panzers in the balkans and italy quarrie

5/17/2018 Panzers in the Balkans and Italy Quarrie

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Early model PzKpfw VAs without ball-mount hull machine-guns(478/3164/39). '


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. ~~'.~~~~.~,-,,~ ~~ '-~.( .~ \'~ D '\'.~ . , . ~ ~ A selection f. 0 German .from the Bwartune photo...... undesarchi graphs, Koblenz


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1981 Patrick Stephens Ltd.Panzers in th@Balkans and Italy

Library of Congress Catalog Number .81-065153ISBN 0-89404-059-6

Published by AZTEX Corporation

First published in 1980Patrick Stephens, Ltd.Bar Hill, CambridgeEngland, CB3 8EL

All rights reserved. No part of this publicationmay be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system ortransmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic,mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise,without prior permission in writing from thepublisher. Duplicates of photographs in this bookmay be obtained for reproduction purposes only fromthe Bundesarchiv, Koblenz.

AZTEX CorporationTucson, Arizona 85703

Printed in the United States of America


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AcknowledgemThe author ~ntse or and p blixpress their si .: u isher w ."Loenartz of thncere thanks to z1uld like to~nce, .without ~~~nhdes~rchiv fo~s~ariaI?-neeen impossibl IC this book er assist-. would have


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Odessa~MEDt:rERRANEAN THEATRE OF OPERATIONS 0.-..:'Li., Milan Ve~ce~ Trieste

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Hitler1's'involvement'liin the Balkans was amilitary mistake almost, although not quite,as bad as Napoleon's 'Spanish ulcer'. ItKbecame, essentially, a police action againstpartisans, sapping manpower and resourceswhich were badly needed elsewhere.Shortly after Mussolini had declared waron France and England in June 1940 (whileGerman troops were crossing the Seine!), theItalian dictator turned on Greece. Havingsuccessfully annexed Albania in April 1939,he now accused the Greek Government ofhaving a non-neutral attitude and demandedthat it renounce England's guarantee ofindependence. During August and Sep-tember 1940 over 40,000 Italian troops wereamassed along the border between Albaniaand Greece, and on October 28 Mussolinihanded the Greek Government a list of'grievances' together with a demand thatitalian troops should be allowed into thecountry.Italian forces began to move into Greecebefore a reply had even been received to thisultimatum and, on October 31, Britishtroops began landing. The Italians fared nobetter on the land than they were alreadydoing at sea. The Greek Army mobilisedrapidly and switched to the offensive, trap-ping 5,000 crack Italian Alpine troops in thePindus Gorge and, during November, actu-ally pushing into Albania itself. By the end of1940, nearly a quarter of Albania was inGreek control.It rapidly became apparent that reluctantGerman participation in the Italian fiascohere - as inNorth Africa - was only a matterof time; indeed, the principal reason theGreek Government had not hithertorequested the assistance of the full BritishExpeditionary Force had been to try to avoidprovoking Hitler into intervening. So, in lateFebruary 1941, the first elements of a com-bined Anglo-Australian-New Zealand forcebegan landing from Egypt.In his book Panzer Battles (Cassell, 1955),

7Generat~Major F. W. von Mellenthin relatesjust how Unwelcome these Balkan develop-in:t:ntswere to the German High Command,particulariy osince they placed the vitalGerman-controlled oilfields at Ploesti, inRumania, withiri reach of RAF bombers.Intervention in the Balkans would also delayHitler's invasion of Russia and this has oftenbeen proposed as one of the reasons why theGermans failed to capture Moscow in theautumn of 1941.German forces began assembling inRumania in January 1941 and moved intoBulgaria in March after Hitler had forced theBulgarian Government to join the TripartitePact on the 1st ofthat month. This put obvi-ous strategic pressure on Yugoslavia, whoseborders had become untenable as a result,and on March 20 Prince Paul's governmentalso decided to join the Pact. For once, how-ever, matters did not proceed in the Germanfavour for, a week later, a coup d'etat byGeneral Simovic overthrew the YugoslavGovernment and replaced it by an anti-Naziregime in the name of King Peter. Hitlerretaliated with Directive No 25 orderirig thedestruction of Yugoslavia as well as Greece.The operation against Yugoslavia, whichinvolved the 5th, 8th, 9th, 11th and 14thPanzer Divisions, with the 16th held inreserve, as well as the 2nd SS Division'Reich', was a virtual walkover since thecountry was divided into so many differentethnic groups, including the pro-GermanCroats and others of German or Italianextraction and sympathy. Simovic only suc-ceeded in mobilising two-thirds of his 31divisions (three of which were cavalry andnone of which included any armour), and theCroatian troops surrendered in droves at thefirst opportunity.(Many Moslem Croatians later joined theWaffen-SS in order to fight against Tito'sChristian Serbian guerrillas; the 13thWaffenGebirgs Division 'Handschar-Kroatische'Nr 1 being formed under BrigadefiihrerSauberzweig in summer 1943. This unitattained a poor fighting reputation but anotoriety for atrocities against civilians..Yugoslav Germans formed the nucleus forthe 7th SS Freiwilligen Gebirgs Division'Prinz Eugen' under Gruppenftihrer Phelpsin spring 1942, a tougher fighting formationbut one, again, with an unenviable repu-tation for cruelty.)General von Weichs' II Army movedsouth from Austria, supported by the 46


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8Panzer Korps pushing south-east from Hun-gary then down towards Belgrade, andPanzer Group Kleist heading north-west tomeet them from Bulgaria; while in the southXII Army moved simultaneously south-wards into Greece from Bulgaria and west tolink up with Italian troops in Albania.As more than one commentator hasobserved, the Yugoslav campaign was 'morelike a peacetime exercise than a bloody oper-ation of war'. XII Army began operations onApril 6 and entered Skopje on the 10th, whenpart of its forces were detached to help theItalians and the remainder swept victoriouslyinto Greece. II Army did not begin movinguntil the 8th, heading towards Zagreb, whilethe two Panzer Groups formed a pincermovement aimed at Belgrade, which wasfirst entered by a reconnaissance unit of the2nd SS Division 'Reich' attached to 46Panzer Korps, although 11th Panzer Div-ision later claimed this distinction. In anycase, the 'race' was very close. Belgrade fellon the 12th and the last organised Yugoslavresistance, in Sarajevo, was crushed the fol-lowing day. The German troops were hailedas liberators practically everywhere, andGeneral Simovic resigned on the 14th, thearmistice being signed in Prince Paul's castleon the 17th.In Greece the resistance was both tougherand better organised, even though the endwas never in question. Against XII Army'sten divisions, including the 2nd Panzer Div-ision, the Greeks could muster only n in thefront line, supported by the 2nd New Zea-land and 6th Australian Divisions and aBritish armoured brigade, all commanded byGeneral Maitland Wilson. TwC' Greek div-isions were covering the deployment of theCommonwealth forces, two were in the gapbetween the rivers Vardar and Struma, whilethe remainder occupied the Metaxas Linebetween the Struma and the Turkish border.The remainder of the Greek Army - another14 divisions - was still engaged with theItalians in Albania.The Metaxas Line was not defended insufficient strength to stand a chance of hold-ing out. XII Army began moving on April 6and had breached the line within 24 hours,opening the road to Salonika and the rear ofthe other Greek dispositions. Three dayslater those elements of XII Army which hadinvaded Serbia were also across the borderand, on the 13th, Greek forces began with-drawing from Albania - but too late, for they

were now cut off. This left the Common-wealth forces holding the line of the RiverAliakmon in an untenable position, and onthe 16th Maitland Wilson gave the order tobegin withdrawing towards the Ther-mopylae Line.The 2nd Panzer Division and 6th Gebirgs-iager Division were ordered to try to stop theretreat by means of an outflanking man-oeuvre around Mount Olympus. 2nd PanzerDivision was split into two battlegroupsadvancing through the extremely difficultterrain either side of the mountain, while thealpine troops moved straight through thecentre. A forced night march by the easternbattle group brought the Germans into theflank and rear of the New Zealand battalionholding the coastal high ground and forcedthem to retire in haste, abandoning much oftheir equipment. Two companies of tankswere laboriously brought up and forded thetorrent of the River Pinios - although notwithout mishap - giving them access to thesouthern bank and the Australian forcesholding the Tempe Gorge, guarding theapproach to Larissa. The Australians werealready under pressure from 6th Gebirgs-[ager Division and the western battlegroup of2nd Panzer Division and, lacking anti-tankguns in sufficient quantity, the Australianswere forced to retreat. Larissa fell to theGermans on the 19th.The retiring Commonwealth forces con-tinued to fight a series of valiant rearguardactions, making the best possible use of theterrain, and even German officers on the spotacknowledged that this phase of the oper-ations was conducted with skill. At Ther-mopylae itself a whole Panzer company wasdecimated by accurate close-range fire and,although the Germans made an audaciousparachute drop on the Corinth Canal to try totrap the retreating troops (see World War 2Photo Album 7: German Paratroops in theMed) , Maitland Wilson succeeded inextricating 43,000 men from Attica and thePe1oponessus. Further Greek resistancebecame pointless and the government capitu-lated on April 23.For the remainder of the war operations inthe Balkans were principally of an anti-guerrilla nature in which tanks, due to therugged character of the countryside in bothGreece and Yugoslavia, were of little' use.These duties were principally carried out bythe 7th SS Freiwilligen Gebirgs Division'Prinz Eugen' utilising a diverse mixture of


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captured and obsolete equipment. The 8thSS Kavallerie Division 'Florian Geyer' wasalso used in this role for a period during1942, together with the Croatian Legionmentioned earlier.However, the whole area continued toexercise a peculiar fascination in the mind ofHitler. After the fall of Tunisia in 1943andthe Allied invasion of Sicily in July of thatyear, the German dictator remained con-vinced that Greece was going to be the centreofthe Allied assault on southern Europe, andeventually maintained no fewer than 20 div-isions in situ to meet this imagined threat.The German Army staff was more practi-callyminded and realised that the landings inSicily and, later, in mainland Italy, rep-resented the real offensive. However, it wasnot until late in 1944, when Bulgaria - underSoviet pressure - changed sides, that Hitlerpermitted the withdrawal of German forcesfrom the Greek islands. The belatedness ofthis action stranded over 20,000 Germantroops in tactically hopeless and strategicallyuseless positions.Similarly, the German forces in Italy suf-fered from Hitler's preoccupation with theBalkans. Prior to the Sicilian landings, therewere only four divisions in residence,although this later grew sixfold. However,the nature of the terrain, coupled with Alliedaerial supremacy, denied the Panzer div-isionstheir proper function. In fact, the onlyPanzer division in 'permanent' residence wasthe 26th, which had been formed in October1942 from the 23rd Infantry Division undercommand of General-Ieutnant SmiloFreiherr von Liittwitz. Others which par-ticipated in the campaign were the 16th(which had been reformed in France after theparent unit was wiped out at Stalingrad)from June to November 1943; the 24th,briefly, from August to October of the sameyear; -and the Luftwaffe's elite 'HermannGoring' Division (for further details ofwhichsee my Osprey !Vanguard title Fallschirm-panzerdivision 'Hermann Goring'). Otherformations which contained an armouredelement and saw action in Italy induded the16th SS Panzer-Grenadier Division 'Reichs-fuhrer SS' and the 3rd, 15th, 29th and 90thPanzer-Grenadier Divisions.Allied operations against the Europeanmainland commenced with the combinedamphibious/airborne assault on Sicilyin July1943 when eight divisions successfully dis-embarked on the island. Command of the

9Axis forces was divided and the Germantroops present were subordinate to theItalians. Although they fought as stubbornlyas elsewhere, they were outnumbered and,when Italian troops in the line broke, this,coupled with an Allied outflanking man-oeuvre, compelled a withdrawal to the toe ofItaly across the Straits of Messina.This defeat heralded the collapse of theItalian Fascist Government and the replace-ment of Mussolini byMarshal Badoglio, whoimmediately commenced surrender negotia-tions. A secret treaty was signed on Sep-tember 3 at the same time that Allied troopswere landing at Reggio. However, the Ger-man troops (under the command of Kessel-ring in the south and Rommel in the north)were prepared for such an eventuality and,when the news became public on the 8th-the day before the Allies landed at Salerno-German troops moved in to disarm theItalians and take over key positions.However, Kesselring's position in thesouth was fraught as he could only disposeseven divisions, although reinforcementswere on the way. Nevertheless, GeneralMark Clark and the US 5th Army met withextremely stiff opposition at Salerno and forthe first two days of the battle it seemed asthough the American troops would bethrown back into the sea. Aerial superioritywon the day, though, and by the 15th thebeachhead was consolidated. Meanwhile,the British 8th Army advancing up fromCalabria had encountered little resistanceand joined up with the Americans on the16th.German forces in the area now numbered15 divisions, however, and, from the timethe Allies had captured Bari and Foggia andreached the line of the River Biferno at theend of the month, they found the going farless easy. The lie of the land favoured thedefenders and, with the exception of theAnzio (Nettuno) campaign, the remainder ofthe war in Italy settled down to become pre-dominantly an infantry slogging match.In this type ofwarfare, where mobility wassecondary to concealment and firepower, thetank was really a luxury since self-propelledguns firing from prepared positions were justas effective. Indeed, many Panther tank tur-rets were mounted on buried casements asanti-tank 'pillboxes'. Local Allied air supre-macy (it was never as complete as manypeople believe) severely inhibited the move-ment of German columns except by night.


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10But when they could be brought into theright place at the right time, the GermanPanzers could still wreak havoc, as they wereto show at Anzio.By the end of 1943 Allied forces in Italywere facing a virtual stalemate situation, andall hopes of being in Rome by Christmas hadfaded before the end of November. A newamphibious assault was therefore launchedin January 1944 to outflank the German linesand open the coast road. This involved50,000 American and British troops underMajor-General Lucas.The landing was virtually unopposed but,with memories of Salerno fresh in his mind,Lucas suspected a German trap and, ratherthan pushing boldly forward, paused to con-solidate his beachead. This gave Kesselringtime to reinforce the Anzio perimeter witheight divisions, including the elite 'HermannGoring' formation, which easily adminis-tered a check to Lucas' troops when heeventually began moving out.Meanwhile, the Allies were having nomore success in breaking through the mainGerman defensive line, since the obviousavenue of approach up the Liri Valley wasclosed by the heroic Fallschirmjagers andother defenders of Monte Cassino. After twodetermined assaults had proved fruitless inresults and costly in lives, the Allies broughtin the air force to bomb the monastery. How-ever, this only succeeded in making it evenmore impregnable and a third attack provedequally futile.During February General Clark visitedthe Anzio beachhead and organised a break-out attempt - which proved similarly fruit-less and provoked a German counter-attackwhich almost drove the Americans back tothe beaches. Heavy naval gunfire saved theday for the Allies, however, and the Germanforces were obliged to fall back.The stalemate continued for two months,Allied operations being particularly ham-pered by heavy rains but, on May II arenewed attack on Cassino, preceded by a2,000-gun artillery barrage, succeeded in dis-lodging the exhausted and depleted defen-ders. At the same time a renewed attack wasmounted out of the Anzio beachhead and,since Kesselring was unable adequately toreinforce either position in time, the road toRome fmally lay open. Kesselring declaredRome an open city on June 4 to prevent itbeing bombed and withdrew his forces to theGothic Line 1S O miles to the north. Allied

troops in Italy were thus able to celebrate thenews of D- Day two days later with their ownvictory.However, events elsewhere now took ahand as many of General Alexander's troopswere withdrawn from Italy to take part inOperation 'Dragoon' - the invasion of south-ern France - so that, despite local successessuch as the capture of Ancono and Livorno,Kesselring's tired but stubborn troops weregiven time to settle into their new dispos-itions. Alexander, together with GeneralClark and Prime Minister Churchill, wereangry and frustrated by this diversion ofvaluable troops at a critical time and wereunable properly to exploit a breach in theGothic Line at Lake Trasimene. The offen-sive did not gather way again until Sep-tember when, however, three successivebreaches were opened, despite heavy casual-ties, in the German line.Under pressure from all sides, Hitlerfinally realised that his forces were over-stretched and at long last, as mentionedearlier, agreed to a partial withdrawal of Ger-man troops in Greece. British paratroops fol-lowed up the advantage and, on October 16,the Greek Government-in-exile returned toAthens. In Italy, however, with the aid ofreinforcements and the heavy rains whichagain hampered the Allies, Kesselring man-aged to staunch the breaches in the GothicLine and the situation reverted to stalemate.The situation remained much the sameuntil April 1945, although on the Germanside Field Marshal Kesselring was woundedand yielded command to von Vietinghoff.(Kesselring was committed to life imprison-ment by a war crimes tribunal but later par-doned and released in 1952). The Alliessecured local victories such as the capture ofRavenna in December 1944 but concen-trated on preparing for a new spring offen-sive, relying in the intervening time onstrategic bombing in this theatre.The fmal offensive opened on April 9when the British 8th Army practically deci-mated the troops opposing them and crossedthe River Senio while, a few days later, tbeAmerican 5th Army finally succeeded in cap-turing Bologna. With the Russians in Berlinand the Allied troops everywhere else vic-torious, the morale of the surviving Germantroops in Italy was understandably at an all-time ebb and, harried by Italian partisans,the retreating men began throwing downtheir arms at an ever increasing rate. As


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American troops entered Milan on the 29thHitler committed suicide and the Germantroops in Italy surrendered unconditionally.The men on each sidehad fought aparticu-larly difficult war in Italy leading to frus-trations and a degree of atrocity - such as theshooting of prisoners - by both. The Ger-mans suffered particularly from the deprada-tions of partisans, making the life of rear-echelon troops particularly nervewrackingand even the occasional leave for front-linesoldiers a far from relaxing experience. Ontheir part, the Allied troops were up againstseasoned defenders in strong and well-camouflaged positions which also affordedthem a greater degree of protection from theelements.The conduct of the campaign has oftenbeen questioned and the doggedness of theGerman defence is usually attributed solelytoHitler's fanatical resistance to giving up aninch of ground. As Kesselring himself said,however, in his Memoir s (William Kimber,1953), 'To evacuate the whole of Italy anddefend the Reich from positions in the

11Alps . .. would have given the enemyuntrammelled freedom of movement in thedirection of France and the Balkans, havemeant sacrificing an indispensable deepbattle-zone and unleashing the air war on thewhole of southern Germany and Austria'.Interested readers may find a deeper analysisof this question - particularly Hitler's inter-ference and the problems of a divided Ger-man command at the time of the Salernolandings - in Matthew Cooper's fine bookThe German Army 1933-1945 (Macdonaldand Jane's, 1978).In closing this, the last title of mine in thisseries, I would like to sincerely acknowledgethe helpful comments, criticisms and sug-gestions of the many readers who have takenthe trouble to write to me. This hasenabled many gaps and some errorsin photo identification and interpre-tation to be rectified, and hopefully inthe fullness of time these will be in-corporated in future revised editionsof the books (Nos 1 to 4 are alreadyavailable).


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The photographs in this book have beenselected with care from the Bundesarchiv,Koblenz (the approximate German equival-ent of the US National Archives or theBritish Public Records Office). Particularattention has been devoted to choosingphotographs which will be fresh to the major-ity of readers, although it is inevitable thatone or two may be familiar. Other than this,the author's prime concern has been tochoose good-quality photographs whichillustrate the type of detail that enthusiastsand modellers require. In certain instancesquality has, to a degree, been sacrificed inorder to include a particularly interestingphotograph. For the most part, however, thequality speaks for itself.The Bundesarchiv files hold some one mil-lion black and white negatives ofWehrmachtand Luftwaffe subjects, including 150,000on the Kriegsmarine, some 20,000 glassnegatives from the inter-war period and sev-eral hundred colour photographs. Sheernumbers is one of the problems which makesthe compilation of a book such as this dif-ficult. Other difficulties include the fact that,in the vast majority of cases, the negativeshave not been printed so the researcher isforced to look through box after box of 35mm contact strips - some 250 boxes contain-ing an average of over 5,000 pictures each,plus folders containing a further 115,000contact prints of the Waffen-SS; moreover,cataloguing and indexing the negatives isneither an easy nor a short task, with theresult that, at the present time, Luftwaffeand Wehrmacht subjects as well as entirelyseparate theatres of operations are inter-mingled in the same files.

There is a simple explanation for this con-fusion. The Bundesarchiv photographs weretaken by war correspondents attached toGerman military units, and the negativeswere originally stored in the Reich Prop-aganda Ministry in Berlin. Towards the closeof World War 2, all the photographs - thennumbering some 31million - were ordered tobe destroyed, One man in the Ministry, aHerr Evers, realised that they should be pre-served for posterity and, acting entirelyunofficially and on his own initiative, com-mandeered the first available suitable trans-port - two refrigerated fish trucks - loadedthe negatives into them, and set out for.safety. Unfortunately, one of the trucks dis-appeared en route and, to this day, nobodyknows what happened to it. The remainderwere captured by the Americans and shippedto Washington, where they remained for 20years before the majority were returned tothe government of West Germany. A largenumber, however, still reside in Washing-ton. Thus the Bundesarchiv files are incom-plete, with infuriating gaps for anyresearcher. Specifically, they end in theautumn of 1944, after Arnhem, and thusrecord none of the drama of the closingmonths of the war.The photographs are currently housed in amodern officeblock in Koblenz, overlookingthe River Mosel. The priceless negatives arestored in the basement, and there are strictsecurity checks on anyone seeking admissionto the Bildarchiv (Photo Archive). Regret-ably, and the author has been asked to stressthis point, the archives are o nly o pen to bo nafid e a utho rs and publis her s, and pr ints can o nlybe supplied fo r reproduction in a boo k o rmagazine . They CANNOT be supplied toprivate collectors or enthusiasts for personaluse, so please - don't write to the Bundes-archiv or the publishers of this book askingfor copy prints, because they cannot be pro-vided. The well-equipped photo laboratoryat the Bundesarchiv is only capable of hand-ling some 80 to 100 prints per day becauseeach is printed individually under strictlycontrolled conditions - another reason forthe fine quality of the photographs but also acontributory factor in the above legislation.

Right Early PzKpfw VAs in Rome being photographed by an SS officer (716/11/8).


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14

Above Crossing the border-probably into Yugoslavia-through a rather flimsy anti-tank barrier (161/209/26).

Left and facing page PzKpfwIIIHs of the 5th Panzer Divisionen route to the Balkans (158/94/11, 12 and 13).

OVERLEAFBackground photographPzKpfw IIIF of the 5th PanzerDivision in Yugoslavia (159/107/36).Inset left PzBefWg IIIH of the5th Panzer Division (l59/107/37).Inset right Another 5th PanzerDivision PzKpfw IIIH (1591144/28).


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IS

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Left PzKpfw lVe of the 5thPanzer Division (159/144/15).

Below and facing page Duringthe invasions of Yugoslavia andGreece, the Panzer divisionshad to use 'roads' wherever theycould find them, as in the case ofthis 5th Division PzKpfw II(below) and IIIH (right)(162/294/9a and 11a), or (belowright) these IIIHs (162/293/27a).


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Above A dodgy river crossing for another PzKpfw III (162/256/39).Below 11th Panzer Division PzKpfw lIIF (161/215/11).


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This pageThe difficulty experienced by tanks in the Yugoslav and Greek mountains can clearly be seenin these shots of PzKpfw Ills, heavily laden with spare kit (166/515/10 and 22).


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Left PzKpfw IVs, probably ofthe 11th Panzer Division, in theBalkans, (I61/247/29a),

Below Panzer crewmen clearaway barbed wire in. front of aPzKpfw IIIF (166/515/24).

Right PzKpfw IIIs in Greece;background vehicle is an AusfFwith old-style commander'scupola and driver's visor, whilethat in the foreground is a lateAusf G or an H (162/257/12a).

Below right A German motor-cyclist examines a knocked-outBritish Cruiser Tank Mark IrACAlO)nicknamed 'Connie II' inGreece (163/316/37).


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24

This and facing page 5rh Panzer Division armoured cars inGreece: an SdKfz 232 ('Seydlirz') (above),233 ('Panrher') (below) and 221 (,Houx') (right) (163/327/24, 175/1265/14 and 164/369/29a).


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Left And who said battle re-enactments were a post-warphenomenon? Self-conscio usGerman troops with cardboardarmour and shields (but notetheir boorsl) put on a carnivalfor the 'locals' (167/562/2).

Below left and this page Scenesfrom later in the war-PzKpfwIVF2s in Athens (175/1270/25,175/1267/23 and 175/1270/33).

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These pages PzKpfw VAs in Italy (478/2164/27,37 and 35).


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This page PzKpfw IVGs entrained to-orfrom?-the front (175/1269/8 and 12).

Right Regrettably, the German censor has been atthe back of this SdKfz 25 1 loaded on a train, but itwas probably photographed in Greece (166/547/2).

Below right and overleafPzKpfw lIAs, Bs and Csof the 9th Panzer Division in the Balkans(160/190/34, 160/152/32, 160/190/29 and 38).


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Right Early PzKpfw IIIG with3.7 em KwK L/46.5 and inter-nal mantlet. Only about SOAusfiihrung Gs were so armed(160/190/28).

Below 9th Panzer DivisionPzKpfw IIIG (160/190/33).


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34Left Well-laden PzKpfw IIIGof the 9th Panzer Division(157/21/23a).

Below After the fall of France,large numbers of French AFVswere pressed into German ser-vice, normally for second-lineand anti-partisan duties. Herea smoke grenade partially ob-scures a Hotchkiss H-39 dur-ing anexercise or demonstration(206/1857/20).

Right Unidentified insignia onthe rear of another H-39(173/1143/23).

Below right A Hotchkiss H-38which has come to grief; TheGermans replaced the domedcupolas on French tanks withthe split-hatch type seen here(174/1152/14).


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Left A Renault R-35 In German service(174/1153/28).

Below A Hotchkiss H-39 in bleak conditions(173/1101/33).

Right An H-39 in the Yugoslav mountains(172/1092/33a).

Below right A Somua S-35 in the Balkans. Untilthe appearance of the Russian T-34, a good casecould be made for rating this the best tank inservice anywhere (169/948/11).


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Facing page A Hotchkiss H39 '323' with an infantry patrol in a Balkan forest (169/916/18 and 23a).Above '334' photographed at the same time (169/917/2).Below Although probably taken in Russia rather than the Balkans, this picture of an H39 will be ofinterest to modellers because of the 'hut on skis' which it is towing! 068/880/15).


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Left Track repairs for a Somua S-35 in Greece (169/915/21).Above A convoy of PzKpfw IBs crossing a wooden bridge. Although obsolete even before 1941, thisvehicle continued in service until 1943 (157/41/8).Below PzKpfw IVG (479/2196/19a) .

. . . - . .. . . . . . . . . . .


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This page A well-camouflaged Panther. Note zimrnerit on turret (477/2124/4 and 6),


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This page Heavily covered with foliage, a convoy of Nashorns passes through an Italian town(316/1161/20 and 21).


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Above left Another Nashorn, revealing rathermore of itself! Of interest are the lengths of wirecriss-crossing the superstructure into which freshfoliage could be inserted for camouflage(313/I004/9a)..

Far left, left and this page Good detail views ofPzKpfw VAs with new style cupola but lackingthe ball-mounted hull machine-gun later fitted tothis mark of Panther (478/2165/16 and 18,2166/18a and 37).


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Above left The Brurnbaer was aself-propelled gun on thePzKpfw IV chassis designed forinfantry support in street fight-ing and against fortifications.Mounting a 15cm howitzer, thisvehicle was issued to Sturm-panzer Abteilungs 217,218 and219 in Italy (313/1004/5a).

Left As only 52 vehicles wereconverted, photographs of theBrumbaer are comparativelyrare. Here a column of Britishprisoners marches past onewhich is preceded by a PzKpfwII. Italy, autumn 1943(310/900131).

Above The zimmerit coating forprotection against magneticmines is very clear in this shot(311/904/7a).

Right A Brumbaer at speedalong an Italian road (312/955/4a).


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Above left An improvisedtank-killer. A captured Carden-Loyd carrier with Horstmannsuspension in the handsof the 3rd Panzer-GrenadierDivision in Italy. The threeRacketenpanzerbiichse 43 8.8em rocket launchers must havebeen a formidable combinationat close range (313/1003/3).

Left A knocked-out Shermanamong the burnt -ou t wreckageof another vehicle in Italy, 1944(313/1004/25a).

This page Sherman used fortarget practice well illustratingthe armour-piercing capabilityof the 5 em KwK39 L/60, rhe7.5 em KwK42 L/70and rhe8.8em KwK36 L/56 (313/1004/20and 21).


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Left The mud in Italy could be every bit as bad asin Russia! Here a Wespe has apparently just beentowed out by an SdKfz 9/1, an IS-ton half-trackmounting a 6-ton crane. In the left foreground isan Italian M13/40 (312/968/20).

Below left Tank crewmen, wearing the late-wardenims, with captured Allied Shermans (311/944/6a).

Right A barrel change for a Nashorn courtesy of a6-ton crane mounted on a four-wheeled truck(311/908/23).

Below A Panzer crewman contemplates withdespondency the task of refitting this Tiger'strack (311/904/23a).

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Background photograph and overleaf top Uncaring trafficrumbles past aTiger stranded ina ditch (311/903/22 and 25).Inset A veteran Panzer Feldwebel (311/904/14a).


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Above A disabled Goliath remote-controlled demolition tank (310/898/34).Below SluG III in Italy (310/896/6).Righ t A clear shot of a Tiger, autumn 1943 (?) (310/880/27).


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Above 'Ellzapoppin II' and another Sherman after a confrontation with the German Panzers(310/876/23).Below Following the Italian surrender, a great deal of equipment was taken over by the German forces,including this Autoblinda AB41 armoured car (309/820/16).


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Above Even in defeat, the Wehrmachtretained a sense of humour . _ . but I would love to know the storybehind this picture (above left) (305/674/30), or (above right) this equally silly shot of an 11th PanzerDivision car! (163/303/30a).Below 20 mm Flak 38 mounted on a light half-track (306/713{20).


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Below The crew of a PzKpfw lVE bargain for fresh fruit with a Greek or Yugoslav farmer (307/762/8a).


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Above Panthers roll into action, Italy 1943 (478/2167/31).Below PzKpfW IV crests a ridge on a mountain road (308/799Q/19a).


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".~."

These pages and overleafPzKpfw IVGs of the 16rhPanzer Division (305/652/13,14, 16, 22 and 24).


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Above Setting up a Nebelwerfer in an Italian field (304/643/15).Below SdKfz 231 in Italy (304/634/26a).


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Captured M-IO in German service (304/626/12a).


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These pages Hiding a PzKpfwV A (early model with 'letterbox'machine-gun flap instead o flater ball-mount) in an Italianvillage (313/1001/17, 27, 32 and35).


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Above left A moment's relax-ation for the crew of a well-camouflaged '88' (304/626/Sa).

Left Despite the poor quality ofthis photo, it is a particularlyinteresting shot as it shows oneof the little CV33s producedwith torsion bar suspensionprincipally for export to Brazil,here inFallschirmjager hands inItaly (304/608/7).

Above Another Italian tank inGerman service, this time anM13/40 (304/614/7).

Right StuG III in south Italy(303/587/17a).

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Above 20mm Flak.vierling-a very effective weapon against both low-flying aircraft and 'soft' groundtargets (303/586/26).B elow and above rig ht StuG III in the mountains (303/580/19 and 22).Righ t PzKpfw IVG at speed (303/556/11).


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These pages The 16th SS Divi-sion 'Reichsfiihrer SS' was inRome in January 1944, asshown in these photos of StuGIlls (305/700/6, II and 19 and312/992/13a).


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Above PzKpfw IIIM (303/556/8).

Left SdKfz 233 (205/1800/34).

Above right Camouflaged StuGIII in an Italian town (303/554/15a).

Right and next three pagesPzKpfw IVGs of the IstPanzerDivision in Greece, August1943 (175/1259/4a, 1264/8,1266/8, 1267/30 and 36 and1268/14a).


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Another PzKpfw .IVG, possibly photographed at ..the same time (176/1372/24).


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These pages and overleafTigers and PzKpfw VAs inRome. Unfortunately, nonecarry any identifying insignia(310/850/19a and 20a, 855/10a,880/33,35 and 38and 884/15a).


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This and next four pages The long retreat up the Italian peninsula. Visible are StuG IUs, PzKpfw VAs,an Elefant and, of especial interest, a little Borgward SdKfz 301 Ladungstrager, or tracked demolitioncharge layer. Photographs from this sequence have often been attributed, incorrectly, to the Russianfront (311/940/13, 16, 18, IS, 32, 34, 3S and 38).


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Left A PzKpfw VA negotiates a stream(478/2165/2).

Below left and this page A PzK pfw VA shows itspaces in Italy (477/2124/17, 22, 23 and 32).


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Comparison of Panzer divisions,1941 and 1943Throughout the war, Hitler was guilty ofsublimating the strength of the GermanArmy by creating new units whose strength,for the most part, had to come through filter-ing off elements of existing formations. In1941 the number of Panzer divisions wasdoubled but - despite the replacement of oldequipment by more modern vehicles andweapons - their combat effectiveness virtu-ally halved.A 1941 division comprised two Panzerregiments, each of two battalions, with onemedium and two light companies to a bat-

talion. A full-strength company had 30tanksin theory, although 20 was closer to thetruth. Many divisions, in fact, only had onetank regiment - although six had three -creating a significant imbalance, since therewere also two infantry regiments, one artil-lery regiment, and armoured reconnais-sance, anti-tank, anti-aircraft, engineer andsignals battalions within the divisions.A division averaged, therefore, 180 tanks,although 160 can be taken as a serviceablenorm. By 1943, however, this had beenfurther reduced to an average of 108 - withonly one two-battalion regiment per division- while the infantry and artillery comple-ments had' increased. Admittedl y, a higherproportion of the artillery in 1943 was self-propelled, but the re-allocation of resourcesdemonstrates remarkably both the increas-ing strain imposed on German industry byAllied strategic bombing and the increas-ingly defensive nature of the war the Axishad to fight.Due to the terrain, of course, there wasless call for highly mobile armoured forces inthe Balkans or Italy than in the land war'scritical theatre - Russia - hence the paucityof the Wehrmacht's tank allocation in thisarea.


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A C H T U N G ! C O M P L E T E D Y O U R C O L L E C T I O N ?Other titles in the same seriesNo 1 Panzers in the Desertby Bruce QuarrieNo 2 German Bombers over Englandby Bryan PhilpottNo 3 Waffen-SS in Russiaby Bruce QuarrieNo 4 Fighters Defending the Reichby Bryan PhilpottNo 5 Panzers in North-West Europeby Bruce QuarrieNo 6 German Fighters over the Medby Bryan PhilpottNo 7 German Paratroops in the Medby Bruce QuarrieNo 8 German Bombers over Russiaby Bryan PhilpottNo 9 Panzers in Russia 1941-43by Bruce QuarrieNo 10 German Fighters over Englandby Bryan PhilpottNo 11 V-Boats in the Atlanticby Paul BeaverNo 12 Panzers in Russia 1943-45by Bruce QuarrieNo 13German Bombers over the Medby Bryan PhilpottNo 14 German Capital Shipsby Paul BeaverNo 15 German Mountain Troopsby Bruce QuarrieNo 16 German Fighters over Russiaby Bryan PhilpottNo 17 E-Boats and Coastal Craftby Paul BeaverNo 18 German Maritime Aircraftby Bryan PhilpottNo 20GermanDestroyers andEscortsby Paul Beaver


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A C H T U N G ! C O M P L E T E D Y O U R C O L L E C T I O N ?I

Thank you for buying this AZTEX book.We're sure you will find it informativeand enjoyable. If you would like to bekept informed of the publishing dates offuture titles please send your name andaddress to:AnnouncementsDept wwnAZTEX CorporationPOBox 50046Tucson, AZ 85703


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~~'i'.r.\.\~"#l~~r., In the Balkan's Hitler, partly through his own\C *- - \.~~~ :. -- \ . c ; , obstinacy and partly through the sheer incom-\ , ~ ~ _ _ \ . 1 - - ' - \..f .~~ peten,ce of his allies, was em~roiled in a cr~el\..,~~ ...., ...' guerrilla. campalg,n. !he partisans, operating" _ \.,.,..'- \. ---( from their mountain hideouts, were able to keep\.t\~' fII! .~\. the Germans engaged in a contest which they__\. ~ (~ __\.\.'" ~\ could not w.in, but which they could not afford to\l' ~,,, lo~e, And, all the time val~able resources we~e,.._, being drained from such Vital theatres as RUSSiaand ltaly. Here, told with the aid of many highquality photographs taken by German war cor-respondents, is one of the stories which decidedthe outcome of the war,

panzers in the balkans and italy quarrie

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