1971-07-30 smith and marshall to kissinger.pdf

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  • 8/10/2019 1971-07-30 Smith and Marshall to Kissinger.pdf

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    234. Draft Memorandum From Wayne Smith and AndrewMarshall of the National Security Council Staff to thePresidents Assistant for National Security Affairs

    (Kissinger)1

    Washington, July 30, 1971.

    SUBJECT

    Intelligence Reorganization: More Limited Options

    If you do not want to recommend the reorganization and othermeasures the NSC/OMB study produced, there are more limitedchanges that would be useful and that would likely be supported bythe PFIAB, OMB, and DCI. They are likely to produce little savings, atleast originally, and reduce the chances for any major reforms in theoperation of the intelligence community for the foreseeable future.

    A minimal package would include:

    (1) Net Assessment Group in the White House to review the in-telligence communitys output.

    Headed by a Senior Member of the NSC staff reporting directlyto you.

    Total of 35 people.Charter to encompass review of NIEs, Presidents Quarterly Re-

    port on Strategic Forces, CIA studies, DIA studies, intelligence com-munitys input required by NSSMs and other directives.

    (2) Measures to enhance the authority and capability of the DCIto plan and guide the national intelligence program.

    Presidential directive spelling out changes in DCI responsibili-

    ties and objectives of changed community arrangements.Delegation of day-to-day operations of CIA so that DCI can con-centrate upon national programs.

    Increased staff supporting DCI in this role as manager ofcommunity.

    DCI to prepare and present to OMB and President consolidatednational intelligence program and budget. CIA and DOD to supply allinformation on their programs to allow this.

    Revision of NSCID 1 to make USIB advisory body and changestructure to set up two major committees. One, essentially the currentUSIB, to assist DCI in producing substantive national intelligence. The

    other, a resources committee, to assist DCI in coordination of resource

    522 Foreign Relations, 19691976, Volume II

    1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files,Box 332, Intelligence Reorganization, Vol. I. Top Secret; Byeman. Kissinger initiated thememorandum.

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    programs. This to be perhaps a combination of NIRB and Ex Com. Pos-sible revision of other NSCIDs to clarify missions of major elements ofcommunity.

    Further development of focal point in DOD for control of intel-ligence resources. Perhaps assignment to one of the two Deputy Sec-retaries of Defense as a main responsibility and ASD/I reporting tohim, creating point of contact for DCI.

    (3) Measures to improve guidance to DCI and community on in-telligence product.

    Set up NSC subcommittee chaired by the Presidents Assistantfor National Security Affairs to review national intelligence productand give guidance to DCI and community.

    Your participation on subcommittee to be staffed by Net As-sessment Group.

    The strategy would be to task the DCI more clearly with man-agement of community and enhance his status and management ca-pabilities, leaving to him the job of working out the many problems ofoverlap and inefficiency in use of resources and improving the qualityof the product. Some thought should be given to steps to be taken laterin the process. Extensive revision of NSCIDs is one example. Anotheris to look beyond Helms retirement and to do what can be done to get

    another John McCone, with strong management abilities, as the nextDCI.

    Implementation

    You will take a good month or so for preparation in appropriatePresidential directive, drafting version of NSCID 1, etc. Plan needs to

    be made for working with DCI and other community elements. Alsopreferable not to present as a major reorganization, but as another steptoward better management of the community. This limited change may

    not work. There are many sources of inefficiency and duplication itstands little chance of touching. By itself, it will not do much to im-prove the product since it will not insure the needed increase in re-sources devoted to production and to the development of improvedintelligence analysis methods.2

    The Intelligence Community and the White House 523

    2 According to Haldemans diary, the President expressed the following views onintelligence during a July 23 budget meeting. On a general basis, the P said never hasa country spent more for less defense than does America. Then he got to intelligence,said weve got to take the same approach there. The CIA tells me nothing I dont readthree days earlier in the New York Times. Intelligence is a sacred cow. Weve done noth-ing since weve been here about it. The CIA isnt worth a damn. We have to get out thesymbolism; so a 25 percent cut across-the-board, get rid of the disloyal types. He toldHenry to take a full month to do it, that it couldnt be done by Shultz or Weinberger. Itmust be in terms of strategy, not in terms of budget. (The Haldeman Diaries: MultimediaEdition,July 25, 1971)