2nd battle of kharkov , may 1942 - kodapa · soviet losses – may 12 ... achtung panzers! ... the...

2nd Battle of Kharkov , May 1942

a TOAW III After Action Report by Robert Widell

INTRODUCTION AND TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction and Table of ContentsThis AAR is written from the Soviet perspective, playing The Operational Art of War, version 3.0.0.17, the Kharkov 42 scenario. The game is a PBEM game versus General Johann Doemann (My opponent as asked to not have is name disclosed)

My disclaimer is the following: “I have no sympathies for the Nazis, the Fascists, the terror of Stalin and/or others. The text and the images in this document are there to add some drama to a PBEM game of The Operational Art of War III”With that being said, let the game begin....

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OKMOBdMGrand AdmiralErich Raeder

HochseeflotteGrand AdmiralErich RaederBaltische FlotteVice AdmiralAlfred SaalwächterUnterseebootsflotteRear AdmiralKarl DönitzTransportflotteRear AdmiralWalter Warzecha

I. U-BootflotilleRear AdmiralKarl DönitzII. U-BootflotilleRear Admiralvon NordeckIII. U-BootflotilleRear AdmiralKurt FrickeU-Boot IVU-Boot IIU-Boot III

INTRODUCTION AND TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of ContentsIntroduction and Table of Contents......................................................................................................................2Prelude to Stalingrad.................................................................................................................................................4

Unit Colors and PBEM Players........................................................................................................................................................... 4Significant Events.................................................................................................................................................................................. 4Technical Information.......................................................................................................................................................................... 4Historical Background.......................................................................................................................................................................... 5

The Soviet Plan..........................................................................................................................................................6Intelligence Reports............................................................................................................................................................................... 7

Executing the Plan.....................................................................................................................................................8The morning of May 13...................................................................................................................................................................... 10

Soviet Losses – May 12............................................................................................................................................................................................................... 12The fighting of May 13....................................................................................................................................................................... 13

Updated Plans.............................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 16Axis activity – May 13................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 17

Surprises and Success - May 14......................................................................................................................................................... 19Belgorod and Lyptsy.................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 20Balakleya....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 21The Romanians and Petropavlovka........................................................................................................................................................................................... 21Barvenkovo – Kramatorsk – Konstantinovka......................................................................................................................................................................... 22

Achtung Panzers! May 15................................................................................................................................................................... 23Soviet Orders for May 15........................................................................................................................................................................................................... 24Making a difference in Belgorod?.............................................................................................................................................................................................. 25Holding the line in Lyptsy.......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 26Uncertainty in Chuguyev and Balakleya.................................................................................................................................................................................... 26Semenovka to Petropavlovka and Kramatorsk area............................................................................................................................................................... 26

Losses are piling up - May 16............................................................................................................................................................ 26Attacks and Counterattacks at Belgorod and Lyptsy............................................................................................................................................................... 27Confusion between Chuguyev and Balakleya........................................................................................................................................................................... 28Breakthrough at Semenovka....................................................................................................................................................................................................... 29Opportunities between Pavlograd and Petropavlovka?.......................................................................................................................................................... 29

May 17 – The loss of the 41st Rifle Division.................................................................................................................................. 29The Soviet plan to disturb the German offensive.................................................................................................................................................................... 30

May 18................................................................................................................................................................................................... 32May 19 to May 23 – The Retreating................................................................................................................................................. 34May 24 and 25 – The End.................................................................................................................................................................. 34

Summary and conclusion of the battle.................................................................................................................36Losses.................................................................................................................................................................................................... 36

Soviet Losses................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 36Axis Losses................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 36

Comparing the Historical outcome with the game............................................................................................37Recommendations for Scenario Development..................................................................................................38References.................................................................................................................................................................39

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PRELUDE TO STALINGRAD

Prelude to StalingradThe Soviet 1942 spring offensive from the Izyum Bulge

Date: May 1942

Location: Eastern Front

Map scale: 10km per hex

Time scale: 1 Day turns

Unit Scale: Regiment/Division

Length: 14 Turns

Scenario design by: Doug Bevard

Unit Colors and PBEM PlayersSovietArmy - Red on Red

Guards - Pink on Red

Played by: Robert Widell

AxisGerman - Grey on Grey

Romanian - White on Grey

Played by: General Johann Doemann

Significant EventsChance of additional Soviet replacements if Soviets occupy Belgorod (26,5).

Chance of additional Soviet replacements if Soviets occupy Taranovka (22,18).

Chance of additional Soviet replacements if Soviets occupy Liptsy (26,11).

Axis supplies reduced if Soviets capture Denepetrovsk (6,40).

Axis supplies reduced if Soviets capture Poltava (2,17).

Chance 6th Romanian Corps will be withdrawn if Soviets breakthrough Romanian position.

Technical InformationThe game was played with The Operational Art of War III, version 3.0.0.17

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PRELUDE TO STALINGRAD

Historical BackgroundIn the spring of 1942 the attention of both sides was focused on the great bulge of Izyum, south of Kharkov, the fateful setting of future decisive battles for the Germans as well as the Russians.

For the purpose of gaining a proper starting-line for their planned summer offensive of 1942 toward the Caucasus and Stalingrad, Führer Directive No.41 had ordered that the Soviet bulge on both sides of Izyum should be eliminated by a pincer operation. The Germans had made a simple plan: the Sixth Army under General Paulus was to attack from the north, and von Kleist's Group with units of the First Panzer Army and Seventeenth Army was to attack from the south. These forces were to pinch off the Izyum bulge and annihilate the Soviet Armies trapped in it. The code word for this plan was "Fredericus."

But the Russians too had a plan and had prepared an attack with strong forces that they hoped would decide the outcome of the war. With five Armies and a whole armada of armored formations they intended to strike from the Izyum bulge and, north of it, from the Volchansk area, and burst through the German front with two wedges. In a big outflanking operation the city of Kharkov, the administrative center of Ukrainian heavy industry, was to have been retaken. Simultaneously they would repeat their earlier attempt of snatching Dnepropetrovsk and Poltava from the Germans. Through these two traffic centers ran the roads and railways and all supplies for the German Armies on the southern wing. Their loss would precipitate a disaster.

The question was merely: who would strike first, who would win the race against time? The German timetable envisaged 18 May as the day for the attack, but the Soviets were quicker. On 12 May they mounted their pincer operation against the German Sixth Army with surprisingly strong forces.

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Illustration 2: General Friedrich Paulus - Commander of the German Sixth Army

Illustration 3: Marshal of the Soviet Union Semyon Timoshenko - Commander of the Soviet forces in the 2nd

battle of Kharkov

THE SOVIET PLAN

The Soviet PlanThe Kharkov area was a pivotal area on the Eastern Front, sitting astride two important strategic axes towards Kursk and the Donbas. The STAVKA had decided that to regain the strategic initiative during the spring of 1942, offensive action should be taken before German forces had time to refit and initiate their own summer offensive. The Kharkov area was chosen because of its strategic importance and because it was felt that German forces in the area were particularly weak following their actions to combat the Russian winter offensive. However, the German 6th and 1st Panzer Armies were assembling in the Kharkov area in preparation for an offensive against the Barvenkovo salient, operation 'Fredericus'.

The area is traversed by the Northern Donets River, along whose banks run the forward edge of both side's defenses. Russian forces had established two significant bridgeheads on the river, one to the south of Kharkov in the Barvenkovo area and one north of Volchansk. German forces meanwhile also occupied one bridgehead to the southeast of Kharkov at Chuguev.

The Russians employed the forces of two Fronts for the operation. The northern shock group was formed by forces of the Southwestern Front, consisting of the 6th, 21st, 28th and 38th Armies. Forces of the Southern Front consisting of the 6th, 9th and 57th Armies formed the southern shock group, which occupied the Barvenkovo salient.

The Soviet Plan was basically to move with force against the Germans and attempt a substantial and decisive breakthrough as quickly as possible. The Soviet High Command decided to initiate a massive movement across the whole front line. The reasons where that the composition of the German forces was not completely well known, and a breakthrough at almost any location would most likely lead to the capture of one or more key locations and also the potential to surround German units defending remote locations along the front

In the north, the 28th Army got the orders to seize control over Belgorod, a key railway junction that would, if it stayed in German hands allow rapid deployment of reinforcements to an area in which the Soviets where weak. In parallel, the 28th Army should capture Liptsy and prepare for an assault on Kharkov, another key location into which the Germans could send reinforcements by train

In the south, the 6th Army was ordered to probe north in the direction of Taranovka, but the key focus was to be to avoid the bridgehead from being outflanked. The bulk of the German forces was believed to be deployed opposing the 6th Army, so the order was also to maintain and tie as many German units as possible along the current front line, but be prepared to take any offensive opportunities

Further south, the Soviets felt they had to use the believed weakness of the Romanian forces, and the 6th Cav Corps along with the 57th Army was ordered to attempt a multi spearhead breakthrough

Finally, the situation in the south did not look promising at the start of the attack as many units had failed to reach their initial positions. The 2nd Cav Corps, the South Front Reserves, the 9th Army and the 37th Army was ordered to secure defensive positions along the current front line and establish a defensive perimeter. If possible, these units would attempt the seizure of better defensive positions , but since this would involve creating another bridgehead, it had low priority and would only be attempted if intelligence showed very weak opposition

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THE SOVIET PLAN

Intelligence ReportsThe intelligence reports talked about German forces of regimental strength defending Belgorod. There was also and Anti Tank battalion located in the town. Further south, just east of Lyptsy was the 513th

Infantry Regiment which was part of the German 294th Infantry Division

Chuguyev was defended by at least two German infantry regiments and one anti tank battalion, while further to the southeast another infantry regiment, the 132nd supported by an anti tank battalion. These two units were part of the 44th Infantry Division

Defending Balakleya and the 1st and 3rd Infantry Regiment and one anti tank battalion of the 3rd

Infantry Division

The main front to the west of the Soviet bridgehead was defended by regiments from the 113th Infantry Division, the 454th Security Division, the 260th Infantry Division. All in all, the estimated force was 7 regiments with two anti tank battalions attached

Further south was an estimated 7 regiments of the Romanian 4th, 2nd and 20th Infantry Divisions

In Petropavlovka was the German 525th Infantry Regiment with an attached anti tank battalion (both of the 298th Infantry Divison), and just south of Barvenkovo was the 518th Infantry Regiment of the 295th

Infantry Divison

On the far east limit of the area of operation were two infantry regiments and one anti tank battalion most likely belonging to the 257th Infantry Division, and in Konstantinovka another infantry regiment, and anti tank battalion, and and an artillery regiment was located

Finally, at least two more infantry regiments and one anti tank battalions was reported to be present at Dnepropetrovsk

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EXECUTING THE PLAN

Executing the Plan

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Illustration 4: The STAVKA plan as of May 1942, including intelligence reports of German and Romanian forces

EXECUTING THE PLAN

On the morning of May 12, the Soviet attack was launched along more or less the complete front line. Starting from the the north, the 28th Army Reserves moved on Belgorod. Some minor attacks from the Luftwaffe, and a confirmed presence of the German 79th Infantry Division, but Belgorod seems to be comparatively lightly defended, and the Reserves may see some real action within 24 hours. South of Belgorod, the rest of the 28th Army run into trouble as a firmly defended line is quickly identified long before the Soviet units reach Lyptsy. This is most likely the German 294th and 297th Infantry Divisions. Based on what the enemy has hidden in Kharkov, this area can turn out to be extremely problematic

The 3rd Guard Cavalry Corps probed the east shore of the Donets River, and immediately identified elements of the 297th Infantry Division and the 71st Infantry Division. Crossing the river would be suicidal so the cavalry division took up defensive positions along the river to prevent a German crossing

The conclusion of the initial operations in this area is that the 28th Army Reserves must strike hard against Belgorod and attempt to push south along the road towards Kharkov. This will be supported by the rest of the 28th Army attempting a flanking maneuver north of Lyptsy. This will most likely be conducted by the 45th and 90th Tank Brigade and the 244th Rifle Division while the rest of the 28th Army secure the current front line from German counterattacks

As units from the 6th Army probe north from their positions towards Taranovka, they only encounter what seems to be light German resistance in the form of a single infantry regiment. This may be an opportunity to increase the size of the Soviet bridgehead and maybe also open a path to the German rear areas. However, this would be a high risk venture due to the large risk of a German counterattack through the thinly spread Soviet units in the area, and the large concentration of German units directly to the south of the probing 6th Army units

As was expected, the Romanian forces did not hold against the 57th Army when the attack started, and a significant breach of the Romanian line was achieved immediately in the opening hours of the battle

More surprisingly, in the southeast area of the theater, the Soviets captured Slavyansk with very little resistance

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Illustration 5: The situation in the Belgorod and Lyptsy area in the morning of May 12. Updated Soviet plans and Intelligence information

EXECUTING THE PLAN

The morning of May 13The intelligence reports suggest that German reinforcements are being moved towards the front in the Petroplavlovsk area, where units from the 97th Lt Infantry Division has been observed. Units are also being brought to face the Soviets directly west of Barenkovo. These German reinforcements seem to belong the 384th Infantry Divisions, indicating there are now at least two German divisions in this area that was previously unaccounted for.

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Illustration 6: The situation in the south area of the theater as of May 12

Attempt flanking move here

Hold this linefor now

Expand breachin Romaniandefense lines

Move Soviet frontfurther south

Expand new Sovietbridgehead

Some reservesare available here

EXECUTING THE PLAN

The situation at Konstantinovka had become severe as the German 101st Light Infantry Division had crossed the Donest River and forced several Soviet divisions from the 37th Army to retreat. This had lead to the establishment of a new German bridgehead at Konstantinovka and in increasing risk of a flanking maneuver. On the positive side, the Soviets still had possesion of Slavyansk, which posted an opportunity to move south along the west shore of the Donets to disturb the German buildup in the Konstantinovka bridgehead

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Illustration 7: Situation on the morning of May 13 with Updated intelligence reports

28th ArmyReserves

97th Inf Div

384th Inf Div

101st Inf Div

9th Inf Div

257th Inf Div

295th Inf Div

298th Inf Div

20th Inf Div

2nd Inf Div

4th Inf Div

260th Inf Div

454th Sec Div

113th Inf Div

305th Inf Div

44th Inf Div

71st Inf Div

297th Inf Div

294th Inf Div

??? Inf Div

79th Inf Div

??? Inf Div

28th Army

3rd GD CavCorps

38th Army

38th Army

3rd Cav Corps

6th Army

6th Army

VI Cav Corps

57th Army

57th Army

South FrontReserves

2nd Cav Corps

9th Army

9th Army

37th Army

EXECUTING THE PLAN

Further west, the Romanians seemed to be pulling forces out of the front lines and away from the attacking Soviet forces. Intelligence reports said an additional German division had started moving east from Dnepropetrovsk, but it was still uncertain if that division would attempt to stop the penetration of the Romanian lines, or reinforce the German offensive operations in the Petropavlovka – Barvenkovo – Konstantinovka area. This unit would most likely arrive in the next 24 to 36 hours regardless of the final destination as the rail lines was still under German control in the area

It was tempting to initiate a strong offensive operation west of Balakleya where the thinly dispersed German 305th Infantry Division faced units from the Soviet 38th Army, 6th Army and 3rd Cavalry Corps- A breakthrough for the Soviets here would pose a severe threat for the Germans to loose control over Kharkov which would most likely force the Germans to withdraw some units from Belgorod and Chuguyev. The situation in Ghuguyev was hard to assess as units from both sides were dispersed in over a larger area. It was important to prevent the expansion of the German bridgehead without opening up the possibilities for a hostile flanking move

Further north, the area in the triangle between Lyptsy, Volchansk and Belgorod also offered some interesting challenges. Unfortunately a large part of the 28th Army had been forced to stop and reorganize. The 28th Army Reserves seemed to have a possibility to gain control over Belgorod which still seemed very lightly defended

Soviet Losses – May 12The first day of the operation has been more costly than expected, with the most severe losses occurring in the infantry units.

● 311 Rifle Squads

● 124 Mounted Rifle Squads

● 113 AT Rifle Squads

● 69 Medium MG Squads

● 61 Heavy MG Squads

● 56 SMG Squads

● 44 Engineer Squads

In terms of equipment, the heaviest losses had occurred in the Anti Tank units, but also in the Artillery units

● 44 45mm AT Guns

● 5 75 and 75mm AT Guns

● 46 76mm Howitzer and Guns

● 12 122mm ER Guns

● 29 82mm Mortars

● 51 120mm Mortars

● 20 Dual AAMG's

● 4 Truck Dual SPMAAG's

● 4 37mm AA Guns

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EXECUTING THE PLAN

● 72 Horse Teams

● 127 Trucks

● 1 KV-I

● 1 T34/76

Finally, the Soviet Air Force reported some losses as well

● 2 I-16

● 2 Il-4

● 3 LaGG-3

● 2 Mig-3

● 7 Pe-2

● 1 Yak-1

Most of these losses was judged to be possible to recover using replacement arriving during the next 48 hours, but if the loss ratios of approximately 10,000 men per day would continue, this campaign may well prove as costly as the rest of the war in the east!

The fighting of May 13The heavy fighting in the outskirts of Belgorod continued in the morning, and it looks as if the Germans will pushed back, and that there will be a possibility to capture the town. The German divisional HQ and the 208th Infantry Regiment was cut off from their main force that retreated into Belgorod. There is now a risk of a counterattack from the German regiment outside Belgorod, as most of the available Soviet forces are preparing to capture the town. Hopefully this situation will be maintained for the coming 12 to 24 hours when the units reorganizing in the south will become available again

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EXECUTING THE PLAN

Further south, Lyptsy was captured by elements from the 28th Army, but the location cannot be reinforced until the reorganization of the northern units of the 28th is done. Hopefully, the town can be held by the 124th Rifle Division for the next 24 hours! Loosing control over both Belgorod and Lyptsy may become a serious blow to the German plans, and Timoshenko will most likely get in touch with the STAVKA and request reinforcements in order to deal a significant blow to the German forces in the area. However, it can be noted that the Artillery Division attached to the 28th Army Reserves is dangerously low on supplies, which may delay a final assault on Belgorod until sufficient artillery support can be provided

The 41st Rifle Division of the 6th Army crossed the Donets west of Balakeya, and immediately, intelligence reported troop movements southeast from Kharkov. No information about size and composition, or even location of the force as of yet, but given how the Germans seems to be organized, it is an Infantry Division deployed as local reserves.

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Illustration 8: The situation in and around Belgorov - May 13

2/28th ArmyReorganizing

28th ArmyReserves

1/28th Army

3rd GD Cav Corps

208th Inf Reg

212th Inf Reg226 Inf Reg

79th Inf DivArt and AT

79th Inf Div HQ

294th Inf Div

297th Inf Div

71st Inf Div

124th Rifle Div

EXECUTING THE PLAN

The Romanian units keep retreating and the breach of their lines becomes larger by the hour. The 106th

Rifle Division of the 57th Army is heading the assault supported by two TK brigades

The whole area between Barvenkovo and Konsatntinovka was consolidated and placed in a defensive mode. The rest of the 9th Army units were moved south to act as reserves in case of further German attacks in the area

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Illustration 9: The situation around Chuguyev - May 13. Estimated movement of German forces inficated

41st Rifle Division

38th TKBrigade

Three InfBattalions

5th Guards Cavalry Div

1/38th Army

132nd Inf Reg

134th Inf Reg

71st Inf Div???

305th Inf Div

2/38th Army

5th Cavalry Corps

EXECUTING THE PLAN

It still remain to be seen what the German 298th and 97th Infantry Divisions will be capable of, and a Soviet attack to capture Petropavlovka may well be initiated in the coming 24 to 48 hours. Such an att, if successful, would place the five German divisions east of Petropavlovka in a very tough supply and logistics situation. If the advance against Pavlograd can continue, this combined with the Soviet forces occupying some of the important junctions west of Lozovaya will hopefully make any larger German operations in the southeast very difficult and time consuming

The report from the Soviet Air Force claim a stunning 42 enemy aircraft destroyed at a loss of 8 of our own so far on May 13

Updated PlansBased on the assessments from the first 24 hours of the operation, the Soviets and Timshenko decided to update the orders to the different field commanders

The new issue of the orders called for the capture of Belgograd, the consolidation and defense of Lyptsy, securing the breach in the Romanian lines, probing the defenses of Petropavlovsk and Konstantinovka while narrowing the alternatives for the axis forces between Tarnovka and Balakleya

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Illustration 10: Situation in the southern parts of the theater - May 13

1/6th Army

2/6th Army

6th Army Reserves

VI Cavalry Corps

1/57th Army57th Army Reserves

99th Rifle Division

106th Rifle Division

7th TK Brigade

2/57th Army

South Front Reserves 2/2nd Cav

Corps

1/2nd Cav Corps

1/9th Army

2/9th Army

1/37th Army

2/37th Army

101st Inf Div

9th Inf Div

257th Inf Div

295th Inf Div

384th Inf Div

97th Inf Div298th Inf Div


???

2nd & 20thInfantry Div

4th Inf Div

260th Inf Div

454th Sec Div

113th Inf Div

Illustration 11: Soviet tank officers plan operations, while gathered around a T-34 Model 1941

EXECUTING THE PLAN

Axis activity – May 13As intelligence reports began coming in to Timshenko and his staff, it quickly became evident that the German forces in the area was not as weak as had first been anticipated. A German Infantry Division was reported moving east between Dnepropetrovsk and Pavlograd. The assessment was that this was the 380th Infantry Division, and that it was currently half way between Dnepropetrovsk and Pavlograd

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Illustration 12: The updated Soviet plan - May 13

EXECUTING THE PLAN

traveling by rail. Already in Pavlograd was, most likely, the 389th Infantry Division which seemed on its way to reinforce the Romanian 2nd and 20th Infantry Divisions which had been pushed out of their positions by the Soviet 57th Army. The next 24 hours would give the answer to if these two German divisions were going to aid the Romanians or prepare for a German attack from Petropavlovka

Even worse was the reports coming in from the northern area, where the 3rd German Panzer Division had been scouted moving out of Akhtyrka, to make a right turn and head for Tomarovka. Their goal was of course to come to the help of the hard pushed German 79th Infantry Division in Belgograd

As for offensive operations, the Axis artillery pounded Soviet positions in the Konstantinovka/Kramatorsk area, south of Balakleya, along the front lines south of Semenovka, north of Petropavlovka and finally immediately to the north of the breach in the Romanian lines

There were no reports of the German units reported to have moved out from Kharkov 24 hours ago, which was good in the sense they had not been deployed against the Soviet forces, but the thought of another German division roaming the countryside with destination unknown was not comfortable

No other German offensive moves had been reported and the Luftwaffe had also been quiet after the loss of the 44 or so aircraft the day before

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EXECUTING THE PLAN

Surprises and Success - May 14Based on the update of the intelligence, the Soviets decided to make some slight changes to the orders of the previous day, but the decision was to stick with the general ideas already communicated to the commanders in the field

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Illustration 13: Updated intelligence report - Morning of May 14

EXECUTING THE PLAN

The change of the plans was that the push for Pavlograd would aim to disrupt the German troop movements and, if possible, make the Germans attack against the well deployed 57th Army before the German divisions had been able to properly deploy for a more controlled operation, alternatively stop the Germans from moving further east. Additional German forces in the Konstantinovka/Kramatorsk area would pose a significant threat to the rear of the Soviet forces

It was stressed that the units in the Belgorod area would be engaged by a German Panzer Division within 36 hours and that the capture of Belgorod before the arrival of this new division was essential to the continued success of the Soviet operation. The 28th Army would also attempt to improve their positions around Lyptsy and prepare for German counterattack

Belgorod and LyptsyIt soon became evident that the Soviet 28th Army Reserves did not occupy a solid enough position to conclude the final assault on Belgorod. The artillery division attached was also running critically low on ammunition. The decision, although not the one the Soviets desired, was to postpone the attack and risk facing the German Panzers. Hopefully the artillery could have received supplies and ammunition, and the positions of the other units could perhaps be improved

Some 60km south of Belgorod, the main force of the 28th Army attempted maneuvers to improve their general positioning, and managed to, to the surprise of the Soviet commanders, catch a large part of the German 294th Infantry Division off guard and surround them in a swift pincher move. The Soviets quickly seized the chance and in 12 hours of bloody fighting, killed, wounded and disabled a large part of the 514th Infantry Regiment and the attached AT battalion. The fighting resulted in some 2000 Soviet infantry soldiers out of action together with minimal losses of equipment and 8 T-34 tanks destroyed. The Germans lost a staggering estimated 4000 soldiers, 50 AT-Guns, 25 Howitzers, 60 Mortars, 20 AA Guns, 10 SdKfz Halftracks, 50 Horse Teams and 30 Trucks. The Soviet 124th Rifle Division in Lyptsy could take a deep breath. At least for the time being, their rear was cleared of enemies, and the way it was cleared was a great victory for the Soviet 28th Army!

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Illustration 14: Belgorod and Lyptsy after the near destruction of the German 514th Infantry Regiment outside Lyptsy

EXECUTING THE PLAN

BalakleyaAnother opportunity appeared right before the eyes of the Soviet 30th Cavalry Division as they probed the area south of Balakleya together with the other units of the 5th Cavalry Corps. The Germans of the 305th Infantry Division surprisingly pulled back as they faced a smaller attack from the Soviet Cavalry. As they did, they exposed their divisional HQ that was currently deployed in Balakley itself. The commander of the Soviet forces in the area decided to risk crossing the Donets as the Germans failed to blow the bridges. The German HQ was forced to retreat north out of Balakleya and the 30th Cavalry Division could secure the town with no losses while the rest of the 5th Cavalry Corps was moved up to cover the south river bank and the rear areas

Meanwhile to the west of Balakleya, elements of the 6th Army pushed the German 108th Infantry Regiment north across the Dnepr, and even with the supply situation for the Soviet 41st Rifle Division and the 38th TK Brigade being poor, it was decided to remain in the positions gained for at least another 24 hours and see if more supplies could be brought to these units. Another, larger flank move could be attempted, but with significant risk for German counterattack. The terrain south of the 41st

Rifle Division, the rest of the 6th Army units is not very suitable for such an attack, but the risk of a major part of the 305th Infantry Division being surrounded might well push the Germans to controversial countermeasures

The Romanians and PetropavlovkaEven further south, where the goal was to reinforce the current positions, and if possible disturb the German movement of reinforcements, the Soviets quickly made contact with what was believed to be elements of the German 389th Infantry Division east of Pavlograd, and it immediately became evident that the Germans would attempt to close the gap in the lines caused by disintegration of the Romanian divisions. The lead unit of the Soviet westbound move, the 255th Rifle Division, found itself in a dangerous position facing the German Division, while still having the remains of the Romanian 2nd and

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Illustration 15: 30thCavalry Division capture Balakleya

5th Cav Corps

2/38th Army

1/38th Army41st Rifle Div

38th TK Brigade

6th Army

44th Inf Div

71st Inf Div

108th Inf Reg

305th Inf Div

Units of the 6th ArmyLow on supply

EXECUTING THE PLAN

20th Divisions threatening the rear and the supply lines. This situation was improved as the 150th Rifle Division divided what was left of the Romanian divisions and pushed them away from the area directly to the north of the 255th Rifle Division. A threatening situation for the Soviets had, within half a day been turned a more than dangerous situation for the, almost, surrounded Romanians

As other units of the 57th Army tested the defenses at Petropavlovka, the retreat south by the German 289th Infantry Division came as a complete surprise to the Soviets. However, another great opportunity had presented itself, and Petropavlovka was quickly occupied by two Rifle Divisions of the 57th Army, and units from the South Front Reserve was moved up to cover the east flank of the 57th Army units in Petropavlovka

Barvenkovo – Kramatorsk – Konstantinovka The line along the Soviet bridgehead did not see much action on May 14. The Soviet units of the 37th

Army pulled away from contact with the German 101st and 9th Infantry Divisions in order to consolidate the defense of the Konstantinovka to Slavyansk line and prevent a German counterattack in this sensitive area

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Illustration 16: The situation along the Romanian front and Petropavlovka - May 14

6th Arny

VI Cav Corps

57th Army

57th Army 2nd Cav Corps

South Front Reserve

4th Inf Div(Retreating)

2nd, 20th Inf Div

20th Inf Div

2nd, 20th Inf Div

389th Inf Div???

389th Inf Div???

106th Rifle Div


EXECUTING THE PLAN

Achtung Panzers! May 15Updated intelligence had now clearly identified units from, not one, but two German Panzer Divisions, the 3rd and the 23rd. Both were operating in the Kharkov to Belgorod area and the first units from these divisions were involved in trying to re-capture Lyptsy, but with no success as the German attackers were beaten back by the 124th Soviet Rifle Division. However, the division needed reinforcements and may even have to withdraw to recover from the heavy fighting it had seen over the last 48 hours. For now, the defense of Lyptsy and the immediate area seemed to be holding up

Units from the 3rd Panzer Division had arrived to the Belgorod area, and the Soviets had to consider a surprise offensive to try to catch the German Tanks off guard. The 1st Guards Division was in a good position to engage the German 3rd PzG Regiment.

It was also evident that the Germans were planning some kind of counterattack as several units across the line was trying to disengage to pull back and regroup. This behavior had been observed in the Balakleya area where units from the 305th Infantry Division was disengaging from the 38th Army units- It was not clear where the 305th would go if they managed to disengage, but a withdrawal might allow them to join with the 23rd Panzer Division for an attack either south of Balakleya in the direction of Lozovenka, or north in the Chuguyev area. The Chuguyev option would included crossign the Donets in the face of well prepared defenders, so the southern alternative sounded like the most likely development at this stage

The same intelligence was coming in from the units along the Petropavlovka to Barvenkovo line along which the German 97th, 295th and 384th Infantry Divisions were attempting to disengage. This was perhaps more worrying than the Balakleya movements as there was a considerable gap between the western units of the Soviet 2nd Cavalry Corps and the eastern units of the same Corps. Some probing and reconnaissance by German units had been reported in the gap. The situation may call for some redeployment of Tank units from the Southern Front Reserves to at least be able to slow any attempts of a breakthrough down

Attacks were also reported by some of the Soviet 6th Army units, but even if the attacks involved some artillery barrage, there was limited danger of a breakthrough with still only three German divisions facing the whole 6th Army, and it may be an attempt from the Germans and their General Paulus to make the Soviets loose focus on the exploitation of the disintegration of the Romanian defenses

Petropavlovka had also been retaken quickly after being seized by the Soviets. Still only one German Regiment in the town, the 527th, but given the worries about an attack in the gap to the east, it was most likely so that no attempt would be made to counterattack the Germans in Petropavlovka until the threat to the flanks of the 9th and 57th Armies was under control.

23




EXECUTING THE PLAN

Soviet Orders for May 15Based on the increasing threats from the German Panzer Divisions, the Soviet orders aimed mainly to disrupt the build up of offensive capability in the key areas of the theater. The 57th Army Reserves at Belgorod was ordered to attack the newly arrived 394th PzG Regiment to prevent them from strengthening the defenses in the town itself

24




Illustration 17: The situation on the morning of the 15th with expected German movements

394th PzG Reg

79th Inf Div

79th Inf Div

3rd Pz Div(HQ + Art) ??

28th Army Reserves

28th Army

3rd Pz Div(Pz + PzG)

201st Pz Reg

294th Inf Div

297th Inf Div

71st Inf Div

44th Inf Div

3rd GD Cav Corps

1/38th Army

2/38th Army

5th Cav Corps

305th Inf Div23rd Pz Recon

23rd Pz Div???

6th Army

VI Cav Corps

113th Inf Div

454th Sec Div

260th Inf Div

4th Inf Div

57th Army

South Front Reserves

2nd Cav Corps

9th Army

37th Army

2nd, 20thInf Div

380th Inf Div???


???

298th Inf Div

97th Inf Div

384th Inf Div

295th Inf Div

257th Inf Div

9th Inf Div

101st Inf Div

EXECUTING THE PLAN

The 57th Army in and around Lyptsy was ordered to ensure that enough defensive preparations had been made to maintain control over the town and protect the flank of the Soviet front and the rear of the 57th Reserves

The Soviet units in the Balakleya area was ordered to attempt pushing more units from the 305th

Infantry Division across the Donets to, in a sense, create an inverted bridgehead. This move coupled with the tactical withdrawal of the advance units of the 6th Army to the west of Balakleya, the 41st Rifle Division and the 38th Tk Brigade, should be enough to secure the area from any attempts to penetrate the relatively thin Soviet defenses and move for Lozovenka

Since there was a few minor attacks along the line of the 6th Army, it was decided to launch a series of attacks along the same line in order to push back some of the weaker German forces and improve the Soviet defensive positions. If this could draw some attention from the Balakleya area and force the Germans to commit their forces along a longer front, any weaknesses should be exploited for a move on Taranovka and Kharkov itself. Should the Germans loose focus in this area, it may prove decisive for the outcome of the battle!

West of Lozovaya, the 57th Army was to continue the dispersal of the Romanian forces. Further to the east, the Southern Front Reserves and the 2nd Cavalry Corps was ordered to secure the gap between the Cavalry Divisions deployed on the road between Petropavlovka and Barvenkovo. Further east it was all about defensive positions and making sure no surprises was about to hit the flanks and rear

Making a difference in Belgorod?The 1st Guards Division quickly forced the 384th PzG Regiment to retreat west from Belgorod, and as the other units of the 28th

Army Reserves took up new positions to protect from German counter moves, it seemed as if cutting the main part of the 79th

Infantry Division that was defending in Belgorod off from their main supply rout could be a possibility to look for. However, with the whereabouts of the bulk of the 3rd Panzer Division not well known, it was back to the defensive position that was the end of the successful operation. The main concern was the very poor supply situation for the artillery. A withdrawal of the artillery towards Volchansk was ordered in the hopes that better artillery support could become available within 72 hours

25




Illustration 18: The situation in and around Belgorod - May 15

EXECUTING THE PLAN

Holding the line in LyptsyWith the German 3rd Panzer Division advancing on the Soviet positions in Lyptsy, it was decided to stay in the defensive positions for at least another 24 hours unless a possibility to exploit any German mistakes would present itself. As for artillery, the situation was the same here, and most of the artillery units was already moved back to Volchansk to rest and refit. In Lyptsy itself, the 124th Infantry Division was in poor shape and was retreating out of Lyptsy. It was now up to the 81st Rifle Division to hold the line. A possible Soviet push from the north of Lyptsy was considered to take some of the pressure off Lyptsy itself, but it was not clear if the units available was strong enough to achieve a significant change to the situation

Uncertainty in Chuguyev and BalakleyaWith a lot of movement from both sides in the area of Chuguyev and Balakleya, this was an area of the theater in which it was hard to predict what was going to happen. Much seemed to depend on how and where the German 23rd Panzer Division would be deployed, but since Kharkov was nearby, it was most likely the amour would be used to ensure that a Soviet advance on Kharkov was stopped before it could even begin. Severe fighting was expected in this area for the next 48 hours, and it could end up being decisive to the outcome of the whole battle!

Semenovka to Petropavlovka and Kramatorsk areaWith the 6th Army trying to open up a gap in the German lines just south of Semenovka, which would enable a move north towards Taranovka, and the 57th Army stretching their supply and logistics lines to the maximum in the pursuit of the scattered Romanians west of Lozovaya, this was also becoming a part of the front that was somewhat confusing and hard to predict. There also seemed to be an option to push for Pavlograd while the situation at Petropavlovka seemed to have turned into somewhat of a stalemate following the hard fights 24 hours ago

Further east, following the reconnaissance movements by German units from the 384th Infantry Division, it seemed as if a German attack in the area was about to come in the next 24 to 48 hours. This was critical, as the whole line from Petropavlovka to Barvenkovo was relatively weakly defended

Losses are piling up - May 16The fighting hardened even more on May 16th as the Germans brought up more reinforcements to the front lines, while the Soviets fought both on the offense and defense at the same time

26




Illustration 19: The situation in the Lyptsy area - May 15

Illustration 20: Situation in the Chuguyev - Balakleya area - May 15

EXECUTING THE PLAN

Attacks and Counterattacks at Belgorod and Lyptsy

27




Illustration 21: Situation at noon on May 16th

79th Inf Div

79th Inf Div

3rd Pz Div

28th Army Reserves

3rd Pz Div23rd Pz Div

294th Inf Div

297th Inf Div71st Inf Div


28th Army

3rd GD Cav Corps

38th Army

5th Cav Corps

23rd Pz Div

6th Army

VI Cav Corps

113th Inf Div454 Sec Div

260th Inf Div

57th Army


2nd Cav Corps

9th Army

37th Army

380th Inf Div

4th Inf Div


298th Inf Div

91st Inf Div

384th Inf Div

14th Pz Div


9th Inf Div

101st Inf Div

384th Inf Div

Major Sovietair raid failsto hurt Germandivision on trains

Luftwaffe unitssouth of Petropavlovkaseverly hit by Sovietartillery

Soviet breakthroughat Semenovka

Soviet movementnorth of Lyptsy

Confused situationin the ChuguyevBalakleya area

94th Inf Div???

57th Army stop toregroup and preparenext move

EXECUTING THE PLAN

There had been some reports of German troop movements north of Belgorod during the night between the 15th and 16th, but as the 1st Guards Division and the 34th Motorized Brigade finally forced the German defenders out of Belgorod, the only German units to the north of the town was some support units (AT and Artillery) of the more and more scattered 79th Infantry Division. The question was now for how long the 28th Army Reserves could hold Belgorod? For some reason, the German 3rd

Panzer Division had been scattered over a large area and had units deployed as far south as Lyptsy, but the Soviets still considered Belgorod to be a prime target for the Germans

The situation around Lyptsy was quickly becoming very confused. The Germans had reinforced the 71st, 294th and 297th Infantry Divisions with units from the 3rd Panzer Division and, most likely, the entire 23rd

Panzer Division. This was creating a huge pressure on Lyptsy, but over the last 24 hours, the Soviets had managed to reinforce the town so it was now defended by the 81st and the 124th Rifle Divisions. Both with severe supply problems, but they had also managed to dig in fairly well even while the first German attacks had been launched. To take some of the pressure off, the 45th TK Brigade, the 90th TK Brigade and the 244th Rifle Division had moved west along the northern outskirts of Lyptsy to disturb the German build up outside the town. Very severe fighting was expected over the coming 24 hours, which made the poor supply situation for the 28th

Army in general more than worrying

The Soviet airforce attacked the newly established Luftwaffe bases southwest of Kharkov, and the results were disappointing. Approximately 44% of the attacking Soviet aircraft were disabled while very limited damages was reported for the Luftwaffe. This meant more than 20 aircraft put out of action for the Soviets, and this together with the extremely limited availability of well supplied artillery was another severe factor to consider in the planning of any operations in the area

Confusion between Chuguyev and BalakleyaThis was most likely the most confused area of the battle at this time. Units had been mixing on and off as the fighting waved back and forth between the Donets and the hills north of Balakleya, and the Germans had by adding significant Panzer units from the 3rd and 23rd

Panzer Divisions, pushed the Soviets back towards Balakleya. The 41st

Rifle Division had been cut off as the Germans moved east along the river, but the 119th Rifle Division had attempted to open up the encirclement, but had been unable to achieve that due to the risk of being encircled themselves by the German 44th Infantry Division operating in the Chuguyev area. The next 24 to 48 hours would be decisive as to what side would have success

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Illustration 22: The situation of May 16 in the Lyptsy area

45th TK Brigade


90th TK Brigade

Luftwaffebases

Illustration 23: The Chuguyev/Balakleya area - May 16

41st Rifle Div

119th Rifle Div

131st Inf Reg

23rd Pz Recon

128th Pz Reg

126th PzG Reg

5th Cav Corps

EXECUTING THE PLAN

Breakthrough at SemenovkaAt Semenovka, the Soviets had decided to pursue an expected weakness in the defensive capabilities of the German 454th Security Division, and as the 6th Army deployed several Rifle Divisions supported by a number of TK brigades, a breach in the German defenses opened. Not only the 454th Division had retreated, but also the 113th Infantry Division had been pushed north which opened several Soviet alternatives, but attempting to push north in the direction of Kharkov seemed like the best alternative as this would force German forces to go on the defensive in the Lyptsy and Belgorod area, while at the same time, the Germans would have problems moving reinforcements from the south as the 57th Army , at least for the time being, controlled the Semenovka to Pavlograd perimeter, albeit with very thinly distributed forces to do so

Opportunities between Pavlograd and Petropavlovka?As the reminder of the Romanian defenders mixed with German units, and the German 389th Infantry Division moved against the units of the Soviet 57th Army, another confusing area of the operations quickly emerged. Another full German Infantry Division was believed to be on its way to Pavlograd by train, and a massive air assault was ordered, the second of the day. Also this attack was more or less useless and only led to another horrifying 26% loss of aircraft, bringing the total of losses of the day for the Soviets to no less than 49 aircraft

Petropavlovka was retaken by 18th and 121st TK Brigades with support from several other units of the 57th Army. This was another critical area of the fighting, and the losses could be expected to become extreme in this area over the next few days.

Luftwaffe had established forward bases close to the front lines just south of Petropavlovsk, most likely to support an offensive to the east of the town. This was spotted by the Soviets and the precious artillery was brought down on the German airfields with great success. Reconnaissance in the area estimated the Germans lost some 70 aircraft in the artillery barrages

More Panzers in the east?Finally, another unexpected Panzer Division, the 14th had arrived in Krasnoarmeyskoye and had moved rapidly to the northwest to attempt to breach the thin defenses east of Petropavlovka. The coming 24 hours would show if their plan was to pose a threat or not to the Soviet rear and flank units?

May 17 – The loss of the 41st Rifle DivisionAt this stage of the campaign, Timoshenko started to realize that his own offense had been launched straight in the face of an unexpected German offense. The main bulk of the German attacks now seemed to be targeting the southeast area of the front, where significant armored and motorized enemy units was now moving rapidly into the weakly defended area directly west of Barvenkovo. There was also another, but for the time being, less dangerous German approach between Chuguyev and Balakleya, maybe as far south as Lozovenka. These two attacks combined could easily threaten to cut the 6th and 57th Army off from the rest of the Soviet forces. This would be a huge disaster, but there was limited room to redeploy any significant forces to prevent both attacks

The decision was to prevent the German offense, by attack ferociously in other areas where the Germans were weak in order to force Paulus to refocus on defending his own rear. This would become something of a chicken race, and the commander with the guts to stay on the offense the longest may will prevail in this battle!

29




EXECUTING THE PLAN

The surrounded 41st Rifle Division was wiped out by German forces, which led to that the losses for the Soviets skyrocketed. Approximately 27,000 men, 190 guns and 200 trucks was lost in the last 24 hours! The message was clear! Don't allow the enemy to surround us!

Following the large scale air operations of the 16th, the losses for the Soviet Air Force had also been heavy, with almost 70 aircraft put out of action the last day

More negative news included the potential arrival of an additional German Infantry Division, the 376th, reportedly north of Poltava, the 22nd Panzer Division was somewhere southeast of Dnepropetrovsk, moving northeast, and would most likely be thrown into the battle within 24 to 48 hours. The 23rd Panzer Division was crossing the Donets to increase the pressure on the Soviet defenders along the German bridgehead. The 75th Infantry Division had arrived in Pavlograd and had immediately deployed along the front lines north of the town. In the southeast, things had grown more severe as the 16th Panzer Division seemed to have arrived to Krasnoarmeyskoye together with the 1st Mechanized Division. The 1st Mechanized had already entered the battle, while the 16th

Panzers were unaccounted for. Finally, the 76th Infantry Division was moving east out of Dnepropetrovsk, but was still 24 to 48 hours away from going into action

All in all, this meant significant German reinforcements were arriving on the scene, and most of them were in places where there was way to few Soviet units to prevent very serious situations to develop. Some kind of countermeasure was needed to stall the German offense, and force Paulus to deploy his highly mobile and dangerous armored and mechanized units in defensive operations

The Soviet plan to disturb the German offensiveThe key to throwing the Germans off balance was of course to threat one or more of their main positions in the rear. A few alternatives were presented

● Push quickly west towards Poltava from the breakthrough at Semenovka. Gain control over Krasnograd in the same move

● Attack through Pavlograd and push quickly for Dnepropetrovsk while fighting to keep control over Petropavlovka in order to prevent German pincher operations from the east

● From Semenovka and Lyptsy, push for Kharkov itself and attempt to cut the German forces in the Chuguyev to Balakleya bridgehead off from the rest of the German forces

The first alternatives were not judged to be realistic due to several reasons. Poltava was 200 km from the closest Soviet forces, while Dnepropetrovsk was approximately 100 km away. This would create huge supply and logistics issues, and the Germans could easily cut behind any Soviet units and destroy them like the 41st Division had been destroyed

That meant the Kharkov plan remained the one that seemed feasible to execute. However, the threat of a German breakthrough in the southeast was still very much a real threat, so some kind of operation was needed also in that area to force the Germans to pull their offensive units out of the gap and back to defend themselves against being surrounded or cut off. The German 295th Infantry Division that was currently deployed west of Slavyansk appeared to be the weak spot in the long German front. It was decided to attempt to breakthrough the defenses of the 295th, and turn west behind the German lines and threaten to roll up the entire front

30




Illustration 24: Soviet soldiers of the 41st Rifle Division taken prisoners as their divisoin was surrounded on May 16

EXECUTING THE PLAN

Both of these operations posed considerable risk of counterattacks and having the Soviet rear units exposed to fast moving German armored units, but the risk was higher to remain passive and wait for the German move to come

As can be seen in the illustration above, the plan called for the 28th Army and the 6th Army to overrun the German defenders and threaten to take control over Kharkov. This would force Paulus to pull forces out of the Balakleya area to defend Kharkov, which in turn would allow the 38th Army and the 5th Cavalry Corps to rest and refit before moving west to support the attack on Kharkov

The 9th Army was to attack the potentially weak German units of the 295th Infantry Division facing them west of Balakleya. When the 295th was out of the way, the Soviet units would attempt to roll up the German flank by pushing west along the German rear lines

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Illustration 25: The Timoshenko plan to stall the German offensive

79th Inf Div3rd Pz AT

394th PzG Reg

79th Inf Div

28th Army Reserves

28th Army


294th Inf Div



23rd Pz Div

3rd GD Cav Corps

38th Army

5th Cav Corps

6th Army

454 Sec Div113th Inf Div

VI Cav Corps

57th Army


2nd Cav Corps

9th Army

37th Army

260th Inf Div

380th Inf Div

389th Inf Div

376th Inf Div???

75th Inf Div???

289th Inf Div

97th Inf Div

1st Mt Inf Div14th Pz Div16th Pz Div

384th Inf Div


9th Inf Div

101st Inf Div

1

2

3

76th Inf Div???

EXECUTING THE PLAN

May 18The morning of May 18 saw the Germans moving in preparations to either attack or overrun Belgorod. There where clear signs that the Soviet maneuver to be able to reach the northern parts of Kharkov would not be accepted by the Germans as counterattacks forced the leading Soviet T34's to retreat back north of Lyptsy. The German 23rd Panzer Division was pushing further east between Balakleya and Lozovenka. This was of course not acceptable to Timoshenko as this was a severe threat to the 6th

Army Headquarters currently in Lozovenka as well as to some very important artillery units preparing to support the push north from Semenovka

The 57th Army area was discomfortingly quiet in the sense there was lots of German movement reported 40 to 60 km's to the west of the front lines. It was hard to predict if these German units where on their way north to reinforce Semenovka and/or Kharkov, or if they would head east and attempt to push the 57th Army out of its current position. Pavlograd looked more and more like a stalemate as both sides were digging in. There was also information indicating the Germans had been able to reinforce the scattered original defenders by moving additional units to the area. The target for the 76th

Infantry was still unclear

Petropavlovka was once again controlled by the German 298th Infantry Division, that had two regiments occupying the town. At the current stage of the fighting it seemed unlikely that the Soviets would be able to regain control over Petropavlovka. The 75th Infantry Division seemed dedicated to the operations in the Petropavlovka area, and the significant Luftwaffe concentration of aircraft on the bases south of Petropavlovka also remained even with the losses incurred by the Soviet artillery was able to reach the bases

East of Petropavlovka, the situation looked more severe. A German breakthrough of the thin Soviet defenses looked evident and units from the German 14th and 16th Panzer Divisions and the 1st

Motorized Division was forcing the Soviet units from the 2nd Cavalry Corps and the Tank Brigades from the Southern Front Reserves to retreat. The main threat was that if the breakthrough got big enough, the Germans would have the initiative and would be able to choose the direction of the next stage of the offensive. They could either continue north to capture Lozovaya, or turn either east or west and severely threaten to cut large Soviet forces off from the main bulk of Timoshenko's front. Even worse was that any re dispositions of Soviet units would potentially open up another area of the front to the same risk of a breakthrough. The good news was that the 37th Army had managed to open up the German lines between Barvenkovo and Slavyansk and was now in a position to strike west and attempt to roll up the German front, or to move southeast and attempt to capture significant German forces (more or less the whole 257th Infantry Division would be under threat) in Slavyansk

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EXECUTING THE PLAN

The goal for the next 24 hours was to transfer small amounts of units into the German breakthrough in order to slow down the advance. This would allow the breach of the German lines in the east to consolidate and decide what the best course of action would be. Even with the limited supply available for the artillery units, the barrage against the Luftwaffe bases south of Petropavlovka was to continue to deny the Germans as much air support as possible

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Illustration 26: Situation on May 18 including intelligence reports on German movements in the west

79th Inf Div

57th Army

1

3rd Pz Div28th Army Reserves


294th Inf Div

28th Army

3rd GD Cav Corps

38th Army

5th Cav Corps

6th Army


2nd Cav Corps

9th Army 37th Army


297th Inf Div

305th Inf Div

23rd Pz Div

113th Inf Div454th Sec Div

260th Inf Div

5th Cav Corps

380th Inf Div

376th Inf Div???

389th Inf Div

76th Inf Div

Inf Div???

22nd Pz Div???

100 Inf Div???

60th MotInf Div ???

94th Inf Div???

20th Inf Div


97th Inf Div

1st Mot Inf Div14th Pz Div16th Pz Div

384th Inf Div

295th Inf Div

9th Inf Div 257th Inf Div101st Inf Div

2

3

EXECUTING THE PLAN

The pressure on Kharkov and Taranovka was to be maintained by keeping up the northern route of advancements from the Lyptsy area as well as attempting to exploit the situation with seemingly disordered German defenders both north and south of Semenovka. It was clear that somewhere between 3 and 5 additional German divisions was on the way to reinforce several areas of the front, so it was of utmost importance to put pressure on as many places as possible to force the Germans to thin out their offensive capabilities and thereby avoiding a Soviet disaster. Timoshenko still saw the opportunity so make the campaign at least a limited success in the sense the Germans could be inflicted losses from which they would have a hard time to recover from

May 19 to May 23 – The RetreatingThe development along the Kharkov front now became very rapid and Timoshenko ended up having to trust his operational field commanders to make the right decisions. The orders where simply “Attempt to exploit any German weaknesses while making sure to avoid being outflanked and overrun. The Soviet forces must live to fight another day, but remember we can sustain worse losses the German enemy. Ensure the defensive perimeter is kept intact...”This meant some advance and hard won locations had to be abandoned. The line from the north west end of the 57th Army perimeter along the lines held by the South Front Reserves was to pull back to Lozovaya to make sure the contact was kept between the 6th and the 9th Army. The 6th Army was to keep the pressure on the German defenders south of Kharkov by attacking Taranovka and thereby threatening the rear areas of the German 305th Infantry Division and the 23rd Panzer Division operating in the Balakleya area

In the north, the 28th Army reserves was to pull back to Volchansk and join the main body of the 23rd Army while in the South, the 9th and 37th Army was to attempt to stabilize the line between Barvenkovo and Kramatorsk

All in all, these moves where successful in the sense that the Soviets where able to disengage and pull back, while the relatively offensive operations against Taranovka forced the German commanders to commit defensive units which could otherwise have been used to overrun the retreating Soviet armies. The southern lines also stabilized, but it was evident that significant German forces was arriving in the area and that a breach in the very thinned out Soviet lines was not very hard for the Germans to achieve should they pursue that

May 24 and 25 – The EndEven with the retreat ordered, it was obvious the German forces was too strong for Timoshenko to oppose, and the situation in the south was becoming more critical for every hour that passed. Large parts of the 57th Army was being cut off, or very close to being cut off as the German advance was

quicker than the retreat of the Soviets. A breach of the lines at Lozovaya would mean that the rear of both the 6th and 9th Armies was exposed to strong German units advancing in the gap. Following the retreat of the 28th Army Reserves to Volchansk, the Germans had also managed to increase the pressure on the 28th Army that had been forced to seize control over Lyptsy. The only good news was

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Illustration 27: The situation on May 23. Soviet forces retreating to prevent German flanking maneuvers

EXECUTING THE PLAN

that elements of the 6th Army was still advancing on Taranovka, but with the development in the north and south, their projection was not very solid either, as they would soon be cut off from supply and facing strong German forces as soon as Lyptsy had fallen and the Soviet defenders on the run. As also Lozovaya in the South fell to the Germans, the battle was finally lost and a general order to retreat was sent by Timoshenko

The 2nd Battle of Kharkov battle ended on May 25 with a German victory. The German 6th Army would soon be on its way to Volga.....and Stalingrad

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Illustration 28: Final situation on May 25 - Battle ending with German Victory

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION OF THE BATTLE

Summary and conclusion of the battleGiven the victory conditions set in the scenario, this is a hard battle for the Soviets to win. Although the result was better compared to the historical outcome (See the chapter below comparing the historical battle with the fictive one), the result was a significant Soviet defeat. Even if Soviet would have been able to hold on to Lozovaya and Lyptsy in the last 24 hours of fighting, the outcome would have been more or less the same. The end result at least felt reasonably realistic given the way the battle developed. The Soviet decision to conserve their forces and attempt to avoid massive losses to German encirclements meant the Soviet losses could be kept lower than the historical ones

LossesLosses where acceptable to the Soviets and except for the destruction of the 41st Rifle Division on May 16, most losses could still be correlated to some kind of wanted effect on the battlefield, and where more related to the German counterattacks than any major mistakes on the Soviet side. The Soviets felt all along the battle that they where dealing significant blows and losses to the Germans

Soviet LossesThe calculated losses for the Soviet side was between 140,000 and 150,000 men which is approximately 35% of the assigned units that started the battle. Some 1700 mortars and artillery pieces and slightly above 400 tanks and armored cars where destroyed along with about 200 aircraft

Axis LossesWhile not as large in numbers as the Soviet losses, the Germans still lost close to 90,000 men, more than 2000 mortars and artillery pieces and 200+ aircraft. Even with these losses, the German had increased their numbers on the battlefield by 50% between May 12 and May 25 as reinforcements arrived on the scene. This can be seen in the table below

The table shows that even with comparatively heavy losses, the German presence on the battlefield increased significantly over the course of the battle, which was of course decisive for the outcome

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Illustration 29: Calculated Soviet losses

Accumulated Losses Total Assigned May 12 May 13 May 14 May 15 May 16 May 17 May 18 May 19 - 25Men (Infantry Units) 369060 0 10880 13348 21644 47660 49864 56580 137804Men (Non Infantry) 36135 0 699 905 1272 2442 2691 3118 7853

Men (Total) 405195 0 11579 14253 22916 50102 52555 59698 145657Guns (Art, AT Guns & SPMRL) 4873 0 107 139 194 372 395 437 1010Mortars 2457 0 80 95 142 275 297 318 681Trucks 8858 0 127 162 229 425 503 625 1803Tanks & Armored Cars 2106 0 1 9 21 58 73 96 428Aircraft 535 0 17 25 38 104 105 120 207

Illustration 30: Calculated German units on the field and estimated accumulated losses by May 25

Assigned May 12 Assigned May 25 Accumulated Losses May 25Men (Infantry Units) 147368 164088 82044Men (Non Infantry) 20163 27923 7697

Men (Total) 167531 192011 89741Guns (Art, AT Guns & SPMRL) 3821 4618 1415Mortars 2505 2740 930Trucks 2728 4929 900Tanks & Armored Cars 734 1618 165Aircraft 503 901 237

COMPARING THE HISTORICAL OUTCOME WITH THE GAME

Comparing the Historical outcome with the gameHistorically, the battle played out slightly different as shown by the map below. It is clear the Soviet initial attack reached much further west compared to the game, but that the German counterattack was also much more successful in the real battle

Comparing losses, the Soviet losses in the real battle has been estimated to between 200,000 and 240,000 while the German losses is stated to have been 20,000. This is another major difference versus the scenario played. The comparison shows that the Soviet lost approximately 100,000 more men in the real battle, while the Germans lost only 1/5 of the men in the real battle compared to the scenario. Again, this can most likely be correlated with the fact that the Soviet advance was slower and less aggressive in the scenario, and the Germans also was more aggressive in the early defensive phases of the scenario while they retreated more quickly in the real battle before turning to the offense.

37

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT

Recommendations for Scenario DevelopmentGiven that this is very challenging scenario for the Soviet commander, achieving better than historical results should be awarded more than the current victory conditions do. One recommendation is to increase the German loss penalties while reducing the Soviet ditto's. This would reflect the necessity for the Germans to conserve their strength, while the Soviets normally did not have to care so much about losses

Another recommendation might be to tune the Victory Points for some of the key locations, like Lozovaya and Lyptsy. Lyptsy is important anyway as it may trigger Soviet reinforcements, but the Germans should perhaps not be given very many Victory Points for these locations. Kupyansk should be given 10 to 15 victory points as this was where the historical battle front lines where at the end of the battle. An increase of the VP's for Volchansk may also be considered to force the Soviets to hold that location to avoid a flanking maneuver from the northern German forces

It is my belief that changes like the ones above will make the game very enjoyable as a PBEM scenario, even if both myself and my opponent enjoyed the game even at its current state. It can be recommended for players looking for a quick battle, or a very skilled (Soviet) player facing a less experienced (German) player in a game that will be a challenge for both players

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REFERENCES

References● Second Battle of Kharkov at Wikipedia

● Second Battle of Kharkov at Answers.com

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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Battle_of_Kharkov

http://www.answers.com/topic/second-battle-of-kharkov

2nd battle of kharkov , may 1942 - kodapa · soviet losses – may 12 ... achtung panzers! ... the...

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