third battle of kharkov

Third Battle of Kharkov:

February – March 1943 INTA 654 Military Strategy

John J. Walter

5/12/2015

Third Battle of Kharkov: February – March 1943

John J. Walter 1

Introduction

The Third Battle of Kharkov from mid-February to mid-March 1943, is perhaps the best example

in history of effective mobile defensive warfare. After the encirclement and destruction of the German

Sixth Army at Stalingrad, suffering from severely limited resources and under constant pressure form

the Red Army, Field Marshal Erich Von Manstein’s Army Group South was able to stave off the collapse

of the entire southern German front and possibly the entire Eastern Front through a skillful tactical

withdrawal while at the same time launching a brilliant counteroffensive using his mobile reserves. The

operation, known as Manstein’s “Backhand Blow,” inflicted significant losses of men and equipment on

two Red Army fronts as well as recaptured significant territory, including the key city of Kharkov, and

stabilized the front.1

The central question addressed by this paper is why the Germans were able to achieve such a

stunning success despite being greatly outnumbered and with the Red Army seemingly on the verge of

total victory in the South. The answer lies in the doctrine used by the Soviets and the Germans. Through

the use of the classical German way of war, or Bewegungskrieg – “war of movement,” an effective

combination of centralized and decentralized command, and well-trained high quality troops, the

Wehrmacht was able to take advantage of the flaws in the implementation of the Soviet “Deep Battle”

doctrine achieving a victory which possibly prevented the complete collapse of the Eastern Front.2

This paper addresses the central question in three ways. First, it will discuss the strategic

background and the battle itself. Second, it will analyze the battle looking at the, costs of the battle,

1 Lawrence L. Izzo, LTC, “An Analysis of Manstein’s Winter Campaign on the Russian Front, 1942, 1943” SAMS

Monograph, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 1986: 1. 2 For a concise description of the evolution of Bewegungskrieg see Robert M. Citino, The Wehrmacht Retreats: Fighting a

Lost War, 1943, (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2012): xvii-xx.


John J. Walter 2

effectiveness of the forces, battlefield assessment of the opposing force, and the effectiveness of

command systems. Finally, this paper provides some lessons learned from the battle.

Before discussing the battle, it is necessary to briefly overview the strategic background which

set the stage for the campaign. Despite the rapid initial success and mass encirclements of Soviet troops

in Operation Barbarossa, the German Wehrmacht failed to crush the Red Army and destroy the Soviet

Union in 1941 as its forces were halted at the gates of Moscow. In order to regain the initiative and

attempt to bring victory in 1942 before the Allies could fully assemble their vast resources, the Germans

developed Operation Blue to be carried out by a newly split Army Group South. The goal of Blue was

the dual objectives of capturing the Caucasus oil fields by Army Group A while Army Group B capturing

Stalingrad to cut off the Soviets from its oil in the south and cut the supply line of the Volga River.3 Just

as its predecessor Barbarossa failed, Blue was unable to achieve its objectives.

The Soviet counteroffensives Operation Uranus and subsequent Operation Saturn resulted in the

destruction of the Romanian, Hungarian, and Italian Axis satellite armies allowing the encirclement and

destruction of the German 6th Army at Stalingrad with a loss of 147,200 men killed and wounded and

more than 91,000 captured.4 These operations also threatened to cut off the German Army Group A in

the Caucasus. This marked a turning point on the Eastern Front and the Germans ended 1942 on the run

westward with Manstein appointed to command a reconstituted Army Group South tasked with

stabilizing the situation and ultimately setting the stage for the Third Battle of Kharkov.

3 Williamson Murray and Allan Millett, A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War, (Cambridge: Belknap Press of

Harvard University Press, 2000): 275. See also Herbert L. Frandsen, Jr. MAJ, “Counterblitz: Conditions Necessary for a

Successful Counteroffensive,” SAMS Monograph, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 1990: 3. 4 Earl F. Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East, (Washington D.C.: Army Historical Series, Office

of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1968): 79


John J. Walter 3

The Battle

Despite fighting on the offensive since late 1942, the Red Army developed plans for two new

offensive operations, dubbed Star and Gallop. These operations were designed to split the German

defenses where Army Group Center and Army Group South meet, create a breakthrough around Kharkov

and Kursk as well as drive to the Sea of Azov cutting off the German forces of former Army Group A

attempting to escape the Caucasus.5 It is important to note however, that after months of offensive

operations, the Red Army units of these fronts by the time of the battle were beginning to wear down,

many operating at 60 percent of the strength listed below in Table 1, particularly the rifle divisions.

Therefore, despite their numerical advantage they were becoming vulnerable to overextension and

counterattack.6

Operation Gallop (or Skachok see Figure 1, page 12), scheduled for January 29-30, 1943 was the

responsibility of the Soviet Southwest Front under the command of General Nikolai Vatutin. This front

consisted of about 325,000 men and 500 tanks the majority of which were assigned to Mobile Group

Popov, its mobile reserve.7 Gallop’s objective was to attack southwest through the German lines and

drive to the Sea of Azov.8

Operation Star (or Zvezda see Figure 1, page 12), scheduled to commence February 2, was

assigned to the Voronezh Front under the command of General Filipp Golikov. This front consisted of

five armies totaling around 200,000 men and approximately 300 tanks.9 Star’s objective was to push

5 David M. Glantz, “Soviet Military Strategy during the Second Period of War (November 1942-December 1943): A

Reappraisal,” The Journal of Military History, Vol. 60, No. 1 (Jan., 1996): 123 6 Robert Forczyk, Erich Von Manstein, (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2010): 34 7 Thomas A. Thompson, LTC, “Field Marshal Erich Von Manstein and the Operational Art at the Battle of Kharkov,” U.S.

Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 2000: 3. See also Forczyk, Erich Von Manstein: 34. 8 Forczyk, Eric Von Manstein: 34. 9 Thompson, “Field Marshal Erich Von Manstein and the Operational Art at the Battle of Kharkov”: 3.


John J. Walter 4

German forces as far west as possible attacking west towards Kursk and attacking southwest towards

Kharkov but left no operational reserve.10

Facing these formidable forces were the remains

of Army Groups A and B newly redesignated as Army

Group South bolstered by the arrival of the SS

Panzerkorps as well as fresh infantry divisions from

Western Europe. For the upcoming counteroffensive, Army Group South was able to muster about

70,000 men and around 350 tanks.11 There were two major units key to the upcoming operation; the 1st

Panzer Army, consisting of the reduced strength III, XL, and LVII Panzerkorps; and 4th Panzer Army,

consisting of a reduced strength but relatively fresh SS Panzerkorps, and a reduced strength XLVIII

Panzerkorps.12 With the exception of the SS Panzerkorps, only arriving in the Kharkov area in mid-

January, the rest of the Panzerkorps had been in constant action for the better part of three months over

open ground.13

To stabilize the front and blunt the Red Army offensives, Manstein proposed a bold plan of

shortening his defensive line by retreating further west and allowing the withdrawal of the 1st and 4th

Panzer Armies from front-line defensive operations in favor of the newly arrived infantry divisions to

create a mobile reserve available for mobile operations. Once those units were free, he proposed shifting

them from his right flank to his left flank, similar to a “castling” maneuver in chess, and subsequently

launch a counteroffensive into the flanks of the overextended Red Army fronts as they continued to drive

10 Ibid.: 3 11 David M. Glantz, From the Don to the Dnepr: Soviet Offensive Operations, December 1942 – August 1943, (London:

Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 1991): 152-153. See also Peter McCarthy and Mike Syryon, Panzerkrieg: The Rise and Fall of

Hitler's Tank Divisions, (New York: Carroll & Graf, 2002): 179-180. 12 Forczyk, Eric Von Manstein: 38-39. 13 Mungo Melvin, Manstein: Hitler’s Greatest General, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2010): 332-333.

Personnel Tanks

Wehrmacht 70,000 350

Red Army 525,000 800

Table 1: Balance of Forces


John J. Walter 5

west and southwest. This proposal was what would become his famous “backhand blow” against an

enemy who had surpassed the culmination of its offensive.14 After the disaster of Stalingrad and Adolf

Hitler’s “No Retreat” policies, Manstein proposed a return to Bewegungskrieg. All he needed to do was

convince Hitler to approve the strategy, which required the Wehrmacht to abandon ground won by

Operation Blue and tactically withdraw units back to the west towards the original German line from the

previous summer. Perhaps owing to the continued shock of the loss of 6th Army and the fragile state of

the Eastern Front, he was able to succeed in convincing Hitler to allow him to implement his plan.15

Operations Star and Gallop launched and quickly achieved success in pushing back the German

forces before them. By February 1st, elements of Vatutin’s Southwest Front, 6th Army and 1st Guards

Army, had already crossed the Donets and were driving a wedge between the SS Panzerkorps and 1st

Panzer Army creating a 100km wide gap. However, after crossing the Donets, his forces ran headlong

into the III Panzerkorps which instead of bypassing he proceeded to engage. His rifle divisions were too

weak to achieve a breakthrough and thus he committed his mobile reserve, Mobile Group Popov, to

attempt a breakthrough. He spent ten days of difficult fighting against the III Panzerkorps at Slavyansk

(See Figure 1) before finally deciding to shift his units west bypassing the strongpoint and into the 100km

gap mentioned earlier threatening to cut off 1st Panzer Army from the rest of Army Group South.16 The

Red Army was having just as much success on the Voronezh Front with Golikov’s forces, specifically

the 40th and 69th armies and the 3rd Tank Army, driving a wedge between Army Group Center and Army

Group South, capturing Kharkov, and continuing to push west.

14 Citino, The Wehrmacht Retreats: Fighting a Lost War, 1943: 64-66. For a description of the culminating point of attack,

see Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton: Princeton

University Press, 1976): 528. 15 Citino, The Wehrmacht Retreats: Fighting a Lost War, 1943: 66-67. 16 Forczyk, Eric Von Manstein: 34.


John J. Walter 6

The stage was set for the German counterattack. The Soviets had created two deep penetrations

of the German lines with the SS Panzerkorps in between west of Kharkov and the XLVIII Panzerkorps

and 1st Panzer Army to the south of the driving Soviet Southwest Front (See Figure 1). Despite the holes

in the German line, Manstein accepted the risk and ordered his newly freed mobile forces, consisting of

about 225 tanks, to launch a counterattack.17 The first stage of the counterattack was to destroy the units

of Vatutin’s Southwest Front. Soviet intelligence had discovered the concentration of the Panzerkorps,

but was convinced of a German withdrawal. Both the Voronezh and Southwest Fronts pushed their units

beyond their culmination point, largely out of ammunition, fuel, and dispersed along their lines of

advance. 18

Early morning on February 20th, The 4th Panzer Army, under General Hermann Hoth smashed

into the Southwest Front’s flanks, the Das Reich and Totenkopf divisions of the SS Panzerkorps

attacking southwest with the XLVIII, XL, and LVII Panzerkorps attacking north in concentric pincer

attacks.19 Vatutin, apparently oblivious to the threat never ordered a shift to the defensive until it was

too late and his units were destroyed piecemeal with 6th Army and 1st Guards Army abandoning most of

their equipment and retreating back over the Donets. Mobile Group Popov on the other hand, was

completely destroyed.20 Once the mauling of Vatutin’s forces was well underway, Golikov shifted the

3rd Tank Army south to assist Vatutin while continuing his advance west with the 40th and 69th Armies.

Golikov’s relief force ran into the German forces charging north and was destroyed. Following the

destruction of the 3rd Tank Army the German forces continued their drive north smashing through the

depleted rifle divisions on the flank of the Voronezh Front, cutting off 40th and 69th Armies, and securing

17 Melvin, Manstein: Hitler’s Greatest General: 340. 18 Forczyk, Eric Von Manstein: 38. 19 Melvin, Manstein: Hitler’s Greatest General: 340. 20 Forczyk, Eric Von Manstein: 40-41.


John J. Walter 7

Kharkov on March 14th. The SS Panzerkorps, in combination with the Grossdeutschland division from

Army Group Center, drove Golikov’s forces all the way back to the Donets and captured Belgorod on

March 16th bringing the offensive to a conclusion.21

Analysis

In order to gain a better understanding of the reasons for the German victory in the Third Battle

of Kharkov, an analysis of the battle is required. The costs of the battle clearly favor the Wehrmacht.

The operation had cost the SS Panzerkorps 11,519 casualties, and it was reduced to about 100 operational

tanks. The XLVIII and III Panzerkorps were reduced to about 40 operational tanks each.22 The rest of

the German casualties are unclear but they likely pale in comparison to those on the Soviet side. The

Southwest Front suffered around 30,000 casualties while the Voronezh Front suffered 58,000 casualties

and both suffered significant losses in material.23 German reports indicated that they destroyed or

captured 676 tanks, 579 field guns, 69 antiaircraft guns, 600 motor vehicles, and large numbers of

machineguns and mortars, not including those destroyed or captured around Kharkov. While these

numbers are impressive, there were no large encirclements of forces like in previous campaigns because

the German forces, largely armored, lacked the infantry support to close the gaps in the Kessel allowing

a large number of Red Army soldiers to escape to the East. The Wehrmacht, after a year of campaigning,

was now holding the very same line it held before Operation Blue the previous summer.24

The Soviet offensives had multiple objectives. Gallop’s objective was to attack southwest

through the German lines and drive to the Sea of Azov while Star’s objective was to push German forces

as far west as possible sending two armies to attack west towards Kursk with the remaining three

21 Ibid.: 40-41 22 Forczyk, Eric Von Manstein: 41-42. Citino, The Wehrmacht Retreats: Fighting a Lost War, 1943: 66-67. 23 Forczyk, Eric Von Manstein: 42. 24 Erich Von Manstein, Lost Victories, (Novato, California: Presidio, 1982): 433-434 and 437.


John J. Walter 8

attacking southwest towards Kharkov.25 Of these objectives, the Red Army succeeded in only capturing

Kursk while failing to achieve the others. The German objectives were to stabilize the front in the south

and blunt the Soviet offensives. They were largely able to successfully achieve these objectives in

recapturing Kharkov, crush the Soviet offensives, and establish a firm defensive line along the river

Donets. They only failed to recapture Kursk, a setback which haunt them in their disastrous attempt to

pinch out the Kursk salient in their upcoming summer offensive. It is clear that the objectives achieved

demonstrate a decisive victory for the Germans, buying them time to rest and refit their forces for future

operations resulting from spring thaw.

Related to the objectives achieved is the difference in the battlefield assessment of the opposing

forces. The Red Army was convinced that the Wehrmacht was collapsing and simply too weak to defend.

General Vatutin reported back to STAVKA (Red Army Headquarters) that the Wehrmacht was retreating

across the Dnepr while Golikov was convinced of collapse by the withdrawal of the SS Panzerkorps

from Kharkov as well.26 These misinterpretations of German movements led to overextension of the

two fronts in their attempts to capitalize on the withdrawal leaving them open to counterattack. In

contrast, the Germans were able to keep their plans secret deceiving the Russians, accept the risks of the

large gaps in their lines, and recognize that the Soviets were reaching the culmination point of attack

providing the opportunity for a decisive counterattack.27 These advantages in the German favor are clear

yet how can this be explained? The answer lies in the combination of the training of the soldiers and

command system and their effect on the doctrine used by each respective force.

25 Forczyk, Eric Von Manstein: 34 and Thompson, “Field Marshal Erich Von Manstein and the Operational Art at the Battle

of Kharkov”: 3. 26 Melvin, Manstein: Hitler’s Greatest General: 344-345. 27 Melvin, Manstein: Hitler’s Greatest General: 345.


John J. Walter 9

At this point in the war, the Wehrmacht possessed no clear advantage in equipment over the Red

Army. Where it maintained an advantage however was in the quality of the training and experience of

its officers and soldiers. The Wehrmacht, recognizing that Soviet numbers could never be matched, had

set out through training in 1941 to offset quantity with quality through superiority of leadership and

fighting skills.28 This training enhanced the German system of command combining centralization at

the highest level and decentralization at lower levels. The German Panzerkorps, much like Napoleon’s

Grand Army Corps, were self-contained strategic units with their own command staffs reporting directly

to Manstein at Army Group South.29 This gave Manstein control overall allowing speed of action yet it

also allowed him to have the confidence in his subordinates to take the initiative and act independently

in pursuit of an overall operational goal.30

There were three points reinforcing the effect of the German command system on the success of

the battle. First, Manstein provided broad “long range tasks” for his Panzerkorps commanders avoiding

restriction of their moves allowing them to devise the exact means of achieving their objectives. Second,

the commanders of the Panzerkorps operated at the front of their formations allowing battlefield

awareness and quick decision making. Finally, the centralization of overall command with Manstein

allowed a quick offensive to quickly be launched while maintaining secrecy from the enemy.31

The Red Army, in contrast, was not trained along the lines of the Wehrmacht. The Red Army

was under strict political control through the political commissars. However, in late 1942, Stalin

removed the commissars from the military units and began a program of systematic retraining of political

28 Hew Strachen, “Training, Morale, and Modern War,” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 41, No. 2 (Apr., 2006):

222. 29 Martin Van Creveld, Command in War, (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1985): 97. 30 Ibid., 97-98. 31 Ibid., 97-98 and MAJ Gen F.W. Von Mellenthin, Panzer Battles: A Study of the Employment of Armor in the Second

World War, (New York: Ballantine Books, 1971): 254.


John J. Walter 10

officials as junior officers on the front lines. The goal of this was to create operational flexibility and

individual initiative much like the Wehrmacht however by the time of the Third Battle of Kharkov, the

Red Army was not quite where it needed to be in terms of effectiveness of its soldiers and officers.32

These differences in quality of soldiers and officers, despite relatively similar command systems

at the time, had a major effect on the doctrine employed by the opposing forces. The Red Army, with

its “Deep Battle” doctrine, meant to capitalize on breakthroughs in the German lines, due to the quality

of its officers and soldiers, simply broke down into advances until the army reached exhaustion, suffered

back-breaking losses, or ran out of supplies and replacements. This tendency lead to overreach without

adequately protecting the flanks and was clearly the case in the Third Battle of Kharkov.33 The Germans,

with their emphasis on Bewegungskrieg, were able to recognize the vulnerability of the Red Army

offensives. As such, with their superior quality soldiers and officers, they were able to use their initiative

and mobility to take full advantage of the overextended Red Army forces breaking through their flanks

into the rear areas in classic style.

There are several important lessons to be learned from this battle. The first is the need to

recognize the point of culmination of an attack.34 This is important not only on offense in avoiding

overextension and consolidating gains, but also on defense in recognizing the opportunity for a decisive

counterattack. The second lesson learned is the importance of maintaining operational mobile reserves

both on offense and defense but in this case particularly on defense. Through his ability to create a

mobile reserve by removing mobile forces from the front lines, Manstein was able to move them to the

optimal location creating a favorable force ratio at the schwerpunkt to strike decisively in a

32 Richard Overy, Russia’s War: Blood Upon the Snow, (New York: TV Books, Inc., 1997): 230-231. 33 Citino, The Wehrmacht Retreats: Fighting a Lost War, 1943: 69 and George M. Nipe, Jr., Last Victory in Russia,

(Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing Ltd., 2000): 61. 34 Clausewitz, On War: 528.


John J. Walter 11

counteroffensive to sever the Red Army lines of communication and cut off their spearheads. A third

lesson learned is the importance of maintaining at least local air superiority over the battlefield.

Recovering from the Stalingrad debacle, The Luftwaffe was once again able to establish local air

superiority over the operational area averaging 1,000 sorties a day and providing close air support

assisting the counteroffensive.35 Air superiority assists the counteroffensive through close air support

and attacking of follow-on forces but also through the gathering of real-time intelligence on the enemy’s

movements. All of these are key to shortening the time to offensive culmination, but also to successful

ground campaigns in general. The final lesson to be learned is the importance of individual command

and the willingness to be bold in the face of opposition both organizationally and in the face of the enemy

against seemingly insurmountable odds. Manstein used all of these to achieve a stunning success, albeit

temporary, on the Eastern Front. The lessons are equally applicable in contemporary mobile defensive

operations.

35 Frandsen, Jr. MAJ, “Counterblitz: Conditions Necessary for a Successful Counteroffensive,”: 6.


John J. Walter 12

Figure 1 taken from Forczyk, Erich Von Manstein, (2010): 39

third battle of kharkov

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