0080934 sepanir south pars unit 116_report

Environmental Resources Management 21/F Lincoln House

979 King’s Road Taikoo Place

Island East, Hong Kong Telephone: (852) 2271 3000 Facsimile: (852) 2723 5660 E-mail: [email protected]

http: //www.erm.com

FINAL REPORT

Sepanir Oil & Gas Energy Engineering Company

South Pars Gas Field Development Phases 15 & 16 Onshore Facilities: HAZOP Report (Unit 116 –Ethane Treatment and Drying) Rev. 0

August 2008

FINAL REPORT

Sepanir Oil & Gas Energy Engineering Company

South Pars Gas Field Development Phases 15 & 16 Onshore Facilities: HAZOP Report (Unit 116 -Ethane Treatment and Drying) Rev. 0

August 2008

For and on behalf of ERM-Hong Kong, Limited

Prepared by: Venkatesh S Position: HAZOP Chairman Approved by: Venkatesh S Signed: ______________________________ Date: ________________________________ 08- Aug -2008

This report has been prepared by ERM-Hong Kong, Limited with all reasonable skill, care and diligence within the terms of the Contract with the client, incorporating our General Terms and Conditions of Business and taking account of the resources devoted to it by agreement with the client. We disclaim any responsibility to the client and others in respect of any matters outside the scope of the above. This report is confidential to the client and we accept no responsibility of whatsoever nature to third parties to whom this report, or any part thereof, is made known. Any such party relies on the report at their own risk.

CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1 INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE OF WORK 1

1.1 BACKGROUND 1 1.2 OBJECTIVES OF STUDY 1 1.3 SCOPE OF STUDY 2

2 OVERVIEW OF UNIT 116 – ETHANE TREATMENT AND DRYING 5

3 HAZOP BASIS AND REFERENCED DOCUMENTATION 6

3.1 BASIS 6 3.2 DOCUMENTATION 6

4 HAZOP METHODOLOGY 7

4.1 NODES FOR STUDY 7 4.2 GUIDEWORDS/PARAMETERS 7 4.3 RISK RANKING 8 4.4 WORKSHEETS 8 4.5 RECOMMENDATIONS 8 4.6 HAZOP PREMISE 9

5 HAZOP SESSIONS 10

5.1 STUDY PERIOD 10 5.2 STUDY TEAM 10

6 CONCLUSIONS & FOLLOW UP 11

6.1 SUMMARY OF HAZOP FINDINGS 11 6.2 FOLLOW UP ACTIONS 16

7 REFERENCES 18

ANNEXES

ANNEX A RISK RANKING METHODOLOGY ANNEX B ATTENDANCE LIST ANNEX C NODE LIST ANNEX D HAZOP WORKSHEET ANNEX E RISK RANKING WORKSHEET ANNEX F DRAWING LIST ANNEX G HAZOP REVIEW ACTION SHEET ANNEX H HAZOP MASTER P&IDS

ERM RISK SOUTH PARS GAS FIELD DEVELOPMENT PHASES 15 &16 ONSHORE FACILITIES

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Environmental Resources Management (ERM), an independent HSE consultancy, was commissioned by Sepanir Oil & Gas Energy Engineering Company (Sepanir) to carry out a Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study for the South Pars Gas Field Development Phases 15 & 16 Onshore Facilities.

This report contains the details of the HAZOP study carried out in July 2008 for the Ethane Treatment and Drying (Unit 116). Reports for other units are produced separately.

The Study for the Ethane Treatment and Drying (Unit 116) covered all the associated piping and instrument diagrams (P&IDs) in Unit 116 and was conducted in accordance with the project HAZOP procedure [1]. Vendor packages for which design were not finalized at the time of study will be reviewed by Sepanir later.

The study involved representatives from the owner, Pars Oil & Gas Company (POGC); South Pars Gas Company (SPGC), the operating company; Sepanir Oil & Gas Energy Engineering Company (Sepanir),appointed the representative for performing the Engineering, Procurement and Construction (EPC) contract of the onshore facilities; joint venture of Sazeh Consultants and Nargan Engineers & Constructors (hereafter referred to as JV) , responsible for the engineering activities of completion of detailed design ; and Prosernat, the Licensor for this unit

The objective of the HAZOP study was to identify and evaluate safety hazards and to identify operability problems which, although not hazardous, could compromise the plant's ability to achieve design intent and productivity and recommend further safeguards as required.

During the sessions a total of 17 nodes were studied and a total of 50 recommendations were generated for resolution or further investigation.

A summary of the study for Unit 116 is as follows:

• Number of P&IDs: 21

• Number of nodes studied: 17

• Number of recommendations: 50

Follow-up and close-out of all recommendations will be monitored by Sepanir through the HAZOP Review Action Sheet.


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1 INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE OF WORK

1.1 BACKGROUND

A consortium consisting of GHORB, IOEC, ISOICO and SAFF, led by GHORB is responsible for executing the South Pars Gas Field Development Phases 15 & 16 Project for Pars Oil & Gas Company (POGC) in IRAN, which includes offshore platforms, offshore and onshore pipelines and onshore facilities. GHORB is responsible for the execution of the onshore facilities. GHORB has appointed Sepanir Oil & Gas Energy Engineering Company (Sepanir) as its representative for performing the EPC contract of the onshore facilities.

The engineering activities of the onshore facilities including FEED, Extended FEED and completion of detailed design is being undertaken by a joint venture of Nargan Engineers & Constructors and Sazeh Consultants (hereafter referred to as JV). MAPNA Group and Omran Sahel are responsible for the EPC of some utility units.

The onshore facilities will be located on the Iranian coast of Persian Gulf in ASSALUYEH (approximately 270 km South East of Bandar Bushehr).

The total capacity of Phases 15 & 16 onshore facilities is 2000 MMSCFD of reservoir fluid. Phase 15 & 16 onshore Complex will include processing units, utilities, offsites and infrastructure necessary to produce sales gas, gaseous ethane cut of petrochemical feedstock quality, commercial grade propane and butane for export and stabilized condensate.

Environmental Resources Management (ERM), an independent HSE consultancy was commissioned to carry out a Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study for the South Pars Oil & Gas Phases 15 & 16 Onshore Facilities.

This report presents the details for the study carried out for Ethane Treatment and Drying (Unit 116) of the project, in July 2008. The HAZOP studies for the other units will be undertaken over the remaining period of 2008 and separate reports will be issued.

1.2 OBJECTIVES OF STUDY

The objectives of the HAZOP study were to identify and evaluate safety hazards and to identify operability problems which, although not hazardous, could compromise the plant's ability to achieve design intent and productivity. In particular, the objectives of the study were to:

• Identify safety related hazards and operability problems related to the design and operation of the systems;


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• Determine the seriousness of the consequences for the identified problems;

• Identify existing engineering and procedural safeguards that will reduce the consequences related to the hazards;

• Evaluate the adequacy of existing engineering and procedural safeguards; and

• Recommend additional safeguards and improvements, where necessary.

1.3 SCOPE OF STUDY

The HAZOP study covered the following process units, utilities and offsites for the South Pars Gas Field Development Development Phases 15 &16 Onshore Facilities listed in Table 1.1E

Table 1.1 Scope of HAZOP Study for South Pars Gas Fields Development Phase 15 &16 Onshore Facilities

A. Scope of HAZOP Study for Sazeh portion

Process

Unit 100 Reception facilities

Unit 101 Gas Treating (Licensor Unit by Prosernat)

Unit 102 MEG Regeneration and Injection

Unit 103 Condensate Stabilisation

Unit 104 Dehydration and Mercury Guard

Unit 105 Ethane Recovery

Unit 109 Sour Water Stripper

Unit 110 Condensate Backup Stabilisation

Unit 111 Propane Refrigeration

Utilities / Offsites

Unit 122 Fuel Gas

Unit 143 Condensate Storage and Export

Unit 145 Propane Refrigerant Storage

Unit 146 Chemical Storage

Unit 181/ 182/ 185/ 189 Utility Distribution

Interconnecting and Distribution

B. Scope of HAZOP Study for Nargan portion

Process

Unit 106 Export Gas Compression and Metering

Unit 107 NGL Fractionation

Unit 108 Sulphur Recovery & TGT Unit (Licensor Unit by Lurgi)

Unit 113 C3/ C4 Caustic Regeneration Unit (Licensor Unit by Axens)

Unit 114 Propane Treatment and Drying (Licensor Unit by Axens)


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Unit 115 Butane Treatment and Drying (Licensor Unit by Axens)

Unit 116 Ethane Treatment and Drying (Licensor Unit by Prosernat)

Utilities / Offsites

Unit 140 Flare and Blowdown

Unit 141 Utilities and Offsite Drains

Unit 142 Burn Pit

Unit 144 Sulphur Storage and Solidification

Unit 147 Propane Storage

Unit 148 Butane Storage and Export

Unit 191 Utility Distribution

Interconnecting and Distribution

C. Scope of HAZOP Study for MAPNA (Utilities/Offsites)

Unit 121 Steam Generation and Distribution

Unit 123 Instrument and Service Air

Unit 124 Nitrogen – High purity nitrogen Plant

Unit 125B Sea Water Storage Distribution and Outfall Effluent Reject to Sea

Unit 126B Desalination Water Storage

Unit 127 Water Polishing (Package)

Unit 128 Potable Water

Unit 129 Waste Effluent Disposal

Unit 130 Firewater

Unit 131 Diesel

Unit 132 Cooling Water

D. Scope of HAZOP Study for Omran Sahel (Utilities/Offsites)

Unit 125A Seawater Intake

Unit 126A Sea Water Desalination Package

The HAZOP Study covered all of the Process and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs), as listed in Annex F. The list of drawings used for each study node is presented in the Node List in Annex C.

For systems with similar configurations, only one system was reviewed as a representative case and therefore, the comments and actions will also be applicable for such similar systems. The following packages and other process system items were not covered in the current study and will be reviewed later by Sepanir. These are listed in Table 1.2.

Table 1.2 Package/ Items requiring further review

Package /Item Relevant P&ID Nos Comments


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Package /Item Relevant P&ID Nos Comments

Anti foam Package 1516-0116-0030-0121 Vendor Package to be reviewed later by Sepanir

Filtration Package 1516-0116-0030-0121A Vendor Package – to be reviewed later by Sepanir

Regeneration Gas Heat Control System

1516-0116-0030-0105 Vendor Package – to be reviewed later by Sepanir


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2 OVERVIEW OF UNIT 116 – ETHANE TREATMENT AND DRYING

The inlet feed gas to Ethane Treatment and Drying unit from Unit 105 is fed first to Feed Gas Knock out drum, liquid is collected and sent to drain. Overhead condensate feed gas is then routed to solvent absorber where MEA is used to absorb CO2. Sweet ethane from the top of solvent absorber is sent to the Treated Gas Knock-Out Drum. Wet sweet gas from the overhead of the Treated Gas Knock-out Drum and sent to the Dehydration Section and the knocked–out solvent is sent to rich solvent MP flash drum.

The wet sweet gas from ethane treatment section is cooled in ethane cooler to condense away the water in the wet gas to reduce the load on dryers. Cooled gas is sent to dryer inlet separator to separate out water. Saturated gas leaving the inlet separator is passed through molecular sieves dryers to reduce moisture content to about 0.1 ppm mol. At any one time, one bed is in adsorption mode and the other in regeneration mode. The dry gas exiting the bottom of the dryer is passed through dryer-after filter to remove any molecular sieves fines and sent for export to petrochemical plant.

A slip stream of clean dry gas from the outlet of filer is used as regeneration gas. This gas is heated in the ethane regeneration heater and passes through the molecular sieve beds in the upward direction. Temperature control for regeneration to dryer is achieved through adjustment of fuel gas to furnace. The wet and hot regeneration gas is cooled against ambient air in regeneration air cooler and condensed liquid separated in the regeneration gas separator. The recovered gas is then routed to suction of regeneration gas compressor and sent back to the inlet of ethane cooler.

Lean solvent is supplied from storage tank and pumped by sulfrex lean solvent transfer pump. This solvent is sent mainly to the solvent absorber with a small stream to flash gas absorber. The lean solvent enters the solvent absorber and leaves the solvent absorber bottom as rich solvent. This rich solvent is then sent to the bottom of the rich solvent MP flash drum. The gas flashed in MP flash drum are passed through flash gas absorber and sent to boilers. The knocked-out solvent from MP flash drum is sent via rich/lean solvent exchanger and sent to the regenerator column. Vapours from regenerator column overhead are sent to flare.

The liquid from regenerator bottom exchanges heat with rich amine in rich/lean amine exchangers and further cooled in the lean solvent trim cooler. The cooled lean amine is sent to the solvent storage tank. Heat for regeneration in the regenerator is provided by reboilers with heat supplied by LP Steam

Wash water system is provided to remove any amine carry-over to the overhead of the solvent absorber.


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3 HAZOP BASIS AND REFERENCED DOCUMENTATION

3.1 BASIS

The basis for the study was primarily the P&IDs issued for review, marked-up with additional information, where applicable. The HAZOP Master P&IDs, with mark-ups indicating the Nodes, are presented in Annex H.

In order for the team to fully understand the intent of the Section, a process description was given, and this was noted in the HAZOP software for each Node, see Annex C.

3.2 DOCUMENTATION

The following documentation was also made available during the HAZOP study and used as reference during meetings:

• Process Description for each Unit ;

• Process and Instrument Diagrams (P&IDs);

• Process Flow Diagrams (PFDs);

• Material Flow Diagrams (MFDs);

• Cause and Effect Diagram;

• Equipment Process Datasheets;

• Unit Plot Plan and Overall Plot Plan;

• Flare Load Summary;

• Line List;

• Process Description for Safety System and

• Emergency Shutdown Philosophy


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4 HAZOP METHODOLOGY

The HAZOP study was conducted in accordance with the project HAZOP Procedures [1], issued by ERM. The procedure is briefly explained in the following paragraphs.

4.1 NODES FOR STUDY

Annex C includes a list of nodes and their description. The design conditions, the identification numbers of equipment involved in the node and the reference drawing numbers are also included in the node listing. Design comments/ P&ID corrections (if any) were marked-up on P&IDs but not recorded in HAZOP. The Nodes are marked on the Master drawing, presented in Annex H.

4.2 GUIDEWORDS/PARAMETERS

The guidewords and parameters used for the study are presented in Table 4.1. Each node was considered in detail to identify any potential problems in safety or operations that may arise due to deviations in the process parameters. The Causes and Consequences of each deviation were identified and the HAZOP team then evaluated the adequacy of existing safeguards, and where necessary, additional safeguards recommended as Actions.

Table 4.1 HAZOP Guidewords/ Parameters and Related Deviations

Deviations Guide Word Parameter Comment

No/Low Flow No/Low Flow

More/High Flow More/High Flow

Reverse/Misdirected Flow

Reverse Flow

Less/Low Pressure Less/Low Pressure Includes vacuum

High Pressure More/High Pressure

Less/Low Temperature

Less/Low Temperature

High Temperature High Temperature

Low Level Low Level Includes loss of level, interface low level and loss of interface level

High Level High Level Includes interface high level

Contamination/ Composition Change

As well as Composition

Start-up/ Shutdown /Maintenance Hazards

Others


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Deviations Guide Word Parameter Comment

Utility Failure Others Includes air, power, cooling water, nitrogen etc.

Others

4.3 RISK RANKING

A simple risk ranking approach was proposed to be adopted to rank those hazardous scenarios where the parties had differing views on the adequacy of safeguards or the need for additional safeguards. Details of the risk ranking procedures are included in Annex A.

However, since there was agreement on safeguards for all the points, no risk ranking was required to be carried out. Hence risk ranking was not done for Unit 116.

4.4 WORKSHEETS

The session proceedings were recorded using PHA-Pro 7 [2] developed by Dyadem Corporation. The records were projected on a screen for comment and agreement by the team members during the sessions.

For this study, a full recording approach was adopted for all guidewords/deviations listed in Table 4.1 whereby every deviation considered by team was recorded even when no significant causes or consequences were found. For guideword “others”, however, recording by exception was adopted (i.e. where an entry is recorded only when the team makes a recommendation or the issue is considered significant).

The completed worksheets are included in Annex D.

4.5 RECOMMENDATIONS

A number of recommendations were identified during the HAZOP study, which, in the team's opinion, will improve the safety or the operability of the facility. A list of recommendations is included in Section 6.

A dedicated form with all HAZOP recommendations is attached in Annex G. This form will be used by JV to fill in the agreed resolution.


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4.6 HAZOP PREMISE

Some assumptions were made regarding the basis of design and these were generally agreed by the HAZOP study team. The main items are listed below:

• In case of a parallel train (i.e. identical equipment), the study was conducted on one train only. Similarly, in case of parallel equipment (with duty and standby/spare equipment) inside the train, the study was conducted for one set of equipment. The actions from this study will therefore apply for such parallel systems as well. The study has however, considered the impact of simultaneous operation of parallel systems including the control requirements and the effect of trip of one system on the other.

• A single check valve was deemed to be an acceptable safeguard against reverse flow, unless the team felt that failure of the valve would lead to unacceptable consequences, or the differential pressure is so high that leakage would be inevitable.

• Equipment/machinery was assumed to be designed, manufactured, and inspected with no defect.

• Rupture of equipment was not considered except for tube rupture/ seal leak.

• Plant was assumed to be well maintained.


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5 HAZOP SESSIONS

5.1 STUDY PERIOD

The HAZOP Study for Reception Facilities (Unit 116) of South Pars Gas Field Development Phase 15 & 16 Onshore Facilities was held over a period of 3 days between 21st July 2008 and 24th July 2008, 22nd /23rd July 2008 with presence of Licensor, Prosernat at Nargan Consultant’s Office in Tehran, Iran.

5.2 STUDY TEAM

The HAZOP team comprised a multidisciplinary team of personnel involved with the project and having adequate experience of design, instrumentation, operations, maintenance, safety and loss prevention. Representatives from Pars Oil & Gas Company (POGC), South Pars Gas Company (SPGC), Sepanir Oil & Gas Energy Engineering Company, joint venture of Sazeh Consultants and Nargan Engineers & Constructors (JV), and Prosernat participated in the HAZOP sessions, which were chaired by an independent consultant from ERM.

The details (names, company and discipline) of the HAZOP team members who attended the HAZOP sessions are presented in Annex B.


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6 CONCLUSIONS & FOLLOW UP

6.1 SUMMARY OF HAZOP FINDINGS

During the sessions, a total of 50 recommendations, as listed in Table 5.2, were identified for resolution or further investigation. Each recommendation can be classified according to the following categories:

• Hardware Change – Scenario to be mitigated by appropriate equipment, piping, valves - block valve, check valve, safety valve etc.

• Minor Change – Scenario to be mitigated by appropriate instrument set-point, alarm, procedural changes or other minor changes etc.

• Design Confirmation – Scenario to be mitigated by confirming the design basis, appropriate control schemes, design philosophy

• Review – Further study/review required on design basis, design/ operating philosophy and examine if further mitigation or protection is required.

A summary of the HAZOP recommendations under these categories is included in Table 6.1, while details are included in Table 6.2. Some recommendations were also reviewed with Licensor, Prosernat, and their comments were recorded and included in Table 6.2 below.

Table 6.1 HAZOP Recommendations Summary forEthane Treatment and Drying (Unit 116)

Recommendation type Count

(1) Hardware change - block valves, check valves, PZV and other significant hardwares

4

(2) Software alarms or minor actions/procedural changes 16

(3) Design confirmation – relief valve basis/other design aspects 12

(4) Review - further study/ review required 18

Table 6. 2 List of Recommendations for Reception Facilities (Unit 116)

Recommendations (HAZOP) Place(s) Used Licensor Comment Action By

Recom. Categories

1. Review the provision of high level alarm with LT-0161 on solvent absorber bottom

Consequences: 2.1.2.1, 2.4.2.1, 2.8.2.1

JV 4

2. Operating procedure to include chemical cleaning of the system prior to start-up.

Consequences: 2.10.1.1, 4.13.1.1, 5.13.1.1, 7.10.1.1

JV 2


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Recom. Categories

3. Operating procedure to include proper cleaning and wetting of the column before opening for maintenance.

Consequences: 5.15.1.1

JV 2

4. Note 13 on P&ID 114 to be modified to reflect the FG connection is for start-up pressurisation, cold circulation and hot circulation (till gas is introduced)


JV 2

5. Review the requirement of amine removal facilities in the boiler area in Unit 121

Consequences: 4.3.1.2, 4.8.4.1, 4.11.1.2, 7.2.2.1

JV 4

6. Review the possibility of increasing the height of C-113 between the packed bed and demister to act as a knock-out drum.

Consequences: 4.3.1.2, 4.8.4.1

As per Licensor, increasing the height between packed bed and demister in C-113 will not help much. The configuration suggested is to provide no pockets and a knock-out drum at boiler inlet. Material of knock-out drum should be SS 316L

JV 4

7. Check the consistency of requirements of steam tracing upstream and downstream of PV-0182A


As per Licensor, the bypass valve (PV-0182A/B) configuration should be such that both the sides of bypass valves are free draining to the main line. Note should be added to P&ID 1516-116-0030-0115

If KOD is provided as per suggestion against Item 18, steam tracing of line to boilers may not be required.

JV 3

8. Review the necessity of extra PSV with adequate capacity on reflux drum if the regenerator PSVs (PSV-0201A/B) cannot protect reflux drum in case of air cooler failure

Consequences: 5.2.4.1, 5.7.1.1, 5.9.1.1, 5.12.3.1

JV 4

9. Review if the provision of check valve at the inlet of reflux to the regenerator column C-112 is required


JV 4

10. Review the backpressure for PV-0221 as presently it is connected to MP flare.


JV 4

11. Operating manual to address the steps for start-up and maintenance procedures in order to avoid toxic gas release to the atmosphere.


JV 2


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Recom. Categories

12. Operating manual to address warming up procedures for reboiler E-112

Consequences: 5.15.3.1, 6.16.1.1

JV 2

13. Ensure that pipe downstream of LV-0212 is designed for two-phase flow.


JV 3

14. The protection of the tank against gas breakthrough and fire case needs to be reviewed by JV with Vendor


As per Licensor, if PSV is sized for fire case, gas blowby should normally be taken care of. Since the pressure available for blowby is very low, Licensor has not considered blowby case. However, this needs to be reviewed by JV and tank Vendor.

JV 4

15. Provide independent transmitter with low low flow alarm with interlock to close SDV-0007


JV 1

16. Operating procedure to include seal maintenance using cold condensate in solvent storage tank.


JV 2

17. Operating procedures to include use of condensate in the tank


JV 2

18. Confirm the vent line of sump drum D-117 is sized for gas blowby (assuming maximum drain valve size and maximum pressure u/s) , maximum liquid inflow (for flashing gas and blocked condition)and vaporisation(if any)

Consequences: 10.4.1.1, 10.4.2.1, 10.4.3.1, 10.8.1.1

JV 3

19. Confirm the max. allowable temp in the drain header (based on drain piping design)and this may be mentioned in the operating procedure

Consequences: 6.13.3.3, 6.13.5.2, 10.6.1.1

JV 3

20. Procedure to govern draining operation for sump drum


JV 2

21. Ensure the coating material is compatible with the maximum operating temp of the sump drum.(eg steam-out condition)


JV 3

22. Operating procedure to strip amine through the use of live steam and sampling before evacuation


JV 2

23. Bypass valve for fuel gas rotameter FG-0101 to be made CSC


JV 2

24. Review relocation of RO-0091 to downstream of bypass junction.


JV 4

25. Procedures for skimming/draining to be included in operating manual.


JV 2

26. Operating procedure to include procedures for diverting ethane to export gas line.


JV 2


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Recom. Categories

27. Possibility of relocating FIC-0172 and relevant valves and instrumentations to downstream dehydration section to be reviewed during detailed engineering stage


Licensor agrees to relocate control valve FV-0172 downstream of dehydration section but wants to keep flow indication FI-0172 at present location

JV 4

28. Review the requirement of installing a PSV on D-112 overhead for fire case during detailed engineering


As per licensor, since there is no blockage in between solvent absorber and D-112 and PSV of solvent absorber is sized to take care of fire in D-112. Hence, there is no necessity of providing a separate relief valve for D-112.

JV 4

29. Review the start-up procedure after relocation of FIC-0172


JV 4

30. Review the requirement of two independent PAHH-0281 A and B. One PAHH in the common header shall serve the purpose.


Licensor have no objection in using one PAHH on the common discharge header of P-124A/B

JV 4

31. Review the actuation of FV-0183 by HV instead of FIC-0183.


LIcensor agrees to the use of HV instead of FIC-0183 for start-up

JV 4

32. Confirm that sequence logic is implemented is such a way that sequence control confirms the position of each valve at the end of each step before proceeding to next step. Sequence failure alarm will be generated in this case


JV 3

33. Review the requirement of strengthening of molecular sieve support for blowdown case when the flow through molecular sieve will be higher than the design flow rate. Drier vendor may be informed in this regard


JV 4

34. Confirm that loading and unloading procedure is in place to carryout loading and unloading of molecular sieve to / from driers. Also enough provision (like space for handling loading / unloading equipment) need to be ensured to facilitate loading and unloading


JV 3

35. Review provision for isolation of vent by single ball valve in the ethane filter (under filter vender scope). This may be decided based on project specification


JV 4

36. Consider specifying the 2" ball valve in the vent line on ethane filter as CSC type


JV 4


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Recom. Categories

37. Consider closing the regeneration compressor suction SDV after a certain time delay of actuating compressor trip due to any reason. This may be confirmed based on compressor vendor requirement


JV 4

38. Consider deleting hydrocarbon skimming facilities along with skimming drum D-116.and associated piping


Skimming drum can be deleted. However, Licensor will review this internally and revert. As per experience in Phase 4 and 5, the skimming facilities are not used.

JV 4

39. Review the deletion of fuel gas connection to the drum so that the drum floats with flare header which has relevant protection like continuous sweeping.


Licensor can agree to delete fuel gas connection provided purging with nitrogen is done prior to connecting the drum to flare during start-up. Licensor will review internally according to existing standards.The sequence of operation for taking the vessel for maintenance is to be provided to the Licensor by Licensee.

JV 3

40. Cold condensate is provided for washing of drum prior to maintenance. Utility points are provided for connecting utility water hoses. Consider deleting hard-piped connection for cold condensate,


Licensor can agree to delete cold condensate connection provided external water washing system is provided in the plant. Licensor will review internally according to existing standards. The sequence of operation for taking the vessel for maintenance is to be provided to the Licensor by Licensee.

JV 3


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Recom. Categories

41. Consider deleting the fuel gas connection to D-116. The drum can float with flare,.


Licensor can agree to delete fuel gas connection provided purging with nitrogen is done prior to connecting the drum to flare during start-up. Licensor will review internally according to existing standards.The sequence of operation for taking the vessel for maintenance is to be provided to the Licensor by Licensee.

JV 3

42. On pump P-115 discharge, there are 2 drain lines provided (without any isolation valve in between). The drain line (3/4"-AM.116.100103-B03N-N) may be deleted.


Action suggested by Licensor

JV 1

43. Delete SDV-0001/0002 on seawater line to E-101 and replaced by manual isolation valve.

Consequences: 14.1.4.1, 14.1.5.1

JV 1

44. Delete SDV-0005 on ethane dryer inlet separator as SDV-0022 is also provided on the same line


JV 1

45. Provide high and low pressure alarm for PIC-0046


JV 2

46. For SDV-0087A/B, it should be made fail close (FC)

Consequences: 16.13.2.1, 17.1.2.2, 17.13.2.1

JV 2

47. Provide high and low pressure alarm for PI-0026 on D-101 overhead


JV 2

48. Check the suitability of seawater outlet line design pressure for tube leak case in E-101


JV 3

49. Operating procedures to include manual operation to be done under close supervision.


JV 2

50. The vent on ethane oily water flash drum D-104 to flare should be sized for gas breakthrough case.


JV 3

Note: Place(s) Used 2.1.2.1 means Node 2, Deviation 1, Cause 2, Consequence 1. See HAZOP worksheets in Annex D for further details.

6.2 FOLLOW UP ACTIONS

Proper follow-up and close-out of all recommendations will be monitored through the HAZOP Study Action & Response sheets. These Action &


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Response sheets filled with the agreed resolution will be issued as a separate ‘HAZOP Action and Response Report’ by JV.


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7 REFERENCES

The following documents were referenced during the preparation of this report:

(1) ERM-Hong Kong, Ltd., South Pars Gas Field Development Phases 15 &16 Onshore Facilities- HAZOP Procedure (April 2008, Rev, 2).

(2) Dyadem International Ltd PHA Pro 7.0 - HAZOP Recording Software.

Annex A

Risk Ranking Methodology

Unit 116 Ethane Treatment and Drying Risk Ranking Metholodogy

ERM Risk Annex A

1/7 South Pars Gas Field Development Phases 15 &16 Onshore Facilities

A.1 RISK RANKING

The team may adopt a simple risk ranking approach to rank those hazards scenarios where the parties have differing views on the adequacy of safe guards or the need for additional safeguards.

Risk is a function of severity and likelihood and the methodology for the risk ranking is described in the following paragraphs

A.1.1 Severity

Three parameters are considered for the severity, namely Health and Safety, Environmental Impact and Economical Losses as shown in Table A.1

Table A.1 Hazard Severity Level in terms of Health and Safety, Environment Impact and Economical Loss

Severity Health and Safety

Economic Losses Environmental Impact

S1 Minor injury Minimal equipment damage, < 1 day loss of

production

Release with no agency notification or permit

violation.

S2 Serious permanent injury to one or more persons, death to one

person

Major equipment damage, >1 to <7 days

loss of production

Release which results in agency notification or permit

notification

S3

Death to several people (1 to 5 fatalities)

Severe equipment damage, >7 to <30

days loss of production

Significant release with off-site impact.

S4 Catastrophic (more than 5

fatalities)/Offsite fatality

Total destruction of some process areas, > 1

month loss of production

Significant release with serious long term off-site

impact

Table A.2 below shows the guidelines for assigning the severity of safety consequences.


ERM Risk Annex A


Table A.2 Guidelines for assigning Safety Consequence Severity

Fluids Moderate (Seal leak/Small piping leak)

Large (Rupture of pipe/equipment)

Sweet Gas S2 S3

Sour Gas S3 S3/S4

Flashing liquids : C3/C4/liquid or liquids handled above boiling points

S3 S3/S4

Evaporating liquid S2 S3

A.1.2 Likelihood

The likelihood of the unwanted scenarios (i.e. outcome scenario such as fire or explosion causing fatality or a toxic leak causing fatality) will depend on the frequency of the initiating event (W), operator exposure probability (A) (for safety consequences) and enabling factor (E) that makes the hazardous situation develop to the undesired consequence.

A.1.3 Frequency of Initiating Event (W)

The frequency of initiating event is classified into 3 categories as follows:

• W1: Very Low ( may occur about 1 time per 30 years or over the plant life)

• W2: Low ( may occur about 1 time per 10 years)

• W3: High (may occur about 1 time per year)

As part of the frequency of demand analysis or following the consequence assessment, the provision of other safeguards for the specific demand/ consequence scenario will also be reviewed. For each such safeguard identified, also called ‘Independent Protection Layer (IPL)’, a risk reduction factor will be determined. This risk reduction factor may be applied to the “originally identified frequency of demand”. The study takes credit for the independent protection layers (IPL) that mitigate the likelihood or consequence. A reduction factor of 10 will reduce W by one level while a reduction factor of 100 will reduce W by two levels.

Table A.3 shows the rule set for the frequency of demand and Table A.4 shows the rule set for Independent Protective Layer (IPL).


ERM Risk Annex A


Table A.3 Rule Set for Frequency of Demand

Scenario Initiating Event Frequency (per year)

Frequency of

Demand (W)

Control loop failure >1.E-01 W2

Analyser failure >1.E-00 W3

Pump Failure Loss of Flow (OREDA, conservatively W3)

7.9E-01 W3

Positive Displacement Pump Trip (OREDA)

1.1E-00 W3

Reciprocating Compressor Trip (OREDA)

2.1.E-00 W3

Single Mechanical Pump Seal Leak 1.E-01 W2

Double Mechanical Pump Seal Leak with announcement

1.E-02 W1

Canned/Magnetic Drive Pump Leak 1.E-02 W1

Loss of electrical power 1.E-01 W2

General Utility Failure 1.E-01 W2

Heat Exch. tube leak 1.E-02 W1 (<100 tubes)

W2 (>100 tubes)

Operator Failure (if considered in the analysis)

Under stress, emergency, action performed more than once a quarter.

Unstressed, action performed more than once a quarter.

Under stress, emergency, action performed once/Qtr. or less

Unstressed, action performed once/Qtr. or less

W3

W2

W2

W1


ERM Risk Annex A


Table A.4 Rule Set for Independent Protective Layer

Independent Protection Layer Risk Reduction Factor

Pressure Relief Device (mechanical safety trip) 100

SIS - SIL 1 10

SIS - SIL 2 100

SIS - SIL 3 1000

BPCS, when independent of initiating event 10

Internal mechanical safety trips that are independent of the SIS or BPCS

10 to 100 (Based on actual operating experience with similar device)

Operator response under high stress, average training 0

Operator response to Alarms with procedures, low stress, recognized event and least 5 minutes to respond.

10

Double Check Valves designed for the hazardous scenario

10

Single Check valve 0

Dikes when capable of mitigating the initiating event. This is an IPL only for environmental events.

100

A.1.4 Exposure Probability (Applicable to safety consequences only)

Exposure probability accounts for the frequency of and exposure time of an operator in the hazardous zone. It is calculated by determining the length of time in the area occupied by an operator during a normal working period.

A0 (100% presence) will be selected when the persons are likely to be present at the time of the hazardous situation, e.g. the demand occurs during local manual start or the hazardous situation may occur after the persons have arrived on the scene to investigate a developing abnormal situation or during startup or maintenance when persons are present near the source of hazard. A default A1 (10% chance of presence) will be selected if the person is not


ERM Risk Annex A


always present as it is expected during normal operations that operators will take rounds about couple of times during a shift.

A.1.5 Enabling Factor

An enabling event is an event or condition that makes possible another event, it must be present for the scenario to develop, even if not directly triggering the scenario (i.e. probability of ignition, etc.). Table A.5 below shows the rule set for enabling event.

Table A.5 Rule Set for Ignition as Enabling Factor

Ordinary Hydrocarbons Easily Ignitable*

Release (Kg) Probability of Ignition

Risk Reduction Factor

Probability of Ignition

Risk Reduction Factor

Minor leak / seal leak (< 1ton)

1.0E-02 E2 1.0E-01 E1

Major leak (1 to 10 ton)

1.0E-01 E1 1 E0

Large leak (> 10 ton)

1 E0 1 E0

Notes: * Hydrogen, Acetylene, Ethylene, Ethylene Oxide, Propylene Oxide (above BP), Butadiene

Rule Set for Equipment Failure (considered as Enabling Factor or as part of consequence assessment)

Probability of vessel or pipeline failure due to overpressure will be determined as follows:

• 1.5 to 2 times man allowable working pressure: flange gasket leaking be assumed

• > 2 times working pressure: rupture will be assumed

Probability of vessel or pipeline failure due to significant design temperature exceedance: 10%

Rule Set for Fatality Probability for toxic release (considered as Enabling Factor)


ERM Risk Annex A


• For toxic release, depending on the size of the leak and concentration, fatality probability of 10% or 100% may be considered.

The overall likelihood (L) of the outcome consequence is calculated as follows: Likelihood (L) = Initiating event (W) x Exposure probability (A) x Enabling factor (E) x Risk reduction due to IPL (IPL)

The overall likelihood (L) of the outcome consequences can be classified into 4 categories as follows:

• L1 : Extremely unlikely to occur in a plant’s lifetime( < 1 in 1000 years)

• L2 : Unlikely to occur in a plant’s lifetime ( < 1 in 100 years)

• L3 : One incident in a plant’s lifetime (about 1 in 30 years)

• L4 : Several incidents in a plant’s lifetime ( > 1 in 10 years)

A.1.6 Risk Ranking Matrix

A qualitative risk ranking of each of the consequence scenario is carried out using the Risk Ranking Matrix as shown in Table A.6. Where L denotes Low risk (i.e. Acceptable risk), M1 and M2 denote Medium risk (tolerable if ALARP) and safeguards may be required to reduce the gap by 1 and 2 levels respectively; H1 and H2 denote High risk (i.e. maybe considered as unacceptable risk) that needs to be reduced by 1 and 2 levels respectively to reach the ALARP region or 3 and 4 levels to reduce to acceptable level.

Table A.7 shows the typical likelihood levels assuming default A1 and E0 values with different IPLs credit taken.

Table A.6 Risk Ranking Matrix

Severity

S1 S2 S3 S4

L4 M1 M2 H1 H2

L3 L M1 M2 H1

L2 L L M1 M2

Like

lihoo

d

L1 L L L M1


ERM Risk Annex A


Table A.7 Typical Likelihood Levels assuming Operator Exposure (A1) and Enabling Factor (E0).

Initiating Event

Frequency

A E IPL=0 IPL =10 IPL =100

W1 A1 (10%)

E0 (100%)

L2 L1 L1

W2 A1 (10%)

E0 (100%)

L3 L2 L1

W3 A1 (10%)

E0 (100%)

L4 L3 L2

It may be noted that the above approach for risk ranking is consistent with the approach for SIL determination as per IEC 61511. The above approach is easier to adopt/follow as it starts with initiating events which can be easily identified by the team. This approach also provides traceability with regard to how the outcome frequency is derived by considering enabling factors, instead of the team being asked to directly assign a likelihood value.

Annex B

Attendance List

Unit 116 Ethane Treatment and Drying Attendance

Team Members Company Title 1. 21/07/2008 2. 23/07/2008 3. 24/07/2008

Subhash Chander Tandon ERM HAZOP facilitator Present Present Present

Ronnie Lim ERM HAZOP scribe Present Present Present

Abbas Tarangar Sepanir Process Engineer Present Present Present

Hamidreza Pourkarim Sepanir Process Engineer Partial Partial

Younes Fallah Sepanir Instrument Engineer Present Present Present

Nasim Amirghasemi Nargan Process Engineer Present Present Present

Hamid Kalatjari Sazeh Process

Khodadad Kamali POGC Process Safety

Ahmad Khaviari Sepanir Safety

Massoud Sadra Sepanir Advisor

Hamid Doroodi POGC Instrument Engineer Present Present Present

Arnaud Grison Prosernat Process Director Present

Antoine Carite Prosernat Process Engineer Present

Hussein Salehi Sazeh Process Engineer Present

Reza Salipi SPGC Process Engineer Present Present

Masumeh Zarei Nargan Instrument Engineer Present Present Present

Naser Fallah Nargan Project Engineer Present Present Present

Masoume Zendehdel Nargan Process Engineer Present Present Present

ERM Risk Annex B

1/1

South Pars Gas Field Development Phases 15 &16 Onshore Facilities

Annex C

Node List

Unit 116 Ethane Treatment and Drying Node List

ERM Risk Annex C


Nodes Node Description/ Design Intent Design/ Operating Conditions

Equipment ID Drawings Comment

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0111 Rev O

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0112 Rev O

1. Feed gas inlet and KOD upto feed gas filter inlet including filter bypass

Feed Gas from Unit 105 is routed to Feed Gas KO Drum 116-D-111. The liquid collected in the feed gas KO Drum is removed at the bottom and sent to drain. The condensate free gas is lead to solvent absorber (116-C-111).

Feed Gas KO Drum Design Pressure/ Design Temp : 39 barg/ 85 degC

116-D-111 ( Feed Gas KO drum)

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0101 Rev 3

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0112 Rev O

2. Solvent absorber bottom upto solvent flash drum

The rich solvent from solvent absorber 116-C-111 bottom is sent to rich solvent MP flash drum (116-D-113), where it enters at the bottom.

Solvent Absorber Design Pressure/ Design Temp : 39 barg/FV/ 85 degC Rich Solvent MP flash drum Design Pressure/ Design Temp : 14 barg/FV/ 5degC(min)/ 85 deg C(max)

116-C-111 (Solvent Absorber), 116-D-113 (Rich Solvent MP Flash Drum)

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0114 Rev O

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0112 Rev O

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0113 Rev O

3. Solvent absorber top circuit including treated gas KOD and upto solvent flash drum inlet

Sweet ethane from the top of solvent absorber (116-C-111) is routed to treated gas KOD (116-D-112). From treated gas KOD, the sweet gas is withdrawn from top and sent to Dehydration Section whereas the knocked-out solvent is sent to rich solvent MP flash drum (116-D-113) and it enters at the top of D-113.

Solvent Absorber Design Pressure/ Design Temp : 39 barg/FV/ 85 degC Treated Gas KO drum Design Pressure/Design Temp : 39 barg/FV/85 degC Rich Solvent MP flash drum Design Pressure/ Design Temp : 14 barg/FV/ 5degC(min)/ 85 deg C(max)

116-C-111 (Solvent Absorber), 116-D-112 (Treated gas KO drum), 116-D-113 (Rich Solvent MP flash Drum)

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0114 Rev O

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0114 Rev O

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0115 Rev O

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0116 Rev O

4. Solvent flash drum and absorber top [upto reflux inlet] and bottom circuits[upto tank inlet]

The gases flashed in 116-D-113 are passed through flash gas absorber 116-C-113 and sent to boilers. The knocked-out solvent from 116-D-113 bottom is sent via rich /lean solvent exchanger 116-E-111 to the top of solvent regenerator 116-C-112.

Rich solvent MP Flash drum Design Pressure/ Design temp : 14 barg/ FV/ 5degC(min)/ 85degC(max) Rich/Lean amine solvent exchanger Design Pressure/ design temp : 14.4 barg/ 6.5barg+FV/ 131 degC/ 142 degC

116-D-113 (Rich Solvent MP flash drum), 116-E-111 (Rich/lean amine solvent exchanger) P&ID 1516-116-0030-

0122 Rev O

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0116 Rev O

5. Regenerator top circuit including reflux

Vapours from solvent regenerator 116-C-112 are routed to regenerator overhead condenser 116-A-111. The overhead gas from D-114 is sent to flare. Condensed liquid together with acid gas is sent to reflux drum 116-D-114. Liquid from reflux drum bottom is pumped via reflux pumps 116-P-112A/B. to solvent regenerator 116-C-112. The pumps are also provided with min flow bypass.

Solvent Regenerator Design Pressure/ Design temp : 5.3 barg/ FV/ 5 deg C(min)/ 142 deg C(max) Regenerator Overhead Condenser Design Pressure/ Design Temp : 5 barg + FV/ 132 degC Reflux Pump Design Capacity/ Shut-off pressure : 11.8 m3/hr/ 10.7 barg Reflux Drum Design Pressure/ Design Temp : 5 barg+ Fv/ 5degC(min)/ 105 degC(max)

116-C-112 (Solvent Regenerator), 116-A-111 (Regenerator Overhead Condenser), 116-P-112A/B (Reflux Pumps), 116-D-114 (Reflux Drum)

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0118 Rev O

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0115 Rev O

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0116 Rev O

6. Regenerator bottom circuit including reboiler

The lean solvent from regenerator bottom exchanges heat with rich amine in rich/lean amine exchangers 116-E-111. The cooled lean amine is pumped by solvent circulation pumps 116-P-122A/B to solvent storage tank 116-T-111 via lean solvent air cooler 116-A-112.The heat for regeneration is provided by the regenerator reboiler 116-E-

Solvent Regenerator Design Pressure/ Design temp : 5.3 barg/ FV/ 5 deg C(min)/ 142 deg C(max) Regenerator Reboiler shell side design

116-C-112 (Solvent Regenerator), 116-E-112 (Regenerator Reboiler),

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0117 Rev O


ERM Risk Annex C




112 which is a thermosyphon reboiler with heat supplied from LP steam which is de-superheated in desuperheater 116-X-111 before being sent to reboiler. The condensate exits reboiler is sent to LP condensate drum 116-D-115. The condensate from LP condensate drum is pumped to battery limit using LP condensate pumps, 116-P-114A/B. The steam flash in D-115 is sent to solvent regenerator 115-C-112.

pressure/design temperature : 5.3barg/FV/142 degC; tubeside Design Pressure/ Design temp : 8/FV/ 270 degC LP condensate Pump Design Capacity/ Shut-off pressure : 19 m3/hr/ 17 barg Circulation pump Design Capacity / Shut-off pressure : 154.4m3/hr/ 9.4 barg LP Condensate Drum Design Pressure/ Design Temp : 8 barg+ Fv/ 5degC(min)/ 270 degC(max)

116-P-114A/B (LP condensate pumps), 116-D-115(LP condensate drum), 116-X-111 (desuperheater), 116-P-122A/B (Solvent Circulation Pump)

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0120 Rev O

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0112 Rev O

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0114 Rev O

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0120 Rev O

7. Lean storage tank and pumping system

Lean solvent from storage tank 116-T-111 is pumped by lean solvent HP pumps 116-P-111A/B. anti foam is injected at the suction of the pumps in the common line at pump suction. The major part of lean amine solvent goes to solvent absorber 116-C-111, where the lean solvent enter the solvent absorber 116-C-111 above the top bed. A part of pump discharge is sent to flash gas absorber 116-C-113. the pumps are provided with min flow circulation .Provision is made to sent lean amine to rich solvent MP flash drum 116-D-113 for startup purposes.The loss of solvent in the system is made up from Unit 146

Solvent Absorber Design Pressure/ Design Temp : 39 barg/FV/ 85 degC Rich MP Flash Drum Design Pressure/ Design Temp: 14 barg/FV/ 5 degC (min)/ 85 degC (max) Flash Gas Absorber Design Pressure/ Design Temp : 14/FV/ 5degC(min)/ 85 degC(max) Solvent Storage Tank Design Pressure/ Design Temp: full of liq. / 5 degC(min)/ 85 deg C(max) Lean Solvent HP Pump Design Capacity/ Shut-off Pressure :

116-C-111 (Solvent Absorber), 116-D-113 (Rich Solvent MP flash Drum), 116-C-113 (flash Gas Absorber), 116-T-111 (solvent Storage Tank), 116-P-111A/B (Lean Solvent HP pump)

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0101 Rev 3

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0112 Rev O

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0116 Rev O

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0120 Rev O

8. Anti foam package

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0121 Rev O

Vendor Package

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0120 Rev O

9. Filtration package

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0121A Rev O

Vendor Package

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0122 Rev O

10. Sump drum Amine from the boot of Hydrocarbon skim drum D-116 is routed to solvent sump drum D-117. The drum is provided with nitrogen connection, condensate connection, steam connection and flare connection.

Solvent Sump Drum Design Pressure/ Design Temp : 3.5 barg/FV/5degC(min)/ 190degC(max) Solvent Sump Pump Design Capacity/ Shut-off pressure : 8 m3/hr

116-D-117 (Solvent Sump Drum), 116-P-115(solvent Sump Pump)

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0123 Rev O

11. Hydrocarbon skim drum

Skimmed oil from rich solvent flash drum D-113, Solvent absorber C-111, reflux drum D-

Hydrocarbon Skim Drum Design Pressure/

116-D-116 (Hydrocarb

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0114 Rev O


ERM Risk Annex C




P&ID 1516-116-0030-0118 Rev O

114 are routed to hydrocarbon skim drum D-116. In the skim drum, the oil is sent to drain and amine solution to solvent sump drums. The drum is provided with nitrogen connection and flare connection

Design Temp : 3.5 barg/FV/5degC(min)/85 degC(max)

on Skim Drum)

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0123 Rev O

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0124 Rev O

12. Sulfrex lean transfer pumps

Lean solvent from storage tank 116-T-111 is pumped by sulfrex lean solvent transfer 116-P-124A/B and sent to Unit 114. This node also includes rich solvent from Unit 114 to 116-D-113. Also, water coming from Unit 114 to reflux drum in Unit 116 is included (to be finalised by Licensor)

Sulfrex lean solvent Transfer Pump design capacity/ shut-off Pressure : 5.5 m3/hr/ 41.9 barg (to be confirmed by Vendor)

116-P-124A/B (Sulfrex lean Solvent Transfer Pumps)

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0114 Rev O

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0112 Rev O

13. Water wash loop Condensate from battery limit is sent along with discharge of water wash pump P-113A/B to solvent absorber C-111. Wash water is collected from the chimney tray (tray no 1) in the solvent absorber and sent to suction of wash water pumps. The purpose of providing wash water is to remove any amine carry-over to the overhead of solvent absorber.

Water Wash Pumps Design Capacity/ Shut off Pressure: 4.5 m3/hr/ 44.2 barg

116-P-113A/B (Wash water pumps)

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0114 Rev O

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0101 Rev 3

14. Wet gas inlet to driers inlet separator including separator

Wet gas from ethane treatment section of Unit 116 is cooled in ethane cooler, E-101, by seawater . This is done to condense the water in the wet gas stream in order to reduce the load on driers. Cooled gas is routed to drier inlet separator to separate the condensed water. Separated water can be routed either to ethane treatment or to sour water stripper feed drum.

Ethane Cooler Shell side Design Pressure/ Design temp : 39barg/FV/ -46degC(min)/ 85 degC(max); tube side design pressure/ design temp : 39 barg/ 85 deg C Ethane Dryer Inlet Separator Design Pressure/ Design Temp : 39barg/FV/ -46 deg C/ 85 degC

116-E-101 (Ethane Cooler), 116-D-101 (Ethane Dryer Inlet Separator)

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0102 Rev 3

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0102 Rev 3

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0103 Rev 3

15. Treated gas from separator to export line to petrochemical inlet including molecular sieve driers

Saturated gas is routed through the molecular sieve driers to reduce the moisture content to about 0.1 ppm mole. Gas is dried in one out of two driers. At any time one bed is in adsorption mode and one in regeneration mode. Normal adsorption time is about 12 hours. The dry gas exiting the bottom of driers is passed through drier after filters to remove molecular sieve fines before sending it for export to petrochemical plant or sent to ethane regeneration cycle..

Ethane Driers Design Pressure/ Design Temp : 39 barg/ -46 degC/ 315 degC Ethane filter design pressure/ Design temp :39 barg/ -46degC(min)/ 85degC(max)

116-D-102A/B (Ethane Dryer), 116-F-101A/B (Ethane Filter)

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0104 Rev 3

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0103 Rev 3

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0104 Rev 3

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0105 Rev 3

16. Regeneration gas from dried gas outlet to regeneration compressor inlet, including cooling step after the regeneration of driers

A slipstream of the clean dry gas from the outlet of filters 116-F-101A/B is used as regeneration gas . The gas heated to about 280 degC in the ethane regeneration heater 116-H-101 and passes through the molecular sieve beds in the upward direction. Temperature control for regeneration to drier is by adjusting the fuel gas to furnace. The wet and hot regen gas in cooled against ambient air in regeneration gas air cooler 116-A-01. Water thus condensed is separated in regeneration gas separator 116-D-103. The recovered gas is then routed to suction of regeneration gas compressor. The liquid bottom of 116-D-103 is sent to ethane oily water flash drum ,116-D-104 During cooling step ramp down, main burner of regeneration furnace is in service. After ramp-down, main burner is switched off The regeneration gas bypasses the furnace and flows through driers in the upward direction. In standby time, regeneration gas stream bypass furnace, dryers and air coolers and is routed directly to the regeneration gas separator

Ethane Regeneration Heater Design Pressure/ Design Temp. : 39 barg/ -29 degC/ 315 degC Ethane Dryers Design Pressure/ Design Temp : 39 barg/ -46 degC/ 315 degC Ethane Regeneration Gas Cooler Design Pressure/ Design Temp. : 39 barg/ -46 degC(min)/ 315degC (max) Regeneration Gas Separator Design Pressure/ Design Temp : 39 barg/ -46degC(min)/ 236 deg C(max)

116-H-101 (Ethane Regeneration Heater), 116-D-102A/B (Ethane Dryer), 116-A-101 (Ethane Regeneration Gas Cooler), 116-D-103 (Regeneration Gas Separator), 116-D-104 (Ethane Oily Flash Drum)

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0106 Rev 3

17. Regeneration compressor discharge to

Regeneration gases after cooling in the regeneration gas air cooler during the

Driers regeneration compressor capacity

116-K-101A/B(Eth

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0105 Rev 3

Regeneration gas compressor 116-K-


ERM Risk Annex C




P&ID 1516-116-0030-0106 Rev 3

wet gas inlet regeneration step are routed to regeneration gas compressor. Compressed regen gas is fed back to the wet gas at the inlet of ethane cooler E-101.

4t/h, design pressure and temperature 39barg, -46/100degC

ane Regeneration compressor)

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0101 Rev 3

101A and 116-K-101B are identical. HAZOP is done for compressor A, observations and recommendations are also applicable to compressor B

Annex D

HAZOP Worksheet

Unit 116 South Pars Gas Field Development Phase 15 and 16

1 of 43 ERM

Node: 1. Feed gas inlet and KOD upto feed gas filter inlet including filter bypass

Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0111 Rev O; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0112 Rev O; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0101 Rev 3

Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions Action By

1.1.1. Low pressure alarm PAL-0151 provided at inlet of feed gas KOD, D-111 1. Reduction of supply from Unit 105 1.1. Less feed to Dehydration Section

1.1.2. PALL-0152 with interlock SD-203 to shutdown unit 116

2. SDV-0011/ESDV-0012 fails close (Train 2)

2.1. Less feed to Unit 116 leading to loss of production 2.1.1. Limit switch provided on SDV-0011/ESDV-0012

1. No/ Less Flow up to feed gas KOD

3. SDV-0012/ESDV-0014 fails close (Train 1)

3.1. Less feed to Unit 116 leading to loss of production 3.1.1. Limit switch provided on SDV-0012/ESDV-0014

1.1. Low flow to solvent absorber affecting downstream units 1.1.1. Low flow alarm FAL-0172 over on top D-112 outlet 1. Plugging of demister in KOD (D-111)

1.2. High pressure upstream of KOD (D-111) 1.2.1. For safeguards, Refer to HAZOP of Unit 105

2.1.1. Low flow alarm FAL-0172 over on top D-112 outlet 2. Malfunction of BDV-0155 in open position

2.1. Reduction in flow to absorber

2.1.2. Limit switches provided on BDV-0155

3.1.1. Safeguard provided in upstream Unit 105

3.1.2. High pressure alarm PAH-0151 provided at inlet of feed gas KOD, D-111

3.1.3. High pressure alarm PAH-0172 provided on overhead of D-112

2. No/ Less Flow on top of feed gas KOD

3. FIC-0172 malfunctions and closes FV-0172

3.1. No flow to dehydration section and higher pressure in upstream units

3.1.4. PIC-0172 will relieve excess pressure to flare

1. LIC-0153 malfunctions and closes LV-0153

1.1. Rise in level in D-111, leading to carry-over of liquid HC with gas to solvent absorber

1.1.1. High high level alarm LAHH-0152 with interlock SD-205 which will shutdown unit.

2.1.1. Limit switch provided on SDV-0157

2.1.2. High level alarm LAH-0153 provided on D-111

3. No/ Less Flow on bottom feed gas KOD

2. SDV-0157 malfunctions and closes 2.1. Same as Conseq 1.1

2.1.3. High high level alarm LAHH-0152 with interlock SD-205 which will shutdown unit.

1.1.1. For protection against overpressure. Refer to Unit 105 1. More supply from upstream unit 1.1. Higher pressure in KOD may lead to failure


2.1.1. Low pressure alarm PAL-0172 provided on overhead of D-112 2. FIC-0172 malfunctions and opens FV-0172 fully

2.1. More flow to dehydration units, leading to less pressure in the unit and column upset.

2.1.2. CV of FV-0172 is provided with a maximum clamp


JV

4. More/High Flow up to Feed Gas KOD

3. Malfunction of BDV-0155 in open position

3.1. More flow through feed gas KOD and loss of gas to flare. Marginally lower pressure in the drum

3.1.1. Limit switches provided on BDV-0155

5. More/High Flow on top of Feed Gas KOD

1. No significant issue identified

1.1.1. Independent level transmitter LT-0151 with low low level alarm LALL-0151 with interlock to close the SDV-0157

1. LC-0153 malfunctions and opens LIC-0153

1.1. Loss of level in KOD leading to gas breakthrough and causing high pressure and consequential failure in sump drum of Unit 107

1.1.2. Refer to HAZOP of Unit 107, Sump drum

2. Inadvertent opening of bypass of LV-0153

2.1. Same as Conseq. 1.1

6. More/High Flow on bottom of Feed Gas KOD

3. Inadvertent opening of drain valve 3.1. Same as Conseq. 1.1 3.1.1. First isolation valve in drain lines is CSC

7. Reverse/Misdirected Flow

1. Depressurising feed gas KO drum 1.1. Possible reverse flow from absorber C-111 to feed gas KO drum, which may lead to damage of demister in feed gas KO drum

1.1.1. NRV provided at inlet of absorber

1.1.1. For safeguards, Refer to HAZOP of Unit 105 1. Plugging of demister in KOD (D-111) 1.1. High pressure upstream of KOD (D-111)

1.1.2. High pressure alarm PAH-0151 provided at inlet of Feed Gas KO Drum D-111

2. More supply from upstream unit 2.1. Refer to Node 1, Deviation 4, Cause 1

3.1.1. Refer to HAZOP discussion in Unit 105

3.1.2. PIC-0172 will relieve to flare (capacity of one train)

3. Non-receipt of supply by downstream consumers (petrochemical plant)

3.1. Higher pressure in Unit 116 and upstream unit (Unit 105)

3.1.3. High pressure alarm PAH-0172 provided on D-112 overhead


JV

4. LC-00153 malfunctions and opens LV-0153

4.1. Refer to Node 1, Deviation 6 , Cause 1

8. More/High Pressure


5.1. Refer to Node 1, Deviation 2, Cause 3 27. Possibility of relocating FIC-0172 and relevant valves and instrumentations to downstream dehydration section to be reviewed during detailed engineering stage

JV


2 of 43 ERM


Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0111 Rev O; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0112 Rev O; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0101 Rev 3


6. External fire 6.1. Overpressurisation of KOD leading to rupture 6.1.1. PSV-0155 is designed for fire case

1. FIC-0172 malfunctions and opens FV-0172 fully

1.1. Refer to Node 1, Deviation 4, Cause 2

2. Malfunction of BDV-0155 in open position


3. PIC-0172 malfunctions and opens PV-0172 fully

3.1. Loss of pressure to downstream section 3.1.1. Low pressure alarm PAL-0151 provided at inlet of feed gas KOD, D-111

9. Low Pressure

4. Low pressure from upstream Unit (Unit 105)


1. High temperature from Upstream unit 105

1.1. Upset and loss in performance in absorber C-111 1.1.1. High temp. alarm TAH-0161 provided at inlet of absorber C-111 10. More/High Temperature

2. External Fire : refer to discussion under High Pressure

11. Low Temperature 1. Low temperature from upstream unit 105

1.1. No significant consequences

12. More/High Level 1. LIC-0153 malfunctions and closes LV-0153


13. Low/Less Level 1. Refer to Node 1, Deviation 6

14. Composition Change 1. Change in composition from upstream 1.1. Off spec product 1.1.1. Frequent sampling in Unit 105

15. Contamination 1. Corrosion material 1.1. Foaming in solvent absorber leading to upset 1.1.1. Antifoam injection facilities provided

16. Start-up/Shutdown/ Maintenance Hazards/ Requirement

1. No issue identified

17. Utility Failure 1. Instrument Air Failure : SDV-0011, SDV-0012, ESDV-0012, ESDV-0014, SDV-0157, LV-0153 are FC type. BDV-0155 is FO type. These are found be in order.

18. Others 1. No new issue


3 of 43 ERM

Node: 2. Solvent absorber bottom upto solvent flash drum

Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0112 Rev O; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0114 Rev O


1.1.1. High level alarm LAH-0163 provided on absorber

1.1.2. Treated gas KO drum D-112 provided to take care of carry-over.


1.1.4. Low level alarm LAL-0181 provided in D-113

1.1. Level increase at bottom of absorber. This may lead to potential carry-over of amine with gas to downstream and also potential overpressure in the absorber

1.1.5. Low low level LALL-0182 with interlock I-323 closes SDV-0183, closes LV-0181 and activates I-328 (closes SDV-0201)

1.2.1. Low pressure alarm PAL-0182A/B provided on outlet of Flash Gas Absorber

1. SDV-0161 closed inadvertently

1.2. Loss of flash gas in MP flash drum. Possibility of low pressure in MP flash drum

1.2.2. Fuel Gas make-up provided through PIC-0183 which operates PV-0183


2.1.2. Bypass provided for LV-0163


1. No/ Less flow

2. LIC-0163 on solvent absorber malfunctions and closes LV-0163




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1.1.1. Independent low low level LALL-0161 provided on absorber with interlock I-314 will close SDV-0161

1.1.2. PV-0182B will relieve to flare

1.1.3. High pressure alarm PAH-0182A/B provided on the outlet of absorber

1.1.4. High high pressure alarm PAHH-0181 with interlock SD-207 to shutdown the unit

1. LIC-0163 on solvent absorber malfunctions and opens fully LV-0163

1.1. Level decrease at bottom of absorber. This may lead to gas breakthrough to MP flash Drum causing high pressure. This will also lead to lower pressure in the absorber, leading to poor performance of absorber

1.1.5. PSV-0181A/B designed to take care of gas breakthrough case.

2.1.1. The drain valve to sump drum is CSC


2.1.3. Low level alarm LAL-0163 provided on absorber

2.1.4. Material of sump drum D-117 is suitable for low temperature caused by flashing

2.1.5. High level alarm LAH-0261/262 provided on sump drum

2.1. Loss of level in C-111 leading to gas breakthrough to sump drum. Loss of gas to flare. Low temperature in sump drum D-117 may lead to failure

2.1.6. Sump drum is connected to the flare




2. More Flow

2. Inadvertent opening of drain line upstream SDV-0161

2.2. Reduction in flow of amine to MP flash drum and may result in low pressure and level in the MP flash drum








1. SDV-0161 closed inadvertently 1.1. Level increase at bottom of absorber. This may lead to potential carry-over of amine with gas to downstream and also potential overpressure in the absorber









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4. High Pressure

3. External fire 3.1. Overpressurisation of absorber leading to rupture 3.1.1. PSV-0161 is designed for fire case

5. Low Pressure 1. SDV-0161 closed inadvertently 1.1. Loss of flash gas in MP flash drum. Possibility of low 1.1.1. Low pressure alarm PAL-0182A/B provided on outlet of Flash Gas Absorber


4 of 43 ERM




pressure in MP flash drum 1.1.2. Fuel Gas make-up provided through PIC-0183 which operates PV-0183




2.1.4. High high pressure alarm PAHH-0181 with interlock to shutdown the unit




3.1.1. Low level alarm LAL-0163 provided on absorber bottom





3. Bypass of LV-0163 open inadevertently 3.1. Same as Conseq. 2.1









4.1. Reduction in flow of amine to MP flash drum and may result in low pressure and level in the MP flash drum. Gas breakthrough to sump drum D-117


1. Refer to Node 1, Deviation 10

2. High lean amine temperature. This will be discussed in later nodes

6. More Temperature

3. Change in composition of gas (high CO2 content)

3.1. No significant consequence.

1. Low temperature from upstream 1.1. No significant consequence. 7. Less Temperature

2. Change in composition of gas (low CO2 content)

2.1. No significant consequence.





1. SDV-0161 closed inadvertently 1.1. Level increase at bottom of absorber. This may lead to potential carry-over of amine with gas to downstream and also potential overpressure in the absorber





8. High Level





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9. Low Level 1. LIC-0163 on solvent absorber malfunctions and opens fully LV-0163




5 of 43 ERM






2.1.3. Low level alarm LAL-0163 provided on absorber




2.1. Loss of level in C-111 leading to gas breakthrough to sump drum. Loss of gas to flare. Low temperature in sump drum may lead to failure


1.1.1. Filtration package is provided to remove any iron sulphide particles 10. Contamination/ Additional Phase

1. Corrosion material (iron sulphide) present in the pipeline and degraded amine

1.1. This may lead to foaming and carry-over of amine to D-112

1.1.2. Antifoam injection facilities provided.


JV

11. Composition change/ Loss of phase


12. Start-up/Shutdown/Maintenance Hazards


13. Utility Failure 1. Instrument air failure : SDV-0161 and LV-0163 are FC type. These are found to be in order

14. Others 1. Corrosion due to CO2 1.1. Reduction in thickness and contamination of solvent leading to poor performance and failure

1.1.1. General : Material has been selected as per corrosion service with NACE material and SS-316L cladding where applicable. PWHT is also considered for this service.


6 of 43 ERM

Node: 3. Solvent absorber top circuit including treated gas KOD and upto solvent flash drum inlet

Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0112 Rev O; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0113 Rev O; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0114 Rev O


1.1.1. Limit switch provided on BDV-0173 1. No/ Less flow of absorber overhead to inlet of treated gas KOD

1. BDV-0173 fails open 1.1. Low flow of sweet gas to Dehydration Section and loss of gas to flare. Low pressure in the unit will affect the performance of absorber. 1.1.2. Low pressure alarm PAL-0172 provided on overhead of D-112




1. FIC-0172 malfunction and closes FV-0172

1.1. No flow to dehydration section and higher pressure in upstream units

1.1.4. High pressure alarm PAH-0151 at inlet of feed gas KOD.D-111

2.1.1. Low pressure alarm PAL-0151 at inlet of feed gas KOD.D-111

2.1.2. Low low pressure PALL-0152 at inlet of feed gas KOD with interlock SD-203 which will shutdown unit


2.1. Low flow of gas to Dehydration Section and loss of gas to flare. Low pressure in the unit will affect the performance of absorber.




3.1.3. Low flow alarm FAL-0172 provided on overhead of D-112


3. SDV-0004 fails close 3.1. Same as Conseq 1.1

3.1.5. High pressure alarm PAH-0151 at inlet of feed gas KOD.D-111

4.1.1. Refer to HAZOP discussion in Unit 105

4.1.2. Low flow alarm FAL-0172 provided on overhead of D-112

4.1.3. PIC-0172 will relieve to flare

2. No/ Less flow from overhead of D-112 to Dehydration Section

4. Non-receipt of supply by petrochemical consumers




1.1.2. KOD provided in dehydration section to take care of carry-over

1.1.3. High level alarm LAH-0171 on D-112

1. Malfunction of SDV-0172 1.1. High level in D-112 leading to carry-over of amine to dehydration section

1.1.4. High high level alarm LAHH-0172 provided on D-112

2.1.1. High high level alarm LAHH-0172 provided on D-112 2. LIC-0171 malfunctions and closes LV-0171


2.1.2. KOD provided in dehydration section to take care of carry-over


3.1.2. Low level alarm LAL-0171 provided on D-112

3.1.3. Independent low low level LALL-0172 provided on D-112 with interlock I-319 which will close SDV-0172.



3. No/ Less flow of rich solvent from the bottom of KOD to rich solvent MP flash drum D-113

3. Inadvertent opening of drain line upstream SDV-0172`

3.1. Loss of level in D-112 leading to gas breakthrough to sump drum. Loss of gas to flare. Low temperature in sump drum may lead to failure


1. FIC-0172 malfunction and open FV-0172 fully

1.1. More flow from absorber causing low pressure in the absorber. Upset in absorber column

1.1.1. Online analysers AI-0171 (CO2) and AI-0172(Total S) provided on outlet overhead line of D-112


2.1.2. High flow alarm FAH-0036 provided on outlet overhead line of D-112

4. More Flow of absorber overhead to inlet of treated gas KOD

2. PIC-0172 malfunctions and open PV-0037 fully

2.1. More flow from absorber causing low pressure in the absorber. Upset in absorber column and loss of gas to flare






2. PIC-0172 malfunctions and open PV-0037 fully

2.1. More flow from absorber causing low pressure in the absorber. Upset in absorber column and loss of gas to flare


5. More Flow from overhead of D-112 to Dehydration section

3. More withdrawal by downstream consumers




7 of 43 ERM





3.1.3. Low pressure alarm PAL-0172 provided on outlet overhead line of D-112


1.1.2. PSV-0181A/B sized for gas breakthrough.

1.1.3. PV-0182B will relieve excess pressure to flare

1.1.4. High pressure alarm PAH-0182A/B provided on C-113 overhead

1. LIC-0171 malfunctions and opens LV-0171 fully

1.1. Loss of level in D-112 leading to gas breakthrough to rich solvent MP flash drum causing overpressure and failure of D-113

1.1.5. High High pressure alarm PAHH-0181 with interlock SD-207 to shutdown the unit






6. More flow of rich solvent from the bottom of KOD to rich solvent MP flash drum D-113





1. No significant issue identified

1. Refer to Node 3, Deviation 2, Causes 1, 3 and 4

2. High pressure from upstream 2.1. Refer to Node 1, Deviation 4, Cause 1

8. High Pressure

3. External fire on D-112 3.1. Overpressure in D-112 leading to rupture and fire. 3.1.1. None identified 28. Review the requirement of installing a PSV on D-112 overhead for fire case during detailed engineering

JV



2. BDV-0036 fails open 2.1. Refer to Node 3, Deviation 1, Cause 1


3.1.2. Low pressure alarm PAL-0151 provided in inlet to feed gas KOD D-111



3.1.3. Low pressure alarm PAL-0172 provided on D-112 overhead



9. Low Pressure

4. More withdrawal by downstream consumers


4.1.3. Low pressure alarm PAL-00172 provided on outlet overhead line of D-112

10. More Temperature 1. High lean amine temperature. This will be discussed in later nodes









11. Less Temperature

2. Low flow of feed gas 2.1. Lower temperature however with no significant consequence

1.1.1. Limit switch provided on SDV-0172 12. High Level 1. Malfunction of SDV-0172 1.1. High level in D-112 leading to carry-over of amine to dehydration section



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1.1.3. KOD is provided in dehydration section to take care of carry-over


2.1.1. High high level alarm LAHH-0172 provided on D-112 2. LIC-0171 malfunctions and closes LV-0171


2.1.2. KOD is provided in dehydration section to take care of carry-over






1. Inadvertent opening of drain line upstream SDV-0172`





13. Low Level



2.1.3. High High pressure alarm PAHH-0181 with interlock SD-207 to shutdown the unit

14. Contamination/ Additional Phase

1. Carry-over of amine to Dehydration Section. This will be discussed in dehydration section HAZOP




1. Relocation of FIC-0172 1.1. No significant consequence 29. Review the start-up procedure after relocation of FIC-0172

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17. Utility Failure 1. Instrument Air failure : FV-0172, PV-0172, LV-0171 and SDV-0172, SDV-0004 are FC type BDV-0173 is FO type These were found to be in order

18. Others 1. No issue identified


9 of 43 ERM

Node: 4. Solvent flash drum and absorber top [upto reflux inlet] and bottom circuits[upto tank inlet]

Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0114 Rev O; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0115 Rev O; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0116 Rev O; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0122 Rev O


1.1. No flow of flash gas to boilers. 1.1.1. Boiler have alternate sources of fuel gas. Moreover, the amount of flash gas is very low compared to main fuel gas.

1.2.1. High pressure alarm PAH-0182B on absorber overhead line

1.2.2. PV-0182B will relieve to flare and is sized for full flow

1.2.3. High high pressure alarm PAHH-0181 with interlock SD-207 which will shutdown the unit

1.2. High pressure in upstream D-113 and C-113

1.2.4. PSV-0181A/B provided on MP flash Drum



1. PIC-0182A malfunctions and closes PV-0182A

1.3. Less CO2/HC desorption from amine leading to prevailing flash in the downstream heat exchangers and associated piping corrosion

1.3.3. PSV-0181A/B provided on MP flash Drum sized for gas breakthrough

2.1.1. Boiler have alternate sources of fuel gas. Moreover, the amount of flash gas is very low compared to main fuel gas.

2.1.2. Low pressure alarm PAL-0182A provided at outlet of flash gas absorber

2.1.3. PIC-0183 will try to maintain pressure , however fuel gas will be lost to flare

2. PIC-0182B malfunctions and opens PV-0182B

2.1. No gas supply to boilers. Low pressure in the drum and absorber

2.1.4. High flow alarm FAH-0181 is provided at outlet of flash gas absorber

3.1.1. High pressure alarm PAH-0182A on absorber overhead line


3.1.3. PV-0182B will relieve to flare and is sized for full flow.


3. Non-receipt of fuel gas by boilers 3.1. Higher pressure in the system will cause process upset in the unit.


4.1.1. High level alarm LAH-0181 provided on MP flash drum 4.1. High level in Rich solvent MP flash drum

4.1.2. High high level alarm LAHH-0183 will cause total unit shutdown

4. Stainer blockage upstream E-111

4.2. Loss of cooling of lean amine. Refer to Node 6, Deviation 10 Cause 2, Conseq 2

4.2.1.

5.1.1. Nitrogen injection to top of C-112 through PV-0201.


5.1. During cold circulation, loss of pressure will not facilitate circulation. This will lead to delay in start-up.

5.1.3. Low pressure alarm PAL-0182B provided at outlet of flash gas absorber

5.2.1. High temperature alarm TAH-0192 downstream of exchanger E-111

5. No flow of fuel gas when demanded due to PIC-0183 malfunction which closes PV-0183

5.2. During hot circulation, loss of driving force in the cold side of exchangers E-111 will cause the hot stream not being cooled enough. This may lead to higher temperature in the storage tank and high temperature in outlet of exchanger E-111. This may occur for a short period of time and therefore no significant impact

5.2.2. Block-and-bypass arrangement has been provided for PV-0183


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1. No/ Less flow of flash gas to boiler from C-113 overhead

6. ESDV-0008/SDV-0007 fails closed 6.1. Same as Node 4, Deviation 1, Cause 1


1.1.2. High level alarm LAH-0181 provided on MP flash drum

1.1. No flow of rich amine to solvent regenerator C-112. This will upset the regenerator and level will build up in D-113.




1.2. Possible overpressure in MP flash drum




1. SDV-0183 closes

1.3. Possible carry-over of amine to boilers


2. LIC-0181malfunctions and closes LV-0181on inlet to solvent regenerator

2.1. Same as Cause 1 2.1.1. High high level alarm LAHH-0183 will cause total unit shutdown

3.1.1. Low pressure alarm PAL-0182A/B on the overhead of absorber

2. No/ Less flow of amine from bottom of D-113 via exchanger E-111 to solvent regenerator C-112

3. Loss of pressure in drum D-113 3.1. Same as Cause 1

3.1.2. PV-0183 will try to maintain pressure in D-113


10 of 43 ERM




1.1. Initially flowrate will increase, however, this component is a small amount compared to total fuel to boiler. Hence, no significant impact on boiler

1.1.1. Boiler has its own fuel gas control system

1.2.1. High flow alarm FAH-0181 provided on overhead of absorber 5. Review the requirement of amine removal facilities in the boiler area in Unit 121

JV

1.2.2. Low pressure alarm PAL-0182B provided on overhead of flash gas absorber

1.2.3. Demister provided on flash gas absorber C-1113

3. More Flow of flash gas to boiler from overhead of D-113

1. PIC-0182A malfunctions and opens PV-0182A fully

1.2. Pressure drop in the flash drum leading to potential carry-over.

1.2.4. PV-0183 will try to maintain pressure in D-113


JV

1.1.1. Low low level alarm LALL-0182 on D-113 with interlock I-323 will close SDV-0183 and LV-0181 and SDV-0183

1.1.2. High high pressure alarm PAHH-0203 on C-112 overhead with interlock I-320 which will close FV-0211, SDV-0183, LV-0181 and SDV-0183

1.1. Loss of level and pressure in D-113. Potential Gas breakthrough to solvent regenerator upsetting the performance of solvent regenerator. Possible overpressurisation of solvent regenerator may lead to failure.

1.1.3. PSV-0201A/B on C-112 overhead is sized to take care of gas breakthrough

4. More flow of amine from bottom of D-113 via exchangers E-111 to solvent regenerator C-112

1. LIC-0181malfunctions and opens LV-0181fully on inlet to solvent regenerator

1.2. Potential two-phase in exchangers may lead to pressure-pulsation and vibration which may lead to mechanical damage to exchangers


5. More flow of gas to flare

1. Refer to discussion in Deviation 1, Cause 3

1.1.1. Check valve provided.

1.1.2. PV-0182A will close in case of low pressure


1. Low pressure in D-113. 1.1. Possibility of reverse flow of fuel gas from boiler area. No significant consequences

1.1.3. PV-0183 will open and try to maintain the pressure




1. PIC-0182A malfunctions and closes PV-0182A

1.1. High pressure in upstream D-113 and C-113


2.1.1. High pressure alarm PAH-0182A on absorber overhead line




2. Non-receipt of flash gas by boilers 2.1. Higher pressure in the system will cause process upset in the unit.



















5.1.3. High High pressure alarm PAHH-0181 with interlock to shutdown the unit

6. ESDV-0008/SDV-0007 fails closed 6.1. Same as Node 4, Deviation 1, Cause 1

7. High Pressure

7. Foaming in amine absorber 7.1. Overpressurisation and carry-over of liquid 7.1.1. Antifoam injection facilities provided


11 of 43 ERM






7.1.4. High high pressure alarm PAHH-0181 with interlock SD-207 to shutdown the unit


8. External fire in D-113 8.1. Overpressure in drum D-113 leading to rupture and fire. 8.1.1. PSV-0181A/B designed to take care of fire case

1.1.1. Low pressure alarm PAL-0182A/B provided on outlet of Flash Gas Absorber 1. SDV-0161 closed inadvertently 1.1. Loss of flash gas in MP flash drum. Possibility of low pressure in MP flash drum






2.1. Reduction in flow of amine to MP flash drum and may results in low pressure and level in the MP flash drum


3.1.1. Boiler have alternate sources of fuel gas. Moreover, the amount of flash gas is very low compared to main fuel gas.



3. PIC-0182B malfunctions and opens PV-0182B

3.1. No gas supply to boilers. Low pressure in the drum and absorber

3.1.4. High flow alarm FAH-0181 is provided at outlet of flash gas absorber

4.1.1. High flow alarm FAH-0181 provided on overhead of absorber 5. Review the requirement of amine removal facilities in the boiler area in Unit 121

JV

4.1.2. Low pressure alarm PAL-0182B provided at outlet of flash gas absorber


4. PIC-0182A malfunctions and opens PV-0182A fully

4.1. Pressure drop in the flash drum leading to potential carry-over.

4.1.4. Demister on Flash Gas absorber C-113 provided


JV



8. Low Pressure

5. LIC-0181 malfunctions and opens LV-0181fully on inlet to solvent regenerator



1. High heat to rich amine in the lean/rich solvent exchanger (eg due to low rich amine flow. high lean amine temp from regenerator , etc)

1.1. Prevailing flashing in the exchangers leading to pressure-pulsation and vibration leading to mechanical failure or damage of exchangers

1.1.1. High temperature alarm TAH-0192 at inlet of solvent regenerator 9. More Temperature

2. Solar heating in the blocked liquid portion

2.1. Overpressurisation and failure of line and exchanger 2.1.1. TSV-0191 provided.

1.1.1. Low temperature alarm TAL-0191 at inlet of solvent regenerator 10. Less Temperature 1. Low heat to rich amine in the lean/rich solvent exchanger (eg due to high rich amine flow, low lean amine temp from regenerator , etc)

1.1. Inadequate regeneration leading to CO2 slippage to the lean amine may lead to corrosion in the bottom section of regenerator 1.1.2. Reboiler E-112 maybe able to compensate for reduction in temperature



1.1. No flow of rich amine to solvent regenerator C-112. This will upset the regenerator and level will build up in D-113.




1. SDV-0183 closes

1.2. Possible carry-over of amine to boilers



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2. LIC-0181 malfunctions and closes LV-0181 on inlet to solvent regenerator

2.1. Same as Cause 1 2.1.1. High high level alarm LAHH-0183 will cause total unit shutdown

3. Loss of pressure in drum D-113 3.1. Same as Cause 1 3.1.1. Low pressure alarm PAL-0182A/B on the overhead of absorber

4. Malfunction of FIC-0243 which opens FV-0243

4.1. Same as Cause 1, however since this quantity is very low, consequence may not be significant

11. High Level

5. LIC-0163 on solvent absorber 5.1. Level increases at MP flash drum. Potential for gas 5.1.1. LIC-0181 will control level in D-113


12 of 43 ERM




5.1.2. High level alarm LAH-0181 provided at MP flash drum

5.1.3. High high level alarm LAHH-0183 provided at MP flash drum




malfunctions and open fully LV-0163 breakthrough







2.1.1. LIC-0181 will control level in D-113

2.1.2. Low level alarm LAL-0181 provided at MP flash drum

2. LIC-0163 on solvent absorber malfunctions and close fully LV-0163 or SDV-0161 fails close

2.1. Level decreases at MP flash drum.



3.1.2. Low low level alarm LALL-0182 provided in D-103





3.1. Loss of level in D-113 leading to amine loss and gas breakthrough to sump drum


12. Low Level

4. Operator forgetting to close the valve after skimming

4.1. Loss of level in D-113 leading to gas blowby to the skimming drum.

4.1.1. Skimming drum D-116 is lined up to flare


1. Corrosion material (iron sulphide) present in the pipeline

1.1. This may lead to foaming and carry-over of amine to D-112 1.1.1. Filtration package is provided to remove any iron sulphide particles 2. Operating procedure to include chemical cleaning of the system prior to start-up.

JV


1. Any change in concentration of amine or CO2 content in amine.

1.1. This will affect the performance of absorber 1.1.1. Periodic analysis of amine solution



1. Steam tracing failure 1.1. Possible corrosion due to condensation 1.1.1. Line are free draining towards C-113. 7. Check the consistency of requirements of steam tracing upstream and downstream of PV-0182A

JV 16. Utility Failure

2. Instrument air failure : PV-0183, PV-0182A, SDV-0183, SDV-0007 , ESDV-0008 and LV-0181 are fail close type PV-0182B and BDV-0181 are fail open type. These were found to be in order

17. Others 1. No new issue identified


13 of 43 ERM

Node: 5. Regenerator top circuit including reflux



1.1.1. Low level alarm LAL-0221 on reflux drum 1.1. Less flow of vapour from the overhead. Low level in reflux drum and loss of reflux. Upset in Unit 116. Potential damage of reflux pump P-112A/B 1.1.2. Low low level alarm LALL-0222 on reflux drum provided with interlock I-331

which will trip reflux pumps

1. Steam failure to reboiler

1.2. No stripping leading to column upset, affecting unit performance. Unit will be shutdown.

2.1.1. High high pressure alarm PAHH-0203 at column overhead

1. No/ Less flow on C-112 overhead up to inlet of D-114

2. PIC-0221 malfunctions and closes PV-0221

2.1. No flow and high pressure in the column and reflux drum D-114. This will affect regenerator performance and less stripping 2.1.2. PSV-0202A/B sized for blocked outlet case.

1.1.1. High level alarm LAH-0221 on reflux drum D-114

1.1.2. High high level alarm LAHH-0222 on reflux drum D-114

1.1.3. Low flow alarm FAL-0223 provided at pump discharge

1.1.4. Low low flow alarm FALL-0221 with interlock I-332 which will autostart of the spare pump P-112A/B and stop running pump

1.1.5. Spare pump provided with auto-start facilities

1.1. High level in D-114 leading to carry-over of amine from regenerator column overhead to D-114.

1.1.6. Pump running indication provided

1.2.1. High temperature alarm TAH-0201 provided on regenerator overhead

1.2.2. High pressure alarm PAH-0081A/B provided on D-114 overhead



1. Tripping of reflux Pump P-112A/B

1.2. Upset in regenerator leading to carry-over of amine to D-114

1.2.5. PSV-0201A/B provided on regenerator column

2.1.1. High high level alarm LAHH-0222 on reflux drum D-114 2.1. Same as Cause 1

2.1.2. Low flow alarm FAL-0223 provided at pump discharge. (low flow alarm may not sound as it is dependent on setpoint and valve opening/closing time)

2.2.1. Min flow bypass FIC-0223 provided


2. LIC-0221 malfunctions and close LV-0221

2.2. Potential damage to pump


3.1.1. Low level alarm LAL-0221 on reflux drum

3.1.2. Low low level alarm LALL-0222 on reflux drum provided with interlock I-331 which will trip reflux pumps

3.1.3. Low flow alarm FAL-0223 provided at pump discharge.


3.1. Loss of level in D-113 and possible damage to the pump and upset in regenerator column

3.1.5. Drain valve is CSC






3. Inadvertent opening of drain valves

3.2. Gas breakthrough to sump drum




2. No/Less Flow in the bottom of D-114 to reflux in the column C-112

4. Tripping of overhead condenser 116-A-111

4.1. Low level in reflux drum and high pressure and high temperature in drum and column. There will be 25% natural draft in air coolers

4.1.3. High pressure alarm PAH-0221A provided on D-114 overhead


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14 of 43 ERM









1.1.4. High pressure differential alarm PDAH-0202 on regenerator bottom

1. FIC-0211/TIC-0201 malfunctions and open FV-0211 fully

1.1. More vapour flow to overhead causing increasing temperature and pressure. Also, level will increase in reflux drum. Potential carry-over of amine to reflux drum


2.1.1. Live steam injection valve is CSC.

2.1.2. High temp. alarm TIC-0201 on regenerator overhead

2.1.3. TIC-0201 will maintain steam temperature


2. Inadvertent opening of live steam valve by operator

2.1. High temperature and pressure in the regenerator column. Potential carry-over of amine to reflux drum


3.1.1. High pressure alarm PAH-0221 on overhead of reflux drum

3. More Flow on C-112 overhead up to inlet of D-114


3.1. Slightly higher pressure in the regenerator column. Also, it can lead to marginal lower temperature.


1.1.1. Low pressure alarm PAL-0201 provided on C-112 4. More Flow of overhead from D-114 to flare


1.1. Low pressure in D-114 and C-112.. No significant consequence.

1.1.2. PIC-0201 will try to maintain pressure of C-112


1.1.2. Low temp. alarm TAL-0201 provided on regenerator overhead

1.1.3. Low pressure alarm PAL-0221 on regenerator overhead

1.1.4. PV-0221 will reduce flow to flare to maintain pressure.

1.1. More reflux will cause loss of level in reflux drum D-114 and may damage the pumps P-112A/B. Low temperature and pressure in the top of regenerator column leading to upset in the column and increased entrainment to reflux drum and reflux trays in the column

1.1.5. Reboiler will try to make up for temperature in the column


1.2. Flooding of column leading to poor performance 1.2.1. High pressure differential PDAH-0202 provided across the column

2.1.1. High flow alarm FAH-0223 provided at pump discharge


5. More Flow in the bottom of D-114 to reflux in the column C-112

2. Malfunction of HIC-0221 and open HV-0221

2.1. Loss of level in D-114 and may lead to gas breakthrough to Sour water (WS) network


1. Failure of nitrogen supply 1.1. Possible reverse flow of C-112 overhead vapours to nitrogen header causing contamination of nitrogen. This may cause severe problems in the nitrogen hose stations

1.1.1. NRV provided downstream of PV-0201

2. Failure of cold condensate supply to reflux drum

2.1. Overhead vapours and liquid may backflow into condensate supply header causing contamination

2.1.1. NRV, double block and blind provided in cold condensate supply line

3.1.1. Spare pump provided with auto-start facilities 3. Tripping of pump P-112A/B 3.1. Reverse flow from column to reflux drum via min flow line.



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4.1.1. NRV provided near injection point 4. Failure of SL supply. 4.1. Possible reverse flow from C-112 to steam header via live steam valve causing contamination of steam.

4.1.2. Live steam valve is CSC


5. Peak overpressure of flare 5.1. Reverse flow of gas to D-114 and C-112 as peak backpresssure is 1.7 barg which is higher than reflux drum D-114 pressure

5.1.1. None identified 10. Review the backpressure for PV-0221 as presently it is connected to MP flare.

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7. High Pressure 1. Tripping of overhead condenser 116-A-111




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2. PIC-0221 malfunctions and closes PV-0221




3.1. High pressure in the regenerator leading to upset in performance







4.1. More vapour flow to overhead causing increasing temperature and pressure. Also, level will increase in reflux drum. Potential carry-over of amine to reflux drum



5. Gas breakthrough due to loss of level in flash drum

5.1. Overpressure in regenerator C-112 which will affect the regenerator performance.


6. External fire on D-114 6.1. Overpressure in drum D-114 leading to rupture, fire and release of toxic gas to atmosphere

6.1.1. PSV-0201A/B designed to take care of fire case

1.1.1. PV-0201 will open and try to maintain pressure in regenerator column 1. PIC-0221 malfunctions and opens PV-0221 fully

1.1. Loss in pressure in reflux drum and regenerator leading to poor performance of regenerator. Loss of gas to flare

1.1.2. Low pressure alarm PAL-0201 provided on regenerator column overhead




2.1.4. Low flow alarm FAL-0223 provided at pump discharge.










3.1.1. Low level alarm LAL-0221 on reflux drum 3. FIC-0211/TIC-0201 malfunctions and closes FV-0211

3.1. Less flow of vapour from the overhead. Low level in reflux drum and loss of reflux. Upset in Unit 116. Potential damage of reflux pump P-112A/B 3.1.2. Low low level alarm LALL-0222 on reflux drum provided with interlock I-331


4.1.1. Low low level alarm LALL-0202 on regenerator with interlock I-325 which will trips P-122A/B, close SDV-0201 and close SDV-0183

4.1.2. Low pressure alarm PAL-0201 provided on regenerator overhead

4.1. Low pressure in the regenerator column. No significant consequence

4.1.3. PV-0201 will open and try to maintain pressure in regenerator.

4.2.1. Low low level alarm LALL-0202 on regenerator with interlock I-325 which will trips P-122A/B, close SDV-0201 and close SDV-0183

8. Low Pressure

4. LIC-0201 malfunctions and open LV-0201 fully

4.2. Gas blowby to storage tank causing rupture of the tank

4.2.2. PSV-0241 provide on T-111


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1.1.3. PV-0221 provided which will relieve acid gas to flare



9. More Temperature 1. Tripping of overhead condenser 116-A-111




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2.1.1. High temperature alarm TAH-0202/0204 at upstream/downstream of reboiler E-112.

2. TIC-0211 malfunctions and closes TV-0211

2.1. High temperature of SL leading to degradation of DEA.

2.1.2. TIC-0201 will try to maintain temperature

3.1.1. Live steam injection valve is CSC.

3.1.2. High temp. alarm TIC-0201 on absorber overhead


3. Inadvertent opening of live steam valve by operator

3.1. High temperature and pressure in the absorber column. Potential carry-over of amine to reflux drum

3.1.4. TIC-0201 will try to maintain temperature

4.1.1. High temperature alarm TAH-0202/0204 at upstream/downstream of reboiler E-112.


4. TIC-0201/FIC-0211 malfunctions and open FV-0211

4.1. Same as Conseq 2.1


1. TIC-0211 malfunctions and open TV-0211

1.1. Lower temperature of SL which may cause poor reboiling. No significant impact as size of condensate line is 2" whereas steam line is 20"



2.1.3. Low pressure alarm PAL-0201

2. Steam failure to reboiler (eg TIC-0201 or FIC-0211 malfunction and close FV-0211)

2.1. Less flow of vapour from the overhead. Low level in reflux drum and loss of reflux. Upset in Unit 116. Potential damage of reflux pump P-112A/B

2.1.4. Low temperature alarm TAL-0202/0204 at upstream/downstream of reboiler E-112.

10. Less Temperature


3.1. Refer to Node 5, Deviation 5 Cause 1





1.1.5. Demister provided in D-114

1.1.6. Spare pump provided with autostart facilities

1.1. High level in D-114 leading to carry-over of amine to flare as well as from regenerator column overhead to D-114.


1.2.1. High temperature alarm TAH-0201 provided on regenerator overhead



1. Tripping of reflux Pump P-112A/B

1.2. Upset in regenerator leading to carry-over of amine to D-114


2.1.1. High high level alarm LAHH-0222 on reflux drum D-114 2.1. Same as Cause 1


2.2.1. Min flow FIC-0223 provided



2.2. Potential damage to pump P-112A/B

2.2.3. Low low flow FALL-0221 with interlock I-332 to trip pumps P-112A/B





3.1. More vapour flow to overhead causing level reduction in regeneration column bottom. Also, level will increase in reflux drum.


11. High Level

4. Inadvertent opening of cold condensate 4.1. High level in reflux drum and loss of solution strength of 4.1.1. Blocks and blind provided on cold condensate line


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line DEA. 4.1.2. Rota-meter FG-0221 provided on cold condensate line to reflux drum

1. Steam failure to reboiler 1.1. Refer to Node 5, Deviation 10, Cause 2













3.1.1. Low level alarm LAL-0221 on reflux drum 3. Tripping of overhead condenser 116-A-111

3.1. Low level in reflux drum and high pressure and high temperature in drum and column. There will be 25% natural draft in air coolers 3.1.2. Low low level alarm LALL-0222 on reflux drum provided with interlock I-331



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4.1. More reflux will cause loss in level in reflux drum D-114 and may damage the pumps P-112A/B. Upset of column


12. Low Level

5. Refer to Node 5, Deviation 5, Cause 2.


1. Corrosion material (iron sulphide) present in the pipeline

1.1. This may lead to foaming and carry-over of amine to D-114.

1.1.2. Provision for injection of antifoam


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1. Inadvertent opening of cold condensate line

1.1. Refer to Node 5Devi, ation 11, Cause 4

1. During shutdown, iron sulphide may cause ignition when exposed to air

1.1. Fire leading to equipment damage 1.1.1. None identified 3. Operating procedure to include proper cleaning and wetting of the column before opening for maintenance.

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2. For maintenance, air ingress in the system

2.1. Formation of polythionic acid leading to corrosion 2.1.1. Nitrogen purge provided 11. Operating manual to address the steps for start-up and maintenance procedures in order to avoid toxic gas release to the atmosphere.

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3. Improper warming up 3.1. Thermal shock may cause leakage through joints (eg flanges etc)

3.1.1. None identified 12. Operating manual to address warming up procedures for reboiler E-112

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4.1.1. Regenerator and reflux drum are designed for full vacuum.


4. Vacuum formation during shut-down 4.1. Possible collapse of equipment and loss of containment. This may lead to environmental problems.

4.1.2. Nitrogen purge provided

1. Instrument air failure : PV-0221 , SDV-0083 and ESDV-0081 are FC type LV-0221, FV-0223 and PV-0221 are FO type These are found to be in order

2. Power Failure : During power failure, fans and pumps will trip. refer to relevant discussions in this node.

3. Cold condensate failure : 3.1. Refer to Node 5, Deviation 9, Cause 2

4. Steam failure 4.1. Refer to Node 5, Deviation 10, Cause 2

16. Utility Failure

5. Nitrogen failure 5.1. Refer to Node 5, Deviation 6, Cause 1

17. Others 1. No new issues


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Node: 6. Regenerator bottom circuit including reboiler



1.1.1. High high level alarm LAHH-0202 on regenerator


1.1. Increase in level in Regenerator bottom may lead to level higher than inlet and outlet for reboiler E-112 in the regenerator column. This will cause loss of thermosyphoning and hence vapourisation in the regenerator. Amine carry-over to reflux drum


1.2.1. Low temperature alarm low TAL-0191 provided on rich amine outlet of E-111 1.2. Low heat to rich amine in the lean/rich solvent exchanger

1.2.2. Reboiler will try to compensate for duty


1.3.2. Low flow alarm FAL-0231 provided on pump discharge


1.3. Potential damage to Pump P-122A/B

1.3.3. Low Low flow FALL-0232 provided with interlock I-327 which will trip P-122A/B


2.1.2. High level alarm LAH-0201 on regenerator

2.1. Same as conseq. 1.1

2.1.3. Refer to safeguards for Consequence 1.1

2.2.1. Limit switch provided on SDV-0201 2.2. Same as Conseq. 1.2



2. SDV-0201 closed at column bottom



3.1.1. High level alarm LAH-0201 on regenerator

3.1.2. High high level alarm LAHH-0202 on regenerator

3.1.3. Low flow alarm FAL-0231 on pump discharge


3.1.5. Low level alarm LAL-0241 on storage tank

3.1.6. Low low level LALL-0242 on storage tank with interlock SD-204 which will shutdown unit

3.1.7. Spare pump with auto-start facilities

3. Pump P-122 trips 3.1. Level build-up in regenerator and low level in storage tank.

3.1.8. Pump running indication

1. No/ Less flow from Column bottom to solvent storage tank via 116-E-111

4. Strainer blockage of E-111 4.1. Same as Conseq 1.1


1.2.1. LIC-0212 will maintain level in condensate drum

1.2.2. Min flow bypass FIC-0213

1.2.3. Low level alarm LAL-0212 in condensate drum

1. Steam failure to reboiler

1.2. No condensation of steam. No supply to condensate drum D-115 causing low level in condensate drum and potential damage to condensate pumps P-114A/B

1.2.4. Low low level alarm LALL-0211 in condensate drum with interlock I-329 which will trip pumps P-114A/B

2. No/ Less flow of steam to E-112

2. TIC-0211 malfunction and closes TV-0211

2.1. No significant impact of SL flow to E-112 and leads to higher steam temperature

2.1.1. High temp alarm TAH-0211 provided on steam to E-112.


1.1.2. High high level alarm LAHH-0211 on D-115


1. Tripping of pump P-114A/B 1.1. Increase in level in D-115 which may cause blockage in reboiler tubes reducing the surface area available for reboiling affecting the performance of reboiler


2.1. Same as Conseq. 1.1 and also vapour locking in the pipe downstream LV-0212

2.1.1. High high level alarm LAHH-0211 on D-115 13. Ensure that pipe downstream of LV-0212 is designed for two-phase flow.

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2.2.2. Low flow alarm FAL-0213 provided


2.2. Potential damage to pump P-114A/B



3.1. No significant consequences

3. No/ Less flow of condensate from D-115 to LP condensate system

4. Non-receipt of condensate in LP steam Condensate (Unit 121)

4.1. Same as Conseq 1.1


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1.1.1. High temperature alarm TAH-0193 at the outlet of E-111

1.1.2. PSV-0241 provided (sizing and type to be decided by Tank Vendor)

1.1. More supply of solvent to storage tank. Also level in regenerator bottoms goes down may lead to gas breakthrough to storage tank leading to high pressure and possible rupture of the tank. Also, overheating of the rich side of exchanger E-111 may occur. Less cooling of lean side of exchangers.

1.1.3. Low low level alarm LALL-0202 provided at bottom of regenerator will close SDV-0201


JV 4. More Flow from Column bottom to solvent storage tank via 116-E-111 and 116-A-112

1. LIC-0201 malfunctions and open LV-0201

1.2. Potential damage to pump P-122A/B 1.2.1. Low low level alarm LALL-0202 provided at bottom of regenerator will trip pumps P-122A/B

5. More flow of steam to E-102



1.1.1. Low level alarm LAL-0212 in condensate drum

1.1.2. Low low level alarm LALL-0211 in condensate drum with interlock I-329 which will trip pumps P-114A/B

6. More flow of condensate from D-115 to LP condensate system


1.1. This will lead to lower level in D-115 and potential pump P-114A/B damage. Potential hammering in the line downstream LV-0212 may cause failure.

1.1.3. Anchoring and sliding support provided for piping downstream LV-0212

1.1.1. Check valve provided at LV-0212

1.1.2. Check valve provided at pump discharge


1. Pump P-114A/B trips 1.1. Possibility of reverse flow from condensate header to condensate drum through pumps and min flow line



2. Failure of cold condensate to desuperheater

2.1. This will lead to reverse flow of steam to condensate header.

2.1.1. Check valve provided


1.1. Refer to Node 5, Deviation 9, Cause 4 8. High Pressure



1. Refer to discussion on Node 5, Deviation 10, Cause 2

9. Low Pressure

2. Tripping of P-122A/B 2.1. Low pressure downstream of P-122A/B. No flow to solvent storage tank. Refer to Node 6, Deviation 1, Cause 3.

1. Refer to discussion on Node 5, Deviation 9

2.1. No cooling of lean solvent stream. This will lead to increased load on air cooler A-112 and also causing high temperature in the storage tank which may lead to failure.

2.1.1. High temperature alarm TAH-0193 at the outlet of E-111 2. No flow of rich amine to rich/lean solvent exchangers

2.2. High pressure in rich amine side due to blockage may lead to failure of rich/lean solvent heat exchangers.

2.2.1. TSV-00191 provided on E-111 respectively

3.1.1. High temp alarm TAH-0231 at outlet of air cooler

10. More Temperature

3. Air cooler A-112 trips 3.1. High temp of lean amine to storage tank

3.1.2. Tank design temperature is higher than maximum inlet temperature to air cooler.

11. Less Temperature 1. Refer to discussion on Node 5, Deviation 10


1.1. Refer to Node 6, Deviation 1, Cause 1, Conseq. 1

2. SDV-0201 closed at column bottom 2.1. Refer to Node 6, Deviation 1, Cause 2, Conseq. 1

3. Tripping of pump P-122 A/B 3.1. High level in regenerator. Refer to Node 6, Deviation 1, Cause 3

4.1.1. LIC-0212 will try to control level





5. Stainer Blockage 5.1. Refer to Node 6, Deviation 1, Cause 4

12. High Level


1. Steam failure to reboiler 1.1. Refer to Node 6, Deviation 2, Cause 1, Conseq. 2 13. Low Level




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3.1.2. Low level alarm LAL-0201 provided on regenerator bottom

3.1. Loss of level in C-112 to sump drum leading to pump damage P-122A/B and gas blowby to storage tank leading to overpressure and rupture

3.1.3. Low low level alarm LALL-0202 with interlock to trip pumps and close SDV-0201.








3. Inadvertent opening of drain line upstream of SDV-0201

3.3. Potential over-temperature of underground piping which will cause piping failure

3.3.1. Drain Valve to sump drum is CSC 19. Confirm the max. allowable temp in the drain header (based on drain piping design)and this may be mentioned in the operating procedure

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5.1.1. Drain valves are CSC


5.1. Low level in D-115 and potential damage of pump P-114A/B

5.1.3. Low low level alarm LALL-0211 with interlock I-329 to trip pump P-114A/B

5.2.1. Drain Valve to sump drum is CSC

5. Inadvertent opening of condensate drum drain valve

5.2. Potential over-temperature of underground piping which will cause piping failure

5.2.2. Sea water injection provided for cooling which must be used in any case for hot draining


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1. Gasket failure in E-111 1.1. Rich amine going to lean amine side. This will lead to higher CO2 content in storage tank and pressurisation of tank. Contamination of tank content will lead to lower absorption of CO2 in the absorber. .

1.1.1. Sampling of lean amine upstream and downstream of exchanger E-111. 14. Contamination/ Additional Phase

2. Refer to discussion under Node 5, Deviation 13

1. Same as discussed under Deviation 14, Cause 1


2. Same as discussed under Deviation 14, Cause 2


1. Improper warming up 1.1. Thermal shock may cause leakage through joints (eg flanges etc)

1.1.1. None identified 12. Operating manual to address warming up procedures for reboiler E-112

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1. Instrument air failure : SDV-0201 , LV-0201 , FV-0211, TV-0211 are FC type FV-0213 is FO type These are found to be in order

2.1. This will lead to tripping of pump P-114 A/B. Refer to Node 6, Deviation 3, Cause 1

2.2. This will lead to tripping of A-112. Refer to Node 6, Deviation 10, Cause 3

2. Power Failure

2.3. This will lead to tripping of pump P-122 A/B. Refer to Node 6, Deviation 1, Cause 3

17. Utility Failure

3. Refer to Node 5, Deviation 16, Cause 3, 4 and 5

18. Others 1. No new issues identified


21 of 43 ERM

Node: 7. Lean storage tank and pumping system

Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0112 Rev O; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0114 Rev O; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0120 Rev O; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0101 Rev 3


1.1.1. Low flow alarm FAL-0241 on discharge of pump


1.1.3. Low low flow FALL-0246 with interlock SD-203 will shutdown the unit.

1.1.4. Low low flow FALL-0242 with interlock I-308 start standby pump and trip running pump

1.1.5. Spare pump provided with auto-start facilities

1.1. No flow of solvent to solvent absorber/ flash gas absorber leading to offspec product

1.1.6. Pump running indication provided.

1.2.1. High level alarm LAH-0241 provided on storage tank

1. Pump P-111 trips

1.2. Level in tank increases

1.2.2. Overflow line provided on tank with seal leg and syphon breaker



2.1. No flow of solvent to solvent absorber leading to offspec product


2.2.1. High level alarm LAH-0241 provided on storage tank 2.2. Level in tank increases


2.3.1. Min flow FIC-0245 provided for pump P-101A/B


2.3. Lower flow through Pump P-111 A/B which may lead to pump damage

2.3.2. Low low flow FALL-0242 with interlock I-308 start standby pump and trip running pump. Refer to Note 4 in P&ID 1516-116-0030-0120

3.1. No flow of solvent to flash gas absorber. No significant impact on pump since it is a 2" line (main line is 10")


3.2. Increase in CO2 content and hence flash gas shall not be routed to boilers

3.2.1. None identified 15. Provide independent transmitter with low low flow alarm with interlock to close SDV-0007

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4. FIC-0245 malfunctions and opens FV-0245

4.1. Less flow to solvent absorber causing offspec product 4.1.1. Pump P-111A/B will be able to handle the min flow bypass (min flow for pump approximately 15%) whereas pump design capacity above normal flow will match this.



5.1. No flow of solvent to solvent absorber leading to offspec product


5.2.1. High level alarm LAH-0241 provided on storage tank 5.2. Level in tank increases


5.3.1. Min flow FIC-0245 provided for pump P-111A/B

5. SDV-0162 fails close

5.3. Lower flow through Pump P-111 A/B which may lead to pump damage

5.3.2. Low low flow FALL-0242 with interlock I-308 start standby pump and trip running pump. Refer to Note 4 in P&ID 1516-116-0030-0120

6.1.1. Low level alarm LAL-0241 provided on storage tank

1. No/ Less flow

6. Low level of solvent storage tank 6.1. Possible damage of pump P-111A/B and no flow to solvent absorber and flash gas absorber leading to offspec product

6.1.2. Low low level alarm LALL-0242 with interlock SD-204 which will shutdown unit

1.1.1. Knock-out drum D-112 provided 1.1. More flow to solvent absorber may lead to carry-over of solvent and flooding of column

1.1.2. High pressure differential alarm PDAH-0163 provided across solvent absorber column

1. FIC-0241malfunctions and opens FV-0241 fully

1.2. Overloading and damage to pump motor (P-111A/B) 1.2.1. Overload trip provided on pump P-111A/B motor


2.1. Carry-over of amine with flash gas to boilers. 2.1.1. Refer to HAZOP of Unit 121 5. Review the requirement of amine removal facilities in the boiler area in Unit 121

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3. FIC-0245 malfunctions and closes FV-0245 fully

3.1. No significant consequence

4.1. High level in D-113 leading to carry-over to boilers

4.2. Overloading and damage to pump motor (P-111A/B) 4.2.1. Overload trip provided on pump P-111A/B motor

4.3.1. Low level alarm LAL-0241 provided on storage tank

4.3.2. Low low level alarm LALL-0242 with interlock SD-204 which will shutdown unit

2. More Flow


4.3. Lower flow of lean amine to absorber affecting the performance

4.3.3. Low flow alarm FAL-0241


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22 of 43 ERM




4.3.4. High flow alarm FAH-245 provided at pump discharge

4.3.5. FALL-0246 with interlock SD-203 which shutdown unit

1.1.1. Check valve provided 1.1. Reverse flow from solvent absorber C-111 causing pressurisation of tank

1.1.2. SDV-0162 will close upon pump trip via interlock I-304

1.2. Reverse flow from flash gas absorber C-113 causing pressurisation of tank

1.2.1. Check valve provided

1.3.1. Two check valves provided

1.3.2. PV-0182 B will relieve excess pressure to flare.

1. Pump P-111A/B trips

1.3. Reverse flow of gas from solvent absorber to flash gas absorber causing pressurisation of flash gas absorber

1.3.3. PSV-0181A/B provided on D-113

2. Makeup pump of Unit 146 not running and makeup lined up

2.1. Reverse flow from tank to solvent make-up line. 2.1.1. NRV provided at makeup pump discharge


3. Tripping of antifoam pump P-117 3.1. Reverse flow of solvent to antifoam tank T-102 causing overflow of tank.

3.1.1. Check valve provided at pump discharge.

1. Pump P-111A/B trips 1.1. Refer to Node 7, Deviation 3, Cause 1



3. PCV-0242 A/B/C opens 3.1. High pressure in the tank may lead to damage 3.1.1. PSV-0241 provided on tank

4. FIC-0243 malfunctions and close FV-0243

4.1. High pressure upstream of FV-0243 and low pressure downstream of FV-0243. However, no significant consequences since it is a 1 1/2" line (main line is 8")





5.1. High pressure upstream of FV-0241 and low pressure downstream of FV-0241. This may lead to pump damage. Also, this may result in off spec products






4. High Pressure

6. SDV-0162 fails to close position 6.1. Same as Cause 5



1.1. High pressure upstream of FV-0243 and low pressure downstream of FV-0243. However, no significant consequences since it is a 1 1/2" line (main line is 8")





2.1. High pressure upstream of FV-0241 and low pressure downstream of FV-0241. This may lead to pump damage. Also, this may result in off spec products


3.1.1. Limit switch provided on SDV-0162 3. SDV-0162 fails to close position 3.1. Same as Node 7, Deviation 4, Cause 5

3.1.2. Refer to safeguards for NOde 7, Deviation 4, Cause 5

4. PCV-0242 fails close / Nitrogen failiure 4.1. This may lead to vacuum formation in the tank leading to rupture of the tank. Loss of level indication on LT-0241 (bubbling type)

4.1.1. PSV-0241 provided for vacuum breaking

5. Low Pressure

5. Loss of seal in tank 5.1. Tank may get depressurised and ingress of air may take place which will degrade the solvent.

5.1.1. None identified 16. Operating procedure to include seal maintenance using cold condensate in solvent storage tank.

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6. More Temperature 1. Refer to Node 6, Deviation 10

7. Less Temperature 1. Refer to Node 6, Deviation 11

8. High Level 1. Pump P-111 trips 1.1. Refer to Node 7, Deviation 1, Cause 1, Conseq. 2


23 of 43 ERM




2. SDV-0162 fails close 2.1. Refer to Node 7, Deviation 1, Cause 5

3. FIC -0241 malfunctions and closes FV-0241

3.1. Refer to Node 7, Deviation 1, Cause 2, Conseq. 2

4. Inadvertent opening of cold condensate valve

4.1. This will lead to high level in the tank , diluting the solvent solution. This will affect the performance of absorber

4.1.1. Two isolation valves provided 17. Operating procedures to include use of condensate in the tank

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5.1.1. Overflow line provided with a seal leg and siphon breaker 5. Inadvertent opening of solvent makeup line

5.1. High level in the tank which may lead to overflow

5.1.2. Two isolation valves provided

1.1.1. Low level alarm LAL-0241 provided on tank 1. Inadvertent opening of drain valves 1.1. Low level in the tank leading to pump damage

1.1.2. Low low level LALL-0242 provided on tank with interlock SD-204 which will shutdown unit.

2. Loss of make-up from Unit 146 2.1. Since it is intermittent service, no significant consequence

3.1.1. Anti-foam injection provided in pump suction, absorber and regenerator.

3.1.2. Low level alarm LAL-0241 provided on tank

9. Low Level

3. Foaming 3.1. Loss of level in the tank leading to pump damage and no supply to solvent absorber/ flash gas absorber

3.1.3. Low low level LALL-0242 provided on tank with interlock SD-204 which will shutdown unit.


1. Corrosion material (iron sulphide) present in the pipeline and degraded amine

1.1. This may lead to foaming and carry-over of amine to D-114.

1.1.2. Provision for injection of antifoam


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1. Increased CO2 content of lean amine due to improper regeneration

1.1. Absorption performance will be affected 1.1.1. Sampling of amine solution for CO2 content

2.1.1. Sampling of amine solution for concentration


2. Changing lean amine concentration due to improper fresh DEA or cold condensate makeup.

2.1. Absorption performance will be affected

2.1.2. Double isolation valves provided for cold condensate and fresh DEA makeup.


1. No issue

1. Instrument Air failure : FV-0241, FV-0243 and SDV-0162 and FV-0183, and are FC type FV-0245 is FO type These have been found to be in order

2. Power failure : 2.1. Pump P-111A/B trip. Refer to Deviation 1, Cause 1

13. Utility Failure

3. Cold condensate failure 3.1. Difficult to adjust solution concentration. This is intermittent service , hence no significant consequence

3.1.1. None identified



24 of 43 ERM

Node: 8. Anti foam package



1. Others 1. Vendor Package


25 of 43 ERM

Node: 9. Filtration package

Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0120 Rev O; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0121A Rev O


1. Others 1. Vendor Package


26 of 43 ERM

Node: 10. Sump drum



1. No/ Less flow 1. Sump drum used for collecting any drains during equipment maintenance. It is transferred when High Level is reached in the drum. This is intermittent operation and hence flow deviation not considered

2. More Flow 1. This is intermittent operation and hence flow deviation not considered

1. Sump Pump P-115 trips 1.1. Potential back flow from solvent filtration unit 1.1.1. Check valve provided d/s of pump min. flow tapping 3. Reverse/Misdirected Flow

2. Pump discharge routed wrongly 2.1. Potential contamination and upset. Solvent filtration unit can get contaminated with amine drains.

2.1.1. Procedure for sampling of content in sump drum and routing to appropriate destination. Sampling connection provided at pump discharge

1. Gas Blowby thru drain line from connected equipment

1.1. Potential overpressure causing possible rupture of drum 1.1.1. Sump drum vent open to flare through CSO valve . Drum designed for 3.5 barg and full vacuum


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2.1.1. Sump drum vent open to flare through CSO valve . Drum designed for 3.5 barg and full vacuum

2. Vaporisation of liquid in the sump drum due to live steam (live steam provided mainly for stripping of CO2 from amine)

2.1. Potential overpressure causing possible rupture of drum

2.1.2. RO-0261 provided in the steam line to restrict steam flow


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3. Flash gas due to draining of amine from high pressure sources

3.1. Potential overpressure causing possible rupture of drum 3.1.1. Sump drum vent open to flare through CSO valve . Drum designed for 3.5 barg and full vacuum


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4.1.1. Drum and flare header have the same design pressure. Piping is designed for max shut-off pressure of pump

4. High Pressure

4. Flare back pressure high 4.1. Pump discharge piping will be subjected to shut-off pressure. Also under high back pressure, lighter elements will not get flashed and lead to carry over to storage tank

4.1.2. Operating procedures addresses the issue of evacuation of sump drum under high flare backpressure.

1. Drum is floating with flare header. During pump-out, liquid displacement will lead to lower pressure in the sump drum

1.1. Flare gas will back up into the sump drum. No significant consequence forseen since flare header is kept under positive pressure through purge of the header

2.1.1. Drum is floating with flare and flare gas will back up into the sump drum

5. Low Pressure

2. Live steam stopped 2.1. Condensation resulting in vacuum formation

2.1.2. Drum is designed for full vacuum.

1.1.1. Procedure to drain liquid only after cooling. Drain drum designed for 210 deg C

6. More Temperature 1. High temp liquid drained from u/s equipment.

1.1. High temp material may cause damage to the buried piping coating and wrapping, although piping material itself is designed for same pressure as upstream up to the isolation valve at drum inlet (although CSO valve is provided ) 1.1.2. All drains are CSC


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1.1.1. Procedure to govern transfer from the sump drum 7. Less Temperature 1. Liquid may be at low temperature due to pressure letdown during draining.

1.1. Potential impact on pumping due to low temperature (Higher viscosity may exceed pump motor load).

1.1.2. Pump is designed to tranfer liquid at 5 deg C. This design temperature is compatible with drum D-117 design temp.

1.1.1. LI-0262 with high level alarm provided 18. Confirm the vent line of sump drum D-117 is sized for gas blowby (assuming maximum drain valve size and maximum pressure u/s) , maximum liquid inflow (for flashing gas and blocked condition)and vaporisation(if any)

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1.1.2. LI-0261 with high level alarm provided

1.1.3. Sump drum vent open to flare through CSO valve . Drum designed for 3.5 barg

1. Liquid drained from u/s equipment without ensuring sump drum has sufficient capacity to hold the drain liquid - Misoperation

1.1. Potential overfilling and overpressure. Carry over of liquid to flare

1.1.4. Sump pump P-115 provided to empty out sump drum content


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2. Level build up in the drum due to pump unavailable or interruption in transfer

2.1. Same as Cause 1

8. High Level

3. Cold condensate valve open 3.1. Same as Deviation 8, Cause 1,Conseq. 1.1 40. Cold condensate is provided for washing of drum prior to maintenance. Utility points are provided for connecting utility water hoses. Consider deleting hard-piped connection for cold condensate,

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9. Low Level 1. Normally low level is expected. Pump 1.1. Potential damage to pump 1.1.1. Low level alarm LAL-0262 on sump drum


27 of 43 ERM

Node: 10. Sump drum



continues to runs even when the liquid has been transferred

1.1.2. Independent low low level LALL-0261 provided on sump pump with interlock I-333 will trip pump

1.1.1. 2" utility connection provided for sludge removal by fluidization but this may get plugged

1.1. This may accumulate in the sump drum or affect draw-off by pump. Also this poses potential maintenance hazard since accumulation of sludge is difficult to be removed

1.1.2. Procedures for maintenance, including purging, steam-out, etc

1.2.1. Sampling connection provided


1. Debris, sludge, salt etc from HC drains

1.2. Contamination of amine cycle after the pumping-out by HC, solid particle etc.

1.2.2. Discharge of sump pump is sent to filtration package


1. Liquid in this sump drum is a mixture of amine and water. No provision for separation in the sump drum. Transfer based on sampling. No new issue


1. Maintenance of sump drum to remove sludge. See discussion in Contamination/Additional Phase

1. Electric Power Failure. 1.1. Pump P-115 trips. Refer to Node 10, Deviation 3, Cause 1

2. Cold condensate failure 2.1. Intermittent operation

3. LP steam failure 3.1. Intermittent operation

13. Utility Failure

4. Fuel gas failure 4.1. Intermittent operation

1.1.1. Periodic monitoring. 1. Corrosion in P-115 discharge piping . Under stagnant condition, presence of water with CO2 may lead to corrosion(piping is CS + 3mm CA)

1.1. Potential pipe leak

1.1.2. Procedure to drain the piping after transfer


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2. Internal coating fails at high temperature.

2.1. Corrosion leading to damage to the drum 2.1.1. None identified 21. Ensure the coating material is compatible with the maximum operating temp of the sump drum.(eg steam-out condition)

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3. Evacuation of sump drum 3.1. Possibility of contamination of amine due to high CO2 content

3.1.1. None identified 22. Operating procedure to strip amine through the use of live steam and sampling before evacuation

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14. Others

4. Improper blanketing of sump drum 4.1. Constant loss of fuel gas to flare and blanketing is not achieved.

4.1.1. None identified 39. Review the deletion of fuel gas connection to the drum so that the drum floats with flare header which has relevant protection like continuous sweeping.

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28 of 43 ERM

Node: 11. Hydrocarbon skim drum



1. No/ Less flow 1. Hydrocarbon skim drum used for collecting any HC drains during equipment maintenance. It is transferred when High Level is reached in the drum. This is intermittent operation and hence flow deviation not considered

2. More Flow 1. This is intermittent operation and hence flow deviation not considered


1. Reverse flow from absorber and treated gas KOD to reflux drum D-114 , rich solvent flash drum D-113 and from flash drum D-113 to reflux drum D-114. Also, skimming drum to reflux drum during transfer case.

1.1. Pressurisation of respective equipment 1.1.1. NRV provided for each stream to prevent backflow.

1.1.1. Connection to flare provided 23. Bypass valve for fuel gas rotameter FG-0101 to be made CSC

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1. Fuel gas by pass open 1.1. Pressurisation of D-116 and loss of fuel gas to flare.

1.1.2. Operating procedure for draining.

41. Consider deleting the fuel gas connection to D-116. The drum can float with flare,.

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2.1.1. Operating procedure for draining.

4. High Pressure

2. Gas blowby from u/s high pressure section during skimming

2.1. Pressurisation of D-116 and loss of gas to flare

2.1.2. Connection to flare provided

5. Low Pressure 1. Wrong procedure adopted during draining. Flare valve and fuel gas valve closed

1.1. Possible vacuum formation in the drum. 1.1.1. Drum is designed for full vacuum 25. Procedures for skimming/draining to be included in operating manual.

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6. More Temperature 1. Not applicable

7. Less Temperature 1. Not applicable

8. High Level 1. Excessive skimming from upstream equipments

1.1. Amine coming along with skimmed oil, increasing level in D-116 and leading to carry-over of skimmed material to flare.

1.1.1. High level alarm LAH-0271 provided on drum

9. Low Level 1. No issue identified


1. Refer to Node 11, Deviation 8 , Cause 1





13. Utility Failure 1. Fuel gas failure 1.1. Difficulty in draining. 1.1.1. Draining by elevation differences assisted by flare gas.

14. Others 1. No liquid HC condensation 1.1. Skimming facilities will not be useful 38. Consider deleting hydrocarbon skimming facilities along with skimming drum D-116.and associated piping

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29 of 43 ERM

Node: 12. Sulfrex lean transfer pumps



1.1.1. Low level LAL-0241 provided on tank 1. No level in tank T-111 1.1. Damage to pump P-116/124A/B and no supply of lean solvent to Unit 114

1.1.2. Low low level LALL-0242 provided on tank with interlock to trip unit

2.1.1. Spare pump provided 2. Sulfrex lean solvent transfer pump P-124A/B trips

2.1. No supply of lean solvent to Unit 114 which will affect the process in Unit 114


3. Inadvertent opening of drain lines 3.1. Possible damage to pumps P-124A/B 3.1.1. Drain valves are CSC

4.1.1. Limit switch provided on ESDV-0281/SDV-0281

4.1.2. High high pressure PAHH-0281A/B with interlock I-348 to trip pumps

4. ESDV-0281 closes/ SDV-0281 closes 4.1. No supply of lean solvent to Unit 114 and high pressure upstream of ESDV-00281/SDV-0281

4.1.3. PSV-0281A/B provided


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5. Inadvertent reduction of speed of motor due to malfunction of flow control from Unit 114

5.1. No supply of lean solvent to Unit 114 leading to process upset

5.1.1. Spare pump provided

6.1.1. High high pressure PAHH-0281A/B with interlock I-348 to trip pumps

1. No/ Less flow of lean solvent

6. Non-receipt by Unit 114 6.1. High pressure in the header and possible damage to the pumps

6.1.2. PSV-0281A/B provided

1.1.1. Limit switch is provided for SDV-0184/ESDV-0181 2. No Flow of rich solvent in the return stream from Unit 114

1. SDV-0184/ ESDV-0181 closes 1.1. No return of rich solvent leading to process upset in unit 114

1.1.2. Refer to HAZOP of Unit 114

3. More Flow of lean solvent

1. Inadvertent increase of speed of motor due to malfunction of flow control from Unit 114

1.1. More supply of lean solvent of Unit 114. No significant consequence.

4. More Flow of rich solvent in the return stream from Unit 114

1. Failure of control in Unit 114 1.1. No significant consequence

1.1.1. Check valve provided at pump discharge 1. Pump P-124A/B trip 1.1. Backflow of lean solvent and propane from Unit 114 to T-111 which may overpressurise and damage tank T-111



2. Reverse flow of rich amine from Unit 116 to Unit 114 in case of depressurisation of Unit 114

2.1. Possible contamination in Unit 114 2.1.1. Check valve provided

1. ESDV-0281 /SDV-0281 closes 1.1. Refer to Node 12, Deviation 1, Cause 4

2. Stoppage of supply by Unit 114 2.1. Same as above


6. High Pressure

3. Propane breakthrough from Unit 114 to Flash Drum in Unit 116

3.1. Overpressurisation of flash drum may lead to failure.

3.1.2. For safeguards, refer to Node 4, Deviation 7, Cause 4

1.1.1. Spare pump provided 7. Low Pressure 1. Tripping of pump 1.1. No pressure in pump discharge leading to loss of supply to Unit 114.


8. More Temperature 1. High lean amine temperature in storage tank

1.1. Supply of hot lean amine to Unit 114 may cause upset in the unit

1.1.1. High temp alarm TAH-0231provided at inlet of tank T-111.

9. Less Temperature 1. Not applicable in this node

10. High Level 1. Not applicable in this node

11. Low Level 1. Not applicable in this node




1. Propane breakthrough from Unit 114 to Flash Drum in Unit 116

1.1. Refer to Deviation 6, Cause 3 on this node


1. No new issue

15. Utility Failure 1. Power failure 1.1. Pump trip : Refer to Deviation 5, Cause 1 of this node

16. Others 1. No issue identified


30 of 43 ERM

Node: 13. Water wash loop



1.1.1. Pump running indication

1.1.2. Spare pump provided

1.1.3. Low flow alarm FAL-0161 provided at discharge of pump

1. Water wash pump P-113 A/B trips 1.1. No removal of carried-over amine which will affect the downstream unit

1.1.4. Low low flow alarm FALL-0163 with interlock I-335 to trip both pump P-113A/B

2.1.1. Low level alarm LAL-0162 on top section of solvent absorber 2. Low level in solvent absorber top section (chimney tray)

2.1. Possible damage to pumps and loss of circulation will lead to no removal of carried-over amine. This will affect downstream units 2.1.2. Low low level alarm LALL-0164 on top section of solvent absorber with

interlock I-359 which will trip both wash water pumps P-113A/B

3.1.1. High pressure differential alarm PDAH-0164 provided across top section of solvent absorber


3.1. Build-up of level in chimney tray of solvent absorber top section leading to carry-over to downstream unit.

3.1.2. KOD D-112 provided at downstream of solvent absorber (C-111) top outlet


4.1.2. High level alarm LAH-0162 provided on top section of solvent absorber

4.1.3. High pressure differential alarm PDAH-0164 provided across top section of solvent absorber

4. SDV-0163 fails closed 4.1. Same as Cause 3

4.1.4. KOD D-112 provided at downstream of solvent absorber (C-111) top outlet

5.1.1. Low level alarm LAL-0162 on top section of solvent absorber 5.1. No flow to solvent absorber leading to loss of circulation. This will lead to carry-over

5.1.2. Low low level alarm LALL-0164 on top section of solvent absorber with interlock I-359 which will trip both wash water pumps P-113A/B

5.2.1. Lines are designed for shut-off pressure.

5.2.2. Low flow alarm FAL-0161 provided at discharge of pump

5. Inadvertent closure of globe valve at the common discharge of pump P-113A/B

5.2. High pressure upstream of the globe valve may cause damage to the pump and pipeline

5.2.3. Low low flow FALL-0163 provided on pump discharge with interlock I-335 will trip both pumps

6.1.1. Periodic sampling

6.1.2. Bypass provided for FV-0162

6.1.3. Low level alarm LAL-0162 on top section of solvent absorber

1. No/ Less flow

6. Malfunction of FIC-0162 closing FV-0162

6.1. Loss of makeup water leading to drop in level, increasing concentration of amine in wash water and drop in performance of the column



1.1.2. PIC-0182B will relieve to flare.

1.1.3. High pressure alarm PAH-0182A/B

1.1.4. High high pressure PAHH-0181 with interlock to shutdown the unit through SD-207.


1.1. More flow to rich solvent MP flash drum. The level in chimney tray 1 will be lost and this will cause damage to wash water pumps P-113A/B. Possibility of gas breakthrough to rich solvent MP flash drum

1.1.5. PSV-0181A/B on flash drum are sized for gas breakthrough.


2.1.2. Low level alarm LAL-0162 on top section of solvent absorber

2.1. Low level in top section of solvent absorber. This can cause damage to pumps


2. Inadvertent opening of drain line at pump suction

2.2. Possible gas breakthrough to sump drum and overpressurisation of sump drum and underground drain line. Refer to Node 10, Deviation 4 , Cause 1

2. More Flow

3. Malfunction of FIC-0162 and opens FV-0162 fully

3.1. Increase in level in chimney tray may lead to carry-over of liquid to D-112. Also, there is a possibility of liquid overflowing to bed below from the chimney tray.

3.1.1. High level alarm LAH-0162 provided on absorber top section

1. Failure of antifoam package pump (101-U-101)

1.1. Reverse flow of gas/liquid to antifoam package causing damage to the package

1.1.1. Check valve provided at injection point.

2.1.1. Check valve provided at condensate makeup line near the injection point.


2. Low cold condensate header pressure 2.1. Contamination of cold condensate header by reverse from absorber. Possible gas breakthrough may cause rupture of cold condensate header 2.1.2. Design pressure of cold condensate header is 42 barg.

4. High Pressure 1. Inadvertent closure of globe valve at the common discharge of pump P-113A/B



31 of 43 ERM

Node: 13. Water wash loop



2. Refer to Node 3, Deviation 8, Cause 2 2.1. 2.1.1. Design pressure of wash water system is equal or above the design pressure of solvent absorber C-111.

1. Refer to Node 3, Deviation 9 5. Low Pressure

2. Refer to Node 13, No/Less Flow

6. More Temperature 1. Refer to Node 4, Deviation 9, Cause 1

7. Less Temperature 1. Refer to Node 3, Deviation 11

8. High Level 1. Refer to Discussion in Deviation 1, Cause 3 and 4

9. Low Level 1. Inadvertent opening of drain line at pump suction





1. Loss of makeup water 1.1. Refer to Node 13, Deviation 1, Cause 6



1. Instrument air failure : LV-0162, SDV-0163 and FCV-0162 are FC type These were found to be in order

2. Cold condensate failure 2.1. Refer to Node 13, Deviation 1, Cause 6

13. Utility Failure

3. Power failure 3.1. Pump P-113 trips. Refer to Node 13, Deviation 1, Cause 1

1.1.1. High presssure differential alarm PDAH-0164 provided across solvent absorber top section.

14. Others 1. Foaming on the top section of solvent absorber

1.1. Cavitation in wash water pump leading to damage.

1.1.2. Antifoam injection provided at the inlet of wash water to solvent absorber.


32 of 43 ERM

Node: 14. Wet gas inlet to driers inlet separator including separator

Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0101 Rev 3; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0102 Rev 3


1.1.1. Low flow alarm FAL-0003 provided at E-101 outlet

1.1.2. Low low flow alarm FALL-0050 provided at inlet to heater with interlock I-342 which will trip heater H-101

1.1. No effect on molecular sieve driers. Regeneration gas is taken from the drier outlet. Hence disruption in wet gas inlet will also lead to disruption in regeneration gas flow through heater (Regeneration compressor may trip in this due to loss of suction etc). Regenerator sequence may trip due to low flow. Possible damage to heater coils

1.1.3. Anti surge control and safeguarding system for compressor K-101A/B

1. No/ less flow of feed wet gas from upstream

1.2. The outlet temperature of sea water will reduce due to loss of heat exchange across E-101. No significant consequence

2.1.1. Anti surge control and safeguarding system for compressor K-101A/B

2.1.2. Low low flow alarm FALL-0050 provided at inlet to heater with interlock I-342 which will trip heater H-101

2.1.3. Low flow alarm FAL-0003 provided at E-101 outlet

2.1. Same as Node 14, Deviation 1 Cause 1


2. SDV-0004 fails close

2.2. High pressure upstream of SDV-0004 2.2.1. For other safeguards, refer to HAZOP discussion in Node 3

3.1. No/Less flow of seawater resulting in high gas temperature and affect the performance of driers

3.1.1. High temperature alarm TAH-0003 provided on outlet of E-101

3.2. High temperature of seawater return 3.2.1. High temp alarm TAH-0002 provided on seawater return line.

3. Plugging of exchanger E-101 tube side

3.3. Same as Node 13, Deviation 1 Cause 1

4. SDV-0001 on seawater inlet to E-101 fails close

4.1. No flow of seawater to E-101 leading to higher temperature on ethane outlet due to loss of heat exchange

4.1.1. High temperature alarm TAL-0003 provided on outlet of E-101 43. Delete SDV-0001/0002 on seawater line to E-101 and replaced by manual isolation valve.

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5.1.1. High temperature alarm TAL-0003 provided on outlet of E-101 5. SDV-0002 on seawater outlet line fails close

5.1. Blocked outlet on seawater side of E-101 causing overpressure and potential failure. Higher temperature on ethane outlet 5.1.2. TSV-0002 provided on seawater return line upstream of SDV-0002


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6.1. Increase in level in D-101 leading to carry-over of wet gas to ethane drier D-102A/B

6.1.1. High high level alarm LAHH-0023 with interlock SD-203 which will shutdown Unit 116



7. SDV-0022 fails close 7.1. Same as Node 14, Deviation 1, Cause 6

7.1.3. High high level alarm LAHH-0023 with interlock SD-203 which will shutdown Unit 116

8. SDV-0005 fails close 8.1. Same as Node 14, Deviation 1, Cause 6 44. Delete SDV-0005 on ethane dryer inlet separator as SDV-0022 is also provided on the same line

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9. Stoppage of receipt by Sour water stripper.

9.1. Same as Node 14, Deviation 1, Cause 6

10.1.1. Limit switch provided on BDV-0028

10.1.2. PIC-0046 will maintain pressure.

1. No/ Less flow

10. Failure of BDV-0028 on drier inlet separator

10.1. Loss of flow to driers associated by loss of gas to flare. Loss of flow to petrochemical consumers

10.1.3. Blowdown rate from BDV-0028 is about 15%as compared to total inlet gas flow.

1.1.1. High flow alarm FAH-0003 provided on E-101 outlet

1.1.2. Moisture analyser provided on each bed with high moisture content alarm (AI-0034A/B)

1.1. Depending on the stage of adsorption bed in the drier, if the drier bed is fresh, the bed may be depleted faster than normal and moisture content in the outlet gas may remain same. However if the bed is at the end of adsorption cycle, increase in flow may lead to breakthrough of moisture from the drier.

1.1.3. Moisture analyser provided at the outlet of drier filter with high moisture content alarm (AI-0044)

1.2.1. High differential pressure alarm provided across the drier beds with PDI-0034A/B

1.2.2. High flow alarm FAH-0003 provided on E-101 outlet


1.2. Increase in pressure drop across the molecular sieve which may lead to bed displacement / breaking of molecular sieve leading to channeling across the bed. This may affect the bed adsorption efficiency


1. More demand from downstream or more flow from upstream

1.3. Temperature of sea water will increase. Possible environmental problem and sedimentation problem.

1.3.1. High temp alarm TAH-0002 provided on seawater return line

2. More Flow

2. LIC-0022 malfunctions and opens LV- 2.1. More flow to sour water stripper causing loss of level in D- 2.1.1. Refer to HAZOP of Unit 109, Sour water stripper


33 of 43 ERM




0022 fully 101 and gas breakthrough to sour water Stripper 2.1.2. Low low level alarm LALL-0024 with interlock I-345 which will close SDV-0022

3.1.1. Refer to HAZOP of Unit 107.


3. Inadvertent opening of drain line upstream of SDV-0022

3.1. Possible loss of level and gas breakthrough to Unit 107 sump drum

3.1.3. Low low level alarm LALL-0024 with interlock I-345 which will close SDV-0022

4. Inadvertent opening of isolation valve from D-101 bottom to ethane treatment

4.1. Loss of flow to Unit 109. No significant consequence, 4.1.1. LIC-0022 will maintain level.

1. Misdirected flow due to BDV-0028 on drier inlet separator malfunctions to open during normal operation

1.1. Loss of flow to downstream. Refer Node 13, Deviation 1, Cause 1



2. Inadvertent opening of isolation valve from D-101 bottom to ethane treatment

2.1. Possible reverse flow from MP flash drum to Unit 109 causing upset in Unit 109

2.1.2. NRV provided at inlet to MP flash drum.

1. External fire on drier inlet separator 1.1. Overpressurization of drier inlet separator 1.1.1. Relief valve provided on drier inlet separator sized for fire case

2.1.1. High high pressure alarm PAHH-0085A/ B with interlock I-351 B will intiate compressor shutdown

2.1.2. High pressure alarm PAH-0086A/B provided on K-101 discharge (anti-surge control)

4. High Pressure

2. High pressure from upstream section 2.1. High discharge of regeneration compressor which may lead to damage to compressor.

2.1.3. PIC-0172 provided on D-112 overhead will relieve excess upstream pressure to flare.

1. Refer to Deviation 1, Cause 10


2.1. Performance of drier will be affected and reduction of supply to petrochemical consumers

2.1.1. PIC-0046 will try to maintain pressure


2.2.1. Low pressure alarm PAL-0082A/B provided on compressor suction

5. Low Pressure

2. Low pressure from upstream

2.2. Low suction to regenerator compressor

2.2.2. Low low pressure PALL-0084A/B will trip compressor

1.1.1. High temperature alarm TAH-0003 provided at the inlet of drier inlet separator


1.1. Temperature of wet gas will increase at the outlet of E-101. The adsorption efficiency of molecular sieve will reduce (corresponding to increase in temperature). This may lead to higher moisture content at the outlet of drier system


6. More Temperature 1. More temperature of wet gas from upstream section

1.2. Temperature of sea water will increase. Possible environmental problem and sedimentation problem.

1.2.1. High temp alarm TAH-0002 provided on seawater return line

1.1.1. Low temp alarm TAL-0003 provided on outlet of E-101 1. Low temperature of wet gas from upstream section

1.1. Potential hydrate formation

1.1.2. Exchanger bypass provided for temperature adjustment

2.1.1. Low temp alarm TAL-0003 provided on outlet of E-101

7. Less Temperature

2. Excessive cooling in E-101 2.1. Potential hydrate formation

2.1.2. Exchanger bypass provided for temperature adjustment

1.1.1. High level alarm LAH-0022 provided on D-101 1. Malfunction of LIC-0022 to close LV-0022 on the liquid outlet of drier inlet separator

1.1. Liquid will accumulate in drier inlet separator followed by carryover to molecular sieve.

1.1.2. High high level alarm LAHH-0023 provided on D-101 with interlock SD-203 which will trip dehydration section and initate SD-205 and SD-206 which will close SDV-0004.

8. High Level

2. SDV-0022 fails close 2.1. Refer to Node 14, Deviation 1, Cause 7

9. Low Level 1. Malfunction of LIC-0022 to open LV-0022 on the liquid outlet of drier inlet separator fully

1.1. Refer to Deviation 14, Deviation 2, Cause 2

1.1.1. Drier inlet separator provided to remove amine including other liquid from the wet gas

1. Amine entrainment from upstream with the wet gas

1.1. Amine entrainment with wet gas to molecular sieve may lead to permanent deactivation of molecular sieve

1.1.2. Alumina or silica guard provided at the top of molecular sieve to adsorb traces of amine


2. Carryover of corrosion product with the wet gas

2.1. Possibility of scaling in E-101 . Also there can be deposition of corrosion product on molecular sieve

2.1.1. High differential pressure alarm provided across the drier beds with PDI-0034A/B




34 of 43 ERM






13. Utility Failure 1. Instrument Air failure : SDV-0004, SDV-0001, SDV-0002, SDV-0005, SDV-0022 and LV-0022 are FC type BDV-0028 is FO type. These were found to be in order

14. Others 1. Tube rupture in exchanger E-101 1.1. Gas will leak into seawater side pressurising sea water header and causing damage.

1.1.1. Design pressure of shell and tube side is same (39barg) 48. Check the suitability of seawater outlet line design pressure for tube leak case in E-101


35 of 43 ERM

Node: 15. Treated gas from separator to export line to petrochemical inlet including molecular sieve driers

Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0102 Rev 3; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0103 Rev 3; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0104 Rev 3


1.1. No through put. Loss of supply to petrochemical consumers.


JV

1.2.1. Design pressure of drier section and upstream section unit of Unit 116 are same (39 barg)


1.2.3. KV failure alarm UA-0056 provided in Dryers Control System

1.2. Increase in pressure of section upstream of KV including shell side of E-101. This will lead to loss of gas to flare through PIC-0069.

1.2.4. Limit switches provided on all KVs

1.3. Regeneration sequence will stop. 1.3.1. Low flow alarm FAL-0045 provided on outlet of ethane filter.

1.4.1. Anti-surge control provided

1. Any of the drier inlet/outlet KVs fails and remains in close position when the bed switch over from standby mode to adsorption mode

1.4. Compressor will have low/no flow and lead to mechanical damage.

1.4.2. Low low pressure PAHH-0084A/B with interlock I-351A will trip compressor

2.1.1. High differential pressure alarm PDAH-0042 provided on each drier

2.1.2. Standby filter provided

2.1. Back pressure in the drier section and upstream will increase associated by loss of dried gas flow to downstream unit. Low supply to petrochemical consumers

2.1.3. Design pressure of drier section and upstream section unit of Unit 116 are same (39 barg)

2.2.1. Low low flow FALL-0050 provided at heater inlet with interlock I-342 which will trip heater

2.2. Low flow to regeneration cycle leading to tripping of regeneration cycle

2.2.2. Low flow alarm FAL-0045 provided on outlet of ethane filter.

2. Plugging of ethane filtter


2.3.1. Refer to Cause 1, Conseq. 1.4

3. Plugging of demister pad in drier inlet separator

3.1. Same as No/ Less Flow, Cause 2 3.1.1. Inspection of demister every turnaround

4.1. No supply to petrochemical consumers

4.2.1. PIC-0172 will relieve to flare (50% of capacity)

4. PIC-0046/FIC-0046 malfunction which close FV-0046

4.2. Pressure rise in dehydration section

4.2.2. Refer to HAZOP of unit 105.

5.1.1. Limit switch es provided for ESDV-0045/0046

1. No/ Less flow

5. ESDV-0045/0046 fails close 5.1. Same as Cause 4

5.1.2. For other safeguards, refer to Cause 4

1.1. More flow to petrochemical consumers and less pressure in the unit. Refer to Node 14, Deviation 5, Cause 2, Conseq. 1

1. PIC-0046/FIC-0046 malfunction which opens FV-0046 fully

1.2. Low pressure in compressor suction. Refer to Node 15, Deviation 1, Cause 4, Conseq 1.

2.1. Loss of gas to flare 2.1.1. Limit switch provided on BDV-0028

2.2.1. Limit switch provided on BDV-0028 2.2. Pressure drop in driers


2. BDV-0028 fails open

2.3. Low flow to petrochemical consumers . 2.3.1. Limit switch provided on BDV-0028

2. More Flow

3. BDV-0036A/B fails open 3.1. Same As Cause 2 3.1.1. Limit switches provided on BDV-0036A/B

1.1.1. High differential pressure alarm PDAH-0034A/B provided on each drier 1.1. Loss of gas flow to flare. The flow of gas through the molecular sieve will increase which may lead to displacement of molecular sieve. This may also affect the molecular sieve support due to higher pressure drop

1.1.2. Limit switch provided on BDV-0036A/B.


JV

1.2.1. Flare header is designed for 270degC

1.2.2. Anti-surge control provided for regeneration gas compressor

1.2.3. Interlock (I-351) provided to trip regeneration gas compressor on very low suction pressure

1.2. If BDV opens during the regeneration mode, this may lead to flaring of high temperature gases to flare header. Also this may lead to loss of suction to regeneration gas compressor leading to compressor surging

1.2.4. Limit switch provided on BDV-0036A/B.


1. BDV-0036A/B malfunctions to open during the operation when bed is in line

1.3. Possible low temperature in the drier 1.3.1. Drier is designed for -46degC


36 of 43 ERM


Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0102 Rev 3; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0103 Rev 3; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0104 Rev 3


2.1.1. Low flow alarm FAL-0045 provided in the regeneration gas line from dried gas outlet

2.1.2. FIC-0045 will try to maintain flow in the regeneration gas line from dried gas outlet

2.1.3. Interlock I-342 provided to trip furnace on very low flow at the inlet of furnace

2. Any of the inlet or outlet KV of drier remains in open position when switching from adsorption mode to regeneration mode

2.1. Possibility of sending dried gas / wet gas to the regeneration gas compressor. This will also restrict the flow of regeneration gas through the regeneration gas furnace. Possible damage to furnace coil due to overheating

2.1.4. Valve position alarm UA-0056 provided on Dryers control system.

3. Vent valve downstream of ethane filter left open due to operator error

3.1. Loss of gas to flare. Considering the size of vent valve, no sginificant consequence

1. Refer causes for No/ less flow

2. External fire on drier 2.1. Overpressurization of drier 2.1.1. Relief valve provided on drier sized for fire case

4. High Pressure

3. External fire on drier ethane filter 3.1. Overpressurization of drier after filter 3.1.1. Relief valve provided on filter sized for fire case

1. Refer to Node 15, Deviation 3, Cause 1, Consqe 2

2. Refer to Node 14, Deviation 1, Cause 1

5. Low Pressure

3. Refer to Node 15, Deviation 2, Cause 1

6. More Temperature 1. Manual misoperation- Operator tries to bring the bed in line without sufficient cooling

1.1. Drier downstream piping can be subjected to high pressure and high temperature (piping class is D01 which is not designed for 39barg at 280degC which is the temperature of bed during regeneration). Possible damage to downstream piping and equipment. This will also lead to thermal shock to molecular sieves and damage

1.1.1. High temp alarm at TI-0031 provided on outlet of ethane regeneration line to gas cooler


1. Refer to Deviation 3, Cause 1, Consequence 1.3

7. Less Temperature

2. Low feed temperature 2.1. No significant consequence

8. High Level 1. Not applicable in this node

9. Low Level 1. Not applicable in this node

1. Molecular sieve fines carry-over 1.1. It may damage compressor and loss of molecular sieves. Consumers may be affected.

1.1.1. Filter provided downstream of driers

2.1.1. Moisture analyser with high alarm AI-0044 provided at outlet of filter


2. Drier bed not regenerated fully and taken into service

2.1. After some time, the bed will be saturated and it will send wet gas to consumers. Regeneration also will be affected.

2.1.2. Moisture analyser with high alarm AI-0034A/B provided on drier


1. No new issue


1. Loading and unloading of molecular sieve

1.1. Handling hazard 34. Confirm that loading and unloading procedure is in place to carryout loading and unloading of molecular sieve to / from driers. Also enough provision (like space for handling loading / unloading equipment) need to be ensured to facilitate loading and unloading

JV

1. Power Failure 1.1. Shutdown of dehydration section. 1.1.1. None identified 13. Utility Failure

2. Instrument Air Failure : FV-0046, ESDV-0045 and ESDV-0046 are FC type These were found to be in order


JV 14. Others 1. Single ball valve on the vent line of ethane filter

1.1. Possibility of valve passing leading to HC leak to atmosphere


JV


37 of 43 ERM

Node: 16. Regeneration gas from dried gas outlet to regeneration compressor inlet, including cooling step after the regeneration of driers

Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0103 Rev 3; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0104 Rev 3; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0105 Rev 3; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0106 Rev 3


1.1. Loss of regeneration cycle leading to incomplete regeneration of drier bed. If the bed is taken in line at this stage (after cooling step), moisture may slip with the dry gas to downstream consumers

1.1.1. Moisture analyser provided on each bed with high moisture content alarm (AI-0034A/B/C)

1.2.1. Low low flow FALL-0050 provided at inlet of heater with interlock I-342 which will activate heater standby mode and trip dryer control system

1.2.2. High skin temperature alarm provided with TI-0051

1.2.3. High temperature alarm TAH-0053 provided at outlet of heater

1.2. Loss of flow through heater may lead to overheating of heater coil leading to coil damage. Possible damage to furnace refractory due to high temperature

1.2.4. High high temperature alarm TAHH-0052 provided at heater outlet with interlock I-342 will activate heater standby mode and trip dryer control system

1.3.1. Anti-surge control provided for regeneration compressor

1.3.2. Low pressure alarm PAL-0082A/B provided on compressor suction

1.3.3. Low flow alarm FAL-0082A/B on compressor suction

1. Malfunction of FIC-0045 to close FV-0045 during regeneration

1.3. Loss of suction to regeneration gas compressor leading to compressor damage due to surging

1.3.4. Low low pressure PALL-0084A/B provided at compressor suction with interlock I-351 which will trip compressor and closes SDV-0081A/B and SDV-0087 A/B

2.1.1. Valve position alarm UA-0056 provided in dryer control system 2. KV-0050 stuck close 2.1. Same as No/ Less Flow Consequence 1.1, 1.2, 1.3

2.1.2. For other safeguards, refer to discussion in Cause 1, Conseq 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3

3.1.1. Valve position alarm UA-0056 provided in dryer control system 3.1. Same as No/ Less Flow Consequence 1.1, 1.2, 1.3






3. Regeneration gas inlet KV-0039A/B to drier stuck close

3.2. Possible overheating in tube leading to potential overpressure and rupture in tube of heater

3.2.5. PSV-0051A/B provided at outlet of heater.

4.1.1. Valve position alarm UA-0056 provided in dryer control system 4.1. Same as No/ Less Flow Consequence 1.1, 1.2, 1.3


4.2.1. PSV-0051A/B provided at outlet of heater.





4. Regeneration gas outlet KV-0032A/B to drier stuck close

4.2. Possible overpressure of drier beds and heater

4.2.6. Temperature control TRC-0054 provided at the outlet of heater to maintain the temperature at heater outlet

5. XV-0061 at the inlet of air cooler malfunctions to close

5.1. Same as No/ Less Flow Consequence 1.1, 1.2, 1.3

6.1.1. PIC-0069 will try to maintain pressure by relieving to flare and maintain regeneration cycle

6. SDV-0081A/B malfunctions to close at the compressor suction

6.1. Same as No/ Less Flow Consequence 1.1, 1.2, 1.3. However in this case, anti-surge control will not provide protection to compressor

6.1.2. Limit switch provided on SDV-0081A/B

7.1.1. Differential pressure gauge PDG-0083A/B provided across regeneration gas compressor suction strainer

7.1.2. PIC-0069 will try to maintain pressure by relieving to flare and maintain regeneration cycle

1. No/ Less flow

7. Plugging of regeneration gas compressor suction strainer

7.1. Same as No/ Less Flow Consequence 1.1, 1.2, 1.3. However in this case, anti-surge control will not provide protection to compressor

7.1.3. For other safeguards, refer to safeguards for Deviation 1, Cause 3.


38 of 43 ERM




8.1.1. High High level LAHH-0066 provided on D-103 with interlock I-356 which will trip both compressors and closes SDV-0081A/B and SDV-0087A/B


8. SDV-0065 fails close 8.1. High level in D-103 leading to potential liquid carry over



9.1. Same as Cause 8 9.1.1. High High level LAHH-0066 provided on D-103 with interlock I-356 which will trip both compressors and closes SDV-0081A/B and SDV-0087A/B


10.1.2. Independent high level alarm LAH-0076

10. SDV-0076 fails close 10.1. High level in D-104 leading to potential liquid carry over to flare

10.1.3. Limit switch provided on SDV-0076.


11.1. Same as Cause 10 11.1.1. Independent high level alarm LAH-0076

12.1.1. High differential pressure alarm PDAH-0042 provided on each drier 12.1. Back pressure in the drier section and upstream will increase associated by loss of dried gas flow to downstream unit. Low supply to petrochemical consumers 12.1.2. Standby filter provided

12.2.1. Low low flow FALL-0050 provided at heater inlet with interlock I-342 which will trip heater

12.2. Low flow to regeneration cycle leading to tripping of regeneration cycle

12.2.2. Low flow alarm FAL-0045 provided on outlet of ethane filter.

12. Plugging of ethane filtter


12.3.1. Refer to Node 15, Cause 1, Conseq. 1.4

13. BDV-0055 malfunctions and opens fully

13.1. Reduction in regen gas flow to the bed and loss of gas to flare. This may lead to improper and insufficient regeneration.


14.1. Depressurisation of beds which will affect the regeneration and possible damage to beds. Loss of gas to flare and reduction in regen gas to regeneration cycle.

14.1.1. Limit switch provided on BDV-0036A/B 14. BDV-0036A/B malfunctions and opens fully

14.2. Potential freezing in bed which will lead to improper regeneration.

14.2.1. Limit switch provided on BDV-0036A/B

15.1.1. Valve postion alarm UA-0056 provided on dryer control system. 15.1. Improper cooling of driers

15.1.2. High temperature alarm TAH-0031 provided on regeneration gas outlet which does not permit the dryer control system to switch the bed to adsorption automatically.

15. KV-0048 closure during cooling step

15.2. Loss of suction to regeneration gas compressor leading to compressor damage due to surging. Refer to Cause 1, Conseq 1.3

16. KV-0063 and XV-0064 closes during the standby time

16.1. Loss of suction to regeneration gas compressor leading to compressor damage due to surging. Refer to Cause 1, Conseq 1.3

16.1.1. Valve postion alarm UA-0056 provided on dryer control system.





17.1. Low flow resulting in high temperature in Heater


17.2.1. Low temp alarm TAL-0031 provided on regeneration gas outlet from dryer

17. KV-0048 opens during heating mode

17.2. Less temperature of regen stream to drier leading to improper regeneration.

17.2.2. Moisture analyser AI-0034 A/B with high alarm provided on dryer

18.1. Refer to Deviation 1, Cause 17, Conseq 17.1 18. KV-0063 opens during heating mode

18.2. Less flow of gas to drier leading to improper regeneration 18.2.1. Moisture analyser AI-0034 A/B with high alarm provided on dryer


2. More Flow 1. Malfunction of FIC-0045 to open FV-0045 more during regeneration

1.1. Possibility of decrease in temperature at the outlet of heater. This may lead to regeneration at lower temperature. Regeneration may be less efficient

1.1.2. Low temperature alarm provided with TRC-0054 at heater outlet


39 of 43 ERM




1.2.1. High pressure alarm PAH-0082A/B provided at compressor suction

1.2.2. High flow alarm FAH-0082A/B provided at the compressor suction

1.2.3. High temperature alarm TAH-0064 provided at the outlet of air cooler

1.2.4. About 20% design margin provided for regeneration gas air cooler

1.2. More flow to compressor suction may lead to high pressure in compressor suction including regen gas separator. If the furnace is able to accommodate the higher flow by increasing the firing in the furnace, temperature at the suction of compressor may increase due to limitation of capacity of regeneration gas air cooler

1.2.5. Pressure control provided on regen gas separator through PIC-0069

2.1.1. Low low level LALL-0066 provided at D-103 with interlock I-347 which will close SDV-0065 and SDV-0076


2.1. Loss of level in D-103 leading to potential gas breakthrough to D-104 causing overpressurisation and damage

2.1.2. Vent with CSO valve provided on D-104



3.1. Possible backflow from flare header and flare gas going to open drain

3.1.1. Low low level LALL-0077 provided at D-104 with interlock I-349 which will close LV-0073 and SDV-0076

4.1.1. Compressor suction and discharge designed for 39barg 4.1. More flow leading to build up of pressure in the compressor suction






4. Anti-surge valve malfunctions to open during normal operation

4.2. Loss of flow through heater leading to overheating of coil and failure


1.1.1. Check valve provided at the compressor discharge upstream of the point where it joins the wet gas line

1. Regeneration gas compressor trips 1.1. Back flow of wet gas from inlet of E-101 through anti-surge to the suction

1.1.2. Interlock (I-352A/B) provided to close the compressor discharge SDV on trip signal of compressor

2.1.1. Low flow alarm provided with FIC-0045 in the regeneration gas line from dried gas outlet

2. Inlet or outlet KV of drier stuck open during regeneration step

2.1. Possibility of sending dried gas / wet gas to the regeneration gas compressor. This will also restrict the flow of regeneration gas through the regeneration gas furnace. Possible damage to furnace coil due to overheating 2.1.2. Low low flow FALL-0050 provided at inlet of heater with interlock I-342 which

will activate heater standby mode and trip dryer control system

3.1. Loss of regeneration gas flow (about 400t/h) to flare associated by decrease in regen gas flow through drier beds




3. BDV-0055 at outlet of heater malfunctions to open during normal operation

3.2. Possibility of sending high temperature gases to flare header (temperature at the outlet of heater is about 280 degC)

3.2.2. Flare header is designed for 270degC. RO-0055 provided which will reduce temperature by reducing pressure within design condition.

1. External fire on regen gas separator 1.1. Overpressurization of regen gas separator 1.1.1. Relief valve provided on regen gas separator sized for fire case


2. Continued heating in the furnace coil in case of disruption at the outlet of heater due to any reason

2.1. Overpressurization of furnace coil including the piping / equipment upstream of disruption point

2.1.2. Safety valve provided at outlet of heater sized for blocked outlet case


3.1. Refer to Deiviation 1, Cause 3, Conseq 3.2


4.1. Refer to Deiviation 1, Cause 4, Conseq 3.2

5. XV-0061 malfunctions and closes 5.1. Refer to Deviation 1, Cause 5


6.1. Refer to Deviation 1, Cause 6

7. Plugging of regeneration gas compressor suction filter


4. High Pressure

8. Regeneration gas compressor trips 8.1. Refer to Deviation 3, Cause 1

1.1.1. Low pressure alarm PAL-0082A/B provided on compressor suction 5. Low Pressure 1. PIC-0069 malfunctions and open PV-0069 fully

1.1. Potential loss of pressure in the suction of regeneration gas compressor. Possible damage to compressor due to surging



40 of 43 ERM




1.1.3. Low low pressure PALL-0084A/B provided at pump suction with interlock I-351 which will trip compressor and closes SDV-0081A/B and SDV-0087 A/B


2.1. 2. Refer to Deviation 1, Cause 1, Conseq 1.3

3. BDV-0055 malfunctions and opens fully 3.1. 2. Refer to Deviation 1, Cause 13

4. BDV-0036A/B malfunctions and opens fully

4.1. 2. Refer to Deviation 1, Cause 14

1.1.1. High skin temperature alarm TAH-0051 provided on heater

1.1.2. High temperature alarm provided with TI-0053 at the outlet of heater


1.1. Possible damage to heater coil and downstream piping / equipment due to high temperature

1.1.4. Downstream piping and equipment including regeneration gas air cooler is designed for 315degC


1.2. Possible damage to molecular sieve due to high temperature

1.2.2. High temperature alarm provided with TI-0053 at the outlet of heater


1.3.2. High temperature alarm TAH-0053 provided at the outlet of heater

1.3.3. High temperature alarm TAH-0064 provided at the outlet of air cooler

1. TRC-0054 malfunctions to increase fuel gas firing to furnace when not required or any other reason leading to increased firing when not required

1.3. There is a possibility of increase in temperature at the outlet of air cooler and hence at the suction of regeneration gas compressor. Possible damage to compressor due to high temperature operation

1.3.4. Design temp of D-103 is 236 deg C (this is taking into account 20% natural circulation of A-101)

2. Regen gas air cooler fan trips 2.1. Same as More Temperature, Consequence 1.3 2.1.1. Regen gas separator is designed for 236degC


3.1. Refer to Deviation 1, Cause 1, Conseq 1.2

4. KV-0050 stuck close 4.1. Refer to Deviation 1, Cause 2





7. XV-0061 at the inlet of air cooler malfunctions to close




9. Plugging of regeneration gas compressor suction filter


10. KV-0063 in the bypass line of regeneration system opens during regeneration mode

10.1. Refer to Deivation 1, Cause 16

6. More Temperature

11. Low flow of regen gas during cooling 11.1. Improper cooling may cause high temperature 11.1.1. High temperature alarm TAH-0031 provided on regeneration gas outlet which does not permit the dryer control system to switch the bed to adsorption automatically.


1. TRC-0054 malfunctions to decrease fuel gas firing to furnace when not required or heater trips due to any reason during regeneration

1.1. Lower temperature of regen gas to drier may lead to incomplete drying of beds. Possibility of moisture breakthrough when drier bed is taken in line for adsorption

1.1.2. Low temperature alarm provided with TRC-0054 at heater outlet

2. BDV-0036A/B malfunctions and opens fully

2.1. Refer to Deivation 1, Cause 14

3. Malfunction of FIC-0045 to open FV-0045 more during regeneration


7. Less Temperature

4. High flow of regen gas during cooling 4.1. No significant consequence

8. High Level 1. Malfunction of LIC-0065 to close LV-0065 when required to open or LV-0065 stuck close

1.1. Normally the build up of level is very slow, however if liquid level continues to build up, it may lead to liquid carryover to regeneration gas compressor leading to compressor damage



41 of 43 ERM





2.1.2. High level alarm LAH-0065 provided

2. SDV-0065 malfunctions to close in the bottom outlet line of regen gas separator

2.1. Normally the build up of level is very slow, however if liquid level continues to build up, it may lead to liquid carryover to regeneration gas compressor leading to compressor damage

2.1.3. LImit switch provided on SDV-0065

3. SDV-0076 fails close 3.1. Refer to Deviation 1, Cause 10



1. Malfunction of LIC-0065 to open LV-0065 more than required

1.1. Possibility of depleting level in regen gas separator followed by gas blowby to sour water stripper feed surge drum which is designed at more lower pressure as compared to operating pressure of regen gas separator. Potential vessel failure lead to loss of containment

1.1.1. Low low level LALL-0067 with interlock I-347 which will close SDV-0065 and LV-0065

2. LIC-0073 malfunctions and opens LV-0073




3. Inadvertent opening of drain valve at outlet of D-103

3.1. Loss of level in D-103 and leads to gas breakthrough to open drain

3.1.3. Low low level alarm LALL-0067 provided with interlock I-347 which closes SDV-0065



4.1. Loss of level in D-104 and leads to gas breakthrough to open drain

4.1.3. Low low level alarm LALL-0077 provided on D-104 with interlock I-349 which will closes SDV-0076.

9. Low Level

4. Inadvertent opening of drain valve at outlet of D-104

4.2. Back flow from flare header to open drain. Refer to Deviation 2, Cause 3


1. Higher content of CO2 in the wet gas from upstream section

1.1. Since the regen gas is combined with the feed to dehydration section, there is a possibiilty of adsorption of CO2 on the molecular sieve(this needs to be confirmed) and desorbed during regeneration step. Gradually CO2 may build up in the system to significant level and this may lead to corrosion in the pipe and vessel

1.1.1. CO2 analyser AI-0171 with high alarm provided on overhead of D-112


1. No specific issue


1. Maintenance on one drier bed 1.1. Unit will not be available to operate if one of the bed is under maintenance

1.1. Refer to air cooler fan trip

1.2. Compressor motor trip.

1. Electric power failure,

1.3. All KVs will stay in the last position

13. Utility Failure

2. Instrument air failure: PV-0069, LV-0073, LV-0065, XV-0063, XV-0064, SDV-0081A/B. SDV-0065 and SDV-0076 are FC type BDV-0036A/B, BDV-0055 and ,SDV-0087A/B are FO type SDV-0087A/B are found not to be in order.

2.1. 46. For SDV-0087A/B, it should be made fail close (FC)

JV

14. Others 1. Trip of compressor due to any reason 1.1. Interlock leading to trip of compressor also close suction and discharge SDVs of compressor. However the anti-surge line for compressor is joining upstream of suction SDV. This may lead to compressor damage due to coast down surge


JV


42 of 43 ERM

Node: 17. Regeneration compressor discharge to wet gas inlet

Drawings: P&ID1516-116-0030-0105 Rev 3; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0101 Rev 3; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0106 Rev 3


1.1.1. Regeneration compressor trip alarm provided on DCS 1. Regeneration gas compressor trips 1.1. The flow through the regeneration heater will reduce / stop. Gradually pressure at the suction of compressor will build up to the pressure at the outlet of drier. However furnace is likely to tripped due to loss of flow before operator action takes place

1.1.2. PIC-0069 provided which will try to maintain pressure and regeneration flow.

2.1. Same as Deviation 1, Consequence 1.1

2.2.1. Limit switch provided on SDV-0087A/B


2.2.3. High high temperature TAHH-0085A/B provided on compressor discharge with interlock I-351A/B to trip compressor

2.2.4. High high pressure PAHH-0085A/B provided on compressor discharge with interlock I-351A/B to trip compressor

2. Inadevertent SDV-0087A/B closure

2.2. High pressure / high temperature at the compressor discharge. Potential for compressor damage due to overpressure

2.2.5. Relief valve provided on compressor discharge sized for blocked outlet case


JV

3.1. Same as No/ Less Flow Consequence 1.1

3.2.1. Compressor suction and discharge designed for 39barg 3.2. Build up of pressure in the compressor suction





3. Anti-surge valve malfunctions to open during normal operation

3.3. Loss of flow through heater leading to overheating of coil and failure


4. Refer to discussion in Node 16, Deviation 1 (No/Less Flow)

5.1. Loss of regeneration gas to flare followed by increase in flow through compressor (sized for 5.7 t/hr)

5.1.1. Limit Switch provided on BDV-0089

1. No/ Less flow

5. BDV-0089 malfunctions to open during normal operation

5.2. Low pressure at compressor discharge 5.2.1. Low pressure alarm PAL-0086A/B provided in anti-surge control and safeguarding system

2. More Flow 1. No issue identified

1. BDV-0089 malfunctions to open during normal operation

1.1. Low pressure in compressor discharge may lead to reverse flow from wet gas to compressor




2. Regeneration gas compressor trips 2.1. Back flow of wet gas from inlet of E-101 through anti-surge to the suction

2.1.2. Interlock (I-352A/B) provided to close the compressor discharge SDV-0087A/B on trip signal of compressor

4. High Pressure 1. Refer to Deviation 1, Cause 2

1. Compressor trip. Refer to Deviation 1, Cause 1

5. Low Pressure

2. BDV-0089 malfunctions to open during normal operation, refer to Deviation 1, Cause 5, Consequence 5.2

1.1.1. High high temperature TAHH-0085A/B provided at compressor discharge with interlock I-351A/B to trip compressor

1. More temp in upstream. Refer to Deviation 6 in Node 16.

1.1. More temp in compressor discharge

1.1.2. High temp alarmTAH-0086A/B provided in anti-surge control and safeguarding

6. More Temperature

2. Inadvertent closure of SDV-0087A/B at compressor discharge


7. Less Temperature 1. Low temp at compressor suction 1.1. No significant consequence

8. High Level 1. Not applicable

9. Low Level 1. Not applicable


1. No issue in this node


43 of 43 ERM


Drawings: P&ID1516-116-0030-0105 Rev 3; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0101 Rev 3; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0106 Rev 3



1. No new issue


1. No new issue

1. Power failure 1.1. Compressor trips. Refer to Deivation 1, Cause 1 13. Utility Failure

2. Instrument air failure : SDV-0087A/B, FV-0082A/B, BDV-0089 are FO type Failure position of SDV-0087A/B is not in order

2.1. 46. For SDV-0087A/B, it should be made fail close (FC)

JV


Annex E

Risk Ranking Worksheet

Unit 116 Ethane Treatment and Dryer Risk Ranking Worksheet No Risk Ranking was done for Unit 116

ERM Risk 1 of 1 South Par Gas Field Development Phases 15 & 16 Onshore Facilities Annex E

Annex F

Drawing List

Unit 116 Ethane Treatment and Drying Drawing List

ERM Risk Annex F


Drawing Description Place(s) Used Comment

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0101 Rev 3 Wet Gas chilling Nodes: 1, 7, 14 Process Drawing – Reviewed

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0102 Rev 3 Dryer Inlet Separator Nodes: 14, 15 Process Drawing – Reviewed

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0103 Rev 3 Molecular Sieve Driers Nodes: 15, 16 Process Drawing – Reviewed

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0104 Rev 3 Ethane Regeneration Heater Nodes: 15, 16 Process Drawing – Reviewed

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0105 Rev 3 Regeneration Gas Piping Nodes: 16 Process Drawing – Reviewed

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0106 Rev 3 Driers Regeneration Compressor Nodes: 16 Process Drawing – Reviewed

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0107 Rev 3 Regeneration Gas Heat Control System Vendor Package – To be reviewed later

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0111 Rev O Feed Gas KO drum Nodes: 1 Process Drawing – Reviewed

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0112 Rev O Solvent Absorber Nodes: 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 13 Process Drawing – Reviewed

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0113 Rev O Treated Gas KO Drum Nodes: 3 Process Drawing – Reviewed

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0114 Rev O Solvent Flash Drum and Flash Drum Absorber Nodes: 2, 3, 4, 7, 11, 12, 13

Process Drawing – Reviewed

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0115 Rev O Rich/Lean Solvent Exchanger Nodes: 4, 6 Process Drawing – Reviewed

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0116 Rev O Solvent Regenerator Nodes: 4, 5, 6, 8 Process Drawing – Reviewed

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0117 Rev O Solvent Reboiler Condensate System Nodes: 6 Process Drawing – Reviewed

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0118 Rev O Solvent Regenerator Reflux Section Nodes: 5, 11 Process Drawing – Reviewed

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0120 Rev O Lean Solvent Storage and Pump Nodes: 6, 7, 8, 9 Process Drawing – Reviewed

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0121A Rev O Filtration Package Nodes: 9 Vendor Package – to be reviewed later

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0121 Rev O Anti Foam Package Nodes: 8 Vendor Package – to be reviewed later

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0122 Rev O Sump Drum Nodes: 4, 10 Process Drawing – Reviewed

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0123 Rev O Hydrocarbon Sump Drum Nodes: 10, 11 Process Drawing – Reviewed

P&ID 1516-116-0030-0124 Rev O Sulfrex Lean Solvent Transfer Pump Nodes: 12 Process Drawing – Reviewed

Annex G

HAZOP Review Action Sheet

Unit 116 Ethane Treatment and Drying HAZOP Review Action Sheet

ERM Risk Annex G

1 of 73 South Pars Gas Field Development Phases 15 &16 Onshore Facilities

Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008

Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0111 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0101 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0112 Rev O


Deviation: 4. More/High Flow up to Feed Gas KOD

Cause: 2. FIC-0172 malfunctions and opens FV-0172 fully

Consequence: 2.1. More flow to dehydration units, leading to less pressure in the unit and column upset.

Safeguard: 2.1.1. Low pressure alarm PAL-0172 provided on overhead of D-112; 2.1.2. CV of FV-0172 is provided with a maximum clamp

Recommendations (HAZOP):


Initial Response:

Company Comments on Initial Response:

Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008



Deviation: 8. More/High Pressure

Cause: 3. Non-receipt of supply by downstream consumers (petrochemical plant)

Consequence: 3.1. Higher pressure in Unit 116 and upstream unit (Unit 105)

Safeguard: 3.1.1. Refer to HAZOP discussion in Unit 105; 3.1.2. PIC-0172 will relieve to flare (capacity of one train); 3.1.3. High pressure alarm PAH-0172 provided on D-112 overhead



Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008



Deviation: 8. More/High Pressure

Cause: 5. FIC-0172 malfunctions and closes FV-0172

Consequence: 5.1. Refer to Node 1, Deviation 2, Cause 3

Safeguard:



Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008

Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0112 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0114 Rev O


Deviation: 1. No/ Less flow

Cause: 2. LIC-0163 on solvent absorber malfunctions and closes LV-0163

Consequence: 2.1. Same as Conseq. 1.1

Safeguard: 2.1.1. Treated gas KO drum D-112 provided to take care of carry-over.; 2.1.2. Bypass provided for LV-0163; 2.1.3. Low level alarm LAL-0181 provided in D-113; 2.1.4. Low low level LALL-0182 with interlock I-323 closes SDV-0183, closes LV-0181 and activates I-328 (closes SDV-0201)



Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008



Deviation: 4. High Pressure






Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008



Deviation: 8. High Level






Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008

Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0101 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0112 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0114 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0115 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0116 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0118 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0120 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0122 Rev O


Deviation: 10. Contamination/ Additional Phase

Cause: 1. Corrosion material (iron sulphide) present in the pipeline and degraded amine

Consequence: 1.1. This may lead to foaming and carry-over of amine to D-112

Safeguard: 1.1.1. Filtration package is provided to remove any iron sulphide particles; 1.1.2. Antifoam injection facilities provided.



Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008

Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0112 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0113 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0114 Rev O



Cause: 3. External fire on D-112

Consequence: 3.1. Overpressure in D-112 leading to rupture and fire.

Safeguard: 3.1.1. None identified


28. Review the requirement of installing a PSV on D-112 overhead for fire case during detailed engineering

Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008



Deviation: 16. Start-up/Shutdown/Maintenance Hazards

Cause: 1. Relocation of FIC-0172

Consequence: 1.1. No significant consequence

Safeguard:


29. Review the start-up procedure after relocation of FIC-0172

Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008

Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0114 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0115 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0116 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0122 Rev O


Deviation: 1. No/ Less flow of flash gas to boiler from C-113 overhead

Cause: 5. No flow of fuel gas when demanded due to PIC-0183 malfunction which closes PV-0183

Consequence: 5.2. During hot circulation, loss of driving force in the cold side of exchangers E-111 will cause the hot stream not being cooled enough. This may lead to higher temperature in the storage tank and high temperature in outlet of exchanger E-111. This may occur for a short period of time and therefore no significant impact

Safeguard: 5.2.1. High temperature alarm TAH-0192 downstream of exchanger E-111; 5.2.2. Block-and-bypass arrangement has been provided for PV-0183



Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008

Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0101 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0112 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0114 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0115 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0116 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0120 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0122 Rev O


Deviation: 3. More Flow of flash gas to boiler from overhead of D-113

Cause: 1. PIC-0182A malfunctions and opens PV-0182A fully

Consequence: 1.2. Pressure drop in the flash drum leading to potential carry-over.

Safeguard: 1.2.1. High flow alarm FAH-0181 provided on overhead of absorber; 1.2.2. Low pressure alarm PAL-0182B provided on overhead of flash gas absorber; 1.2.3. Demister provided on flash gas absorber C-1113; 1.2.4. PV-0183 will try to maintain pressure in D-113



Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008



Deviation: 3. More Flow of flash gas to boiler from overhead of D-113



Safeguard: 1.2.1. High flow alarm FAH-0181 provided on overhead of absorber; 1.2.2. Low pressure alarm PAL-0182B provided on overhead of flash gas absorber; 1.2.3. Demister provided on flash gas absorber C-1113; 1.2.4. PV-0183 will try to maintain pressure in D-113



Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008



Deviation: 8. Low Pressure



Safeguard: 4.1.1. High flow alarm FAH-0181 provided on overhead of absorber; 4.1.2. Low pressure alarm PAL-0182B provided at outlet of flash gas absorber; 4.1.3. PIC-0183 will try to maintain pressure, however fuel gas will be lost to flare; 4.1.4. Demister on Flash Gas absorber C-113 provided



Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008






Safeguard: 4.1.1. High flow alarm FAH-0181 provided on overhead of absorber; 4.1.2. Low pressure alarm PAL-0182B provided at outlet of flash gas absorber; 4.1.3. PIC-0183 will try to maintain pressure, however fuel gas will be lost to flare; 4.1.4. Demister on Flash Gas absorber C-113 provided



Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008




Cause: 1. SDV-0183 closes

Consequence: 1.2. Possible carry-over of amine to boilers

Safeguard: 1.2.1. Limit switch provided on SDV-0183; 1.2.2. High level alarm LAH-0181 provided on MP flash drum; 1.2.3. High high level alarm LAHH-0183 will cause total unit shutdown



Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008




Cause: 1. Corrosion material (iron sulphide) present in the pipeline

Consequence: 1.1. This may lead to foaming and carry-over of amine to D-112

Safeguard: 1.1.1. Filtration package is provided to remove any iron sulphide particles



Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008



Deviation: 16. Utility Failure

Cause: 1. Steam tracing failure

Consequence: 1.1. Possible corrosion due to condensation

Safeguard: 1.1.1. Lines are free draining towards C-113.


7. Check the consistency of requirements of steam tracing upstream and downstream of PV-0182A

Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008



Deviation: 2. No/Less Flow in the bottom of D-114 to reflux in the column C-112

Cause: 4. Tripping of overhead condenser 116-A-111

Consequence: 4.1. Low level in reflux drum and high pressure and high temperature in drum and column. There will be 25% natural draft in air coolers

Safeguard: 4.1.1. Low level alarm LAL-0221 on reflux drum; 4.1.2. Low low level alarm LALL-0222 on reflux drum provided with interlock I-331 which will trip reflux pumps; 4.1.3. High pressure alarm PAH-0221A provided on D-114 overhead; 4.1.4. High high pressure alarm PAHH-0203 on C-112 overhead with interlock I-320 which will close FV-0211, SDV-0183, LV-0181 and SDV-0183; 4.1.5. PSV-0201A/B provided on regenerator column



Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008



Deviation: 6. Reverse/Misdirected Flow

Cause: 3. Tripping of pump P-112A/B

Consequence: 3.1. Reverse flow from column to reflux drum via min flow line.

Safeguard: 3.1.1. Spare pump provided with auto-start facilities; 3.1.2. Pump running indication provided



Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008




Cause: 5. Peak overpressure of flare

Consequence: 5.1. Reverse flow of gas to D-114 and C-112 as peak backpresssure is 1.7 barg which is higher than reflux drum D-114 pressure



10. Review the backpressure for PV-0221 as presently it is connected to MP flare.

Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008






Safeguard: 1.1.1. Low level alarm LAL-0221 on reflux drum; 1.1.2. Low low level alarm LALL-0222 on reflux drum provided with interlock I-331 which will trip reflux pumps; 1.1.3. High high pressure alarm PAHH-0203 on C-112 overhead with interlock I-320 which will close FV-0211, SDV-0183, LV-0181 and SDV-0183; 1.1.4. PSV-0201A/B provided on regenerator column



Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008

Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0115 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0116 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0117 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0118 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0120 Rev O



Cause: 4. LIC-0201 malfunctions and open LV-0201 fully

Consequence: 4.2. Gas blowby to storage tank causing rupture of the tank

Safeguard: 4.2.1. Low low level alarm LALL-0202 on regenerator with interlock I-325 which will trips P-122A/B, close SDV-0201 and close SDV-0183; 4.2.2. PSV-0241 provide on T-111



Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008



Deviation: 9. More Temperature



Safeguard: 1.1.1. Low level alarm LAL-0221 on reflux drum; 1.1.2. Low low level alarm LALL-0222 on reflux drum provided with interlock I-331 which will trip reflux pumps; 1.1.3. PV-0221 provided which will relieve acid gas to flare; 1.1.4. High pressure alarm PAH-0221 provided on D-114 overhead; 1.1.5. High high pressure alarm PAHH-0203 on C-112 overhead with interlock I-320 which will close FV-0211, SDV-0183, LV-0181 and SDV-0183; 1.1.6. PSV-0201A/B provided on regenerator column



Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008



Deviation: 12. Low Level



Safeguard: 3.1.1. Low level alarm LAL-0221 on reflux drum; 3.1.2. Low low level alarm LALL-0222 on reflux drum provided with interlock I-331 which will trip reflux pumps



Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008




Cause: 1. Corrosion material (iron sulphide) present in the pipeline

Consequence: 1.1. This may lead to foaming and carry-over of amine to D-114.

Safeguard: 1.1.1. Filtration package is provided to remove any iron sulphide particles; 1.1.2. Provision for injection of antifoam



Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008




Cause: 1. During shutdown, iron sulphide may cause ignition when exposed to air

Consequence: 1.1. Fire leading to equipment damage



3. Operating procedure to include proper cleaning and wetting of the column before opening for maintenance.

Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008




Cause: 2. For maintenance, air ingress in the system

Consequence: 2.1. Formation of polythionic acid leading to corrosion

Safeguard: 2.1.1. Nitrogen purge provided


11. Operating manual to address the steps for start-up and maintenance procedures in order to avoid toxic gas release to the atmosphere.

Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008




Cause: 3. Improper warming up

Consequence: 3.1. Thermal shock may cause leakage through joints (eg flanges etc)




Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008



Deviation: 3. No/ Less flow of condensate from D-115 to LP condensate system

Cause: 2. LIC-0212 malfunctions and closes LV-0212

Consequence: 2.1. Same as Conseq. 1.1 and also vapour locking in the pipe downstream LV-0212

Safeguard: 2.1.1. High high level alarm LAHH-0211 on D-115


13. Ensure that pipe downstream of LV-0212 is designed for two-phase flow.

Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008



Deviation: 4. More Flow from Column bottom to solvent storage tank via 116-E-111 and 116-A-112

Cause: 1. LIC-0201 malfunctions and open LV-0201

Consequence: 1.1. More supply of solvent to storage tank. Also level in regenerator bottoms goes down may lead to gas breakthrough to storage tank leading to high pressure and possible rupture of the tank. Also, overheating of the rich side of exchanger E-111 may occur. Less cooling of lean side of exchangers.

Safeguard: 1.1.1. High temperature alarm TAH-0193 at the outlet of E-111; 1.1.2. PSV-0241 provided (sizing and type to be decided by Tank Vendor); 1.1.3. Low low level alarm LALL-0202 provided at bottom of regenerator will close SDV-0201



Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008

Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0115 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0116 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0117 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0120 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0122 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0123 Rev O



Cause: 3. Inadvertent opening of drain line upstream of SDV-0201

Consequence: 3.3. Potential over-temperature of underground piping which will cause piping failure

Safeguard: 3.3.1. Drain Valve to sump drum is CSC



Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008




Cause: 5. Inadvertent opening of condensate drum drain valve

Consequence: 5.2. Potential over-temperature of underground piping which will cause piping failure

Safeguard: 5.2.1. Drain Valve to sump drum is CSC; 5.2.2. Sea water injection provided for cooling which must be used in any case for hot draining



Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008




Cause: 1. Improper warming up

Consequence: 1.1. Thermal shock may cause leakage through joints (eg flanges etc)




Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008

Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0101 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0112 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0114 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0120 Rev O



Cause: 3. FIC-0243 malfunctions and closes FV-0243

Consequence: 3.2. Increase in CO2 content and hence flash gas shall not be routed to boilers



15. Provide independent transmitter with low low flow alarm with interlock to close SDV-0007

Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008



Deviation: 2. More Flow


Consequence: 2.1. Carry-over of amine with flash gas to boilers.

Safeguard: 2.1.1. Refer to HAZOP of Unit 121



Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008





Consequence: 4.3. Lower flow of lean amine to absorber affecting the performance

Safeguard: 4.3.1. Low level alarm LAL-0241 provided on storage tank; 4.3.2. Low low level alarm LALL-0242 with interlock SD-204 which will shutdown unit; 4.3.3. Low flow alarm FAL-0241; 4.3.4. High flow alarm FAH-245 provided at pump discharge; 4.3.5. FALL-0246 with interlock SD-203 which shutdown unit



Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008




Cause: 5. Loss of seal in tank

Consequence: 5.1. Tank may get depressurised and ingress of air may take place which will degrade the solvent.



16. Operating procedure to include seal maintenance using cold condensate in solvent storage tank.

Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008




Cause: 4. Inadvertent opening of cold condensate valve

Consequence: 4.1. This will lead to high level in the tank , diluting the solvent solution. This will affect the performance of absorber

Safeguard: 4.1.1. Two isolation valves provided


17. Operating procedures to include use of condensate in the tank

Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008




Cause: 1. Corrosion material (iron sulphide) present in the pipeline and degraded amine

Consequence: 1.1. This may lead to foaming and carry-over of amine to D-114.

Safeguard: 1.1.1. Filtration package is provided to remove any iron sulphide particles; 1.1.2. Provision for injection of antifoam



Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008


Node: 10. Sump drum


Cause: 1. Gas Blowby thru drain line from connected equipment

Consequence: 1.1. Potential overpressure causing possible rupture of drum

Safeguard: 1.1.1. Sump drum vent open to flare through CSO valve . Drum designed for 3.5 barg and full vacuum



Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008


Node: 10. Sump drum


Cause: 2. Vaporisation of liquid in the sump drum due to live steam (live steam provided mainly for stripping of CO2 from amine)


Safeguard: 2.1.1. Sump drum vent open to flare through CSO valve. Drum designed for 3.5 barg and full vacuum; 2.1.2. RO-0261 provided in the steam line to restrict steam flow



Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008


Node: 10. Sump drum


Cause: 3. Flash gas due to draining of amine from high pressure sources


Safeguard: 3.1.1. Sump drum vent open to flare through CSO valve. Drum designed for 3.5 barg and full vacuum



Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008


Node: 10. Sump drum


Cause: 1. High temp liquid drained from u/s equipment.

Consequence: 1.1. High temp material may cause damage to the buried piping coating and wrapping, although piping material itself is designed for same pressure as upstream up to the isolation valve at drum inlet (although CSO valve is provided )

Safeguard: 1.1.1. Procedure to drain liquid only after cooling. Drain drum designed for 210 deg C; 1.1.2. All drains are CSC



Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008


Node: 10. Sump drum


Cause: 1. Liquid drained from u/s equipment without ensuring sump drum has sufficient capacity to hold the drain liquid - Misoperation

Consequence: 1.1. Potential overfilling and overpressure. Carry over of liquid to flare

Safeguard: 1.1.1. LI-0262 with high level alarm provided; 1.1.2. LI-0261 with high level alarm provided; 1.1.3. Sump drum vent open to flare through CSO valve. Drum designed for 3.5 barg; 1.1.4. Sump pump P-115 provided to empty out sump drum content



Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008


Node: 10. Sump drum


Cause: 3. Cold condensate valve open

Consequence: 3.1. Same as Deviation 8, Cause 1,Conseq. 1.1

Safeguard:


40. Cold condensate is provided for washing of drum prior to maintenance. Utility points are provided for connecting utility water hoses. Consider deleting hard-piped connection for cold condensate,

Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008


Node: 10. Sump drum

Deviation: 14. Others

Cause: 1. Corrosion in P-115 discharge piping. Under stagnant condition, presence of water with CO2 may lead to corrosion(piping is CS + 3mm CA)

Consequence: 1.1. Potential pipe leak

Safeguard: 1.1.1. Periodic monitoring. 1.1.2. Procedure to drain the piping after transfer



Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008


Node: 10. Sump drum


Cause: 2. Internal coating fails at high temperature.

Consequence: 2.1. Corrosion leading to damage to the drum



21. Ensure the coating material is compatible with the maximum operating temp of the sump drum.(eg steam-out condition)

Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008


Node: 10. Sump drum


Cause: 3. Evacuation of sump drum

Consequence: 3.1. Possibility of contamination of amine due to high CO2 content



22. Operating procedure to strip amine through the use of live steam and sampling before evacuation

Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008


Node: 10. Sump drum


Cause: 4. Improper blanketing of sump drum

Consequence: 4.1. Constant loss of fuel gas to flare and blanketing is not achieved.



39. Review the deletion of fuel gas connection to the drum so that the drum floats with flare header which has relevant protection like continuous sweeping.

Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008




Cause: 1. Fuel gas by pass open

Consequence: 1.1. Pressurisation of D-116 and loss of fuel gas to flare.

Safeguard: 1.1.1. Connection to flare provided; 1.1.2. Operating procedure for draining.


23. Bypass valve for fuel gas rotameter FG-0101 to be made CSC

Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008









Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008








41. Consider deleting the fuel gas connection to D-116. The drum can float with flare.

Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008




Cause: 1. Wrong procedure adopted during draining. Flare valve and fuel gas valve closed

Consequence: 1.1. Possible vacuum formation in the drum.

Safeguard: 1.1.1. Drum is designed for full vacuum


25. Procedures for skimming/draining to be included in operating manual.

Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008




Cause: 1. No liquid HC condensation

Consequence: 1.1. Skimming facilities will not be useful

Safeguard:


38. Consider deleting hydrocarbon skimming facilities along with skimming drum D-116.and associated piping

Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008


Node: 12. Sulfrex lean transfer pumps

Deviation: 1. No/ Less flow of lean solvent

Cause: 4. ESDV-0281 closes/ SDV-0281 closes

Consequence: 4.1. No supply of lean solvent to Unit 114 and high pressure upstream of ESDV-00281/SDV-0281

Safeguard: 4.1.1. Limit switch provided on ESDV-0281/SDV-0281; 4.1.2. High high pressure PAHH-0281A/B with interlock I-348 to trip pumps; 4.1.3. PSV-0281A/B provided



Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008

Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0101 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0102 Rev 3



Cause: 4. SDV-0001 on seawater inlet to E-101 fails close

Consequence: 4.1. No flow of seawater to E-101 leading to higher temperature on ethane outlet due to loss of heat exchange

Safeguard: 4.1.1. High temperature alarm TAL-0003 provided on outlet of E-101



Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008




Cause: 5. SDV-0002 on seawater outlet line fails close

Consequence: 5.1. Blocked outlet on seawater side of E-101 causing overpressure and potential failure. Higher temperature on ethane outlet

Safeguard: 5.1.1. High temperature alarm TAL-0003 provided on outlet of E-101; 5.1.2. TSV-0002 provided on seawater return line upstream of SDV-0002



Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008




Cause: 8. SDV-0005 fails close

Consequence: 8.1. Same as Node 14, Deviation 1, Cause 6

Safeguard:


44. Delete SDV-0005 on ethane dryer inlet separator as SDV-0022 is also provided on the same line

Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008




Cause: 2. Low pressure from upstream

Consequence: 2.1. Performance of drier will be affected and reduction of supply to petrochemical consumers

Safeguard: 2.1.1. PIC-0046 will try to maintain pressure



Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008




Cause: 1. Tube rupture in exchanger E-101

Consequence: 1.1. Gas will leak into seawater side pressurising sea water header and causing damage.

Safeguard: 1.1.1. Design pressure of shell and tube side is same (39barg)


48. Check the suitability of seawater outlet line design pressure for tube leak case in E-101

Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008

Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0102 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0103 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0104 Rev 3



Cause: 1. Any of the drier inlet/outlet KVs fails and remains in close position when the bed switch over from standby mode to adsorption mode

Consequence: 1.1. No through put. Loss of supply to petrochemical consumers.

Safeguard:



Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008




Cause: 1. BDV-0036A/B malfunctions to open during the operation when bed is in line

Consequence: 1.1. Loss of gas flow to flare. The flow of gas through the molecular sieve will increase which may lead to displacement of molecular sieve. This may also affect the molecular sieve support due to higher pressure drop

Safeguard: 1.1.1. High differential pressure alarm PDAH-0034A/B provided on each drier; 1.1.2. Limit switch provided on BDV-0036A/B.



Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008




Cause: 1. Manual misoperation- Operator tries to bring the bed in line without sufficient cooling

Consequence: 1.1. Drier downstream piping can be subjected to high pressure and high temperature (piping class is D01 which is not designed for 39barg at 280degC which is the temperature of bed during regeneration). Possible damage to downstream piping and equipment. This will also lead to thermal shock to molecular sieves and damage

Safeguard: 1.1.1. High temp alarm at TI-0031 provided on outlet of ethane regeneration line to gas cooler



Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008




Cause: 1. Loading and unloading of molecular sieve

Consequence: 1.1. Handling hazard

Safeguard:


34. Confirm that loading and unloading procedure is in place to carryout loading and unloading of molecular sieve to / from driers. Also enough provision (like space for handling loading / unloading equipment) need to be ensured to facilitate loading and unloading

Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008




Cause: 1. Single ball valve on the vent line of ethane filter

Consequence: 1.1. Possibility of valve passing leading to HC leak to atmosphere

Safeguard:



Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008

Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0103 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0104 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0105 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0106 Rev 3



Cause: 2. LIC-0065 malfunctions and opens LV-0065 fully

Consequence: 2.1. Loss of level in D-103 leading to potential gas breakthrough to D-104 causing overpressurisation and damage

Safeguard: 2.1.1. Low low level LALL-0066 provided at D-103 with interlock I-347 which will close SDV-0065 and SDV-0076; 2.1.2. Vent with CSO valve provided on D-104



Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008

Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0103 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0104 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0105 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0106 Rev 3, (Unnamed)



Cause: 2. Instrument air failure: PV-0069, LV-0073, LV-0065, XV-0063, XV-0064, SDV-0081A/B. SDV-0065 and SDV-0076 are FC type BDV-0036A/B, BDV-0055 and ,SDV-0087A/B are FO type SDV-0087A/B are found not to be in order.

Consequence: 2.1.

Safeguard:



Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008

Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0103 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0104 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0105 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0106 Rev 3



Cause: 1. Trip of compressor due to any reason

Consequence: 1.1. Interlock leading to trip of compressor also close suction and discharge SDVs of compressor. However the anti-surge line for compressor is joining upstream of suction SDV. This may lead to compressor damage due to coast down surge

Safeguard:



Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008

Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0103 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0104 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0105 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0106 Rev 3,



Cause: 2. Inadvertent SDV-0087A/B closure

Consequence: 2.2. High pressure / high temperature at the compressor discharge. Potential for compressor damage due to overpressure

Safeguard: 2.2.1. Limit switch provided on SDV-0087A/B; 2.2.2. Anti-surge control provided for regeneration gas compressor ; 2.2.3. High high temperature TAHH-0085A/B provided on compressor discharge with interlock I-351A/B to trip compressor; 2.2.4. High high pressure PAHH-0085A/B provided on compressor discharge with interlock I-351A/B to trip compressor; 2.2.5. Relief valve provided on compressor discharge sized for blocked outlet case



Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:


ERM Risk Annex G


Action By: JV Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008

Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0103 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0104 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0105 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0106 Rev 3,



Cause: 2. Instrument air failure : SDV-0087A/B, FV-0082A/B, BDV-0089 are FO type Failure position of SDV-0087A/B is not in order

Consequence: 2.1.

Safeguard:



Initial Response:


Final Resolution:

Date:

Annex H

HAZOP Master P&IDs

0080934 sepanir south pars unit 116_report

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