(2008) truth judgment and speculative logic (bulletin of the hegel society of great britain)
DESCRIPTION
HegelTRANSCRIPT
-
Trisokkas, Ioannis (2008), Truth, Judgment and Speculative Logic, Bulletin of the Hegel Society Britain 57/58, 154-172
[154] Review Article: Truth, Judgment and Speculative Logic
Chong-Fuk Lau, Hegels Urteilskritik: Systematische Untersuchungen zum
Grundproblem der spekulativen Logik (Mnchen: Wilhelm Fink Verlag,
2004), pp. 319. ISBN 3-7705-3898-6
I. Introduction
Chong-Fuk Laus long book Hegels Critique of Judgment: Systematic
Investigations into the Fundamental Problem of Speculative Logic1 is one of the
most interesting and lucidly written products of current German Hegelian
scholarship. It was initially written as a doctoral dissertation at Heidelberg
University (accepted in 2002) under the supervision of the late Rdiger Bubner
and published two years later (2004) by Wilhelm Fink Verlag as part of the
important series jena-sophia, edited by Christoph Jamme and Klaus Vieweg.
Besides its very informative although rather excessive in number and length
footnotes, the book also offers comprehensive and insightful comparisons of
Hegels thought with the philosophies of Aristotle, Kant and Frege. It also
manages, especially in the footnotes, to give the reader a valuable sense of the
central positions of Germanys major post-war Hegel scholars, such as Dieter
Henrich, Klaus Dsing, Rdiger Bubner, Klaus Hartmann, Hans-Friedrich
Fulda and Michael Theunissen, citations from and comments on whose work
appear on almost every page of the book; on the other hand, important current
English-speaking Hegel scholars, such as Robert Pippin, Stephen Houlgate,
Robert Stern, John Burbidge, Richard Winfield and Kenneth Westphal, are
either only very briefly mentioned or not mentioned at all.2
The book aims firstly to offer a detailed analysis of the systematic
relation between (a) the speculative notion of truth, (b) the theory of the
speculative proposition and (c) the ontological and logical structure of the
judgment, and secondly to employ this analysis for the elucidation of Hegels
Science of Logic. To achieve this twofold aim Lau proceeds in three steps that
correspond to the three main parts of his book. In the first part, Conditions of
the System and Critique of Judgment, he defines the speculative notion of truth
and relates it to the notion of the presentation of truth. The upshot of this first
part is that the relation between those two notions creates a problem, which Lau,
following Lorenz Bruno Puntel,3 sees as the fundamental problem of
speculative logic and which arises from the problematic ontological and logical
structure of the judgment. The latter appears on the scene because it constitutes
the core of the notion of presentation. In the second part, Speculation and
-
Speculative Proposition, Lau tries to establish a direct connection between (a)
Hegels theory of the speculative proposition (especially as it is expounded in
the Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit) and (b) the ontological and logical
structure of the judgment. Finally, in the third part, Logic and Ontology, Lau
seeks to use and expand the results of his analysis of the theory of the [155] speculative proposition so as to explain and/or elucidate the central ontological
and logical aspects of Hegels Science of Logic.
Although in the course of the book Lau quite often offers detailed and
insightful analyses of philosophers other than Hegel and of works by Hegel
other than the Science of Logic, in the present essay I will concentrate on that
thread of his argument (which, as the subtitle suggests, is intended to be
conceived as the main argument or thesis of the book) that aims at resulting in
an explicit and successful explanation and/or elucidation of the project of the
Science of Logic alone. With this restriction in mind, I will now formulate the
essence of what I take to be Laus main argument and then proceed to flesh it
out and finally evaluate it: Given the speculative notion of truth and its inherent
relation to the notion of the presentation of truth, the judgment proves to be (a)
intrinsically related to the speculative notion of truth, but (b) unsuitable to
express it. The first is the case because the presentation of truth cannot be made
without the use of judgment; the second because the judgment has a logical and
ontological structure (or essence), manifested in the everyday or natural
understanding of the world (natrliches Weltverstehen), that prevents it from
ever expressing the speculative truth. This paradox (Lau calls it a
Januskpfigkeit) is resolved through the speculative proposition, which denotes
nothing other than the immanent self-critique of judgment (and not, as Dsing
and others maintain, a new kind of judgment): The judgment, when embedded
in a speculative framework, exhibits a specific movement that destroys its
logical and ontological structure and thereby forces it to be transformed into a
new judgment (that is, into a new judgment-token, not into a new judgment-
type). This process continues up to the point where a whole system of perfectly
interconnected judgments is established, something that signals the actualisation
of speculative truth. Laus distinctive claim is that this is exactly what happens
in the Science of Logic, from which claim it follows that the judgment (and, of
course, its self-critique) is the moving force (das Movens) of the dialectical
development of the logical categories.
II. Truth
Lau begins his investigations by correctly specifying the main concern of
Hegels speculative logic as the definition and acquisition of truth (35). In order
to achieve this aim Hegel had to confront both the influential Thomistic
-
correspondence theory of truth and the Kantian reaction to it. The former
professed that truth takes place whenever the content of the intellect
corresponds to things or states of affairs that are external to the intellect. Kant
complained that this definition of truth has no philosophical significance
whatsoever, for it cannot help us decide whether a particular intellectual content
(a judgment) is true or false (to wit, it fails to function as a criterion of truth);
such a decision would require that we are able to compare the intellectual
content with the external things; but this is impossible, since external things
appear always as intellectual contents (43-44). Intellectual contents can be
compared only with other intellectual contents. Truth, Kant [156] continues, can
be determined only with respect to its formal aspect, the universal rules of the
understanding (e.g. the law of non-contradiction), to which the intellectual
contents as judgments must conform (45). For Kant, this determination of truth
affects only the form of judgment not its content. Because it says nothing about
the content of things, it has only a negative function, and so it helps us only with
the exclusion of some false judgments from the domain of truth, i.e. those
whose form fails to satisfy the universal rules of the understanding; it does not
also enable us to positively identify those judgments whose content designates
something true (45). Thus, if one follows Kant on this issue, one should
abandon the project of saying something true about the content of things. Kant,
of course, tried to reduce the negative ramifications of this determination of
truth by (a) distinguishing between formal or universal logic, on the one hand,
and transcendental logic, on the other, and then (b) defining the latters project
as the provision of the a priori universal conditions for the possibility of
knowledge of objects. Yet, precisely because these conditions belong to or
emerge solely from the ego, the determinations they assign to the objects
objective determinations are not determinations of the objects as they are in
themselves, but only determinations of them as they are for us. Thus, the
judgment, for Kant, can reveal (through its various structures) the most abstract
universal features of the content of things, but only when this content is taken as
the content of their appearances.4 When Kant, therefore, uses the terms
content, knowledge and objectivity, he assigns a very peculiar meaning to
them, since they are synonymous to content-for-us, knowledge-for-us and
objectivity-for-us.
Being dissatisfied with the Kantian conclusion, while at the same time
acknowledging the deficiency of the traditional formulation of the
correspondence theory, Hegel, Lau argues, attacks them both by reconciling (or
sublating) them in a new notion of truth, the speculative one. This is achieved in
two steps: Firstly, he shows through the Phenomenology of Spirit that the
fundamental premise of the Thomistic formulation of the correspondence
theory, namely that the intellect (or, in Hegels terms, concept or thought)
-
and the thing (or, in Hegels terms, reality or being) are originally divided,
can have absolutely no justification, independently of how it is framed. This
allows for the positing of a starting-point in which concept and reality are
originally united (50-51, 69-70). But, secondly, this original unity cannot
possibly be exemplified as a simple identity, for in that case the terms would
collapse into each other with the result that instead of a relation we would have
two self-subsistent existences: a reality-less concept and a concept-less reality.
Clearly, such a conclusion would revive the two positions Hegel wants to
sublate. The only way to escape this impasse is to respect the fact that the
original unity of concept and reality is a relation and, therefore, accept that the
difference of the relata must also be explicated. Consequently, Hegels
reconciliatory project requires a single structure that would manage to satisfy
both of these demands, to wit, the unity and difference of concept and reality.
Hegel discovered this structure in the operation of absolute negativity,
through which the correspondence of concept and reality becomes processual in
nature: The concept [157] corresponds to reality by turning itself into its other
(i.e. into its negation) which it then embraces (and, therefore, negates) (50-52).
This process and its result constitute the formal character of the speculative
notion of truth. In this way, Hegel succeeds in reconciling the correspondence
theory with the Kantian critique: Truth indeed requires the correspondence
between concept and reality, but since these are originally united, Kants
objection does not hold; on the other hand, Kant was, in a sense, right to stress
that there is no truth outside the concept, for reality (the content of things)
exhibits itself in its truth only when the concept has fully embraced its other (p.
52).
Thus, truth, as the absolute negativity of the concept, consists of two,
theoretically distinct, basic elements: (a) an element which exemplifies the
concepts being the other of itself and (b) an element which exemplifies its
embracing its other. In the first case, considered in isolation from the second,
the concept does not correspond to reality (for the relata show themselves to be
different); in the second case, it does correspond to it (for the relata reunite after
having shown themselves to be different). Clearly, however, the non-
correspondence that the first case designates has a totally different meaning
from the one it had in the Thomistic-Kantian framework (53). To say that the
concept does not correspond to reality cannot now possibly mean that they have
nothing to do with one another, that they are self-subsistent existences which
have only an indifferent relation. This is so because they are originally united.
The reality which the concept fails to correspond to is its reality; and, vice
versa, the concept which reality fails to correspond to is its concept (53).
Logically, then, the concepts being-the-other-of-itself must be a purely internal
phenomenon, a state of affairs developed from within the horizon of that
-
original unity of concept and reality (55). According to Lau, such a deficient
state of affairs could arise in this instance only in terms of a comparison
between the two basic elements of the speculative notion of truth. The concepts
being-the-other-of-itself is a deficient state of affairs because it falls short of
that state of affairs which denotes the concepts embracing-its-other. Since (a)
the latter exemplifies the (full) correspondence of concept and reality and (b)
the former cannot possibly exemplify the (absolute) non-correspondence of
concept and reality, the concepts-being-the-other-of-itself must necessarily
denote a partial correspondence of concept and reality (58).
Thus, for Lau, the speculative notion of truth consists of two fundamental
and irreducible elements: (a) the concepts-being-the-other-of-itself which
exemplifies the partial correspondence of concept and reality and (b) the
concepts-embracing-its-other which exemplifies the full correspondence (or
correspondence proper) of concept and reality. Realisation of the second
element requires passing through the first, for the difference of concept and
reality must necessarily first appear as that state of affairs which is the concepts
being-the-other-of-itself. But, at the same time, realisation of the first element
requires the presence of the second, because the concepts being-the-other-of-
itself denotes the partial correspondence of concept and reality only if it falls
short of their full correspondence.
[158] Now, since the Science of Logic is meant to provide a manifestation
of the speculative truth, those two fundamental elements must be present in it.
And since the full correspondence of concept and reality is exemplified therein
by the absolute idea (54), each and every foregoing logical category or
constellation of categories must necessarily exemplify the partial
correspondence of concept and reality, to wit, a state of affairs in which the
concept is the other of itself. Although this picture requires some qualifications
and refinements, Lau takes it that the core of the Logics formal structure has
now been determined.
III. Judgment
The preceding discussion has led Lau to the conclusion that Hegels Logic
represents a process whereby (a) the partialness of each logical category is
dissolved or washed away (aufgelst ist) and (b) through this dissolution,
more and more of that state of affairs which represents the full correspondence
of concept and reality is revealed (enthllt ist). The whole process culminates in
that state of affairs which requires no other content for its determination than the
content and perfect interconnection of all the categories that lead up to it. Such a
state of affairs Hegel calls system or whole or absolute idea. Of course, the
character of the dissolution of partialness (or untruth) and the revelation of
-
truth is not uniform throughout the Logic (Lau points out the important
differences between the logics of being, essence and concept on this matter), but
each and every logical category or constellation of categories dissolves untruth
(or is a manifestation of critique) and reveals (or discloses) truth (64).
The point we have now reached is the single most important moment in
Laus book, for his whole argument depends upon it and it is the point where
the reader should consider carefully whether or not she/he agrees with the move
he now makes. As already pointed out, the speculative notion of truth is
processual in character, the reason being that, first, difference, and, second, its
sublation in a state of identity, must become explicit in the unity of the concept.
Clearly, this processual character of truth excludes the possibility of it existing
immediately, as if shot from a pistol.5 Rather, truth must be presented
(dargestellt), in the sense that there has to be an active expression (Ausdruck) of
a movement from an event of difference to one of speculative unity (or identity).
Now, Lau maintains that Hegel holds the view (which he shares with Plato,
Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Kant and Frege) that no presentation or expression
of truth can take place without the employment of judgment, for the latter is the
minimal locus of the expressed truth (56). In fact, Lau ascribes an even stronger
belief to Hegel; for, according to Lau, the latter takes the position that the
judgment is constitutive of the dynamic structure of speculative truth, i.e. of the
dialectical movement of the logical categories.6 It is not as if truth has a certain
structure which the judgment comes to express only afterwards; rather,
speculative truth acquires its structure through the judgment. Here is how Lau
puts it:
[159] It is in the judgment where thought develops and presents itself. For one
cannot avoid using the form of judgment whenever one wants to refer to a
certain entity in the world or to determine a certain thought. Indeed, when the
subject-matter is the truth, the form of judgment is always already
presupposed. (84)
In short, the presentation of truth is constitutive of speculative truth and since
the presentation of truth cannot be made without the use of judgment, the latter
is constitutive of speculative truth as well.
What underlies this argument is Laus conviction that, for Hegel,
speculative truth is not only expressed by, but also exists in language
(considered here in its essence, its core, what Chomsky would call the
universal grammar). Or, to put it differently, in being expressed in language,
speculative truth becomes what it is. For Laus Hegel, without language there
can be no speculative truth. This claim affects the above argument because the
-
presentation (Darstellung) of truth, and hence the judgment, which constitutes
its core, are taken by Lau to be linguistic phenomena:
For Hegel, the problem of language plays [] a crucial role, because he
proposes a notion of truth that is indistinguishable from its presentation. For
the presentation of truth develops itself necessarily in language, and, in fact, in
a human language, in which one can think and understand. (85)
So, in terms of the actual order of the basic premises of Laus argument, it
seems that, first he asserts the inherent relation between the presentation of truth
and the speculative truth, second he claims that the presentation of truth cannot
be made without the employment of judgment, third he makes it explicit that the
presentation of truth and the judgment are linguistic phenomena, and fourth he
affirms that language is constitutive of the speculative truth, i.e. of the rational
or of the dialectical movement of the logical categories, in the sense that the
latter cannot exist without the former. Here is how he formulates this fourth
premise: For Hegel, the rational [die Vernnftigkeit] and language [die
Sprachlichkeit] are at the end of the day identical. (100)
And a few pages further (p.) he supports this claim by reference to
Hegels Lectures on the History of Philosophy:
And when the word and the subject-matter [die Sache] are opposed to one
another, it is the word which is the highest; because the unexpressed subject-
matter [die nicht ausgesprochene Sache] is really an irrational thing; the
rational exists only as language.7 In this relation language shows itself not
only as something that belongs to reason, but rather as what constitutes
[ausmacht] reason as such. What does not allow itself to be expressed [was
[160] sich nicht aussprechen lt] withdraws from the rational. Language, then,
is the existence of reason. (114)
If, now, one accepts (a) that the essence of language is constitutive of
speculative truth, (b) that the presentation of truth, and hence the judgment, are
linguistic phenomena, and (c) that the judgment is the minimal locus of an
expressed (or presented) truth, then it necessarily follows that the previous
description of the structure of speculative truth can be translated in terms of
judgment. Recall that the speculative notion of truth has the following two
fundamental characteristics:
(1) It consists of logical categories which perform two functions: on the
one hand, they dissolve partialness or untruth; on the other, they reveal or
disclose truth.
-
(2) It also consists of the whole or system or absolute which is the state of
affairs that (i) completes the movement of the logical categories and (ii)
functions as their criterion of truth (or, if you like, completeness).
Since the judgment is constitutive of these two elements, it must be
essentially characterised by both (a) an ability to dissolve untruth and disclose
truth and (b) an ability to relate to and culminate in the absolute.
Laus problem is to explain or illuminate how exactly the judgments
structure of partialness, i.e. a deficient structure, can actually exercise those two
externally projected abilities. How they can actually be exercised in the Logic
(in simple terms, how exactly the deficient structure of judgment can actually
come to express the absolute) Lau sees as the fundamental problem (das
Grundproblem) of speculative logic. In his opinion, Hegels theory of the
speculative proposition is intended to elucidate and provide a specific solution
to this particular problem. Let us, then, turn our attention to this notion.
IV. Speculative Proposition
A necessary consequence of Laus argument is that the inherent correlation
between the logical category and the judgment must now be followed by the
fulfilment of three tasks: It should namely be explained (a) in what sense the
judgment has a structure of partialness (i.e. a deficient structure), (b) how
exactly it manages to dissolve partialness (or untruth) and disclose truth and (c)
how exactly this process allows it to culminate in and, therefore, express the
absolute. An explanation of this kind has to be given in terms of the judgment,
not in terms of the actual development of the logical categories. In other words,
reconstructing the linear logical movement from pure being to the absolute idea
will not do the trick, for Laus problem can be resolved only if the judgment,
considered in its own terms, is shown to exemplify (or reflect) that movement.
This does not mean that logical categories could not be employed in the
formulation of the required explanation, but in such case they should prove to
be relevant to the judgments own peculiar structure and movement.
[161] The required explanation unfolds in three stages: In the first stage
Lau attempts to fulfill the first task by employing elements from the prelude to
the immanent analysis of the category of judgment in the Logic (147-168).8 In
the second stage he refers to the theory of the speculative proposition (as
developed in the Preface to the Phenomenology)9 with the aim of fulfilling the
third task and providing a sketch of the way in which the second task could be
approached (168-192, 269-287). In the third stage he combines (a) information
relevant to the notion of judgment found in various writings by Hegel with (b)
the theory of the speculative proposition so as to give a more detailed account of
how the second challenge is to be met (pp. 193-269). In this section we will
-
follow the first and second stages of his explanation; in the next we will deal
with the third stage, which is the most complex and difficult to comprehend.
To begin with, the structure of the judgment is deficient because the
subject-predicate relation that constitutes it exemplifies only a partial unity or
identity between the relata (p. 171). There is a unity because the copula, being
an essential element of the judgment, cannot be removed. But this unity is
partial, for the scopes (Umfnge) of the relata do not fully overlap. This is
manifested in two different ways: On the one hand, the subject, which refers to
an individual, relates to the predicate, which refers to a universal quality; but the
latter has many instantiations, only one of which is the individual designated by
the subject; this shows that in the locus of judgment the subject is only partially
united or identical with the predicate, since the scope of the latter is clearly
wider. On the other hand, the individual which the subject refers to has many
qualities, not just the one assigned to it by the predicate; in this sense, the scope
of the subject is wider than the scope of the predicate and, therefore, it is once
more shown that the only identity the judgment can express is a partial one.
The judgment is what it is only if it exemplifies those two fundamental
partial identities. It is thus a unity of subject and predicate, whose scopes are
always only partially united. But since the judgment is constitutive of
speculative truth, it must be shown how the partial unity of subject and
predicate is transformed into a full unity, i.e. how subject and predicate will
come to correspond perfectly with one another. However, in this case, the result
will no longer be accommodated in the locus of the judgment, for without the
relata being only partially identical there can be no judgment.
This paradox confronts speculative logic with the huge problem of how to
achieve the presentation of speculative truth. According to Lau, the theory of
the speculative proposition (der speculative Satz) is meant to provide a meta-
theoretical resolution of exactly this paradox and thereby enable the expression
of the dialectical development of the logical categories and its culmination in
the absolute (168-169). For scholarly and philosophical reasons (176-183), one
can be sure that, for Hegel, it achieves this, not by establishing a new kind of
philosophical judgment (as Dsing, for example, argues),10
but by showing how
the judgment itself, when embedded in a speculative framework, destroys its
own structure through self-critique. The latter takes the form of an immanent
movement from the subject to the predicate and back again, through which
movement what sustains [162] the partial correspondence of subject and
predicate (identified by Lau with the logic and ontology of the ratiocinative
thinking rsonierendes Denken and the natural understanding of the world
natrliches Weltverstehen) collapses (175, 185ff.). The concrete result of this
collapse is a new kind of relation in which subject and predicate prove to be
fully identical and, therefore, strictly speaking no longer subject and predicate.
-
The collapse of the partial identity of the relata through the self-critique
of judgment, i.e. through the speculative proposition, is verified, as it were, in
the Logic by the appearance of statements of identity (e.g. being and nothing
are the same or, simply, being is nothing, Hegel 1986:Vol. I: 83). These,
contrary to what many Hegelians think, are not special judgments, but rather
exemplifications of that state of affairs in which the partial identity of subject
and predicate collapses; and, therefore, they are no judgments at all (173-174,
185-186). In other words, the speculative proposition is a structure that denotes
both the movement of self-critique and the result of this movement, the
statement of identity. Considered specifically as a statement of identity, the
speculative proposition has two functions.11
Firstly, it concludes the dialectic
between the subject and predicate of a specific judgment and, therefore,
dissolves partialness and discloses truth. Secondly, it is the state of affairs that
enables the emergence of a new judgment (i.e. a new judgment-token), which
once more exemplifies a partial identity between the relata (188-192).
Of course this general picture needs to be filled in with quite a lot of
details if it is to meet anyones approval. Before we attempt to do that, though,
let us complete Laus overall argument by providing his response to the third
task specified earlier: How does the speculative proposition enable the judgment
to relate to and culminate in the absolute? The relation to the absolute arises in
that specific moment when the judgment is transformed into a statement of
identity. For a new judgment will emerge from the movement of the self-
critique of judgment only if what that identity denotes somehow falls short of
the whole or system (otherwise there would be no need for a further judgment).
In other words, Lau sees each speculative proposition, i.e. the self-critique of a
specific judgment, as aiming at the satisfaction of an intentional correlate
(intentionales Korrelat), that is, the complete identity of concept and (its) reality
or the absolute (275). Thus, the movement from one judgment to another will
continue until the absolute is fully exemplified. In that state of affairs all
judgments will bind together (through speculative propositions) in a perfect,
organic unity (56, 189).
Now, clearly, given the constitutive affinity between the judgment and
the logical category, this argument entails that what enables the movement from
one category to another in the Logic is the fundamental discrepancy between a
speculative proposition and its intentional correlate or the absolute. This
discrepancy, however, exists in the first place because the judgment, even in its
dynamic existence as a speculative proposition, cannot accommodate all the
determinations of the absolute. Lau maintains that Hegel sees this structural
discrepancy between what the judgment expresses and the absolute as a
contradiction, a state of affairs in which the concept corresponds and does not
correspond to (its) reality (57-58, 284). It corresponds to it because the
-
speculative [163] proposition is a disclosed truth; it does not correspond to it
because the speculative proposition does not express the whole truth. Lau
argues that it is only because the inevitably appearing contradictions must be
resolved that there is a movement from one category to another (276). And
since the contradictions emerge due to the specific (deficient) structure of
judgment, the latter shows itself as the moving force (das Movens) of the
dialectic of the categories (6, 275). Consequently, even though Hegel criticises
Kant for deducing the categories from the table of judgments, he still uses the
judgment, albeit now in a negative fashion, as a guiding thread (Leitfaden) for
the development and presentation of the categories in the Logic (275).
All in all, for Lau, the dialectic of the categories in Hegels Logic is a
necessary consequence of the discrepancy between the category the concept
each time exemplifies and its fully realised truth, which is the whole system of
the categories in their interconnection (24, 287). This discrepancy denotes a
contradiction and its resolution can be achieved fully only at the end of the
logical system, as the absolute idea. What is distinctive in Laus position is his
claim that this contradiction not only is expressed by the judgment, but also
occurs because of this expression (193, 275-276). In other words, the
occurrence of contradiction in a certain category arises from the expression (or
presentation) of this same category through the judgment. But, peculiarly, Lau
adds to this argument that a certain contradiction is resolved only if there is a
movement to another judgment, which expresses a new category:
Every individual judgment, every individual sentence in the Logic is therefore
a contradiction that resolves itself. Every individual determination of the
concept in the judgment is at the same time an expression (Ausdruck) of its
difference from the truth, so that this determination must resolve itself by []
passing over into an other, which, of course, is once more burdened with a
(new) contradiction. For a judgment a structure that contains contradiction
is untrue and causes (zwingt) the move to the next one, which indeed resolves
that contradiction, but in its turn entangles itself in another, more complex
one. In this way, the movement of the judgment develops itself further and
further. In this process of discovery and resolution of contradictions []
vague and confused determinations of the concept become transparent, so that
those differences which have not yet been transparent are now gradually
conceived as internal differentiations of the concept, and, in fact, as
constitutive moments of its self-identity. This movement of the concept, which
is always motivated by contradiction, continues up to the point where the
concept unfolds into a monistic-holistic system, in which it realises itself and
corresponds fully to itself. This realised truth of the concept that has freed
-
itself from all contradictions is called [] absolute idea, and the movement
toward it dialectic. (285-286)
[164] The first and second stages of Laus argument have now been presented;
what remains is the fulfilment of the second task, which demands a more
detailed account of what is involved in that event in which judgment dissolves
partialness (or untruth) and discloses truth, enabling thereby the move to
another judgment. However, before we proceed to the next section, we should
bring forth certain oddities one encounters in Laus general account of the
speculative proposition.
Firstly, even though Lau does not explicitly acknowledge it, he seems to
develop his argument based on two different notions of partial identity. On the
one hand, there is the partial identity of subject and predicate in the judgment;
on the other hand, there is the partial identity of the speculative proposition,
taken as a statement of identity, and the absolute. I have presented him as saying
that while the first partial identity is indeed dissolved through the speculative
proposition (see esp. 173), the dissolution of the second requires the
culmination of the dialectical development of the categories in the absolute (see
esp. p. 190). This understanding would fit in with his talk of (a) resolution of
individual contradictions through speculative propositions and (b) resolution of
all contradictions through the system.
Secondly, however, the resolution of an individual contradiction would,
according to his own argument, require the full identity of the scopes of subject
and predicate. But such identity is exactly what he ascribes to the absolute
(recall that the judgment had been assigned a structure of partialness in the first
place because the scopes of the relata were not fully identical). Thus, as far as I
can see, when Lau refers to the resolution of a contradiction in a certain
judgment through the speculative proposition, he should not identify this with
the emergence of the full identity of the scopes of that judgments relata (since
this is not supposed to be attained until the end of the logical movement; cf. p.
190-192). What kind of resolution this would then be remains to be seen.
Finally, there is the issue of the emergence of a new judgment. For if the
speculative proposition indeed resolves the contradiction in a judgment, by
Laus own definition of contradiction there should be no need for another
judgment. Yet maybe this will be clarified as soon as we discover in what sense
the speculative proposition resolves a contradiction before the full identity of
the absolute is exemplified.
-
V. Substantiality, Determination and Contradiction
In the preceding section the speculative proposition has been identified with the
immanent self-critique of judgment (considered both as a process and as a
result) and its content has been determined as the movement from subject to
predicate and back again. Lau conceives this movement as a forceful critique of
the logic and ontology of the so-called natural understanding of the world or
ratiocinative thinking (5, 16, 168-169). In ontological terms, this
understanding holds the view that the fundamental basis of reality [165] (the
really real) consists of immediate individuals whose status is superior to their
universal qualities; this view translates to the more concrete claim that while
universal qualities cannot exist without inhering in individuals, the latter can
exist without having universal qualities (195, 229). In logical terms, this
ontological picture gives rise to the claim that an immediate individual can be
determined without relating to any universal quality. Since the subject refers to
an essential individual and the predicate to an inessential universal quality, the
natural world-understanding is committed to the belief that the judgment
exemplifies only an external relation between subject and predicate, a relation
namely in which the subject is logically-ontologically prior to the predicate and,
therefore, its existence and determinate character is not affected by its relation
to the latter (173, 228). Due to these specific features of the relata, the natural
world-understanding takes the position that the subject refers to a substance and
the predicate to an accident (194, 202-203, 232).
Hegels laborious analysis of this theoretical standpoint, especially in the
first chapter of the Phenomenology, Sense Certainty (Hegel 1970: 82-92), and
in the dialectic of something in the Logic (Hegel 1986:Vol. I: 122-139), shows
clearly that it cannot be sustained (217-224, 234). In logical terms, the
determination of an individual requires, paradoxically, reference to its universal
qualities, because it is only through the latter that it can be individuated, i.e.
distinguished from other individuals (210, 216, 223, 234). In ontological terms,
to continue claiming that there exist substances despite the fact that they cannot
be determined is to assert the existence of the thing-in-itself, a totally self-
contradictory notion, a content-less content (208, 221). The very notion of the
individual, therefore, requires its inherent relation to and dependence upon the
notion of universal quality if it is to be sustained. In this way, the logical-
ontological priority or substantiality of the subject has been transferred to the
predicate, since without the latters referent (the universal quality), the referent
of the subject (the individual) would remain indeterminate. The essence of the
thing, the substance, lies now in its properties or universal characteristics (174,
186, 210, 235, 236).
-
Nevertheless, the substantialisation of the predicate cannot be the end of
the story, for, as the second chapter of the Phenomenology, Perception (Hegel
1970:93-107), shows, there arises the problem of how to avoid a state of affairs
in which the determinations or universal qualities have only an indifferent
relation to one another (an auch-relation, 230ff.). What is it that makes them be
determinations of one thing and not of another? What is it that unites them and
turns them into a single, specific thing? Lau claims that, for Hegel, this can be
achieved only if the substantiality of the predicate is in turn denied (or
negated), facilitating thereby a return to the subject and its substantiality. But
the restoration of substance in the subject is not a relapse to the immediate
individual, the underlying substrate to which the universal qualities relate only
externally, for the latter have been shown to be indispensable for the
determination of individuality. Rather, the subject that has become substance
again signals a change in perspective (Perspektivenwechsel), whereby the
really real is now constituted, not by substrata which [166] carry properties
externally, but rather by the pure development of an active principle, the self-
determination of the single concept. This is the movement that exemplifies an
original unitys becoming determinate through its own differentiation and
maintaining itself by negating this differentiation (6, 174, 236).
Thus, for Lau, the speculative proposition has a specific onto-logical
content. It is the movement through which (a) the immediacy and logical-
ontological priority of the subject is destroyed, (b) the predicate shows itself as
a multiplicity of universal qualities (or simply determinations) and (c) this
multiplicity of universal qualities becomes the self-determination of a single
element, the concept. But how does this content fit in with the Science of
Logic? Lau gives two answers here, only one of which addresses the question
we raised in the previous section, namely how exactly the speculative
proposition illuminates (a) the dissolution of partialness and disclosure of truth
within a single logical category (or judgment) and (b) the emergence of a new
logical category (or judgment). The irrelevant answer, which I will not develop
here, is that the first stage of the movement of the speculative proposition
corresponds to (or reflects) the logic of being, the second to the logic of
essence, and the third to the logic of the concept (235-236; see too 192, 194,
218). As far as I can see, this reading of the Logic as a giant speculative
proposition contributes nothing to the aforementioned problem, because its
approach is too macroscopic. To say that the first stage of the speculative
proposition reflects the logic of being might illuminate the general character
of the development of the logical categories in that logical sphere, but it does
not explain how it is that each logical category or constellation of categories in
the logic of being has the structure of the whole speculative proposition. (And,
as seen, the structure of Laus argument demands that an explanation should be
-
given of how it is that each logical category exemplifies the whole speculative
proposition (see 185, but compare with 190-191).)
The relevant answer goes as follows: Each judgment constitutive of a
logical category is initially an expression of the immediate existence of the
absolute or concept in that logical category (215). The immanent dialectic
developed within it, however, shows that it must relate to another judgment,
expressive of a logical category that is opposite or contradictory to the one
initially posited, if it is to have a determinate content. In this way, a
constellation of judgments arises, whose relation is one of opposition.
According to Lau, such relation is accommodated in the second stage of the
speculative proposition, where a multiplicity of predicates is manifested. But the
immanent dialectic operative within each of those constellations shows that as
soon as the relation of opposition is established, the self-subsistence of each of
the relata cannot be thought outside of the relation itself. This gives rise to a
higher category (or higher perspective), which, however, cannot be expressed
by a judgment, for the latter, by its very nature, cannot incorporate oppositional
or contradictory determinations (236, 280). In this way, the movement of the
speculative proposition completes itself by establishing the unity of the
oppositional judgments through a process whereby their opposition emerges
from and dissolves itself into a common ground. It is exactly when the latter
becomes explicit that the speculative [167] proposition crystallises itself as a
statement of identity and thereby fulfils its third stage, the return of
substantiality to the subject from the predicate.
It has thus been shown how the speculative proposition, that is, the
immanent self-critique of judgment, dissolves partialness and reveals truth. It
achieves the former by destroying (a) the immediacy, i.e. self-subsistence, of a
logical category and (b) the fixed opposition of a pair of inter-determining
categories. It achieves the latter by disclosing the common ground, the higher
category, from which the inter-determining categories emerge as meaningful
entities. The crucial question, however, remains unanswered: How is it that this
disclosure of the common ground formally enables the move to another
judgment, facilitating thereby a process that culminates in a holistic unity, in
which all differences are enclosed as integrated? (256)
As far as I can see, Lau responds to this crucial question by employing
the same notion as before, namely the discrepancy between the logical content
and the absolute or system or the whole. At this stage of the argument, though,
and despite the fact that Lau does not explicitly state this, the logical content in
question has been crystallised as the higher category that grounds a
constellation of contradictory categories, the statement of identity that
completes the immanent movement of an individual speculative proposition.
Here is what Lau says:
-
If one recalls that the Hegelian truth is nothing else than the correspondence of
the concept with itself, then it becomes apparent that, for Hegel, contradiction
must be understood as the negative correlate of truth. Only in the fully-fledged
truth is contradiction missing; in all other stages of the development of the
concept it always pops up. [] That which Hegel designates as contradiction
shows itself as the difference between the concept that is still on the way to the
truth and this same concept in its truth. To put it differently: A contradiction is
present when there exists a discrepancy between what something actually is
and what something, given its truth, ought to be. [] The decisive point here
is that the concept, being on its way to its full realisation, must go through all
those stages that do not yet (noch nicht) correspond to its realised form or
truth. It is because of this state of affairs that there emerges a continuous
difference between a certain developmental stage and the full realisation of the
concept. (284)
And here is how this relates to the judgment and the question we raised above:
Given the structure of the judgment [] being and ought cannot correspond to
each other fully, for any individual judgment may express only one
determinate side of the concept. In the judgment the concept must become, so
to speak, one-sided, insofar as it does not find itself therein [168] fully.
Because of this structural one-sidedness there emerges in every judgment a
discrepancy between what is said and what is intended. This discrepancy gives
rise to the counterthrust (Gegensto) one sees in the speculative
proposition [i.e. the statement of identity that expresses the completion of the
self-critique of judgment (I.T.)], which negates (aufhebt) the natural
(verstndig) reading of the judgment and thereby forces (zwingt) thought to
conceive it anew, i.e. to pass over to a new judgment. (285)
Thus, each logical category entails a contradiction because the content its
constitutive judgment expresses falls short of the full truth of the concept.
However, as we have seen, each logical category entails also another
contradiction (i.e. the fixity of some inter-determining categories), the one that
is required for its local determination, which is indeed resolved in the higher
category, expressed by the speculative proposition and finally exemplified as a
statement of identity. Thus, it must be the case, for Lau, that it is this statement
of identity that expresses a content that is only partially true (cf. pp. 190-191).
This contradiction next forces (zwingt) thought (das Denken) to pass over
(bergehen) into a new judgment (i.e. a new logical category or constellation of
-
categories). Despite having read Laus book again and again, this is the only
answer I could find to the aforementioned problem.
VI. Conclusion
Hegels theory of judgment has received relatively little attention from Hegel
scholars or continental philosophers in general.12
Lau is therefore to be
commended for systematising Hegels various comments on and analyses of the
notion of judgment in such a lucid and bold manner. His account is extremely
informative and engaging, packed with descriptive richness and critical acuity
and he does manage to build a link between the theory of the speculative
proposition and the Logic. Thus, I would strongly recommend his book to
anyone interested in Hegels Science of Logic and/or his philosophy of
language.
However, if my presentation and analysis of his main argument is correct,
I believe that some serious flaws can be detected in it. Firstly, the way Lau sets
up the problematic of speculative logic seems to commit him to a slightly more
sophisticated version of that mistaken picture of the Logic put forth by
Schelling. Like Schelling, Lau sees the absolute or the whole as being present in
each logical category and playing a functional role in the movement from one
category to another. Both of them conceive each logical category in the Logic as
what is not yet (noch nicht) the absolute/whole and the movement from one
category to another as being motivated by the lack of full correspondence with
the absolute/whole. The difference between them is only that while Schelling
uses this conception to ground what he believes to be the introduction of [169]
external factors in the movement of the categories (and in this way destroy
Hegels aspiration to a purely immanent project),13 Lau, who does not in
principle doubt the immanent character of Hegels project, uses the same
conception to justify his idea of a constitutive affinity between the logical
category and the judgment. Nevertheless, the same objection one could raise
against Schelling, one could also raise against Lau, namely that for Hegel the
absolute, both as a result and as a process, emerges from the dialectic of the
categories and, therefore, plays no functional role in the movement from one
category to another.14
Lau, just because he bases his whole inquiry on what
Hegel says in the Preface to the Phenomenology, takes it that Hegel begins the
Logic by wondering how he is going to express the absolute/whole. This,
however, assumes that at the beginning of the Logic it is known that the truth is
the absolute/whole and the only problem the philosopher has is how to express
it. In my opinion, this is a mistaken view of the Logics project because it
deliberately ignores the fact that the Logic aspires not only to express the truth,
but also to define or discover it in the first place. The question Hegel asks is not
-
How can one express the absolute? but rather What is truth and what is there
in truth?15 Yet, if I am right, and the absolute or whole plays no functional role
in the movement of the categories, the judgment, as Lau conceives it, could not
possibly be the moving force of the dialectic. This is so because (a) according
to him the structure of the judgment (considered specifically in its appearance as
a statement of identity) is deficient because it falls short of the absolute and (b)
in fact, the deficiency of a certain judgment emerges independently of its
relation to the absolute; put simply, one can explain how and why a category is
deficient without even mentioning its falling short of the absolute.16
Secondly, Laus view that language is constitutive of the rational or the
dialectical development of the categories, in the sense that without language the
rational could not exist, finds no textual support in Hegels Science of Logic
and, more importantly, goes against the realist character of its programme.17
For
if one accepts Laus suggestion, one would have to accept that without language
what there is in truth would not have the structure it actually has, which is
absurd. Rather, speculative logic shows how being determines itself
independently of whether this self-determination is expressed or not (and the
fact that it is expressed through it does not affect the validity of this claim). All
Hegel wants to say with his remarks on language is that a certain level of
language (its universal grammar or essence, to use Laus terminology) does
not oppose the expression of the rational, because the latter is constitutive of the
essence of language, in the sense that without the rational, i.e. the logical
categories, language would not be what it is. But the opposite does not hold, for
the logical categories would still be what they are, i.e. determinations of what
there is in truth, even if no language expressed what there is in truth. In other
words, pace Lau, language is not the condition of reason considered as an
ontological principle. Thus, the following claim is fallacious:
What does not allow itself to be expressed withdraws from the rational.
Language, then, is the existence of reason. (114)
[170] The first sentence is true, because for Hegel it is one of the fundamental
features of the rational that it can be expressed in language. But the second
sentence does not logically follow from the first, because what it actually says is
that the rational must be expressed in language in order to be what it is. It is true
that Lau devotes more than thirty pages of his book trying to establish that there
is indeed textual support for his claim (85-117), but it seems to me that besides
the previously cited passage from the Lectures on the History of Philosophy no
other passage from the ones he mentions actually supports it. Unfortunately,
given the nature of the text of the Lectures (a compilation of Hegels lecture
-
notes and notes from his students) and the uniqueness of the passage, one is not
permitted to ground such a crucial point upon it.
Now, Lau offers also a philosophical justification for his claim:
Language is constitutive of the rational because (a) the presentation
(Darstellung) of the rational is constitutive of it and (b) language is constitutive
of the presentation of the rational. This argument, though, is extremely
problematic because while Lau himself introduced the notion of presentation in
order to denote simply the movement from an original unity to a speculative
unity, i.e. a unity that would incorporate difference, he then suddenly and with
no warrant started using that notion as if it denoted the linguistic expression of
this movement. The presentation of truth denotes first and foremost the
development of a primordial, immediate state of affairs (sense-certainty in the
Phenomenology, pure, indeterminate being in the Logic), not the linguistic
expression of this development. It is correct to say, therefore, that the
presentation of truth is constitutive of truth, but this does not entail that
language is constitutive of this notion.
Thirdly, there is a problem regarding Laus account of the deficient
structure of the judgment. On the one hand, he explains this in terms of a
discrepancy between the scopes of subject and predicate in that judgment. On
the other hand, he explains it in terms of a discrepancy between what has
resulted from the self-critique of a certain judgment (i.e. the statement of
identity) and the absolute. The difficulty here is to understand the exact relation
between the statement of identity and the deficient structure of the judgment out
of which it emerges. Does the statement of identity dissolve that deficiency?
Lau implies that it does, if only in terms of local determination. Yet, does this
not mean that there is no deficiency left with respect to that judgment and that
therefore, there is no need for another judgment? In other words, why should
local determination not be enough for a judgment to express what it intends to
express? Lau, of course, avoids this question because he associates the
deficiency of each judgment with the absolute; but, for us, who do not accept
this arbitrary association, the question remains.
Finally, and in relation to the previous point, although Lau
continuously maintains that the speculative proposition as a statement of
identity gives rise to a new judgment or logical category, he never explains, in
the formal framework in which he develops his argument, how this actually
takes place. Sure, each speculative proposition is deficient as long as it falls
short of the whole/absolute, and this discrepancy will force [171] thought to
move to another judgment, but how is this supposed to tell us how exactly the
new judgment will emerge immanently from the individual speculative
proposition?18
-
Ioannis D. Trisokkas
Department of Philosophy
University of Warwick
Notes
1 All references in the text are to Laus book. All translations are mine. 2 But Lau refers quite extensively to Brandom, Strawson, and Quine. 3 L. B. Puntel (1973), Darstellung, Methode und Struktur. Untersuchungen zur Einheit der systematischen Philosophie G. W. F. Hegels, Bonn: Bouvier, 34. 4 I. Kant (1998), Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Hamburg: Felix Meiner, A490 / B518. 5 G. W. F. Hegel (1986), Wissenschaft der Logik, in two volumes, E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel eds. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, here vol. I: 65. 6 Compare this with A. F. Koch (2002), Dasein und Frsichsein (Die Logik der Qualitt), in A. F. Koch and F. Schick eds., G. W. F. Hegel: Wissenschaft der Logik, Klassiker Auslegen, Berlin: Akademie Verlag: Anders stnde es mit vorpropositionalen Sachverhalten, kurz Ursachverhalten []. Viele der notorischen Seltsamkeiten der Wissenschaft der Logik rhren daher, da sie keine Logik der Aussagen und Prdikate, sondern eine Logik der Ursachverhalte [] ist. (28) Lau is diametrically opposed to this position. 7 The reference is to G. W. F. Hegel (1986), Vorlesungen ber die Geschichte der Philosophie, Vol. I, E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel eds., Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp: Und wenn Wort und Sache einander entgegengesetzt wird, ist das Wort das Hhere; denn die nicht ausgesprochene Sache ist eigentlich ein unvernnftiges Ding, das Vernnftige existiert nur als Sprache. (527). 8 Hegel 1986: Vol. II: 301-310. 9 G. W. F. Hegel (1970), Phnomenologie des Geistes, E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel eds., Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1970, 11-81, esp. 57-64. 10 See K. Dsing (1986), Syllogistik und Dialektik in Hegels spekulativen Logik, in D. Henrich (ed.), Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik. Formation und Rekonstruktion, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 20ff. and K. Dsing (1995), Das Problem der Subjektivitt in Hegels Logik. Systematische und entwicklungsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zum Prinzip des Idealismus und zur Dialektik, Bonn: Bouvier, 198ff. According to Dsing, Lau argues, the notion of the speculative proposition, as described in the Preface, denotes a special philosophical judgment, through which the absolute identity of the relata would be expressed. The predicate would in this case refer, not to just one of the determinations of the subject, but to its essence, to what defines it and makes it what it is. However, as Dsing himself acknowledges, if that is the meaning of the speculative proposition, it must by the standards of the Logic dramatically fail to express the speculative truth. This is because, firstly, the Logic explicitly denies that the definition could function as the locus of truth, since in this case the subject would become a sheer opinion, an indeterminate substrate, that is, an element which is superfluous in the judgment; secondly, such speculative proposition would fail to accommodate the difference and non-identity of the relata; and, thirdly, with no difference and non-identity the processual structure of the absolute would be turned into something static. Moreover, Dsings understanding of the speculative proposition entails that that there is a special form of sentence in which speculative truth could be accommodated; but Hegel is very clear that no sentence could ever express the speculative truth. Given these problems, Dsing is forced to claim that Hegel
-
[172] formulated the theory of the speculative proposition in his Phenomenology years and
abandoned it by the time he developed the Logic. However, as Lau correctly points out, Dsing must be mistaken here, for (a) Hegel had already expressed his criticism of the sentence as a locus of truth in his Frankfurt and Jena writings and (b) the Preface to the Phenomenology, in which the notion of the speculative proposition is developed, was intended to serve as the introduction to the whole system (including the discipline of speculative logic). 11 Note that the speculative proposition is now a complex structure, constituted by (a) the movement of self-critique and (b) its result, the collapse of the partial identity of the relata. 12 For a notable exception see Werner Salomons magnificent study (1982) Urteil und Selbstverhltnis: Kommentierende Untersuchung zur Lehre vom Urteil in Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik Frankfurt a.M.: R. G. Fischer Verlag. 13 See F. W. J. Schelling (1856-1861), Smmtliche Werke, K. F. Schelling ed., Part I, Vol. 10 Stuttgart: Cotta, 126-164, esp. 131-135. For the definitive refutation of Schellings understanding of the Logic see S. Houlgate (1999), Schellings Critique of Hegels Science of Logic, The Review of Metaphysics 53: 99-128 and A. White (1983), Absolute Knowledge: Hegel and the Problem of Metaphysics Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, esp. 43-66. It is here worth emphasizing that Lau does not cite these two works in his bibliography, despite the fact that they were published long before he published his book. 14 Cf. S. Houlgate (2006), The Opening of Hegels Logic: From Being to Infinity (West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press: Although earlier categories prove to be imperfect in comparison with later categories, the disclosure of such relative imperfection is not what drives thought on from one category to another in the first place. Thought does not compare a specific category with the absolute Idea, judge that category to be deficient, and then move on to a new category that better approximates to the Idea. (48) 15 Compare my position to E. E. Harris (1983), An Interpretation of the Logic of Hegel (Lanham: University Press of America: The general principle of the dialectic, so often and so variously misrepresented, is the fundamental holism which grounds it and of which it is the expression, and when this is clearly and firmly grasped, many difficulties and obscurities melt away, and what (at first sight) seem arbitrary connexions and transitions are seen to be in place). (xii) See also Harris (1993) The Spirit of Hegel, Atlantic Highlands: Humanities: The essential feature of Hegelian dialectics is not the triadic arrangement of opposites so much as the holism from which the triadic structure results. (142) 16 This is exactly what Houlgate does with the dialectic of the categories in the logic of being in Houlgate 2006. 17 Cf. Hegel 1986:Vol.I:20: Die Denkformen sind zunchst in der Sprache des Menschen herausgesetzt und niedergelegt; es kann in unseren Tagen nicht oft genug daran erinnert werden, da das, wodurch sich der Mensch vom Tiere unterscheidet, das Denken ist. In alles, was ihm zu einem Innerlichen, zur Vorstellung berhaupt wird, was er zu dem Seinigen macht, hat sich die Sprache eingedrngt, und was er zur Sprache macht und in ihr uert, enthlt eingehllter, vermischter oder herausgearbeitet eine Kategorie; so sehr natrlich ist ihm das Logische, oder vielmehr: dasselbige ist seine eigentmliche Natur selbst. Note that this passage does not support Laus position. Hegel is not saying here that the thought-determinations (i.e. the determinations of the concept or of what there is in truth) are born in or by language. What he says is that with respect to human beings, the thought-determinations appear first in (their) language. Humans appropriate the logical structure of the world through language, and the former permeates their life and thinking through the latter. But, of course, this does not mean that if there was no language, the world would have no logical structure. 18 I am grateful to Professor Stephen Houlgate for detailed comments on this article. I would also like to thank Sebastian Stein and Chris Bassett for helpful discussions.