFBI Legal Attachés remain of par-ticular benefit to the task force.These special agents, assigned toU.S. embassies throughout theworld, provide initial law enforce-ment information on JTTF interna-tional terrorism cases.

Each of the other participatingagencies similarly contributes itsown resources and areas of exper-tise to the JTTF. The integration ofthe many agencies, each bringing itsown unique skills and investigativespecialties to the task force, makesthis unit formidable in combatingterrorism.

“

”

The key to thesuccess of the JTTFconcept remains themelding of personnel

from the variouslaw enforcementagencies into a

single, focused unit.

Deputy Inspector Martin, New York City Police Department, serves on theFBI-NYPD Joint Terrorism Task Force. He is a member of the IACP.

March 1999 / 25

“...the task force wouldremain in place,

becoming a close-knit,cohesive unit capable

of addressing thecomplex problems

inherent in terrorisminvestigations.

”

Despite the obvious benefits ofthe JTTF, measuring the successand effectiveness of the unit is notalways as clear when judged by tra-ditional standards. Law enforce-ment officers who work on terror-ism-related investigations can laborfor months without producing theusual results often used to judge theefficiency of a functioning detec-tive squad (e.g., numbers of arrests,cases cleared, cases closed). Super-visors monitoring the productivityof the JTTF initially might not beimpressed with the numbers pro-duced, but such numbers can be de-ceiving. Opinions of the capabili-ties of the task force changedrapidly and dramatically on a day inFebruary 1993.

The World TradeCenter Bombing

On Friday, February 26, 1993, amassive explosion occurred in thepublic parking garage of the WorldTrade Center in New York City. Asa result of the explosion, 6 personswere killed, and more than 1,000injured. The site of the blast becameone of the largest crime scenes inNYPD history. Estimates showedproperty damage in excess of one-half billion dollars. The sense offear and panic in the city was pal-pable. Indeed, many in law enforce-ment thought of this investigationas the “case of the century.”

The JTTF stepped into themaelstrom and helped restore calmto the city. Within a month of theblast, the JTTF apprehended fourindividuals responsible for the at-tack. The suspects went on trial onSeptember 13, 1993. The trial lasted6 months with the presentation of

The quick action taken by theJTTF did much to allay fears andreturn a sense of normalcy to NewYork City. The World Trade Centerbombing will be remembered as thegravest attack of international ter-rorism to occur directly on Ameri-can soil. As part of the plot to strikeat the United States, these interna-tional terrorists intended to disruptthe dynamics of daily life, com-merce, and finance in one of themost heavily populated cities in the

United States. The suspect and hisassociates had hoped to kill up-wards of 35,000 innocent people.The excellent work accomplishedby the JTTF in investigating andsuccessfully resolving the case dis-pelled the sense of vulnerability theterrorists had hoped to instill.

Terrorist Groups

As the World Trade Center caseunfolded, investigators uncovered asecond, potentially far more deadlyplot—a threat posed by a radicalIslamic terrorist group. It soon be-came apparent that this groupplanned to strike out against theUnited States, and intended to com-mit these acts in the New York Cityarea. Investigation by the JTTF re-vealed that these individuals weremaking explosive devices and in-tended to use them on such targetsas the Lincoln and Holland tunnels,the United Nations headquartersbuilding, and the federal buildingthat houses the FBI New York FieldOffice.

On June 23, 1993, JTTF mem-bers raided the group’s safe houseand found its members makingbombs they planned to use duringsimultaneous attacks on the fourtargets. As a result of this investiga-tion, the JTTF made 15 arrests be-tween June 24 and August 23, 1993.The arrests prevented the groupfrom carrying out acts of plannedterrorism, including murders andbombings. The arrests also in-creased confidence in the ability oflaw enforcement, working in con-cert on the federal, state, and locallevel, to protect the lives and busi-nesses of the residents of New YorkCity.

204 witnesses and more than 1,000pieces of evidence. A jury con-victed the four defendants on March4, 1994, in federal court on all 38counts against them. On May 25,1994, a judge sentenced each of thefour defendants to 240 years inprison and a $250,000 fine. On Feb-ruary 7, 1995, authorities in Paki-stan arrested the prime fugitivewanted in connection with thebombing and subsequently ren-dered him to U.S. authorities. Thissuspect, the mastermind behind thebombing, was sentenced to 240years in prison on January 8, 1998.


Five of the 15 defendants plead-ed guilty or became governmentwitnesses. Ten of the defendantswent on trial in federal court onJanuary 9, 1995. On October 1 ofthat year, a jury found all 10 defen-dants guilty of a total of 25 criminalcharges. On January 17, 1996, thedefendants received sentencesranging from 35 years to life plus 65years.

Additional Successes

On July 17, 1996, TWA Flight800 crashed off the coast of LongIsland, New York, killing all 230people aboard the plane. Althoughultimately determined not to be anact of terrorism, initial speculationcentered on terrorism as one pos-sible cause of the crash, and the

safety of U.S. civil aviation wascalled into question. The sense offear grew among some air travelers.

Once again the JTTF ran theinvestigation. From the start, theFBI and the other members of theJTTF worked in tandem with theNational Transportation SafetyBoard. The FBI handpicked specialagents from terrorism squads towork on the investigation. Locallaw enforcement contributed re-sources, as well. The JTTF at-tempted to determine whether acriminal act brought down TWAFlight 800.

A 16-month exhaustive investi-gation followed. In that time period,investigators from the JTTF con-ducted more than 7,000 interviewsthat spanned from the shores of

Long Island to several foreign coun-tries. Investigators recovered ap-proximately 1 million pieces of theaircraft (about 96 percent of theplane), which bomb technicians andlaboratory personnel visually in-spected. All 230 victims were re-covered and subsequently identi-fied. Experts performed exhaustiveanalysis and explored all avenues ofpotential criminality to determine ifa bomb or missile could havecaused the explosion. The JTTFpursued every lead it found in thiscase. In the end, no evidence indi-cated that a criminal act caused theincident.

The JTTF concept again provedits worth. Months of delay in assem-bling a team and initiating liaisoncontacts with federal agencies were


March 1999 / 27

avoided because the mechanismsalready existed. The members of theJTTF took great pride in the thor-oughness of their investigation andin allaying the fears of the Ameri-can public that terrorism caused thistragedy.

The year 1997 proved to be abusy one for the JTTF, providingnew examples of the benefits thetask force concept brings to investi-gations. In addition to the EmpireState Building shooting, the yearwitnessed a terrorist threat in NewYork from an unconventionalweapon. In March 1997, the suspectof a mail-order fraud case invitedthe investigating detectives into hisresidence. The cluttered house con-tained a large cache of chemicals,gasoline, and fuel additives. Thesuspect told investigators that heused these products to make “superfuel” for the model airplanes that heraced. However, he offered no ex-planation for the far more ominouscanister clearly marked “Sarin Gas”that the detectives also found in thehouse. They immediately exited thehouse and called for hazardous ma-terials support personnel.

Sarin gas is a highly toxicchemical nerve agent. On March20, 1995, a Japanese terrorist groupdispersed Sarin gas in three Tokyosubway lines at the height of morn-ing rush hour. Twelve people diedas a result, and 5,500 people re-quired medical treatment.

Fearing that they had discov-ered a potential weapon of mass de-struction, the JTTF responded andconferred with ranking police andemergency management personnelon the scene. The NYPD’s elitehazardous materials team, the

Once the technical escort teamcontained the canister in its owncylinder, they boarded a militaryaircraft, which flew the team andtheir potentially deadly packageback to Aberdeen. Tests performedthere revealed the canister to beempty. The suspect had told investi-gators the truth—that he had la-beled the canister Sarin gas as ajoke. He was arrested on numeroustheft charges, the neighborhood re-turned to normal, and police, fire,and city officials breathed a sigh ofrelief. The incident proved a goodexercise for everyone involved andserved as another example of thecontacts and services the JTTF canprovide.

Conclusion

Since its inception, the FBI-NYPD JTTF has remained on theforefront of the war against terror-ism. The World Trade Centerbombing proved that Americanscould not view terrorism as amalady that affected only othercountries. That attack, as well as theOklahoma City bombing and thebombing at the 1996 SummerOlympics, awakened Americans tothe fact that terrorism had come tothe United States.

Today, 16 JTTFs stand ready todeter, counter, and respond to actsof terrorism. The FBI-NYPD JTTF,as well as the others throughout thecountry, remain dedicated to fight-ing terrorism and eliminating thefear and panic that terrorists relyon to advance their causes. Thecombining of federal, state, andlocal law enforcement resourceshas resulted in effective maximiza-tion of resources, the provision ofsophisticated investigative andtechnological resources, and link-age to all federal government re-sources in the United States andworldwide. The participating lawenforcement agencies, working asone, provide the needed know-ledge, skills, and resources essentialfor law enforcement agencies tosucceed in fighting the menace ofterrorism.

Emergency Service Unit (ESU), en-tered the house and safely containedthe canister. Because no facilities inthe city existed to safely performthe tests needed to identify the con-tents of the canister, the ESU trans-ported the canister to the NYPD’soutdoor range in the Bronx. TheJTTF followed established proce-dures and contacted the U.S. ArmyTechnical Escort Unit in Aberdeen,Maryland, which immediatelydispatched a team to the Bronxlocation.

The author gratefully acknowledgesNYPD Lt. John Haughie, DetectivesThomas Corrigan and Louis Napoli,FBI Special Agent John J. Liguori,and all of the members of the JTTFfor their significant contributions inpreparing this article.

“ ...the JTTFremains on theforefront of the

war againstterrorism.

”


Police Practice

group of business people returning fromlunch notices an unattended briefcase in the

for a bomb squad. After the officer learns that thenearest bomb squad is 250 miles away and will not beavailable for at least 4 hours, he informs the buildingmanager who becomes upset and demands that some-thing be done to resolve this major inconvenience.Faced with the distasteful duty of listening to theirritated manager for the next several hours, not tomention agreeing with the manager’s assessment thatthe briefcase probably contains nothing dangerous,the officer decides to take matters into his own hands.He gingerly picks up the briefcase and moves it out-side to lessen the inconvenience for the office work-ers and to make it more accessible to the bomb squad.

Such a scenario should sound somewhat familiarto anyone in the law enforcement community, espe-cially those serving on bomb squads. Variations onthis theme happen almost every time someone findsa suspect package, particularly if they find it in aninconvenient location. In this example, the officersafely resolved a potentially dangerous situation;however, without proper training, the officer may notbe so successful, or so lucky, with the next suspectpackage.

Aentryway of their building. Having heard about bombsleft in such circumstances, one group member callsthe local police and reports the suspicious briefcase.

An officer arrives at the scene and observes agrowing crowd of onlookers standing in the lobby,eyeing the briefcase, and carrying on a spirited debateabout who might have left it and whether they shouldbe concerned. The building manager arrives and tellsthe officer that it is probably nothing and asks howlong it will take to resolve. Unfortunately, theofficer’s ensuing actions are dangerously incorrectand the direct result of a preventable lack of propertraining.

After cautioning everyone to stand back, theofficer approaches the suspicious briefcase andexamines it, looking for anything that might provide aclue as to what it contains. Without the proper train-ing, however, the officer really has no idea what he islooking for or what to do if he finds something. Aftera cursory examination, the officer walks about 20 feetacross the lobby and uses his handheld radio to call

Bomb ThreatA Primer for theFirst ResponderBy T.C. Fuller

March 1999 / 29

TRAINING FIRST-RESPONDING OFFICERS

Today, society demands much from its lawenforcement officers. As a result, time for trainingbecomes a premium, constantly competing with theneed for officers to remain on the street. Therefore,very few officers ever receive any training on how toidentify and react to suspect packages. However, withthe increase in dramatic bombings in the UnitedStates and abroad over the last few years, mostdepartments should find the time to train their officersin handling such situations. Further, because first-responding patrol officers encounter these packagesmore often than any other law enforcement member,this lack of training becomes aserious safety issue when theseofficers suddenly face their firstsuspect package. Without propertraining, these officers and thecivilians they attempt to help couldbecome victims of these devices.

However, if first-respondingofficers have received even themost rudimentary training in basicimmediate reactions, they cangreatly reduce or eliminate anydanger presented by these devices.The fact that officers discoversuspect packages that have notdetonated prior to their arrivalconstitutes a victory for law enforcement. At thispoint, officers armed with basic knowledge abouthandling suspect packages can initiate an organized,professional response to lessen the danger to them-selves and to innocent bystanders. Most important,these informed officers know that no way exists fordetermining what will detonate an improvised explo-sive device (IED) until it has been examined. There-fore, their only safe course remains to assume that thedevice could detonate at any time for any reason.

Hands Off the Package

The most important rule in handling suspect pack-ages remains: DO NOT TOUCH the package. If at allpossible, officers should not approach suspect pack-ages; they should observe them from a distance—the

greater the distance the better. Officers should re-member that bomb squad personnel, with the benefitof specialized training and equipment, will notapproach a suspect package until one of them hasdonned a bomb suit and helmet, and they havegathered as much initial information as possible. Ifofficers must approach suspect packages, they shouldtry to take the same path as others who may haveapproached the packages before their arrival. Thesame caution remains when officers depart the area.Most important, officers should never approachsuspect packages solely for taking photographs. Whilephotographs of these packages are valuable to bomb

squad members, they rarely receivephotographs and, consequently, donot expect them.

Additionally, because suspectpackages can prove harmless,contain an actual device, or lureofficers into an ambush, officersmust remember the “street smarts”and survival tactics that theyemploy every day in their normalpolice duties. First responders—law enforcement officers,firefighters, emergency medicalworkers, and bomb disposalpersonnel—have been the targetsof bomb threats and IEDs in

foreign countries for several years. While instances ofsecondary devices placed specifically to target firstresponders have not become as common in the UnitedStates, officers must remain vigilant to this potentialthreat whenever they encounter suspect packages.

Clear the Area

In handling potential bomb situations, officersshould evacuate the area immediately and ensure thatno one reenters. Establishing an initial “exclusionarea” of a 300-foot radius constitutes a good rule tofollow. Officers can adjust the size of the area, ifneeded. They should consider the physical size of thepackage and the surrounding area. For example, asuspicious paper sandwich bag in the empty gunvault of a National Guard Armory may indicate that

“

”

The most importantrule in handling

suspect packagesremains: DO NOT

TOUCH thepackage.


officers probably could lessen the distance becausethe package is small and the surrounding area con-tains little, if any, dangerous material. Conversely,officers encountering a suspicious 24-foot movingvan in the center of an urban metropolis shouldincrease the exclusion area appropriately. In this case,such materials as glass from nearby buildings canbecome incorporated into the blast, creating lethalsecondary fragmentation that increases the destructivecapability of the IED. Therefore,suspect packages, regardless oftheir size, found near potentiallydangerous materials usuallyrequire a larger exclusion area. Forexample, officers discovering asmall suspect package next to alarge propane tank obviouslyshould expand the 300-footexclusion rule. Officers must usetheir common sense and remainalert to the many variables at thescene of suspect packages.

Moreover, during an evacua-tion, officers must plan the routesthat individuals will use to leave the area. Officersmust ensure that escape routes do not bring theseindividuals close to the device. Also, officers at thescene should request as many additional officers asneeded to clear and secure the area. Because thesescenes prove highly visible and attract many onlook-ers, including the media, getting individuals out andkeeping them out of these areas remain vital toensuring their safety.

Alert Emergency Personnel

Along with clearing the area, officers should alertfire and emergency medical personnel. Officersshould give these support units explicit instructionson how to approach the scene and where to wait. Incase the device detonates, officers must keep theseunits far enough away so that they do not becomeincapacitated, yet close enough to respond rapidly.Also, officers and bomb squad members must main-tain dependable communication with these personnel,even face-to-face contact, to ensure that all involvedservices understand the situation. Moreover, until fire

and medical emergency personnel arrive, bomb squadmembers will not approach a suspect package becausethey may need these services themselves if the devicedetonates.

Turn Off the Radios

Officers should curtail all radio use within 300feet of a suspected IED. Because all devices have afuse, and some employ an electric firing system, using

radio transmitters near such adevice risks providing it withenough electromagnetic energy todetonate. After bomb squadmembers conduct an initial recon-naissance, they can provideofficers with guidelines aboutusing radios at the scene.

Investigate the Scene

After officers have cleared thearea and alerted emergencypersonnel, they should initiate apreliminary investigation of thescene being careful not to reenter

the evacuated area. At this point, the area involvedhas become a potential crime scene and officersshould treat it as such. Patrol officers initiate crimescene investigations every day, and the standard rulesapply to the scenes of suspect packages or IEDs.Some measures, however, warrant special mention.

As soon as possible, officers should identify andsegregate witnesses and interview individuals whoactually saw the device. They should have witnessesdescribe the suspect package in detail, includingsketching the device. Because bomb squad memberswill want to speak with these individuals, they shouldstay near the scene. However, officers need to keepall witnesses apart from each other to prevent themfrom exchanging crucial information. Because everydetail, no matter how trivial it may seem, provesvitally important to bomb squad members, officersshould maintain the integrity of the eyewitnessaccounts.

Additional questions officers should ask wit-nesses include many similar to those they would askat other crime scenes.

“

”

Along with clearingthe area, officersshould alert fireand emergency

medical personnel.

• Has someone recently threatened the area oranyone associated with it?

• Does anyone have a grudge to settle that mightmanifest itself in such a manner?

• Who found the package? When?

• Has anyone approached the package? If so, bywhat route?

• Has anyone touched the package?

• Does anyone have any suspects?

• Do any of the suspects identified in the initialinvestigation have the knowledge to build sucha device?

To aid in their examination of suspect packages,bomb squad members will appreciate any informationthat first-responding officers can obtain. Further, oncethe squad renders the suspect package safe, investiga-tors conducting the follow-up investigation also willvalue this initial information, which may providemany of the answers they need.

CONCLUSION

Handling suspect packages remains one of themost hazardous law enforcement duties. Becausepatrol officers usually are the first to arrive at thescene of these packages, they need adequate trainingin how to identify and react to these situations.

When dealing with suspect packages, first-responding officers should observe the “assume theworst and hope for the best” rule. If these officersassume the worst and act accordingly, they can re-duce the risk of injury or death to themselves andthose around them. By employing such safeguards asnot approaching the suspect package, clearing the areasurrounding it, alerting emergency personnel, notusing their radios near the area, and initiating apreliminary investigation of the scene, first-respond-ing officers can resolve these potentially deadlysituations effectively and, most important, safely.

Special Agent Fuller serves in the Burlington, Vermont,Resident Agency of the FBI’s Albany Division.

March 1999 / 31

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GENERAL INFORMATION

The FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin is anofficial publication of the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation and the U.S. Department ofJustice.

Frequency of Publication: MonthlyPurpose: To provide a forum for the

exchange of information on law enforcement-related topics.

Audience: Criminal justice professionals,primarily law enforcement managers.

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Length: Feature article submissionsshould be 2,000 to 3,500 words (8 to 14 pages,double-spaced). Submissions for specializeddepartments, such as Police Practice, CaseStudy, and Perspective, should be 1,200 to2,000 words (5 to 8 pages, double-spaced).

Format: All submissions should bedouble-spaced and typed on 8 1/2- by 11-inchwhite paper. All pages should be numbered,and three copies should be submitted forreview purposes. When possible, an electronicversion of the article saved on computer diskshould accompany the typed manuscript.

References should be used when quoting asource exactly, when citing or paraphrasinganother person’s work or ideas, or whenreferring to information that generally is notwell known. Authors should refer to A Manualfor Writers of Term Papers, Theses, andDissertations, 6th ed., by Kate L. Turabian,for proper footnote citation format.

Research papers, reports, and studiesshould be revised to reflect the editorial needsof the Bulletin. Subheadings and lists shouldbe used to break up the text and providedirection to readers.

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Basis for Judging Manuscripts: Materialthat has been published previously or that isunder consideration by other magazines will bereturned to the author. Submissions will bejudged on the following points: Relevance toaudience, factual accuracy, analysis of infor-mation, structure and logical flow, style andease of reading, and length. Generally, articleson similar topics are not published within a 12-month period. Because the Bulletin is a govern-ment publication, favorable considerationcannot be given to articles that advertise aproduct or service.

Query Letters: Authors may submit aquery letter along with a detailed 1- to 2-pageoutline before writing an article. Editorial staffmembers will review the query to determinesuitability of topic. This is intended to helpauthors but does not guarantee acceptance ofany article.

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FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

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The Bulletin Notes

Law enforcement officers are challenged daily in the performance of their duties; they face eachchallenge freely and unselfishly while answering the call to duty. In certain instances, their actionswarrant special attention from their respective departments. The Bulletin also wants to recognizetheir exemplary service to the law enforcement profession.

Officers DavidRoss and LarryLescure of theWaverly, Tennes-see, Police Depart-ment responded toa report of a 14-year-old boytrapped in a rain-swollen creek. Theboy and his 13-year-old cousin

were playing on a utilities crossing when rushing water sweptthe boy into the creek. The force of the water took the boy down-stream, where his foot became stuck in a fallen tree. His cousinran to a nearby house and obtained a rope, which he threw to theboy who tied it around his body. Upon arrival, the officers sawthe boy’s head begin to slide beneath the water. They immedi-ately waded into the creek, freed the boy by removing his shoe,and carried him to safety. The selfless actions of Officers Rossand Lescure, along with his cousin’s quick thinking, saved theboy’s life.

Officer Ross Officer Lescure Sergeant Norwood

Sergeant Wayne Norwoodof the St. John the BaptistParish, Louisiana, Sheriff’sOffice responded to an accidentinvolving a vehicle that had goneover an embankment andcrashed into a swamp. SergeantNorwood, who has years ofdiving experience, arrived at thescene. Although he did not havehis diving equipment with him,he immediately dove into themurky water, which containedsnakes and alligators. After sev-eral dives, he located the vehicleand pulled the driver out of thewater. Tragically, the driver haddied as a result of the crash, butSergeant Norwood’s valiantefforts were greatly appreciatedby the victim’s family.

Deputy Peterson

While on patrol late one evening,Deputy Jack Peterson of the SevierCounty, Utah, Sheriff’s Office receiveda call about a possible suicide. DeputyPeterson located the distraught female at alocal park. She was sitting in her vehiclewith the doors locked. She had a can ofwhite gas in one hand and a cigarettelighter in the other and statedthat she was going to set herselfon fire. Deputy Peterson immedi-ately smashed the drivers’ side

window with his flashlight and took the woman intocustody. She was transported to a local hospital as wasDeputy Peterson, who received injuries to his righthand from the broken glass. Deputy Peterson’s quickresponse thwarted the suicide attempt.

Nominations for the Bulletin Notes should be basedon either the rescue of one or more citizens orarrest(s) made at unusual risk to an officer’s safety.Submissions should include a short write-up(maximum of 250 words), a separate photograph ofeach nominee, and a letter from the department’sranking officer endorsing the nomination. Submis-sions should be sent to the Editor, FBI Law Enforce-ment Bulletin, FBI Academy, Madison Building,Room 209, Quantico, VA 22135.

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