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Features

Editor’s Note:

Due to the special contents of this issue, the 2007 subject and author

indexes, which usually would appear in the December issue, will be in our

January 2008 issue. Also, the second part of the article, “Program Evaluations:

Improving Operational Effectiveness and Organizational Effi ciency,” will be

moved to our January issue.

This issue includes our last book review. As of our January 2008 issue,

we no longer will publish book reviews.

December 2007Volume 76Number 12

United StatesDepartment of Justice

Federal Bureau of InvestigationWashington, DC 20535-0001

Robert S. Mueller IIIDirector

Contributors’ opinions and statementsshould not be considered an

endorsement by the FBI for any policy,program, or service.

The attorney general has determinedthat the publication of this periodicalis necessary in the transaction of thepublic business required by law. Use

of funds for printing this periodical hasbeen approved by the director of theOffice of Management and Budget.

The FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin(ISSN-0014-5688) is published

monthly by the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation, 935 PennsylvaniaAvenue, N.W., Washington, D.C.

20535-0001. Periodicals postage paidat Washington, D.C., and additionalmailing offices. Postmaster: Send

address changes to Editor, FBI LawEnforcement Bulletin, FBI Academy,

Madison Building, Room 201,Quantico, VA 22135.

Editor

John E. Ott

Associate Editors

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David W. MacWha

Bunny S. Morris

Art Director

Denise Bennett Smith

Assistant Art Director

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Staff Assistants

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Arlene F. Smith

This publication is produced by

members of the Law Enforcement

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Issues are available online at

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© Digital Stock

Send article submissions to Editor,

FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin,

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Room 201, Quantico, VA 22135.

Countering Violent

Islamic ExtremismBy Carol Dyer, Ryan E. McCoy,

Joel Rodriguez, and

Donald N. Van Duyn

Words Make WorldsBy Angus Smith

Operation SmokescreenBy Robert Fromme and

Rick Schwein

A Look at Fusion CentersBy Bart R. Johnson

3

To effectively penetrate the extremist

world, the law enforcement and

intelligence communities must

understand extremist discourse.

Working with communities andidentifying patterns and trends ofextremist behavior in its early stagescan help counter the spread ofextremist ideology.

12

20Smaller law enforcement agencies can

reap benefi ts from crime analysis reports

and maps similar to those derived by

larger ones.

10 Book Review

Bomb and Bombings

18 Unusual Weapon

Plastic Spike

19 Leadership Spotlight

Fellowship

26 Bulletin Reports

Computer-Based Training

Crime Victims

Juvenile Justice

Education

28Establishing state fusion centers

has been a vital step toward sharing

information.

This case illustrates that terrorists

do not operate only in major cities

but also in small towns.

ISSN 0014-5688 USPS 383-310

For the past decade, al Qaeda has been the driving force of terrorism—movingthousands of people through training camps in Afghanistan and providing themotivation, the money, and the management of worldwide attacks. Since the

terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, U.S. and foreign services have made tremen-dous progress in weakening al Qaeda. Yet, the group has been resilient at rebuildingits leadership and creating new safe havens, and, just as dangerous, its message ofviolence also has inspired followers with no formal links to the group. We have in-creasingly seen the emergence of individuals and groups inspired by al Qaeda that willcarry out attacks on their own soil.

Homegrown terrorists or extremists, acting in concert with other like-minded in-dividuals or as lone wolves, have become one of the gravest domestic threats we face.Largely self-recruited and self-trained, these terrorists may have no direct connectionto al Qaeda or other terrorist groups.

Identifying these individuals and groups is a tremendous challenge, and the role ofour partners in state and local law enforcement is critical in these efforts. Local policeoffi cers, who are out on the streets, are on the frontline of the war on terrorism. Theyoften may be the fi rst to detect potential terrorists. The vast jurisdiction of state, local,and tribal offi cers brings invaluable access to millions of people and resources, whichcan help protect the nation and its citizens. The information gathered on the street andin our communities is one of the most powerful tools we have.

Understanding the radicalization process also proves vital to our efforts of iden-tifying terrorists. What are the early indicators of those who demonstrate a potentialfor violence? How does an individual become a radical extremist, and how does anextremist then become a terrorist?

To help answer these questions, the International Association of Chiefs of Police(IACP) Committee on Terrorism requested that this issue of the FBI Law Enforce-ment Bulletin be devoted to terrorism. With the foresight to focus on terrorism beforeit came to the forefront of American concerns, the committee fi rst undertook this ef-fort in the March 1999 issue of the magazine. Because the terrorist threat has evolveddramatically during the past 8 years—especially in the wake of September 11—thecommittee determined that it was time to publish another focus issue and enhance ourunderstanding of emerging terrorist threats by focusing on homegrown terrorism andradicalization. We hope that these four articles, contributed by IACP Committee onTerrorism members, will give readers a clear understanding of the challenges posedby homegrown terrorism and the importance of a coordinated response to the terroristthreats we face.

Focus on TerrorismFocus on Terrorism

December 2007 / 1

© Photos.com

“Countering Violent Islamic Extremism” provides law enforcement with apotential approach to identify indicators for extremists who pose the greatestdanger to society. The article urges law enforcement to engage Muslim com-munities and dispel misconceptions that may foster extremism. Complementingthis article, “Words Make Worlds: Terrorism and Language” offers insights tounderstand and accurately describe extremist rhetoric. The article asserts thatsuch terms as jihadism and Islamic terrorism confl ate terrorism with mainstreamIslam and erroneously cast all Muslims as terrorists or potential terrorists. Instead,the intelligence and law enforcement communities must understand extremistdiscourse and use this understanding to counteract extremist rhetoric.

Two additional articles highlight the importance that collaborative effortsplay in the war on terrorism. “Operation Smokescreen” details the multiagencyinvestigation of a terrorist cell operating in North Carolina and raising money forHizballah by smuggling cigarettes. This case not only illustrates how interagencypartnerships can address terrorist threats but also shows the critical role local lawenforcement plays in detecting criminal activity that may form part of a largerterrorist plot. Further emphasizing the importance of a multiagency approachto countering terrorism, “A Look at Fusion Centers” describes the integral rolestate fusion centers play in assisting intelligence and law enforcement agenciesin sharing information and combining their resources to understand the threatenvironment and address terrorism.

One consistent message resonates through each of the articles: our greatestweapon against terrorism is unity. That unity is built on information sharing andcoordination among our partners in the law enforcement and intelligence com-munities. It is built on partnerships with the private sector and effective outreachto the public as our eyes and ears. It is built on the idea that, together, we aresmarter and stronger than we are standing alone. In the past 6 years, the coopera-tive efforts of intelligence and law enforcement agencies have made substantialprogress in detecting U.S. terrorist cells. Some notable successes this year aloneinclude identifying and disrupting the plan to attack our military forces at FortDix and the plot against JFK Airport.

These successes show that no one person, no one agency, no one police de-partment, and no one country has all of the answers. We may not always knowwhere and when terrorists will attempt to strike. But, we do know they will tryagain, and we must combine our intelligence, our technology, and our resourcesto stop them.

Willie T. HulonExecutive Assistant Director

National Security BranchFederal Bureau of Investigation

2 / FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

December 2007 / 3

The disruption of ter-rorist plots in 2006 in the United Kingdom,

Canada, and the United States, as well as the July 2005 attacks in London, generated signifi cant attention to the concept of homegrown radicalization. But, this term does not defi ne the real focus of concern violentIslamic extremism. Before fi nding an effective solution to this problem, law enforcement

fi rst must understand and defi ne it.1 What is Islamic extremism? Do radical beliefs always lead to terrorist activity? The ex-ploitation of religion by Islamic extremists to use violence both overseas and at home is one of the gravest dangers facing the United States. Al Qaeda repre-sents the most pressing mani-festation of this problem, and the FBI still assesses attacks directed by core al Qaeda

leadership as the primary terror-ist threat to the United States. Al Qaeda’s infl uence has prolifer-ated; its ideology and infl uence has spread beyond the Middle East and South Asia. It now has subsidiaries in Iraq, North Africa, and Greater Syria.2

However, as the March 11, 2004, attacks in Madrid demon-strated, direct al Qaeda con-nections are not a precondition for successful Islamic terrorist

Countering Violent Islamic ExtremismA Community ResponsibilityBy CAROL DYER, RYAN E. MCCOY, JOEL RODRIGUEZ,

and DONALD N. VAN DUYN

Russell Square, London, 2005


operations. The fact that everyterrorist attack, even when alQaeda does not claim credit,creates a debate as to whether alQaeda in some way directed theoperation signifi es that al Qaedahas become a “brand” as muchas an organization.

Public opinion surveys ofMuslims in the Middle East andthe West suggest the diffi cultyof countering the message ofviolent extremists to those in-clined to hate the United Statesand the West for perceivedoppression against Muslims.3 Asurvey conducted in the UnitedKingdom in the spring of2006 indicated that a small butsignifi cant minority supportedthe July 2005 attacks there.4

It also revealed that a major-ity of Muslims in the MiddleEast still believe that the 9/11attacks were a Mossad plot,5

even after Usama Bin Ladinpublicly claimed credit. Morerecent fi ndings have suggestedthat negative and suspicious at-titudes toward the United Statespersist.6 Because of this en-trenched mind-set, support forviolent Islamic extremism willremain a continuous problem.

The speed with whichradicalization to violence canoccur and the increasing youthof those drawn to the cause poseadditional challenges. BothBritish and Canadian authoritiesreported that people involved inthe plotting in those countriesapparently had not previously

been interested in religion butchanged and became willing tocarry out terrorist operationswithin a year. In the summer of2006, the “Toronto 18” plot, aterrorist operation that sought tobomb several prominent build-ings in the Canadian cities ofToronto and Ottawa, includedfi ve participants younger than18. The timeframe needed todevelop a plot can be disturb-ingly short, and the tendencyto dismiss youthful enthusiasmas empty bravado may proveextremely dangerous.

even without First Amendmentconcerns about using these be-haviors as indicators. But, lawenforcement agencies and in-telligence services around theworld wrestle with the problemof predicting people’s behavior.To address the threat that vio-lent extremists pose, the FBI de-veloped a 2-pronged approach:1) identify early indicators ofthose who demonstrate the po-tential for violence and 2) en-gage in extensive outreach toMuslim communities to dispelmisconceptions that may fosterextremism.

IDENTIFYINGEARLY INDICATORS

Conversion to Islam isnot radicalization. The FBIdefi nes violent extremists aspersons who engage in, encour-age, endorse, condone, justify,or support in any way thecommission of a violent actagainst either the U.S. govern-ment, its citizens, or its alliesto achieve political, social, oreconomic changes or againstothers who may possess opin-ions contrary to their ownradicalized ideology.

The FBI assesses theradicalization process as fourstages: preradicalization, iden-tifi cation, indoctrination, andaction. Each one is distinct,and a radicalized individualmay never reach the fi nal stage.The chart (page 6) identifi esdifferent aspects of the stages

Law enforcement leadersmust be able to identify individ-uals with the most potential toeffect immediate harm, therebycontrolling the operating envi-ronment and designating time toaddress the larger issues under-lying violent Islamic extremism.Expressing dislike for the Unit-ed States or lauding Usama BinLadin does not make an individ-ual a terrorist. Such an approachwould create a scenario simplytoo large to address effectively

”

Acceptanceseeking, a form of

extrinsic conversion,is a fundamental

human motivation.

“

December 2007 / 5

and provides indicators to help determine when an individual likely is in a certain one.

Preradicalization

Conversion may be to a religion or a commitment to another form of the religion. An individual’s motivation is critical to the process and not always static. For example, people who initially convert to gain acceptance may reinterpret their faith if the group they join is composed of Muslim extremists.

Motivation

In a jilted-believer conver-sion, internal frustration and dissatisfaction with the current religious faith leads the indi-vidual to change belief systems. The new system can be initially religious in tone or secular. Conversion attempts to resolve inconsistencies between what the person has come to believe and was taught to believe. For example, Adam Gadahn (aka Azzam the American), a Cali-fornia native who converted to Islam and supports al Qaeda and Islamic extremism, wrote in his conversion story that Jesus was, at best, the Son of God and not someone who individuals should revere and pray to.7

A protest conversion may be an attempt by people to identify themselves apart from or to rebel against a society or circumstances they perceive as oppressive. Additionally, faith

reinterpretation is another form of an intrinsically driven con-version where individuals alter their religious tradition through introspection and evaluation. This motivation refers specifi -cally to those born into Muslim families but choose to follow a more extremist form of Islam, including such individuals as Faysal Galab, Tasein Taher, and

at least a minimum quantity of lasting and signifi cant in-terpersonal relationships.10

However, the product of these relationships can have positive or negative consequences for the people involved. Those with weak social ties may benefi t from the solidarity that extrem-ist groups provide.

Stimulus and Opportunity

Converts who proceed through the radicalization process often are driven by a respected, frequently older, extremist with whom they have come into contact. Kamal Derwish played a key role in the radicalization of the Lacka-wanna Six. In the case of the Virginia Jihad Network, spiri-tual leader Ali Al-Timimi con-vinced a group of individuals, including a technology expert from Pakistan, a decorated Gulf War veteran and member of the National Rifl e Association, a Korean immigrant, a son of a Yemeni diplomat, and a Muslim who had converted from Ca-tholicism, to engage in violent jihad against U.S. troops. Inter-actions between converts and Islamic extremists can occur in a variety of venues. For exam-ple, in mosques, extremists can observe other Muslims’ com-mitment to the faith and their reactions to the Islamic message given by extremist religious leaders. In prisons, extremist recruiters can identify a popula-tion disaffected with society and

Shafal Mosed of the Lacka-wanna Six. Galab, Taher, and Mosed drank alcohol, used drugs, and had relationships with non-Muslim women—all forbidden by the Koran—before converting. After this transition, it was easier for Kamal Der-wish, who primarily infl uenced their newfound Islamic path, to convince them to participate in jihad as a way of absolving their sins.8

Acceptance seeking, a form of extrinsic conversion, is a fundamental human motiva-tion.9 Individuals have a perva-sive drive to form and maintain

© Ronald Jeffers


use their operational skills andpropensity for violence to fur-ther their cause. In Islamic andsecular universities, they canfi nd curious individuals whoquestion society, as well as theirown beliefs. Further, extremistscan interact with others in busi-nesses, which provide a privatesetting to conduct meetingsand further indoctrinate newconverts, and in Internet chatrooms where vulnerable indi-viduals from around the worldcan gather to discuss Islamicdoctrine.

faith. Converts’ social connec-tions with other like-mindedindividuals can strengthen thisdedication. In addition, overseastravel may accelerate the radi-calization process by provid-ing networking and experience(e.g., religious or language in-struction and basic paramilitarytraining) that later may supportoperational activity.

Indoctrination

Indoctrination can involvebecoming an active participantin a group or being initiated

Identifi cation

In this stage, individualsidentify themselves with a par-ticular extremist cause and ac-cept a radicalized ideology thatjustifi es violence or other crimi-nal activity against perceivedenemies. Accepting the causeleads people to become increas-ingly isolated from their for-mer lives. New converts oftenseek and follow guidance fromimams, more senior followers,on how to live every detail ofthe religion, becoming morecommitted to the newfound

PRERADICALIZATION IDENTIFICATION INDOCTRINATION ACTION

The Radicalization Process

Motivation/Conversion

• Jilted believer

• Acceptance seeker

• Protest conversion

• Faith reinterpretation

Stimulus

• Self

• Other

Opportunity

• Mosque

• Internet

• School

• Employment

• Prison

• Conferences

Individual accepts the

cause

• Increased isolation

from former life

• Developing social

bonds with new group

• Forge new social

identity

• Domestic training

• Overseas experience

• Religious training

• Language training

• Basic paramilitary

activities

• Intensifi ed group

bonds

• Social

• Terrorist

• Increased vetting

opportunities

• Training camp

• Surveillance

• Finance

Individual convinced

that action is required

to support the cause.

Individual knowingly

engages in extremist

activity.

• Operational

activities of

Facilitation

Recruitment

Financing

include:

• Preparation

• Planning

• Execution

CONVERSION/REINTERPRETATION

NO ACTION

ACCEPTANCE

PROPENSITY FORACTION

CONVICTION

READY FOR ACTION

TERRORISM

IMPLEMENT ACTION

December 2007 / 7

within the recruit’s self-createdjihadist environment. Throughvarious activities with the groupand increasingly demandingand signifi cant roles within it,converts see their potential asa jihadist and, ultimately, canbecome convinced of the needfor further action to support thecause.

Formal recruitment intoa terrorist group usually willoccur before or during indoc-trination. Recruitment plays animportant role in any terroristorganization, and radicalizedindividuals can use their experi-ence to spot, assess, and encour-age potential recruits to followthe same path. This process alsocould include vouching for newrecruits or helping them estab-lish their extremist credentials.A charismatic recruiter withlimited training or participa-tion in jihad can transform thatexperience into a particularlyenticing recruitment tool forindividuals susceptible to anextremist message. ExtremistIslamic clerics can play a majorrole because of their knowledgeof Islam, their ability to providereligious justifi cation for terror-ist attacks, and the emotionalhold they can have over impres-sionable recruits.

In the case of Jam’iyyatUl-Islam Is-Saheeh (JIS), KevinJames, the group’s founder,propagated JIS ideology andrecruited adherents insideand outside prison mainly by

disseminating the JIS manifestoand through direct meetingswith inmates. James also soughtnew recruits without prisonrecords who could benefi t thegroup through their occupa-tions, abilities, or access tosensitive locations.

forming distinct operationalcells.

Facilitation, a key compo-nent of any terrorist attack, canbe accomplished by operativesdedicated to the support role orwaiting for a separate attack,supporters unwilling or unableto perpetrate a terrorist attack,or unwitting participants. Itcan include providing fi nancialassistance, safe houses, falsedocuments, materials, attackplans, surveillance, or travelassistance. Individuals un-able or unwilling to carry out aviolent terrorist attack still canfurther the goals to which theysubscribe. For example, facilita-tors play a key role in obtainingfunding for a terrorist operationthrough such criminal activi-ties as fraud, scams, embezzle-ment, or theft and some mayeven involve violence. The JIScase included three homegrownIslamic extremists in Los Ange-les, California, who robbed gasstations allegedly to fund theirplanned operations in support ofthe JIS cause.

ENGAGINGTHE COMMUNITY

Using this model to identifyviolent extremists, offi cers needto rely on the community. Lawenforcement resources are lim-ited, and offi cers may not havethe intimate community knowl-edge to detect subtle indica-tors when an individual movestoward terrorist action. Only

Action

The fi nal stage consists ofsupporting or engaging in ter-rorist activities. Although thisaction can be violent or nonvio-lent (e.g. fi nancing), it alwaysintends to infl ict damage on theenemy. Some individuals whoreach this stage will attempt toparticipate in a terrorist attack.

Every action has threestages: preparation, planning,and execution. During any ofthese, recruits can try to stopparticipating. However, theymay be so caught up in thegroup’s activities that they willengage in behaviors they other-wise would not consider. Attackpreparations can include targetselection, casing, fi nancing, and

”

Recruitmentplays an importantrole in any terrorist

organization….

“


people who reside near potentialextremists can provide this ca-pability. Police offi cials in Can-ada and the United Kingdomemphasize that fi ghting violentIslamic extremism must becomea community responsibility inthe wake of the disrupted terror-ist operations in their countries.Law enforcement agencies mustfi rst build trust with individualsin these areas and then create alink for communities to shareissues of concern.

In September 2001, the FBIbegan developing an extensiveprogram to strengthen relationswith Arab-American, Muslim,Sikh, and South Asian com-munities to establish trust andencourage careers in the FBI.The program seeks to dispelmyths about the FBI and U.S.government policies towardthese communities, particularlythe notion that the governmenttargets Muslims. The FBI estab-lished liaison with the nationalleaders of Muslim and Arab-American advocacy groups.For example, the FBI consultedwith the American-Arab Anti-discrimination Committee todevelop effective communica-tions strategies. FBI fi eld offi cesregularly contact local chaptersof the same groups and holdrecurring meetings with com-munity members as well. Alsoessential to the FBI’s outreachefforts are such programs asthe FBI Citizens Academyand the Community Relations

Executive Seminar Training(CREST). Members of theArab-American communityhave attended the citizens acad-emy, a popular 8-week programdesigned to give communityleaders an overview of FBIand U.S. Department of Justicepolicies and procedures. FBIfi eld offi ces host the CRESTprogram, a shorter version ofthe citizens academy, in theirlocal area.

on watchlists and conductingsearches at airports continu-ously frustrate individuals ofMiddle Eastern descent, theU.S. Department of HomelandSecurity established its ownoutreach program to addressthe issue. Similarly, school andrecreation offi cials can play animportant role in preventingdisaffected youth from espous-ing and engaging in extremistbehaviors.

CONCLUSION

Although the most danger-ous instances of violent extrem-ism have occurred overseas, theIslamic radicalization of U.S.persons, foreign-born or na-tive, increasingly concerns lawenforcement leaders becauseof its potential to lead to vio-lent action. The key to successin countering violent Islamicextremism lies in identifyingpatterns and trends of extrem-ist behavior in its early stages.This delicate balance requiresan approach that protects FirstAmendment rights. Law en-forcement professionals mustconvey that, as part of a fairand compassionate govern-ment, they also share the in-terests of communities. Theymust respond aggressively tohate crimes and discriminationagainst any ethnic populations.By upholding and enhancing thecommunity’s trust, law enforce-ment can counter the spread ofthis extremist ideology.

Reaching out to the com-munity is a long-term effort.Large gaps in trust persist. Ac-cording to community leaders,many members of Arab-Ameri-can and Muslim communitiesalmost unanimously feel thatgovernment agents treat them assuspects and view all Muslimsas extremists.

Any successful effort mustinvolve a multifaceted approachaddressing the variety of factorsthat affect attitudes in Muslimcommunities. For example,because identifying individuals

”

Any successfuleffort must involve

a multifacetedapproach.…

“

December 2007 / 9

Ms. Dyer is an intelligence analyst inthe FBI’s Counterterrorism Division.Mr. McCoy is an intelligence analyst inthe FBI’s Counterterrorism Division.Mr. Rodriguez is an intelligenceanalyst in the FBI’s CounterterrorismDivision.Mr. Van Duyn serves as the deputyassistant director of the FBI’s Counter-terrorism Division.

Endnotes1 The model the authors present in this

article was derived from both classifi ed

and open source information and academic

literature and refl ects events that occurred

up until April 2006.2 Greater Syria encompasses the pres-

ent-day states of Jordan, Israel, Lebanon,

and Syria before those states were formed;

retrieved from http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/

syria/sy_glos.html.3 Andrew Kohut and Bruce Stokes,

America Against the World: How We Are

Different and Why We Are Disliked (New

York, NY: Times Books, 2006).4 http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.

php?ReportID=2535 The Institute for Intelligence and Spe-

cial Operations, otherwise known as the

Mossad, has been appointed by Israel to

collect information, analyze intelligence,

and perform special covert operations

beyond its borders. For more information,

see http://www.mossad.gov.il/Eng/About

Us.aspx.6 http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/

pipa/articles/brmiddleeastnafricara/346.

php?nid=&id=&pnt=346&lb=brme7 http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/

f-news/1482394/posts8 A group of six Yemeni-Americans

convicted of providing material support to

al Qaeda.9 Roy Baumeister and Mark Leary,

“The Need to Belong: Desire for Interper-

sonal Attachments as a Fundamental Hu-

man Motivation,” Psychological Bulletin

117 (1995): 497-529.10 Psychological research on terrorism

suggests that psychopathology proves only

a modest risk factor for general violence

and possibly irrelevant to understanding

terrorism. Thus, it is prudent to conclude

that the current population inferred to

comes from a nonclinical sample, which

would apply to all nonclinical psychologi-

cal research fi ndings to understand and

predict the behavior of someone who

is extreme. A distinct difference exists

between extremist behavior and someone

who is extreme. Blowing oneself up can be

considered extremist behavior, but camp-

ing trips for the purpose of radicalization

are not.

T he FBI Law Enforcement Bul-letin staff invites you to commu-

© Digital Vision

nicate with us via e-mail. Our Internetaddress is [email protected].

We would like to know yourthoughts on contemporary law en-forcement issues. We welcome yourcomments, questions, and suggestionsabout the magazine. Please includeyour name, title, and agency on alle-mail messages.

Also, the Bulletin is available forviewing or downloading on a numberof computer services, as well as theFBI’s home page. The home pageaddress is http://www.fbi.gov.

The Bulletin’sE-mail Address


Book Review

Bombs and Bombings: A Handbook toProtection, Security, Detection, Disposal,and Investigation for Industry, Police andFire Departments, third edition, Thomas G.Brodie, Charles C. Thomas Publisher, Spring-fi eld, Illinois, 2005.

In this well-written and clearly presentedbook, the author provides a unique look atbombs and explosive-related problems fromthe comprehensive viewpoint of an experiencedand accomplished bomb technician and inves-tigator. The text, detailed and well researched,includes extensive data on a wide variety ofrelated topics. Information on organizing,training, and equipping a bomb response unit isclearly presented. The author adds fi rsthand in-formation about the selection of personnel andthe availability of various types and sources oftraining plus offering valuable insight regard-ing the organization of such a specialized unitwithin a department or agency.

The proliferation of improvised explosivedevices (IEDs) being used in numerous ter-rorist attacks, combined with individual-borneIEDs, suicide bombers, vehicle-borne IEDs,and remotely detonated massive amounts ofexplosives, are taking a toll on bomb techni-cians worldwide. This has led to some changes

in the procedures, methods, and techniquesfor handling bomb and explosive situations. Anumber of manufacturers now produce numer-ous new tools and innovative items of equip-ment and supplies for use by bomb units. Otheritems are being revised and updated, and manymore models and varieties of robots, bombsuits, disruptors, and similar equipment havebegun appearing in the marketplace.

In this new third edition of Bombs andBombings, Tom Brodie, relying on his consid-erable background, knowledge, personal expe-rience, research, and numerous contacts in thefi eld, provides a detailed and in-depth look at awide variety of the equipment and techniquessuitable for use in handling and investigatingthese situations. In addition to vehicles anditems used for the movement, transportation,safe disposal, and destruction of explosives,bombs, IEDs, ordnance items, and other haz-ardous materials, the textbook also discussesthe latest in protective clothing and bomb suits,other specialized handling paraphernalia, and avariety of robotic equipment.

The book, expanded in content to over 300pages of material, presents a large measure ofnew information, case studies, and additionalphotos to impart details and ideas regardingbomb detection, bomb investigation, bombsearch procedures, crime scene search investi-gation, and evidence collection procedures. Italso covers range disposal sites and personalsafety, as well as environmental and noise is-sues and concerns.

Law enforcement offi cers, military person-nel, security professionals, fi re and emergencyservice workers, and other individuals involvedin personal and industrial safety and securitywill fi nd a wealth of information regardingcommercial explosive items and products,military explosives and ordnance items, andhomemade or improvised explosive devices.

Various types of initiators, detonators, switch-es, timing devices, and booby traps, as well astime, action, motion, command, and remote-control detonation methods are discussed. Asa bomber may employ just about any type ofmechanical or electrical switching method, thematerial in this book proves invaluable to anyprofessional that may come into contact withsuch a device. The book also covers bombthreats and their consequences, along withprotection of individuals, buildings, vehicles,public and private conveyances, planes, trains,and ships.

This book contains valuable informationand ideas and should be on the personal book-shelf of every bomb technician, investigator,EOD technician, security professional, lawenforcement offi cer, and anyone else involvedin public or private security and service.Readers will learn much from it and itsauthor.

Reviewed byDr. Larry Linville

Professor of Criminal JusticeNorthern Virginia Community College

Annandale, Virginia

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Since September 11, 2001, many Western intelli-gence and law enforce-

ment agencies have received criticism for the terminology they use to describe terrorism that has an ideological basis in Islam. Inherent diffi culties exist in fi nding appropriate language that does not imply a clash between Islam and Western re-ligion and culture.1 Such terms as Islamic or Islamist terrorism,jihadism, and Islamo-fascismfuse terrorism with mainstream

Islam, thereby casting all Muslims either as terrorists or potential ones. Although intel-ligence offi cers and analysts may understand this terminol-ogy, meanings become blurred when fi ltered through the media and public perceptions. Even innocuous terms and completely legitimate expressions of belief become loaded with innuendo. Yet, attempts to downplay Islamic components of terrorist conspiracies and acts by focus-ing on the mechanics of the

plots, rather than the religious backgrounds of the terrorists, ignore a critical element of this global threat.2 To address this conundrum, the law enforce-ment and intelligence communi-ties must understand extremist discourse to counteract extrem-ist rhetoric.

Describing Jihad

Like the other Abrahamic faiths—Judaism and Christian-ity—the fundamental tenets of Islam are rooted in compassion,

Words Make WorldsTerrorism and LanguageBy ANGUS SMITH

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December 2007 / 13

kindness, forgiveness, and,perhaps most important, socialjustice. For example, one of thePillars of Islam is zakat (thegiving of alms to the poor), and,during the Ramadan fast, Mus-lims are enjoined to rememberthe less fortunate who fastinvoluntarily.3 Incorrect state-ments about the nature of Islamoffend Muslims who try to livewithin those tenets. More im-portant, distorted and infl amma-tory linkages between Islam andterrorism can convince Muslimsthat the West is their enemy.

The word jihad, which hasbecome almost a catchall termfor extremism of any kind,illustrates this problem. De-spite widespread belief to thecontrary, jihad is not one of thePillars of Sunni Islam (in addi-tion to fasting at Ramadan andthe giving of alms, these con-sist of the profession of faith,daily prayer, and pilgrimage toMecca).4 Translated literally,jihad means striving and oftenis expressed jihad fi sabil illah,or striving in the path of God.5

In this context, jihad describesthe efforts to live in the waythat God intends and fi nd theinner will and discipline to liveaccording to the basic tenets ofIslam.6 Jihad is a duty for allMuslims, an act of piety aimedat social or personal improve-ment. For example, Muslimsmight talk about their jihad tostop smoking, raise money fora community project, or simply

become a better person. Also,in 2005, Raheel Raza was thefi rst Muslim woman to leadmixed gender Friday prayers inCanada. She characterized thecourage and determination thatallowed her to persevere overthe objections of conservativeand traditionalist elements asa form of gender jihad aimed,ultimately, at helping all womentake their rightful and scrip-turally mandated place as fullparticipants in the temporal andspiritual life of the communityof Muslims.7

But, jihad also can have amore combative interpretation.Like the basic texts of Judaismand Christianity, the Koran hasnumerous references to physi-cal struggle and confrontationwith unbelievers and others whorepresent a threat to the safetyand integrity of the community

of the faithful.8 Combat repre-sents one of the central meta-phors of the history of earlyIslam, as the Prophet Muham-mad and his followers battledand ultimately triumphed overthose they considered idolatersand unbelievers.9 The canonof Islamic teachings stressesthat all Muslims must defenddar al-islam (the land of Islam)from moral or spiritual corrup-tion originating in dar al-harb(the land of war) where Islamiclaw does not prevail.10 Despitethis, Islamic law and traditionalways have favored defensiveover offensive war; the impor-tance of mercy to enemies; andthe inviolability of women,children, and noncombatants.11

Additionally, Islamic teachingsoften stress the importance ofthe greater (spiritual) jihad overthe lesser (physical) jihad.12

“

”Mr. Smith is offi cer in charge, Alternative Analysis, National

Security Criminal Investigations, Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

In determiningappropriate

terminology, wemust remain mindful

of words and theirnuances.


The concept of jihad as anoffensive war, largely a 20thcentury phenomenon, devel-oped primarily in the writingsof ideologues, such as AbdulAla Mawdudi (founder ofPakistan’s Jamaat-i Islami)and Sayyid Qutb (the Egyptianthinker who, in many respects,is the ideological father of alQaeda and its offshoots). Bothindividuals reinterpreted theconcept of jihad by framing it asan obligation equivalent to oneof the pillars and transforming itfrom a spiritual concept to a po-litical one. In this reinterpretedunderstanding, jihad became aphysical, rather than spiritual,struggle and one to use againstthe ignorance and barbarism ofthose who threaten the funda-mental integrity of Islam (gen-erally interpreted as the Westernworld or the “far enemy” ofUsama Bin Ladin) and Muslimleaders (the “near enemy”) whoturn their backs on the teachingsof the Koran and the exampleof the Prophet Muhammad.13

Omar Bakri, the Syrian-bornIslamic cleric recently barredfrom the United Kingdom, viv-idly illustrated both the thinkingbehind and the consequencesof this form of jihad in a 2007television interview.

The duty of jihad...had beenneglected by the Islamicnation for a long time be-cause of the arrogance andinjustice of America and itsallies against the Islamic

nation and because of theirsupport for Israel...the 9/11operations were a responseto great acts of aggressionby America—its attacks onAfghanistan, on Iraq, onSudan, not to mention thehistoric Crusades from longago[.]...[K]illing innocentpeople is forbidden in Islam.But, who is innocent—thatis another question.14

If both interpretations ofjihad are correct, they provehighly problematic from polic-ing and intelligence viewpoints.If we use the term jihad todescribe either terrorist activityor the terrorist mind-set, werisk alienating those Muslimsfor whom jihad describeseither a highly personalizedinternal struggle or an effort toeffect positive change withinor beyond the Muslim com-munity. We effectively brandthem as dangerous radicals, ifnot as terrorists, perpetuatingstereotypes that equate Islamand its adherents with terrorism.On the other hand, the combina-tion of jihad with violence inthe name of faith (or a politicalcreed disguised as faith) isalso a reality. But, by referringto extremists as jihadis—apositive component of theMuslim historical and culturalexperience—we also recognizetheir actions as being in thepath of God and, therefore,legitimate.15 In opposing jihadand its practitioners, we againrisk characterizing ourselves asthe enemies of Islam. Not onlydoes this empower extremistsbut it also conveys a strongmessage that we are engaged ina struggle not with extremismbut to suppress Islam itself.

Identifying AccurateTerminology

To correctly name enemies,we must learn more about them:

This highly politicized in-terpretation of jihad has drivencritical events in the Muslimworld from the assassinationof Egyptian President AnwarSadat in 1981 to the rise of theTaliban. It also lies at the heartof a range of terrorist plots andattacks beginning with the fi rstWorld Trade Center bombingin 1993 through such recentthreats as the “Toronto 18”plot in the summer of 2006, anoperation that sought to bombseveral prominent landmarks inthe Canadian cities of Torontoand Ottawa.

”

To correctlyname enemies,

we must learn moreabout them….

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December 2007 / 15

how they think and how they likely will act. Those at the forefront of addressing terror-ism—the intelligence and law enforcement communities—should assume a leadership role in researching and determining appropriate terminology to de-scribe extremism and its perpe-trators. To date, relatively little research exists in this area.16

Although a glossary of alternate terminology is beyond the scope of this article, more appropriate descriptions of the challenges we face do exist. Usama Bin Ladin and many other extremists are heavily infl uenced by the writings of Sayyid Qutb, who urged his followers not only to withdraw from the moral vacuum of mod-ern society but also to destroy it.17 Qutb validated extreme violence in the cause of faith, so Islamic terrorism could more accurately be called Qutbian terrorism.

In determining appropriate terminology, we must remain mindful of words and their nuances. For example, many contemporary terrorist move-ments—including Afghanistan’s Taliban and al Qaeda—have theological roots in Wahab-bism, a sect that forms the state orthodoxy of contemporary Saudi Arabia.18 Wahabbism, a particularly strict interpreta-tion of Islam, originated in the Salafi st notion that pure Islam must be rooted in the teachings

of the early fathers, the Prophet Muhammad and his compan-ions.19 Both “Wahabbist” and “Salafi st” have been extensively used to defi ne particular types of terrorism. While elements of Wahabbism could encourage a mind-set that includes extremist action, as September 11 dem-onstrated, the vast majority of Wahabbists and Salafi sts are not terrorists.

physical jihad.20 This imperative can represent a form of jihad. The critical consideration is not what Raza says but the manner in which it diverges from other forms of Islamic discourse.

Ideological and rhetorical differences divide the larger Islamic world and Muslim com-munities throughout the West. Further, in Europe, where the infl uence of extremist ideology tends to inhibit the integration of certain segments of Mus-lim populations into their host societies, physical jihad exerts tremendous infl uence. 21 Beyond this, ideological confl ict within Islamic communities often man-ifests itself between two distinct cultural groupings. Muslim academic and theologian Tariq Ramadan characterizes the fi rst as middle-class, assimilated Muslims whose Islam is sophis-ticated and attuned to broader social and intellectual currents.22

The second group, and neces-sarily of great interest to the law enforcement and intelligence communities, consists of young, unassimilated, and often under-class individuals characterized by a strong sense of specifi c or generalized grievance. They exhibit strong leanings toward a shared Islamic identity and a spirit of precisely Islamic activ-ism and mobilization frequently in confl ict with Western so-cial and political norms. They reject Western culture (includ-ing Westernized intellectuals

Understanding the People

The debate over the mean-ing and proper role of jihad occurs in Muslim communities around the world. Some Muslim commentators, such as Raheel Raza, emphasize the need for Muslims to speak out and take action to ensure that terrorism, extremism, and anti-Western propaganda are eliminated from Muslim discourse. For exam-ple, Raza states that Muslims must “take back the mosques” to ensure that the voices of “reasonable Muslim men and women” are heard over calls for

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and assimilated Muslims) as areproach to true Islam and aredrawn into historical and ideo-logical discourse that proves thegreatness of Islamic civilization.This combination of perceivedoppression and the search fora dignifi ed alternative easilytranslates into openness to phys-ical, or politicized, jihad.23 Thisdemographic group includesthe British-borne terrorists whobombed the London transporta-tion system in July 2005 andthe “Hamburg Cell” terrorists,the nucleus of the September 11attacks.

Exemplars of Ramadan’sfi rst group, such as Raza, tendto distance themselves from thesecond group that they believehas transformed the traditionalconcept of jihad as a form ofspiritual struggle into an ideol-ogy of violence and revenge.Distortion also occurs whenportraying true Islam in anunremittingly positive light.Extremism in the name of apoliticized Islam is a perversionof faith but a legitimate formof discourse to its adherents,fully justifying direct action thatcan range from proselytizing toovert acts of terror on the scaleof September 11.

The messaging, particularlythe interpretation of jihad, thatoriginates with assimilatedMuslim thinkers and commen-tators is comforting, especiallyto non-Muslims who fi nd them-selves perplexed and disquieted

by the violence inherent in alQaeda-type extremist ideol-ogy. But, those thinkers andcommentators may not speakfor that portion of the Muslimworld disconnected, isolated, orotherwise susceptible to suchideology, making it diffi cult toaccurately guage the impactof their message in the overallcontext of Muslim discourseor to what extent it can com-pete rhetorically with the sirencall of extremism and physicaljihad.

phenomenon. As one Saudi ex-tremist exhorted, “I do not needto meet the Sheikh and ask hispermission to carry out someoperation, the same as I do notneed permission to pray or tothink about killing the Jewsand the Crusaders. There area thousand bin Ladens in thisnation. We should not abandonour way, which the Sheikh haspaved for you, regardless of theexistence of the Sheikh or hisabsence.”25

Even before September 11,governments and the law en-forcement and intelligence com-munities engaged in a concertedstrategy to confront extremismthrough a variety of means,such as disrupting conspiracies,preempting terrorist operations,forging meaningful alliances,and gaining knowledge and un-derstanding of the threat. How-ever, the problem continues andmany indicators suggest that itis becoming worse.

Ultimately, the construc-tion of alternative narrativesdesigned to subvert extremistmessaging may prove the mosteffective long-term strategyagainst al Qaeda-type extrem-ism, domestic or global. Weneed to fi nd ways to counter-balance the culture of deathand martyrdom with one thatcelebrates the value of life26

and determine the targets of ourmessaging. The United States’cold war experience shows thatmessaging campaigns tend to

SeekingAlternatives

An understanding of thenuances of concepts like jihad iscritical. However, any attemptto promote one understandingor interpretation over anothermay be futile because classicaltexts do not necessarily speakfor contemporary Muslims, andindividual Muslims ultimatelywill make up their own minds.24

With the extremist mind-set, weaddress a cultural and emotional

”

An understandingof the nuances

of concepts likejihad is critical.

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December 2007 / 17

work best when asymmetric, fo-cused away from the opponent’s center of gravity, and aimed toward more receptive groups.27

Domestically, hardened activists may be a lost cause, whereas confused and idealistic adoles-cents may pose real opportuni-ties to exert far-reaching infl u-ence. Internationally, it may be possible to engage groups that remain Islamist while repudiat-ing extremism.

The Internet is one of the most important tools available to the contemporary terrorist. Al Qaeda-inspired entities that are less groups and more loose as-sociations of far-fl ung networks must rely on the Internet to recruit and train adherents, raise funds, propagandize, document their history and mythology, and organize terrorist strikes.28

Further, extremists with engi-neering and computer training from Western colleges and universities undoubtedly fi nd poetic justice in using the tech-nology of the West as a means of attacking and terrorizing the societies that created that tech-nology (e.g., the choice of civil aviation as a continuing focus of terrorist activity).29 On a more practical level, few extremists have any grounding in either the history or the culture of the societies they intend to destroy. By immersing themselves in the applied sciences, they acquire a superfi cial understanding of the technological manifestations of

Western culture but not its intel-lectual underpinnings.

Conclusion

The intelligence and law enforcement communities must learn not only how to penetrate the extremist world effectively but also how to understand the discourse that defi nes that world. This involves gaining a much broader and deeper understanding of the cultural roots of extremism than we cur-rently possess, not just words or rhetoric but also the meaning and symbolism underlying even sounds, colors, and images.30

The creation of alternative narratives requires not just cul-tural understanding on our part but on the target audience’s as well. To be effective, however, any large scale, cross-cultural initiatives cannot originate in a missionary sensibility that char-acterizes one culture as inferior to the other but, rather, should

seek to fi nd common ground and demonstrate what is worth saving in both cultures. Extrem-ism is a global phenomenon; no single agency or govern-ment can counteract extremist messaging on its own. Such a challenge requires a worldwide response and signifi cant interna-tional cooperation to have any real effect.

Endnotes1 Some political scientists have argued

that individuals’ religious and cultural

identities will be the primary source of

confl ict in the post cold war world. For

more on this theory, see Samuel P. Hun-

tington, The Clash of Civilizations and the

Remaking of World Order (New York, NY:

Simon and Schuster, 1996).2 See, for example, Christie Blatchford,

“Ignoring the Biggest Elephant in the

Room.” Globe and Mail, June 5, 2006.3 All scriptural references are from the

M.A.S. Abdel Haleem translation of the

Koran (Oxford, England: Oxford Univer-

sity Press, 2004), 2:177; 183-186.4 For example, see the Koran (1:1-7;

2:125-129; 142-153; 196-202; 22:26-30

among others).

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5 Douglas E. Streusand and

Harry D. Tunnell, Choosing Words

Carefully: Language to Help Fight Islamic

Terrorism (National Defense University,

2006), 3.6 Karen Armstrong, Islam: A Short

History (New York, NY: Random House,

2002); and Raheel Raza, Their Jihad...

Not My Jihad (Ingersoll, Ontario: Basileia

Books, 2005), 18.7 Supra note 6 (Raza, 118-122).8 The Koran (48:16-18; 2: 190-196;

8:12-20; 9:29).9 Supra note 6 (Armstrong, 18-22).10 Richard C. Martin, Said Amir Ar-

jomand, Marcia Hermansen, Abdulkader

Tayob, Rochelle Davis, John Obert Voll

(eds.) Encyclopedia of Islam and the

Muslim World (New York, NY: Macmil-

lan, 2004).11 The Koran 2:190-196.12 Ibid.13 Supra note 6 (Armstrong, 168-170).14 Middle East Research Institute,

Special Dispatch Series 1529 (March 30,

2007).15 Supra note 5.

16 The European Union has prepared a

handbook of nonoffensive terminology to

use in describing terrorism, but this remains

classifi ed. See BrunoWaterfi eld, “Don’t

Confuse Terrorism with Islam, Says EU,”

The Telegraph (March 31, 2007).17 Supra note 6 (Armstrong, 169-170);

Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al

Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (New York,

NY: Knopf, 2006), 28-31.18 Robert Fisk, The Great War for Civi-

lization: The Conquest of the Middle East

(London, England: Fourth Estate, 2005),

1045.19 Charles Allen, God’s Terrorists: The

Wahhabi Cult and the Hidden Roots of

Modern Jihad (London, England: Little,

Brown, 2006), 210.20 Supra note 6 (Raza, 61).21 International Crisis Group, “Under-

standing Islamism,” Middle East/North

Africa Report (No. 37, March 2, 2005), 13.22 Tariq Ramadan, Western Muslims

and the Future of Islam (New York, NY:

Oxford University Press, 2004), 106-107.23 Ibid., 107-109.24 Supra note 5.

Note: The opinions expressed in thisarticle are the author’s and not neces-sarily those of the Royal CanadianMounted Police or the government ofCanada.

25 Jessica Stern, “The Protean Enemy,”

Foreign Affairs (July/August 2003): 35.26 This idea builds on those expressed

by others, including Gabriel Weimann of

Haifa University, cited in Joshua Sinai,

“Defeating Internet Terrorists,” Washing-

ton Times, October 8, 2006.27 Angel Rabasa, Cheryl Benard, Lowell

H. Schwartz, and Peter Sickle, Build-

ing Moderate Muslim Networks (Santa

Monica, CA: RAND Center for Middle

East Public Policy, 2007), 142.28 http://www.usip.org/pubs/special

reports/sr116.html29 Ibid.30 See, for example, Combating Terror-

ism Center, U.S. Military Academy, The

Islamic Imagery Project: Visual Motifs

in Jihadi Internet Propaganda; retrieved

from http://ctc.usma.edu/publications/

publications.asp.

Plastic Spike

Law enforcement officersshould be aware of this plasticspike (dagger). Offenders may at-tempt to use this unusual weapon.And, magnetometers cannot de-tect it because of its composition.

Unusual Weapon


December 2007 / 19

Leadership Spotlight

Leadership Through Fellowship: No One Has All of the Answers

Deborah Southard, a leadership program specialist in theLeadership Development Institute at the FBI Academy,

prepared Leadership Spotlight.

Good fellowship and friendship are lasting….

—William Wycherley

In July 2007, I gave a presentation on en-lightened leadership at the 12th AnnualNational Association of Women Law

Enforcement Executives (NAWLEE) in BatonRouge, Louisiana. NAWLEE is dedicated toaddressing the needs and issues of women lawenforcement executives and those who aspireto these positions. To learn more about these,I decided to attend the conference, as well asfacilitate a workshop. What a wonderful op-portunity this was.

While the educational elements and pro-fessional presentations were exceptional, Ifound that fellowship, by far, was the greaterbenefi t. The membership of NAWLEE con-sists of both male and female law enforcementprofessionals of every rank and type of depart-ment. These members can reach out to eachother for advice, support, counseling, or men-toring. They know they do not have to haveall of the answers all of the time, and they canseek guidance from others regardless of theirrank, position, or department.

A recent search of the Internet revealeda multitude of law enforcement associationsin every state and in nearly every city andcounty. There also are organizations at thenational and international levels with member-ships in the thousands. These groups include

those that refl ect the ethnic, religious, orcultural background of offi cers, while oth-ers focus on regional issues. Some cater tothe concerns faced by offi cers specializingwithin a fi eld such as canine units, probation,youthful offenders, community policing, andnarcotics. Many of these associations, such asNAWLEE, hold national or regional confer-ences. Although conference participation isbenefi cial, offi cers often are hindered by theirdepartment’s lack of funding. If scholarshipsor other subsidized sources are not available,interested individuals still can be involved byreceiving newsletters, reviewing associationWeb sites, and developing one-on-one rela-tionships with other members in their area.

An effort as small as having lunch withofficers from neighboring counties everyfew months can be the catalyst to developingvaluable fellowship and liaison that canserve everyone well. The trials faced by lawenforcement personnel everywhere are toomany and too severe to be faced alone; offi cersmust reach out to their sisters and brotherswho just might have the answers.


On a spring day in 1999, Detective Sergeant Fromme of the

Iredell County, North Carolina, Sheriff’s Offi ce thought that what the two FBI agents sitting across from him at the U.S. Attorney’s Offi ce in Charlotte had just told him was something right out of a Hollywood script. Moreover, he had mixed feelings about the disclosure. On the one hand, the agents

confi rmed something he had long suspected: there was much more to the group of Lebanese cigarette smugglers he had spent the last several years investigating than mere criminal activity. On the other hand, with his case ready for indictment, Detective Fromme feared that the long, painstaking investiga-tion he had conducted alongside the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF)

was about to be hijacked by the FBI in the name of national security.

The agents’ startling infor-mation revealed that the sus-pects in Detective Fromme’s cigarette-smuggling case were members of Hizballah, an inter-national terrorist organization responsible for the deaths of more Americans than any other terrorist group in the world prior to September 11, 2001.1

OperationSmokescreenA Successful Interagency CollaborationBy ROBERT FROMME and RICK SCHWEIN, M.A.

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December 2007 / 21

When he learned this, Detective Fromme knew that the inves-tigation was about to take on a life of its own.2

The Cell

In 1992, Mohamad Youssef Hammoud arrived in New York City using a fraudulent visa. Over time, the FBI determined that Hammoud and several of his relatives were members of, affi liated with, or sympathetic toward Hizballah. These indi-viduals also participated in an ongoing pattern of relatively low-level criminal activity that ranged from fraud (e.g., immi-gration, marriage, credit card, and identity) to money launder-ing (e.g., cigarette smuggling). The information developed by the FBI augmented and, in some cases, mirrored that from the criminal investigation of ciga-rette-smuggling activities con-ducted by Detective Fromme and the ATF.

According to FBI Special Agent Schwein, who conducted much of the FBI’s investigation, Hammoud and the other cell members were “part-time ter-rorists and full-time criminals.”3

The criminality of Hammoud and his confederates ultimately became their greatest vulner-ability and allowed investiga-tors to painstakingly unravel a criminal enterprise inexorably tied to terrorism, specifi cally fund-raising and procurement

activities directed by and con-ducted on behalf of Hizballah. “The case opens an important window on the small but wor-risome subculture of militant Islamic immigrants who despise America, even while living in it, who fl aunt its laws and actively aid its enemies.”4

The Crime

An example of the type of open criminality practiced by the North Carolina Hizballah cell exists in the blatant manner in which the group engaged in cigarette smuggling. In early 1995, while off duty working in uniform at a tobacco shop, Detective Fromme observed something that his instincts told him went beyond a typical criminal operation. He watched while several Middle Eastern

Special Agent Schwein is the

FBI liaison to the U.S. Special Operations Command at MacDill

Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida.

Mr. Fromme, a retired detective,

currently serves as a senior consultant with a private fi rm

in McLean, Virginia.

individuals entered the store carrying plastic grocery bags containing $20,000 to $30,000 in cash and bought massive quantities of cigarettes.

During the next few months, Detective Fromme began to document the activities of these people as they continued to purchase large amounts of ciga-rettes on an almost daily basis. They carried large volumes of cash and bought anywhere from 1,000 to 4,500 cartons of ciga-rettes at a time. After loading their purchases in cars, vans, or trucks, they took the interstate toward Virginia or Tennessee. Detective Fromme followed them to the North Carolina state line to detail that the individuals had crossed into an adjoining state, thereby potentially violat-ing federal law.


He contacted Charlotte ATFagents who advised him thatwhat he had uncovered wasmost likely a cigarette diver-sion ring, a scheme to purchaselarge amounts of cigarettes instates where the tax is low, suchas Virginia and North Carolina,and transport them to northernstates, such as Michigan, NewYork, and Pennsylvania, wheretaxes are much higher.5 Typical-ly, a carton of cigarettes costing$14 in North Carolina wouldsell for $28 in Michigan. Takingthese cartons to Michigan bythe thousands, they were mak-ing an average of $13,000 profi tper van load, and the group wascapable of shipping as many asthree van loads per day.

In September 1996, ATFopened an offi cial investigationand signed a memorandum ofunderstanding with the IredellCounty Sheriff’s Offi ce, whichassigned Detective Frommeto the ATF on a permanentfull-time basis. This markedthe fi rst formal collaborationamong law enforcement agen-cies in the case and resultedin an investigative frameworkand the collection of extensiveevidence that readily augmentedthe intelligence investigationsbeing simultaneously conductedby the FBI. In turn, intelligencethe FBI developed supportedsubsequent criminal investiga-tions by the Immigration andNaturalization Service (INS)and the U.S. Department of

State’s Diplomatic SecurityService (DSS) of possible viola-tions of visa, immigration, andmarriage fraud. As the investi-gation expanded and additionalorganizations joined, it becameapparent that the efforts of thecombined agencies were mutu-ally supportive.

the investigation uniquely suitedto their areas of expertise. Thisdivision of labor proved to bea highly effi cient and effectiveway of doing business. As anexample, INS and DSS handledthe immigration, visa, and mar-riage fraud; ATF and the IredellCounty Sheriff’s Offi ce focusedon the cigarette smuggling andmoney laundering; and the FBIdeveloped the racketeering andterrorism-related charges.

The sheer breadth andscope of the criminal activ-ity conducted by the CharlotteHizballah cell provided enoughevidence for the U.S. Attorney’sOffi ce to charge the suspectsunder the racketeer infl uencedcorrupt organization (RICO)statutes, which were designedto break up criminal enterprisesand require proof of an ongoingpattern of criminal activity andevidence that the coconspira-tors are associated in fact. Asidefrom the evidence document-ing the cell’s ongoing patternof criminality, the investigationalso gathered information thatlinked individuals to each otherand to Hizballah. The NorthCarolina cell met weekly ateach others’ homes ostensiblyfor religious prayer meetingsand often watched Hizballah-produced videotapes, whichcell leader Mohamad Ham-moud used to solicit donations.At these meetings, the cell alsodiscussed and shared techniquesfor conducting various criminal

The Collaboration

By the time DetectiveFromme had the fateful meetingwith the FBI agents in 1999, theagencies with mutual investiga-tive interests in the subjects hadbegun formally sharing infor-mation. At that point, the scopeof the investigation clearly wasso large that no single organiza-tion or agency could effectivelypiece everything together. Whatemerged was an unprecedentedcollaborative effort involvingmore than 16 separate local,state, federal, and internationallaw enforcement agencies andintelligence services. Each orga-nization worked the aspects of

”

Each organizationworked the aspectsof the investigation

uniquely suitedto their areas of

expertise.

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December 2007 / 23

activities, such as cigarette-smuggling routes and tactics and procedures for committing credit card, identity, marriage, visa, and immigration fraud. Employing the RICO statutes to disrupt or dismantle an opera-tional terrorist cell set a prec-edent, allowing the investigators to defi ne the group as a Hizbal-lah cell and to seize evidence during the execution of search warrants that could be used to prove the elements of the mate-rial support violations.

To connect the cell to Hizballah, the investigation leveraged disparate and seem-ingly unconnected investiga-tive efforts to support larger operational goals. Cell member Said Harb became the linch-pin between the fund-raising conducted in Charlotte and procurement activities directed by Hizballah in Vancouver, Canada. Harb came to the at-tention of U.S. law enforcement offi cials, specifi cally the ATF, as a result of his involvement in the cigarette-smuggling ring. Subsequent investigation by the FBI determined his heavy involvement in numerous visa, marriage, and immigration frauds and in organized identity, credit, and bank frauds. Harb attended meetings Hammoud hosted with the Charlotte cell and personally couriered money for Hammoud to a Hizballah military commander in Leba-non. One description of Harb

and his role in the group por-trayed him as “a smooth talker with an innocent air.... Harb was perhaps the most versatile crook of the bunch. He had played a key role in the cell’s criminal activities, personally driving cigarettes to Michigan and rais-ing a lot of money through bank and credit fraud. At one time, he had 12 credit cards and 3 driver’s licenses, all in different names. His cell phone had fi ve distinct rings, each for a sepa-rate identity, and he needed to refer to a notebook to keep track of his myriad of social security numbers and bank accounts.”6

The Canadian Security In-telligence Service (CSIS) also

Mohamad Darwiche (third from left), one of Hammoud’s convicted confederates, poses with Hizballah militia.

A teenage Mohamad Hammoud poses with an automatic rifl e in front of a picture of Ayatollah Kho-meini. Arabic writing on the back of the photograph reads, “Mohamad at Hizballah Center.”

was scrutinizing Harb as a re-sult of his relationship to Moha-mad Dbouk, an Iranian-trained Hizballah operative. Dbouk, an intelligence specialist and propagandist, was dispatched to Canada by Hizballah for the express purpose of obtaining surveillance equipment (video cameras and handheld radi-os and receivers) and military equipment (night-vision devic-es, laser range fi nders, mine and metal detectors, and advanced aircraft analysis tools). CSIS could do little more than moni-tor his activities because Cana-da did not have anything simi-lar to a material support statute at the time and Dbouk and his


accomplices had not violated Canadian law. When Dbouk solicited his old friend Said Harb to assist in purchasing the equipment and to test counter-feit credit cards as a method of doing so, the dynamic changed and the Canadian cell became part of an overarching conspira-cy that violated the U.S. mate-rial support statutes. Canadian authorities subsequently

through the cooperation of a number of U.S. law enforce-ment agencies directly led Harb to plead guilty to violat-ing the material support stat-utes and to subsequently testifyagainst Charlotte cell leader Mohamad Hammoud. In turn, Harb’s testimony helped con-vict Hammoud during his trial on RICO and material support charges.

Ultimately, the investigation led to the indictment of 26 indi-viduals on charges ranging from immigration violations to RICO and material support violations. Cell leader Mohamad Ham-moud was convicted at trial and sentenced to 155 years in fed-eral prison. In addition to being the fi rst case in U.S. history to result in a conviction of an in-dividual charged with violating the material support statutes, as well as the fi rst use of the RICO statutes to disrupt or dismantle an operational terrorist cell, it was one of the few cases where a friendly foreign intelligence service provided its intelligence holdings for use as evidence in a U.S. trial.

Among the other positive outcomes of the investigation, it served as the impetus for the FBI to form the North Caro-lina Joint Terrorism Task Force (NCJTTF). Many of the inves-tigators assigned to work on the Operation Smokescreen case subsequently became charter members of the NCJTTF.

Mohamad Darwiche (right) and another convicted confederate count money likely collected from selling contraband cigarettes.

Mohamad Darwiche (left) and Mohamad Hammoud (right) stand at the back fence of the White House in Washington, D.C.

provided the United States with transcripts and photo-graphs to support the indict-ment and prosecution of Harb, Dbouk, and others involved in the conspiracy.

The Consequences

This unprecedented col-laboration between CSIS and the FBI and the overwhelm-ing criminal case developed

December 2007 / 25

Detective Fromme offeredthis observation, “This caseserves to show the importanceof law enforcement agenciescoming together and workingas a team. I can say withoutreservation that everyoneinvolved in the case left theiregos at the door. It was a perfectexample of how an investiga-tion should be conducted.”Detective Ken DeSimone of theCharlotte-Mecklenburg PoliceDepartment and assigned to theinvestigation remarked aboutthe strength of the collabora-tion between the agencies, “Iwas a little intimidated the fi rsttime I traveled with the FBIto Canada for meetings withCSIS. After all, I’m just a localcop and I fi nd myself sittingin a big conference room atthe headquarters of a foreignintelligence service discuss-ing policy issues relating tothe sharing of information andintelligence to support interna-tional terrorism operations andprosecutions. What impressedme the most is that not onlydid the FBI treat me as a fullpartner but the CSIS operativesseemed genuinely interested inmy perspective and opinion as alocal police offi cer.”7

Conclusion

At its heart, OperationSmokescreen remains an ex-cellent example of the kind ofinteragency collaboration andcooperation necessary to ef-fectively combat transnational

crime and terrorism in today’sinterconnected world. As thecase illustrates, terrorists do notjust use major cities to carryout their activities but also canoperate in small towns. Becauseof this, local law enforcementoffi cers play a key role in pro-tecting the nation because theyoften are fi rst to detect criminalactivity that may be part of alarger terrorist plot. But, no lawenforcement or intelligenceagency can have all of thepieces at hand to dismantle sucha plot on its own.

”

Ultimately,the investigation ledto the indictment of

26 individuals….

“

Endnotes

1 As the literal translation of its name

suggests, Hizballah or “The Party of God”

is a religious terrorist organization formed

in the early 1980s to organize Shiite

fundamentalists in opposition to the Israeli

occupation of Lebanon. Hizballah sees

the use of violence as a sacramental act or

divine duty executed in response to a theo-

logical imperative. Hizballah has repeat-

edly shown that terrorist tactics, such as

suicide bombings, airline hijackings, and

kidnappings, are justifi able in furtherance

of their ideology. See, Bruce Hoffman, In-

side Terrorism (New York, NY: Columbia

University Press, 1998), 94. Former CIA

Director George Tenet compared them

with al Qaeda when he stated, “Hizbal-

lah as an organization with capability and

worldwide presence is [al Qaeda’s] equal,

if not a far more capable organization.

I actually think they are a notch above in

many respects.” Deputy Secretary of State

Richard Armitage further warned of the

serious threat posed by Hizballah, “Hizbal-

lah may be the ‘A’ team of terrorists and

maybe al Qaeda is the ‘B’ team...they are

global and can reach out when they are

ready.” See, “Hizballah: The A Team of

Terror,” American Israel Public Affairs

Committee Near East Report, October 11,

2004, 72.2 For additional details on Operation

Smokescreen, see Tom Diaz and Barbara

Newman, Lightning Out of Lebanon:

Hizballah Terrorists on American

Soil (New York, NY: Presidio Press,

2006).3 David E. Kaplan, “Homegrown Ter-

rorists: How a Hizballah Cell Made Mil-

lions in Sleepy Charlotte,” U.S. News and

World Report, March 10, 2003, 31.4 Daniel Pipes, Militant Islam Reaches

America (New York, NY: W.W. Norton

and Company, 2003), 198.5 For additional information, see Dean

T. Olson, “Financing Terror,” FBI Law

Enforcement Bulletin, February 2007, 1-5.6 Michael Crowley, “Blood Money,”

Reader’s Digest, February 2004, 200.7 Detective Ken DeSimone, interview

by author, June 19, 2007.

On that spring day in 1999,Detective Fromme could notpossibly have imagined thathis cigarette-smuggling inves-tigation would help form thefoundation of an unprecedentedpartnership among local, state,federal, and foreign law en-forcement offi cials and intelli-gence offi cers. By sharing infor-mation and joining forces, suchcollaborative efforts representa unifi ed approach that aptlysymbolizes America’s stalwartdetermination to remain strongin the face of serious threats.


The National Institute of Justice offers Incident Commander: A Training Simula-tion for Public Safety Personnel, a CD-ROM that provides simulation training forpublic safety incident commanders in developing action plans and implementingthem in various crisis scenarios through resource allocation and the assignment oftasks. The training can be done alone or with up to 16 players. Each participant canchoose to manage squads from one or more agencies; take control of one or moreincident command sections; or be an observer. After a tutorial on how to manage anemergency-response scenario through the provided software and computer tools,crisis situations are addressed from the perspective of the Incident Commander Sys-tem. The scenarios portrayed include a school hostage situation, a courthouse bombthreat, a chemical spill, and a severe storm. Each situation offers different challengesto the players. Some scenarios emphasize law enforcement. In others, fi refi ghting isthe greatest challenge. Some may confront players with downed power lines, water-main breaks, noxious chemicals, and the media. Recognizing the greatest threats anddealing with them by effective use of the Incident Command System and appropriatedeployment of responders are the keys to success and a high score in the training. Cri-sis scenarios are managed through detailed maps displayed on the computer screen.These maps include icons that can be selected and moved to perform certain tasksat various locations. Copies ofthe program can be obtained bycontacting the National Crimi-nal Justice Reference Serviceat 800-851-3420 or http://www.ncjrs.gov. Also, authorizedpublic safety agencies canregister to receive the softwarefree of charge at http://www.incidentcommander.net/.

Computer-Based Training

The Offi ce for Victims of Crime presents ServingCrime Victims with Disabilities, a DVD containing twopopular award-winning videos originally produced in De-cember 2002 and no longer available in VHS form. “TheTime Is Now” helps crime victim service providers reachout and serve people with disabilities. “Meet Us WhereWe Are” presents fi rst-person accounts of how crimeaffects people with disabilities and educates disabilityservice providers and people with disabilities about crimevictims’ rights and resources. These videos, along withtranscripts, and DVD copies can be obtained by contactingthe National Criminal Justice Reference Service at 800-851-3420 or http://www.ncjrs.gov.

Crime Victims

Bulletin Reports

December 2007 / 27

The Offi ce of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention introduces Tool Kitfor Creating Your Own Truancy Reduction Program, which serves as a resourcefor communities striving to address the problem. The fi rst chapter provides anoverview of the issue, as well as information pertaining to the national problem oftruancy, including the extent of the issue, its short- and long-term consequences,contributing factors, and the types of efforts that have helped to improve schoolattendance. The next chapter examines how truancy programs are defi ned, aswell as the elements of evaluation design and data collection methods. This isfollowed by guidelines for program development. The third chapter begins withschool policies that engage students and families. Those discussed range frommodifying school grading policies related to attendance to creating alternatives toout-of-school suspension and expulsion. The fourth, and fi nal, chapter providespractical ideas for managing truancy cases, improving school attendance, increas-ing parent and community involvement, creating alternatives to juvenile deten-tion, and working with other agencies to keep kids in school. This report is avail-able online at http://ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/publications/truancy_toolkit.html or through

the National CriminalJustice Reference Ser-vice at 800-851-3420 orhttp://www.ncjrs.gov.

Juvenile Justice

EducationAddressing Shortfalls in Forensic Science Education, a

fact sheet presented by the National Institute of Justice, de-scribes the benefi ts of an accredited forensic science educa-tion program. Many crime labs fi nd that new graduates fromthese programs are not properly trained. A committee led bythe American Academy of Forensic Science has developedan evaluation and accreditation process to help universitiesimprove their curriculum. An accredited curriculum gives em-ployers, such as crime lab directors, standard criteria to assesswhether an applicant is qualifi ed. This report is available athttp://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffi les1/nij/216886.pdf or by contactingthe National Criminal Justice Reference Service at 800-851-3420 or http://www.ncjrs.gov.

The tragic terrorist at-tacks on September 11,2001, highlighted the

inadequacy of information shar-ing among many law enforce-ment and intelligence agencies.Since then, the law enforcementand intelligence communitieshave worked to combine theirresources, experience, and ex-pertise to pursue terrorists andgather intelligence to thwart fur-ther attacks. A fundamental part

of these efforts and a focal pointfor sharing information are statefusion centers. An overviewof these facilities, along with acase example of how the NewYork State Intelligence Cen-ter develops a comprehensiveview of the threat environment,illustrates how fusion centersplay an integral role in assist-ing law enforcement agenciesachieve their mission to protectthe citizens they serve.

“We are working toward an eraof increasing collaboration, andfusion centers are a great ex-ample of how partnerships canachieve great success.”

—Secretary Michael Chertoff,

U.S. Department of Homeland Security1

A Look at Fusion CentersWorking Together to Protect AmericaBy BART R. JOHNSON


© Photodisc

December 2007 / 29

DEFINITION OFA FUSION CENTER

A fusion center is “a col-laborative effort of two ormore agencies that provideresources, expertise, and infor-mation to the center with thegoal of maximizing their abilityto detect, prevent, investigate,and respond to criminal andterrorist activity.”2 Althoughfusion centers may vary fromstate to state, most includestate and local law enforcementdepartments, public health andsafety organizations, and federalagencies, such as the FBI, U.S.Department of Homeland Secu-rity, and the Bureau of Alcohol,Tobacco, Firearms, and Explo-sives. Bridging the gap betweenstate and local agencies and thefederal government, fusion cen-ters facilitate real-time informa-tion sharing. Together, offi cers,agents, and intelligence analystswork side by side collectingintelligence, analyzing criminaltrends and terrorist threats, anddisseminating information.

But, fusion centers providemore than just timely intelli-gence. They allow agencies tosee both the macro and microview of the threat environment.Understanding the connec-tions beyond state and nationalborders enhances the ability topredict and prevent crime andterrorism, rather than just react-ing to such incidents. It alsohelps narrow the gaps between

potential threats and the abilityto meet those threats.

Because fusion centers alsolook at information from local-level criminal activity, they cananalyze it to determine whetherany connection exists betweenseemingly typical low-levelcrime and terrorist activity.For example, in the summer of2005, a group of men in Tor-rance, California, engaged ina series of gas station robber-ies. Although on the surfacethese appeared to be typicallocal crime scenes, they helpedfi nance a larger terrorist plot toattack military and Jewish fa-cilities. As this case illustrates,no neat lines divide criminaland terrorist activities. Thisshows why fusion centers are sovital in helping agencies gain amore comprehensive picture ofthe threats they face.

Although the more than 40existing fusion centers sharea common mission, they alsohave unique characteristics.The Fusion Center Guidelineswere created to ensure that eachfacility is established and oper-ated consistently.3 They respectthe individual qualities whileenabling the centers to operatewithin a common framework—similar to the construction of agroup of buildings where eachis unique, yet a standard setof codes and regulations areadhered to regardless of thesize or shape of the structure.The guidelines and relatedmaterials provide assistance tocenters as they prioritize andaddress threats posed in theirspecifi c jurisdictions for allcrime types, including terror-ism. In addition, the guidelineshelp administrators develop

“

”Colonel Johnson, deputy superintendent in charge of fi eld command for the NewYork State Police, currently serves as the vice chair of the U.S. Department of

Justice’s Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative Advisory Committee.

A fundamental partof these efforts

and a focal point forsharing information

are state fusioncenters.


policies, manage resources, andevaluate services associatedwith the jurisdiction’s fusioncenter. Overall, these guidelinesfacilitate enhanced coordinationefforts, stronger partnerships,and improved crime-fi ghtingand antiterrorism capabilities.

EXAMPLE OF AFUSION CENTER

How do all of these poli-cies and functions translate intopractice? A case example fromthe New York State IntelligenceCenter (NYSIC) shows a fusioncenter in action.4 In July 2004,the NYSIC received an anony-mous call about a suspiciousuniversity student in upstateNew York. The caller indicatedthat the student, a senior whoheaded the Muslim StudentAssociation, on several occa-sions had expressed his hatredfor America and was only inthe country to teach Islamicreligion. While researching thecase, a New York State trooperfound a link between this stu-dent and a report concerningtwo Middle Eastern males whoclaimed to be Israeli nationalsinquiring about the location ofa nearby synagogue becausethey were musicians hired fora wedding occurring there. Alicense plate check of their ve-hicle linked the registrant to thesame house as the suspiciousuniversity student. The NYSICforwarded this information tothe FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task

services to the entire New Yorklaw enforcement communityin an all-crimes environmentthrough state, federal, public,and private information data-bases. Offi cers who suspectterrorist links can investigatethose leads and contributeinformation regarding suspi-cious activities. Additionally,the NYSIC compiles data anddisseminates intelligence andadvance warnings to law en-forcement agencies statewideregarding possible terrorist andcriminal incidents.

Stakeholder Support

A key to the success ofan intelligence fusion centeris the support of stakeholdersin regional law enforcementorganizations. As a multia-gency endeavor, the NYSIC hasreceived the full support of theNew York State Association ofChiefs of Police, the New YorkState Sheriffs’ Association, andmany federal and state agencies.

The ability of organizers toencourage the participation andcooperation of multiple agen-cies represents another highlyinfl uential factor. Located nearthe state’s capital, the NYSICpools the resources of the NewYork State Police; the NewYork State Offi ce of HomelandSecurity; and a number of otherfederal, state, and local law en-forcement organizations to gath-er data in a centralized location.Agencies throughout New York

Force (JTTF) to investigatefurther. With access to criminaland intelligence informationthroughout the state, the fusioncenter connected these seem-ingly unrelated incidents.

The NYSIC serves as anerve center for all calls com-ing into the statewide terrorismtip line. Those with a suspectednexus to terrorism are forward-ed to the JTTF for further in-vestigation through the NYSICCounterterrorism Center, which

is designed to expand counter-terrorism efforts by providingreal-time information exchangeof terrorism threats, indicators,and warnings. This reciprocalinitiative has proven instrumen-tal in improving investigativeand reporting efforts by lawenforcement offi cers statewide.

The center actively developsand disseminates law enforce-ment-sensitive intelligenceproducts and supplies terror-ism and criminal intelligence

”

A key to thesuccess of an

intelligence fusioncenter is thesupport of

stakeholders….

“

December 2007 / 31

not only submit information to the NYSIC and make requests for case assistance but contrib-ute personnel to staff the center.

Having both sworn and civilian personnel with knowl-edge and expertise in a variety of designated areas of respon-sibility, the NYSIC acts as a centralized and comprehensive criminal intelligence resource available to assist law enforce-ment agencies 24 hours a day,

7 days a week. It provides both analytical services and general case support, which allows law enforcement offi cers throughout the state to save costly person-nel hours and investigative steps in their criminal cases. Because of the diverse agencies repre-sented, the NYSIC functionally operates as part of a statewide intelligence network. Access to an extensive array of data-bases through a single contact

point is provided by the various components, thereby facilitating the exchange of criminal intel-ligence and information.

In close cooperation with its law enforcement partners, the NYSIC has undertaken an initiative recognized as an important component of the in-telligence process. To that end, the NYSIC has developed intel-ligence collection requirements for terrorism, gangs, narcotics,

10 Simple Steps for Information Sharing

1. Recognize your responsibilities and lead by example.

2. Establish a mission statement and a policy to address developing and sharing information and intelligence data within your agency.

3. Connect to your state criminal justice network and regional intelligence databases and participate in information sharing initiatives.

4. Ensure privacy issues are protected in policy and practice.

5. Access law enforcement Web sites, subscribe to law enforcement Listservs, and use the Internet as an information resource.

6. Provide your agency members with appropriate training on the criminal intelligence process.

7. Become a member of your in-region Regional Information Sharing Systems® (RISS) center.

8. Become a member of the FBI’s Law Enforcement Online (LEO) system.

9. Partner with public and private infrastructure sectors.

10. Participate in local, state, and national intelligence organizations.

Source: U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), Offi ce of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Assistance, in

collaboration with DOJ’s Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, 10 Simple Steps to Help Your Agency

Become a Part of the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan; retrieved from http://it.ojp.gov/documents/

Ten_Steps.pdf for complete document.


guns, and money laundering. Through these established pro-cedures, pertinent information is collected, allowing for it to be analyzed and disseminated to the appropriate stakeholders.

Future Initiatives

Worthwhile information sharing depends on more than just interagency cooperation; it also requires a shared techno-logical standard that enhances the interchange among different computer systems. Participating agencies currently have access to a collective intelligence sys-tem, which stores information about criminal or terrorist activ-ity. Data mining of multiple systems is a capability that the NYSIC has examined at length. This evolving intelligence sys-tem will be accessible not only to all agencies at the NYSIC but throughout the entire state.

Since the NYSIC began in August 2003, its role, responsi-bilities, and integration into the operations of agencies across the state have greatly increased. Other new programs and initia-tives have expanded and will continue to increase the role of the NYSIC in law enforcement operations throughout New York.

CONCLUSION

September 11, 2001, changed the thought process of law enforcement agency heads,

supervisors, and line offi cers regarding the topic of informa-tion collection and exchange. With the realization that ter-rorists and those who support them were operational in and moving freely about the United States, departments recognized they no longer could afford to operate without standards and procedures regarding the identifi cation of indicators and warnings of terrorist and criminal activity. In addition, intelligence and law enforce-ment agencies recognized that a centralized collection and analysis point must be estab-lished to ensure that criminal intelligence is exchanged in a timely, coordinated, and effec-tive manner. The establishment of state fusion centers has been vital to meeting these real-time information-sharing needs.

Endnotes

1 Offi ce of the Director of National

Intelligence News Release No. 07-07,

Keynote Address, First Annual National

Fusion Center Conference, March 2007,

Sandestin, Florida.2 U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), Of-

fi ce of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice

Assistance, in collaboration with DOJ’s

Global Justice Information Sharing Initia-

tive and the U.S. Department of Homeland

Security, Fusion Center Guidelines: Law

Enforcement Intelligence, Public Safety,

and the Private Sector; retrieved from

http://www.iir.com/global/guidelines.htm.3 Ibid.4 Previously called the Upstate New

York Regional Intelligence Center.

TechnologyUpdate

he FBI’s Criminal Justice Information T

Services (CJIS) Division announced the creation of the Law Enforcement Online’s (LEO) 100,000th vetted member account on July 2, 2007. LEO was created in July 1995 when the FBI entered into a cooperative agreement with Louisiana State University in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. LEO continues to provide an advanced technological resource to further the state of the art in law enforce-ment communications capabilities, technologies, and procedures to the inter-national law enforcement community. LEO functions as a conduit for FBI sensi-tive but unclassifi ed (SBU) intelligence information, which supports all of the FBI’s missions, strategic goals, and objectives. LEO forms a cornerstone of the FBI’s Information Sharing Initiative. The LEO network provides an Internet link to international, federal, state, local, and tribal police departments and agencies throughout the world. LEO is a certifi ed and accredited system approved for the dissemination of SBU intel-ligence information.

The Bulletin Notes

Law enforcement officers are challenged daily in the performance of their duties; they face each

challenge freely and unselfishly while answering the call to duty. In certain instances, their actions

warrant special attention from their respective departments. The Bulletin also wants to recognize

those situations that transcend the normal rigors of the law enforcement profession.

Sergeant Land

Officer McKay Officer Rastetter

Nominations for the Bulletin Notes should be based on either therescue of one or more citizens or arrest(s) made at unusual risk to anofficer’s safety. Submissions should include a short write-up (maximumof 250 words), a separate photograph of each nominee, and a letterfrom the department’s ranking offi cer endorsing the nomination. Sub-missions should be sent to the Editor, FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin,FBI Academy, Madison Building, Room 201, Quantico, VA 22135.

One evening, Sergeant Jamie Land of the Elizabethtown, Kentucky,Police Department responded to an emergency call involving a possibledrowning at a local fi tness center. Several juveniles had climbed a fenceand begun swimming in the outdoor pool. Upon arrival, Sergeant Landdetermined that one of the youths was at the bottom of the 14-foot deepend. Quickly, he removed his duty belt and dove into the pool. Because ofthe boy’s body weight, Sergeant Land could not retrieve him on the fi rstdive. However, he was successful on the second attempt. By that time,emergency medical technicians and another offi cer had arrived, and theadditional personnel helped remove the boy from the water. Sergeant Landcontinued with CPR until the juvenile was transported. Unfortunately, theyoung man died approximately 2 weeks later.

While on patrol, Offi cers Michael McKay andMichael Rastetter of the Canton, Ohio, Police Depart-ment observed a large amount of smoke. Subsequent-ly, they determined that the third fl oor of a home wasfully engulfed in fl ames. After getting no response atthe door, the offi cers forced entry. They evacuatedfour people from the fi rst fl oor and returned to rescuetwo teenagers asleep on the second fl oor. Because ofthe quick actions of Offi cers McKay and Rastetter, noone was seriously injured.

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FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin935 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, DC 20535-0001

Offi cial Business

Penalty for Private Use $300

Patch Call

The patch of the Nye County, Nevada, Sheriff’sOffi ce features part of the U.S. fl ag; 9 of the starsand the 11 stripes are in memory of the infamousattacks. The remaining stars represent the heroesof fl ight 93 and the three terrorist targets. The blackbackground behind some of the lettering honorspeace offi cers who have given their lives. The fourrays of the sun in the state seal symbolize mining,agriculture, industry, and scenery.

Incorporated in 1772, the town of Hillsbor-ough, New Hampshire, is named after ColonelJohn Hill. The patch of its police departmentdisplays one of the stone arch bridges featured inthe town, which boasts the largest number in NewEngland. The one pictured spans Gleason Falls.Hillsborough is the birthplace of Franklin Pierce,the 14th president of the United States. His home,built in 1804, today serves as a living museum.