29 tan vs director of forestry.docx

8/18/2019 29 Tan vs Director of Forestry.docx

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FACTS:

The Bureau of Forestry issued an advertisement for public bidding for acertain tract of forest land in Olongapo, Zambales The public forest land !aslocated !ithin the former "S #aval $eservation comprising %,&'& hectares of timberland (etitioner submitted his application in due form along !ith nineother applicants Thereafter, (resident Carlos ( )arcia issued a directive tothe *irector of the Bureau of Forestry to draft a proclamation establishing thesaid area as a !atershed forest reserve for Olongapo and that the bidsreceived for the issuance of timber license be re+ected The Secretary ofAgriculture and #ational $esources sustained the recommendations of the*irector of Forestry !ho concluded that it !ould be bene cial to the publicinterest if the area is made available for e-ploitation under certainconditions Finally, the area !as a!arded to petitioner $avago Commercial

Company and .orge /ao 0appic1 led motions for reconsideration !hich !eredenied by the *irector of Forestry $avago appealed to the Secretary ofAgriculture and #atural $esources, !hich later on, declared the licenseissued to petitioner by *irector of Forestry as null and void (etitioner2smotion for reconsideration !as denied

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5hether or not the license of the petitioner is valid

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#o, the license of the petitioner !as void ab initio since it !as granted!ithout authority

The Supreme Court held that the area covered by petitioner6appellant7stimber license practically comprises the entire Olongapo !atershed 3t is ofpublic 1no!ledge that !atersheds serves as a defense against soil erosionand guarantees the steady supply of !ater As a matter of general policy, the(hilippine Constitution e-pressly mandated the conservation and properutili8ation of natural resources, !hich includes the country7s !atershed5atersheds in the (hilippines had been sub+ected to rampant abusivetreatment due to various unscienti c and destructive land use practicesOnce lush !atersheds !ere !antonly deforested due to uncontrolled timbercutting by licensed concessionaries and illegal loggers This is one reason!hy, in paragraph &% of the rules and regulations included in the ordinarytimber license it is stated:


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The terms and conditions of this license are sub+ect to change atthe discretion of the *irector of Forestry, and that this licensemay be made to e-pire at an earlier date, !hen public interestsso

Considering the overriding public interest involved in the instant case, theCourt therefore too1 +udicial notice of the fact that, the area covered bypetitioner6appellant7s timber license has been established as the Olongapo5atershed Forest $eserve by virtue of 4-ecutive (roclamation #o &9 bythen (resident *iosdado ;acapagal

The release of the license on .anuary


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property or a property right, nor does it create a vested rightE nor is itta-ationD Thus, the Court held that the granting of license does not createirrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights

The !elfare of the people is the supreme la! Thus, no franchise or right canbe availed of to defeat the proper e-ercise of police po!er and that the Statehas inherent po!


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$epublic of the (hilippinesSUPREME COURT

;anila

S4CO#* *3 3S3O#

G.R. No. L- 24548 October 27, 1983

WENCESL O !"N#ONS T N, T$E %&RECTOR O' 'ORESTR(, POLON&OT$E SECRET R( O' GR&CULTURE N% N TUR L RESOURCES )OSE (.'EL&C& NO, respondents6appelllees,vsT$E %&RECTOR O' 'ORESTR(, POLON&O R&!ER , T$E SECRET R( O'

GR&CULTURE N% N TUR L RESOURCES )OSE (. 'EL&C& NO, re*+oe t*- ++e""ee*,R ! GO COMMERC& L CO., )ORGE L O $ PP&C/ T N C&O M LL R&, intervenors,

Camito V Pelianco r! for petitioner"appellant!

#olicitor $eneral for respondent Director!

%stelito P! &endo'a for respondent (a)ago Comm*l Co!

+nacleto adoy for respondent +tanacio &allari!

&ariano de oya, r! for respondent orge -ao .appic/, r!

M / S& R, J:

This is an appeal from the order dated .anuary & , =>


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Olongapo, Zambales, provided tenders !ere received on or before ;ay &&,=>


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$espectfully for!arded to the honorable, the 4-ecutive Secretary;alacanang ;anila inviting particular attention to the commentand recommendation of the *irector of Forestry in theproceeding in indorsement in !hich this Of ce fully concurs

The observations of responsible forest oGcials are most revealingof their 8eal to promote forest conservation and !atershedprotection especially in Olongapo, Zambales area 3n convincingfashion, they have demonstrated that to declare the forest areainvolved as a forest reserve ratify than open it for timbere-ploitation under license and regulation !ould do more harmthan of to the public interest To convert the area into a forestreserve !ithout an ade@uate forest protection force, !ould ma1eof it a 7Free Zone and /ogging (aradise,7 to the ever 7(roblem

/oggers7 of *inalupihan, Bataan an open target of timbersmugglers, 1aingineros and other forms of forest vandals anddespoilers On the other hand, to a!ard the area, as planned, toa reputable and responsible licensee !ho shall conduct loggingoperations therein under the selective logging method and !hoshall be obliged to employ a suGcient number of forest guards topatrol and protect the forest consecration and !atershedprotection

5orthy of mention is the fact that the Bureau of Forestry hadalready conducted a public bidding to determine the most@uali ed bidder to !hom the area advertised should be a!arded#eedless to stress, the decision of the *irector of Forestry todispose of the area thusly !as arrived at after much thought anddeliberation and after having been convinced that to do so !ouldnot adversely aHect the !atershed in that sector The result ofthe bidding only have to be announced To be sure, some of theparticipating bidders li1e ;r 4dgardo (ascual, !ent to muche-pense in the hope of !inning a virgin forest concession To

suddenly ma1e a turn about of this decision !ithout strong +usti able grounds, !ould cause the Bureau of Forestry and thisOGce no end of embarrassment

3n vie! of the foregoing, it is earnestly urged that the *irector ofForestry be allo!ed to proceed !ith the announcement of theresults of the bidding for the sub+ect forest area p =9, CF3 rec


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The OGce of the (resident in its ?th 3ndorsement dated February &, =>


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ordinary timber licenses, !hich order too1 eHect on the same day, *ecember=>, =>


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On ;arch >, =>


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promulgated an order commenting that in vie! of the observations of the*irector of Forestry +ust @uoted, Dto grant the area in @uestion to any of theparties herein, !ould undoubtedly adversely aHect public interest !hich isparamount to private interests,D and concluding that, Dfor this reason, thisOGce is of the opinion and so holds, that !ithout the necessity of discussingthe appeals of the herein appellants, the said appeals should be, as herebythey are, dismissed and this case is considered a closed matter insofar asthis OGce is concernedD p % , rec

On April = , =>


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has not e-hausted all available administrative remediesE ? that the petitiondoes not state a cause of actionE and ' that purely administrative anddiscretionary functions of administrative oGcials may not be interfered !ithby the courts The Secretary of Agriculture and #atural $esources +oined themotion to dismiss !hen in his ans!er of ;ay = , =>


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0e argues that the sole issue in the present case is, !hether or not the factsin the petition constitute a suGcient cause of action p 9=, rec (etitioner6appellant, in his brief, presented a lengthy discussion on the de nition of theterm cause of action !herein he contended that the three essential elementsthereon, I namely, the legal right of the plaintiH, the correlative obligationof the defendants and the act or omission of the defendant in violation ofthat right I are satis ed in the averments of this petition pp 9=69&, rec0e invo1ed the rule that !hen the ground for dismissal is that the complaintstates no cause of action, such fact can be determined only from the factsalleged in the complaint and from no other, and the court cannot considerother matters aliunde 0e further invo1ed the rule that in a motion to dismissbased on insuGciency of cause of action, the facts alleged in the complaintare deemed hypothetically admitted for the purpose of the motion pp 9&699, rec

A perusal of the records of the case sho!s that petitioner6appellant7scontentions are untenable As already observed, this case !as presented tothe trial court upon a motion to dismiss for failure of the petition to state aclaim upon !hich relief could be granted $ule =< Ng , $evised $ules ofCourt , on the ground that the timber license relied upon by the petitioner6appellant in his petition !as issued by the *irector of Forestry !ithoutauthority and is therefore void ab initio This motion supplanted the generaldemurrer in an action at la! and, as a rule admits, for the purpose of themotion, ail facts !hich are !ell pleaded ho!ever !hile the court must acceptas true all !ell pleaded facts, the motion does not admit allegations of !hichthe court !ill ta1e +udicial notice are not true, nor does the rule apply tolegally impossible facts, nor to facts inadmissible in evidence, nor to facts!hich appear by record or document included in the pleadings to beunfounded ol =, ;oran7s Comments on the $ules of Court, =>% ed , p' ', citing cases

3t must be noted that there !as a hearing held in the instant case !hereinans!ers !ere interposed and evidence introduced 3n the course of the

hearing, petitioner6appellant had the opportunity to introduce evidence insupport of tile allegations iii his petition, !hich he readily availed ofConse@uently, he is estopped from invo1ing the rule that to determine thesuGciency of a cause of action on a motion to dismiss, only the facts allegedin the complaint must be considered 3f there !ere no hearing held, as in thecase of Cohen vs " S CCA ;inn =>?&,=&> F &d %99 , D!here the case !aspresented to *istrict Court upon a motion to dismiss because of alleged


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failure of complaint to state a claim upon !hich relief could be granted, andno ans!er !as interposed and no evidence introduced, the only facts !hichthe court could properly consider in passing upon the motion !ere thosefacts appearing in the complaint, supplemented be such facts as the court

+udicially 1ne!

3n -lanto )s! +li Dimaporo, et al =< SC$A < =, ;arch 9=, =>


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motion is purely one of la! This legal issue !as fully discussed insaid motion and the opposition thereto 3n this posture, oralarguments on the motion are reduced to an unnecessaryceremony and should be overloo1ed And, correctly so, becausethe other intendment of the la! in re@uiring hearing on a motion,i e , 7to avoid surprises upon the opposite party and to give to thelatter time to study and meet the arguments of the motion,7 hasbeen suGciently met And then, courts do not e-alt form oversubstance 4mphasis supplied

Furthermore even if the complaint stated a valid cause of action, a motion todismiss for6 insuGciency of cause of action !ill be granted if documentaryevidence admitted by stipulation disclosing facts suGcient to defeat theclaim enabled the court to go beyond disclosure in the complaint /OCA/S

#o =?% , #o =?, and #o ='=& of the 3nternational /ongshoremen7sAssociation vs Southern (aci c Co , < Fed $ules Service, p = %E " S CircuitCourt of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, *ec %, =>'&E =9= F &d < ' Thus, althoughthe evidence of the parties !ere presented on the @uestion of granting ordenying petitioner6appellant7s application for a !rit of preliminary in+unction,the trial court correctly applied said evidence in the resolution of the motionto dismiss ;oreover, in applying said evidence in the resolution of themotion to dismiss, the trial court, in its order dismissing the petition, pointedout that, Dthere is no reason to believe that the parties !ill change theirstand, arguments and evidenceD p ?% , CF3 rec (etitioner6appellant didnot interpose any ob+ection thereto, nor presented ne! arguments in hismotion for reconsideration pp ? &6? ?, CF3 rec This omission meansconformity to said observation, and a !aiver of his right to ob+ect, estoppinghim from raising this @uestion for the rst time on appeal D 3 @uestion notraised in the trial court cannot be raised for the rst time on appealD

;atien8o vs Servidad, Sept = , => =, = % SC$A &%<

;oreover, petitioner6appellant cannot invo1e the rule that, !hen the groundfor as1ing dismissal is that the complaint states no cause of action, its

suGciency must be determined only from the allegations in the complaintDThe rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical senseErules of procedure are used only to help secure substantial +ustice 3f atechnical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made, their aim !ould bedefeated 5here the rules are merely secondary in importance are made tooverride the ends of +usticeE the technical rules had been misapplied to thepre+udice of the substantial right of a party, said rigid application cannot be


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countenancedD ol =, Francisco, Civil (rocedure, & ed , =>%9, p ='%, citingcases

5hat more can be of greater importance than the interest of the public atlarge, more particularly the !elfare of the inhabitants of Olongapo City andZambales province, !hose lives and properties are directly and immediatelyimperilled by forest denudation

The area covered by petitioner6appellant7s timber license practicallycomprises the entire Olongapo !atershed p &


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Bureau of Forestry map #o F$6=9&, to !it: < O ) #o &9,9=>

(etitioner6appellant relies on Ordinary Timber /icense #o & 67


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"nder #otice #o & %, a tract of public forestcontaining , =>


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sold at public auction by the defendants and for !hich it no! see1sindemnity, the said complaint does not give plaintiH any right of actionagainst the defendants 3n the same case, this Court further held that, inacting on a motion to dismiss, the court cannot separate the complaint fromits anne-es !here it clearly appears that the claim of the plaintiH to be the Ao!ner of the properties in @uestion is predicated on said anne-esAccordingly, petitioner6appellant7s petition must be dismissed due to lac1 ofcause of action

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(etitioner6appellant, in his petition, alleged that he has e-hausted all hisadministrative remedies to no avail as respondents6appellees have failed,neglected, refused and continue to refuse to allo! petitioner6appellant to

continue operation in the area covered by his timber license 0e furtheralleged that he has neither recourse by !ay of appeal, nor any plain, speedyand ade@uate remedy in the ordinary course of la! e-cept thru this specialcivil action, as the last oGcial act of the respondent6appellee Secretary ofAgriculture and #atural $esources in declaring void the timber licensereferred to above after denying petitioner6appellant7s motion forreconsideration, is the last administrative act (etitioner6appellant relies onthe case of *emaisip vs The Court of Appeals, et al = < (hil &9%, Sept &?,=>'> , !herein it !as held that the failure of the plaintiH to appeal from theadverse decision of the Secretary to the (resident cannot preclude theplaintiH from ta1ing court action in vie! of the theory that the Secretary of adepartment is merely an alter6ego of the (resident The presumption is thatthe action of the Secretary bears the implied sanction of the (resident unlessthe same is disapproved by the latter illena vs the Secretary of 3nterior, >, ? , .une &>, =>


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At any rate, the appellant7s contention that, as the Secretary ofAgriculture and #atural $esources is the alter ego of the(resident and his acts or decisions are also those of the latter, heneed not appeal from the decision or opinion of the former to thelatter, and that, such being the case, after he had appealed tothe Secretary of Agriculture and #atural $esources from thedecision or opinion of the *irector of /ands he had e-hausted theadministrative remedies, is untenable

The !ithdra!al of the appeal ta1en to the (resident of the(hilippines is tantamount to not appealing all thereto Such!ithdra!al is fatal, because the appeal to the (resident is thelast step he should ta1e in an administrative case

3n =>=&, in the case of -amb )s! Phipps && (hil ?>=6>&, .uly &&, =>=& , thisCourt stressed the doctrine of e-haustion of administrative remedies, thus:

5hen a plain, ade@uate and speedy remedy is aHorded by and!ithin the e-ecutive department of the government the courtswill not interfere until at least that remedy has been exhausted

.ao 3gco vs Shuster, = (hil $ep ?? E 41iu vs " S , =?& " S


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petitioner6 appellant7s speedy and ade@uate remedy is an appeal to the(resident of the (hilippines

Accordingly, Dit is settled to the point of being elementary that the only@uestion involved n certiorari is +urisdiction, either !ant of +urisdiction ore-cess thereof, and abuse of discretion shall !arrant the issuance of thee-traordinary remedy of certiorari !hen the same is so grave as !hen thepo!er is e-ercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion,pre+udice or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as toamount to an evasion of positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform aduty en+oined, or to act at all in contemplation of la!D FS *ivinagracia Agro6Commercial 3nc vs Court of Appeals, = ? SC$A =>= NApril =, => = Theforegoing is on the assumption that there is any irregularity, albeit there isnone in the acts or omissions of the respondents6appellees certiorari is not a

substitute for appeal as held time and again by this Court (eople vsillanueva, == SC$A ?,=>


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(etitioner6appellant not only failed to e-haust his administrative remedies,but also failed to note that his action is a suit against the State !hich, underthe doctrine of State immunity from suit, cannot prosper unless the Stategives its consent to be sued Ka!anana1oa vs (olyban1, & ' " S 9?>E Sirenvs " S , % 5all ='&E Sec =%9 Constitution

The respondents6appellees, in revo1ing the petitioner6appellant7s timberlicense, !ere acting !ithin the scope of their authority (etitioner6appellantcontends that Dthis case is not a suit against the State but an application of asound principle of la! !hereby administrative decisions or actuations maybe revie!ed by the courts as a protection aHorded the citi8ens againstoppressionD p =&&, CF3 rec But, piercing the shard of his contention, 5e

nd that petitioner6appellant7s action is +ust an attempt to circumvent therule establishing State e-emption from suits 0e cannot use that principle of

la! to pro t at the e-pense and pre+udice of the State and its citi8ens Thepromotion of public !elfare and the protection of the inhabitants near thepublic forest are property, rights and interest of the State Accordingly, Dtherule establishing State e-eraiption from suits may not be circumvented bydirecting the action against the oGcers of the State instead of against theState itself 3n such cases the State7s immunity may be validly invo1edagainst the action as long as it can be sho!n that the suit really aHects theproperty, rights, or interests of the State and not merely those of the oGcernominally made party defendantD S3#CO, (hil (olitical /a!, = th ed , p 9'ESalgado vs $amos,


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)ranting arguendo, that petitioner6appellant7s timber license is valid, stillrespondents6appellees can validly revo1e his timber license As pointed outearlier, paragraph &% of the rules and regulations included in the ordinarytimber license states: D The terms and conditions of this license are subject tochange at the discretion of the Director of Forestry, and that this license may be made to expire at an earlier date, when public interests so require D 4-h*, p &&, CF3 rec A timber license is an instrument by !hich the Stateregulates the utili8ation and disposition of forest resources to the end thatpublic !elfare is promoted A timber license is not a contract !ithin thepurvie! of the due process clauseE it is only a license or privilege, !hich canbe validly !ithdra!n !henever dictated by public interest or public !elfareas in this ceise

DA license is merely a permit or privilege to do !hat other!ise !ould be

unla!ful, and is not a contract bet!een the authority, federal, state, ormunicipal, granting it and the person to !hom it is grantedE neither is itproperty or a property right, nor does it create a vested rightE nor is itta-ationD 9% C . =< Thus, this Court held that the granting of license doesnot create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights (eoplevs Ong Tin '? O ) %'%< 3n the case of (edro vs (rovincial Board of $i8al

'< (hil =&9 , it !as held that:

A license authori8ing the operation and e-ploitation of a coc1pitis not property of !hich the holder may not be deprived !ithoutdue process of la!, but a mere privilege !hich may be revo1ed!hen public interests so re@uire

The !elfare of the people is the supreme la! Thus, no franchise or right canbe availed of to defeat the proper e-ercise of police po!er Surigao 4lectricCo , 3nc vs ;unicipality of Surigao, &? SC$A > , Aug 9 , =>< The Statehas inherent po!er enabling it to prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety,and !elfare of society 4du vs 4ricta, 9' SC$A ? =, Oct &?,=>%

V

As provided in the aforecited provision, timber licenses are sub+ect to theauthority of the *irector of Forestry The utili8ation and disposition of forestresources is directly under the control and supervision of the *irector ofForestry 0o!ever, D!hile Section = 9= of the $evised Administrative Codeprovides that forest products shall be cut, gathered and removed from anyforest only upon license from the *irector of Forestry, it is no less true that as


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a subordinate oGcer, the *irector of Forestry is sub+ect to the control of the*epartment 0ead or the Secretary of Agriculture and #atural $esources

See %>Nc , $ev Adm Code , !ho, therefore, may impose reasonableregulations in the e-ercise of the po!ers of the subordinate oGcerD *irectorof Forestry vs Benedicto, = ? SC$A 9 >, ;ay ', => = The po!er of controlof the *epartment 0ead over bureaus and oGces includes the po!er tomodify, reverse or set aside acts of subordinate oGcials (rovince of(angasinan vs Secretary of (ublic 5or1s and Communications, 9 SC$A =9?,Oct 9=, =>E ;ontano vs Silvosa, >% (hil =?9, =??, =?%6=? Accordingly,respondent6appellee Secretary of Agriculture and #atural $esources has theauthority to revo1e, on valid grounds, timber licenses issued by the *irectorof Forestry There being supporting evidence, the revocation of petitioner6appellant7s timber license !as a !ise e-ercise of the po!er of therespondent6 appellee Secretary of Agriculture and #atural $esources and

therefore, valid

Thus, Dthis Court had rigorously adhered to the principle of conserving forestresources, as corollary to !hich the alleged right to them of privateindividuals or entities !as meticulously in@uired into and more often than notre+ected 5e do so againD *irector of Forestry vs Benedicto, supra 54reiterate Our delity to the basic policy of conserving the national patrimonyas ordained by the Constitution

504$4FO$4, 3# 345 OF A// T04 FO$4)O3#), T04 O$*4$ A((4A/4* F$O;3S 04$4BJ AFF3$;4* 21 T8T8 COSTS A)A3#ST (4T3T3O#4$6A((4//A#T

SO O$*4$4*,

Concepcion r!, $uerrero, +bad #antos and %scolin, !, concur!

+quino, , concurs in the result!

De Castro, !, is on lea)e!

29 tan vs director of forestry.docx

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