7/31/2019 03232012 the Method to Putin's Syria Madness

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The Method to Putin's Syria Madness

Matthew RojanskyCNN, March 23, 2012Comments

To much of the world, Russias intransigence inface of intense international pressure to halt thviolence in Syria seems like sheer madness.Russia has prevented countless efforts to impa ceasefire, blunted calls by Syrias Arabneighbors to end the crackdown, and negatedBashar al-Assads own incentives to do anythibut hold onto power by whatever meansnecessary.

Yet, as seen from Moscow, there is a method

this madness. For anyone who still believes thconflict should be resolved with the backing ofU.N. Security Council, Russia cannot just bewritten off as an irrational actor. In fact, senselas Moscows position might appear, there are Russian interests at stake over Syria, and if wemake an effort to understand them, it may bepossible to find a solution that satisfies VladimPutin and saves Syrian lives.

So, what does Russia really want with Syria?

Matthew Rojansky

Deputy Director

Russia and Eurasia ProgramMore from Rojansky...

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SubscribeFollow the Money. A considerable amount of cash is at stake for Moscow in Syria. Since the 1950s, the Soviet Union and then Russia werentimately involved in developing Syrias oil-processing, electric power, irrigation, transportation and other major infrastructure projects. These,together with massive arms sales, including equipping Syrias armies for two major wars with Israel, resulted in over $10 billion in Soviet-era debowed by Damascus to Moscow. The Russians forgave two thirds of that in 2005, but still expected the remaining $3.6 billion to be paid by 2015

In addition, Syrias history as a Soviet client state has kept lucrative investment opportunities open for Russians in the post-Soviet era, includingof millions invested in oil exploration, billions in oil and natural gas transit and refining, and some $4 billion in active arms contracts as of 2011 - nmention the $550 million deal to sell Syria Yak-130 trainer jets signed in January while al-Assad was already pummeling Homs with Russian-builthardware.

The bottom line is that Russias billions of dollars in current and future accounts payable have Bashar al-Assads name on them, and nopost-al-Assad government is likely to honor them. To win Russian support for a Syrian transition strategy will require a credible deal for compenthe Kremlin and powerful commercial interests close to it.

The Syrian Gambit. Putin sees Russia as a great power with global interests, and like a savvy chess player, he thinks several moves ahead.Russias navy base at Tartus may not be worth much today, when Russias skeletal navy can hardly spare vessels to patrol far-off Mediterraneanwaters, but Putin has a long-term plan for his countrys rearmament, which includes building dozens of new fighting ships and submarines to reasMoscows global conventional military power. If al-Assad goes, Putin can hardly expect to keep his lease on Tartus, and Russias fleet may not fsingle welcoming port of call from the Bosporus to Gibraltar.

Part of demonstrating Russias great power status is also proving that it is not beholden to any other global power center - especially the United

Method to Putin's Syria Madness - Carnegie Endowment for Internatio... http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/03/23/method-to-putin-s-syria

3/27/2012

7/31/2019 03232012 the Method to Putin's Syria Madness

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