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Speculate RealsmAfer finiude, and beyond?

A vade meum

Louis Moelle

anslaed by Leah Oh wih he assisane o Mak Allan Ohm,

Jon Cogbun, and Emily Bek Cogbun

Introducton: Does speculatve realsm even exst?

P -can movemen in coninenalphilosophy since srucuralism,speculaive realism (SR) vociferously announces he end of

correlaionism and anhropocenrism in philosophy in favorof a speculaive urn. By accommodaing hings, mater, sci-ence, and he real quaobjecs as imporan as (if no more sohan) language, hough, he phenomenal, and he social, SRhas garnered atenion and criicism from all sides hese pasfew years. Speculaive Realism was originally he ile of aconference in 2007 ha brough ogeher four lesser-known

bu promising philosophers, and hen i subsequenly spreadlike wildfire via he Inerne hrough blogs and open-accesspublishers, in addiion o he radiional journal aricles, books,colloquia, conferences and oher official channels of academia.I has now become a legiimae subjec o scholarship,augh in cerain deparmens of conemporary philosophyand aesheics and acquiring a secion on he websie Phil-papers.1And ye, wha is SR? For SR seems o have become, in

1htp://philpapers.org/browse/speculaive-realism
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By correlaion we mean he idea according o which we only ever

have access o he correlaion beween hinking and being, and never

o eiher erm considered apar from he oher. We will henceforh call

oelaionismany curren of hough which mainains he unsurpass-

able characer of he correlaion so defined.2

The erm refers o he endency of Wesern philosophy sinceKan o base all philosophical discourse on condiions oknowledge and o rejec meaphysical proposiions since heyinvolve freedom from reference o experience, paricularlyphenomenal experience. More precisely, i seeks o poinou he refinemen ha correlaionism brings o idealism,

namely, ha we do no reduce everyhing o a single origin,bu o a dual relaion (subjec-objec, Dasein-Being, ec.) fromwhich escape is impossible. This improvemen is inendedo provide philosophy wih a foolproof proecion from anyrealis or meaphysical illusion. I does no change he hrusof he hesis, o reduce every real being o being dependenon he relaion o an originary ground, which is iself invari-ably reduced o an anhropological deerminaion (wheherof experience or language).

This condensed descripion of he mos criicized aspecso correlaionism (i is, afer all, an inrinsically polemicalconcep) is more or less common o all he philosophersidenified wih speculaive realism. None of hem, however,solely subscribe o his general characerizaion; by sudyinghem closely one can disinguish exremely acue deviaions.In fac, he problem is undersanding which elemen, whichassumpion he correlaion is based on (he correlaioniswo-sep, as Meillassoux calls i) and how correlaionism

should be characerized. We can say ha he challenge is ogive subsanial meaning, proper conen, o he undeer-mined orm o correlaionism oulined by Meillassoux in

Afe Finiudeby linking i o a fundamenal source or error.However, according o he naure of he diagnosed error, he

2Quenin Meillassoux,Ae Finiude: An Essay on he Neessi o Coningenc,rans. Ray Brassier (London: Coninuum, 2008), 5.


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excesses o correlaionism acceped as sympomaic revealdiseases of a very differen sor.

For wo of hese philosophers, he problem resides in herelaion beween onology and episemology, beween beingand knowledge.

For Ray Brassier, he problem of correlaionism is foundin he dissoluion of he barrier beween meaphysicsand episemology. Indeed, by reducing all possibleknowledge o a singular apprehension deermined byhe naure of a fundamenal correlaion, correlaionismconribues o he reducion of every facual proposiion,

every meaning, o a paricular sandpoin cu off fromany universaliy. I is hereore impossible o singleou a solid episemological crierionhis impossi-

biliy, which Brassier mos srongly opposes, is due omisconsruing a coningen relaion as a fundamenalfeaure of realiy, ypically, bu no exclusively, subjec-ive or phenomenal experience.3

In conras, or Graham Harman, he problem is hereducion o every saemen o is episemological

precondiions, ha is o say, o human knowledge; heoriginal sin of correlaionism is he implici presuppo-siion of he superioriy of he episemological relaionof knowledge over all oher relaions.4

3 Correlaionism is suble: i never denies ha our houghs or uterancesaimaorinendmind-independen or language-independen realiies; i merelysipulaes ha his apparenly independen dimension remains inernally

relaed o hough and language. Thus conemporary correlaionism dismisseshe problemaic o skepicism, and o episemology more generally, as ananiquaed Caresian hang-up. Ray Brassier, Nihil Unbound: Enlighenmenand Exinion (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 53.4 Graham Harman,Te Quaduple Objec (Washingon: Zero Books, 2011),chaper 3. Also: Correlaionism arbirarily reas he human/world rela-ion as philosophically more imporan han any objec/objec relaion.

In correlaionism, human and world are he sole realiies and are muuallydeermined by heir permanen rappor. Graham Harman, Pine o Newoks(Melbourne: re.press, 2009), 176, 185.
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The oher wo philosophers believe i is essenial o searchfor a soluion in he relaion beween hough and heabsolue.

Iain Hamilon Gran sees he correlaionis error inhe confusion beween he srucure of knowledge (heKanian ranscendenal) and is dynamic precondiions,which can be reconsruced from he srucure, bu areno found wihin i.5

Finally, for Quenin Meillassoux, correlaionism errs byignoring he inrinsic possibiliy of a relaion beweenhough and he absolue, which is revealed o be heabsolue characer of coningency.

We are hus dealing wih versions of he same concep haare, if no opposed, a he very leas clearly disinc. Moreover,i is possible o ariculae he differences by demonsraingha he speculaive realiss recapiulae cerain elemensof correlaionism, while a he same ime rejecing a cenralelemen of i. In oher words, we can idenify, in eah o heiposiions, elemens ha parially validae he correlaionisposiion. While keeping his in mind in each o he ol-

lowing secions, i will be necessary o elucidae preciselyhow each posiion is ani-correlaionis, and, perhaps moreimporanly, how some of heir heses are implicily drawnfrom correlaionism.

Neverheless, one may cerainly be emped o hink hahis diversiy seems o clearly consiue evidence againsa cohesiveness o SR, since nobody seems o even agree onhe naure o he problem o be ackled. Does i sill makesense, hen, o discuss a cohesiveness based on a mere re-

jecion of an idea? I hink so, insofar as his denial and hedisagreemens ha i enails make significan philosophicaldebae beween heoriss possible, alhough i is clear ha he

5 The Idea is exernal o he hough ha has i, he hough is exernal ohe hinker ha has i, he hinker is exernal o he naure ha produces

boh he hinker and he hough and he Idea. Ray Brassier, Iain HamilonGran, Graham Harman, and Quenin Meillassoux, Speculaive Realism,inCollapse, Vol. III, 340.


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uniy hereby produced is a weakened one. One can make anhisorical analogy here: jus as he rejecion of Kanian andHegelian idealism gave rise o currens as diverse as Peircesand James pragmaism,6he logical posiivism of he ViennaCircle, ordinary language philosophy, and phenomenology;in he same way he rejecion of correlaionism enables he

birh o heerogeneous philosophical currens capable ocommunicaing wih one anoher. This is due o he fac hahe rejecion of correlaionism remains a opic of discussionand a projec common o all hese currens, even houghdisagreemen reigns over he effecive conen of he projec.

Despie he vagueness o he posiive conen, i can be

formulaed. Rejecion of correlaionism implies he ruh ofa leas pars of modern nauralism as exemplified by Meillas-souxs concep of ancesraliy. The problem hen becomes hesame as wih correlaionism: wha is he ruh ha nauralismsuperficially maniess? For Brassier, nauralism meanscomplee maerialism; or Harman, one mus go beyondnauralism o reach an onology where all levels of he worldwould be equally real; for Gran, naure as a power of creaionand irreducible ransformaion becomes he absolue.

I is hus apparen ha he rejecion o correlaionism isull o consequences, and his allows one o say quie seri-ously ha speculaive realism signs he birh cerificae of apossible oninenal meaphysis.

A meaphysicsfirs, because inroducing he erm cor-relaionism ino philosophy shifs he presupposiionscorrelaionism ress on rom he saus o obvious acs oquesionable and debaable poins. Thus, correlaionism isno longer a rejecion o meaphysics, bu one meaphysics

among ohers, an addiional meaphysics. As such, all atemps(or example, along he lines o Heidegger and Derrida) oan overcoming o meaphysics7are rejeced as obsolee,

6 Jean Wahl,Te Plualis Philosophies o England and Ameica, rans. FredRohwell (London: Open Cour, 1925).7Pierre Aubenque,Fau-il donsuie la maphysique?(Paris: Presses Uni-versiaires de France, 2009).


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no so much because hey are false, bu because hey rely ona disavowed meaphysics. Bypassing cerain usual precau-ions, we can hen reinerpre cerain heses wih uncerainsaus in coninenal philosophy as properly meaphysicalproposiions. For insance, when, a he end o The EarhDoes No Move, Husserl posulaes he ranscendenal egoha precedes and remains independen o he exisenceo every living being,8or when Heidegger assers ha hehisoriciy o Being involves lieral meamorphoses o i,ransforming from ancien Greece and medieval heology omoderniy,9are we no hus dealing wih proposiions sup-pored by meaphysical eniies every bi as speculaive as

Spinozis subsance or Leibnizian monads? The speculaiverealiss abandon he suspicion associaed wih meaphysicalaciviy: raher han being required ojusifis meaphysicalapproach, or examine is endless possibiliy, we mus simplyackle he problem, since we canno escape i10

There is room hen or meaphysics, and raional discus-sion beween conflicing posiions, where argumenaionand refuaion canno be evaded. Every meaphysical atempispima acie legiimae, because o he mere ac ha no

absolue prohibiion can be pu in place prior o discussion.I is rue ha he form meaphysics mus ake sill remainsvague, especially wih respec o wha i mus abandon andwha i can keep, precisely because i mus firs be discussed,

8 See also his affirmaion, in heIdeas, ha God would perceive no he hingsin hemselves, bu a hings adumbraive percepion.Edmund Husserl, IdeasPeaining o a Pue Phenomenology and o a Phenomenologial Philosophy: FisBook, Geneal Inoducion o a Pue Phenomenology, rans. F. Kersen(TheHague: Marinus Nijhoff, 1982), 43.9 Lee Braver,A Ting o his Wold: A Hisor o Coninenal Ani-Realism (Evan-son: Norhwesern Universiy Press, 2007), 270-272.10 Heidegger seeks a way ou of meaphysics. He endeavors o clear a spacewhere he can evade is grasp. Bu Whiehead doesn yearn or a reurn

before, or for a leap beyond, meaphysics. Much more subversively, I hink,he simply does meaphysics in his own way, invening his own caegoriesand working hrough his own problems. Seven Shaviro, Wihou Ciea:Kan, Whiehead, Deleuze, and Aesheis (Cambridge : Press, 2009), x.


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a common concepual scheme ha serves as he foundaionor he various opions adoped. This exremely ambiiousreconsrucion is ineresing in ha i provides a commonramework or he evoluion o coninenal philosophy,13presening i as a coheren projec, which is precisely whaSR seeks o rejec.

Finally, he meaphysics ha SR produces is cerainly aconinenal meaphysics o he exen ha i does no deparfrom anoher cenral poin in he coninenal radiion, namely,he problemaic saus given o raionaliy, in pariculardiscursive raionaliy. I is for his reason ha ypically con-inenal philosophers such as Heidegger, Laruelle, Deleuze,

or even Derrida (according o Marin Hgglund), ar rombeing dismissed, are quie accepable reerences in hesemeaphysical debaes. The paradoxical idea of a meaphysicsha does no seek o ignore objecions o i bu o incorporaeheir conribuions, makes he realism in quesion specula-ive, since i ries o develop specific modes of hough andoundaion, aking seriously he ineviable inerwining oreason wih oher forms of hough, apprehension, and exis-ence. Of course, his las poin is highly problemaic for he

jusificaion of docrines resuling from such a process (wewill have he opporuniy o reurn o his), bu i is crucialo undersand how SR is very much a coninuaion o heconinenal line of hough.

In his ex, I will atemp o presen he main hreads oSR. I will no concenrae as much on he proposed renewalo subjecso philosophical inquiry (hus leaving aside heinsisen call o reurn o he real, o ocus on maerialobjecs or he conribuions of naural science or he social

sciences), bu raher on he various meaphysical and on-ological alernaives ha underlie his urn (he cenralanhology o SR is iled Te Speculaive un, echoing he

correspondence, o independence rom he mind, onological pluralism,rejecion o bivalence, acive role o he subjec relaive o is knowledge,pluraliy of he subjec.13 As well as a ramework or communicaion beween analyics and con-inenals.


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linguisic urn). I will also consider he argumens, conceps,and poins of debae ha emerge, as his is he hear of hesubjec. I will successively presen Harmans objec-oienedonology, Brassiers nihilism, and finally Grans variey oneo-vialism.14

I. Object-Orented Ontology: Graham Harman(Latour / Hedegger)

Varants: Lev Bryant, Bruno Latour

C: Every apprehension and every relaion is

essenially differen from he objec i aims a (he ree ha Ihink is by definiion differen from he ree iself).

A-: here is no fundamenal onologicaldifference in he relaions beween subjec and objec andhe relaions beween objecs.

Objec-oriened onology (OOO)15assers he realiy andundamenaliy o singular individuals, bapized objecs.An objec is defined as a subsanial singulai endowed wih

14 I leave aside Quenin Meillassoux, firsly because Marin Forier has morehan adequaely inroduced his work in he seminar in which his paperwas iniially presened (now archived a htp://www.amoc.fr/seances/; scrolldown o he sevenh presenaion in he series for Foriers alk), secondly,

because, unlike oher currens, Meillassoux does no make a school, a leaso my knowledge, for reasons due o human coningency (non-appearance

o LInexisence divine), and probably, also o he very singular characer ohis hough.15 [In Morelles ranslaion,lonologie objecuelle, lierally, philosophy ori-ened owards he objec (Trisan Garcia ranslaes his lierally in French asphilosophie-oiene-obje). The erm daes from 1999, and is varian (OOO)rom 2008. The official ranslaion [in French] isphilosophie cene sulobje[philosophy cenered on he objec]. Graham Harman,LObjequaduple, rans. Olivier Dubouclez (Paris: Presses Universiaires de France,2010). The erm adoped [by Morelle, i.e., onologie objecuelle] is personal,and responds o crieria of simpliciy and euphony.]
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uni and ieducible o he whole o elaions ha elae o i(wha Harman summarizes by he expression unified andauonomous16). OOO is hereore an atemp o argue hahe concep of subsance is sill as indispensible o meaphys-ics as i is o every oher heory and discourse. The domaino objecs includes: physical objecs (a quark) and heorei-cal objecs (conceps), naural objecs (a dog) and arificialobjecs (a compuer), inangible objecs (a mulinaional)and concree objecs, real objecs and imaginary objecs. Thecenral claim o OOO is ha hese are all on equal ooing.And he concep o objec has he concep o relaion as iscorrelae, eiher deermining he objec independenly, or

on he inerior of anoher objec (he car ha I observe andhe car ha he road suppors are one and he same objec,bu apprehended hrough wo disinc relaions: vision andspaial copresence). Ye hese relaions are no dealing wihhe car isel, in is proper being, bu wih a vesiono his:he visible car and he heavy car. The real car iself is in-accessible o every relaion. To be real, i mus exis by iself,rom isel, and no by anoher hing: he realiy o a hing,whaever i may be, is is wihdrawal (and or his reason

relaions only deal wih second-order objecs, equivalen oHusserlian inenional objecs, disinc rom real objecs:Harman bapizes hem sensual objecs).

The concep of wihdrawal is direcly inheried from Heidegger.Bu whereas he German philosopher atribued wihdrawalo Being alone, denying i o beings immediaely accessible,presen a hand eniies, OOO claims ha wihdrawal is heessenial characerisic of every realiy quaindividual realiy.In fac, because i equaes realiy wih wihdrawal, every ne-

gaion of he fundamenal feaure of objecs is, in effec, henegaion of heir realiy. If objecs were in some way effecsin an order o hings disinc rom hemselves, hey wouldquie simply no exis. Consequenly, a radical posiion, hadenies he realiy o objecs,17is equivalen in he end oa

16 Harman,Pine o Newoks, 154.17 Harman,Pince o Newoks; Harman, Te Quaduple Objec, chaper I:


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more or less well-disguised monism, essenially reurningo a orm o correlaionism. And ye correlaionism onlyconsiss in elevaing a specific ype of relaion above all oh-ers: he relaion beween human being and world. In order omainain a realiy full of individual objecs, i is necessary oasser ha here is no onological difference beween subjec/objec relaions and objec/objec relaions.

Thus experience and hough are resriced o a paricularcase o he universal caegory o relaion: heir emergencecan only be envisioned as one leap among ohers, purely

onic, and never onological.18The problem ha remains isknowing how each relaionof causaliy, of subjeciviy, or of

mereological composiionis meaphysically possible, whichleads o he renewal of he ancien problem of occasionalism.19Wha is essenial, however, is ha he mysery is no limiedo he sphere of humaniy or senience.

In addiion, percepion, quarelaion, is necessarily a cari-caure, bu a legiimae caricaure, presen on all levels of hecosmos; rom here percepual realism dissolves, since noobjec is presen in any relaion, bu always in he reduced,inelligible orm given o experience. We are aced wih a

paradox: objecs are precisely as hey are given (quasensualobjecs) and precisely oher han hey are given (quarealobjecs). OOO is presened as an onological realism and anepisemological ani-realism, a posiion ha sparks a numberof inernal difficulies.

Indeed, as we have said, since here is no difference beweensubjec/objec relaions and objec/objec relaions, in Hus-serlian language hey are boh inenional (because heyake place beween singular objecs).20To cones his hesis

Undermining and Overmining.18 Harman,Te Quaduple Obje, chaper VIII: Levels and Psyche. See alsoGraham Harman, Gueilla Meaphysis: Phenomenology and he Capenr oTings (Chicago: Open Cour, 2005), chaper XII: Some Implicaions; heemergence of percepion is presened here as a simple case among oher

gradaions composing he hisory of he universe.19 Harman,Te Quaduple Obje, chaper V: Indirec Causaion.20Graham Harman,ool-Being: Heidegge and he Meaphysis o Objes (Chi-


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would mean denying he speificharacer of each ineracion,namely, ha i depends upon he naure of he objecs in play.For example, obviously a able does no ener ino a similarrelaion wih a eaher alling on i as i does wih a heavysone ha is capable of smashing i. We noice, however, hai is hrough Husserl ha Harman defends his hesis; in fac,his refuaion of empiricism in he Logial Invesigaionsusesan inerpreaion of he sensible as composed of immanenor inenional objecs.21Bu such a heoreical gesure is nomade wihou raising a number of difficulies.

Indeed, acivaing a disincive caegory o experience,inenionaliy, in order o atribue i o every relaion qua

elaion, is double-edged; on one hand, i seems o exhaushe logic of he decenering of onology by atribuing whaseems o only be a privilege o human percepion o everyineracion beween objecs o all sors; on he oher, hespecer of wha one can call he sophism o he pojeion, ha is,he idea of coverly reducing wha is called onology o onlyhuman subjeciviy, becomes a looming danger. The ype ofposiion defended by OOO is a imes called afla onology,22and he meaphor is here quie meaningul: by flatening

he onological errain, and as a resul forcing he rehinkingo every ype o exisence and relaion on he same level,he problem immediaely arises of knowing whihlevel hisis, how o succeed in deermining is essence, and above all,wheher i consiues a form more or less disguised by pro-

jecion in he way we jus inroduced.Therefore, we are again confroned wih a paricular version

o he absolue like he nigh in which all cows are black.Such a difficuly was already presen in a precursor o SR

such as Whiehead, who admis o ideniying his concep

cago: Open Cour, 2002), 121, 220; Graham Harman, Inenional Objecsor Non-Humans, Lecure given a he Universi de Toulouse le Mirail,France, November 18 2008.21 Harman,Gueilla Meaphysis, chaper II and 154-158; Harman, Te Qua-duple Obje, chaper II.22 Term borrowed from Manuel De Landa,Inensive Siene and Viual Phi-losophy (London: Coninuum, 2002), 47.


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ofpehension(ha is o say, every relaion beween eniies)wih he concep of hough or of idea:

Wih he purpose o obaining a one-subsance cosmology, prehen-sions are a generalizaion from Descares menal cogiaions, and

rom Lockes ideas, o express he mos concree mode o analysisapplicable o every grade of individual acualiy.23

This quesion, which can be called he problem of decener-ing, is especially roublesome wih respec o OOO, because icanno iself be envisioned, since he will o abolish all onologi-cal privilege conneced o human subjeciviy precludes any

concepual accoun of he modaliies of human subjeciviy,and herefore canno avoid making is cenral idea unclear.I hus fails o conceive of subjeciviy as a mere paricular-izaion of onology, ha is o say, as somehing oher han ahidden model ha would dissolve he decenering. For hisreason, i is no saisfying o conceive of aleriy solely via afundamenal wihdrawal, despie Harmans call for polypsy-chism as a remedy o panpsychis excesses, claiming haonly he later falls prey o he sophism of projecion. This

is because, in boh cases, he relaional variaions begin fromhe model of human subjeciviy.24This problem of decener-ing would involve an incapaciy, in he end, o disinguish

fla onologies rom heir correlaionis adversaries (see,for example, he lieraure on he rapprochemens beweenWhiehead and phenomenology, and Pierre Cassou-Nogusrecen book, Le bod de lexpiene [, 2010], dealing explic-ily wih such a projec).

23

Alred Norh Whiehead,Pocess and Reali: An Essay in Cosmology corr.and ed. David Ray Griffin and Donald W. Sherburne (New York: Free Press,1978), 19.24 Despie he exciing possibiliy ha his opens. On he descripion of heinerior o objecs: I would even propose a new philosophical disciplinecalled speculaive psychology dedicaed o ferreing ou he specific psychicrealiy of earhworms, dus, armies, chalk, and sone (Harman, Pine o Ne-woks, 213). This projec is aken seriously by Ian Bogos, who concenraeson echnological objecs in hisAlien Phenomenology, o Wha Is Like o Be aTing (Minneapolis: Universiy of Minnesoa Press, 2012).


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The discussion wihin SR ocuses on he possibiliy o avalid episemology saring rom he presupposiions oOOO. In order o summarize his debae, i is useful for us ofocus on Bruno Laour, and more precisely on his explicilyonological work, Ieduions, which can be used as a smallermodel o OOOs essenial proposiions on his errain. RayBrassier arges i in his aricle Concep and Objecs, wihhe same goal. In shor, Laour is criicized for he compleedissoluion of he limis separaing real objecs from repre-senaions; ha is, he is guily of endorsing he impossibiliyo every noion o he rue and alse by way o a collapsingo all hings ino a neural monism o acans and heir

muual rials of srengh.Indeed, Laour redraws he episemological relaions oknowledge inpagmaicerms, envisaging represenaionsand conceps, no as deached modes o conemplaing es-ablished acs, bu as relaions beween acans. As beingso he world hese acans no only demand an exercise oforce and a maerial effor in order o be realized, bu aeanexercise of force hemselves: Nohing is knownonly real-ized (Ieduions, 1.1.5.4). For example, in order o know he

chemical properies of a liquid, i is necessary o subjec i odiverse ialsof composiion and decomposiion, as in somesor o orure where he liquid acan reveals is characer-isics hrough resisance o confroning forces. A senencedoes no hold ogeher because i is rue, bu beause i holdsogehe we say ha i is rue.25If conceps have ruh, i is

because hey are hings among ohers and are subjec o hesame rules of efficacy as any oher relaion. The reading ofIeducions is exremely disurbing in his regard, because

i forces one o consider ideas from a compleely desecraedview, ye wihin he ramework o a ully coheren line oreasoning.

Ye or Brassier, his acualis concepion o onologyonly serves o desroy every limi which migh allow heseparaion o valid discourse rom abricaion. He accuses

25 Bruno Laour, Irreducions, inTe Paseuizaion o Fane(CambridgeMA: Harvard Universiy Press, 1988), 2.4.8.


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Laour of reducionism wih regard o episemology, forminga meaphysics liberaed rom any demand or jusificaionand argumenaion:

he difference beween words and hings urns ou o be no more

han a funcional difference subsumed by he concep of acanha

is o say, i is a merely nominal difference encompassed by he mea-

physical funcion now ascribed o he meaphor acan.26

Brassiers criique proves problemaic, boh because i resson a raher heavy se of presupposiions (see he followingsecion), and because i does no give an accoun of he finer

poins of Laours onology. However, i cerainly helps makehe problem of Laours fla onology, as well as OOO, veryacue as hey fail o offer an inenalepisemological crierion:why qualify onological uniies as acans raher han as pas-sive subjecs of exernal forces? Thus, he confusion produced

by onological decenering proves o be difficul o eliminaewihou he risk of falling ino a meaphysics wih a founda-ion ha would prove, ulimaely, irraional. The fundamenalproblem hen consiss in noicing how difficul i is o sup-

ply i wih a rue episemological foundaionwih he popeoolsof OOO. Such a foundaion would be he complee lossof OOOs projec, hopelessly engulfing i in a heory of senseand represenaion as he poin of deparure for philosophy.Effecively, he responses of OOOs followers o he objecions

born from episemological preoccupaions such as Brassiers,

26 Ray Brassier, Conceps and Objecs, inTe Speulaive un: ConinenalMaeialism and Realism, ed. Levi Bryan, Nick Srnicek, and Graham Har-man (Melbourne: re.press, 2011), 52. See also: I is insrucive o noe howmany reducions mus be carried ou in order for irreducionism o ge offhe ground: reason, science, knowledge, ruhall mus be eliminaed. Ocourse, Laour has no qualms abou reducing reason o arbiraion, scienceo cusom, knowledge o manipulaion, or ruh o force: he veriable objecof his irreducionis afflaus is no reducion per se, in which he wanonlyindulges, bu explanaion, and he cogniive privilege accorded o scienificexplanaion in paricular. Thus, i is impossible, according o Brassier, ophilosophically reconexualize he caegory of explanaion wihou putinga radical atack in is place, since episemology is, irrevocably, firs philosophy.


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(a) Ordinary realism (independence of he world from he mind)(b) Inferenialism (formal auonomy of reason)(c) Scienific realism (he proposiions produced by scienific

and mahemaical mehod genuinely inform us abouhe world)

(d) Eliminaivism concerning experience (he conens of ex-perience do no lierally represen any real deerminaion)

(e) Maerialism (onological prioriy o inorganic overorganic, of mater over he living)

No only are hese compaible, bu hey also muually enailone anoher based on conceps o a realiy independen o

he mind and reason being ied o ruh. The conclusion ofnihilism, ha is, he inexisence of any meaning inhereno hings hus emerges, as he essenial ruh of he Enlighen-men projec (he emancipaion of Reason).28In oher words,if for Coninenals he ruh (or, in is sead, wha philosophyproduces) is supposed o be exciing or grand, and i, orhe analyics, o discover i involves making i edious,29for

28 An atemp, which I am no enirely saisfied wih, a connecing heseheses: Reason, impersonal and formal, is he condiion of possibiliy of allhough and speculaion (inerenialism). I compellingly makes possiblehe raional knowledge of realiy (ranscendenal realism). This knowledgeis based on he idea o a realiy absoluely independen o hough, andposulaed by he already esablished concep of reason. In urn, his allowsa se o subsanial deducions abou he world, devoid o meaning andharmony beween human being and he world, hough and being, acsand values (nihilism).29 Any effor in philosophy o make he obscure obvious is likely o beunappealing, or he penaly o ailure is conusion while he reward osuccess is banaliy. Nelson Goodman, Te Suue o Appeaane (Boson:

R. Reidel, 1977). On he coninenal side, see he concep of image of houghdefended by Gilles Deleuze in Diffeene and Repeiion(New York: ColumbiaUniversiy Press, 1994). As long as were conen wih criicizing he false,were no bohering anyone (rue criique is he criicism of rue forms, nofalse conens. You don criicize capialism or imperialism by denouncingheir misakes). Gilles Deleuze, Dese Islands and Ohe exs, -(Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2004), 138, or he more sysemaic defense ofrheoric by Harman in Pine o Newoks, 168-174. Le us add (of course)ha hese characerizaions do no consiue value judgmens. Here I es-


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Brassier, he ruh proves o be despairing, (even mus be,according o he inerpreaion ha we will orm) or, morerigorously, violenly demysifying.

I is he link beween hese fundamenal heses, raher hanhese heses hemselves, ha give an ideniy o his curren.I would be largely inaccurae, excep for he sake of exposi-ion, o discuss his posiion only hrough is eliminaivisor scienis aspecs, as is ofen done, since he concepualframework of he heory is acually much larger.30Tha alsocomplicaes he ask of summarizing his underlying philo-sophical projec in an inelligible way, since one could dedicae(and some indeed have) enire books o each individual hesis.

One can quickly give an adequae idea of Brassiers posiionby conrasing i wih anoher maerialis o SR, QueninMeillassoux. As we have seen wih Meillassoux, he discoveryof he absence of an ulimae reason for hings is ha of anabsolue:

Insead of laughing or smiling a quesions like Where do we come from?

or Why do we exis?, we should ponder insead he remarkable fac

ha he replies From nohing. For nohing really aeanswers, hereby

realizing ha hese really were quesionsand excellen ones a ha.31

Bu if, for Meillassoux, his absence of reason (or principle ofunreason) is an absolue fac, in an even more audacious wayfor Brassier, i is a fac which carries a subsanial hesis: heabsolue onological primacy of mater over mind, of deahover life.32Philosophy hen becomes he discipline chargedwih bringing o ligh he insurmounable ruh of exincion.

senially refer o he differences in atiude concerning language, rheoric,and he naure of knowledge produced by philosophy in he wo radiions.30 I would be difficul or sandard eliminiaviss, la Churchland, noonly o refer o, bu o admi as accepable, he philosophical mehods drawnfrom Laruelle, Badiou, or Heidegger...31 Meillassoux,Afe Finiude, 110.32 Brassier,Nihil Unbound, preface.


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For insance, coming back o he eliminaivis hesis, if onesupposes is lieral ruh,33hen one iners rom i ha heulimae meaning of his ruh is ha hough and experienceallow access o no real deerminaion. Thereore, i passesfrom grass is no really,in isel, green, o our experienceof grass is only a secondary effec and foreign o grass iself.Ulimaely Brassiers ani-correlaionism consiss in is lieralinversion: he correlae of hough is no being, bu non-being.

This projec, and he heses ha i proposes, can seem ex-cessively heavy, arbirary, or absurd (a sor of philosophicalHouellebecq). This would be he case indeed if here were nomehod o suppor his ambiion. And ye one of hem exiss,

ound principally by Brassier, in he French philosopherFranois Laruelle.34I will cerainly no venure o summarizehe houghs of his raher arduous auhor, bu will quicklypresen he par which concerns us here: Laruelles projecinvolves replacing philosophy wih non-philosophy, i.e., hesysemaic opposiion o every philosophical atemp o usehough o add anyhing o he fla discoveries of scienificiyand he radically immanen presence of he Real. The Realis always presen, always accessible, bu, since i is no an idea

or a concep, he naure of philosophy is o perpeually missi. Indeed, he sin o philosophy is is inaugural Decisionoundersand he Real (or he One) by somehing oher hani (by idea, inuiion, language, ec.), o divide isel rom iin order o undersand i. Philosophy does nohing excepdevelop his circular Decision. All he subsequen work ophilosophy involves he desperae atemp o rejoin wha has

been separaed, forming a synhesis from an always-arbiraryconrol-poin.35This negaive hesis, which corresponds o

a formal and generalized version of denunciaions of mea-33 We undersand wha we suppose o be rue, if demonsraed philosophi-cally o be rue. I will reurn o his. Tha is, if we suppose i philosophicallydemonsraed o be rue.34 Hgglund makes use of Derrida in his approach, seeking o unearh heconsrucive ools of a radical aheis maerialism wihin deconsrucion.35 Wha Laurelle calls he mehod o ranscendenal deducion Brassier,Nihil Unbound, 123.


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physics by Heidegger or Derrida,36permis abolishing everyatemp o hink abou he world apar from he insurmoun-ableasof he real ha are proposed o us.37To hink of heReal as separae rom hough requires a non-Decisionalphilosophy ha, wih one of he mos painful lexical choicesof he wenieh cenury, Laruelle bapizes non-philosophy.

We now reurn o eliminaivism (which is no he onlyhesis o Brassiers nihilism, bu is raher useul or us as aguiding hread here): he mos conemporary opposiionagains eliminaivism involves caegorizing i as nonsense,eiher hrough self-conradicion, or because i is incapableof giving a ground for iself, and mus resor o a form of, a

he very leas, insufficien pragmaism.38

Laruelles mehod,reviewed by Brassier, acceps philosophical irreducibiliyfrom heaof he absence of correlaion beween being andhoughno only he empirical, bu he onological ruh ofhe consequences o eliminaivism: We gain access o hesrucure o realiy via a machinery o concepion whichexracs inelligible indicesom a wold ha is no designedo be inelligible and is no oiginaily inused wih meaning.39

36 [Laruelles] innovaion is fundamenally formal, Brassier,Nihil Unbound, 148.37 Meaphysics conceived o he auonomy o he objec in erms o hemodel o subsance. Bu successive criiques o he hyposaizaion osubsance rom Kan o Heidegger have undermined he plausibiliy omeaphysical (subsance based) realism, hereby securing he riumph ocorrelaionism. Laruelles work challenges his correlaionis consensus

by proposing a version of ranscendenal realismwherein he objec is nolonger conceived of as a subsance bu raher as a disconinuous cu in hefabric of onological synhesis. I is no longer hough ha deermines heobjec, wheher hrough represenaion or inuiion, bu raher he objecha seizes hough and forces i o hink i, or beter, aodingo i. Ibid., 149.38 Teed Rockwell, Beyond Eliminaive Maerialism: Some Unnoiced Im-plicaions of Churchlands Pragmaic Pluralism, Revised version, Ocober1998, unpublished aricle. Accessed May 31 2011:htp://users.sfo.com/~mcmf/

beyondem.hml39 Ray Brassier, Conceps and Objecs, 4 (Our emphasis). Compare hiswih Churchlands declaraion: i is far from obvious ha ruh is eiher heprimary or he principal produc of [cogniive] aciviy. Raher, is funcionwould appear o be he ever more finely uned adminisraion of he organ-isms behaviour. Paul M. Churchland,A Neuoompuaional Pespeive: Te
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Brassiers oher mehod of supporing his posiion consissin mainaining ha every atemp o deny he objeciviy-nihilism correlaion, hrough vialism or an overurning ofhe caegory of objeciviy, is based on an illegiimae concepo reason or hough ha exceeds wha can be deended byreason. The paradigmaic example here would be ha oBergson, whose philosophy o lie celebraes novely andrelies heavily on a limied concepion o reason, he later

being marginalized in favor of inuiion. Agains such a cur-ren of hough (which brings ogeher Deleuze, Whiehead,Heidegger, Hegel, and all he meaphysicians of SR), Brassierresors o a deconsrucion inspired by Wilfrid Sellars and his

criique of he myh of he given. The myh of he given ishe idea ha here is a cerain saumof experience which issomehow making a ruh claim and which is somehow more

basic han any acquired concepual sysem.40For Brassier, allhe vialis or phenomenological claims of concepual prioriyfor lived experience and he non-concepual over concepualreason are reduced o nohingness, eiher hrough criiqueof he myh of he given,41or hrough a prior reducion o aform of correlaionism undermined by his criique: In he

absence of any physicalis correcive o vialis hubris, biocen-rism leads infallibly o noocenrism.42Thus, every appeal oinellecual or sensual inuiion is humiliaed and rejecedin avor o an irreducible atachmen o an impersonalconcep of reason borrowed from Rober Brandom (MakingI Explii). This rejecion is no only formal, bu also impliesa subsanial conclusion, namely he prioriy of deah over

Naue o Mind and he Suue o Siene (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1989),150, cied in Brassier, Nihil Unbound, 19.40 Wilfrid Sellars, Nore Dame Lecures, 1969-1986, ranscr. Pedro Amaral,249. Accessed July 1 2012: htp://zimmer.csufresno.edu/~pedroa/Wilfrid%20Sellars%20Nore%20Dame%20Lecures.pdf41 Ray Brassier, Bergson, Lived Experience, and he Myh o he Given,Lecure given a colloquium in Zagreb, June 18 2011.42 Brassier,Nihil Unbound, 200.
http://zimmer.csufresno.edu/~pedroa/Wilfridhttp://localhost/var/www/apps/conversion/tmp/scratch_7/20Lectures.pdfhttp://localhost/var/www/apps/conversion/tmp/scratch_7/20Lectures.pdfhttp://zimmer.csufresno.edu/~pedroa/Wilfrid


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life: The living is only a form of wha is dead, and a very rareform (Niezsche).43The omnipresence of exincion in hevery hear of life and hough is he highes ruh.

How, hen, can his concepion be criiqued? The mosobvious problem resides in is very specific usage o philo-sophical raionaliy ha claims o discover some subrac-ionis ruhsboh subsanial and negaive ruhs (namely,nihilism)by a formal mehod. I is uncerain wheher sucha posiion is enable, a leas according o he precision wihwhich Brassier guards himsel. So, more generally, his posi-ion is based on an emphaic inerpreaion o he naureo he ideas o objeciviy and raionaliy, which in heir

proper form would have profound subsanial conen;44

yehis mehod, hough proving definiively powerul when icomes o refuaion, appears much weaker when i comes odefending is own heses. Moreover, he argumens agains him,incidenally, are less concerned wih he exremely echnicalmeaphysical presupposiions borrowed rom Badiou andLaruelle, han his reprise of scienific realism (and his elimi-naivis conclusions) via inferenialism, iled ranscendenalrealism. The meaphysical i-for-a response (from Harman

o Brassier) consised in showing how atemps o ideniyscienific raionaliy wih onology were doomed o failurebecause hey hemselves rely on an exremely unsophisicaedmeaphysics equivalen o a nave process-relaionalism(c. he nex secion). On a broader level, Harman objecso Brassier because he absoluizes scienific mehods andresuls. This, argues Harman, does no consiue he deepermessage of he Enlighenmen, bu simply underwries a formo correlaionism, since his affirms ha he condiions opossibiliy of knowledge delimi he framework of onology.45

43 Friedrich Niezsche,Te Gay Science, ed. Bernard Williams (Cambridge:Cambridge Universiy Press, 2001), III, 109.44 As Brassier summarizes i: I am a nihilis because I believe in ruh.45 C. Brassier, Conceps and Objecs, 1, and Harman, I am also o heopinion ha maerialism mus be desroyed.


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I seems ha he quesion remains open since he rejeciono he posiion (normaive nihilism) involves an onologyclose o OOO (and inversely), because he wo end o muu-ally refue each oher. We will herefore examine wha makesup he las ype of posiion.

III. Neo-Vtalsms: Ian Hamlton Grant(Schellng/Deleuze/Whtehead)

Varants: Manuel De Landa, Steven Shavro

C: No essenial difference exiss beween he

maerial and he ideal.A-: I is impossible o reduce he origino exisence o properies or deerminaions ha are indi-vidually idenifiable or can be apprehended by an experience.

The las curren of SR is no he easies o approach, on he

one hand, because alernae versions abound (especially in-spired by Deleuze and Whiehead46), and, on he oher hand,because is original represenaive, Iain Hamilon Gran,expresses his hough in a way ha is difficul o access, byconfining i o he narrow space o Schellingian sudies. Infac, for Gran, he abandonmen of acive naure, which char-acerizes modern philosophy in general and correlaionismin paricular (is aphysia, or orgeting o Naure), ound aworhy adversary in F. W. J. Schellings Nauphilosophie. His

essenially hisorical work demonsraes he exisence ononrivial hough abou naure in Schelling, and he arguesha i is irreducible o any oher philosophical alernaive.In doing so, he arrives a a vialis version o idealism. By

idealism, he means:

46 I will no linger here on he Whieheadians, such as Seven Shaviro, inorder o simplify his inroducion somewha.


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(a) Plaonis realism (he Idea exiss jus as much as houghand hings),

(b) a concep of mater as acive and subsanial raher hanas a mere negaion of form,47and

(c) relaiviy o he exisence o singular hings, commen-surae wih a dynamism more profound han he hingshemselves (Naure).

Idealism is he condiion, (a) o every meaphysics, (b) oevery rue maerialism, and (c) o a realism ha is no na-ve and essenialis. We obain he only enable realism by

reuniing hese hree aspecs: a speculaive realism, in hesense Schelling gave o speculaive physics. Wha maters forGran is o be opposed o conemporary negaions of hesehree undamenal heses. e Idea wihin correlaion o hehinking subjec, endorsing he incessan survival of a neo-Ficheanism agains he Schellingianism he defends. Agains(b), he Arisoelian privilege accorded o form, resuling ina negaive concepion o mater agains Plaos acive ma-er. The oher orms o speculaive realism do no lierally

subscribe o (a), bu, are no, sricly speaking, opposed o i(above all objec-oriened onology, which acceps he realiyof conceps as objecs); by conras, i is wih (b) and (c) hahe difference is he cleares. Firs, concerning (b), here isno doub ha OOO and ranscendenal nihilism are clearlydevoed o he auonomy of form over mater.

For Brassier, he negaion of (b) is wofold: here is a realiyo orm, since is auonomy wih respec o every deermi-naion is he condiion o exisence o reason and hough,

uprooed from every inuiion; bu here is also a primaryrealiy of iner mater, since Brassier compleely adops heconcep o iner mater ha Gran rejecs and makes heulimae ruh of onology from i.

47 Iain Hamilon Gran,Philosophies o Naue afe Shelling (London: Con-inuum, 2006), 47.


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speculative realism_morelle.pdf

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