13562753-hazid-record (1)
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Document No: NPL-01-R-01Preliminary Design Major Accident Safety Report for King Street Gas StorageFacility
Appendix B : HAZID Record
Issue: 3.0
Risktec Solutions Limited Page B1 of B21
APPENDIX B
HAZID RECORD
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Document No: NPL-01-R-01Preliminary Design Major Accident Safety Report for King Street Gas Storage Facility
Appendix B: HAZID RecordIssue: 3.0
Risktec Solutions Limited Page B2 of B21
HAZID RECORD
RISK POTENTIALREFNo.
GUIDEWORD HAZARDDESCRIPTION
CONSEQUENCES
CONS. FREQ.
SAFEGUARDS/ MITIGATINGFEATURES
ACTIONS/COMMENTS
Node1: Initial Cavity Filling
Hazards additional to Nodes 2 and 5 included here for Initial Cavity Filling. All other hazard entries as Nodes 2 and 5.
Engineering safeguards and mitigations all as per “Preliminary Engineering Report”, 1670-010-000-RPT-001 Rev 02 September 2007 unless otherwisespecified
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Document No: NPL-01-R-01Preliminary Design Major Accident Safety Report for King Street Gas Storage Facility
Appendix B: HAZID RecordIssue: 3.0
Risktec Solutions Limited Page B3 of B21
RISK POTENTIALREFNo.
GUIDEWORD HAZARDDESCRIPTION
CONSEQUENCES
CONS. FREQ.
SAFEGUARDS/ MITIGATINGFEATURES
ACTIONS/COMMENTS
1.1 Mechanical failure
- cavity
Loss of containment
- gas
Release of flammablegas, ignited orunignited
Low forsmallreleases,high forlargereleases
High forsmallreleases,low forlargereleases
- Solution mining/initial gas filling ofcavities to be carried out byspecialist contractors
- Thickness of pillar material betweenthe cavities controlled during cavitycreation to prevent cavity collapsedue to inadequate support.
- Cavity size/spacing based ongeological surveys and detailedcomputer modelling
- Will be undertaken as first livecommissioning of the well –undertaken under PrincipalContractor’s HSE andCommissioning regulations andprocedures.
- Pressure integrity checks of bothcavity and equipment/piping prior toinitial cavity filling.
- Cavities that fail the integrity checkare not used.
- Installation of Xmas trees(snubbing) by specialist contractors
- Free flow gas import used ifpossible, hence avoiding potentialleaks from gas processing plant
-
1.2 Corrosion
- internal
- external
No additional hazardsto Nodes 2/5identified.
- - - - -
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Document No: NPL-01-R-01Preliminary Design Major Accident Safety Report for King Street Gas Storage Facility
Appendix B: HAZID RecordIssue: 3.0
Risktec Solutions Limited Page B4 of B21
RISK POTENTIALREFNo.
GUIDEWORD HAZARDDESCRIPTION
CONSEQUENCES
CONS. FREQ.
SAFEGUARDS/ MITIGATINGFEATURES
ACTIONS/COMMENTS
1.3 Incorrect operation
- valve/ compressor/ pumpoperation
- maintenance
Snubbing operation As 1.1 High Low - Snubbing is carried out by aspecialist contractor, using astandard, well understood technique
Snubbing operation –fitting of surface Xmas treeand subsurface safety valveto a well, at the end of theinitial filling operation.
1.4 High/lowtemperature/pressure/flow
- mechanical integrity
Low pressure As 1.1 As 1.1 As 1.1 - Mechanical integrity checks includepressure testing of both cavity andequipment/piping prior to initialcavity filling.
- Cavities that fail pressure test arenot used
- Round the clock monitoring ofprocess parameters during initialcavity filling with gas withcontinuous adjustments as necessarybased on comparison with computermodelling.
-
High/low temperature/pressure/flow
As 1.1 As 1.1 As 1.1 - Round the clock monitoring ofprocess parameters during initialcavity filling with gas withcontinuous adjustments as necessarybased on comparison with computermodelling.
-
1.5 Knock on effects
- Effects of an event at one itemon the process area on anotheritem
- non-process fire or explosion(e.g. sub station fire,transformer explosion)
No additional hazardsto Nodes 2/5identified.
- - - - -
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Document No: NPL-01-R-01Preliminary Design Major Accident Safety Report for King Street Gas Storage Facility
Appendix B: HAZID RecordIssue: 3.0
Risktec Solutions Limited Page B5 of B21
RISK POTENTIALREFNo.
GUIDEWORD HAZARDDESCRIPTION
CONSEQUENCES
CONS. FREQ.
SAFEGUARDS/ MITIGATINGFEATURES
ACTIONS/COMMENTS
1.6 Misrouted gas Gas breakthrough Loss of containment As 1.1 As 1.1 - High integrity pressure switches tobe included in the design
- Vent provision for washing plant
- Controls for gas entrainment to beincluded in the FEED and DetailedDesign stages.
- As 2.1
-
1.7 Vehicle impact
- lorry/ tanker
- fork lift trucks
- private vehicles
- trains
- farm vehicles
- aircraft
No additional hazardsto Nodes 2/5identified.
- - - - -
1.8 Missiles
- compressed gases
- fast moving machinery
- explosive materials/processes
No additional hazardsto Nodes 2/5identified.
- - - - -
1.9 Cranes
- operational use
- maintenance use
- construction
No additional hazardsto Nodes 2/5identified.
- - - - -
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Document No: NPL-01-R-01Preliminary Design Major Accident Safety Report for King Street Gas Storage Facility
Appendix B: HAZID RecordIssue: 3.0
Risktec Solutions Limited Page B6 of B21
RISK POTENTIALREFNo.
GUIDEWORD HAZARDDESCRIPTION
CONSEQUENCES
CONS. FREQ.
SAFEGUARDS/ MITIGATINGFEATURES
ACTIONS/COMMENTS
1.10 Knock-on effects
- event at nearby facility
- event on nearby roads
- offsite pipeline release
- field fire in area
No additional hazardsto Nodes 2/5identified.
- - - - -
1.11 Dropped items
- SSV or Xmas tree droppedduring snubbing operation
Loss of containmentdue to dropped loadonto live plant
- gas
As Node 1.1 As Node1.1
As Node1.1
- Lifting procedures/ controls to bedeveloped by operator/owner
- As Node 1.1
-
Loss of containmentdue to dropped loadonto wellhead
1.12 Natural hazards
- flooding
- wind
- earthquakes
- lightning
- cold weather
As Node 2 As Node 2 As Node2
As Node2
As Node 2 As Node 2
1.13 Loss of services
- power
- other
As Node 2 As Node 2 As Node2
As Node2
As Node 2 As Node 2
1.14 Security
- vandalism
As Node 2 As Node 2 As Node2
As Node2
As Node 2 As Node 2
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Document No: NPL-01-R-01Preliminary Design Major Accident Safety Report for King Street Gas Storage Facility
Appendix B: HAZID RecordIssue: 3.0
Risktec Solutions Limited Page B7 of B21
RISK POTENTIALREFNo.
GUIDEWORD HAZARDDESCRIPTION
CONSEQUENCES
CONS. FREQ.
SAFEGUARDS/ MITIGATINGFEATURES
ACTIONS/COMMENTS
1.15 Salt solution
- return piping to washing plant
- salt solution tanks
- washing plant
Loss of containment –salt solution returnedduring solution miningand initial gas fillingoperations
Environmental effects
- plant damage
- contamination ofaquifers
Medium/high forlargeenviron-mentalreleases.
Low forsmallreleases
As 1.1 - Short term storage only of re turnedsalt solution
- Bunding around brine storage tanksfor 110% capacity of the largestbrine storage tank. Bunds will be ofwaterproof construction compliantwith BS 5328.
- Isolation of salt solution supply totanks on high level detection intanks
- Majori ty of piping is buried
- EIA taken into account in the design
- Facilities will meet PPC regulations
- Facilities to be designed,constructed and commissioned inaccordance with best practice andnational/international standards (see1670-010-000-RPT-001 Rev 02)
- The design will be reviewed andadditional studies undertaken as partof the FEED and Detailed Designstages including Fire and ExplosionAssessment
- Design will be subject toOperational review
- Maintenance, asset integrity andmonitoring controls to be developedby site operator/owner
Action 1
Confirm what are thevolumes of the salt waterstorage tanks.
Action on : Bob Pearson
COMPLETE
Action 2
Confirm the bundingarrangements for the saltwater storage tanks.
Action on : Bob Pearson
COMPLETE
Action 3
Confirm the liquidtightness of the bund floorof the salt solution tanks.
Action on : Bob Pearson
COMPLETE
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Document No: NPL-01-R-01Preliminary Design Major Accident Safety Report for King Street Gas Storage Facility
Appendix B: HAZID RecordIssue: 3.0
Risktec Solutions Limited Page B8 of B21
RISK POTENTIALREFNo.
GUIDEWORD HAZARDDESCRIPTION
CONSEQUENCES
CONS. FREQ.
SAFEGUARDS/ MITIGATINGFEATURES
ACTIONS/COMMENTS
Node2: Free Flow Import
Engineering safeguards and mitigations all as per “Preliminary Engineering Report”, 1670-010-000-RPT-001 Rev 02 September 2007 unless otherwise specified
2.1 Mechanical failure
- catastrophic vessel orpipework failure
- leakage from (e.g.) valves,flanges, vessels, connections,pipewelds
Loss of containment
- gas
Unignited release offlammable gas
Low forsmallreleases,high forlargereleases
High forsmallreleases,low forlargereleases
- Facilities to be designed,constructed and commissioned inaccordance with best practice andnational/international standards (see1670-010-000-RPT-001 Rev 0)
- The design will be reviewed andadditional studies undertaken as partof the FEED and Detailed Designstages including Fire and ExplosionAssessment
- Design will be subject toOperational review
- Maintenance, asset integrity andmonitoring controls to be developedby site operator/owner
- Free flow gas import used ifpossible, hence avoiding potentialleaks from gas processing plant
- F&G detection system
- ESDV on gas import/export line
- Blowdown system
Action 4
Confirm whether or not,during emergency venting,the process inventory onlyor whether well inventoriesas well are vented.
Action on : AMEC
Response:
The vent stack/sterile areadesign will be developedduring the FEED/DetailedDesign phases of theproject but will based onthe following:
- The automated ESD willvent the above ground GasProcessing facility only.Consideration will begiven to manual initiationof venting of the wellunderground pipework inextreme circumstances (tobe fully documented in theMajor Accident Plan).
Complete
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Document No: NPL-01-R-01Preliminary Design Major Accident Safety Report for King Street Gas Storage Facility
Appendix B: HAZID RecordIssue: 3.0
Risktec Solutions Limited Page B9 of B21
RISK POTENTIALREFNo.
GUIDEWORD HAZARDDESCRIPTION
CONSEQUENCES
CONS. FREQ.
SAFEGUARDS/ MITIGATINGFEATURES
ACTIONS/COMMENTS
2.1(cont’d)
Ignited release Low forsmallreleases,high forlargereleases
High forsmallreleases,low forlargereleases
- As unignited release above
- PFP
- Active fire protection
- Hazardous area classification;equipment selected in accordancewith “Equipment and ProtectiveSystems Intended for Use inPotentially Explosive AtmospheresRegulations 1996”
- Adequate separation betweenflammable hydrocarbons andignition sources, emergencyservices, main safety equipment andescape routes.
- Layout principles to minimisedistance between Control Room,Sub-stations, main safety equipmentand escape routes.
- Wellheads at least 300m from anyoff -site inhabited buildings.
- Buildings to be adequatelydesigned/constructed so as to fulfiltheir function under normal andemergency conditions
- Gas ingress protection of buildingsto be reviewed during FEED andDetailed Design stages.
- Primary gas processing plant locateda minimum of 250m from the siteboundary fence
-
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Document No: NPL-01-R-01Preliminary Design Major Accident Safety Report for King Street Gas Storage Facility
Appendix B: HAZID RecordIssue: 3.0
Risktec Solutions Limited Page B10 of B21
RISK POTENTIALREFNo.
GUIDEWORD HAZARDDESCRIPTION
CONSEQUENCES
CONS. FREQ.
SAFEGUARDS/ MITIGATINGFEATURES
ACTIONS/COMMENTS
2.1(cont’d)
Low forsmallreleases,high forlargereleases
High forsmallreleases,low forlargereleases
- Adequate communicationsprovision for use in both normaland emergency conditions
- Adequate fire fighting access to allareas, via alternative routes.
- Sufficient means of escape to allowsafe evacuation from all areas todesignated muster point underemergency conditions
- Orientation of gas plant takes intoaccount prevailing wind direction inrelation to safe areas, ignitionsources, inhabited property andpublic roads/railway outside theboundary fence
- Fire and explosion breaks includedin the design; both within sub-divisions of the process area and thesite boundary; size depending on thelevel of risk.
- Design incorporates results ofliaison with emergency services andemergency planning authorities.
- Emergency Responseprocedures/controls to be developedby operator/owner
-
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Document No: NPL-01-R-01Preliminary Design Major Accident Safety Report for King Street Gas Storage Facility
Appendix B: HAZID RecordIssue: 3.0
Risktec Solutions Limited Page B11 of B21
RISK POTENTIALREFNo.
GUIDEWORD HAZARDDESCRIPTION
CONSEQUENCES
CONS. FREQ.
SAFEGUARDS/ MITIGATINGFEATURES
ACTIONS/COMMENTS
2.2 Corrosion
- internal
- external
As 2.1 As 2.1 As 2.1 As 2.1 - As 2.1
- The design wi ll be reviewed andadditional studies undertaken as partof the FEED and Detailed Designstages consideration of cathodicprotection for buried pipework
- All equipment/pipework designedfor 25 year plant life
- Mild steel pipework
- Corrosion allowances included inthe design
- Imported gas is clean and dry
- Maintenance, asset integrity andmonitoring controls to be developedby site operator/owner
-
2.3 Incorrect operation
- flow control – high importflow rate
As 2.1 As 2.1 As 2.1 As 2.1 - Operational controls to be reviewedduring the FEED and Detaileddesign phases
- Considered to have little potentialfor leading to loss of containment
-
2.4 High/low temperature/pressure
- process fluids
Cavityoverpressurisation
As 2.1 As 2.1 As 2.1 -Pressure indication on import line
-Methanol injection to preventhydrate formation
- Operational controls to be reviewedduring the FEED and DetailedDesign phases
-As 2.1
-
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Document No: NPL-01-R-01Preliminary Design Major Accident Safety Report for King Street Gas Storage Facility
Appendix B: HAZID RecordIssue: 3.0
Risktec Solutions Limited Page B12 of B21
RISK POTENTIALREFNo.
GUIDEWORD HAZARDDESCRIPTION
CONSEQUENCES
CONS. FREQ.
SAFEGUARDS/ MITIGATINGFEATURES
ACTIONS/COMMENTS
Hydrate formationleading toblockage/partialblockage
- Incoming gas is dry
-Methanol injection to preventhydrate format
-
2.5 Knock-on effects
- process fire or explosion
- non-process fire or explosion(e.g. sub station fire ,transformer explosion)
Loss of containment As 2.1 High Low - Pipelines mainly underground
- As 2.1
- Operational controls to be developedby site operator/owner
-
2.6 Misrouted gas Not considered to be asignificant hazard.Only possiblemisrouting identifiedwas through the gasprocessing plant –operational issue.
- - - - -
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Document No: NPL-01-R-01Preliminary Design Major Accident Safety Report for King Street Gas Storage Facility
Appendix B: HAZID RecordIssue: 3.0
Risktec Solutions Limited Page B13 of B21
RISK POTENTIALREFNo.
GUIDEWORD HAZARDDESCRIPTION
CONSEQUENCES
CONS. FREQ.
SAFEGUARDS/ MITIGATINGFEATURES
ACTIONS/COMMENTS
2.7 Vehicle impact
- lorry/ tanker
- fork lift trucks
- private vehicles
- farm vehicles
- aircraft
- construction vehicles
As 2.1 As 2.1 Low forsmallreleases,high forlargereleases
* - Pipework mainly underground
- Fencing round site, along roads,wellheads, gas processing plant andother critical areas
- At specific points e.g. bends, next tokey equipment, provision of Armcobarriers
- Individual access cul -de-sacs forwells; each road has at least 1 90deg bend
- Reviews of safeguards/ mitigationsfor vehicle impacts to be included inFEED/Detailed Design stages.
- Access controls to site, wellheadsand other critical areas to bedeveloped by owner/operator
- Construction controls for vehicles inforce during construction
- Gas plant construction will becomplete prior to import of gas.
* Varies with vehicle, asfollows:
- lorry/ tanker - low
- fork lift trucks - medium
- private vehicles - low
- farm vehicles - high
- aircraft - low/very low
- construction vehicles –low
Farm vehicles will haveaccess to fields around thewellheads during siteoperation.
2.8 Missiles
- compressed gases
- fast moving machinery
- explosive materials/processes
No hazards identified - - - - -
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Document No: NPL-01-R-01Preliminary Design Major Accident Safety Report for King Street Gas Storage Facility
Appendix B: HAZID RecordIssue: 3.0
Risktec Solutions Limited Page B14 of B21
RISK POTENTIALREFNo.
GUIDEWORD HAZARDDESCRIPTION
CONSEQUENCES
CONS. FREQ.
SAFEGUARDS/ MITIGATINGFEATURES
ACTIONS/COMMENTS
2.9 Cranes
- operational use
- maintenance use
- construction
Loss of containmentdue to dropped load onlive plant
Loss of containmentdue to dropped load onwellhead
As 2.1 Low forsmallreleases,high forlargereleases
High - Dropped Object Assessment to becarried out during FEED stage ofdesign
- Operational controls formaintenance, crane and all liftingoperations to be developed by siteoperator/ owner
- No operational requirement for useof cranes
- Construction controls in forceduring construction
- As 2.1
-
2.10 Knock-on effects
- event at nearby facility
- event on nearby roads, tankeraccident leading to spillage/fire
- offsite pipeline release
- field fire in area - vandalism
As 2.1 As 2.1 As 2.1 As 2.1 - Review of notification proceduresfor events at other local facilities,pipelines and roads to be included inFEED and Detailed Design phases
- Provision of firebreaks with respectto farming activities to be reviewedin FEED stage of design
- Pipelines in the area are buried
- Holford Brinefield not considered tobe a hazard because of distance fromsite
- Morrisons depot is not a processingfacility
- Vent design includes provision ofsterile area; vent stack and sterilearea will comply with API-521,pressure Relieving and DepressuringSystems
- As 2.1 and 2.14
Local facilities identified:
- Ineos Gas Storage site
- Holford Brinefield
- Morrisons depot
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Document No: NPL-01-R-01Preliminary Design Major Accident Safety Report for King Street Gas Storage Facility
Appendix B: HAZID RecordIssue: 3.0
Risktec Solutions Limited Page B15 of B21
RISK POTENTIALREFNo.
GUIDEWORD HAZARDDESCRIPTION
CONSEQUENCES
CONS. FREQ.
SAFEGUARDS/ MITIGATINGFEATURES
ACTIONS/COMMENTS
2.11 Dropped items
- onto plant
- onto wellhead
- other
As 2.9 As 2.9 As 2.9 As 2.9 As 2.9 -
2.12 Natural hazards
- flooding
- wind
- earthquakes
- lightning
- cold weather
As 2.1 As 2.1 As 2.1 As 2.1 - Distances between the wells and theKing Street geological fault takeninto account in the layout of thewells and plant
- Earthquake potential to be reviewedas part of the FEED and Detaileddesign
- Results of the climatic data report tobe considered in the FEED andDetailed design e.g provision ofweather cladding for buildings
- Provision of lightning conductorsand earthing to be included in theFEED design
- Site location is above local canaland river levels
- Electrical surface heating forpipelines and related equipmentrequiring frost and maintainedtemperature protection
- As 2.1
Flooding of wellhead pitsdue to high groundwaterlevels/ heavy rainconsidered to be anoperational issue.
2.13 Loss of services
- power
- other
As 2.1 As 2.1 As 2.1 As 2.1 - UPS provision for critical systemsand will allow safe and orderly shutdown in the event of an emergency
- plant is designed to fail safe
-
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Document No: NPL-01-R-01Preliminary Design Major Accident Safety Report for King Street Gas Storage Facility
Appendix B: HAZID RecordIssue: 3.0
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RISK POTENTIALREFNo.
GUIDEWORD HAZARDDESCRIPTION
CONSEQUENCES
CONS. FREQ.
SAFEGUARDS/ MITIGATINGFEATURES
ACTIONS/COMMENTS
2.14 Security
- vandalism
As 2.1 As 2.1 As 2.1 As 2.1 - Site security provision to be furtherconsidered in the FEED stage of thedesign
- 24 hour site manning
- CCTV provision
- Fencing around site, wellheads, gasprocessing plant and other criticalareas
- Security and access controlprocedures to be developed byoperator/owner
-
- Shooting As 2.1 As 2.1 As 2.1 As 2.1 - Consultation by site operator/ ownerwith local farmers/other gun ownersabout shooting activities
-
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Document No: NPL-01-R-01Preliminary Design Major Accident Safety Report for King Street Gas Storage Facility
Appendix B: HAZID RecordIssue: 3.0
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RISK POTENTIALREFNo.
GUIDEWORD HAZARDDESCRIPTION
CONSEQUENCES
CONS. FREQ.
SAFEGUARDS/ MITIGATINGFEATURES
ACTIONS/COMMENTS
Node3: Assisted Import
Engineering safeguards and mitigations all as per “Preliminary Engineering Report”, 1670-010-000-RPT-001 Rev 02 September 2007 unless otherwisespecified
No additional hazards identified to Nodes 2 and 5.
RISK POTENTIALREFNo.
GUIDEWORD HAZARDDESCRIPTION
CONSEQUENCES
CONS. FREQ.
SAFEGUARDS/ MITIGATINGFEATURES
ACTIONS/COMMENTS
Node
4: Free Flow Export
Engineering safeguards and mitigations all as per “Preliminary Engineering Report”, 1670-010-000-RPT-001 Rev 02 September 2007 unless otherwisespecified
No additional hazards identified to Nodes 2 and 5.
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Document No: NPL-01-R-01Preliminary Design Major Accident Safety Report for King Street Gas Storage Facility
Appendix B: HAZID RecordIssue: 3.0
Risktec Solutions Limited Page B18 of B21
RISK POTENTIALREFNo.
GUIDEWORD HAZARDDESCRIPTION
CONSEQUENCES
CONS. FREQ.
SAFEGUARDS/ MITIGATINGFEATURES
ACTIONS/COMMENTS
Node5: Assisted Export
Engineering safeguards and mitigations all as per “Preliminary Engineering Report”, 1670-010-000-RPT-001 Rev 02 September 2007 unless otherwisespecified.
Additional hazards to Node 2 recorded here. Other entries as Node 2.
5.1 Mechanical failure
- catastrophic vessel orpipework failure
- leakage from (e.g.) valves,flanges, vessels, connections,pipewelds
As 2.1 As 2.1 As 2.1 As 2.1 - Compressors located in separatebuildings and have separate MCCs
- Cavity design/developmentmethodology prevents marlentrainment
- Dehydration facility in the gasprocessing plant
- As 2.1
-
5.2 Corrosion
- internal
- external
Corrosion/ erosion as aresult of:
- Drop out products
- Wet gas
- Hydrate particles
As 2.1 As 2.1 As 2.1 - Drop out products and wet gasupstream of gas processing facilityonly
- Methanol injection to preventhydrate formation
- As 2.1
-
5.3 Incorrect operation
- flow control – high importflow rate
No additional hazardsidentified
- - - - -
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Document No: NPL-01-R-01Preliminary Design Major Accident Safety Report for King Street Gas Storage Facility
Appendix B: HAZID RecordIssue: 3.0
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RISK POTENTIALREFNo.
GUIDEWORD HAZARDDESCRIPTION
CONSEQUENCES
CONS. FREQ.
SAFEGUARDS/ MITIGATINGFEATURES
ACTIONS/COMMENTS
5.4 High/low temperature/pressure
- process fluids
- hydrate particles
Loss of containmentdue to compressordamage from hydrateparticles
As 2.1 Low risk - Design intent is for operationoutside the hydrate band
- Compressor design as per API 617,“Axial and Centrifugal Compressorsand Expander-Compressors forPetroleum, Chemical and GasIndustry Services”
- System designed for maximum NTSrange of temperatures and pressures
- DCS for process control
- Maximum design pressure of thecompressors ~85 bar
- Effects of over -pressured gasexpected to have minimal effects onthe large NTS inventory
- As 2.1
-
5.5 Knock-on effects
- Incident at one compressoraffects the 2nd compressor
As 2.1 As 2.1 As 2.1 As 2.1 - Compressors housed in separatebuildings including separate MCCs
- Protection of the compressorbuildings to be considered at theFEED and Detailed Design stages
- As 2.1
-
5.6 Misrouted gas
- gas processing facilitiesbypassed
- - - - - Assisted export used when cavitygas pressure < required exportpressure. Hence, gas processingfacility is the only route for gasexport
Bypass of gas processingfacilities not considered tobe a credible hazard
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Document No: NPL-01-R-01Preliminary Design Major Accident Safety Report for King Street Gas Storage Facility
Appendix B: HAZID RecordIssue: 3.0
Risktec Solutions Limited Page B20 of B21
RISK POTENTIALREFNo.
GUIDEWORD HAZARDDESCRIPTION
CONSEQUENCES
CONS. FREQ.
SAFEGUARDS/ MITIGATINGFEATURES
ACTIONS/COMMENTS
5.7 Vehicle impact
- methanol tanker
- As 2.1
Loss of containment -methanol
As 2.1 As 2.1 As 2.1 - Bunding around methanol tanks for110% of the larger methanol tankbut takes into consideration the lostvolume in the base of any othertanks or equipment
- Spill containment around hoses
- Design of methanol storage area tobe further considered at the FEEDand Detailed Design stages
- Operational controls for tankerdeliveries to be developed by siteoperator/ owner
- As 2.1
40 te methanol tankers tomake daily deliveries.
Tanker inventory – 25 temethanol
5.8 Missiles
- compressed gases
- fast moving machinery
- explosive materials/processes
As 2.1 As 2.1 As 2.1 As 2.1 - Operational controls regarding gascylinders and use of equipment to tobe developed by site operator/owner
- Explosives not expected to be usedon site
- As 2.1
-
5.9 Cranes
- operational use
- maintenance use
- construction
As 2.1 and 2.9 As 2.1 and 2.9 As 2.1and 2.9
As 2.1and 2.9
- Current design intent is for skid-mounted compressors
- Lifts over live plant to be furtherconsidered at the FEED andDetailed Design stages
- As 2.1 and 2.9
-
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Document No: NPL-01-R-01Preliminary Design Major Accident Safety Report for King Street Gas Storage Facility
Appendix B: HAZID RecordIssue: 3.0
Risktec Solutions Limited Page B21 of B21
RISK POTENTIALREFNo.
GUIDEWORD HAZARDDESCRIPTION
CONSEQUENCES
CONS. FREQ.
SAFEGUARDS/ MITIGATINGFEATURES
ACTIONS/COMMENTS
5.10 Knock-on effects
- event at nearby facility
- event on nearby roads, tankeraccident leading to spillage/fire
- offsite pipeline release
- field fire in area - vandalism
No additional hazardsidentified
- - - - -
5.11 Dropped items
- onto plant
- onto wellhead
- other
No additional hazardsidentified
- - - - -
5.12 Natural hazards
- flooding
- wind
- earthquakes
- lightning
- cold weather
No additional hazardsidentified
- - - - -
5.13 Loss of services
- power
- other
No additional hazardsidentified
- - - - -
5.14 Security
- vandalism
No additional hazardsidentified
- - - - -