hazid methodology report for rcy

HAZID Study Methodology Report for Potable Water Supply Project

Prepared For:

Prepared By:

Velosi Certification LLC

16-Jun-15

HAZID REVIEW METHODOLOY REPORT PAGE 2 OF 21

Report Type: HAZID Study Methodology Report for Potable Water Supply Project

Project Title: Safety Studies (HAZID, HAZOP and SIL Assessment) regarding

potable water supply

Client Contact Name:

Client Company Name:

Issued By: Syed Quraishy

Date: 16-Jun-15

Document Production & Approval Record

Issue No. Name Signature Date Title

Prepared by Syed Quraishy

11-Jun-15

Loss

Prevention Engineer

Revised by Mike Snakard 13-Jun-15 Loss Prevention

Manager

Approved by Mark Kenyon

15-Jun-15

Regional HSE

Consultancy

Manager

Document Revision Record

Issue No. Date Details of Revision

Rev 0 16-Jun-15 Initial report

COPYRIGHT

© This report is the copyright of Velosi Certification LLC. Any unauthorised reproduction or

usage by any person other than the addressee is strictly prohibited.


LIMITATIONS

Applus+ VELOSI has prepared this report for the sole use of Medgulf Construction Co. W.L.L in

accordance with the agreement under which our services were performed. No other warranty,

expressed or implied, is made as to the professional advice included in this report or any other

services provided by us. This report may not be relied upon by any other party without the prior and

express written agreement of Applus+ VELOSI.

Unless otherwise stated in this report, the assessments made assume that the sites and facilities will

be used for their current intended purpose without significant change. The conclusions and

recommendations contained in this report are based upon information provided by others and upon

the assumption that all relevant information has been provided by those parties from whom it has

been requested. Applus+ VELOSI has not independently verified information obtained from third

parties, unless otherwise stated in the report.

Where inspections have been carried out, these have been restricted to a level of detail required to

achieve the stated objectives of the services. The results of any measurements taken may vary

spatially or with time.


Table of Contents

1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 5

2 PROJECT BACKGROUND ................................................................................... 5

3 OBJECTIVES ..................................................................................................... 6

4 SCOPE OF WORK .............................................................................................. 6

5 STUDY METHODOLOGY .................................................................................... 6

5.1 OVERVIEW .......................................................................................................... 6

5.2 HAZID CHECKLIST ............................................................................................... 7

5.3 HAZID PROCEDURE .............................................................................................. 7

5.4 RISK RANKING ..................................................................................................... 8

5.5 RECORDING OF STUDY MINUTES ............................................................................... 8

5.6 FOLLOW-UP ........................................................................................................ 9

6 REVIEW SESSIONS ........................................................................................... 9

6.1 LOCATION AND SCHEDULE ...................................................................................... 9

6.2 HAZID REVIEW TEAM MEMBERS .............................................................................. 9

6.3 REPORTING ....................................................................................................... 10

APPENDIX A ......................................................................................................... 11

PROJECT SPECIFIC HAZID GUIDEWORDS & CHECKLIST ......................................................... 11

APPENDIX B ......................................................................................................... 18

QP RISK ASSESSMENT MATRIX ........................................................................................ 18

APPENDIX C ......................................................................................................... 20

QP H&E REGISTER TEMPLATE ......................................................................................... 20


1 INTRODUCTION

Due to an increasing demand of water supply for several Qatar Petroleum (QP) operating

facilities at Dukhan, QP decided to construct a sustainable and fully functional water supply

scheme to supply the Dukhan Concession Area. Medgulf Construction Co. W.L.L. has been

awarded with the EPIC contract from Qatar Petroleum (QP) for Potable Water Supply to

Umm Bab, Jaleha and Khatiyah North. The detailed engineering design for this project must

undergo third party HAZID, HAZOP and SIL Assessment reviews, as per QP requirement.

In support of Medgulf’s request for an assessment of their facility, Applus+ VELOSI has

provided a proposal to conduct safety studies to provide Medgulf with their required HSE

Procedures. Medgulf has awarded Applus+ VELOSI a project to conduct the safety studies

such as HAZID, HAZOP and SIL Assessment. This document describes the methodology for

a Hazard Identification Study (HAZID) for the project.

2 PROJECT BACKGROUND

Dukhan Concession Area, located 80 km west of Doha serves as an onshore oil and gas

producing field for Qatar Petroleum Company (QP). As part of this operation, a number of

production facilities have been built and more are expected that would require an increased

demand for water. Present storage capacity at Jabel Tank Farm is approximately 10 MIG

(45,000 m3). Presently, there are 6 existing storage tanks at Jabel Tank Farm. Currently,

water demands for a number of production stations within the Dukhan fields are fed by an

8’’ diameter (200 mm) water main from the Dukhan Desalination Plant (DDP) located west

of the Dukhan Township. The DDP supplies desalinated water through three sets of

pipelines:

To the Fahahil Stripping Plant (FSP) through an 8’’ diameter pipeline with branches

to the following facilities; Fahahil Stripping Plant (FSP), Fahahil South Degassing

Station, Fahahil North Degassing Station, Arab-D Gas Recycling Station, Khatiyah

South Degassing Station, Qatar Petroleum Support Facilities Area (QPSFA) and

Qatar Petroleum Administration Area (QPAA);

To Dukhan Water Sports Club, PWI-1, Weather Forecast Station, Beach House etc.,

through 4” dia pipeline; and

To the Al Jebel Tanks through 10’’ and 16’’ diameter pipelines Mobile tankers

provide water from the tanker filling station at the DDP to the stations in the

Dukhan fields which are not currently connected to the potable water pipelines.

Mobile tankers provide water from the tanker filling station at the Dukhan Desalination Plant

to other stations in the Dukhan fields, which are currently not connected to the potable

water pipelines.

This 8’’ diameter (200mm) water main is a Carbon steel line with HDPE liner inside. The

liner was observed cracked in many places and needs replacement. Liner replacement can

not be done without long term shut down of the pipeline and long term shut down of the

pipeline is not possible. Hence, a new line has to be laid and the existing line has to be

retired form potable water service or scrapped.


3 OBJECTIVES

The purpose of the HAZID (Hazard Identification) study is to aid in managing project risk

through the early identification of potential process hazards and threats associated with the

project. Medgulf Construction Co. W.L.L has hired Applus+ VELOSI to conduct a HAZID

Review following Qatar Petroleum Guidelines. This document describes the scope of work

and proposed methodology for conducting a HAZID review for the Medgulf Connstruction

Co. W.L.L.

4 SCOPE OF WORK

Applus+ VELOSI will facilitate a one day HAZID session for the construction of a pipeline

network to transfer potable water from existing tanks at Jabel Tank Farm to all QP facilities

with the required controls and structures. Applus+ VELOSI understands that the pipeline

network will be comprise three (3) main sections:

1. Jabel Tank Farm to Khatiyah North in Northern end of Dukhan Fields and other QP

facilities along the pipeline route;

2. Jabel Tank Farm to Umm Bab facilities in South direction and other QP facilities

along the pipeline route; and

3. Umm Bab to Jaleha Degassing Station further South and other QP facilities along

the pipeline route.

Applus+ VELOSI also understands that as part of the engineering scope of work, three new

fully automated air-conditioned pumping stations and associated water storage reservoirs

will be constructed as will bulk disinfection facilities at Jabel Tanks Farm and the three (3)

new pumping stations. Local disinfection facilities will also be constructed at the consumers’

premises.

With regard to the scope of the HAZID, Applus+ VELOSI has assumed that the three main

section of the pipeline will all be reviewed independently. One chlorine dioxide (ClO2)

injection facility will be reviewed and then applied to the four proposed facility and one local

disinfection facility will be reviewed with the results applied to all other local disinfection

facilities.

5 STUDY METHODOLOGY

5.1 Overview

A HAZID is a team based brainstorming analysis to identify process and non-process

hazards. This technique is designed to identify and mitigate risks associated with the

decisions made in the early stages of the project. By identifying these risks at early stage of

the project, the cost and scheduling impact associated with the implementation of risk

reduction measures can be minimized.

A HAZID review will be conducted following the QP Guideline for Hazard Identification Study

(HAZID), QP Document No.: QP-GDL-S-040. The purpose of the HAZID review is to identify

hazards and relevant risks across the following categories:

The surroundings on the facilities;

The facilities on their surroundings; and

The facilities on the health.


5.2 HAZID Checklist

The study method is a combination of identification, analysis and brainstorming based on

the hazards identified on the checklist which is divided into four main sections containing

several categories. The sections contain global hazards and project implementation issues

which may be covered once for the whole development, namely:

Section 1 External and Environmental Hazard;

Section 2 Facility Hazards;

Section 3 Health Hazards; and

Section 4 Project Implementation Issues.

Subtopics to be considered for each of these categories during the HAZID Review are listed

in Appendix A.

5.3 HAZID Procedure

The HAZID technique is designed to identify and mitigate risks through effective

brainstorming to identify hazards and through implementation of recommendations to

reduce risks. HAZID provides a forum where by experienced operations personnel, design

staff and HSE professionals are able to review the issues surrounding a new venture or

development or modification project. The HAZID is intended to be a rapid identification and

description process highlighting potential high risk areas of the proposed design, it is not a

forum for trying to solve potential problems. Should design issues arise during the HAZID,

they will be noted within a “Parking Lot” of non-HAZID related topics for review and action

outside the HAZID process.

Since the QP Guidelines for HAZID were developed based on use within industrial

applications, a selected list of guidewords from the QP Guideword Checklist has been

selected for this project and are listed in Appendix A.

The HAZID study will following the QP HAZID process and will be conducted as follows:

The HAZID Facilitator will make a short presentation on the HAZID Technique and

the objectives of the HAZID session;

Medgulf/COWI Engineer will make a short presentation explaining the facilities;

Once the two items above are completed, the HAZID Review will start. The HAZID

review will systematically go through the following steps for each area of the

design:

An area of the design will be identified;

The design intent and process conditions will be defined;

The first/next Hazard Category (Refer Appendix A) will be selected;

The first/next guide word and Hazard Category will be applied to give the

hazard scenarios under consideration (Refer Appendix A);

Potential causes of the hazards will be listed and the team will agree on the

credibility of each cause;

Worst credible consequences of each causes will be assessed; along with

means of protection and prevention;

The likelihood of each hazard will be assessed;

Safeguards in place will be identified to prevent the hazard;

Control measures will be identified to help mitigate the escalation of the

consequences associated with the hazard;

A risk level for each hazard will be assigned using the QP Risk Assessment

Matrix (As shown in Appendix B);


Assessment of the existing safeguard and control measures will be done to

check whether those are adequate or not; and

Recommendation for action or further consideration of the problem will be

proposed, as applicable.

This process will be repeated across all areas of the design. Pictorial description of the

HAZID review procedure is shown in Figure 1 on the following page:

Figure 1: HAZID Process Steps

5.4 Risk Ranking

Each identified hazard will be ranked using the will be ranked using the QP Risk Assessment

Matrix (Appendix B). The goal of the risk ranking endeavour is to categorize each hazard

in terms of “High”, “Medium” or “Low” risk. It is evident that the safeguards and controls of

the high risk hazards needs to be greater and thus the review team will focus more on such

high risk hazards and look for means for further reduction of the assessed risk. Likelihood

and consequences associated with the hazardous event will be taken into account to

determine the risk. But the impact of any identified Action will not be taken into account as

the action is yet to implemented. The risk reduction due to implementation of the Action is

not to be evaluated at this stage.

5.5 Recording of study minutes

HAZID scribe will record the significant points arising from the discussion of the HAZID

review team in real time using a laptop and projector so that all team members of the

HAZID workshop can read the worksheet and comment upon or change the recorded

comments. The scribe will use a worksheet template in PHA Pro. After the review session in

concluded, the review minutes will be tidied up and distributed for comment.


5.6 Follow-Up

After completion of the HAZID review session, a series of Action sheets will be generated

(one sheet per action) with a person assigned responsibility to each action to ensure that it

is followed up and closed out in an appropriate manner.

6 REVIEW SESSIONS

6.1 Location and Schedule

The HAZID is scheduled to take place in Doha, Qatar. The workshop time will be from

7:30am to 13:30pm with prayer break. The following tentative HAZID session agenda is

proposed:

07:30 to 07:45 hrs. Introductions;

07:45 to 08:00 hrs. HAZID Introductory Presentation;

08:00 to 08:15 hrs. Project Overview;

08:15 to 11:30 hrs. HAZID Review Workshop;

11:30 to 11:50 hrs. Prayer Break; and

12:00 to 13:30 Review continues & Close out.

6.2 HAZID Review Team Members

In performing a HAZID study, the proper selection of team participants is very important.

The study team will consist of personnel who are knowledgeable in the process technology,

experienced in the operations of the facilities and lead by an independent 3rd party

Facilitator and an experienced scribe.

The core team shall include staff from the following areas:

HAZID Facilitator;

HAZID Scribe;

QP Corporate HSE Representative;

Safety;

Process;

Mechanical;

Structural;

Piping/Layout and

Project Engineering.

Other Engineering Representatives that may be required will be requested to attend the

HAZID to address specific specialty issues, should they arise.

Mr. Mike Snakard will serve as the HAZID workshop chairman and will be supported by Mr.

Syed Quraishy as a scribe.

Mike Snakard is a Process Safety Management professional with over 25 years of experience

and has led numerous HAZID, HAZOP, LOPA and SIL Assessment workshops around the

world. Within the field of Process Safety and Loss prevention he has extensive experience in

the safe design, start-up, troubleshooting and operation of industrial plant processes. Mr.

Snakard has been approved by QP to undertake third party HAZID assessments in the past.


Mr. Syed Quraishy will be scribe for the HAZOP workshop. Syed Quraishy is a Chemical

Engineer with specialization in Process Safety and is working for Applus+ VELOSI as

“Process Safety/Loss Prevention Engineer”. Mr. Quraishy is a TÜV Rheinland Certified

Functional Safety Engineer. Prior to joining Applus+ VELOSI he worked three (3) years for

Chevron as “Operation Specialist” in a Gas Development Project at Bangladesh.

6.3 Reporting

The proceedings of the HAZID review will be recorded using PHAPro v8.4 software. Each

review session will be recorded in independent worksheets following QP Guidelines for

HAZID. HAZID proceedings will be reported using the QP HSE Register format (Appendix

C). Recommendations (action/query items) will be recorded using HAZID that VELOSI will

generated for each recommendations. The subsequent follow-up and close out of each

HAZID Action item will be the responsibility of Medgulf/COWI. In addition to generating the

HAZID Action sheets, VELOSI will prepare and issue a HAZID report following the session.

The proposed content of these reports is shown below:

HAZID Report Table of Contents

Executive Summary;

Scope of the HAZID Review:

HAZID Methodology;

Study Attendees;

HAZID Review Summary;

Appendices:

HAZID Worksheets

Recommendations

Action Sheets


APPENDIX A

Project Specific HAZID Guidewords & Checklist


Project Specific HAZID Guidewords & Checklist

The proposed HAZID Checklist to be used for this project has been extracted from the QP

HAZID Guidelines. Guidewords and expanders identified as not applicable to this project

have been highlighted using strikethrough text in the table below, which lists all guidewords

and expanders in the QP HAZID Guidelines.

Section 1: External and Environmental Hazards

Category Guide word Expanders

Natural and

Environmental Hazards

Climate Extremes

Lightning

Earthquake

Erosion / Subsidence

Temp, wind, sandstorms flooding

Ground structure, foundations,

Effect of the Facility on the

Surroundings

Geographical - Infrastructure

Proximity to Population

Adjacent Land Use

Proximity to Transport

Corridors

Environmental Issues

Social Issues

Plant location, plant layout

Accommodation camps

Shipping lanes, air routes, roads, etc.

Previous land use, vulnerable fauna and

flora, visual impact

Social/cultural areas of significance

Infrastructure Normal Communications

Communications for

contingency planning

Supply Support

Road links, air links, water links

Consumables/spares holding

Environmental Damage

Continuous Plant Discharges to Air

Continuous Plant Discharges to Water

Continuous Plant Discharges

to Soil

Emergency/upset Discharges

Contaminated Ground

Facility Impact

Waste Disposal Options

Timing of Construction

Flares, vents, fugitive emissions, energy efficiency

Target/legislative requirements, drainage facilities, oil/water separation

Drainage, chemical storage

Flares, vents, drainage

Previous use or events

Area minimization, environmental impact

assessment

Seasons, periods of environmental significance


Section 2: Facility Hazards


Control Methods /

Philosophy

Manning/operations Philosophy

Operations Concept

Maintenance Philosophy

Control Philosophy

Manning Levels

Emergency Response

Concurrent Operations

Start-up Shutdown

Effect on design, effect on locality (Manned,

unmanned, visited)

1 & 1 Spare or Two 50% systems

Plant/train/equipment item, heavy lifting,

access, override, bypass, commonality of equipment, transport

Appropriate technology, (DCS/local panels).

Accommodation, travel, support requirements. Consistency with operations

and maintenance, etc. philosophies

Isolation, ESD philosophy

Production, maintenance requirements

Partial or system wide

Fire and Explosion

Hazards

Stored Flammables

Sources of Ignition

Equipment Layout

Fire Protection and Response

Operator Protection

Improper storage, operator error (release), defect, impact, fire (mitigation measures

include: substitute non-flammable, minimize and separate inventory)

Electricity, static electricity, sparks, hot

surfaces (mitigation measures include: identify, remove, separate)

Confinement, escalation (operator error, defect, corrosion), module layout/proximity,

orientation of equipment, predominant wind

direction (mitigation measures include: reduce degree of confinement, spacing

based on consequence assessment, escalation barriers)

Active/passive insulation, fire/gas detection, firefighting facilities

Means of escape, PPE, communications,

emergency response.

Process

Hazards

Inventory

Release of Inventory

Excess hazardous material (mitigation

measures include: minimize hazardous

inventory, alternate processes and utility systems)

Excessive process stress, impact (penetration by foreign object), process

control failure, structural failure, erosion or

corrosion (mitigation measures include: recognize and minimize process hazards



Over Pressure

Over/under Temperature

Excess/zero Level

Wrong Composition/Phase

during design, inherently safe plant,

containment and recovery measures)

Offsite sources, process blockage, thermal

expansion, connection of process to utility systems, chemical reaction

Atmospheric conditions, fire, hot surfaces,

chemical reaction

Overfill storage tanks, loss of function in separation vessels, blow by to downstream

vessels

Offsite contamination, failure of separation

process, build-up of wrong phase (sand,

hydrates, etc.), toxic substances

Utility Systems Firewater Systems

Fuel Gas

Heating Medium

Diesel Fuel

Power Supply

Steam

Drains

Inert Gas

Waste Storage and Treatment

Chemical/fuel Storage

Potable Water

Sewerage

Maintenance

Hazards

Access Requirements Override

Necessity

Bypasses Required

Commonality of Equipment

Heavy Lifting Requirements

Transport

Oil Spillage

Confined spaces

Vessels/pipes

Pits

Sewers

Containers

Sumps

Tunnel

Trenches

Excavations

Portable Containers

Manholes

Construction / Existing Facilities

Tie-ins (shutdown Confined spaces



requirements)

Concurrent Operations

Reuse of Material

Common Equipment Capacity

Interface -

Shutdown/blowdown/ ESD

Skid Dimensions (weight

handling/equipment

(congestion)

Soil Contamination (existing

facilities)

Mobilization/ demobilization

Excavation near existing cable

trench

Vessels/pipes

Pits

Sewers

Containers

Sumps

Tunnel

Trenches

Excavations

Portable Containers

Manholes


Section 3: Health Hazards


Health Hazards Disease Hazards

Asphyxiation hazards

Carcinogenic

Toxic

Physical

Mental

Working Hazards

Transport

Chemical & Other Hazards

Endemic diseases, infection, malarial

mosquitoes, hygiene - personal and/or

catering, contaminated water or foodstuff,

social, e.g. AIDS, VD, etc. stagnant water,

poor living conditions

Asphyxiating atmospheres, failure to use

appropriate PPE, , working in confined

spaces, smoke, exhaust

Chemicals in use

Hazardous atmosphere, asphyxiating atmosphere, chemicals in use

Noise, ergonomics

Shift patterns

Diving, working in water, working at heights,

hazardous equipment, hazardous surfaces, electricity Extreme weather

Quality of roads (mitigation measures include: effective journey management)

Dust

Smoke

Fumes

Aerosols

Mists

Gasses

Vapour

Fluids / Corrosive Liquids

Fires

Asbestos

Noise

Non-ergonomic equipment


Section 4: Project Implementation Issues


Contracting

Strategy

Prevailing Influences

Legislation

External Standards

External Environmental

Constraints

Stability and contractual conditions , Contractor

selection constraints

Governmental contracting requirements

Additional engineering and construction

standards

Governmental environmental requirements

Hazards

Recognition and

Management

Hazard Studies

Hazards and Effects Register

Project Controls

HAZOP, QRA, PHA, EA, HRA, etc.

Quality assurance (change control, interdepartmental involvement and interfaces)

Contingency

Planning

Geographical Infrastructure

Recovery Measures

Plant location, plant layout

Medical support, firefighting support, spill leak/clean-up support, security/military

support, evacuation

Competency Level of Indigenous Training

Training Requirements

Level of Technology

Quality of local workforce and contractors


APPENDIX B

QP Risk Assessment Matrix


QP Risk Assessment Matrix

The QP Risk Assessment Matrix will be used in the HAZID Review to assess risks to People, Asset/Production, Environment and Company

Reputation based on a qualitative assessment of probability and severity. A complete description of the Risk Assessment Matrix can be found in the

QP Guidelines for HAZID Review.


APPENDIX C

QP H&E Register Template

HAZID REVIEW AND HAZOP REVIEW METHODOLOY REPORT PAGE 21 OF 21

QP H&E Register Template

The proceedings of the HAZID will be recorded in the QP format of HSE Register. A sample of the H&E Register to be used on this project (taken

from the QP Guideline for HAZID Study) is provided on the following page.

Note: The example (Hazard) given above is for illustrative purposes only. Risk levels (Low / Medium / High) shall be assigned per the QP Risk

Assessment Matrix as attached in Appendix B.

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